To the reader: This offprint contains italics in the notes, which did not appear in the printed version of the article. Also, the pagination of the offprint pages are not an exact match with the printed journal article. Please note one correction on page 122 (p. 121, line 5 from bottom in the printed version). If you notice any other errors, please write to me directly at: [email protected] or [email protected] AMC 05/10/11 The Polish Review, Vol. LVI, Nos. 1-2, 2011:111-152 ©2011 The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America ANNA M. CIENCIALA THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI AND JÓZEF BECK, 1926-1939: MISCONCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS1 Interwar Poland is hardly mentioned in current American textbooks on the history of twentieth-century Europe, and even then the information is generally sparse and often misleading. Poland makes an appearance with the Versailles Treaty of 1919, generally considered a bad treaty whose German- Polish settlement is sometimes judged as contrary to the principle of self- determination. Polish armed resistance against the Germans in September 1939 generally goes unmentioned and the Soviet attack on Poland is often explained as dictated by Soviet security. There is usually very little mention of Polish foreign policy, yet it should be studied as a factor in international politics in the interwar period, especially in the years from Hitler‘s rise to power in Germany to his attack on Poland, sparking the outbreak of WW II. The pre-Hitler period is often passed over lightly although it contains the roots of Western attitudes toward Nazi Germany. In fact, before adopting the policy of appeasement toward Hitler, Britain, whose decisions ultimately determined French policy, assumed that German demands for the revision of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, particularly the German-Polish settlement, must be satisfied to secure lasting peace. One should bear in mind that despite her defeat in November 1918, Germany was still the greatest industrial power in Europe; France feared Germany but needed her coal and steel, while Britain needed the German market for her goods. Britain also needed peace in Europe to devote her limited armed forces to the defense of her overseas Empire. Finally, Eastern Europe was not seen as a sphere of vital British interests. All these factors contributed to the belief of all British governments that the Polish-German frontier — not recognized by Germany — should be revised in her favor. This meant, above all, the return to 1 This is a much expanded version of the paper read in my absence by Dr. Patrice Dabrowski at the panel ―Commemorating Piłsudski II: Military and Diplomatic Themes,‖ at the ASEEES annual convention in Los Angeles, November 17, 2010. I wish to thank her for reading it and the panelists for their comments. I also ask the indulgence of readers for including some background material which is familiar to them, but not to most American historians of twentieth- century Europe and their students, to whom this paper is dedicated. 112 The Polish Review Germany of the preponderantly German port city of Danzig — made a self- governing Free City by the Treaty of Versailles — and also the preponderantly Polish-speaking Polish Pomerania, awarded by the treaty to Poland. The Germans called it the Polish Corridor because this narrow neck of land separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. French governments came to accept the British view and saw the Franco-Polish alliance (1921) as less an advantage than a burden. Few people realized at the time that all German statesmen before Hitler aimed at the return not just of Danzig and the Polish Corridor but also most, and if possible all the territory of Prussian Poland as well as eastern Upper Silesia, even though the vast majority of the inhabitants of these territories were Polish. At the same time, Poland was often criticized for taking too much former Russian territory after its victory over the Red Army in 1920, a view shared by the Soviet leadership with émigré Russian politicians, most of the European Left, most Western governments, and most Western and Russian historians today. While Moscow officially recognized the Polish-Soviet frontier established in March 1921 by the Treaty of Riga, the Comintern (Communist International) claimed to support the principle of self- determination and questioned Poland‘s right to both her western and eastern frontiers, but especially the eastern, Polish-Soviet frontier. Few Anglo- American historians of twentieth-century Europe mention Józef Piłsudski‘s original aim of establishing a Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian federation allied with an independent Ukraine. When this goal proved unrealistic due to the Lithuanian and Ukrainian desire for independence and the Polish-Soviet War, he aimed at a strategically defensive frontier. The Treaty of Riga gave Poland less than Piłsudski wanted, but even so the majority of the population east of the Bug and San rivers — roughly equivalent to the Curzon Line of July 1920 and the eastern frontier of Poland since 1945 — was Ukrainian and Belarusian, plus a significant number of Jews. Nevertheless, Poles formed an overall minority of about 40% with majorities in the cities and regions of Białystok, Lwów (Ukr. Lviv), and Wilno (Lith.Vilnius). In view of all the factors mentioned above, every Polish foreign minister had a very difficult task before him: how to secure the existence of an independent Poland between her two traditional enemies, neither of whom viewed its frontiers with her as acceptable, while her Western ally France agreed with the British view on the need to revise the Polish-German settlement established by the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and also concluded an alliance with the USSR in 1935. In this paper, I will discuss two key features of Polish foreign policy in the period 1933 — 1939, both of which were strongly criticized or even condemned at the time, and are still criticized or condemned by historians and journalists today. These two features are: (1) the Polish- German Declaration of Non-Aggression of January 26, 1934, which was the joint achievement of Piłsudski and Foreign Minister Józef Beck, and (2) The Foreign Policy of Józef Piłsudski and Józef Beck 1926-1939… 113 Polish foreign policy during the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1938, culminating in the annexation of two-thirds of western Cieszyn (Teschen) Silesia, known in Polish as Zaolzie (the land across the Olza river), after the Munich Conference of September 29, 1938. At this conference, the leaders of Britain, France and Italy agreed to Adolf Hitler‘s annexation of a part of Czechoslovakia, the highly industrialized, mainly German-speaking Sudetenland (formerly, with the rest of Czechoslovakia, part of the Austro- Hungarian Empire), but postponed for three months decisions on Polish and Hungarian claims to Czechoslovak territory. Before discussing Polish foreign policy, however, a few words are needed about Western perceptions of Piłsudski (1867-1935). He directed Polish foreign policy in the first years of independence as well as after his seizure of power in May 1926. A socialist leader in the struggle for independence before 1914, organizer of Polish legions in World War I, head of state in 1918-22, victor over the Red Army in 1920, and in power from 1926 to his death, he is recognized by most Poles as the greatest Polish statesman of the twentieth century. In English-language historical literature and reference works, however, his policies are generally criticized and he is often described as a dictator.2 In fact, he was not a dictator, but developed an authoritarian form of government after seizing power in May 1926 and aimed for good relations with both of Poland‘s great neighbors. It is also worth noting that the Polish victories over the Red Army in 1920, which prevented the further spread of Soviet communism westward, are generally ignored in Anglo-American histories of twentieth-century Europe, while Piłsudski‘s previous march with Simon Petliura‘s Ukrainian divisions to Kiev (April–May 1920), if mentioned at all, is generally condemned.3 The 2 For a discussion of negative views of Piłsudski, see Cienciala, ―Józef Piłsudski w Anglo-Amerykańskich informatorach i podręcznikach historycznych po drugiej wojnie światowej. Zagadnienie mitu-stereotypu negatywnego‖ [Józef Piłsudski in Anglo-American Reference Works and History Textbooks after World War II. The Problem of the Negative, Mythical Stereotype], in Wojciech Wrzesiński, ed., Polskie mity polityczne XIX i XX wieku [Polish Political Myths of the 19th and 20th Centuries] (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1994), 167-194. For a positive but often ignored English- language study of Piłsudski‘s seizure of power, see Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup d’Etat (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). 3 See: Cienciala, ―Historiografia anglosaska o wojnie polsko-sowieckiej i zwycięstwie polskim nad Armią Czerwoną w 1920 r.‖ [English-language Historiography on the Polish-Soviet War and the Polish Victory over the Red Army] in: Anna M. Cienciala, Piotr Wandycz, eds., Wojna Polsko-Bolszewicka 1919-1920 w ocenach historyków [The Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 as Evaluated by Historians] (Warsaw: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 2003), 41-54. A recent world history handbook states that Piłsudski ―led an unsuccessful 114 The Polish Review exception to this general condemnation is the textbook on European history by the best-known Western historian of Poland, Norman Davies. His work on the Polish-Soviet War is excellent although partly outdated, while some of his statements about Piłsudski and the Bolsheviks are somewhat strange.4 Another exception is the balanced account given in Wikipedia under ―Polish- Soviet War‖ (accessed November 2010), which has a good reading list. Anglo-American historians of twentieth-century Europe also generally ignore the fact that Piłsudski originated the policy of ―equilibrium‖ — that is, balancing between Germany and the USSR — a policy carried out by his disciple, Beck, deputy foreign minister, 1930-1932, and minister from December 1932 until September 1939.