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Home , 1947 Jammu massacres, Ajit Prasad Jain, Azad Kashmir Day, Balraj Puri, Freda Bedi, National Herald

THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE GOVERNMENT IN AND , 1948-53

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy IN HISTORY

BY SAFEER AHMAD BHAT

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF PROF. ISHRAT ALAM

CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH () 2019 CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION

I, Safeer Ahmad Bhat, Centre of Advanced Study, Department of History, certify that the work embodied in this Ph.D. thesis is my own bonafide work carried out by me under the supervision of Prof. Ishrat Alam at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. The matter embodied in this Ph.D. thesis has not been submitted for the award of any other degree.

I declare that I have faithfully acknowledged, given credit to and referred to the researchers wherever their works have been cited in the text and the body of the thesis. I further certify that I have not willfully lifted up some other’s work, para, text, data, result, etc. reported in the journals, books, magazines, reports, dissertations, theses, etc., or available at web-sites and included them in this Ph.D. thesis and cited as my own work. The manuscript has been subjected to plagiarism check by Urkund software.

Date: ………………… (Signature of the candidate)

(Name of the candidate) Certificate from the Supervisor Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University This is to certify that the above statement made by the candidate is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Prof. Ishrat Alam Professor, CAS, Department of History, AMU

(Signature of the Chairman of the Department with seal) COURSE/COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION/PRE- SUBMISSION SEMINAR COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Mr. Safeer Ahmad Bhat, Centre of Advanced Study,

Department of History, has satisfactorily completed the course work/comprehensive examination and pre-submission seminar requirement which is part of his Ph.D. programme.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

Date:……………… Signature of the Chairman of the Department COPYRIGHT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE

Title of the Thesis: “The First National Conference Government in Jammu and Kashmir, 1948-53”

Candidate’s Name: Safeer Ahmad Bhat

Copyright Transfer

The undersigned hereby assigns to the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, copyright that may exist in and for the above thesis submitted for the award of

Ph.D. degree.

Signature of the candidate

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University However, the author may reproduce or authorize others to reproduce material extracted verbatim from the thesis or derivative of the thesis for author’s personal use provided that the source and the University’s copyright are indicated. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All the praises and thanks are to Almighty Allah whose countless blessings and grace gave me the strength and fortitude to complete the thesis. I express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Ishrat Alam whose consistent guidance, generous cooperation, encouragement and support made it possible for me to accomplish the present study. His critical analysis and meticulous review of the numerous drafts has immensely benefitted me. I am thankful to the eminent historian (Prof. Emeritus) for introducing me to a theme of my interest. This made the research exciting and less boring. I am also thankful to Prof. Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi, Chairman CAS Department of History for his support.

I am extremely grateful to Prof. Bashir Ahmad Rather and Prof. A. R. Najar for sanctioning generous leaves in my favour which allowed me to complete the Study uninterruptedly. I acknowledge their support and encouragement. I am thankful to Dr Altaf Hussain Para for his valuable suggestions. I owe a lot to my teachers who shaped my understanding and worldview. I am indebted to Maulana Shan-i-Alam, Shabir sir, Zahoor sir and Younis sir for guiding me. Maqbool sir deserves my special thanks for his guidance and counselling at different stages of my academic career.

In conducting the research for this Study I have benefitted from a number of institutions and libraries. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the assistance provided by the staff of the Seminary Library, Department of History (Aligarh Muslim University), Maulana Azad Library (A. M. U), Allama Iqbal Library, University of Kashmir (Srinagar), Jammu and Kashmir State Archives (Srinagar Repository), Jammu and Kashmir Information Department (Srinagar), ResearchMaulana and Publications Azad Library, Department Aligarh (Srinagar), Muslim National University Archives of India () and Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (New Delhi). I am particularly indebted to Shaheena, Shagufta and Mudassira madam of the Archives Repository Srinagar and Zahoor Ahmad of the Information Department who went far beyond their duties in assisting me. I am thankful to the University Grants Commission for its financial support in the initial stages of the work.

I offer sincere thanks to my friends, seniors and colleagues who helped me in various stages of the Study and from whose intellectual discussions I have immensely benefitted. I am thankful to Sahib Khwaja, Firdaus Hameed Parey, Naseer Ahmad

i Mir, Mir Haseeb Abdullah, Suhail R. Lone, Javid Ahmad Ahanger, Bilal Farooq, Sameer Ahmad Bhat, Dilawar Nabi, Basharat Hassan, Ishfaq Abdullah, Ishfaq Shafi, Javid Ahmad Bhat, Lone Zahoor, Umar Ahmad Khanday, Rather Adil, Hafiz Ashraf Wagay, Dr Firdaus Ahmad, Bilkeesa Akhter, Iftikhar A. Pall, Shahid, Mudasir, Shameem, Arshid Hussain, Sheeraz Ahmad, Adil Farooq, Hilal and Muzzammil Rasool. My thanks to Imtiyaz Ahmad Dar who not only entertained me with his humour but was also generous in providing me accommodation throughout these years at the University of Kashmir. I am specially thankful to Muzafar Ahmad Dar of JNU for his unstinting support and friendship and for helping me with his critical review of the drafts.

The thesis would not have seen the light of the day but for the unflinching and unwavering support of my family. I am short of words to express my heartfelt gratitude and debt to my parents, Ghulam Mohammad Bhat and Sayeeda Banoo whose guidance, care, love and supplications groomed me and always acted as a source of inspiration. They endured hardships and sufferings but encouraged me to achieve excellence. The work is a tribute to their sacrifices and encouragement.

I am fortunate in having a very loving and supporting family. Right from the beginning everyone was very much interested in the Study and supported me throughout the years. I am very grateful to my family members-Showkat Ahmad, Dildar Ahmad, Shagufta and Shaheena for their encouragement. Aabid Hussain read a large portion of the thesis and gave me some valuable suggestions. Azhar Dawood’s expectations have been pushing me forward. I earnestly hope that this Study will inspire Aabid and Azhar to strive for excellence. Hadiya and Taqwa with their angelic appearances have always lifted my mood. I also owe my debt to my extended family- Mohammad IqbalMaulana Mir, Shafiqa Azad Banoo, Library, Tajamul, Aligarh Qurat -Muslimul-Ain and University Bisma who have given me immense respect and love.

My better half, Kehkashan Iqbal has been a constant source of emotional and intellectual support. She has spent sleepless nights while painstakingly reviewing the thesis and benefitting me with her intellectual critique. Above all, she provided words of comfort and encouragement at seemingly hopeless moments and believed in my ability to overcome the adversity. She deserves my earnest thanks.

Safeer Ahmad Bhat

ii DEDICATED

TO

MY ABBU AND AMMI

WHO ENDURED ADVERSITY BUT GAVE ME THE BEST THEY COULD ABSTRACT

The thesis is an attempt to study the functioning of the first National Conference Government in Jammu and Kashmir from 1948 to 1953. It critically analyses the socio-economic and political policies of the Government and their impact in shaping the developments in the State and outside. How the Government conducted its relations with the Union Government and its endeavours to preserve the internal autonomy of the State has been examined. The Government’s attempts at hegemonising the masses with the dual purpose of legitimising itself and creating popular support in favour of accession to India has been discussed. How far the Government safeguarded the democratic rights of the people and tolerated the dissent has been studied. An endeavour has been made to study the evolution and strengthening of the opposition in the State with special reference to Praja Parishad agitation which was instrumental in effecting a change in ’s attitude towards India. The different facets of the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah including the involvement of have been analysed.

It has been argued that the creation of the Jammu and Kashmir State by virtue of the Treaty of Amritsar and the policies pursued by the Dogra State directly influenced the post-1947 developments in the State. The forced merger of the three regions of the State with diverse geographical, economic, cultural and political identities proved inimical as the divergences made implementation of a uniform State policy bereft with difficulties. The Dogra rulers followed a policy of regional discrimination as they considered Jammu their homeland and Kashmir as the purchased property. Further, a preferential treatment was given to the in and Dogra Hindus in particular. , particularly from the were marginalised and despite their numerical majority were neglected in the power-sharing arrangements of the Dogra State which also excluded them from its tools of legitimacy. In the given context the most serious and organised reaction against the State came from the Valley of Kashmir in the form of Muslim Conference which was later converted to National Conference. The study focuses on the different facets of National Conference politics and its mobilisation techniques with special reference to Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. It has been held that the Conversion and the consequent implanting of nationalist politics in the State divided the Muslim community and

I resulted in political upheavals in 1947. How the Quit Kashmir Movement deprived the State of popular leadership at a time when the future of the was being decided has been discussed.

The formation of the National Conference Government after the State’s accession to India brought forth many discrepancies which were a direct legacy of the hundred years of Dogra rule. Kashmir and its Muslim inhabitants assumed importance as a result of the internalisation and became the pivot of the Government’s policies which had its influence in other regions of the State, particularly Jammu whose influence had been diminished as a result of the loss of territory and prestige. In the backdrop of the Tribal onslaught and political uncertainty, the Government restored the confidence of people by organising the defence and settling the refugees. It has been argued that the transfer of power to the Popular Government led by Sheikh Abdullah was due to the political considerations of plebiscite as Sheikh Abdullah appeared indispensable for winning the vote in favour of India. Naya Kashmir Plan became a reference document and the Government sought to implement its provisions to transform the socio-political and economic landscape of the State. The Study argues that the Plan and its implementation proved too idealistic for the State and it failed to usher in a phase of envisioned progress. However, the circumstances in which the Government had to operate and the consistent political uncertainty regarding the future of the State acted as a serious hindrance in the functioning of the Government. Hitherto unused official and non-official sources have been used in the Study to understand the developments during the period.

The Study discusses in detail the economic policies of the Government with special reference to land reform measures. It has been held that the reforms were revolutionary and unprecedented in entire India and led to the empowerment of lakhs of peasants. The reforms also strengthened the political constituency of Sheikh Abdullah who became a ‘messiah’ in the eyes of the peasants. There were, however, lacunas in the policies and the faulty implementation coupled with corruption and favouritism diminished their impact. The reforms also led to a religious divide as most of the dispossessed landlords were Hindus who accused the Government of being communal, notwithstanding the fact that Muslim landlords, wherever, were also expropriated. The Study critically discusses the Government policies regarding development of , animal husbandry, augmenting of irrigation facilities, II transport and development of industries. It has been argued that due to some structural constraints and financial mismanagement the Government could not tackle the financial crisis in the State which led to dissatisfaction among the common masses.

The Study analyses the different trajectories of Centre-State relationship and its impact on the political scene of the State. It has been argued that the Central and State Governments differed on the quantum of relationship between the Centre and the State. Due to the vital importance of the State and to allay the fears of unwanted central intervention, it was given a special status in the form of Article 370, a separate flag and a Constituent Assembly. The Delhi Agreement later extended the Centre’s jurisdiction. The negotiations between the two governments were long and arduous and brought forth the differences in the motives of the two. The conduct of elections has been discussed and it has been held that the Government resorted to undemocratic and authoritarian practices and muzzled the voice of the opposition which set a very grim precedent for the future.

The diverse nature of the regional aspirations and the failure to ensure equitable development of all the regions created an imbalance in the State. An attempt has been made to understand how the regional divergences in terms of economy, culture, religion and political aspirations came to the forth during the period and shaped the developments in the State. Raising a mixture of regional and communal demands, Praja Parishad started a satyagrah against the Government. The different facets of the Satyagrah, response of the Government and its impact on the attitude of Muslims of the Valley and Sheikh Abdullah have been examined in detail. It has been argued that the satyagrah and the support it received from the communal parties of India shook the faith of Kashmiri Muslims in India who began to worry about the safety of their future. Sheikh Abdullah viewed the tendencies as communal and his unflinching faith in India began to waver which was also because he felt that the Government of India was failing in giving him concrete assurances of autonomy. The Study argues that the popularity of Sheikh Abdullah was dwindling because his support to the State’s accession to India was not proving beneficial for Kashmir, his main constituency. His hostile utterances against India and toying with the idea of independence were an attempt to regain his lost popularity. Division within the Cabinet confused the common people of Kashmir as they heard multiple voices from their leaders regarding the future of the State. Sheikh Abdullah’s relationship with Nehru became strained III and its impact on the State was pernicious. The Thesis has attempted to understand the complexity of the problem and argued that the lack of direct communication between the two and the trust deficit aggravated the problem which culminated in the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah through a conspiracy which was hatched in Delhi. The role of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and his associates and their search for legitimacy has also been studied.

IV CONTENTS

Page No.

Acknowledgements i - ii

List of Abbreviations iii

Glossary iv - vii

Maps viii - xi

Introduction 1- 13

Chapter 1: Dogra State, National Conference and the Emergence of Kashmir Dispute 14 - 54

Chapter 2: ‘Emergency Administration’ and the Formation of First National Conference Government 55 - 91

Chapter 3: Socio-economic Policies of the National Conference Government: A Critical Study 92 - 179

Chapter 4: Political Developments in the State and Relations with India 180 - 226

Chapter 5: Opposition to National Conference Government and the Dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah 227 - 304

Conclusion 305 - 314

Appendices 315 - 320 Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Plates 321 - 329

Bibliography 330 - 355 List of Abbreviations

JKA Jammu and Kashmir State Archives

NAI National Archives of India, New Delhi

NMML Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

iii Map 1: of Jammu and Kashmir and its main administrative divisions, 1846-1947

(Source: Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: , Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir)

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

viii Map 2: The State of Jammu and Kashmir in relation to neighbouring regions

(Source: Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947)

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

ix Map 3: The scheme of division of the State along the Cease-fire Line which would give the north-westernMaulana area (vertical Azad shading) Library, to Aligarh and most Muslim of Jammu Universityand Ladakh (diagonal shading) to India. The area including the Valley of Kashmir (cross-hatching) would be independent.

(Source: Robert Trumbull, New York Times, via , 10 July 1953).

x Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Map 4: Azad State of Jammu and Kashmir

(Source: Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War)

xi Glossary

Abi Land requiring continuous irrigation; such crops

Abiana Irrigation tax

Aloo Bub Epithet used for Sheikh Abdullah for his insistence on consuming potatoes instead of rice

Anjuman An association

Ashgal Tax for the maintenance of priests

Assami A tenant of the state who possessed permanent hereditary occupancy rights

Azad Free; independent

Bedzars Willow plantation

Begar Forced labour

Chak Wasteland

Chakdar The assignee of chak lands

Dar-ul-Fatwa A place where scholars of Islam enunciate opinions regarding the religious and mundane aspects of life

Dharmarth Charitable rent-free grants to individuals and religious institutions for their maintenance

Gabba recycled old woollen blankets or lois that are washed, milled and dyed in various colours Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Gompas Buddhist monasteries in Tibet and Ladakh

Hadith Traditions of the Prophet Mohammad S. A. W

Halqa The lowest organisational unit of National Conference which was formed by clubbing a number of villages

Hanji Boatmen

Jagir An assignment of revenue; the assigned land; also, revenue-free lands

iv Jihad Striving for perfection; Muslim holy war

Kahcharai Grazing tax

Kanal One-eighth of an acre; 505.857 sq. meters

Kandi Land at the foothills; stony surface; tough to plough

Kharwar ass-load; unit of weight used for revenue assessment in Kashmir; one unit is equivalent to 80.4 kg; four acres of land in measurement

Khudkashta Self-cultivated land

Khushki Dry land; lands not water intensive

Khutba Religious sermon

Kishtabani Ferry allowances paid to the boatmen who assisted the travellers in crossing certain rivers in Ladakh area.

Kuhl Water channel, natural or artificial, taken off from large stream

Ladishah The art of embedded satire in songs

Lambardar Village headman

Malikana Rent paid to the proprietor for cultivating his land

Mān Unit of weight; One mān is equal to 40 seer

Mandri Tax for the maintenance of temples

Maulana Title given to Muslim religious scholar

Mirwaiz Title given to head-priest of a mosque or shrine Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Muafi Revenue-free religious and charity grant to an individual or institution

Muafidar Recipient of muafi grant

Mujahid A person fighting the Muslim holy war

Mujwaza Portion of revenue which the state government collected from the peasants in kind and was used for the issue of rations to the city dwellers

v Muqarrari A category of jagir in which the holder received money from the government treasury after the expiry of six months

Muqarraridar Also Mukkararee-khwar; holder of mukkararee grant

Namdah Felt

Nanakshahi The ruling currency of the Sikh Empire

Naqshbandi A Muslim family which was held in great esteem in Kashmir

Nautor/nautod Newly-broken up lands, generally wastelands

Nautor Najaiz Newly broken-up land cultivated illegally without due permission from the authorities

Nazrana The accepted token of loyalty or tribute towards Maharaja

Pashmina Fine type of Kashmiri wool

Pattadars Those who held jagirs below Rs 3000

Patwar Halqa A unit of revenue administration

Rahdari A mechanism of embargo on migrations

Rakh Forest area reserved for the ruler, usually for hunting purposes

Rasum Fees, perquisites, or customary payments (usually illegal) demanded by the officials connected with the collection of revenue

Ryot Peasant cultivator

Safedazar Poplar plantation

SahukarMaulana AzadA m oneylenderLibrary, Aligarh Muslim University

Satyagraha Literally the way of truth; form of political agitation based on moral pressure pioneered by

Seer Unit of weight; equivalent to 1.25 kg

Shamilat Village common lands

Sharia/Shariat Literally ‘a clear path’; set of moral injunctions constituting

Shawl Baf A shawl-weaver

vi Toiran Ababeel Flights of Birds

Trāk Unit of weight equivalent to 5 kg

Ulema Islamic scholars

Wani/Bakal A huckster who sold salt, oil, tea and cloth etc. and also served the villagers’ credit needs

Wazaif-i-Yatama Scholarship for the orphans during the Dogra period

Wudar Karewa lands

Zaildar An official incharge of a zail (territorial unit constituted by clubbing a number of parganas)

The months of the Samvat Year with their corresponding Gregorian months, are:

1. Chaitra (March-April)

2. Baiśākha (April-May)

3. Jyaiṣṭha (May-June)

4. Asādha (June-July)

5. Srāvana (July-August)

6. Bhādrapada (August-September)

7. Asvinā (September-October)

8. Kārtikā (October-November)

9. AgrahāyaMaulanaṇa (November Azad-December) Library, Aligarh Muslim University 10. Pauṣa (December-January)

11. Māgha (January-February)

12. Phālguna (February-March)

vii INTRODUCTION

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is multi-polar in character and consists of different regions with diverse geographical, economic, demographic and political identities. The Valley of Kashmir is geographically compact and comprises of a homogenous population with majority of them being Muslims. Common religion and common language, Kashmiri, helped in the evolution of a more or less homogenous political identity. As against this, Jammu was more heterogeneous with diversity extending beyond the religious composition to cultural, linguistic, tribal and caste categories.1 The diversity resulted in the region pulling in different directions in terms of political identities. Even within the same religious group the political interests varied depending on the groups, sub-groups, castes and sub-castes. Ladakh, ethnically more congruent to Tibet, was almost uniformly divided between Buddhists and Muslims (Shia). The political identity of Ladakh was a complex interplay of religious, ethnic and regional factors.2 It was the Treaty of Amritsar signed between the English East India Company and Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu in 1846 which connected the three diverse regions into a single unit. However, the contiguity was not a union of hearts and the regional diversity was evident throughout the hundred years of Dogra rule. The discriminatory policies of the Dogra Maharajas and the preferential treatment to Jammu not only widened the chasm between the different regions but also led to inter- regional rivalry. The three regions had very little in common and it was the autocratic Dogra rule which held this diverse and disunited State together.3 There were also very little inter-regional contacts during the Dogra period owing to the long distances involved and the absence of a common language. The topographical and climatic differences were so imminent that a person from the Jammu province would find Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University himself an alien in the Kashmir province. This made any possibility of a homogeneous political loyalty quite difficult. People living in different parts had different political aspirations. This legacy was well carried into the Partition and resulted in divergent political loyalties.

1 Chowdhary, ‘Identity Politics of Jammu Region’ in Rekha Chowdhary, ed., Identity Politics in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, 2010, p. 119. 2 Balraj Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, New Delhi, 2008, p. 3. 3 Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of , London, 2012, p. 12. 1 Kashmir was the most important of the three regions and enjoyed a position of dominance throughout the Dogra rule. Partly responsible for its dominant position was its fame as a beautiful tourist attraction, a Switzerland of the East.4 Srinagar, the summer capital of the State and located in the Kashmir province was a prominent city in North India and had a huge population of 2,07,787 which was significantly higher than Jammu and many other neighbouring cities.5 It was because of the imminent position of the Kashmir valley that notwithstanding the fact that Jammu province was more populous than Kashmir, the State was popularly called Kashmir and the title used for the ruler was ‘Maharaja of Kashmir’ instead of Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.6 The political movement for the establishment of responsible government in the State continued to keep Kashmir in the limelight as the movement was more strong and prominent there and most of the political activity took place in Kashmir valley, particularly Srinagar city. Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference attained fame and Kashmir became a point of discussion throughout India. The developments in the State in pre and post-accession period resulted in the emergence of Kashmir as a focal point in national and international politics. Simultaneously, Jammu faced a diminution due to geographical, demographic and political factors. Its western part, inhabited by a majority of Muslims seceded from the State and formed Azad Kashmir. In the eastern parts of Jammu which had a preponderant Hindu majority a massacre of the Muslim population was organised with close connivance of the Maharaja and his administration. Thousands of Muslims were killed and many more fled to the western side which had now become Azad Kashmir. This turned Jammu from a Muslim majority province into a Hindu one coupled with the large scale influx of Hindu and Sikh refugees from both within the State and . Thus Jammu Province’s reduced size, due to the loss of its western part to Azad Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Kashmir and its net loss of population resulted in Muslim-majority Kashmir become the most populous region in the State which also resulted in its political supremacy. Thereafter Jammu played second fiddle to Kashmir.7 The valley of Kashmir had a

4 The European travellers who flocked to Kashmir in the 19th century gave vivid depictions of the beauty of Kashmir-snow-clad mountains, fresh water lakes and green meadows. Their travelogues popularised Kashmir in Europe and it became the most sought summer resort for the British officials in India. 5 R. G. Wreford, ed., Census of India 1941, Vol. XXII, Jammu & Kashmir State, Pt. III, Village Tables, Jammu, 1943, p. 344. The population of Jammu was only 50,379 as per the Census of 1941, Ibid., p. 2. 6 Christopher Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and , London, 2015, p. 38. 7 Snedden, The Untold Story, p. 48. 2 homogenous population which made a broad consensus on political matters possible. Jammu, on the other hand, had a mixed population with the Hindus divided into caste Hindus and Dalits (comprising 31% of the population), Dogras and Gujjars which inhibited the formation of a broad-based unity among them.8

An important aspect of the Dogra State was that there was a policy of discrimination against the Muslims who were marginally represented in the power-sharing arrangements. The sectarian policies of the Dogra State and its attempts to transform a Muslim-majority region into a Hindu State-defining and legitimising its existence in terms of Hindu identities,9 not only influenced the nature of the political organisation and mobilisation during the period but also had a direct bearing on the post-1947 political trajectories of the State.

As a first major organised reaction against the Dogra State, National Conference played a crucial role in politicising the masses and providing a radical and progressive direction to the prevailing political discontent. It also played a major role in the process of assertion of the political identity of Kashmir. Right from its inception, the National Conference stood for the end of autocracy and the establishment of a responsible democratic government in the State. Theoretically, National Conference based its programme on secularism while at the same time it did not fail to use religion as a tool for mobilization. The mixture of religion and politics made National Conference popular among the Muslims while it also began to wean non-Muslims away from it. This paradox became also imminent after 1947 when it was caught between the avowed loyalty to India and the sentiments of the masses. Sheikh Abdullah became increasingly associated with Jawaharlal Nehru and Congress and opposed Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his Two Nation Theory. This loyalty to Congress playedMaulana a crucial role Azad in shaping Library, the future Aligarh of the StateMuslim and greatly University affected the Centre- State relationship in the post-Independence period. In 1944 Naya Kashmir Plan was adopted which visualized the future political and economic setup of the State. The Plan was revolutionary as well as idealistic and envisaged a state free from economic exploitation, political despotism and social backwardness, with secularism as the

8 Balraj Puri, Simmering Volcano: Study of Jammu’s Relations with Kashmir, New Delhi, 1983, p. 5. 9 Mridu Rai has contended that the Dogra State was not the case of a Hindu king ruling a Muslim majority state only. Rather it was a Hindu State trying to legitimise itself in terms of Hindu idioms, customs and traditions, Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the , New Delhi, 2004.

3 basic principle. With the there was political uncertainty in the State. The tribal invasion of Kashmir hastened the accession of the State to India and Sheikh Abdullah was appointed as the Chief Emergency Administrator. On 5 March 1948, Maharaja appointed him as the Prime Minister and he headed the first Popular Government till 1953.

While studying the functioning of the First National Conference Government, the Thesis seeks to emphasize three key points. First, the formation of the National Conference Government came at a time when the State was passing through a very difficult phase. The tribal invasion of the State had resulted in the collapse of administrative machinery and the breakdown of law and order. No authority, except the National Conference, existed on the ground. The State was in the grip of a war between two nations. India had taken the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council where it was hotly debated by the representatives of both the countries. India laid its claims on Kashmir on the basis of Maharaja Hari Singh’s accession and the support to it by the most popular party of Kashmir–National Conference. India attached cardinal importance to the stay of Kashmir within India as it believed that Kashmir would strengthen Indian Secularism and would act as a guarantee for the safety and security of the Muslims living in India. On the other hand, Pakistan claimed Kashmir on the basis of the demographic composition of its population as it held that Pakistan was ideologically and politically incomplete without Kashmir. The State was also passing through a phase of financial stringency as a result of the serious economic dislocation caused by the Partition and its aftermath. Highways and river ways were closed. Trade came to a stop and there was shortage of essential commodities in the State. These developments–collapse of administrativeMaulana mechanism, Azad political Library, uncertainty Aligarh and economic Muslim breakdown University had a direct bearing on the functioning of the Government and its relations with India. The policies of the Government were aimed at winning the support and confidence of the people, particularly the Muslims so that in case of plebiscite they vote for India. Further, Sheikh Abdullah stood for limited accession to India and not complete merger. He strongly favoured complete internal autonomy of the State and laid great emphasis on self-reliance. This brought him into direct conflict with the Indian Government. The limited resources of the State coupled with his reluctance to depend on the Government of India for solving the economic ills of the State aggravated the

4 financial crisis in the State. Given the context it is also important to note that the five and a half years Sheikh Abdullah remained in power were not going to be sufficient to solve all the ills of the country.

The second point is that the Government was functioning in an emergency where immense powers were concentrated in the hands of the ruling party which ultimately narrowed down to one individual and his group of confidants. Therefore, in the main, dissent voices were suppressed and opposition was choked. The closing of the doors of healthy criticism and opposition led to the emergence of reactionary elements. The Government of India tolerated the digression from the democratic principles and allowed the subversion of rights as it believed that the strict measures against those raising voice against the Government and inter-alia against India would strengthen its grip over Kashmir. The failure to protect the fundamental rights of the people, including the right to dissent, however, was not unique with Sheikh Abdullah’s Government. History is testimony to the fact that the revolutionaries raise expectations of the people by promising to be the guarantors of fundamental rights and democratic freedom but when they grab the power, most of them do not prove different than their erstwhile counterparts. As Benedict Anderson has put it:

The model of “official nationalism” assumes relevance, above all, at the moment when revolutionaries success-fully take control of the state, and are for the first time in a position to use state power in pursuit of their visions…Even the most radical revolutionaries always, to some degree, inherit the state from the fallen regime…Like the complex electrical system in a large mansion where the owner has fled, the state awaits the new owner’s hand at the switch to be very much its old brilliant self again. One should therefore not be much surprised as Maulanarevolutionary Azad leaderships Library, come to Aligarh play lord of Muslim the manor…The University more the ancient dynastic state is neutralized, the more its antique finery can be wrapped around revolutionary shoulders.10

Another important aspect is the nature of inter-regional politics in the State after 1947 which was a direct outcome of pre-1947 policies of the Dogra State. When the National Conference Government was formed in 1948 it sought to rectify the historical injustices done to the Kashmir Valley and the Muslims by seeking to make

10 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London, 1991, pp. 145–146. 5 both as the pivots of its policy-making. However, the prominence and the treatment Kashmir received from the Government created its repercussions in the Jammu and Ladakh regions which raised voices against the subordination of their interests. The State was caught in the quagmire of conflicting regional interests and the Government failed to maintain a balance, resulting in the political crisis. For example, while the majority of the landlords who were affected by the agrarian reform policies of the Government were landlords from Jammu, most of the beneficiaries were the Muslims of Kashmir, though a large number of Dalits were also benefitted. No wonder then, the Hindu landlords dubbed the reforms as communal and started a reactionary movement against the Government. The diversity of the regional interests coupled with the Government’s intolerant policy wherein every voice of dissent was dubbed as reactionary increased the regional dichotomy which ultimately sowed the seeds of dissensions in the Centre-State relationship and also corroded the personal bond of Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah, culminating in the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953.

Review of Literature

A plethora of literature has been written on the freedom struggle of Kashmir and the political developments in the State in the post-1947 period. However, most of these works suffer from certain limitations. First, a large number of books have concentrated on the issue of Kashmir’s accession to India, its legality or illegality depending on which country the author supports (India or Pakistan). While the account of Alastair Lamb (Kashmir: A disputed Legacy; Kashmir in Crisis and Birth of a Tragedy) who subjects the question of accession to a critical scrutiny is more supportive of Pakistan, Prem Shankar Jha (Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History) Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University has justified the stand of Indian Government and held that accession was final and irrevocable. Christopher Snedden in Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris and The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir has discussed the emergence of Kashmir Dispute with special reference to Poonch uprising and has laid more focus on the history of Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. Second, with the emergence of armed insurgency in Kashmir in the late 1980s, a renewed interest was generated among the scholars to search for the causes of the armed movement. This brought forth a voluminous literature which tries to locate the background of the insurgency by discussing the political developments in the State from 1947 to 1985. Mention may be

6 made of Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington, 2006); Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge, 2008); Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths To Peace (Cambridge, 2003); Bhattacharjea, Kashmir: The Wounded Valley (New Delhi, 1994) and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: The Tragic Hero of Kashmir (New Delhi, 2008); Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London, 1996); Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict; India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London, 2003); Mushtaqur Rehman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan and Kashmiri People (Boulder, 1996); M. J. Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale (New Delhi, 2002); India and The Siege Within (Middlesex, 1985) and Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors (New Delhi, 1995). These works hold that the trampling of democracy in Kashmir, rigging of elections, choking of dissent, one- party dominance and the absence of healthy opposition, authoritarianism and tickling with the State’s autonomy were responsible for the eruption of militancy in Kashmir. The Third important limitation of these works is that these have been mostly written by political commentators and journalists. There has been no tendency to consult archival sources which form an indispensable part of any serious scholarship on the theme. Further, a serious historical scholarship is lacking. Moreover, Sheikh Abdullah has got much space in the literature and he is either made a hero who saved Kashmir from being trampled by the Tribals or a villain who in opposition to the sentiments of the people threw Kashmir in the lap of India just for the sake of grabbing power. Some scholars like Prem Nath Bazaz, M Yousuf Saraf and M Sultan Pampori hold him responsible for the tragedy of Kashmir because of his ill-timed and short-sighted decisions. Sheikh Abdullah has been studied as a whole, in total and in the light of presentism. His decision to enter into an Accord with in 1975 has been Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University given primacy while all his earlier achievements and contribution has been sidelined. No attempt has been made to study him in the context of his times or by evaluating his attitude and policies in micro-studies, for example, 1931-1939, 1939-47, 1948-53, 1953-75 and 1975-82. This would have laid bare some unknown facets of his personality as well as unaccounted events that shaped his outlook and policies.

There is not a single historical work dealing exclusively with the first National Conference Government between 1948 and 1953. The theme finds minute references in the overall project of accession story, India-Pakistan relations, United Nations’

7 role, and the emergence of insurgency in the State. Sheikh Abdullah’s autobiography in , Aatish-i-Chinar is the most important primary source when it comes to studying the long political career of Sheikh Abdullah, his ups and downs, his relationship with India and his fall out with Nehru. However, as is the case with autobiographies, it presents a highly personal account and does not speak favourably of Sheikh’s political opponents like Bakshi, Sadiq and Mir Qasim. Since it was published in 1985, three years after Sheikh’s death, no part of it was finalised by the author himself during his lifetime. It does not see the developments in the State as they were but as the author thought of them after analysing them some decades later. The author was already aware of the past political developments and accordingly narrates them after sieving and sifting historical facts, giving the impression that he had already visualised the things. Further, many of the sensitive issues were excluded from the book, as has been admitted by its editor Mohammad Yousuf Teng, because of the possibility of its publication during Sheikh Abdullah’s lifetime. The author also admits that he had no knowledge of historical methodology which reduces its historical knowledge. The English translation of the work by , The Flames of the Chinar, is very succinct and gives only an overview of the things. While the original text in Urdu runs in 961 pages, the translated version has only 172 pages. A more detailed translation has recently been attempted by Mohammad Amin Bhat in The Blazing Chinar.

Prem Nath Bazaz, a contemporary of Sheikh Abdullah has written many works on Kashmir. His magnum opus The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir: Cultural and Political is one of the most important sources of our period. He has not only meticulously documented all the important socio-economic and political developments Maulana in the State Azad during Library, the period Aligarh but has also Muslim tried to University critically analyse them. He was once a close associate of Sheikh Abdullah and had influenced him towards secularism. At one time Bazaz saw Gandhi’s twilight in Sheikh Abdullah and even wrote a pamphlet Kashmir Ka Gandhi but soon they fell out. The rivalry made Bazaz a vociferous critique of Sheikh Abdullah which is evident in his book. He charges Sheikh of dualistic policies and of singing different tones in Delhi and Kashmir. Bazaz fills in a critical gap which is left behind in official sources. He gives a critical review of land reforms and the alienation of minorities as a result of Sheikh’s communal policies. His Kashmir in Crucible is also important work which

8 gives an insight into the authoritarian tendencies of the First National Conference Government, particularly its attitude towards the political opponents. Inside Kashmir is one of the boldest books written during the Dogra period. Bazaz is very critical of the Dogra Government and discusses its discriminatory and exploitative policies. He was among the Hindus who acknowledged that the Muslims suffered in the Dogra period only because they were Muslims. The book is an important source to understand the nature of the Dogra State.

Mohammad Yousuf Saraf’s Kashmiris Fight for Freedom in two volumes discusses the history of the State in detail, starting from the earliest times till 1971. His account regarding the Dogra period remains indispensable for understanding the political scenario and the conditions in which National Conference emerged. Being personally associated, earlier with National Conference and later with Muslim Conference (Revived) and ‘Azad Kashmir’, he is able to provide a first-hand experience of the working of the two parties and the Government in Azad Kashmir. He discusses Sheikh Abdullah’s Government and provides useful insights concerning his policies. However, being located in Azad Kashmir, he has exclusively relied on secondary sources, occasional newspaper reports and Radio broadcasts which were highly partisan, for their being used for propaganda purposes across the Cease Fire Line. His inability to use official and non-official sources from Kashmir puts a serious lacunae in his work.

Rashid Taseer’s Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir (Urdu) is a 6-volume series that seeks to explain the history of Kashmir right from the inception of Dogra period to the death of Sheikh Abdullah. Volume IV deals with the period under study. He has voluminously documented all the important events during the period and has also offeredMaulana his scholarly Azad analysis. Library, The Volume Aligarh follows Muslim a chronological University framework. The author has at many places substantiated or counteracted the official viewpoint with his personal knowledge and interviews conducted while pursuing his journalistic career. One serious limitation of the work is that no references have been given which makes it less useful for a student of History. Further, the book fails to hide its strong distaste for Sheikh Abdullah.

Kashmir ka Siyasi Inqilab (Urdu) by Shabnam Qayoom is a voluminous, but biased, account of Kashmir from the beginning of Dogra period. The work runs in 5 volumes,

9 third one related to the period under study. The author’s prejudice against Sheikh Abdullah pervades throughout the book as he also discusses the personal life of Sheikh Abdullah and casts aspersions on his character. At many places the book refers to some unknown events and hidden aspects of Kashmir problem but in the absence of references, their historical value is reduced.

Joseph Korbel’s Danger in Kashmir is one of the first and finest works on post- Independence Kashmir. The major theme of the book is the working of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of which the author was a member. It highlights the procrastination of the Indian and Pakistani Governments vis-à-vis holding of a UN-sponsored Plebiscite in Kashmir. The book devotes one chapter to the developments in the State between 1948 and 1954. This remains the first authentic and the most refereed account of Sheikh Abdullah’s reforms as the Prime Minister of the State. However, the account is succinct and primarily lies on newspapers, some official information and personal accounts. The author saw the developments as a contemporary and was thus not able to utilise the vast sources which became available later on.

Jammu and Kashmir by Jyoti Bhushan Das Gupta has discussed the history of Kashmir from 1947 to 1966. While giving a background of the circumstances in 1947 which resulted in the accession of the State to India, the book analyses the role of United Nations in solving the Dispute. The book has a chapter on the internal dynamics of the State wherein the author gives an overview of the economic and political developments. However, the account is very brief and is mainly based on contemporary newspapers. His ‘judgement’ of the Sheikh Abdullah’s Government is biased and likens it with totalitarian regimes. The book does not give due credit to the revolutionary Maulana reforms launched Azad Library, by the Government Aligarh Muslim and fails University to analyse the circumstances in which Sheikh Abdullah had to govern the State.

A recent addition to the literature on Kashmir is Aijaz Ashraf Wani’s What Happened to Governance in Kashmir? (New Delhi, 2019). It is a critical account of the sorry state of affairs in Kashmir, the subversion of democratic traditions and the emergence of armed insurgency. The book has a chapter on the period under study. The author has analysed the developments during the period from the point of view of governance. However, it fails to give a clear picture of the circumstances in which

10 Sheikh Abdullah had to function as an administrator given the political uncertainty in the State. The policies of the Government have been criticised without highlighting their due merits and the impression is generated that nothing good happened during the period except financial crisis, corruption and mis-governance. The author draws most of his conclusions from Joseph Korbel, Prem Nath Bazaz and M Y Saraf and fails to move beyond anti-Sheikh narrative.

In view of the limitations in the literature in terms of sources and methodology, an attempt has been made in the present work to revisit the history of the period and try to explore the hidden aspects by utilising a wide range of source materials, hitherto unused. The major focus of the study is to critically evaluate the working of the first National Conference Government in Jammu and Kashmir under Sheikh Abdullah. The Government’s political and economic policies, particularly the working of the revolutionary land reforms and their impact on the agrarian structure of the State have been studied. How the Government conducted its relations with India while safeguarding its internal autonomy has been analysed. The attempts at hegemonising the masses with the dual purpose of getting support for the Government and loyalty for India has been discussed. How far the Government safeguarded the democratic rights of the people and tolerated the dissent has been studied. An endeavour has been made to study the evolution and strengthening of the opposition in the State with special reference to Praja Parishad agitation which was instrumental in effecting a change in Sheikh Abdullah’s attitude towards India. The different facets of the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah including the involvement of Jawaharlal Nehru have been analysed.

In preparation of this Thesis, source material has been largely drawn from archives and libraries.Maulana Records Azad were Library, consulted Aligarh in the National Muslim Archives University of India- Records of Political Department, Home Ministry, External Affairs Ministry, States Ministry- Kashmir Section, Information and Broadcasting Ministry-Kashmir Publicity Section and Miscellaneous Intelligence Reports. Records related to Political Department, General Department, Home Department, Education Department, Jammu and Kashmir Gazettes (1947-54), Intelligence reports, Annual Administration reports (1945-1955) Government official publications, material found in censorship, Press releases, propaganda material and revenue records were collected from the Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Srinagar Repository and Archives Reference Library

11 Srinagar. Most of the newspapers published during the period were collected from Jammu and Kashmir Information Department (Press Information Bureau) Srinagar. A good number of contemporary works, both official and non-official, were collected from Research and Publications Department of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi was utilised for getting Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (26 Volumes related to the period), unpublished speeches of Sheikh Abdullah from 1948-53 besides a good number of works related to the Praja Parishad and the role of Communism in Kashmir. One limitation faced with regard to the archival material was that many important sources related to the topic present at the National and State Archives were not granted access to due to some unknown reasons. Moreover, the Archives in Jammu and Kashmir lacks proper cataloguing which makes it very difficult to find the relevant material. To bridge the gap, interviews were conducted of different persons who were contemporaneous to Sheikh Abdullah who gave some valuable insights on the history of the period. A large number of secondary sources-books and journal articles have also been consulted.

While the structure adopted for this thesis, is broadly chronological, a thematic framework is also given so that the events are put in their proper perspective. Since the administrative structure of the State did not undergo any massive change during the period and it was a continuation of the Dogra period, barring some territorial adjustments, it has not been discussed in the present study. The major changes, wherever, have been mentioned at the relevant places. The Thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One discusses the background and the nature of the Dogra State. The limitations-political, economic and religious imposed by the State on its subjects, particularly Muslims have been discussed. The emergence of political consciousness in Kashmir asMaulana a result of Azadthe spread Library, of modern Aligarh education Muslim due to theUniversity intervention of British Residency, influence of press and the emergence of middle class in Kashmir has been dealt with. The emergence and role of National Conference in politicising the masses and its tussle with the Muslim Conference has been discussed. It has been argued that the active policy pursued by Congress vis-à-vis Kashmir as compared to passive policy of Muslim League was one of the reasons why the political atmosphere was favourable towards India and not Pakistan in 1947.

Chapter Two gives an account of the reasons which led to the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah first as the Emergency Administrator and later as the Prime Minister of the

12 State. The tussle between Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah has been discussed and it has been held that the Indian Government’s support to Sheikh Abdullah was because of the considerations of plebiscite as they believed that only Sheikh Abdullah could win Kashmir for India. The achievements of the Government in terms of maintenance of law and order and the rehabilitation of refugees have been highlighted. Massacre of Muslims in Jammu and Maharaja’s complicity in it has been critically analysed. The Government’s attempts to legitimise itself and the struggle for hegemony, with the functioning of the propaganda machinery of India and Pakistan have been studied.

Chapter 3 gives a background of the Dogra agrarian system and the reforms launched by Sheikh’s Government and their impact on the agrarian structure of the State. Why the reforms failed to produce desired results has been examined. How Sheikh benefitted politically from these reforms has been discussed. The Government policy regarding agriculture, animal husbandry, poultry and industry has been studied. A focus has been laid on the Co-operative movement in the State and its impact on the masses. It has been argued that the State faced a financial crisis because of some structural constraints and financial mismanagement as a result of corruption and nepotism.

Chapter 4 discusses the political developments in the State and relationship with the Indian Union. Focus has been laid on the negotiating of Article 370 and the Delhi Agreement. It has been discussed that the way the Government conducted the first elections in the State made a mockery of the democratic process of free and impartial voting. The suppression of the civilian rights and intolerance of opposition has been highlighted.

ChapterMaulana 5 deals with Azad the diverse Library, character Aligarh of the MuslimState and howUniversity it worked to keep the State disunited. The discontent against the Government in Ladakh and Jammu has been highlighted. The supporting of Parishad agitation by the communal parties of India had a direct bearing on the attitude of Sheikh Abdullah towards India and of Nehru towards Sheikh Abdullah. Why the Muslims of the State became disenchanted with India and began to look towards Pakistan has been examined. The causes which led to the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah on 9 August and the role of Nehru have been analysed in detail.

13 CHAPTER 1 Dogra State, National Conference and the Emergence of Kashmir Dispute

The State of Jammu and Kashmir as a single contiguous unit came into existence as a result of the Treaty of Amritsar, signed between the English East India Company and Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu on 16th March 1846. Raja Gulab Singh, one of the most powerful chiefs of the Sikh Empire, had entered into an understanding with the British by maintaining neutrality in the First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845, thereby helping the British authorities in defeating the otherwise formidable Sikh challenge. Gulab Singh was rewarded by the transfer of Kashmir and its adjoining territories by virtue of the Treaty of Amritsar for which he had to pay a paltry sum of 7,500,000 Nanakshahi rupees.1 The transfer of Kashmir was a result of the political and strategic motives of the British. They wanted to dismember the Sikh state- a formidable Sikh Empire which had the potential to challenge English East India Company’s territorial possessions, and create a buffer out of Kashmir, which had contiguous borders with many countries, to counter the ‘Russian Peril’. However, the transfer was not smooth as Sheikh Imam-ud-din, the last Governor of in Kashmir raised a banner of revolt against Gulab Singh and even defeated his troops. He had received requests from many chiefs to resist the handover of Kashmir.2 Bound by the Treaty of Amritsar, the British sent its troops under Henry Lawrence who was successful in extracting Imam-ud-din’s submission. The Treaty bound together the three disparate regions of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh which were unconnected geographically, culturally and demographically. This arrangement proved very fragile and had a bearing on the subsequent history of the State, influencing the emergence of the KashmirMaulana Dispute inAzad 1947 Library, and the post Aligarh-Independence Muslim political University developments in the state.3

1 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries (revised and continued up to 1929), Vol. XII: Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim, and Burma, Calcutta, 1931, p. 21. 2 In a letter to the British the ‘old Muslim rulers of Kashmir’ protested against the transfer of Kashmir. They vowed to fight alongside Imam-ud-din against Raja Gulab Singh’s forces. Letter offered to Government of India by Pt. Sharan Kalia, Ministry of States, Kashmir Section, File No. 16(48)-K/51; 1951, National Archives of India, New Delhi (Henceforth NAI). 3 Christopher Snedden is of the view that the Treaty of Amritsar was directly responsible for the emergence of Kashmir Dispute, Christopher Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, London, 2015, p. 19, e-book, accessed on http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=46B2A83FA3F1B612AD83664E3FBFB118.

14 Nature of the Dogra State

The Dogra State4 in the hundred years of its rule, particularly in the first half failed to usher a period of progressive development in the State. The oppression and exploitation of the people perpetrated by the predecessors of the Dogras-Afghan and Sikh rulers not only continued but also touched new heights under the new regime. One of the important features that continued to pervade throughout the Dogra rule was the discrimination between the Jammu and Kashmir regions which also had an influence on its policies towards the two communities–Hindus and Muslims. The Dogras considered Jammu their ancestral homeland and the Kashmir Valley as their purchased property.5 This conception was reflected in the economic policies of the Dogra regime. Kashmir had been purchased and to make full use of the ‘investment’, policies were geared towards extracting the maximum possible revenue from the area while spending less on the developmental fronts. This policy was more pronounced in the earlier years of Dogra rule but with the consolidation of the State, establishment of British Residency and the popular pressure there were changes in the policies and the magnitude of exploitation was reduced.

The State maintained lackadaisical approach towards providing basic amenities of education and healthcare facilities to the people of the State. In education sector the State was a stark contrast to the Province of Punjab, where the Britishers had already introduced modern education and had made great strides.6 The Dogra rulers were only content with opening of some Pathshalas and funding a few Muslim religious institutions.7 The Christian Missionaries who tried to introduce Western education in the State were not only discouraged but also opposed by the Government. However, there was also a lack of initiative and demand from the people of the State. The Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Muslims particularly were more interested in religious education and under the influence of the priestly class, who not only discouraged the common Muslims from

4 The state so established is called as the Dogra State as Raja Gulab Singh and his successors were Dogras, a linguistic group primarily found in the Jammu region. The Dogras traced their pedigree to the Rajputs, a lineage which was deliberately being publicised. For details see Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir, Delhi, 2004, pp. 66-79. 5 Robert Tharp, Cashmir Misgovernment, London, 1870, p. 26. 6 The State had close economic and cultural ties with the Punjab Province because of its close proximity to the State. Hence it was easy to compare the situation in the two regions. When an organised political leadership emerged in the State, they criticised the Dogra State by comparing the conditions of the State with Punjab–education, healthcare, magnitude of land revenue, freedom of press and political rights. 7 Administration Report of Jammu and Kashmir State, 1873-74, Jammu, p. 114.

15 attaining modern education but also threatened them with turning into apostates, did not take to modern education.8 The Dogra State, like the other Princely States, was not ready to shoulder the responsibility of educating the masses which would have required a huge expenditure. Further, the Maharajas feared that modern education would enlighten the masses and raise consciousness among them who would then subject the Maharajas’ despotic rule to a critical scrutiny.9 It was only after the establishment of the British Residency in Kashmir10 that the modern education started making progress in the State as a good number of schools, though insufficient, were opened throughout the State. Kashmiri Pandits reacted positively to the introduction of modern education and enrolled their children in schools in large numbers. Muslims were conspicuous by their absence so much so that the 250 students on rolls at the Christian Missionary School, Srinagar were all Pandits.11 The backwardness of the Muslims in education was due to poverty, indifference of the people who were more interested in agriculture and a reactionary clergy. Besides, the State maintained an indifferent attitude towards the Muslim education. It did not intervene in an active manner to take the Muslims out of the predicament. Very few schools were opened in the Muslim localities and the officials at the lower rung, majority of whom were Pandits, discouraged the Muslims from receiving education to evade competition with the majority community. Though the Government provided some scholarships to the students, Muslims received a nominal share, notwithstanding the fact that they formed the majority of the population. In the Orphan Scholarship (Wazaif-i-Yatama), the share of Muslims was a nominal 22% as they received only 42 scholarships out of 190. Even the Muslim students were discouraged by their Hindu teachers to take up Science subjects.12 In 1916, Maharaja Pratap Singh appointed Sir Henry Sharp, the Educational Commissioner of the Government of India to suggest ways and means for Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 8 Mohammad Ishaq Khan, History of Srinagar (1846-1947): A Study in Socio-Cultural Change, Srinagar, 1978, p. 156. 9 Prem Nath Bazaz, Daughters of Vitasta, New Delhi, 1969, p. 215. 10 The establishment of British Residency in Kashmir was a direct result of the changing political motives of the British, primarily to counter the Russian threat, although there was no provision for the establishment of the Residency in the Treaty of Amritsar and had been continuously opposed by the successive Maharajas. For details see Ali Mohd Pir, British Policy towards Kashmir (1846- 1947), Unpublished PhD Thesis, Aligarh Muslim University, 2013. 11 Tyndale Biscoe, Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade, London, 1922, pp. 265-68. He comments that ‘the sons or grandsons of those officials who had bullied and squeezed the Mohemmadan (sic) peasants for years past, and their large houses in the city, with all their wealth, were a standing witness to their looting powers, for the salary they received from the State was quite insignificant’. 12 Report of the Commission Appointed under the Orders of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur dated the 12th November 1931 to Enquire into Grievances and Complaints, Jammu, 1933, p. 12 (Henceforth Glancy Commission Report).

16 improving Muslim education in the State. He deplored the attitude of Hindu teachers towards the Muslim pupils and recommended opening of more schools and appointment of Muslim teachers besides scholarships for the Muslim students.13 However, the recommendations were kept secret and never implemented.14

The Dogra State followed a policy of discrimination against the non-Dogras in general and Muslims in particular. The claimed Rajput identity of the Dogra Maharajas was publicised and used as a legitimising tool. No wonder then, the Dogra community enjoyed certain special rights and privileges under the direct patronage of successive Maharajas. It is instructive to note that Maharaja Pratap Singh formulated a ‘Dogra Code’ to further the interests of Jammu Dogras, his ‘brethren’ in terms of religion and caste. This ‘Code’ gave them preferential rights in land, education and employment.15 As late as 1940 when the discriminatory policies of the State had diminished under the influence of the popular resistance, the Government passed the Arms Act which gave only the Dogra Rajputs the right to possess firearms.16 Thus the non-Dogra communities faced discrimination. Besides, the State used religious symbols, idioms, customs and traditions to gain legitimacy in the course of which the Muslims were marginalised. The entire edifice of the State was couched in religious terms, which also defined its outer manifestations: the levying of purely Hindu religious taxes, the establishment of Dharmarth Department, the banning of cow slaughter and the public honour of Hindu festivals and customs.17 Initially cow slaughter was punishable by death sentence which was then lowered to life imprisonment and finally ten years imprisonment.18 The policy of hostility followed against the Muslims is evident from the fact that their religious places were confiscated, their nomenclatures changed19 and some of them were converted into ammunition andMaulana grain stores. Azad20 Library,The Muslims Aligarh were forcedMuslim to payUniversitytaxes for the

13 Sharp Committee Report, Calcutta, 1916, pp. 14-43. 14 Glancy Commission Report, p. 9. 15 Rai, Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects, p. 141. 16 Fida Mohammad Hassnain, Freedom Struggle in Kashmir, New Delhi, 1988, p. 104. 17 Mridu Rai argues that the use of religion by the Dogra State was deliberate and aimed at transforming the State into a Hindu State, notwithstanding the demographic composition of the population, Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, pp. 109-27. 18 Tharp, Cashmir Misgovernment, p. 51. 19 G. M. D. Sufi, Kashir, Being a History of Kashmir from the Earliest Times to Our Own, , 1948, p. 570. 20 Tharp, Cashmir Misgovernment, p. 38.

17 maintenance of temples and priests (Mandri and Ashgal).21 There were many instances of the confiscation of jagirs enjoyed by the Muslims and shrines and mosques.22 The Muslims were under represented in State services, with their share not more than 15% as late as 1931, notwithstanding the fact that they constituted 80% of the total population of the state.23 On the other hand, though the Kashmiri Pandits constituted just 5% of the population they had a virtual monopoly over the administrative posts, particularly in the Revenue Department. In 1872 while 5,572 Kashmiri Pandits out of a population of 75,000 were working as clerks, not a single was Muslim.24 Besides being the co-religionists of the Dogras, the Pandits had attained proficiency in Persian language and also took to modern education earlier than the Muslims. With the replacement of Persian with Urdu as the official language of the State in 1889,25 the fortunes of the Pandits started receding as they were not literates in the language. The State policy of discrimination and creating wedge between the different communities is evident from the Statement of Maharaja Pratap Singh who ‘would say, don’t give too much to Rajputs, use Kashmiri Pundits as much as you can and see that Muslims do not starve’.26

Land revenue was the main source of income for the State and it was levied at exorbitant rates. The State demanded one-half of the annual produce but coupled with legal and illegal cesses, the peasant was barely left with one-third of the produce.27 The Government seized the occupancy rights of the peasants and reduced them to the status of tenants at will.28 It was only after Lawrence’s Settlement29 that permanent but inalienable occupancy rights, and not proprietary rights, were bestowed upon the

21 Walter Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, London, 1895, p. 102. 22 Yusuf Ganai, Kashmiri’s Struggle for Independence (1931-1939), Srinagar, 2003, p. 11.Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 23 His Highness Government, Jammu and Kashmir, Report of the Srinagar Riots Enquiry Committee, Srinagar, 1931, pp. 205-06. 24 Charles Ellison Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir and the Adjacent Districts of Kishtwar, Badrawah, Jammu, Naoshera, Punch, and the Valley of the Kishen Ganga, Calcutta, 1873, p. 30. 25 Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State, 1893-94, Jammu, p. 46. 26 Gwasha Lal Koul, Kashmir Through the Ages, 5000 B.C. to 1954 A.D.: A Historical Survey, Srinagar, 1954, p. 122. 27 Diwan Kirpa Ram, -i-Kashmir, Lahore, 1856, pp. 256-7. 28 A. Wingate, Preliminary Report of Settlement Operations in Kashmir and Jammu, Lahore, 1888, p. 56. 29 In 1886 Kashmiri Muslims had sent a petition to the Resident to appoint a ‘courteous and compassionate’ Englishman as Settlement Officer. Consequently A. Wingate was appointed for the purpose, Foreign Department, Letter from the Resident in Kashmir to the Secretary to the Government of India, S.E. October 1886, No.s, 235-300, p. 20 cited in Ishaq Khan, History of Srinagar, p. 169.

18 peasantry.30 Along with the loss of rights in land, the peasants were subjected to a very harsh and cruel treatment by the revenue officials. They were corrupt to the extreme and exacted illegal exactions known as Nazrana and Rasum from the peasants which left the peasants half-fed and starving.31 Walter Lawrence who had an opportunity to closely study the agrarian structure of the State provides heart wrenching account of the atrocities committed by the Pandit revenue officials on the peasantry class and comments that, ‘they have proved as officials rapacious, short- sighted and cruel’.32 The cumulative impact of these retrograde policies was the impoverishment of the peasantry and ruination of agriculture. As a result Kashmir was continuously visited by which devastated it and led to large scale wiping out of the population. Sir Albion Banerjee, the Prime Minister of Maharaja Hari Singh who resigned from his position summarised the situation in the State as:

Jammu and Kashmir State is labouring under many disadvantages, with a large Mohammedan population absolutely illiterate, labouring under poverty and very low economic conditions of living in the villages and practically governed like dumb driven cattle. There is no touch between the Government and the people, no suitable opportunity for representing grievances and the administrative machinery itself requires overhauling from top to bottom to bring it up to the modern conditions of efficiency. It has at present little or no sympathy with the people's wants and grievances.

There is hardly any public opinion in the State. As regards the Press it is practically non-existent with the result that the government is not benefited to the extent that it should be by the impact of healthy criticism.33

Emergence of Political Consciousness

The Dogra StateMaulana did not only Azad exploit Library, the state Aligarheconomically Muslim but also University barred its citizens from enjoying any political rights. Formation of any kind of political association was banned and any kind of political activity was illegal.34 The Maharajas, since functioned as ‘breakwaters in the storm’ did everything to thwart any attempt at

30 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, p. 427. 31 Prem Nath Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir-Cultural and Political from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, New Delhi, 1954, p. 144. 32 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, p. 282 and pp. 412-14. 33 Bazaz, History of Struggle, pp. 140-1. 34 Jammu and Kashmir Government, General Records, File No. 66/102-C of 1921, Jammu and Kashmir Archives, Srinagar (Henceforth JKA).

19 political mobilisation in the State. Even a mere sympathy with the Swadeshi Movement was deemed as seditious.35 Due to the authoritarian attitude of the State and mass illiteracy and poverty there was absence of political consciousness among the people of the State up to the first decade of 20th century. However, there were several localised revolts against the Dogra State like the Shawl Baf Revolt of 186536 or expression of disapproval of Dogra State policies as is reflected in the secret memorandum to the Viceroy on the occasion of 1877 floods,37 but on the whole there was absence of any concerted political consciousness.

It was only after the establishment of British Residency in Kashmir in 1885 that the Kashmiri people, Muslims in particular got an opportunity to present their grievances. In fact the Resident was regarded as a Saviour by the people. Naqshbandis, the most eminent family among the Muslims of Valley sent petitions directly to the Resident and Viceroy, bypassing the Maharaja deliberately, requesting them to redress the grievances of the Muslims. In 1909 a petition was sent to the Private Secretary of the Viceroy by the Kashmiri Muslim representatives, acknowledging the changing conditions as a result of the Resident. They expressed hope that the Resident would bring ‘safety and justice to the Kashmiri Musalmans and relieve them of the tyranny and zulm’.38 Since press was practically non-existent in Kashmir, the educated Kashmiris used the platform of Punjab press to highlight their amicable conditions. They sent reports and articles to the newspapers and impressed upon the British government to intervene and ameliorate their conditions as they had lost hope in the Maharaja’s administration.39

The prelude to an organised public opinion in the State was the formation of socio- religious associations, formed first by the Kashmiri Pandits and later followed by their Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

35 Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 226. 36 Exorbitant taxes were levied on the shawl-weavers by Dagshawl Department which they were unable to pay. On 29 April 1865 they marched in a procession to protest against the repressive taxes. The Dogra forces fired upon them which resulted in the killing of 28 weavers, Ghulam Hassan Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, 1931-1940, New Delhi, 1980, repr., Srinagar, 2009, pp. 78-9. 37 Kashmir was visited by a in 1877 due to excessive rainfall which led to the destruction of crops. The inefficiency of the Dogra administration aggravated the problem resulting in the death of thousands of people. Some Kashmiri Muslims secretly submitted a memorandum to the Viceroy of India and levied gravest accusations against the Maharaja, Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 142. 38 Government of India, Foreign Department (General Branch), January 1909, No.s, 15-16, NAI. 39 Letter to the Observer, Lahore, 16 September 1911. See also, the articles of the period in Zamindar (Lahore), Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), Inqilab (Lahore) and Alfazl (Qadian).

20 Muslim counterparts. These associations provided them with an opportunity to make use of the constricted space conceded by the Dogra state and confront it by using the socio-religious sphere in the furthering of political interests. By 1890s both Hindus as well as Muslims had begun to form associations purely for religious and social reformation and by 1927 there were more than 100 socio-religious associations functioning in the State.40 Since any kind of political activity was not tolerated by the State, it was through the platforms of these socio-religious associations that sometimes issues of political significance were discussed secretly. When the issue of the protection of the hereditary State Subjects came up, the Pandit leaders like Jia Lal Jalali and J. L. Kilam secured the services of these associations and outside press to organise public meetings and conferences.41 Muslim preachers in their sermons also used the platform of religious associations to voice issues which were political in nature. No wonder then, the early political leadership of Kashmir emerged out of these associations and were directly or indirectly connected with it. Muslims did not lag behind in the formation of socio-religious reform associations and by the first decade of the 20th century a number of such associations were functioning in both the Jammu and Kashmir regions. Among the associations which had far reaching impact on the socio-religious sphere of Kashmir was Anjuman-i-Nusrat-ul-Islam founded by Mirwaiz Rasul Shah in 1899. It established a primary school to impart a blending of religious and secular education to the Muslims of Kashmir.42 The Anjuman received social recognition and prestige with receiving donations from the influential Muslims of Srinagar, particularly the Naqshbandis. It rose to play a significant role in educating a coterie of influential Muslims and enlightening the masses regarding their position in the Dogra rule.

In the last decadeMaulana of the 19Azadth century Library, there was Aligarh a greater Muslim awareness University of their position within the State which was couched in religious terms and the tendency to confront the discrimination, particularly in the assertion of religious rights. The trampling of the religious rights was now confronted upon, albeit in a limited manner and methods deemed not seditious by the State. In the 1890s there were increasing reports of

40 List of Societies, Anjumans and Sabhas, Political and Quasi-Political, and Religious in Existence in the State on 31 December 1926, General Department, 1928, File No. 264/P-21, JKA cited in Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 227. 41 Jia Lal Kilam, A History of Kashmiri Pandits, Srinagar, 1955, pp. 280-295. 42 U. K. Zutshi, Emergence of Political Awakening in Kashmir, Delhi, 1986, p. 165.

21 unusual rise in cow slaughter cases in the State,43 not because people had no alternatives but as a conscious assertion of their religious rights. There were attempts to fight the State within its legal structures, for example, by raising funds to fight cow-killing cases.44 This religiously-informed awareness was a step further in the emergence of an organised political consciousness in the State given the changing circumstances in British India in general and the State in particular. However, the political consciousness and protests were disorganised and lacked appeal beyond a limited time and space. It was only after the spread of modern education among the Muslim community by the efforts of twin organisation of Christian Missionaries and Anjuman-i-Nusratul Islam that the political consciousness increased. Outside Kashmir, Punjabi Muslims of Kashmiri-origin started organising themselves and lending their support to the cause of Kashmiri Muslims. The formation of Anjuman-i- Kashmiri Musalmanan-i-Lahore in 1896 was a landmark development as it raised awareness about the socio-economic disabilities faced by the Kashmiri Muslims.45 They published articles in newspapers and magazines and highlighted the sorry state of affairs in the State. The Dogra State for its policy of discrimination was particularly criticised. These newspapers found their way into Kashmir and were read by the modern-educated Kashmiris.46

The Silk Factory Revolt and the submission of Memorandum to Lord Reading in 1924 reflect the emergence of political consciousness which presumably laid the foundations of an organised political movement in the State. The Silk Factory workers had been working in miserable conditions and they had numerous grievances with regard to ‘insufficiency of wages, corruption of the officials and the tyranny of the inspecting staff’.47 On 12 July 1924 the workers took out a peaceful procession to press forMaulana their demands. Azad TheLibrary, procession Aligarh was fired Muslim upon by University the State Forces which resulted in the death of a number of workers.48 This caused uproar in the entire city of Srinagar and people took out processions in solidarity with the workers. These protests constitute an important milestone in the emergence of political consciousness

43 Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, pp. 178-181. 44 Ibid., p. 181. 45 Mirza Shafiq Hussain, Kashmiri Musalmanun ki Siyasi Jadujahad 1931-39: Muntakhab Dastawaizat, , 1985, pp. 7-8. 46 Khan, History of Srinagar, pp. 176-77. 47 Report of the Srinagar Riots Enquiry Committee, p. 111. 48 Administrative Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the year 1924, Jammu, 1925, p. 9.

22 in Kashmir as for the time the people assembled to get their economic grievances redressed.

When the Viceroy of India, Lord Reading visited the state in 1924, some influential Kashmiris submitted a memorandum to him, apprising him of the deplorable situation in Kashmir and their demands. A look at the demands raised clearly singles out the fact that the people were becoming politically conscious and a class of people had emerged who clearly understood the reasons of their predicament and were ready to raise their voice. It also raises the issue of sovereignty to the fore as after the establishment of British Residency in Kashmir people were looking forward to it and considered the Britishers as the only force which could persuade Maharaja to redress genuine grievances of the masses. The demands ranged from taking steps to further modern education, restoration of confiscated religious places, grant of proprietary rights in land, an elected Legislative Assembly, abolition of Begar and granting of due representation to Muslims in government services.49 The government of Maharaja was unnerved and the drafters of memorandum were severely punished, Saad-ud-din Shawl, the leading petitioner was banished from the State.50 However, under public pressure he was soon recalled and there were large processions to welcome him back into the State which clearly shows the enthusiasm and awareness of the people.

By the 1930s the Kashmiri Pandits who were more educated and well represented in government services as compared to their Muslim counterparts had clearly developed their sense of a religiously informed community, initially confronted against the and later against the Muslims, each time reasserting their loyalty to the self and throne of Maharaja. The Kashmiri Pandits who since the time of Afghans had formed an indispensable part of the administration and depended entirely on the government services,Maulana51 suddenly Azad felt Library, threatened Aligarh by the emplo Muslimyment Universityof Punjabi Hindus in the State administration which, they believed, snatched the ‘bread’ from the Pandits. Consequently, they began organising themselves in order to protect their economic and religious interests. Petitions were sent to the Maharaja and pressure created by publishing articles in the Punjab press to define the ‘State Subjects’ so as to restrict the state employment of outsiders.52 The struggle finally culminated in the

49 Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, pp. 90-3. 50 Report of the Srinagar Riots Enquiry Committee, p. 193. 51 Prem Nath Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, Srinagar, 1941, p. 283. 52 Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, pp. 250-52.

23 adoption of ‘State Subject Definition’ which defined the rights of native subjects of Jammu and Kashmir in more clear terms and satisfied the Pandits.53 It is significant to note that while confronting the Punjabi Hindus, the Pandits used the broad based inclusive identity of a well-knit region, wherein the Muslims were included by default and whose interests coalesced with that of the Pandits, to justify their protest against the Punjabi encroachment. However, this coalition was presumably short-lived, especially after 1930s when the Muslims began to assert their identity and pressurise the Maharaja to bring an end to the discrimination faced by the Muslims and grant special provisions to ameliorate their economic and religious conditions, the Pandits used the religious identity, vilified the Muslim protests, and dubbed them as communal. It was an ingenious method of the oxymoron of using both the inclusivist and exclusivist identities to fulfil their interests.

Formation of Muslim Conference and its Conversion to National Conference

The 1930s mark an important watershed in the emergence of an organised public opinion in the State. It was the time when many young people had returned from British India after receiving education from different universities. They were influenced by the British Indian politics to a large extent as the activities of and the Muslim League had strongly influenced the political atmosphere of the Subcontinent. These young men could easily compare their conditions with that of British India where the people enjoyed certain rights like the freedom of press, speech and above all the right to carry political activities. On their return to the State they felt a sense of deprivation as there was a clear contrast between the conditions prevailing in the State and those in British India with regard to Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University the enjoying of political and economic rights. It was this feeling of deprivation which led these young men to search for alternatives and work for improving the conditions in the state. Prominent among them were Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah who had earned his degree from Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband which was a hotbed of politics and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who had obtained his Masters in Chemistry from Aligarh Muslim University in 1930. They were ready to take cudgels against the Maharaja and change the status quo. A Reading Room was established in Srinagar where the

53 Foreign and Political Department, File No. 517-PR/H- 157 of 1928, JKA, Srinagar.

24 discussions of political nature were held. It was from this platform that articles and letters were sent to the newspapers of Punjab highlighting the disturbing economic and political conditions of the State.54

Fortunately for Sheikh Abdullah and Kashmir, there had been simmering discontent among the Muslims of Kashmir against the atrocious policies of the Maharaja and there were signs that the Muslims were getting activated and ready to demand their share of rights.55 By 1931 the political atmosphere of the State was such that a strong determined person would emerge as the leader who was ready to sacrifice his personal well-being and instead of offering unflinching loyalty to the Maharaja would voice the sentiments of the masses. A series of events catapulted Sheikh Abdullah into the political firmament of Kashmir. The Tauheen-e-Quran (Desecration of Holy Quran) incident and ban on Khutba56 in Jammu evoked severe reaction among the Muslims of Kashmir who deemed it as a direct attack on their religion.57 There was restlessness among the Muslims of Kashmir and a series of meetings were held to protest against the assault on religion. One of the most significant of these meetings was the one at Khanqah-i-Mualla, approximately participated by about fifty thousand people. The meeting saw a cross-section of Kashmiri elites sitting shoulder to shoulder for the first time and a few among them were chosen and deputed to present their grievances to the Maharaja.58 It was in this meeting that Abdul Qadeer, a Pathan in the service of an English Army officer vacationing in Kashmir, made a fiery speech exhorting Kashmiris to rise against the Dogra Maharaja. It was this speech and the subsequent events which ultimately led to 13 July 1931 incident when the Kashmiris for the first time openly protested against the Maharaja and challenged his authority. It was the inauguration of ‘freedom struggle’ against the Dogra state. The killing of twenty two Kashmiris on Maulana13 July 1931 Azad evoked Library, strong reaction Aligarh from Muslim within and University outside the state. Protest demonstrations, sometimes violent were held in all the towns of Kashmir and

54 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Aatish-i-Chinar, Srinagar, 1986, p. 48 and pp. 55-59. 55 From the Resident in Kashmir dated 17 July 1931, CRR, Political Department, File No. R/1/1/2064, cited in Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 259. 56 Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, Kashmakash, Srinagar, 2001, pp. 63-67. 57 Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850, London, 2000, p. 354. 58 Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol. I, Lahore, 1977, repr., 2005, p. 372.

25 many people were killed in government action. There was enactment of martial law and a reign of terror was let loose in the city of Srinagar.59

Extensive propaganda was carried out by the Punjabi Ahmediyas who formed All India Kashmir Committee immediately after 13th July incident to further the Kashmiri Muslim interests and pressurise the Government of India to help the people of the State in securing the basic rights of humanity.60 It decided to celebrate 14th August as Kashmir Day in solidarity with the Kashmiris which evoked widespread support in the form of demonstrations, public meetings and protests throughout the subcontinent.61 It has been argued that the interest shown by the Punjabi Ahmediyas in Kashmir was also due to the fact that by sympathising with Kashmiris they wanted to convert them to their faith, as they regarded Kashmir sacred due to their belief that Jesus Christ lay buried in Srinagar.62 Realising that Kashmir was being dominated by the Ahmediyas, Ahrars who regarded the former as heretics and was constituted of Ulema, began to send its volunteers in the form of Jathas to Kashmir. They tried to mobilise the Kashmiri Muslims against the Ahmediyas by holding that they did not believe in the finality of the Prophethood and were also (Ahmediyas) conspiring with the British in Kashmir.63 Their mobilisational activities led to many communal riots in the Jammu province as they also provoked the Muslim peasants against the landlords and moneylenders who were mostly Hindus.64 This created a precarious situation for the Maharaja and sometimes he had to rush in the British troops to contain the protests.65 The cumulative impact of the Ahmediya and Ahrar activities was that it encouraged the Muslims to organise themselves and resist the State oppression. The economic conditions of the State were worsening as a result of the trade depression which had led to the falling of agricultural prices and had hardly hit the shawlMaulana trade. A Azad large numberLibrary, of artisansAligarh and Muslim craftsmen University had been thrown out of jobs.66 The Silk Factory workers were aghast against the State as their grievances

59 Ibid., p. 382. 60 Statesman, Calcutta, 28 July 1931. 61 Tribune, Lahore, 29 July 1931. See also, Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, pp. 141-42. 62 The presence of a long grave at Rozabal was believed to be of Jesus Christ. However the claim has been contested by most of the scholars who take it as a myth bereft of any evidence and a flagrant attempt at imposing sacredness to a site. Freeland Abbott, Islam and Pakistan, New York, 1968, pp. 148-62. 63 Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, p. 294. 64 Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 264. 65 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 159. 66 P. N. K. Bamzai, Culture and Political History of Kashmir, New Delhi, 1994, p. 723.

26 related to lower wages, high-handedness of the Pandit officials, non-payment of pensions and illegal expulsion from the job had not been redressed. As a result of the crop failure in 1929 coupled with the Great Depression, the food control policy of the State had broken down and the majority of the people of Srinagar were deprived of cheap grains. The cultivators themselves were under distress due to illegal taxation, begar, official corruption, indebtedness and high revenue demand of the State.67 The worsened economic conditions provided an opportunity to the leadership to mobilise the masses and use their grievances against the State. Sheikh Abdullah took the best out of these conditions and was able to carve himself out by championing the rights of the distressed peasants, artisans and workers. He skilfully wove these grievances into a well-knit criticism against the State which ultimately culminated in the formation of a well organised political movement.

In the aftermath of the 13th July incident and the consequent protest demonstrations both in and outside the state, and the Ahrar activism which had the potential of disturbing peace not only in Kashmir but in Punjab also, the British pressurised the Maharaja to appoint a commission so as to look into the grievances of the Muslims. Consequently B. J. Glancy was appointed for the purpose.68 The Commission found that Muslims had serious and valid grievances against the State and recommended their redressal. Among its recommendations which had an enormous impact was the recognition of the right to form political associations and publish newspapers in the State.69 The Muslim leaders had been strongly feeling the necessity of a state-wide political organisation which could unite the Muslims and present a unified voice. Capitalising on the recommendations of Glancy Commission, the Muslim leaders under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah moved forward to form a political organisation. ExtensiveMaulana deliberations Azad Library, were held Aligarh with the Muslim leaders of University Jammu70 and All India Kashmir Committee71 who assured their full cooperation, moral and material, in this regard. As a result All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was born and the inaugural session was held on 14, 15 and 16 October 1932 at Pathar Masjid Srinagar

67 Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 272. 68 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 439. 69 His Highness Government, Jammu and Kashmir, Orders on the Recommendations Contained in the Glancy Commission Report, 2nd Edition, Jammu, 1933, p. 8. 70 Abbas, Kashmakash, p. 118. 71 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 482.

27 under the presidentship of Sheikh Abdullah.72 The Muslim Conference tried to strengthen its organisation and emerge as a strong voice of the oppressed Kashmiri Muslims. It skilfully used the socio-religious fabric of Kashmir to its benefit and was successful in mobilising the common masses against the Dogra state.

It has been argued that the Muslim Conference consistently used religion as a tool of political mobilisation. Given the fact that the Dogra State was couched in religious terms and used religious symbols, idioms and scriptures as tools of political legitimacy, the reaction against it followed the same trajectories. Since religion was the pre-eminent marker of social identity, Muslim Conference used religious symbols to seek political legitimacy and to reach to the larger public. It used mosques and shrines as the centres of its political activity to mobilise the masses against the Dogra state. The restoration of Pathar Masjid which had been confiscated by the government remained at the core of the Muslim Conference activities. When restored it became the hotbed of Muslim Conference politics which also constructed its office there, notwithstanding the fact that the government had restored it with a condition that the speeches of political nature were not to be delivered from its pulpits.73 It tried to infringe on the religious space exclusively reserved for the religious class. The opening of a Dar-ul-Fatwa within the premises of the party office and then establishing its branches throughout the Kashmir valley clearly demonstrates that the Muslim Conference was seeking to establish its presence in all the aspects of Kashmiri socio-religious life. The Kashmiri Muslims were divided in their loyalty to the two Mirwaizs, of Jamia Masjid and Khanqah-i-Mualla. The former represented a more orthodox view and was against the Sufi-shrine based orientation of religion. The Hamadani Mirwaiz was a liberal and believed in the Sufi doctrines and veneration of shrinesMaulana74 and as a Azad result hadLibrary, much widerAligarh support Muslim base among University the Muslims of the Valley. There was continuous tussle and contestation between the two with regard to the preaching rights in mosques and shrines.75 Sheikh Abdullah was aware of the social strength and support base of Mirwaiz Hamadani and therefore chose to support

72 Rashid Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. I, Srinagar, 1966, p. 246. 73 Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 219. 74 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 130-35. 75 Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, pp. 238-9.

28 him against the Mirwaiz of Jamia Masjid who was also more closely associated with the Dogra state.76

The Muslim Conference, though not a communal organisation, functioned more within the ambit of religion, raising the grievances of the Muslims and mobilising them. The leaders tried to convince the non-Muslims that their movement was not directed against any community and that only through communal harmony and cooperation would they achieve the goal of responsible government.77 There were a few attempts to persuade the non-Muslims to join the organisation so that a joint struggle for their rights could be launched 78 but the latter viewed the Conference with suspicion as they were not ready to accept the fact that there were instances where the State discriminated against the Muslims solely on the basis of their religion.79 Meanwhile, certain developments took place which resulted in the Muslim Conference trying to woo the non-Muslims to its side and also persuaded some of the liberal Pandits to join the chorus against the State. There was a section among the Kashmiri Pandits represented by Prem Nath Bazaz who conceded that the Muslims were economically and politically marginalized and felt the need of political mobilization on the basis of regional identity. In July 1932 a meeting took place in Srinagar between Bazaz and Sheikh Abdullah where it was resolved to work together for the secularisation of politics. Bazaz launched the Daily Vitasta to popularise the demand for the establishment of responsible government and the ideal of secular politics in the State.80 In 1935 Bazaz and Sheikh Abdullah jointly launched weekly newspaper Hamdard, as a ‘standard bearer of democracy and unity of all Kashmiris without any consideration of caste or creed’.81 The Hamdard was vociferous in its criticism of Punjabi Muslims (Ahrars) who were communalising the politics of Kashmir.82 It continuouslyMaulana Azadunderlined Library,the need Aligarh for broadening Muslim the political University movement of Kashmir. Since the constitution of Muslim Conference clearly laid out that only Muslims could become members of Muslim Conference, the non-Muslims felt constricted to join Muslim Conference. It was advised that Muslim Conference should

76 Ibid., pp. 267-9. 77 Vitasta, Srinagar, 28 January 1933. 78 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. I, p. 263. 79 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 250. 80 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 140. 81 Ibid., p. 167. 82 Abdullah, Aatish-i-Chinar, pp. 136-147. See also, Hamdard, Srinagar, 1 February 1936.

29 draw lessons from Congress which had kept its doors open for the Muslims.83 The rift between Sheikh Abdullah and Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah84 persuaded the former to look for support beyond his constituency of Muslims. The formation of the Praja Sabha in 1934 had brought the Muslim and Hindu leaders on a common platform and there were occasions when the two cooperated with each other on issues pertaining to the state in general.85 Therefore by mid 1930s a situation had been created where if the Muslim leadership would compromise on its certain ideals, the non-Muslims would certainly join them in the struggle for responsible government.

The meeting between Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru in 1938 in North West Frontier Province proved very significant and decisive for the future history of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was very much impressed by Nehru and his ideals of Socialism and Secularism. It has been argued that Nehru had an emotional attachment to Kashmir as his ancestors had migrated from there.86 But the friendship between the two was less emotional and more political in nature. Sheikh Abdullah hoped to benefit from his friendship with a stalwart of Indian National Congress whose stature as a politician was acknowledged even by the British. Nehru was instrumental in reorienting Congress policy towards the Princely States from that of non- interventionist to recognising ‘that the people in the Indian States have an inherent right to Swaraj no less than the people of British India’.87 Sheikh Abdullah found support from Nehru for his movement for responsible government. In his presidential address to the All India States Peoples Conference in 1939 at Ludhiana, Nehru said, ‘In Kashmir I am glad to see a number of wise and far-seeing Hindus and Sikhs threw their weight on the side of the popular movement and supported the National Demand which asked for a responsible government’.88 On the other hand Nehru could also projectMaulanaSheikh Abdullah’s Azad Library,secularism Aligarhas a counter Muslim to the charge University by Muslim League that Congress represented only the Hindus. Encouraged by the support of Nehru and

83 Prem Nath Bazaz, ‘Muslim Conference ke Khilaf Aqliyatun ki Sab se Badi Shikayat’ (Urdu), Hamdard, 1 May 1937. 84 Mirwaiz had carved out his separate party, Azad Muslim Conference in 1933. Many reasons have been attributed to his alienation from Sheikh Abdullah, prominent being the latter’s increasing anti- Dogra rant and the personal animosity as Mirwaiz felt threatened by the popularity of Sheikh Abdullah. See Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol.1, pp. 290-3. 85 Abdullah, Aatish-i-Chinar, pp. 204-13. See also, Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. I, pp. 344-48. 86 Abdullah, Aatish-i-Chinar, pp. 209-11. 87 B. N. Pandey, ed., The Indian Nationalist Movement, 1885-1947: Select Documents, London, 1979, p. 233. 88 M J Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale, New Delhi, 2002, p. 82.

30 some influential non-Muslims, Sheikh Abdullah was successful in effecting the conversion of Muslim Conference into National Conference,89 albeit not without facing opposition from some leaders like Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, Abdul Majid Qarshi and Sheikh Ahmed Din Banihali.90 Their main contention was that Muslim Conference would lose its independent character and become a hand maid of Congress.91 If non-Muslims become members of National Conference it would become difficult to fight for those rights which Muslims had been deprived of only on the basis of their religion, like ban on cow slaughter, the issue of inheritance of Hindu converts to Islam, impediments in the way of conversion to Islam, propagation of or discrimination against Muslims in services.92 Sheikh Abdullah and Bazaz tried to allay the fears of Chaudhary Abbas who finally set some preconditions for conversion. These included that National Conference would remain aloof from Congress politics and would continue to work for the economic, political and religious rights of the Muslims.93 On the acceptance of these conditions, Abbas lent his support to the conversion of Muslim Conference into National Conference. The conversion paved the way for many Hindu and Sikh leaders like P. N. Bazaz, Pandit Kashyap Bandhu, Girdhari Lal Dogra, Jia Lal Kilam and Sardar Budd Singh to join the National Conference.94 However, the conversion did not result in the non-Muslims joining the Party on a massive scale as had been hoped. Those who joined the Conference jeopardized it from within as they were not able to rise above from their communal interests since most of them had ‘worked for years in different communalist Hindu and Sikh organisations and had risen to eminence by espousing the cause of obscurantism, reaction and repression’.95

National Conference did not maintain its isolation from the nationalist politics and was getting closerMaulana to the Congress.Azad Library, Sheikh Abdullah Aligarh in Muslimparticular Universitywas strengthening his contacts with Nehru and openly praising Congress. In May 1940 Nehru and Khan

89 Chaudhary Abbas held that Sheikh Abdullah put forward two reasons for converting Muslim Conference into National Conference. One that Gopalaswamy Ayyengar, the Prime Minister of Kashmir had promised him that a programme of reforms would be initiated in the state and two popular ministers inducted into the cabinet if a nationalist body was formed in the State. Second, a few non-Muslims were ready to join the party if necessary changes were effected in it, Abbas, Kashmakash, p. 169. 90 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. I, p. 367. 91 Bazaz, History of Struggle, pp. 144-5. 92 Abbas, Kashmakash, p. 177. 93 Ibid., p. 178. 94 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, pp. 313-4. 95 Bazaz, History of Struggle, pp. 148-9.

31 Abdul Ghaffar Khan visited Kashmir and were given a rousing reception by National Conference. By becoming member of the All India States Peoples Conference in 1941, National Conference, on the one hand was getting support and legitimacy from the Congress and increasing the political reputation of Sheikh Abdullah96 but on the other was raising suspicions among the Muslims of the State that National Conference was increasingly becoming a stooge of the Congress. When Mahatma Gandhi launched the , National Conference supported the Congress demands and condemned the repression unleashed by the British Government.97 Interestingly, Sheikh Abdullah’s close association with Congress led a good number of Kashmiri Pandits to join the National Conference not because they were supporting the movement against the Maharaja but because they identified their interests with the Hindu Congress. In this endeavour they were fully supported by Prime Minister Gopalaswamy Ayyengar who was sympathetic to the Congress.98 The National Conference-Congress nexus was unnerving the Muslim League and its supporters in Kashmir as the rise of Sheikh Abdullah was perceived as the rejection of Jinnah and Muslim League. Sheikh Abdullah denounced Pakistan Resolution and the ‘Two Nation’ theory of Jinnah as an emotional slogan and declared that Kashmir had no need of Pakistan as Muslims were living happily with the Hindus.99 While addressing Kashmiri students at Aligarh Muslim University on 1 April 1939 Jinnah criticized Sheikh Abdullah’s close association with the Congress which had put the Muslim community in a whirlpool. He expressed the hope that Sheikh Abdullah would soon realize his mistake and cut his ties with the Congress which was a Hindu organisation.100 Sheikh Abdullah reacted sharply to Jinnah’s address by retorting that they could not ally with the ‘friends and protectors’ of princes.101 National Conference’s close association with Congress led to disillusionment among the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Muslims, particularly of Jammu region, and there were attempts to revive the Muslim Conference and a manifesto was issued on 1 October 1940 in this regard. In 1941 Muslim Conference was revived with a key role played by Chaudhary Abbas and

96 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Hertingfordbury, 1991, pp. 95-6. 97 Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale, pp. 83-6. 98 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 156. 99 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, , Abridged and translated by Khushwant Singh, New Delhi, 1993, p. 56. 100 A G Noorani, The Kashmir Dispute, 1947-2012, New Delhi, 2013, p. 92. 101 Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, pp. 371-72.

32 Allahrakha Sagar.102 The revived Muslim Conference maintained close ties with the Muslim League and consulted it in all the matters of the State. As early as 1943 Chaudhary Abbas declared that Muslim Conference was ‘part and parcel of Muslim League’.103 With its revival the political climate of Srinagar was charged as there were continuous scuffles, skirmishes, mud-slinging and slandering between the workers of National Conference and Muslim Conference.104 Thus the implanting of nationalist politics in Kashmir by National Conference and Muslim Conference by respectively associating themselves with Congress and Muslim League sowed the seeds of dissension among the Kashmiri Muslims who were now divided more sharply than earlier. It has been argued, keeping in view the developments in 1947, that this dissension had a pernicious effect and proved inimical for the interests of the State and threw Kashmir into a quagmire of violence and uncertainty in 1947 when the fate of Subcontinent was decided by the British.

Notwithstanding the revival of Muslim Conference in 1941, its support base remained confined to Jammu region and some areas of Srinagar city which were under the influence of Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah. It lacked a sound organisation and leadership which could challenge Sheikh Abdullah. The fact that it was dominated by Jammu based leaders, who could neither speak nor understand Kashmiri language created impediments in increasing its support base.105 It was no comparison to National Conference which under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah had made deeper inroads into the Kashmiri society. However, in the 1940s many developments took place which created opportunities for Muslim Conference to refurbish its image and gain popularity among the masses. The popularity of National Conference was already shrinking as a result of its increased association with Congress which was seen as a Hindu organisationMaulana by a Azad section Library, of the Muslims. Aligarh106 The Muslim government University was moving shrewdly and in order to divide the people and create wedge between the communities Arms Act and Script Act, making Devanagri script at par with Persian script, were passed in 1940. Sheikh Abdullah strongly condemned the Acts which were communal

102 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 164. 103 Khalid, Srinagar, 12 January 1943. 104 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 164. 105 This lacuna was felt by Jinnah when he visited the state in 1944 and advised Chaudhary Abbas to learn Kashmiri, Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 638. 106 Abbas, Kashmakash, p. 212.

33 and aimed at implanting alien culture in Kashmir.107 All the National Conference members resigned from the Praja Sabha in protest.108 However, soon Sheikh Abdullah changed tune in favour of Maharaja and signalled to cooperate with him which was rewarded by inducting National Conference nominees to those seats of the legislature which had fallen vacant as a result of resignation by the National Conference members in the wake of script controversy, without submitting to any vote.109 This unconstitutional practice by Maharaja and its acceptance by the National Conference was criticized by Muslim Conference and other sections who organised protest demonstrations against National Conference. National Conference was accused of being anti-people and fearful of the popular mandate which would have resulted in its defeat.110 In the winter of 1942-3 there was serious fuel crisis in the valley and a Fuel Committee was constituted by the Government of which Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, a National Conference leader was appointed as one of non-official members. Similarly a National Conference member was appointed to the committee tasked to revise shali ration cards. These appointments brought bad reputation to National Conference as it became evident that it was functioning as a prop of the Dogra regime and was part of the structure that kept the Dogra State going. This helped Muslim Conference to expand its support base to a certain extent. Further the National Conference members followed a policy of partiality as fuel was denied to the supporters of Muslim Conference and their ration cards were either cancelled or were given less rations than due to them.111 This increased the animosity between the two and vitiated the political atmosphere of Srinagar so much so that the government had to step in and summon the representatives of both Muslim Conference and National Conference to soften their tone. It is alleged that Sheikh Abdullah himself participated in these acts of threatening and muzzling the opposition. He is reported to have said Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University that to silence his opponents he would not hesitate to take up sword.112 The only

107 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 158. 108 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i- Kashmir, pp. 162-63. The script controversy had divided the National Conference leadership from within as Pandit members were in favour of the Devanagri script. Consequently, P. N. Bazaz and many others resigned from the party. See, Bazaz, History of Struggle, pp. 185-86. 109 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 192. 110 Khalid, 12 November 1942. Regarding this controversy Saraf believes that though National Conference resorted to unconstitutionalism, it would have certainly emerged victorious in case of elections as Sheikh Abdullah was still ruling the hearts of Kashmiris, Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol. 1, p. 595. 111 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 166. 112 Shabnam Qayoom, Kashmir Ka Siyasi Inqilab, Vol. II, Srinagar, 1989, pp. 98-99.

34 winner in this tussle was the Dogra state which took advantage out of the disunity and strangulated the oppositional politics in the State.

It has been argued that the support base of National Conference was dwindling because of its association with the government113 and a significant number of educated Muslims of the state were getting inclined towards the Muslim League as they were baffled by the Pakistan Slogan. No doubt that Sheikh Abdullah commanded the support of the majority of the Muslims living in the Kashmir valley but he and National Conference had only a nominal presence in the Jammu region which was a strong bastion of Muslim Conference. Therefore both the parties were in favour of reconciling their differences as their tussle was hampering the interests of the state, in particular dividing the Muslims. It was in this backdrop that Sheikh Abdullah met Jinnah at Delhi and invited him to Kashmir so as to help National Conference and Muslim Conference to reach to a compromise.114 On reaching Kashmir, Jinnah was given a rousing reception by the people which so overwhelmed him that he termed it as a ‘Royal welcome’.115 National Conference accorded a formal welcome to Jinnah with Sheikh Abdullah addressing him as the ‘beloved leader of the Muslims of India’ to which Jinnah replied that the warm welcome was actually a mark of respect to the Indian Muslims and Muslim League.116 While in Srinagar Jinnah met different shades of opinion and tried to evolve a consensus between National Conference and Muslim Conference. Sheikh Abdullah was ready to accept the leadership of Muslim League in All-India matters but he demanded non-interference of Muslim League in State politics which was unacceptable to the Muslim Conference as they derived their strength from the moral support of Muslim League.117 With the reconciliation talks failing, Jinnah, while addressing the annual session of Muslim League on 27th June, 1944, called uponMaulana Muslims Azad to unite Library, under the Aligarhbanner of aMuslim single organisation University (Muslim Conference) and not to hide behind the veneer of false nationalism which had failed in its objective of welding Hindus and Sikhs to the movement for responsible government.118 This clearly pro-Muslim Conference stance was not liked by Sheikh

113 Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, Princeton, 1954, p. 22. 114 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 60. 115 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 623. 116 Khidmat, Srinagar, 11 June 1944. 117 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 627. 118 Javed, Srinagar, 6 July 1944. M J Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale, p. 85 mentions that in that session Jinnah called National Conference a ‘band of gangsters’. The newspaper Javed has produced the full address in its issue of 6 July 1944 but this statement is mentioned nowhere.

35 Abdullah and he began to address a series of meetings to explain his position and criticise Jinnah. On 20 June Sheikh Abdullah lashed out at him, ‘If Jinnah does not give up the habit of interfering in our politics, it will be difficult for him to go back in an honourable manner’.119 Jinnah was thus unsuccessful in reconciling the differences of Muslim Conference and National Conference. It was very unfortunate that a joint meeting of Jinnah, Sheikh Abdullah and Chaudhary Abbas did not take place,120 which could have helped in solving the differences. It has been argued that it was impractical on the part of Muslim Conference to demand liquidation of the National Conference which was unacceptable to Sheikh Abdullah whose popularity at least in Kashmir was near universal. National Conference was better organised and was a mass movement as compared to Muslim Conference which was largely supported by the religious class and landed gentry. The more sensible solution was that Sheikh be called upon to maintain close relations with the Muslim League and cut his ties with the Congress. On the other hand while Sheikh Abdullah demanded non-interference of Muslim League in Kashmir affairs, he was not ready to sever his ties with the Congress and continued to consult it in internal matters. More so this relationship increased after the failure of Jinnah’s visit which is evident from the frequent visit of top brass of Congress to Kashmir.

Jinnah’s verdict in favour of Muslim Conference had provided it an opportunity to expand its support base as apparently National Conference was weakened. But the Muslim Conference failed to encash it. Instead of increasing their political activities and mobilising the masses in its favour, the leaders retired to their homes and did not bother to undertake any tour of the valley.121 The problem with the Muslim Conference was the absence of a presentable Kashmiri speaking leader of Sheikh AbdullahMaulana’s stature .Azad Mirwaiz Library, Yousuf Aligarh Shah was Muslim more venerated University as a religious and spiritual leader whose political convictions were weak and could easily be won over

Pertinently neither Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, pp. 59-61, nor Chaudhary Abbas, Kashmakash, pp. 222-236 or Prem Nath Bazaz, Struggle for Freedom, pp. 208-12 mention these words. 119 Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale, p. 85. 120 Jinnah had expressed his wish to mediate between the two but Abbas was not ready to do so. See, Abbas, Kashmakash, p. 223. 121 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 640.

36 by the State. This apparently was the reason behind Jinnah’s urging Mirwaiz to leave politics and function purely as a religious head.122

While Muslim Conference could not capitalise on Jinnah’s visit, National Conference was able to stir the imaginations of the people through the framing of New Kashmir Plan which was adopted in 1944. It was a comprehensive political, economic and social programme for laying the foundations of a democratic and progressive state, aimed at creating ‘exemplary personalities’ out of the people who had been oppressed spiritually and mentally.123 It provided for a democratic system resting on the ‘Jacobin conception of popular sovereignty augmented by a generous dollop of Bolshevism’.124 The plan framed by B. P. L Bedi and his wife Freda Bedi clearly bear out the socialist leanings of Sheikh Abdullah. The Plan was copied from the Stalin’s Constitution of Russia. Despite its progressive character, reactionary elements who were apprehensive of losing their privileges criticized the Plan. Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah condemned the Plan as ‘Un-Islamic’, without assigning any sound argument except that it was couched in Communist language.125 Bazaz called the Plan ‘interesting’ but ‘thoughtlessly documented’ which did not curtail the powers of Maharaja in the overall administration.126 However, notwithstanding the criticism, Naya Kashmir was a visionary document and reflected the progressive ideals of Sheikh Abdullah and National Conference. When the first National Conference government was formed under Sheikh Abdullah in 1948, as the succeeding chapters will show, Naya Kashmir became a reference point for measuring the progress of the government.

On 2 October 1944 Maharaja announced to induct two legislators, one each from Hindus and Muslims, into his cabinet. Though Muslim Conference boycotted the elections, National Conference fielded Mirza Afzal Beg who won and was appointed as Public WorksMaulana Minister. 127AzadThe boycottLibrary, of the Aligarh lure of office Muslim and a Universityrefusal to function as a prop of the government helped Muslim Conference to win the confidence of people to a certain extent. National Conference was criticized for working with the

122 Abbas, Kashmakash, p. 228. Sheikh Abdullah claims that Jinnah had a very poor opinion of Mirwaiz and called him ‘a rotten egg’, Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 60. 123 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 58. 124 Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Cambridge, 2003, p. 26. 125 Khalid, 30 April 1945. 126 Bazaz, History of Struggle, pp. 220-21. Commenting on Naya Kashmir, Lord Birdwood says that it ‘conveys the synthesis of idealism, showmanship, and material ambition which governs the lives of greater men than Abdullah’, Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, London, 1956, repr., Srinagar, 2005, pp. 226-27. 127 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 597.

37 oppressive Dogra regime while fooling the people with Naya Kashmir.128 However, National Conference projected the appointment of Afzal Beg as a triumph and a furtherance of the cause of freedom struggle. But soon Afzal Beg realized that diarchy was only a farce and he was unable to work under an autocratic government which continuously shelved his pro-people initiatives.129 He therefore resigned from his position. The decision was partly influenced by the consistent criticism of Muslim Conference on the acceptance of office by National Conference. The huge participation of people in the Id Milad procession on 16 March 1945130 organised by the Muslim Conference had unnerved National Conference and Afzal Beg’s resignation was an attempt to refurbish its image among the masses. The resignation was highly praised both in and outside the state as it laid bare the Maharaja’s claim of sharing power with the people and exposed the hollow nature of dyarchy.131 However, the machinations of R C Kak, the new Prime Minister resulted in the treacherous acceptance of Public Works minister post by Mian Ahmad Yar Khan, the leader of the National Conference legislators which gave a blow to the prestige of National Conference.132

In the last week of July 1945 annual session of National Conference was held which was graced by the prominent leaders of Congress like Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.133 Their visit to the state came at a very crucial juncture. The visit of Jinnah in 1944 had to some extent corroded the support base of National Conference which now looked forward to Congress to strengthen its base. The strategy of Nehru vis-à-vis Kashmir was important in that he used religious affiliation to garner support among the Muslims of valley. Nationalist Muslim leaders like Maulana Azad, Asaf Ali, Mian Iftikhar-ud-din and Badshah Khan accompaniedMaulana him inAzad his Kashmir Library, visits Aligarh with the Muslimpurpose to University impress upon the people that the League criticism of Congress that it was purely a ‘Hindu’ organisation was baseless as enlightened and prominent Muslims were its members. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of Pakhtun Muslims was a close ally of Congress and had

128 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 190. 129 ‘Dyarchy under Cross-light’, Khidmat, 6 May 1946. 130 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 191. 131 Khalid, 5 April 1946. 132 Khalid, 19 April 1946. 133 Indira Gandhi and Mridula Sarabhai had already visited Kashmir in 1944 and 1945 and were hosted by Sheikh Abdullah. It is alleged that Sarabhai had conveyed her displeasure over the warm welcome given by National Conference to Jinnah, Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, pp. 642-43.

38 rejected Muslim League’s Pakistan demand. Inadvertently an analogy was drawn between him and Sheikh Abdullah to impress upon him that there was no contradiction in being a leader of a Muslim-majority area and being affiliated with Congress.

The Congress leaders were taken in a splendid boat procession in river Jehlum. Muslim Conference had announced its opposition to the procession passing through its localities and staged demonstrations. Black flags were carried by Muslim Conference supporters who also raised slogans in favour of Pakistan and denounced the Congress. There were stone pelting incidents which resulted in the death of one Salam and injuries to a number of persons.134 National Conference was successful in laying claims to the dead body of Salam Darzi as its member, though his links with either Muslim Conference or National Conference were ambiguous. The Congress leaders attended a number of meetings wherein they called upon the people of Kashmir to support National Conference. While addressing a meeting at Hazuri Bagh, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan said, ‘Sheikh Abdullah is a gift of God. If you do not follow him you will be humiliated’.135 Similarly Nehru praised National Conference for its non-communal and progressive character and called upon the Pandits to support it or ‘bid goodbye to the country’.136 These pronouncements helped National Conference in regaining its position it had lost to Muslim Conference.

Quit Kashmir Movement

Events in the Indian Subcontinent were moving with lightening rapidity. At the end of the World War II Britain was weaker politically and economically and it was difficult for it to maintain the burden of colonies. Britain had decided to quit India and transfer power to Indians.Maulana With theAzad arrival Library, of British Aligarh Cabinet Muslim Mission University to India and the consequent negotiations for the transfer of power, Sheikh Abdullah as president of the All India States’ Peoples Conference was deeply concerned for the fate of the people of the Princely states.137 Sheikh Abdullah was not happy with the Congress leadership who were gearing to get the support of princely rulers against the Muslim league in any future political set up. In a memorandum to the Cabinet Mission on 22 April,

134 Martand, Srinagar, 3 August 1945. 135 Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale, p. 88. 136 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 248. 137 Khidmat, 18 April 1946.

39 which was drafted by B. P. L. Bedi,138 Sheikh Abdullah criticized the British plan of transferring power to the rulers of Princely states who were autocrats. He denounced the Treaty of Amritsar and questioned its political and moral basis. He demanded that Cabinet Mission should accept the right of Princely states to an independent rule as per the aspirations of people.139 Sensing that the autocratic Maharaja might get the right to decide their future, Sheikh Abdullah began to warn people of the impending tragedy. His avarice of the Dogra rule became much more pronounced and he began to criticise the Dogra regime in vehement terms. He called for an all-out mass movement against the Dogra autocracy and shook the very foundations of Dogra regime. He roared, ‘The time has come to tear up the Treaty of Amritsar. Sovereignty is not the birth right of Maharaja Hari Singh. Quit Kashmir is not a matter of revolt, it is a matter of right’.140 Raising the banner of revolt, Sheikh Abdullah called upon the people to contribute one Rupee each so as to return the amount of Seventy five lakh Rupees to the Maharaja and oust him from the rule of Kashmir.141 Right from 1932 when the organised movement came into existence, National Conference (earlier Muslim Conference) officially never demanded independence from the Dogra rule. Though the leaders talked about the degeneration that had crept into Kashmir owing to the long term subjection to foreign oppressive rule, they never defined their goal as the end or freedom from Dogra rule. Rather National Conference demanded the establishment of a responsible government in the state, fair treatment to Muslims in education, employment and administration and the end of exploitation. Even the revolutionary Naya Kashmir manifesto did not visualise the end of monarchy. By 1946 the struggle had reached to a level wherefrom the demand for the abrogation of the Treaty of Amritsar could be voiced and fought for. Therefore, the Quit Kashmir slogan was both revolutionary and unprecedented in the annals of freedom struggle of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Kashmir.

The Quit Kashmir movement, as the agitation came to be called, galvanised the people and protests and demonstrations were held in almost all the parts of Kashmir valley. The British Resident, W. F. Webb termed the movement no less than a

138 Munshi Mohammad Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, Srinagar, 2014, p. 142. 139 For a full text of the Memorandum see, P. L. Lakhanpal, Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute, New Delhi, 1958, repr., 1995, p. 33. 140 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, pp. 26-7. 141 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 79.

40 rebellion.142 The Maharaja’s administration had been preparing for the battle and Sheikh Abdullah was arrested. Violence erupted in various parts of Kashmir which was ruthlessly suppressed by Maharaja resulting in the killing of more than 20 persons.143 The movement became a turning point in the history of the state. The popularity of National Conference touched new heights as almost every section of the Muslim population was galvanised.144 They could imagine emancipation for themselves after a century of deprivation, oppression and exploitation. The increased popularity of National Conference as a result of Quit Kashmir Movement came at a very critical stage. After a few months British decided to partition India and transfer power to two countries-India and Pakistan. National Conference backed by popular support with its tilt towards Congress played a significant role in determining the fate of the state.

The official response of Muslim Conference to the Quit Kashmir Movement was politically immature. It advised the Muslims of Kashmir to stay away from the agitation as it had been started at the behest of Congress which wanted to create further schisms in the Muslim community.145 Commenting on Quit Kashmir slogan, Chaudhary Hameedullah Khan had said that this slogan applied to Kashmir only and not the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, otherwise Muslim Conference would have given its fullest cooperation.146 This position had been taken on Jinnah’s advice who dubbed the movement as foreign inspired and a ‘movement of lumpen proletariat, instigated by foreign elements’.147 Muslim League’s policy towards the princely states was ambivalent as it did not want to annoy the princes who could become a new source of support for it in the light of Cabinet Mission’s proposals to grant them sovereign status.148 The aloofness from the movement was a tactical blunder on the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 142 Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir-1947 to 1966, London, 1966, p. 46. 143 Times, New Delhi, 31 May 1946. A detailed account of the Movement, activities of the leaders, press reports and trial of Sheikh Abdullah on the charges of sedition was published by National Conference as, State Versus Sheikh Abdullah: Kashmir on Trial, with an Introduction by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Lahore, 1947. 144 Hindus of the state were not happy with Sheikh Abdullah’s Quit Kashmir demand and they accused him of not consulting the National Conference Working Committee. As a result Hindus staged demonstrations against Sheikh Abdullah and greeted Nehru with black flags when he came to Kashmir to defend Sheikh Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar: An Autobiography, Translated by Mohammad Amin, Srinagar, 2013, p. 260. 145 Abbas, Kashmakash, pp. 258-9. 146 , 1 June 1946. 147 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 82. 148 Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation, Columbia, 1963, p. 94 cited in Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, Washington, 2006, p. 9.

41 part of Jinnah as it was difficult for the common Kashmiri Muslims to comprehend that a movement which aims to liberate them after a century of oppression was being opposed by the person who claims to fight for the rights of Muslims. This anti- Kashmir stand by Jinnah was to be consistently attacked by National Conference and Congress after 1947 when they wanted to win the loyalties of the masses.149 However, notwithstanding the official stand of Muslim Conference, many of its leaders and members participated in the protest demonstrations against the Maharaja.150

As against Jinnah, Nehru actively involved himself in the affairs of Kashmir and criticized the Maharaja for using repressive measures to curb the agitation. The official stand of Congress, in initial stages, was critical of Quit Kashmir Movement as it was against the Congress policy vis-à-vis the princely states. Acharya Kripalani held that the movement was unjust and unreasonable, a mischievous move that left little scope for compromise between Maharaja and National Conference.151 However, later on Nehru geared up all the Congress machinery for Sheikh Abdullah’s help. When Sheikh Abdullah was arrested Nehru, notwithstanding his important assignments in Delhi, rushed to his rescue and was detained by the Maharaja’s administration. All the Congress affiliated bodies like Praja Mandals, Lok Parishads and Regional Councils were asked to stand in solidarity with Kashmiris, raise funds and send volunteers to Kashmir to participate in protest demonstrations against the Dogra state.152 Prominent Congress lawyers like Asaf Ali and Baldev Sahai were deputed to defend Sheikh Abdullah in his sedition case. Nehru’s support at that critical hour endeared him to the Kashmiris and created an impression that Congress was pro-people and supported the right of Kashmiris to decide their own destiny. Sheikh Abdullah consistently commended Nehru and Congress for coming to the rescue Maulanaof Kashmir Azadand supporting Library, their Aligarh struggle againstMuslim Dogra University autocracy.153 If Nehru supported Sheikh Abdullah against the Dogra Maharaja, Sheikh Abdullah reciprocated later by supporting him against Pakistan.

149 Hitvada, 24 January 1948. 150 Lamb, Disputed Legacy, p. 95. 151 The Times of India, New Delhi, 26 May 1947. See also, Satish Vashisht, Sheikh Abdullah Then and Now, Delhi, 1968, p. 40 152 Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, pp. 18-9. Sheikh Abdullah was consistently praised by the Congress press for his anti-imperialist stance and for his cooperation with the Congress, Hindustan Times, 10 March 1947. 153 Hitvada, 24 January 1948; Hindustan Times, 13 February and 30 August 1951; National Herald, 17 June 1948.

42 The enthusiasm shown by the common masses in Quit Kashmir Movement blew the wind out of the sails of Muslim Conference whose popularity in Kashmir valley was diminishing. The leadership, feeling themselves lesser patriots and realizing that their policy of non-intervention had done no good, jumped into the conflagration against the Dogra state by demanding an immediate Constituent Assembly and celebrating August 16 as ‘Azad Kashmir’ Day.154 They decided to hold the annual session of Muslim Conference against the government orders which had banned any kind of mass meetings in Srinagar. As a result Chaudhary Abbas was arrested by R C Kak which led to a tussle between Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah and Chaudhary Hameedullah Khan over the presidentship of Muslim Conference.155 Thus the top leadership of both National Conference and Muslim Conference was behind the bars when the fate of the Indian Subcontinent and Kashmir was to be decided. There was a leadership vacuum at the time of partition which possibly contributed to the upheavals of 1947.

Partition and Kashmir

British Paramountsy lapsed on 15 August 1947 and two Dominions-India and Pakistan came into existence as per the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. There was greater concern with regard to the fate of 562 Princely states. As per the memorandum of the Cabinet Mission, all powers would return to the Princely states after the lapse of British Paramountsy.156 After the announcement of Partition, Lord Mountbatten held the view that though legally the princely states were independent but they were called upon to join India and Pakistan while keeping in view their geographical contiguity and demographic composition of the population.157 Kashmir was the largest Princely state in India with a size of 84,471 sq. miles and was contiguous to both India and Pakistan but was more connected to the latter Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University geographically, economically and demographically.158 Maharaja Hari Singh was

154 Abbas, Kashmakash, p. 268. 155 Chaudhary Abbas mentions that he, in consultation with the working committee of Muslim Conference had nominated Chaudhary Hameedullah Khan as his successor in case of his arrest, Abbas, Kashmakash, p. 271. 156 Government of India, Ministry of States, White Paper on Indian States, New Delhi, 1948, p. 153. 157 Ibid., p. 161. While Jinnah advocated that rulers were free to join either of the Dominions or remain independent, Nehru was strongly against the idea of independence of Princely states as he believed that it would lead to the balkanization of India, Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, London, 2003, pp. 32-3. 158 Sufi, Kashir, pp. 396-97. The state’s road connectivity with the outside world was through Jehlum Valley Route which passed through Pakistan. The riverine routes via Jehlum and Chenab also connected with . The nearest railhead was Jammu which was connected to .

43 politically very elusive and was unable to decide about the future of the state. Presumably, he did not want to join India as he hated Nehru whose anti-feudal ideology he very well knew. Nehru was also the friend of Maharaja’s most hated enemy-Sheikh Abdullah. Moreover, his accession to India might also not go down well with the people of his state, the majority of whom were Muslims. Being a staunch Hindu he could not accede to Pakistan either as it had been created in the name of Islam as a homeland for the Muslims. He therefore began to think of independent status, making Kashmir as a Switzerland of the East and recognised by both India and Pakistan. Maharaja was under the influence of Swami Sant Dev who implanted in his minds the dream of an independent Dogra Empire stretching from the rivers of Punjab to the Himalayas.159 As late as October 1947 when Maharaja was in a very precarious position, M C Mahajan, Prime Minister of Maharaja and B. L. Batra, his Deputy Prime Minister were still thinking in terms of making Kashmir an independent country due to its strategic location which bordered six countries- India, Pakistan, Tibet, Russia, and .160 However, the Maharaja failed to use his temporary independent position, which the state maintained from 15th August to 26th October 1947, well and as opined by Ali Yawar Jung, ‘If the ruler of Kashmir had played his cards well and played the game fairly by his people, he might have won for his state a semi- independence recognised by both Dominions’.161 To persuade Maharaja to join either of the Dominions, Lord Mountbatten visited the state on 17th Jun 1947. However, Maharaja avoided direct discussions with him and sent him to fishing trips.162 In his discussion with R. C. Kak, the Prime Minister of the state, Mountbatten suggested the State to decide on the basis of geographical position, political situation and demographic composition of the population. Kak refused to join

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

159 Karan Singh, Heir Apparent-An Autobiography, Delhi, 1982, p.38. Kak also reiterates the fact that Maharaja was under the influence of Swami Sant Dev who had close relations with some Congress leaders. Acharya Kripalani’ visit to the state in 1947 was due to his intervention. A. G. Noorani, ‘Kak and Sheikh’, Frontline, Volume 27 Issue 18: Aug. 28-Sep. 10, 2010. Menon who played a significant role in securing the state’s accession to India also found Maharaja dreaming of independence, V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, Calcutta, 1956, p. 395. 160 Hindustan Times, 14 October 1947; Times of India, October 1947. 161 Ali Yawar Jung, Hyderabad in Retrospect, Bombay, 1949, p. 16 cited in Noorani, The Kashmir Dispute, p. 70. Lord Birdwood is also of the opinion that ‘Had there been in Kashmir in 1947 a ruler entrenched in the affections of his people with an effective undivided representative government based on popular support, a bid for independence might well have been successful’, Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 40. 162 Karan Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 48.

44 either India or Pakistan.163 On August 14 the state entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan by virtue of which essential services of posts, telegraph and trade were to be continued. India did not sign the agreement and requested the Kashmir Durbar to send some high level official for further negotiations.164

Congress maintained an active policy towards the Princely states in general and Kashmir in particular. Nehru gave his personal attention to the developments in Kashmir and had maintained close relations with the National Conference leadership, particularly Sheikh Abdullah. He was obsessed with Kashmir and his personal attention to Kashmir at that crucial juncture did not go down well with his senior colleagues who were annoyed.165 Colonel Webb, the British Resident in Kashmir, held that as early as 1946 Nehru had a well-developed policy vis-à-vis Jammu and Kashmir.166 Nehru’s interest in Kashmir was on two counts. First he was conscious of the strategic importance of the state which had contiguous borders with China, USSR and Afghanistan and formed an important link in the Caravan trade route that ran from Central Asia to India. By becoming part of India Kashmir could strengthen India’s North-West Frontier and give her the privilege of scientific frontiers. With such a huge geo-political importance, Kashmir could not be allowed to go into the hands of an uncertain country, which could let ‘loose a tribal invasion through the North-West. Srinagar today, Delhi tomorrow’.167 Second Nehru’s ideals of secular nationalism could be strengthened by Kashmir’s accession to India which was in fact a ‘miniature Pakistan’. Nehru was consistently fighting the communal elements in India and trying to disprove the Two-Nation Theory. If a Muslim majority state could accede to India on the principles of secularism and was successfully governed, the communal elements in India could be silenced.168 It was with these ideals in mind that Nehru stronglyMaulana impressed uponAzad Mountbatten Library, thatAligarh the interests Muslim of Kashmir Universitywere safe in joining the Constituent Assembly of India and that joining Pakistan would have disastrous consequences as the people of the state under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah were not in favour of it.169 After the announcement of Partition Nehru was very impatient to visit Kashmir lest the Maharaja should declare independence or

163 Noorani, ‘Kak and Sheikh’, Frontline, Volume 27, Issue 18, Aug.28-Sep.10, 2010. 164 Ministry of States, File No. 118(4)-PR/47, NAI. 165 Andrew Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir, New Delhi, 2007, p. 33. 166 Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, Hertingfordbury, 1994, p. 48. 167 Menon, Integration of the Indian States, p. 394. 168 S. Gopal, Nehru: An Anthology, New Delhi, 1980, p. 217. 169 Lamb, Disputed Legacy, pp. 108-9.

45 accession to Pakistan. However, because of Maharaja’s aversion to Nehru and to keep the doubts off as Nehru’s visit might raise eyebrows among the sympathisers of Pakistan, it was decided that Mahatma Gandhi would visit the State, ‘in view of the religious aura around him’.170 Gandhi had declared his visit to the state apolitical but he met Maharaja Hari Singh, R C Kak and Begum Abdullah, the wife of Sheikh Abdullah. In his statement about his visit to Kashmir, Gandhi held that ‘without going into the intricacies of law….common sense dictated that the will of the Kashmiris should decide the fate of Jammu and Kashmir. The sooner it was done the better’.171 Mahatma’s visit was followed by important developments in the state. Janak Singh replaced Kak as the Prime Minister of the State and contacts with the Congress leaders increased. The statements of high level officials of the State including M C Mahajan, the new Prime Minister were decidedly pro-Indian and anti-Pakistan. Sardar Patel maintained his direct communication with the Maharaja and tried to persuade him to join India as soon as possible.172

As against the active policy of Congress, Muslim League failed to devote much time and attention towards Kashmir as Jinnah was obsessed with Hyderabad. Since the demographic composition of Jammu and Kashmir and its geographical location were favourable to Pakistan, Muslim League possibly did not feel the necessity of devoting time and energy to Kashmir. While commenting on the future status of Kashmir, Jinnah had said that ‘it will fall into my lap like a ripened fruit’.173 Congress was consistently trying to woo Maharaja and was utilising all the possible resources to secure Kashmir’s accession to India. Muslim League failed to develop a coherent policy towards the State. It had advised Muslim Conference to demand independence of the state and not accession to Pakistan which might disturb the communal harmony Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

170 Transfer XII, Doc. 302, pp. 449-50 cited in Ajit Bhattacharjea, Kashmir: The Wounded Valley, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 108-110. 171 D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Vol. 8: 1947-48, Bombay, 1962, p. 78 cited in Noorani, The Kashmir Dispute, p. 5. 172 Durga Das, ed., Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945-50: New Light on Kashmir, Vol. I, Ahmedabad, 1971, Document 34, p. 33. Commenting on the developments in the state after Gandhi’s visit, The Times (London) wrote, ‘The Union of India has been taking a lively interest in the subject and indications are that the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir, sir Hari Singh, has lately been much influenced by Mr. Gandhi who visited Kashmir three months ago and by other Congress leaders’, The Times, London, 25 October 1947 quoted in Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 59. 173 Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, New York, 1967, p. 297.

46 of the state.174 It was only after the Congress leaders’ frequent visits to the state created apprehensions among Muslim League circles that it advised the Maharaja, in July 1947 to consider the accession to Pakistan because of the state’s demographic composition. Muslim League’s relationship with National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah was that of animosity and disdain as it had criticised the Quit Kashmir Movement and was supporting the Muslim Conference. Thus it was deprived of the popular support and could appeal only to the Maharaja to decide about the future of the state.

With the release of Sheikh Abdullah in September 1947175 the political atmosphere of Kashmir became charged but the political stalemate continued. Since Sheikh Abdullah was unconnected with the developments in the state, he decided to study the political atmosphere first and then put forward his view point regarding the future of the state. He addressed a series of meetings at Hazuri Bagh, Mujahid Manzil and Hazratbal and raised the slogan of ‘freedom before accession’ and primacy of the will of the common masses.176 Before they could decide about their future, he said, Kashmiris should be freed from their slavery from the Dogra State. However, it was clearly evident from the tone and content of his speeches that his preference was India and not Pakistan. He consistently criticized Jinnah and his Two Nation Theory while praising Nehru and Congress for their support to the freedom struggle of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah’s political ideology was identical with that of Nehru in that both were anti-feudal and believed in secularism and had socialist tendencies. Muslim League was dominated by Zamindars and feudal elements which made Sheikh Abdullah apprehensive that his revolutionary reforms as had been visualised in Naya Kashmir Manifesto would not be implemented in Pakistan.177 Sheikh Abdullah visited Delhi where heMaulana was very warmlyAzad Library,received by Aligarh Nehru and Muslim stayed as University his special guest. He had detailed negotiations with the latter on the future of Kashmir and while

174 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol. 1, pp. 707-08. Kak’s Note suggests that Jinnah had advised him that he won’t mind the state not joining Pakistan if it did not accede to India either, Noorani, ‘Kak and Sheikh’, Frontline. 175 Congress on its part was consistently trying to persuade the Maharaja’s Government to release Sheikh Abdullah as it was quite clear that in view of the partition Sheikh Abdullah’s role would be primary, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Document 37, p. 36. That Gandhi had a direct connection with the release of Sheikh Abdullah is evident from the fact that when he was asked about his release at a meeting in Srinagar, he replied that he would be released very soon, Khalid, 12 August 1947. 176 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 86. 177 Ibid., p. 83.

47 addressing a press conference called for an end to autocracy and giving the people of Kashmir the right to decide about their future.178 With his speeches and correspondence with the Congress leaders, things were getting easier for Maharaja Hari Singh who had now the support of the most popular leader of Kashmir if he acceded to India. In consultations with Sardar Patel, Col. Kashmir Singh replaced Major General Scott as the Commander-in-Chief of the State Forces and efforts were made to increase the military cooperation with India by linking the state through roads, telegraph and wireless.179

Pakistan sent Muhammad Din Taseer, Sheikh Sadiq and Mian Iftikhar-ud-din to negotiate with Sheikh Abdullah and press him to accede to Pakistan. Though the discussions were very fruitful and Sheikh Abdullah had agreed to meet Jinnah, it could not break the ice as Abdullah insisted on freedom before accession. He held that the decision to join Pakistan had to be made by the Kashmiris themselves on their own, without any external interference.180 Sheikh Abdullah deputed G M Sadiq, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhary Shafi to hold talks with Pakistan. But they were not allowed to meet Jinnah. Pakistani press started a vociferous campaign against the Kashmiri leaders and demanded their arrest for refusing to accede to Pakistan unconditionally. Even Chaudhary Shafi was beaten in Lahore.181 Later Liaquat Ali Khan also sent his trusted representative Col. A. S. B. Shah to hold talks with Maharaja but he was given a cold shoulder by the Prime Minister Mahajan whose loyalty was clearly with India. As a result the talks failed and he was asked to clear out.182 With the negotiations and diplomacy failing, Pakistan resorted to an unofficial blockade of the state to put pressure on the Maharaja. Essential supplies of grains, salt and fuel were cut by the Pakistani authorities which created a crisis in the state. ThroughMaulana this Azadblockade Library, Pakistan Aligarh was actually Muslim trying toUniversity highlight the economic dependence of Kashmir on it and that it could reduce it to starvation in case it did not accede to Pakistan. The Kashmir Government accused Pakistan of trying to use illegal means to secure the accession of the state and threatened to look for ‘other’ side and

178 Ibid., p. 88. 179 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, pp. 42-3. 180 C. Bilqees Taseer, The Kashmir of Sheikh Abdullah, Lahore, 1986, repr., Srinagar, 2005, p. 50. 181 Ghulam Mohiuddin Sufi, Kashmir 1931 se 1977 Tak (Urdu), Srinagar, 1980, p. 41. Sadiq later held that Pakistan was not ready to guarantee the rights of the state subjects, Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p. 45. 182 Mehr Chand Mahajan, Looking Back: The Autobiography of M. C. Mahajan, London, 1963, p. 269.

48 implore other options.183 Though Pakistan denied any involvement in the blockade and called for high-level negotiations to resort the matter, Mahajan showed a cold shoulder which embittered the relations between the two. This blockade would certainly have made the things worst for Maharaja and forced him to negotiate with Pakistan but for consistent material and moral support by India which rushed in supplies of food grains and fuel to the state.184

While both India and Pakistan had their respective pockets of support in the State, there were a large number of voices which advocated the independence of the state. As early as 1946, Muslim Conference had passed the Azad Kashmir Resolution to demand independence of the State. It called for an immediate responsible government and held that only people of the State had a right to decide about their future.185 Kisan Mazdoor Conference called upon the Maharaja not to accede to either of the Dominions and maintain friendly relations with both.186 A look at the contemporary newspapers reveals that their preference lay with an independent Jammu and Kashmir, recognised by both India and Pakistan. Khalid while discussing the situation emerging out of the partition and its impact on the people of the princely states wrote that since Jammu and Kashmir was contiguous to both India and Pakistan, the best course for it would have been to form its own federation and remain autonomous. This would have satisfied the common masses also.187 Khidmat, the official organ of National Conference criticized the diplomatic efforts of India and Pakistan without considering the wishes of the common masses. It held that ‘attempts are again being made to extend the period of the contract. So there may be another auction for Kashmiris in Delhi’.188 Even Sheikh Abdullah was not oblivious of the option of independence and was ready to consider it if India and Pakistan guaranteed it. Khwaja Umar Bhat whoMaulana was the secretaryAzad Library, of Begum AligarhAbdullah Muslimwrote in the University ‘Uplift’ that the only way a war could be prevented and saving the lives of 32 lakh Kashmiris was that the State should declare its independence.189 While addressing more than 80000 people at Hazratbal barely a week after his release, he held that the future of the state has to be decided on the basis of interests and not sentiments. The economic position

183 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 66. 184 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 42-7 and pp. 56-63. 185 Khalid, 14 June 1946. 186 Bazaz, History of Struggle, pp. 227-28. 187 Khalid, 7 July 1947. 188 Khidmat, 6 May 1947. 189 H. L. Saxena, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Kashmir Muddle, New Delhi, 1949, pp. 15-16.

49 of Kashmir was such that it depended on export trade and arrival of foreign tourists which could be best safeguarded through maintaining good relations with both the Dominions.190

Meanwhile two significant developments were taking place which had a far-reaching impact on the future of the State. Both the developments began within the jurisdiction of the State but ended up involving the outsiders in a critical manner. The Partition of India was accompanied by communal holocaust and engulfed the entire Indian subcontinent with killings and destruction and the displacement of millions of people. The Kashmir valley did not witness any kind of communal frenzy. National Conference played a significant role in ensuring peace and protection to the minorities. A Central Peace Committee was formed which directed all the National Conference local committees to ensure Hindu-Muslim unity and help the refugees of West Punjab. A War Council was established to deal with any kind of emergency. Posters were pasted throughout Kashmir requesting people to protect the life and property of minorities.191 However, Jammu region was communally more polarised as it was closer to Punjab where the communal question was more prominent. With the influx of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Poonch and West Punjab the situation further deteriorated. The Dogra administration instead of stopping the communal frenzy abetted it by distributing arms among the Hindus and Sikhs and the actual participation of State troops in the riots which resulted in a systematic persecution of the Muslims.192 There was continuous influx of RSS volunteers from Punjab into Jammu which led to communal riots. Thousands of Muslims were killed and a belt of devastation was created near the Pakistan border.193 The fleeing Muslims found refuge in the neighbouring North-West Frontier Province and carried with them the tales ofMaulana killings, repression Azad Library, and rapes Aligarh at the hands Muslim of Sikhs University and Hindus. Emotions were running high and there were cries of revenge among the Pathans who, abetted and encouraged by Pakistani officials, decided to invade Kashmir.

190 Khidmat, 8 and 22 October 1947. 191 Khalid, 26 August 1947. 192 Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 65. 193 Duke to Smith, TNA: DO 142/494 Dated 03 November 1947, Lionel Carter, Partition Observed: British Official Reports From , 16 October-31 December 1947, New Delhi, 2011, p. 617.

50 Meanwhile in Poonch region194 of the state discontentment against the Dogra state was increasing and was taking the shape of an open armed rebellion. The people of Poonch had not reconciled themselves to the loss of their special status and were brewing with discontent owing to the atrocious policies of Maharaja Hari Singh. More than 60,000 Poonch soldiers out of a total of 71,667 Kashmir troops had served in the World War II. After the end of the war when they reached their villages they found the conditions very deplorable. A notification was issued by the government directing all the ex-soldiers to return their weapons to the state. However, practically arms were snatched from the Muslims only and the same were handed over to the Sikhs and Hindus.195 This unnerved the Muslim ex-soldiers and they began preparations to counter the Dogra State. Coupled with this, the economic situation of Poonch was worsening owing to the harsh and repressive taxation policy of the Dogra state. Richard Symonds in his report for wrote, ‘there was a tax on every hearth and every window. Every cow, buffalo and sheep was taxed and even every wife. Finally the Zaildari tax was introduced to pay for the cost of taxation, and Dogra troops were billeted on the Poonchis to enforce collection’.196 A number of meetings were held in different villages of Poonch which resolved not to pay any kind of additional taxes to the Maharaja. When Gandhi visited the state in August, in a detailed letter the people of Poonch apprised him of the situation in Poonch and wrote that they were being burdened with a number of repressive taxes like Zaildari and sales tax which they are unable to pay. They requested Gandhi to visit the region and personally see the plight of people.197 Instead of doing away with the repressive taxation, Maharaja’s administration responded with armed action. Villages were torched and food grains burnt leading to the killing of a number of civilians. The Poonchis responded with an armed rebellion which was rapidly spreading throughout Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University the Poonch region and some parts of Mirpur district. The revolt completely paralysed the administration and by ending August 1947, it was out of control of the State

194 Poonch was a jagir granted to Dhian Singh, brother of Raja Gulab Singh. With an area of 3600 sq. miles, it had an overwhelmingly Muslim population and functioned as a semi-independent state under the of Kashmir Durbar. It was also the recruiting ground for British with 20,000 Poonchi troops out of a total of 30000 participating in the . Maharaja Hari Singh sought to curtail the autonomous status of Poonch and bring it more under the control of Kashmir Durbar. After 1936 it was stripped of its special position and administratively integrated with the Jammu province, Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy, pp. 54-61. 195 Christopher Thomas, Faultline Kashmir, Middlesex, 2000, p. 170. 196 The Statesman, Calcutta, 4 February 1948 quoted in Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy, p. 61. 197 Khalid, 12 August, 1947.

51 armed forces.198 The government ordered a pre-censorship of newspapers and periodicals publishing any news related to Poonch.199 Despite censorship the news of Poonch revolt was reaching Kashmir and the people sympathized with the plight of Poonchis. Sheikh Abdullah called the revolt a ‘peoples’ movement which had been started due to the unwise policies of Kashmir Durbar.200

The people of Poonch had close ethnic, cultural and economic ties with the Pathans of Hazara in North-West Frontier Province. With the armed resistance gaining momentum, they established contacts with the leading individuals, official and unofficial, in Pakistan and were able to procure arms and ammunition and the services of ex-soldiers in their fight against the Dogra state. This aggravated the Poonch problem as Pakistan got militarily, though unofficially, involved in Kashmir and ultimately paved the way for the tribal invasion of Kashmir as the Pathans of North- West Frontier Province joined the Poonch revolt in large numbers. Even Jinnah held that the tribal invasion was the direct result of Dogra assault on Poonch rebels who were punished for their pro-Pakistan feelings.201 Thus the real beginnings of Kashmir Dispute lie in the Poonch revolt and not the tribal invasion of Kashmir. The revolt was started by the state subjects themselves against the oppressive policies of Dogra regime and involved the tribals only later.202

Whilst the massacre of Muslims in Jammu and the Poonch revolt were taking place, Maharaja had not yet taken any decision with regard to the future of the state. However, it was clearly evident that Kashmir was now more closer to India as economic and diplomatic relations of Maharaja with the Indian government were on a high. On October 15 Mahajan held that due to imbalanced public opinion the decision of accession could not be made. He praised Sheikh Abdullah and Indian government and in Maulanathe same breath Azad criticised Library, Pakistan. Aligarh203 British Muslim Resident University reports from Kashmir suggest that Maharaja had already decided to tie his knot with India but was awaiting

198 Situation Reports from Poonch, 19 August 1947 to 26 August 1947, JKA, Srinagar. 199 Order of District Magistrate Srinagar, Kashmir, No. C/2242/Cir. Dated 27 August 1947, JKA, Srinagar. 200 Hindustan Times, 22 October 1947. 201 Graftey-Smith to Noel Baker, TNA D0 133/69, Dated December 9, 1947 , Carter, Partition Observed, Vol. II, p. 812. 202 Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, p. 117. 203 Carter, Partition Observed, Vol. II, p. 551.

52 some dramatic and favourable incident to announce that.204 On the other hand Sheikh Abdullah in his statements on October 17 and October 21 continued with his demand for immediate responsible government and freedom before deciding about the future. However, the dilly dallying opinion of National Conference with regard to the future of the state was simply to hoodwink the masses as they had already decided to accede to the Indian Union but were not making it public, fearing the public opinion.205

Meanwhile, thousands of tribesmen from North-West Frontier Province, swelled by the ranks of ex-Indian army men and (INA) soldiers entered into Kashmir province. They killed a large number of Sikhs and Hindus and looted their properties. Towns were sacked, houses burnt and women were raped. Even Muslims were not spared.206 The tribals had reached within 20 miles of the Srinagar city after completely devastating Baramulla and it was just a matter of time that Srinagar would fall to the invaders. National Conference rose to the occasion and formed a volunteer corps, Peoples’ Militia to defend the Srinagar city.207 They were equipped with whatever was available to them-rifles, sticks and iron rods. It was composed of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs and aimed to maintain communal peace and protect the minorities against any possible onslaught. Though it boosted the morale of the common people, it was no match for the tribals who were well-equipped and had the services of professional soldiers. Maharaja was panic-stricken and he decided to leave Kashmir for Jammu on 26 October 1947. He carried all the jewellery, precious items and imported furniture along with him in about forty eight motor lorries. Even the entire state supply of gasoline was taken along with him.208

The fleeing of Maharaja left the people undefended and lowered their morale. In this hour of crisis Maharaja requested Indian government to provide military help which was made conditionalMaulana on Azad accession. Library, Maharaja Aligarh abided andMuslim signed University the Instrument of

204 Shone to Noel Baker Telegram, TNA, DO 35/3158 October 30 1947, Carter, Partition Observed, Vol. II, p. 575. 205 Dwarkanath Kachru’s Note to Nehru on 4th October 1947, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, pp. 54-55. The report of W. P. Cranston who was at Srinagar from 10 to 14 October also suggests that there was an understanding that if Maharaja acceded to India Sheikh Abdullah would not regard it as unfriendly and would support him, Report by W. P. Cranston, India Office Record: L/PS/13/1845 (B) Dated 18 October 1947, Carter, Partition Observed, Vol. II, pp. 522-24. 206 For an account of the tribal atrocities see Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Defending Kashmir, Delhi, 1949. 207 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 93. 208 M. Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, New York, 1949, p. 193.

53 Accession with India on 26th October 1947.209 However, the accession was made conditional on reference to the people of Jammu and Kashmir once the State was cleared of the invaders.210 On 27th October the first contingent of Indian army arrived in Kashmir to fight the tribals and liberate Kashmir.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

209 The details of Kashmir’s controversial accession to India and the consequent internationalisation have deliberately been omitted as a plethora of literature has been produced on the issue. For details see Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, Crisis in Kashmir and Birth of a Tragedy; Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict and Kashmir in Crossfire; Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History, Delhi, 1996; Korbel, Danger in Kashmir; Christopher Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris. 210 White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi, 1948, pp. 47-8.

54 CHAPTER 2

‘Emergency Administration’ and the Formation of First National Conference Government

The Tribal invasion of Kashmir was followed by chaos and confusion due to the breakdown of law and order machinery. The tribals had wreaked havoc through the areas they had marched and indulged in loot, plunder, rapes and molestations. A large number of people were killed, houses burnt and people forced to migrate from the affected areas. Though there is no accurate estimate of the damage caused by the tribal invasion, contemporary reports suggest extensive looting of property, large scale killing and kidnapping of men and women.1 It was estimated that out of a population of 14000 people, only 3000 survived in Baramulla alone.2 However, it is possible that a large number of people would have migrated to other areas of Kashmir valley after hearing of the tribal onslaught and their repression in Mirpur and areas. A highly conservative estimate of the devastation caused by the tribal raiders in 1947-48 points out that more than 50,000 people were killed, 6000 houses were burnt and property worth 15 crores was looted.3 But the report is based on estimates that does not mention the basis of its calculations. It becomes more evident from the Government’s reply to a question in the State Legislature that 1798 villages in the Jammu region were affected by the tribal raids while in Kashmir Province the number of affected villages was 264.4

After hearing of the tribal onslaught Maharaja Hari Singh left Srinagar for Jammu.5 He was followed by his relatives and important government officials who also took away their belongings.6 The state administrative machinery was completely paralysed which Maulanafurther frigh Azadtened the Library, people. SituationAligarh in Muslim Srinagar wasUniversity worrisome due to the absence of any law and order mechanism and the continuous influx of refugees from raid affected areas. National Conference rose to the occasion and organised defence of the city. Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad formed a Caretaker Government under the name

1 Hindustan Times, 26 October 1947. 2 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 76. 3 Tribal Atrocities in Kashmir in 1947, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, File No. 5/4/57-KP, NAI. 4 Q. D. No. 424, Ram Rakha Mal, Assembly Records, Rehabilitation Branch, Register No. 5, Box No. 10, JKA, Srinagar. 5 Discussed earlier in Chapter 1, p. 37. 6 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 289.

55 of Defence Committee. It comprised of different organs like General Coordination and General Militia, Peace Brigade, Refugee affairs, Postal and Communication affairs, and functioned till 30th October.7 The Peace Brigade, under the command of Ghulam Mohiuddin Hamadani was successful in taking control of different ammunition stores and ensured that these do not fall into the hands of raiders. National Conference trained volunteers in the use of arms and posted them at vital places like bridges to protect them from miscreants.8 Armed with all sorts of weapons like rifles, lathis, iron rods and swords, the volunteers paraded the streets of Srinagar, shouting Hamlawar Khabardaar, Hum Kashmiri hain tayyar (O invader! beware! we Kashmiris are ready to face you) and Yeh Mulk Hamara hai Iski Hukumat Hum kareinge (This Country is ours and we will rule it).9 How the National Conference kept the city moving during the troubled days has been attested by Brig. Hira Lal Atal who was sent as a special emissary to Kashmir by Nehru. He was all praise for Sheikh Abdullah and his workers who were working round the clock to create a semblance of normality.10 A strong emphasis was laid on the communal unity. It goes to the credit of National Conference that the communal flare did not engulf Srinagar which had a large number of Hindu and Sikh population. The Peace Brigade which comprised of Muslim, Hindu as well as Sikh volunteers made it sure that the life and property of minorities remained secure from any kind of threat. This revolutionary force not only protected the city of Srinagar and boosted the morale of the scared common masses, it provided opportunity for the emancipation of common Kashmiris by giving them the right to get trained in arms, the right denied to them by the successive regimes right from the Mughal occupation of Kashmir.11 The Kashmir Militia also broke the gender barriers and empowered the women as for the first time women could be seen shoulder to shoulder with their male counterparts, holding rifles and participating in Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

7 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. III, pp. 327-8. 8 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 289. 9 Through Blood, Sweat and Tears: An Account of the Activities of the Emergency Administration from October 31, 1947 to March 5, 1948), pp. 1-5, Accession No. 641/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 10 Hira Lal Atal, Nehru's Emissary to Kashmir, October 1947, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 43-8. 11 Mohibbul Hasan, Kashmir Under the Sultans, Calcutta, 1959, p. 281 argues that after the Mughals occupied Kashmir, they themselves undertook the defence of the Valley and deprived Kashmiris from the same which resulted in the gradual loss of martial spirit and fighting qualities among the Kashmiris. Abdul Majid Mattoo, Kashmir Under the Mughals (1586-1752), Srinagar, 1988, p. xv and p. 233, corroborates him but adds that other factors like Buddhist, Shaivite and Sufi influences also diminished the martial spirit.

56 parades.12 This was a liberating experience for the Kashmiri women who swelled the ranks of Militia and played a leading role in the defence of Srinagar. However, after the tribals were repulsed and pushed beyond Baramulla the Militia turned its guns towards the opponents of National Conference and terrorized them. It has been discussed later in the chapter.

After the fleeing of Maharaja to Jammu, he requested the Government of India for military help which was granted after the State formally acceded to the Indian Union on 26th of October 1947. This was followed by the arrival of first battalion of Indian Army to Kashmir on 27th October. The role of Sheikh Abdullah who had been released on 29th September13 in the accession of the State to India has been a contested one. Without going into the intricacies of the debate, Sheikh Abdullah directly prevailed upon Nehru that the Maharaja’s offer of Accession to India had the backing and support of National Conference.14 Sheikh Abdullah was in favour of the State acceding to the Indian Union as compared to Pakistan, though he did not express it overtly fearing public opinion but it was quite evident in his speeches in which he praised India and denounced Pakistan.15 Indian Government on its part was anxious to get the support of Sheikh Abdullah in any future arrangement with Maharaja. In his communiqués with Maharaja Hari Singh and Mahajan, Patel advised them to try to sort out the differences with Sheikh Abdullah and maintain friendly relations with him. It was only through Sheikh’s support, Patel maintained, that the disruptive forces within the state could be controlled and conditions made favourable for India.16 Nehru prevailed upon Maharaja and Mahajan to have fullest cooperation with Sheikh Abdullah as without the popular backing India’s claims on Kashmir would be weakened. He called for an urgent formation of a provisional government under the leadershipMaulana of Sheikh Azad Abdullah Library,, with Maharaja Aligarh continuing Muslim to University enjoy his powers so that

12 Andrew Whitehead, ‘The People’s Militia: Communists and Kashmiri Nationalism in the 1940s’, Twentieth Century Communism: A Journal of International History, Vol. 2, 2010, pp. 155-56. 13 Though Sheikh Abdullah who was facing the punishment of sedition was released, the Muslim Conference leaders who had done lesser crimes continued to languish in jails, Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 85. 14 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 292. 15 Safeer Ahmad Bhat, ‘Jammu and Kashmir on the Eve of Partition- A Study of Political Conditions’, South Asian Studies- A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, July–December 2017, pp. 290-1. 16 Sardar Patel’s letter to Mahajan, 21 October 1947, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 65, p. 61.

57 the common people could feel a sensation of freedom.17 Such an arrangement would also fulfill the aspirations of National Conference whose slogan was ‘freedom before accession’. It was in this backdrop that when Maharaja Hari Singh sent the ‘Letter of Accession’ to the Indian Government, he held that ‘it is my intention at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister’.18 Maharaja’s offer to share power with his bitterest enemy who only a month earlier was behind the bars is an interesting development. Notwithstanding the continuous pressure exerted by the Indian Government on him to reconcile with Sheikh Abdullah, the internal dynamics of the State cannot be ignored. The tribals were within the borders of the State and had wreaked havoc on its inhabitants. Maharaja was in a precarious position and had fled from Srinagar. At that critical juncture he was unsure about the safety of his State, particularly Kashmir which was the stronghold of Sheikh Abdullah. While himself being in Jammu he did not mind Kashmir going to Sheikh Abdullah who would have to ‘function specially in the valley’19 as among the two evils he chose to prefer Sheikh Abdullah over the barbarian Pathans.

After the Government of India decided to accept the Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, Nehru, referring to the terms on which the accession was accepted, held that an Interim Government under Sheikh Abdullah should be formed in the state on the Mysore pattern.20 In a subsequent letter to Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru informed him about the Maharaja’s consent to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an Interim Government in the State. A closer study of Nehru’s twin letters to Mahajan and Sheikh Abdullah reveals the tactical diplomacy of Nehru in wooing the latter. While he advised Mahajan to continue as the Prime Minister of the State and exercise his powers,21 his Maulana tone towards Azad Sheikh Library, Abdullah Aligarh was more Muslim conciliatory Universityand gave the impression that the real power was in his hands while the Maharaja would be a mere constitutional head, bound by the advice of his Ministry.22 While Nehru fully backed the case of Sheikh Abdullah, Patel did not entertain a very high opinion of him and

17 Nehru’s letter to M. C. Mahajan, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 4, New Delhi, 1986, pp. 272-73 (Henceforth SWJN). 18 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 82. 19 Nehru’ letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 27 October 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, pp. 279-82. Later on it was decided between Mahajan and Sheikh Abdullah that the former should take care of the Jammu province while the latter will be incharge of Kashmir region, Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 157. 20 Nehru’s Note to Mahajan, 26 October 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, pp. 276-7. 21 Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 155. 22 Nehru’s letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 27 October 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 280.

58 instead wished to keep Mahajan on the political scene of Kashmir.23 There was a clash of interests between Mahajan and Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah demanded that he should be made Prime Minister of the else he would not be able to perform his functions under dyarchy.24 However, such an arrangement would have been unacceptable to the Maharaja whose intense hostility towards Sheikh Abdullah was well known. It was through the intervention of Nehru that Sheikh Abdullah agreed to the proposal of becoming the Emergency Administrator. Consequently on 31st October Sheikh Abdullah was sworn in as Head of the Emergency Administration by the Chief Justice of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the Prime Minister’s office.25 The Maharaja’s proclamation was to form the real constitutional basis of Sheikh Abdullah’s government till the state drafted its own constitution.26 Though there was no clear demarcation of power between Mahajan and Sheikh Abdullah, but it was believed that the latter would be the real incharge of Kashmir government who would also nominate his representatives to the government.27 To cope with the emergency and improve administrative efficiency, Sheikh Abdullah appointed some of his colleagues as Emergency Officers who were associated with different departments and regions:

Maulana Syeed Masoodi- Incharge of Publicity Pandit Jia Lal Kilam- Food Control Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad- Internal Security Pandit Shamlal Saraf- Supplies Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq- Home Guards Dr. S. N. Peshin- Public Health Pandit Kashyap Bandhu- Refugees KhwajaMaulana Ghulam Mohiuddin Azad Library,- Communications Aligarh Muslim University Khwaja Ahsanullah- Transport Sardar Budd Singh- Rehabilitation

Similarly Sofi Mohammad Akbar was appointed Administrator for Baramulla, Mohammad Maqbool Geelani for Uri, Ghulam Qadir Bhat for Ladakh and Mirza

23 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 97. 24 Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 157. 25 Press Communiqué No. 152, Dated 31 October 1947, Publicity Department, JKA, Srinagar; Khalid, 1 November 1947. 26 Lamb, Disputed Legacy, p. 184. 27 Nehru’s letter to Hiralal Atal, 27 October 1947, Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir, pp. 54-60.

59 Afzal Beg for Anantnag.28 While taking the oath as an Emergency Administrator, Sheikh Abdullah pledged his loyalty to the Maharaja and his heirs and successors.29 The oath of loyalty was a dramatic reversal of events as barely a year earlier Sheikh Abdullah had raised the banner of revolt against Maharaja. He had questioned the Maharaja’s right to rule over Kashmir and called him to quit the State bag and baggage. Now when Sheikh Abdullah was offered a share in the power he was quick to assure Maharaja of his loyalty. Sheikh Abdullah was enthroned under the very treaty he had declared a ‘sale deed’.30

The appointment of Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues symbolized the victory for the common masses, particularly Muslims who had been deprived by the Dogra Government from the top ranking posts in the state administration. The people of Kashmir were jubilant at their appointment and were present in great numbers at the oath ceremony of Sheikh Abdullah. Addressing the huge crowd Sheikh Abdullah offered his thanks to the people of Kashmir for refusing to bow before the autocratic powers and for standing behind the National Conference at all times. He advised his opponents to shun their political differences and through deliberations and constructive discussions work for the building of New Kashmir.31 However, the emotional assurances of Sheikh Abdullah to his political opponents were short-lived and very soon they were targeted by the Abdullah administration.

The Emergency Administration was confronted with a number of challenges-internal as well as external. The most pressing challenge was the maintenance of law and order in the backdrop of the tribal invasion. In the absence of any government control administrative machinery had been paralysed and was invisible at ground level. The partition of India had resulted in the influx of thousands of refugees from West Punjab who had settledMaulana in Jammu. Azad The tribal Library, invasion Aligarh aggravated Muslim the refugee University crisis as a large number of Hindus and Sikhs had taken shelter in Srinagar to escape from tribal rapaciousness.32 Their rehabilitation was one of the serious challenges facing Abdullah Administration. The state’s main connectivity with the outside world was through Jehlum Valley Route which had come under the control of tribesmen. The

28 Press Note No. 163, Dated 6 November 1947, Publicity Department, JKA, Srinagar. 29 Vashisht, Sheikh Abdullah Then and Now, p. 44. 30 Refer to Chapter 1, pp. 24-6. 31 Through Blood, Sweat and Tears, pp. iv-v. 32 Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, New York, 1953, p. 151.

60 Valley heavily depended on this route for exports and imports and its disruption resulted in a serious food and fuel crisis in the state. The Emergency Administration had to work round the clock to bring the State to a state of normalcy.

The Peace Brigade with its strength of around 10000 volunteers was successful in protecting the government institutions, banks, post offices and telephone and telegraph lines. It not only ensured communal unity in Srinagar but also did much social service by keeping a vigilant eye on black-marketeers and corrupt officials who were fishing in the troubled waters and fleecing the common masses.33 Though the tribals had been pushed to the backfoot as a result of the Indian Army offensive, their danger still loomed large. The defence of Kashmir was of primal importance both for Sheikh Abdullah and Indian Government. To maintain law and order in the Valley and to help the Indian Army in its operations, Nehru suggested massive arming of the civilian population with rifles and sten (sic) guns to guard vital locations like airport and radio station in Srinagar and other towns of the valley.34 It was advised that young men from among the supporters of National Conference should be chosen to form Home Guards who would receive a formal training. Supporters of Muslim League and Muslim Conference were to be excluded from recruitment in the proposed militia.35 Consequently in November Sheikh Abdullah’s administration sanctioned the raising of 6000-strong force to be called ‘The Kashmir National Home Guards’. Though the enlistment to the Force was on a voluntary basis, the Government held that the conscription orders could be issued for ‘suitable’ persons.36 Arrangements of proper training to the personnel were made by appointing Lt. Col. Ram Lal and Lt. Col. Adalat Khan as training officers. G M Sadiq was made the Officer-in-Charge of the Home Guards. It was decreed that any government official willing to join the Home GuardsMaulana would continue Azad to getLibrary, his salary Aligarh and other Muslim remunerations. University37 Though the Home Guards faced tremendous difficulties with regard to the organization and the absence of adequate arms and ammunition, they were successful in displaying their fighting capabilities against the raiders and got the commendation of Indian Army officers. They played their role in different capacities- as translators, guides, informers and

33 Khalid, 13 November 1947. 34 Nehru’s letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 27 October 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 281. 35 Nehru’s letter to Hiralal Atal, 27 October 1947, Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir, pp. 54-60. 36 Press Note No. 161, Dated 5 November 1947, Publicity Department, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 28th Kathik 2004 (13 November 1947), JKA, Srinagar. 37 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. III, p. 337.

61 active combatants. The Commanding Officer of the Militia, Col. B. N. Rao in his radio address on 1st January 1948 praised the dedication and fighting skill of Kashmiris, many of whom, like Nazeer Masoodi, had played a vital role in disturbing the ranks of tribal raiders.38

A Women Self Defence Corps was also formed to train women in the use of arms. Prominent women members of National Conference like Zenab Begum, Sajida Begum, Miss Mehmuda, Miss Uma Razdan and Mrs. Mehraj Qureshi were the pivots of the Corps who raised awareness among the women of Kashmir regarding tribal infiltration and the necessity to actively participate in their defence. It was not meant to join the combatants fighting against the tribals, but to train them in self-defence so that in case of tribals entering Srinagar, they could defend their homes and honour.39 They also played a significant role in politicising the women folk of Kashmir. Besides getting elementary military training, weekly meetings were held at Srinagar which were addressed by prominent National Conference leaders in which questions of political nature were discussed and women were made aware of their rights and duties. After the end of Emergency period, members of the Women Corps went from Halqa to Halqa, explaining to the people the democratic significance of Kashmir struggle and spreading the message of communal unity.40 In Kashmir where there was little space for women in public affairs, their participation in Militia and armed training in the use of .303 rifles and hand grenades was no less than a revolution and signified their emancipation. Both the National Militia and Women Defence Corps came under the increasing influence of communist leaders like Rajbans Khanna, a young communist from Lahore and Mrs. Freda Bedi who sought to organize these on communist lines. The intelligence officer of the Militia was given the title of Political Officer whichMaulana echoed ‘by Azaddesign orLibrary, otherwise, Aligarh of the leftist MuslimInternational University Brigades in the Spanish Civil War a decade earlier’.41

The Militia bolstered the image of National Conference in more than one way. The presence of armed squads at the disposal of National Conference confirmed the political ascendency of Sheikh Abdullah. This force, as the later events show, could be used to silence his political opponents. The recruits to the Militia had to get a

38 Ibid. 39 Mir Qasim, My Life and Times, Bombay, 1992, p. 37. 40 Through Blood, Sweat and Tears, p. 6. 41 Whitehead, The People’s Militia, p. 156.

62 certificate from the National Conference Halqa committees to the effect that their character and antecedents were satisfactory.42 Anyone whose loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah and India was questioned was not deemed fit for the service. This ultimately bred corruption as the National Conference committees could easily deny the clearance to the recruits on the non-payment of bribes. Furthermore, the Militia began to misuse its powers and not only muzzled the voice of political opponents of National Conference but also terrorised the common masses by forcefully entering into their houses and undertaking unnecessary searches.43 There were distressing incidents that on mere verbal complaints of National Conference members, people were dragged out of their houses and lodged in jails.44 The worst sufferers at the hands of Militia were the Muslim Conference members who were called as fifth columnists in a derogatory manner. Accused of sabotaging the governmental activities and propagating their dangerous ideology, they were consistently humiliated, tortured and detained in jails. Those areas of Srinagar city which were strongholds of Muslim Conference and traditional bastions of Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah were kept under constant curfew and a strong vigilance so that any support for Pakistan became invisible.45 People who were suspected of being supporters of Pakistan were arrested and treated as ‘pariah dogs; prisoners' hands were frequently tied with ropes behind their backs and they were dragged like animals’.46 In the name of maintaining law and order anyone who was critical of Militia activities was suppressed and brutalised. Somnath Tikoo, editor of New Kashmir, a weekly had criticized the dictatorial attitude of militia men in one of his editorials and had called upon the government to restrain its activities. But next day he was dragged from his office and mercilessly beaten for exposing the Militia and was warned of dire consequences in case he continued his tirade against the government. Humiliated, the editor left the valley next day.47 Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Beating of political opponents and tying them with ropes was a common sight at Amira Kadal, the headquarters of Militia. R C Kak was arrested and beaten and while he was being taken to the court on foot, National Conference supporters abused and

42 Ministry of States, File No. 5(3)-K/49, NAI. 43 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. III, p. 330. 44 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 411. 45 See the Press Note No. 160, Dated 5 November 1947; Press Note No. 166, Dated 8 November 1947; Press Note No. 172, Dated 9 November 1947 and Press Note No.s 179, 183, Dated 14 November 1947, Publicity Department, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 12th Maghar 2004 (27 November 1947), JKA, Srinagar. 46 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 410. 47 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. III, p. 333.

63 spat on him.48 The reports of the period are full with serious complaints against the personnel of the Militia. The people accused them of theft, looting of Government properties and sexual harassment. When Sheikh Abdullah’s attention was driven to the atrocious and inhuman activities of the Brigade, he turned a deaf ear and refused to do anything to stop its activities.49

Besides internal security, Sheikh Abdullah’s administration faced the challenge of economic regeneration of the state. In September Pakistan had resorted to an unofficial economic blockade of Kashmir in order to pressurise Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. This had resulted in the shortage of essential supplies in the state. The tribal invasion in October aggravated the crisis as the only all-weather route connecting Kashmir to Punjab (East) had come under their control. Though National Conference tried to contain the situation by forming Central Food Committee under the headship of Begum Abdullah to oversee the situation of food in Kashmir, it could not achieve much success due to the apathy of the Dogra administration.50 By October the prices of essential items had sky rocketed and the tribal incursion and the consequent administrative breakdown put the valley on the brink of a food crisis. The supply position of the state had deteriorated and the granaries were practically empty. After the formation of Emergency Administration steps were taken to procure supplies in view of the fast approaching winter. All stocks with the private individuals and firms were seized and made available for public distribution.51 Indian Government had showed its incapacity to send food grains to Kashmir as the only available planes were used for military purposes. It was expected that the State Government would make its own arrangements for food procurement.52 The government passed an order prohibiting the export of foodgrains and their derivatives, like paddy, rice, wheat, pulses, oilseeds,Maulana butter and Azad vegetables Library, from Aligarhthe Kashmir Muslim Province University so that the same could be used for meeting local needs.53 Due to the disturbances in October which was also the harvesting season in Kashmir, peasants had defaulted on the collection of

48 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 191. 49 Ibid., p. 192. 50 Khidmat, 7 February 1947. 51 Through Blood, Sweat and Tears, p. 14. 52 Nehru’s letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 1 November 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 301. 53 Press Note No. 186, Dated 15 November 1947, Publicity Department, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 12th Maghar 2004 (27 November 1947), JKA, Srinagar.

64 Mujwaza.54 Pandit Jia Lal Kilam, the Emergency Officer of Food Control passed directions for the immediate collection of Mujwaza, 50 % of which was collected in a very short time. A Food Procurement Committee was constituted under his chairmanship which purchased more than 50,000 Kharwars of paddy on cash payment.55 Since there was a huge gap between demand and supply, food grains were procured from West Punjab and Jammu which were transported over snow-blocked Banihal by coolies. Trade with Punjab and other adjoining regions had come to a halt as a result of communal disturbances. Goodwill missions were sent by the Government to Punjab to allay the fears of traders and adequate arrangements were made for transporting goods.56 This resulted in the restoration of some trading contacts and items worth lakhs of rupees like Shawls, Carpets, Dry fruits and Embroidery articles were exported from the state and articles like cloth, salt, tea and sugar were imported into the state. All these measures helped in containing the food crisis to a certain extent.57

Due to the communal disturbances associated with the partition of India and the infiltration of tribals into the state there was an influx of a large number of refugees- internal as well as external. Jammu saw an unimaginable influx of refugees from the neighbouring Punjab where the communal riots were at peak. The rescue and rehabilitation of the refugees proved to be one of the most excruciating tasks before the Emergency administration. Immediately after taking over the reins of government, Sheikh Abdullah constituted a Central Refugee Committee under the Chairmanship of Pandit Kashyap Bandhu with the mandate to open camps for refugees, raise finances for their relief and make transport arrangements.58 Schools and Colleges and a number of commandeered houses were used for housing the displaced people. The refugeesMaulanawhose number Azadwas Library, consistently Aligarh swelling Muslimand comprised University mostly of Sikhs and Hindus from Muzaffarabad were provided free accommodation and clothing by the government. The Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross for the year

54 It was the portion of revenue which the state government collected from the peasants in kind and was used for the issue of rations to the city dwellers. 55 Press Note No. 164, Dated 6 November 1947, Publicity Department, JKA, Srinagar. 56 Through Blood. Sweat and Tears, pp. 15-6. 57 Ibid. 58 Press Note No. 157, Dated 5 November 1947, Publicity Department, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 12th Maghar 2004 (27 November 1947), JKA, Srinagar.

65 1949 mentions that two million persons were displaced on both sides of the Ceasefire Line.59 The gravity of the crisis can be understood by the following figures:60

a) Refugees in the camps of J&K State : 31,500 b) Refugees outside the camps in J&K State : 150,000 c) Refugees in the camps in India : 5,000 d) Refugees outside the camps in India : 40,000 Total number of Refugees 2,26,500

The Government settled the refugees temporarily in government and private buildings. It also organised big blocks of refugee camps in Srinagar and Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah opened a donation fund for the refugees and the amount was spent for refugee welfare.61 Since there was congestion in the camps which made these prone to infectious diseases, the civil administration with the help of Indian Army made arrangements for disinfection, mass delousing and isolation of suspect cases of epidemic diseases.62 The refugees included a large number of women and children who were living in a pitiable condition in the camps. Women Self-Defence Corps played an active role in alleviating the condition of these refugees by making women- specific arrangements like distribution of baby milk and clothes, reporting of delivery cases and taking care of pregnant women.63 The refugee crisis came with its baggage of challenges for women. In the absence of proper security and extreme poverty there were cases of young girls being sold off and pushed to the flesh trade by some members of Red Cross Committee. Women Corps brought the perpetrators to book and ensured that such cases do not get repeated. Red Cross Wing was brought under the control of the Corps.64

After the CeasefireMaulana Agreement Azad between Library, India Aligarh and Pakistan Muslim and the University initial settlement of refugees was over, Sheikh Abdullah’s administration focussed on their rehabilitation. A constructive programme was launched for the resettlement of refugees in their villages, wherever possible. The government opened special

59 United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan passed a resolution on 13 August 1948 which called for a ceasefire in Kashmir. On 1 January 1949 the ceasefire came into effect. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 153. 60 Report by Dr. R. Marti of the International Red Cross regarding the Conditions of Refugees in the Jammu and Kashmir State, Ministry of States, File No. 7(63)-K/49, NAI. 61 Through Blood, Sweat and Tears, p. 27. 62 Report by Dr. R. Marti, p. 6. 63 Through Blood, Sweat and Tears, pp. 8-9. 64 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. III, p. 341.

66 educational centres for imparting education to the refugee children. Four schools achieved prominence for excelling in the field of providing education which also included physical training and political education. These were the New Kashmir School in Wazir Bagh, Old Hospital School, the Jammu Muslim Camp School and the Chhatti Padshahi School.65 Answering a question in the Legislative Assembly on the steps taken by the government for refugee rehabilitation, it was held that free timber and poplars had been supplied to the refugees for the repair and reconstruction of their houses. The cost incurred by the Government was Rs 1,57,337. In addition loans were paid to them for the maintenance of their houses. To ensure that they become economically self-sufficient, a sufficient amount was advanced as trade loan for carrying out petty businesses.66 Evacuee land was available in the state in abundance. In order to resettle and rehabilitate the refugees about 2 lakh acres of land was distributed among them. The Government spent an amount of Rs 53,49,559 for the rehabilitation of refugees.67 The cumulative impact of these measures was that by 1952 more than ¾ of the refugees had been rehabilitated.68

Tussle between Mahajan and Sheikh Abdullah

The scheme of dyarchy under which Mahajan functioned as the Prime Minister of the state and Sheikh Abdullah as the Emergency Administrator did not function smoothly. There was no clear division of power between the two which resulted in frequent tussles. While Mahajan was the Prime Minister, it was actually Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues who wielded all the important powers.69 Soon Sheikh Abdullah began to take all the important decisions by himself without reference to the Maharaja or his Prime Minister.70 The rivalry between Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah was not new but the latter’s new capacity as the de facto head of the state signified the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University psychological blow to the Maharaja who only a few days earlier was the sovereign of

65 Through Blood, Sweat and Tears, p. 9. 66 Assembly Questions for the Session 1952, No. RB-I/52, Assembly Records, Register No. 5, Box No. 10, JKA, Srinagar. 67 Q. D. No. 15, Krishan Dev Sethi, Assembly Records, Rehabilitation Branch, Register No. 5, Box No. 10 , JKA, Srinagar. 68 Q. D. No. 424, Ram Rakha Mal, Assembly Records, Rehabilitation Branch, Register No. 5, Box No. 10, JKA, Srinagar. 69 Lamb, Disputed Legacy, p. 184. 70 Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 157. Nehru was aware of the psychological repercussions of Sheikh Abdullah not making formal references to Maharaja or not issuing orders in his name. He suggested that Sheikh Abdullah should make references to Maharaja wherever it was necessary or desirable. It would have no effect on Sheikh Abdullah as he was the real head of the state, Nehru’s letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 12 December 1947, SWJN, p. 370.

67 the State. Maharaja’s attitude towards Sheikh Abdullah was well known and it was only under pressure from the Government of India that he had accepted to give powers to Sheikh Abdullah. However, he became jealous of Sheikh’s authority which marked the beginning of a never-ending conflict between the two.71 Karan Singh believes that the real cause of friction was that there existed a dichotomy between the two worlds represented by them. While Maharaja belonged to an old feudal order and was not ready to accept the change, Sheikh Abdullah was a charismatic mass leader with revolutionary ideology in which there was no space for the feudal lords.72

After assuming charge of the administration Sheikh Abdullah launched a vociferous criticism against the Maharaja for fleeing from Kashmir at the critical juncture and letting people to fend for themselves. His taking of gold ornaments, furniture and expensive carpets with him was specially targeted by the National Conference leaders who equalled it with loot of the treasures of Kashmir.73 Sheikh Abdullah’s abhorrence of Maharaja had a personal aspect also. Before 1947 Sheikh Abdullah had derived his popular legitimacy by reducing the autocratic Dogra rule to a critical scrutiny. The more strong his anti-Dogra stance, the more his popularity was. After launching Quit Kashmir Movement, Maharaja’s administration had filed a sedition case against him and sentenced him to 3 years imprisonment.74 This had resulted in increasing animosity between the two. After being made the Emergency Administrator by the Maharaja, albeit reluctantly, Sheikh Abdullah gave vent to his anger against the Maharaja by holding him responsible for all the political and economic ills of the State. This embittered the relations between the two as Maharaja found it difficult to tolerate his criticism given the fact that Sheikh Abdullah had done the same, he too had fled from Kashmir and had evacuated his family members with the help of Indian Army.75 MaharajaMaulana wrote a Azadprotest Library,letter to Sheikh Aligarh Abdullah Muslim and told University him to put a stop to the vicious propaganda against his personality as this was badly affecting his position as the constitutional head of the state.76 If on the one side Sheikh Abdullah

71 Karan Singh, Heir Apparent, p.77. 72 Ibid., 85. 73 Sheikh Abdullah’s aversion for Maharaja was evident from his account of Maharaja’s flight from Kashmir which he called as ‘cringing escape’. Calling him a coward, he used to taunt him for holding the titles of Maharaja Adhiraj. The ‘looted’ wealth which was worth crores of rupees was later recovered by Sheikh Abdullah’s government. Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 289. See also, Ranbir, Jammu, 1 December 1949; Chand, Jammu, 16 April 1951. 74 Kashmir on Trial, p. 214. 75 Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir, p. 51. 76 Letter from Maharaja to Sheikh Abdullah, 3 December 1948, Singh, Heir Apparent, pp. 86-87.

68 hated Maharaja, on the other the latter did not trust Sheikh Abdullah.77 The Indian Government was aware of the clash of interests between Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah and its repercussions on the nature of . Kanwar Dalip Singh of the External Affairs Department was appointed as an intermediary between the Government of India and Maharaja. Though primarily he was to function on the part of the Government of India and see whether the policy laid down by them is pursued, among his tasks was to promote cordial relations between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah and ensure that there was smooth functioning of the government.78

Disturbances in Jammu and the Impact on Maharaja-Sheikh Relationship

As compared to Kashmir Valley, the Jammu province was communally more polarised. In the Districts of Jammu, and there was a preponderant majority of the Hindus. As per the Census of 1941, the total population of these three districts was 9,03,251 out of which the Hindu population was 5,45,015 which amounts to 60.33%.79 These areas were closer to Punjab and in the past many communal riots had taken place. After the partition of India and the resultant communal disturbances there was enormous influx of refugees from West Punjab to Jammu and by 1947 end their number had swelled to 1,60,000.80 From August itself the killing of Muslims began on a small scale which had escalated by November 1947 when it took the shape of a systemic decimation of Muslim population.81 After Maharaja’s flight to Jammu on 25 October 1947, the communalists among Dogras began to think that their time was over. A vicious campaign was launched against the Muslims in public meetings and newspapers gave full vent to the anti-Muslim rhetoric.82 The British observers in the State reported attacks on the Muslim villages in Jammu which were being cleared and burnt. The communal devastation was more Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University evident about 3 miles alongside the border of the state in which the Kashmir State troops, Sikhs and Dogra men participated.83 The Muslim localities of Talab Khatikan

77 Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 164. 78 Letter from Nehru to Dalip Singh, 1 November, 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, pp. 306-306a. 79 R. G. Wreford, ed., Census of India 1941, Vol. XXII, Jammu & Kashmir State, Pt. III, Village Tables, Jammu, 1943. 80 ‘Tribal Hazards in the Border Territory’, The Times, London, 26 January 1948, p. 5. 81 Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, London, 1950, p. 97. 82 G. K. Reddy, ‘Mass Killings of Muslims in Jammu province’, Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, 29 October 1947, p. 3 cited in Illays Chatta, ‘Terrible Fate: ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of Jammu’ Muslims in 1947’, Journal of Pakistan Vision, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009. 83 Duke to Smith, TNA: DO142/494 Dated 3 November 1947, Lionel Carter, Partition Observed, Vol. II, p. 617.

69 and Ustad Mohalla were besieged for days and then killed en masse. A major role in these killings was played by the communal organisations like RSS and Sikh refugees who paraded the streets of Jammu with naked swords. A Hindu-Sikh Defence Committee had been set up in Jammu under Dina Nath Mahajan ostensibly to defend the Hindus and Sikhs but actually to organise the massacre of Muslims.84 Different eye witness and survivors’ accounts have been published regarding the Jammu massacre which clearly establish that it was a systematic attempt to decimate the Muslim population from the Jammu province.85

On 5 November 1947 announcements were made on loudspeakers that anyone who wishes to go to Pakistan should assemble at Police lines. Muslims came in more than 36 lorries which when reached Samba were attacked resulting in the killing of thousands of people.86 of The Statesman wrote, ‘within a period of about 11 weeks starting August, systematic savageries….practically eliminated the entire Muslim element in the population amounting to 500000 people. About 200000 just disappeared’.87 Stephen did not give the source for his claims and his version was reproduced by the Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Governments.88 The figures could be exaggerated and Saraf holds that a fair estimate of the Muslim deaths in the Jammu massacre would be around 20,000 to 30,000.89 Notwithstanding the uncertainty about the exact number of casualties, the killings would be sufficient to instil fear in the Muslim Community who were afraid that various Hindu rajas and Maharajas in collaboration with the Dogra Army were planning to wipe out the Muslim

84 Eye witness Account of Ved Bhasin, ‘Jammu 1947’, Kashmir Life, Srinagar, 17 November 2015, https://kashmirlife.net/jammu-1947-issue-35-vol-07-89728/, accessed on 23 March 2016. 85 Nisar Ahmed Thakur, ‘3 survivors recount horrors of Jammu genocide’, Greater Kashmir, Srinagar, 6 November 2008, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/more/news/3-survivors-recount-horrors- of-jammu-genocide/Maulana, accessed Azad on 9 SeptemberLibrary, 2016; AligarhKhalid Bashir Muslim Ahmad, University ‘Jammu 1947: Tales of Bloodshed’, Greater Kashmir, 5 November 2014, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/gk- magazine/jammu-1947-tales-of-bloodshed/, accessed on 10 April 2017; Khalid Bashir Ahmad, ‘Jammu Massacre: Role of Jammu in the Freedom Struggle has not been Acknowledged', Greater Kashmir, 5 November 2015, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/jammu-massacre-role- of-jammu-in-the-freedom-struggle-has-not-been-acknowledged/, accessed on 9 September 2016; Khalid Bashir Ahmad, ‘Survivor of a Massacre’, Greater Kashmir, 22 July 2017, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/survivor-of-a-massacre/, accessed on 25 March 2016. 86 Khalid Hasan and Rehmatullah Rad, eds., Memory Lane to Jammu, Lahore, 2004, pp. 174-75 cited in Luv Puri, Across the Line of Control: Inside Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, New York, 2012, p. 26. 87 Ian Stephens, Pakistan, London, 1963, p. 200. 88 Christopher Snedden, ‘What Happened to Muslims in Jammu? Local identity, ‘"the massacre” of 1947’ and the roots of the ‘Kashmir problem’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2001, pp. 121-23. 89 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol. II, p. 841.

70 population.90 This fear psychosis apparently was driving out the Muslims from the Jammu region in large numbers who took refuge in safer places, particularly in Sialkot which was in close proximity to Jammu.91 Though the exact number of persons who migrated to Pakistan is contested, it was significant enough to in altering the demographic composition of Muslims in the Jammu province for ever.

The Maharaja’s administration instead of stopping the massacre helped the RSS by providing arms and ammunition to them. Nehru complained to Patel that the arms meant for the distribution among the Home Guards had been supplied to the RSS people in Jammu with close complicity of Maharaja.92 The State Forces augmented by the Sikh Regiment of Patiala troops actively participated in the unabated killing of Muslims. Nehru was aware of the Maharaja’s complicity in the massacre of Muslims in Jammu. He had received reports of impartial ‘non-Muslim observers’ which made it clear that State Forces had directly participated in the killings.93 The official complicity is also evident from the fact that when National Students Union was working to promote peace in Jammu, its general secretary, Ved Bhasin was summoned by the Governor Lala Chet Ram Chopra and warned of dire consequences in case he continued his peace activities. He was instead advised to receive arms training along with the RSS volunteers for killing the Muslims.94 When Hiralal Atal advised the government that the 2000 Muslim evacuees proposed to be taken to Pakistan should be taken back to the city, Mahajan was ‘as adamant as ever’ and strongly insisted that ‘they should be pushed out’.95

Mahatma Gandhi was greatly perturbed by the killing of Muslims in Jammu.96 He had found a hope, a beacon light in Kashmir where the Muslims had protected the Hindus and Sikhs. In his prayer meetings he frequently referred to the merciless killing of MuslimsMaulana in Jammu. Azad He held Library, that Maharaja Aligarh and hisMuslim administration University were to blame for the massacre as the armed forces were under his control and he could have stopped

90 Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan, The Kashmir Saga, revised and enlarged Edition, Mirpur, 1990, pp. 49-50. 91 Snedden, What Happened to Muslims, pp. 124-8. 92 Nehru’s letter to Patel, 30 Dec 1947, P. N. Chopra, Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel-Kashmir and Hyderabad, Delhi, 2002, p. 63. 93 Nehru’s letter to Dalip Singh, 21 November 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 331. 94 ‘Jammu 1947’, Kashmir Life, 17 November 2015. 95 Hiralal Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir, p. 123. 96 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 99.

71 the killings.97 He was full of praises for Sheikh Abdullah who had done a commendable job and won the hearts of both Hindus and Sikhs.98 Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference had only a nominal presence in the Jammu province which was a bastion of Muslim Conference. He was not popular among the Hindus of the region who were pro-Maharaja. Therefore he was not able to exert his influence in stopping the massacre. After taking over the reins of government he was preoccupied with the situation in Kashmir and could not give his due attention to Jammu. All he could do was to appeal the majority community to emulate the people of Kashmir and protect the minorities. In his speeches addressed to the people of Jammu Sheikh Abdullah talked about the dangers of communal frenzy for the state and asked people to draw lessons from the happenings in East and West Punjab.99 He ordered a Goodwill Mission to be sent to Jammu with a view to allay the fears of minorities and help in restoring the confidence and mutual trust among the members of different communities. It comprised of prominent members from both the communities including Sardar Budd Singh, Pandit Shiv Narain, Mohammad Amin and Prem Nath Dogra.100

Maharaja’s direct role in the killing of Muslims infuriated Sheikh Abdullah and his avarice of the Dogra Maharaja became much more pronounced. He was convinced that the Muslims of the State could not feel secure as long as the Dogra Maharaja was there and he therefore began to demand the abdication of Maharaja and transfer of full powers to him. In a letter to Patel on 7 October 1948 Sheikh Abdullah criticised the Maharaja for organising an ‘orgy of arson and loot and murder of Muslims’. The killing of Muslims had continued under the very nose of Maharaja.101 Though the administration in Kashmir was out of gear due to the tribal incursion and a strict censorship ofMaulana the press wouldAzad have Library, made theAligarh circulation Muslim of the University news of Jammu massacre difficult. But the fact that a large number of Kashmiris had their relatives in Jammu and in such volatile situations rumours spread rapidly. The killing of Muslims in Jammu, Sheikh believed, would have a direct bearing on the attitude of Muslims living in Kashmir and elsewhere. Sheikh Abdullah’s apprehensions are reflected in his

97 Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Delhi, 1988, Vol. 98, p. 113. 98 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 308. 99 Press Note No. 156, Dated 4 November 1947, Publicity Department, JKA Srinagar. 100 Press Note No. 175, Dated 11 November 1947, Publicity Department, JKA Srinagar. 101 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 237.

72 observations: the people of Kashmir had preferred India over Pakistan because of the former’s secular credentials and the belief that there would be no discrimination on the grounds of religion and that the life and property of Muslims would be secure. The killings would convince the Muslims that their future was not safe in India.102

The impact of Hindu communalism in general and the Jammu happenings in particular on the public opinion in Kashmir was strongly felt by the Indian Government, particularly Nehru. He was quite conscious of the situation in Kashmir and the challenges faced by Sheikh Abdullah. No doubt that Sheikh had been installed as the Chief Administrator of the State but Kashmir was largely governed by the ‘military situation’.103 Apart from the repulsion of Tribal invasion with the help of military, the people of Kashmir had to be won over to the Indian side through arguments, discussions and more so by convincing them that their future was safe in India. A confidence had to be constructed so that the Kashmiris should feel that they would benefit from their association with India. But the incidents like that of Jammu massacre were hampering the interests of India too in Kashmir. More so, these were perturbing Sheikh Abdullah who was the main force on which Indian chances in Kashmir depended.

If on the one side Nehru was taking every step to strengthen the hands of Sheikh Abdullah, on the other side the hiatus between Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah were increasing. Maharaja’s role in the Jammu massacre was playing a negative role. Mahajan notes that Sheikh Abdullah began to issue ordinances arbitrarily without reference to Maharaja. More so, Maharaja’s suggestions with regard to the appointments of different officers were not accepted by him.104 Mahajan complained to Patel that the administration was being run on ‘Hitlerian’ methods and was earning a bad Maulana name. He went Azad on Library, to mention Aligarh certain instances Muslim where University Sheikh Abdullah had acted on his own rather than listening to the advice of Maharaja. The State High Court was not allowed to function in Jammu. The Governor of Jammu, who was the Maharaja’s man had been transferred to Srinagar and then detained arbitrarily. The workers of National Conference had become all powerful and were interfering in the functioning of the administration.105 Sheikh Abdullah began to feel that his pro-people

102 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 90. 103 Nehru’s letter to Dalip Singh, 1 November 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 306. 104 Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 157. 105 Mahajan’s letter to Patel, 11 December 1947, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 92.

73 policies were being shelved by the duo of Maharaja and Mahajan and he began to express his displeasure at the continuation of status quo.106 Mahajan was accused of sitting idle in the palace while drawing the salary of Rs 6000 per month for ‘doing nothing’.107 The clash of interests between the two also strengthened regional prejudices between Kashmir and Jammu regions. While the people of Kashmir overwhelmingly supported Sheikh Abdullah, Maharaja Hari Singh was adored by the people of Jammu. The clash was evident in the fact that Maharaja along with his supporters in Jammu thwarted Sheikh Abdullah’s attempt to govern the state on efficient lines.108 Nehru advised Sheikh Abdullah to meet the Maharaja frequently and have direct consultations with him without any intermediaries as the lack of coordination would complicate the matters.109

Indian Government had made the acceptance of the Accession of Jammu and Kashmir conditional on the reference to the people of the state.110 The assurance that a plebiscite would be held as soon as the tribal raiders were pushed out of the State was reiterated time and again by Nehru. On 2nd November while broadcasting a speech from All India Radio, Nehru discussed the Kashmir situation in detail and the conditions in which the state acceded to the Indian Union and held that the fate of Kashmir has ultimately to be decided by the people of Kashmir.111 He reiterated his pledge on 6 November in a speech at Delhi, 112 and at Srinagar on 11 November.113 He gave a detailed speech in the Indian Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1947, highlighting the course of events in a chronological manner and showed regret for the killing of Muslims in Jammu. He reaffirmed the pledge of his government to give chance to the people of Kashmir to decide their future.114 By December 1947, India was contemplating to take the issue of Kashmir to the United Nations and to hold plebiscite underMaulana its auspices. Azad With Library, the possibility Aligarh of a plebiscite Muslim it was University very important that the trust of the people of Kashmir be won so that they would vote for India. It was here that Sheikh Abdullah appeared as Indian man on the scene. In his public pronouncements Sheikh Abdullah held that the accession of Kashmir to India was

106 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 102. 107 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 320. 108 R. N. Kaul, Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah- A Political Phoenix, New Delhi, 1985, p. 49. 109 Nehru’s letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 12 December 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, pp. 368-371. 110 P.L. Lakhanpal, Essential Documents, p. 57. 111 SWJN, Vol. 4, pp. 306c-310. 112 The Hindu, Madras, 7 November 1947. 113 Hindustan Times, 12 November 1947. 114 Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Vol. 1, Delhi, 1948, pp. 592-96.

74 final, unalterable and irrevocable and there was no need of a plebiscite. He declared that the union with India was a ‘kinship of heart and soul’,115 a decision taken not in a state of passion but after giving due deliberations. Calling the provisional accession to India ‘permanent’, Sheikh Abdullah expressed his loyalty to India, ‘we have decided to work with and die for India’.116 Sheikh Abdullah went to the extent of suggesting Indian Government not to talk of referendum and give an ultimatum to Pakistan to either stop the tribal infiltration or face a full-fledged war.117 These pronouncements strengthened India’s position that Kashmir had voluntarily acceded to India without any force. It also legitimised the presence of Indian Army in Kashmir which had to repulse the ‘Pakistan-sponsored’ tribal invasion. If Sheikh Abdullah supported India’s claims in Kashmir, India was expected to reciprocate by supporting him against the Maharaja. Nehru consistently reminded Maharaja of the significance of Sheikh Abdullah and the need to have cordial relations with him. Nehru tried to impress upon Maharaja:

The only person who can deliver the good in Kashmir is Sheikh Abdullah. He is obviously the leading popular personality in Kashmir………no satisfactory way out can be found in Kashmir except through Sheikh Abdullah. If that is so full confidence must be placed in him.118

In another letter to the Maharaja on 1 December, Nehru called upon him to strengthen the hands of Sheikh Abdullah and cooperate with him. For India to succeed in plebiscite, Nehru told Maharaja:

We have to work in such a way as to gain the goodwill of the majority of the population of the state, which means chiefly the Muslims. The policy recently pursued in Jammu Province has alienated the Muslims there very Maulanagreatly and Azad has created Library, a great Aligarh deal of ill -Muslimfeeling in certainUniversity parts of the country. The only person who can effectively deal with the situation is Sheikh Abdullah.119

Nehru was very anxious to see that Mahajan was relieved of his duties and Sheikh Abdullah became the Prime Minister of the State with full-fledged powers.120

115 , 24 May 1950. 116 Statesman, 7 March 1948. 117 SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 336. 118 Nehru’s letter to Maharaja Hari Singh, 13 November 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 325. Italics mine. 119 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 100-06; SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 351. Italics mine 120 Nehru’ Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 12 December 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, pp. 368-371.

75 Gopalaswamy Ayyengar with his expertise on the constitutional matters was deputed to hold consultations with Maharaja regarding the transfer of power to Sheikh Abdullah. After many deliberations Maharaja agreed to accept Sheikh Abdullah as his Prime Minister but had serious reservations about relieving Mahajan. He wanted to apply the Mysore Model as had earlier been suggested by the Indian Government. Under the scheme while Sheikh Abdullah would be designated as Prime Minister, Maharaja’s nominee would function as Dewan who would also have the powers to preside over the cabinet meetings.121 However, later Gopalaswamy Ayyengar expressed his discomfort at his negotiations with Maharaja whom he called ‘foolish man’ who had put himself in ‘inconvenient and gratuitous riddle’.122 Both Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah had serious reservations about the continuation of Mahajan. He was accused of being hand in gloves with the RSS and trying to sabotage the administration of Sheikh Abdullah. Besides, he was believed to have strong anti- Muslim feelings which did not fit in the nature of things for Kashmir. Nehru believed that his presence would be a constant irritant and the source of trouble and friction for Sheikh Abdullah.123 Therefore Nehru tried to persuade Maharaja that Mahajan should go as the Mysore Model had become outdated in the Mysore itself and could not be extended to Kashmir with all its complications. It was argued that Kashmir was in a critical situation and if anything was done to curb Sheikh Abdullah who represented a public force, there would be disastrous consequences.124

On 1 January 1948 the Government of India formally approached the United Nations Security Council to intervene on the Kashmir Issue. It was followed by long and arduous discussions by the Pakistani and Indian delegations and the consequent internationalisation of the Kashmir Dispute. Sheikh Abdullah went with the Indian Delegation to Maulanathe Security AzadCouncil Library, and made Aligarha long speech Muslim vindicating University India’s stand on Kashmir and criticising Pakistan for planning the aggression against Kashmir through the tribals.125 Negotiations with the Maharaja continued for the transfer of power to Sheikh Abdullah. With each passing day Maharaja was losing his bargaining power and he had no option but to succumb to the Indian Government’s

121 Hari Singh’s Letter to Patel, 17 December 1947, Chopra, Thematic Volumes, pp. 58-9. 122 Gopalaswamy’s Letter to Nehru, 30 December 1947, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 111, p. 144. 123 Nehru’s Letter to Patel, 30 December 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 414. 124 Nehru’s Letter to Maharaja, 30 December 1947, SWJN, Vol. 4, pp. 415-18. 125 Ashutosh Varshney, ‘Three Compromised Nationalisms’, in Raju. J. C Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Westview, 1992, pp. 194-95.

76 pressure. In his last attempt to secure his position, Maharaja wrote a threatening letter to Patel.126 Ostensibly Maharaja expressed his concern for the inability of the Indian Army to drive out the tribal invaders, in reality he was more concerned about his position. He was feeling ‘helpless’ as not only had he been deprived of the internal administration but also of the control over armed forces. While he held that he was unable to do anything for ‘his’ people, he was only concerned about the fate of Hindus and Sikhs. Seldom did he express any sympathy for his Muslim subjects. He threatened to withdraw the accession of Kashmir and rule it on his own. It was the last unsuccessful attempt to restore the diminishing role of his rule and preserve his dynasty. Nehru’s strong reaction to the threatening letter is borne out from his reply to the Maharaja in which he advised him to ‘do nothing at all’.127

Towards February end, Mahajan was invited to Delhi where he was persuaded by Nehru and Gopalaswamy Ayyengar that Maharaja should issue a declaration appointing Sheikh Abdullah as his Prime Minister while he himself function as Dewan.128 Gopalaswamy Ayyengar drafted the proclamation which had to be accepted by Maharaja at all costs.129 Consequently, on 5 March 1948 at 12 pm Maharaja Hari Singh issued a declaration from Rajgarh, Jammu appointing Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir:

The people of the state deserve the establishment of responsible government. I had already appointed Sheikh Abdullah as the Chief Administrator of the state. Today I have laid the foundations of a new interim government in the state with Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister who will appoint other ministers of his cabinet. Dewan will be my nominee in the Cabinet.130

On 17th March at 10:30 am Sheikh Abdullah was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University the state by Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, Mr. J. N. Wazir. The text of the command appointing him read as:

Whereas we being graciously pleased to give and grant during our pleasure unto Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah the office of Prime Minister, constituted and appointed under and by virtue of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution

126 Maharaja’s Letter to Patel, 31 January 1948, Chopra, Thematic Volumes, pp. 81-88. 127 Nehru’s Letter to Patel, 9 February 1948, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 126, p. 165. 128 Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 171. 129 Ibid., p. 172. 130 Translated from Urdu, Khalid, 6 March 1948.

77 Act of 1996 passed in the fourteenth year of our reign. We do by these our presents (sic) hereby constitute and appoint him the said Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to be Prime Minister during our pleasure with all the interest, power, titles, authorities, privileges and duties appertaining unto and vested in the said office.

Given at our palace of Amar Mahal this 5th day of Chet Sambat 2004 under our signatures and seal in the twenty third year of our reign.131

On 18th March the first popular Ministry in the state was formed under Sheikh Abdullah and comprised of the following cabinet members:132

1) Ghulam Mohammad Bakshi, Home and Deputy Prime Minister 2) Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, Revenue Minister 3) Sardar Budd Singh, Health and Rehabilitation Minister 4) G. M. Sadiq, Development Minister 5) Sham Lal Saraf, Food and Supplies Minister 6) Girdhari Lal Dogra, Finance Minister 7) Col. Pir Mohd. Khan, Minister for Education.

The timing of the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister is significant. India had requested the mediation of United Nations to help it to reach a settlement with Pakistan on Kashmir issue. However, later India regretted at having sought the services of Security Council as Kashmir became a pawn in the hands of international powers. In its January Resolutions the Security Council called upon both the governments of India and Pakistan to enter into talks directly to reach a settlement and appointed a Commission to look into the issue in detail.133 The Kashmir Issue was expected to come for next discussions before the Security Council in April. The Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Indian Government had been left red-faced by the brilliant advocacy of Sir Zafarullah Khan who while discussing the Kashmir situation in detail made a record speech for five hours and subjected the entire issue of the princely states to a critical scrutiny.134 Therefore, Indian Government wanted to secure a moral high in the Security Council in two ways. First by arguing that the state of Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to

131 Press Communiqué, Dated 17 March 1948, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 13th Chet 2004 (25 March 1948), No. 30, JKA, Srinagar. 132 Press Communiqué, 18 March 1948, Publicity Department, JKA, Srinagar. 133 Security Council Official Reports, S/654, 20 January 1948. 134 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 102.

78 India not because Maharaja wanted it but because the people of Kashmir were in favour of it. Kashmiri people had not only welcomed the Indian troops but also rendered help and cooperation in repulsing the tribal invasion.135 Second, Sheikh Abdullah represented the will of the people of Kashmir and was supporting India’s claims on Kashmir. By making him incharge of the affairs in Kashmir, the support of the world community could be solicited by holding that a popular government truly representative of the sentiments of the common masses was in favour of India. Maharaja was an odd man whose presence could not have helped India to secure any points as the world was critical of the ‘system of Indian States’ and their autocratic rule.136 Bazaz notes that the move to make Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister was an attempt to ‘throw dust in the eyes of the world’ that a Popular Government was functioning in the State. Further, the people could be fooled to believe that they were free as they were represented by their genuine leaders.137

The appointment of Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister of the State signified a victory for the people of Kashmir. For the 100 years the Dogras ruled over the State and appointed more than 28 Prime Ministers but not a single was Muslim. The appointment of a Muslim to the covetous post signalled the death-knell of the which was breathing its last. It was not a voluntary transfer of power but, as the previous pages have shown, was exacted with much coercion, threats and pressure both from the Indian Government and the public force represented by Sheikh Abdullah. The ‘forced abduction’, however, was to sow seeds of discord between the two and eventually between the two regions of Kashmir and Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah’s appointment was much publicised in the State especially Kashmir valley and it was hailed as the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the state.138 However,Maulana notwithstanding Azad Library, the celebrations, Aligarh Sheikh Muslim Abdullah University had not to face the ballot test to assess his real popularity. He was appointed Prime Minister through a royal gesture, the proclamation of Maharaja and not after emerging victorious in elections. There is no doubt in the fact that he commanded the loyalty of the majority of the people of Kashmir, not the entire state. His popularity faded as one moved

135 Nehru’s Statement in the Constituent Assembly, 5 March 1948, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Vol. III, pp. 1648-57. 136 Nehru’s Letter to Patel, 9 February 1948, Chopra, Thematic Volumes, p. 88. 137 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 406. 138 Lamb, Disputed Legacy, p. 190.

79 towards the Jammu province where he faced a tough political competition.139 Therefore, one can only speculate on how he would have performed in a fair and impartial election.

The Struggle for Hegemony

The controversial accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India on 26th October, 1947 140 and the consequent internationalisation of the Kashmir issue and the possibility of a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations ushered in a new phase of comprehensive catalogue of claims and counter claims by both India and Pakistan over Kashmir and secure their respective national interests and influence the international public opinion. Both the countries, supported by the regimes on both sides of the Ceasefire Line used every possible means to convince the people of the State in general and Kashmir in particular so that in case of plebiscite in future they vote for either of them. Every possible means–radio, press, pamphlets and speeches, government reports and posters was used to carry on the propaganda and influence the masses. India accused Pakistan of launching a proxy war on Kashmir by providing moral and material support to the tribals.141 It also launched a vitriolic criticism of the tribals by dehumanizing and demonizing them. The focus was on the savagery of the tribals- burning, raping, looting and killing whosoever came in their way,142 even not sparing the Muslims whom they had allegedly come to liberate. Eyewitness accounts of the tribal atrocities, their rapaciousness particularly the assault on women were published in newspapers.143 The main purpose behind this narrativisation was possibly to impress upon the Kashmiris the beneficence of India whose timely intervention saved them from the ferocious tribals and show the world that only after the tribals created havoc in Kashmir did India intervene. The Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University ‘undisciplined motley’ image served another purpose: it was to create a barbarian image of tribals in the minds of Kashmiri people who had initially come in significant

139 For a detailed analysis of Sheikh Abdullah’s popularity in Jammu and Kashmir, see Safeer Ahmad Bhat, ‘Jammu and Kashmir on the Eve of Partition- A Study of Political Conditions’, South Asian Studies- A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, July–December 2017, pp. 285- 95. 140 The date of accession has given rise to a controversy. Lamb claims that Maharaja signed the Accession document on 27th October ‘after’ the Indian troops had landed in Kashmir and not on 26th as claimed in the official version, Lamb, Disputed Legacy, pp. 134-7. 141 Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Defending Kashmir, Delhi, 1949. 142 Hindustan Times, 26 October 1947. 143 Khalid, 4 May 1948.

80 numbers to welcome them.144 Meetings were held in various remote parts of the State wherein the people were told about the Tribal aggression and how the National Conference, with Indian help was successful in thwarting their attempt to invade Kashmir by force.145 The tribal invasion received much attention in Indian and foreign newspapers which can possibly be explained by the presence of a significant number of foreigners who were holidaying in Kashmir whose safety became a cause of concern for the Western countries146 and the assault on St. Joseph’s Convent at Baramulla.147 Notwithstanding the attention given to the tribal invasion and its consequences, the contemporary accounts as well as later historical discussions were general reticent about the loss of lives of the Muslims in Jammu massacre. The Poonch uprising also did not get the attention as Pakistan failed to highlight the issue. It was only in 1950 that Sir Zafarullah Khan talked about the Jammu Massacre.148 However, he failed to pursue it very seriously and as a result public opinion could not be mobilised. The Indian narrative was strengthened by the fact that the people of Kashmir under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah had risen to defend Srinagar against the tribal assault. National Conference arranged a grand welcome to the Indian Army and was successful in projecting them as ‘Toiran Ababeel’.149 This was despite the fact that the Indian Army, on the very first day of its arrival on 27th October had killed several Kashmiris near the airfield.150

Pakistan’s reaction to the accession of J &K to India was spontaneous and panicky. Jinnah called the accession as illegal and based on ‘fraud and violence’.151 In a fit of rage he called upon his Commander-in-Chief to send his regular army to Kashmir, but

144 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol. II, p. 898. 145 PeopleMaulana in many remote Azadareas Library, denied any knowledgeAligarh of Muslim tribals but wereUniversity motivated by the National Conference workers to believe that tribals destroyed Kashmir, Miscellaneous Intelligence Reports for 1947 and 1948, JKA, Srinagar. 146 Some put the number between 200 and 450, Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy, p. 89. 147 A detailed account of the assault is given in Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir, pp. 80-96. 148 Abdul Ahad, Kashmir amid propaganda, Greater Kashmir, 7 May 2015, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/kashmir-amid-propaganda/, accessed on 23 December 2018. 149 ‘Flights of Birds’. According to Islamic belief, when Abraha came to attack on Makkah, Allah sent these birds who flung stones at Abraha’s army and destroyed it, Al-Quran, Chapter 105, Verse 3, tr. by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, p. 463. By calling Indian Army as Toiran Ababeel, National Conference used the religious sensibilities of the masses to project them as the liberating force, Ahad, Kashmir amid propaganda. 150 Bilal Handoo, ‘1947: First Blood’, Kashmir Life, November 2, 2015, https://kashmirlife.net/1947first-blood-issue-33-vol-07-88609/, accessed on 15 November 2017. 151 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 72, pp. 71-81.

81 was persuaded to withdraw the orders.152 The failure of the Pakistan propaganda was that they paid little attention to the tribal brutalities and didn’t accept any role of Pakistan Government in it. They held that the tribal invasion was a spontaneous result of the Dogra atrocities on the state subjects and the rampant massacre of the Muslims in Poonch and Jammu.153 When forced to accept their hand in the invasion, they failed to contextualize and legitimize the violence154 by, for example, toeing the Bazaz’s line who wrote that the motives of the Tribals should be considered. They wanted to free Kashmir from the tyranny of Maharaja and nationalist renegades ‘and we should not forget that some members of the Indian Army did no less of looting and molesting’.155 Such arguments would have won them support in the Valley. Even Ian Stephens whose reports from Baramulla kept the Western world informed of the Tribal assault on the Missionary later wrote that the St. Joseph’s episode ‘had been blown out of proportion by Indian propaganda aimed at countries of the Christian West’.156

The main focus of the Pakistani propaganda was on keeping the Kashmir Issue alive by highlighting that Accession was based on fraud and violence. The purpose was to delegitimize Indian rule over Kashmir by arguing that Kashmir had geographical, economic, cultural and ethnic ties with Pakistan. Most importantly, 77% of the population of Kashmir was Muslim and by terms of the Partition Plan, it had to accede to Pakistan. It was held that Pakistan’s existence was incomplete without Kashmir.157 When India took the Kashmir Issue to the United Nations Organisation, Pakistan’s case was based on these propositions and was able to influence international opinion in its favour. India was perturbed by the support Pakistan received and the Government was criticized for taking Kashmir Issue to the Security Council.158 In order to influence upon the people of Kashmir to vote in favour of Pakistan in anyMaulana future plebiscite, Azad UrduLibrary, pamphlets Aligarh were publishedMuslim in University question- answer

152 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics, Cambridge, 2014, p. 68. 153 Radio broadcast of Liaquat Ali Khan on November 4, 1947, cited in V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, London, 1956, p. 406. 154 Legitimisation of violence is one of the important features of a successful propaganda. See Sukla Sanyal, ‘Legitimizing Violence: Seditious Propaganda and Revolutionary Pamphlets in Bengal, 1908-1918’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 67, No. 3, August 2008, pp. 759-787. 155 Prem Nath Bazaz, Azad Kashmir: A Democratic Socialist Conception, Lahore, 1951, repr., Srinagar, 2005, p. 26. 156 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p. 60. 157 Text of Maulana Syeed Masoodi’s Speech in the Indian Parliament, 11 August 1951, Accession No. 463/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 158 B. N. Mullick, My Years with Nehru: Kashmir, New Delhi, 1971, p. 3.

82 form. The questions ranged from identical Islamic and Muslim identity to socio- economic, cultural and political aspects like ‘which is the biggest Muslim state in the world, who will liberate Kashmiris from undemocratic administration, who supports Kashmiris right to self-determination, who will improve the social, economic and cultural state of Kashmiris, in view of the above who rightfully deserves your vote’? The answer to all these questions in these pamphlets was Pakistan and therefore it was the sacred duty of every Kashmiri to strengthen Pakistan.159 Pakistani press launched a vitriolic criticism of India, calling it anti-Muslim and anti-Islam. It focused on the activities of the communal organisations like Bhartiya Jan Sangh, Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh and the plight of minorities and put forward the view that Kashmiri Muslims could never live peacefully in India. The entire discourse was couched in religious terms as it directly appealed to the emotions of the people. Sheikh Abdullah, who had supported accession of the State to India, was specially targeted in Pakistan press. He was called as the enemy of the Muslims and the main hurdle in the State’s accession to Pakistan. After United Nations called for holding a plebiscite in the state after fulfilling certain conditions, the main stress of Pakistan was on the holding of plebiscite while India vacillated.160 Khan Abdul Qayoom Khan in a Radio Pakistan programme on November 28, 1949 criticized India for delaying Plebiscite as it was aware of the outcome and ‘in next 4 or 5 years they will so suppress the Muslims of Kashmir that they will not be able to say anything’. This was published in almost all the leading dailies of Pakistan and aired in Urdu and Kashmiri on Azad Kashmir Radio.161

During this period Kashmir was widely discussed in International Press and one of the tactics used by Pakistan to influence the public opinion in Kashmir and abroad was to publishMaulana the news items Azad appearing Library, in international Aligarh Muslim press and Universityfavourable to Pakistan in local newspapers. Joseph Korbel, member of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan wrote an article in a New York magazine, New Leader on November 12, 1951 in which he mentioned how Kashmiri Muslims were coming to him and his colleagues and urged them to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule. He

159 Information Department, File No. S5/924/49, JKA, Srinagar. 160 For a detailed account of the politics played on plebiscite see Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, pp. 118-165. 161 Government of India, Ministry of States, File No. 8(26)-K/49, NAI.

83 charged Nehru with ‘refusing to accept the policy of the UN’.162 India was anxious that this article should not get publicity, but after a few days it was published by most of the Pakistan English dailies.163 Prem Nath Bazaz who stood against the merger of Kashmir with India wrote a number of articles and pamphlets criticizing Sheikh Abdullah and India. His reports and articles found regular space in Pakistani newspapers so consistently that he was accused of being an agent of Pakistan.164 Pakistan also actively used Azad Kashmir in its propaganda against Sheikh Abdullah’s Government. Newspapers from Azad Kashmir like Awaz-e-Haq, Hamari Awaz, Hamara Kashmir and Tanzeem published news and columns on Kashmir with a twist and hyperbole, trying to charge the emotions of the people against India, while happily forgetting about the internal problems of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan and the plight of minorities there.165

Immediately after the formation of the Emergency Government under Sheikh Abdullah, a National Cultural Front was organized. It launched a powerful propaganda drive by composing militant songs, plays, articles, news bulletins, cartoons and battle scenes to counteract the ‘enemy’ propaganda and raise the morale of the people. Even pamphlets were dropped on Azad Kashmir territories from the aeroplanes.166 The Publicity policy was aimed at making Kashmiris realize true nature of the autocratic and dictatorial regime in Pakistan, the distinct cultural identity of Kashmir, highlighting Pakhtoon Movement and publishing favourable foreign press comments. Books, pamphlets and articles considered ‘seditious’ were censored in large number.167

The very foundation of Pakistan’s arguments on the basis of which it claimed Kashmir were subjected to a strict scrutiny and rebuttal. Maulana Syeed Masoodi, General SecretaryMaulana of the NationalAzad Library, Conference Aligarh in a speech Muslim at Karnah University criticized those who called the tribals as ‘Mujahids’. Citing Quran and Hadith, he said that the terror

162 Joseph Korbel, ‘Nehru, the UN and Kashmir’, New Leader, 12 November 1951, http://search.opinionarchives.com/TNL_Web/digitalarchive.aspx., accessed May 20, 2016, 163 Foreign Press Reports, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 5/1/51-KP, NAI. 164 Press Reports on Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 11/5/50-KP, NAI. 165 For details on Azad Kashmir newspapers see Abdul Qayoom Durrani, Sahafat-i-Kashmir, Lahore, 2004, pp. 33-38. 166 Through Blood, Sweat and Tears, pp. 36-7. 167 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, File No. 20/1/64-KP, NAI.

84 unleashed by the tribals at Baramulla was anarchy and not Jihad.168 In a Government publication Pakistan Demand was criticized as an ‘emotional slogan’. Pakistan was criticized for enforcing an economic blockade on the ‘Muslims’ of Kashmir in 1947, India’s benevolence was acknowledged and the unity of ideals between India and Kashmir were stressed. Pakistan’s contention that Kashmir had geographical contiguity with Pakistan was sarcastically put to rest by saying that East Bengal was contiguous to India and thousands of miles separated from Pakistan, then why it did not become part of India. The contention that Pakistan was a Muslim country and by virtue of its demographic composition, Kashmir should merge with Pakistan was put aside by evoking the Universal ideals of Islam, arguing that Islam does not believe in national boundaries. It was held that a large number of Sufis, Saints and Ulema had left their native countries to settle elsewhere. Furthermore, more than 40 Million Muslims resided in India itself was the guarantee for the security of Kashmiri Muslims and therefore there was no need to merge with Pakistan.169 Attempts were made to appeal to the emotions of the people by, for example, trying to evoke the Muslim Cultural heritage of India for political purposes. It was propagated that Qutb Minar, Humayun’s Tomb, Taj Mahal, Jamia Masjid, Red Fort, and ‘Muslim’ cities like Delhi, Agra and Ahmedabad were located in India, not Pakistan.170 In the life of a common Kashmiri Muslim, Sufis, saints and shrines played a very vital role, thronging these places in happiness and sorrow.171 The propaganda was directed to exploit this aspect also by arguing that the tombs of Nizam-ud-din Auliya and Khwaja Moin-ud-Din Ajmeri, Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband, Nadwat-ul-Ulema and the prestigious Aligarh Muslim University all were located in India.172 What was implied was that the Muslims of Kashmir should not get carried away by the ‘Muslim-ness’ of Pakistan and should rather prefer India which had more aspects of Islamic identity than Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Pakistan.

Sheikh Abdullah in most of his speeches discussed the ‘Kashmir Question’ and launched a scathing criticism on Pakistan. He questioned the very foundation of Pakistan as based on hate and the clash of its ideology with National Conference had

168 Khalid, 26 June 1948. 169 Department of Information and Broadcasting, Hind aur Kashmir Naqabl-i-Taqseem hain, 1949, pp. 4-9, Accession No. 518/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 170 Dawat-e-Fikr: Ek Dard-e-Dil Rakhne Wale Musalman Ke Qalam se, p. 6, Accession No. 459/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 171 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, pp. 286-99. 172 Dawat-e-Fikr, pp. 6-9.

85 forced it to sponsor tribal invasion of Kashmir.173 Time and again he told people that the sweeping agrarian reforms which led to transformation of the lives of the peasants would not have been possible in Pakistan which was dominated by feudal and reactionary elements so much so that the agrarian reforms were relegated to the background. Maulana Syeed Masoodi called Pakistan a ‘failed state’ and criticized it for not being successful in framing a constitution. Its reservations about elections to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly were termed as its frustration.174 It was alleged that Pakistan was being used, through Kashmir, by the Anglo-American nexus to further its interests in the Indian Subcontinent. Since Pakistan was fighting against the demand for an independent Pakhtoonistan by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, newspapers in Kashmir carried detailed news of the movement, accused Pakistan of ‘fascism’ and assured Khan of full support of the Kashmiri people.175 The objective was to demonise Pakistan and impress upon the people of Kashmir that they would meet the same fate as Pakhtoons if they supported Pakistan. The extent to which the Government tried to nourish hatred against Pakistan in the minds of the common Kashmiris could be gauged from the fact that Naya Kashmir posters were pasted in schools, depicting ugly men with the caption, Yeh Pakistani Jasoos hain (These are Pakistani spies).176

Apparently Pakistan was quite successful in convincing the outside world about its position on Kashmir and it received sympathetic comments in the international press. It seems that India was unable to convince the international community on the same scale and its vacillation on the proposed plebiscite on Kashmir was questioned. It, therefore, advised Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad (Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir) to meet the foreign journalists and establish cordial relations with them so as to minimiseMaulanathe unfavo uAzadrable comments Library, on Aligarh India. As aMuslim pre-emptive University exercise, it was further advised that trained National Conference workers should be positioned in the outlying villages likely to be visited by foreign correspondents.177 The purpose was possibly to secure their support–to write objectively about India’s stand on ‘Kashmir Issue’ which could have served two purposes. First, with favourable international

173 Text of Speech of Sheikh Abdullah on the 2nd Anniversary of Radio Kashmir, 1 July 1950, Accession No. 697/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 174 Masoodi’s Speech, 11 August 1951. 175 ‘Resolution of the Kashmir Labours’ Union’, Khalid, 27 November 1950. 176 Gulzar Mufti, Kashmir in Sickness and in Health, New Delhi, 2013, p. 193. 177 Foreign Press Reports, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 5/1/51-KP, NAI.

86 reports India hoped to neutralise Pakistan’s edge on the Issue and the same would strengthen its position in the United Nations. Second, by publishing such favourable international reports in the local press, it could be used to influence the common Kashmiris. Indian Government also tried to utilized the services of Indian Muslims to influence the opinion of Kashmiri Muslims in two ways. First, the articles and speeches of the prominent Indian Muslims in which they vindicated the stand of the Government of India on Kashmir and appeared mainly in the Urdu Press were given wide publicity. These articles and speeches followed the known trajectories – criticizing Pakistan for its communalism and sponsoring the tribal raids on Kashmir, expressing full support for Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah’s Government, hailing India’s secularism and safeguards for minorities in the Constitution and criticizing the communal elements like Praja Parishad Party in Kashmir.178 In 1957, Information and Broadcasting Ministry published speeches of 34 prominent Indian Muslims on Kashmir in the form of booklets and pamphlets and were distributed widely throughout India, especially in Kashmir for this purpose.179 Second, special representations and requests were made to the Kashmiri Muslims through newspapers and radio to support India and safeguard the future of 40 million Muslims of India. If Kashmir voted for Pakistan, India, it was said, might well turn into a Hindu country, leading to the re-enactment of the communal holocaust of 1947.180 However, the impact of such appeals on Kashmiri Muslims is difficult to ascertain.

One of the important methods adopted by the Government of India to further its interests in Kashmir was to highlight the issues in Azad Kashmir.181 Azad Kashmir leaders like Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas and Chaudhary Hameedullah were specially targeted. They were accused of being turncoats, corrupt and of deceiving the people of KashmirMaulana and runningAzad Library, sword thr oughAligarh the bodyMuslim of Kashmir University by dividing it.182

178 Articles by Maulana Ahmad Sayed, Vice-President of Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind and Abdul Qayoom Ansari, former Minister of Bihar, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 5/3/57-KP, NAI. 179 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 8/6/57-KP, NAI. 180 India has quite often mentioned Kashmir as a security for Indian Muslims and a guarantee of Indian Secularism. Such narrativisation leaves no right for Muslims to be Indian citizens per se. Dr , Kashmir ke Mutaliq Bharti Muslim Rehnumaon ka Tawajja Nama (included representations of 14 prominent Muslims) Accession No. 446/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA Srinagar. See also Khalid, 15 October 1952. 181 Officially called so till 1954 when it was decided to use Pakistan Occupied part of J&K instead of Azad Kashmir, Ministry of Home Affairs, File No. 1-K (54), NAI. 182 Ali Mohammad Tariq, ‘Qaid-i-Millat’ Ghulam Abbas Aur Muslim Conference, Accession No. 493/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA Srinagar.

87 Chaudhary Abbas’s speech in which he had said that until Kashmir Issue remained unsolved Sharia could not be implemented was blown out of proportion and used (mis) to propagate un-Islamic attitude of Azad Kashmir leaders and ultimately of Pakistan.183 A number of books and pamphlets were published which threw light on the ‘plight of the people of Azad Kashmir’. The main arguments were: Azad Kashmir was not really free as it was ruled by the Pakistan Government through Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, people of Azad Kashmir were no better than refugees-poor, hungry and oppressed and humiliated by the Pakistani officers; there was political bribery, oppressive behaviour of and lack of development. Poverty and unemployment of Kashmiri Muslims was specifically mentioned and it was alleged that Pakistan Government was creating hindrances for those Kashmiris who wanted to return to the Valley.184 Some Pakistani news reports which criticized Pakistan’s handling of Azad Kashmir were given wide publicity. The main motive behind this was to impress upon the people of Kashmir that they were far better than their counterparts on the other side of the fence and the belief that Azad Kashmir was a ‘dreamland’ for Kashmiris was a myth. Eyewitness accounts of those Kashmiris who had visited Pakistan were widely distributed. These contained a negative image of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir-feudalism, lawlessness, unemployment, high handedness of the army, and political instability.185 To bolster India’s image it was argued that Pakistan was ruling Azad Kashmir like a colony unlike Kashmir which enjoyed a special constitutional position in the Indian Union under Article 370.186 By implication it meant that Kashmir’s future was safe only in India and in any future plebiscite, people of Kashmir should, therefore, choose ‘benevolent’ India as against ‘oppressive’ Pakistan and that Kashmir’s distinct cultural identity would flourish only within India. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Radio was the most important means of spreading propaganda and counter- propaganda. It had a reach beyond the borders and allowed information to be transmitted quickly and uniformly to vast populations. Moreover, unlike newspapers

183 Khalid, 5 September 1948. 184 Real Azad Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir Government, Ministry Of Information and Broadcasting, pp. 2-16, Accession No. 1292/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA Srinagar. Also, Khalid, 27 April 1951. 185 Hum ne Pakistan Mein Kya Dekha: Chaar Kashmiri Musalmanon ke Chashm deed Halaat, Accession No. 439/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 186 Hind ke Aayeen Mein Hamari Makhsoos Position, National Conference Working Committee, Accession No. 445/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar.

88 radio could be listened to and understood by vast majority of the uneducated people in both India and Pakistan. Both the countries utilised its services to the fullest by broadcasting news, commentary and cultural programmes.

Pakistan, through the Azad Kashmir Radio launched an extensive anti-India propaganda and projected itself as representing the sentiments of the common Kashmiris against the Indian ‘occupation’. Azad Kashmir Radio carried news on every political development in the State and aired broadcasts, specially targeting Sheikh Abdullah’s Government. Pakistan’s Radio Trarkhal aired an anti-India programme, Dol ka Pol which had become so popular among the Kashmiris that the Jammu and Kashmir Information Department had to create a separate monitoring cell so that suitable replies could be given to counter its propaganda.187 Azad Kashmir Radio also aired news on Kashmir through ‘This is Trarkhal Radio’.188 The news was usually set in religious tones with India being projected as a ‘Hindu’ country. India’s secularism was projected as against the very tenets of Islam. Kashmiris were exhorted to rise in revolt against the unholy Indian army and throw away the yoke of slavery. A contemporary says that Trarkhal Radio was the only major source of news for people from Kashmir to Kishtwar and that it were the Trarkhal programmes that ‘set the discourse’ and ‘shaped the narrative’ in Kashmir. It aired special Ladishah programmes which were very much popular and more ‘powerful than the State Government’s Information and Broadcasting Department’.189 Zarb-e-Kaleem and Garoor ki Khudai were other anti-India programmes of Radio Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Radio. Indian armed forces were targeted and the news of anti-protests in Kashmir, usually blacked out by Radio Kashmir and All India Radio were broadcasted with exaggeration.190

In orderMaulana to counter Azad the Pakistani Library, propaganda Aligarh Radio Muslim Kashmir, University Jammu (December 1, 1947) and Srinagar (July 1, 1948) were established. It was to expose the evil machinations of Pakistan, to boost the morale of the people and educate them about

187 Propaganda Wars, Basta No. 69, File No. 1765, JKA, Jammu. 188 Khalid, 9 July 1948. 189 Z. G. Muhammad, ‘Shortwave 62.3’, Greater Kashmir, 24 April 2016, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/shortwave-62-3/ accessed on 24 April 2016. 190 Z. G. Muhammad, ‘Of Zarb-e-Kaleem Days’, Greater Kashmir, 21 August 2016, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/of-zarb-e-kaleem-days/, accessed on 21 August 2016.

89 political happenings in and outside the state.191 Radio Kashmir Srinagar aired a special daily programme called Jawabi Hamla to counter the Azad Kashmir Radio propaganda and highlight the real state of affairs in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir.192 The focus was on highlighting the differences in religious practices and culture between Pakistan and Kashmir. Kashmiri traditions were rooted in , Rishi’sm and and the peaceful coexistence of a myriad of religions and cultures whereas Pakistanis were fundamentalists, war-like people and had no concern for the distinct cultural identity of people of Kashmir. Gumbad ki Awaz and Kashmir Hamara hai were also aired to promote patriotic feelings and anti-Pakistan sentiments. Since everyone could not afford radio, Community Listening Centres were established where people listened to the Radio Kashmir and All India Radio.193 Listening to Pakistan Radio and Azad Kashmir Radio was a crime and any person found guilty was beaten up by the National Conference workers and persecuted under the Enemy Agents Ordinance.194 During this period, curiously enough, salt became the most politicized commodity. Since Kashmir was mostly dependent on Pakistani rock salt (Khewra salt), Azad Kashmir Radio in its programmes consistently made fun of the Sheikh Abdullah’s Government that it was dependent on Pakistan even for its basic necessities like salt. What was implied was that Kashmir was economically dependent on Pakistan since it was cut off from the rest of India for many months in winter. On the other hand, it had an all-weather connectivity with Pakistan and, therefore, it was in the best interests of the state to throw off its ‘unholy’ coalition with India and join Pakistan. The reaction of the State Government was to ban import of Khewra salt into Kashmir and start procuring Sambhar salt from .195 However, Sambhar salt was expensive than Khewra salt, partly due to high transportation charges and was sold at the rate of 6 to 61/2 annas per seer196 while in Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Azad Kashmir it was sold at less than 4 annas per seer. Once again Azad Kashmir Radio launched propaganda that due to accession to India, Kashmiris were forced to buy salt at high rates. It was then decided by the Government of India to subsidize salt

191 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir 1947-50: An Account of Activities of first Three years of Sheikh Abdullah’s Government, Jammu, 1951, pp. 18-20. 192 ibid., p. 21. 193 ibid., p. 29. 194 Promulgated in 1948 for trial and punishment of enemy agents and those helping raiders. Under the garb of being enemy agents, the opponents of Sheikh Abdullah and National Conference were apprehended and beaten up, Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 313. 195 Ministry of States, File No. 6 (14)-K/49, NAI. 196 1 seer equals 1.25 kg.

90 to Jammu and Kashmir which would reduce its price and bring it at par with Azad Kashmir. Everyone in the Home and Finance Ministry believed that it would have immense political impact.197 India became self-sufficient in salt production and began to export salt to Pakistan.198 It was now the turn of Radio Kashmir, Srinagar to avenge the sarcasm and criticize Pakistan for failing to fulfill its salt needs by itself.199 The rivalry between Radio Kashmir Srinagar and Azad Kashmir Radio was increasing with every passing day and the provocations had the potential of disrupting peace. In the Inter-Dominion Information Consultative Committees held at Karachi (March 16, 1949) and New Delhi (August 2, 1949) it was decided that both the countries should use their good offices to bring about an improvement with regard to the tone of Radio Kashmir Srinagar and Azad Kashmir Radio.200

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

197 Ministry of States, File No. 6 (25)-K/48, NAI. 198 Statesman, 6 January 1952. 199 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 5/1/51-KP, NAI. 200 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Internal Publicity, File No. 24/65/49-IP, NAI.

91 CHAPTER 3

Socio-economic Policies of the National Conference Government: A Critical Study

In 1947 the state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of the poorest states in India in terms of economic development and was kept in the zone of special category states by the Union Government. Partition of India had resulted in the economic dislocation of the state, contributing further to the already deteriorating economy. By 1950 more than 85% of the population was directly dependent on agriculture which was represented by decadency and sluggish growth. 89% of the population was illiterate and the power generation in the state was a mere 6 MWs.1 Therefore the state bequeathed by Sheikh Abdullah in 1948 was characterized by economic bankruptcy, destitution, poverty and mass illiteracy.2 The decadent state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 was a direct result of the discriminatory and exploitative economic policies followed by the Dogra government right from 1846 when the State came into existence.

The administrative mechanism of the Dogra state was geared towards extracting maximum from the people and spending very less on the developmental fronts. The underlying principle of the state was that Kashmir was a purchased property and therefore every kind of arbitrary extraction was justified.3 The state had an agricultural economy with a preponderant majority of the population directly dependent on agriculture and allied activities for their livelihood.4 Though there was the presence of silk, timber and horticulture industries, the Census of 1941 notes that these were linked too directly to agriculture to be labeled as separate sectors.5 Instead of followingMaulana a farsighted Azad policy Library, for the Aligarh development Muslim of agri Universitycultural sector, the Dogra State remained callous and contend itself with the mere collection of revenue. It also discouraged any individual efforts at improving the state of agriculture as the attitude

1 R. C. Bhargava, ‘Economic Background’ in Baghwan Sahay, ed., Jammu and Kashmir, 1969 Guide, Srinagar, 1969, p. 119. 2 M.L Misri and M. S. Bhat, Poverty, Planning and Economic Change in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, 1994, p. 28. 3 Tharp, Cashmir Misgovernment, p. 26. 4 In 1944 Ganganath Commission Report mentioned that 75% of the population was directly dependent on agriculture, Shri Ganga Nath Commission Report on Administration of Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu, 1943, p. 73. 5 Census of India 1941, Jammu and Kashmir, Parts I and II, Vol. XXII, p. 7.

92 of state officials was harsh, cruel and discriminatory.6 The state followed a policy of exorbitant taxation which fell very heavily on the common populace. Besides collecting land revenue at high rates, the state levied taxes on practically every item produced in the state- shawl, walnut, milk, vegetables, cattle, ghee, timber and poultry.7 Walter Lawrence who spent many years in Kashmir as Settlement Commissioner attests to the heavy taxation system of the Dogras and maintains that ‘everything save air and water was brought under taxation’.8 Notwithstanding the huge amounts collected from the people, the Dogra state maintained an apathetic attitude towards spending the same on the economic development of the state. The high magnitude of taxation and the consequent decline of agriculture contributed to famines, epidemics and the desertion of lands by the peasantry so much so that the government imposed a ban on the migration of peasants to outside lands particularly Punjab.9 It was the person of the Maharaja who symbolized the state. There was no distinction between his personal expenditure and the other expenditure heads of the state. Even the most enlightened of the Dogra rulers, Maharaja Hari Singh appropriated for himself about Rs 41,00,000 out of a total state income of Rs 2,77,18,000 which amounts to more than 14%.10 The State was more concerned about the maintenance of law and order and the suppression of any voice of protest than working for the welfare of the common masses. It was only after the establishment of British Residency in 1885 that the State began to show some interest in the development activities. Because of the active intervention of the British Residency, there was visible improvement in education, health, agriculture and the development of some industries. However, the character of the Dogra state continued to be the same- exploitative and discriminatory which so impoverished the economy of the state that in 1947 when the Dogra rule was breathing its last, the per capita income Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University and the consumption levels of the state were one of the lowest in the Indian Subcontinent which in the longer run perpetuated poverty in the state.11

6 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, p. 401. 7 Ibid., p. 415. 8 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, p. 417. 9 Suhail-ul-Rehman Lone, Indian National Movement and the Freedom Struggle of Jammu and Kashmir (1931-1947 A.D.), Unpublished Dissertation, Aligarh Muslim University, 2013, p. 7. 10 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 220. 11 Javeed Ul Aziz, Economic History of Modern Kashmir with Special Reference to Agriculture (1947- 1989), Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Kashmir, 2010, p. 4.

93 National Conference under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah raised its voice against the state exploitation and demanded the establishment of responsible government. Right from its inception, it continuously spoke against the harsh economic policies of the Dogra state and their impact on the common masses. Presidential addresses of Sheikh Abdullah show a clear understanding of the economic scenario of the state and the need to strengthen its basis.12 The demands of National Conference included the adoption of a pro-peasant agricultural policy, reduction in land revenue demand, development of irrigation canals, development of industries, animal husbandry, protection of the interests of traders, merchants and artisans and craftsmen.13 In 1944 National Conference adopted a comprehensive plan for addressing the political and economic ills of the country and for laying the foundations of a democratic and progressive ‘New Kashmir’. It envisaged the formulation of a National Economic Plan for acquiring national self-sufficiency and raising the standard of living.14 Framed by B. P. L. Bedi, a noted communist, the Plan clearly echoed the socialist fundamentals of the reorganization of the means of production and property relationships. It envisioned the setting up of an Agricultural Plan with focus on the abolition of landlordism, land to the tiller and cooperative association.15 Cultivable land was scarce in Kashmir as the majority of the portions of land are mountainous and hilly areas, making only 30% of the land fit for cultivation.16 Keeping in view this natural limitation, the Plan aimed at better utilization of the land already under cultivation and the development of cultivable waste. Regarding industrial development of the state, the Plan envisioned the abolition of big private capital, government ownership of all the key industries and the organization of cottage industries through industrial cooperatives.17 The New Kashmir Plan was to function as the blue-print of the future National Conference government and it became the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University most refereed document both for the government and the common masses. The success or failure of the government was to be judged on the level of promises it was able to keep in the light of the Plan.

12 See the Presidential Addresses of Sheikh Abdullah delivered in the annual sessions of National Conference in Mirza Shafiq, Dastawaizat, pp. 225-28, pp. 300-304, pp. 447-48, pp. 461-65 and pp. 468-470. 13 Ibid., pp. 301-390. 14 New Kashmir, Kashmir Bureau of Information, New Delhi, n. d., p. 23. 15 Ibid, pp. 25-6. 16 Javeed Ul Aziz, Economic History of Modern Kashmir. 17 New Kashmir, pp. 29-36.

94 Confronted with the challenges of uncertain political atmosphere and an impoverished economy, a direct legacy of the Dogra state, the National Conference took over the reins of the government in 1948. In its efforts of economic rejuvenation of the state it was considerably influenced by the inherited patterns of poverty, underdevelopment and feudal relations. The government prioritized the economic restructuring of the state with a special emphasis on agriculture. A slew of reforms were initiated which transformed the agricultural scenario and proved a long way in the economic development of the state. The reforms included: Abolition of landlordism, Land to the tiller and Debt relief measures.

Agrarian System under Dogras

The agrarian structure of the Dogra State was essentially archaic and feudal. Immediately after getting control of Kashmir in 1846, Maharaja Gulab Singh declared all the proprietary and occupancy rights as null and void.18 No respect was shown to the customary traditions when the peasant of Kashmir had been enjoying the same rights from the earliest times. The confiscation of proprietary rights resulted in great distress for the peasants and adversely affected the agriculture. Besides paying land revenue, the peasants had to pay malikana to the state in view of the ownership rights vested in the government which became ‘a farmer working with coolies under a management closely approximating forced labour’.19 In the agrarian structure of the Dogra state there existed a hierarchy of functionaries between Maharaja and the peasant–Jagirdars, Muafidars, Chakdars and Muqarraridars.20 The Dogra rulers generously distributed jagirs among their family members, relatives, co-religionists and influential families. Jagirs were also granted for political purposes with an aim to create a network of loyalties and collaborating class who would owe their very Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University existence to the Dogra state and show their unflinching support and loyalty to the person and throne of Maharaja.21 An interesting feature of the Dogra jagirdari system was that the number of Muslim Jagirdars was nearly negligible. Dr. Elmslie records

18 Parvez Ahmad, ‘Nature of Land Rights in Kashmir under Dogras-1846-1947’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 64, 2003, pp. 822-838. 19 A. Wingate, Preliminary Report of Settlement Operations in Jammu and Kashmir State, Lahore, 1888, p. 56. 20 For a detailed discussion on the landlord class see, Showkat Ahmad Naik, ‘Landlords, Peasants and the Dogra rule in Kashmir’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 73, 2012, pp. 782- 793. 21 Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, pp. 71-72.

95 that out of fourty-five jagirs in the valley of Kashmir, the Muslims enjoyed only five.22

In 1930 accepting the recommendations of a committee appointed for Jagirs and muafis, the government divided the jagirs into two categories: 1) Persons who held a jagir of Rs 3000 per annum or above were termed as Jagirdars. 2) Those who held the jagirs below Rs 3000 were called as Pattadars.23 Though the jagirdars possessed revenue collecting rights over vast tracts of land, they did not enjoy proprietary rights.24 After collecting about ¾ of the total produce from the peasant, the latter was left with the barest minimum to enable him to continue production. Besides collecting land revenue, the Jagirdars levied many illegal cesses and taxes on the peasants- collection of grazing tax in the same manner in which the jagirdar collected land revenue, tax on water mills and share from everything that the peasant produced.25 Besides, the Jagirdar enjoyed many privileges either directly conferred on him by the state or manipulated by him by misusing his position and power in the absence of a strict state control. He enjoyed the forest rights and needed no shooting licenses within his jagir. He was exempted from the State Subject Certificate and from personal appearance in the civil courts. Any arrears of jagir from the peasants were recovered by the Jagirdar against arrears of land revenue. His say was final in the appointment of village headmen. Within the jagir, on the death of a landholder his right instead of escheating to the state devolved on the Jagirdar.26 The conferment of such privileges led to the ruination of agriculture and reduced the peasant to abject poverty who despite keeping everything at the disposal of the Jagirdar faced continuous threats and intimidation. The Jagirdar had to pay a part of the produce in kind to the state who was also allowed commutation rates at very low figures which were tenMaulana times lower Azad than Library, the market Aligarh prices.27 MuslimTherefore, University the jagirdars not only fleeced the peasants and robbed them off their hard earned produce, they were also a

22 Charles Ellison Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir and the Adjoining Districts of Kishtwar, Baderwah, Jammu, Nowshera, Punch and the Valley of Kishanganga, Calcutta, 1873, pp. 29-30. 23 Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, ‘On the Way to Golden Harvests-Agricultural Reforms in Kashmir’ in Suresh K. Sharma and S. R. Bakshi, eds., Encyclopaedia of Kashmir, Vol. 10, New Delhi, 1995, p. 200. 24 Since the proprietary rights were held by the state, it was only in a few special cases that the jagirdars were bestowed ownership rights, Wingate, Preliminary Report, pp. 90-91. 25 R. L. Hangloo, Agrarian System of Kashmir, 1846-1889, New Delhi, 1995, p. 84. 26 Afzal Beg, Golden Harvests, pp. 200-202. 27 Mirza Afzal Beg, On the Way to Golden Harvest: Agricultural Reforms in Kashmir, Jammu, 1951, p. 52.

96 burden on the state treasury. However, this did not stop the Dogra rulers from bestowing jagirs of different nature to their kinsmen and influential persons. The jagirdars had wide-ranging powers since they derived their authority directly from the Durbar and were ‘to represent the durbar in their jagirs’.28 They constituted a mini- state in their jagirs with no sympathy for the poor cultivators as most of the jagirdars were either Dogras or Punjabi officials. In the absence of the occupancy rights for the peasants of the jagir lands, they could easily be evicted by the jagirdars at their whims.

After the establishment of British Residency in Kashmir, there was pressure on the Dogra state from its colonial masters to review the functioning of jagirs and regulate its affairs in a more clear manner. As a result in 1896-7 Captain J. L. Kaye was appointed as the Settlement Commissioner for assessing Jagir lands.29 Kaye recommended the curtailment in the powers of the jagirdars through the active interference of the State by defining their status and the tenants on their lands. No occupancy or proprietary rights were to be conferred on the jagirdars as they were mere assignees of the state revenue. On the other hand, the tenants on jagir estates were no different from the tenants of the Durbar and therefore occupancy rights should be bestowed on them.30 Jagirdars’ collection of illegal taxes and cesses from the peasants and their rights over the wastelands was subject to a critical scrutiny and it was held that they had no rights to the same.31 These recommendations curtailed the powers of the jagirdars and helped to a certain extent in improving the conditions of the peasants. However, the conferment of assami rights on the jagirdars complicated the tenancy problem and there were cases of large scale evictment of tenants. Maharaja Pratap Singh passed the Tenancy Act of 1923 which divided the tenants into four categories.Maulana It gave protectionAzad Library, to the tenants Aligarh and Muslim held that theyUniversity could not be evicted till they declared the land unfit for cultivation.32 In 1931 the government granted further privileges to the jagirdars. On the conversion of land revenue realization from kind to cash, non-proprietary jagirdars were allowed forest and grazing rights in another village granted as an additional jagir. Additional jagirs were

28 Private Record of His Highness, 1898/13, p. 4, JKA, Jammu cited in Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 72. 29 Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 96. 30 J. L. Kaye, Note on the Assessment Report on the Minor Jagir Villages situated in the Valley of Kashmir, Lahore, 1897, pp. 14-17 cited in Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 97. 31 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 32 J&K Tenancy Act, 1923, Register No. 1281, JKA, Srinagar.

97 granted in Kashmir and Jammu provinces to the non-proprietary Zamindars of Ladakh and . Most important of all, jagirdars were granted proprietary rights in the lands over which they enjoyed only assami rights.33 This further strengthened the position of the jagirdars vis-à-vis cultivators. Since most of the jagirdars were not the actual tillers of the soil, the conferment of proprietary rights on them enabled them to buy thousands of acres of land as they had enough capital to invest in land. This resulted in the intensification of the exploitation of peasantry by the jagirdars. Sheikh Abdullah best summed up the situation by holding that it led to the growth of ‘mushrooms of Maharajas in the form of Jagirdars and Zamindars round the autocratic regime of Hari Singh, collectively exploiting the poor tiller of the land’.34

The Chakdari system was instituted in 1862-63 during the reign of Ranbir Singh with the purpose of bringing fallow land under cultivation.35 As long as the Chakdars continued to pay the State its due share, they were entitled to the possession of the land and half of its produce. They received concessions with regard to the payment of land revenue and had to pay 12 ½ % less than the actual revenue rates.36 Though the chak lands were allotted with the strict condition that the persons employed in the lands should be non-cultivators, the Chakdars did not comply with the same and found ways and means to grab the lands already under cultivation and forcibly employ the cultivating class, turning them into tenants at will.37 A. Wingate termed the system as ‘ryotwari in ruins’.38

Muafidars and Muqarrari holders constituted other two categories of the Dogra landlord class. Muafidars were the holders of revenue free religious and charitable grants (muafis) given by the Dogra rulers for invoking the blessings of God. Though the grants were mainly bestowed on the Brahmans and temples and Pathshalas, the grants Maulanagiven by the Azad previous Library, rulers to Aligarhmosques and Muslim MuslimsUniversity were kept intact. Muafi grants were of two types-religious and non-religious.39 Religious muafis were granted to religious institutions like temples and mosques and were managed by

33 Afzal Beg, Golden Harvests, p. 202. 34 Abolition of Big Landlordism: Text of the Announcement made by Sheikh Abdullah on Martyr’s Day at Lal Chowk, Srinagar, 13 July 1950, Accession No. 559/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 35 Wingate, Preliminary Report, p. 27. 36 Afzal Beg, Golden Harvests, p. 207. 37 Wingate, Preliminary Report, pp. 29-32. 38 Ibid., pp. 530-33. 39 Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 74.

98 religious personages which assumed hereditary character. Religious muafidar received 1/3 of the assigned revenue in cash and the remaining amount in kind at the rate of Rs 2/4/- per Kharwar.40 In case of non-religious muafis, granted to individuals for constructing works of public utility, revenue was received in cash or kind. The holders not only sapped the vitality of the peasants by exploiting them but also opened the scope for corruption as the Chakdars fraudulently enlisted their lands as muafi to escape paying revenue to the government. The total number of Jagirdars and Muafidars in the state was 396 who collectively denuded the state treasury of Rs 5,56,313 annually.41 The Muqarrari holders received money from the government in six-month installments notwithstanding whether the land was cultivated or not.42 They received hefty amounts and became a burden on the State treasury.

Condition of the Peasantry

The peasants formed the lowest rung of the Dogra agrarian structure and constituted the majority of the population. Their condition was miserable as they had to bear the brunt of the state oppression in the form of excessive and illegal taxation, begar and official exploitation.43 The Dogras displayed regional prejudice in that while the peasants of Jammu enjoyed proprietary rights in their lands, the same were denied to their Kashmiri counterparts who were treated as mere tenant-farmers. The different experiments of the State vis-à-vis the mechanism of the revenue collection only strained the peasant and increased his burden. The depravation of the peasant was evident from the fact that though he produced foodgrains for the entire state, he was not able to feed himself and his family for the entire year as even after paying all that he produced and selling his cattle and essentials the state and its intermediary class was not satisfied.44 As a result, he had to turn to the Punjab plains where he worked in Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University the post-harvest season to meet his requirements. The major beneficiaries of this oppressive system were the Dogra State and its collaborators. It was a ‘vicious, unending process with every limb of the ruling system aiding and abetting in its continuance and growth’.45 Following the appointment of British Residency in

40 The price at which the muafidars received grains from the peasants was four times lower than the prevailing market prices, Beg, Golden Harvests, p. 205. 41 Ibid., p. 206. 42 Wingate, Preliminary Report, p. 28. 43 Tharp, Cashmir Misgovernment, pp. 9-28. 44 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, p. 272. 45 O.N. Dhar, ‘Land Reforms in Kashmir’, Indian Affairs Record, Vol. III, No. 4, May 1957, p. 475.

99 Kashmir, there was greater pressure on Maharaja to reform the agrarian system and streamline the revenue collecting machinery as land revenue was the principal source of State income and the method of its collection was crucial.46 A. Wingate was appointed as the Settlement Commissioner followed by Lawrence in 1889. After facing stiff opposition from the government officials and intermediary classes,47 Lawrence was successful in completing the Settlement in 1895. It was a remarkable achievement and heralded the beginning of a new phase in the agrarian history of Kashmir. He recommended the granting of permanent hereditary occupancy rights, non-saleable and non-transferable, to the peasants who accepted the first assessment,48 and the collection of revenue partly in cash and kind. The objectionable form of Begar was abolished, though it continued till 1920s. The intermediary class who fleeced the peasants through the levying of illegal exactions was abolished and state was to collect the revenue from the peasants directly.49 As a result of the reforms the condition of peasants improved to a certain extent and progress began to be made in agriculture. This is attested by the Census of 1901 which holds that the peasants were better off than earlier and large areas of uncultivated tracts were brought under cultivation.50

With the emergence of political consciousness as a result of the spread of modern education, there were greater demands for granting proprietary rights to the Kashmir peasantry and ending their exploitation. In 1924 some prominent Kashmiris sent a memorandum to Viceroy Lord Reading demanding that the regional prejudice be done away with and proprietary rights be restored in favour of the peasants.51 The Glancy Commission also recommended the restoration of proprietary rights with the right to sale and transfer the land. The pressure on Maharaja increased with the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 46 Col. R.P. Nisbet to the Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, 29 January 1890, No. 295, NAI cited in Shakti Kak, ‘The agrarian system of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir: A study of colonial settlement policies, 1860–1905’ in Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati, eds., India’s Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism, London, 2007, p. 73. 47 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, pp. 424-5. 48 Ibid., pp. 429-30 49 Ibid., pp. 428-37. 50 Khan Bahadur Munshi Ghulam Ahmed Khan, Census of India, 1901, Vol. XXIII, Kashmir, Part 1: Report, Lahore, 1902, p. 10. The extent to which the Settlement resulted in the improvement of peasant conditions has been contested by Chitralekha Zutshi by arguing that the narrative of agricultural progress by the stroke of Settlement was the result of colonial exaggeration. The prosperity of peasant, if any, was the result of a gradual process of reforms beginning with in the middle of the 19th century and the colonial intervention only exacerbated the process, Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, pp. 98-101. 51 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 138.

100 Muslim Conference leaders consistently criticizing the government for failing to protect the interests of peasants by depriving them of their legitimate rights. Consequently in 1933 Maharaja issued a proclamation which granted saleable and transferable hereditary proprietary rights to the peasants of Kashmir.52

Notwithstanding the different reforms initiated by the Dogra state at the behest of British Residency and the pressure exerted by the popular movement, the peasant continued to be in a state of constant agony and suffering. The triumvirate of the State, landlords and corrupt officials continued to rob the peasant. In the process the agriculture also deteriorated. It was left to the National Conference government to emancipate the peasant and rescue him from the clutches of state oppression, landlords and moneylenders.

Agrarian Reforms: Abolition of the Jagirdari System

Keeping in view the deteriorating socio-economic conditions it was imperative for the Popular Government to work for emancipation of the peasants. However, besides economic reasons the reforms were launched with a political agenda. The majority of the population of the state comprised of agriculturists who lived in a state of deprivation. They were supporters of Sheikh Abdullah because he echoed their concerns and consistently criticised the Dogra state for its anti-peasant and anti-poor policies while calling for an end to their misery. On the other hand, Jagirdars were a collaborating class and functioned as props of the Dogra state. Once into power it was necessary for Sheikh Abdullah to weaken this collaborating class. Naya Kashmir had stirred the imaginations of the peasantry and the dreams had to be transformed into reality. By initiating the reforms which would benefit the poor peasants, Sheikh Abdullah hadMaulana the opportunity Azad toLibrary, strengthen Aligarh his constituency. Muslim University The demand for plebiscite was hanging like a Sword of Damocles and therefore it was imperative to convince the common masses that their future was safe with National Conference and hence with India. The National Conference could boost that such revolutionary reforms were not possible in Pakistan which was dominated by feudal elements and, hence, India was to be supported. The State was also guided by the principles of a

52 Maharaja’s Order on Glancy Commission Report, p. 4, JKA, Srinagar.

101 welfare state and therefore the betterment of the peasants was of primary concern for Sheikh Abdullah’s Government.53

Immediately after the formation of Popular Ministry under the command of Sheikh Abdullah, the government went on to transform the dream of Naya Kashmir into a reality by reforming and restructuring the agrarian sector of the state. Sheikh Abdullah believed that the political freedom if not accompanied by socio-economic empowerment would be a farce. Addressing the people through radio, he said that the government ‘will implement the economic programme of ‘New Kashmir’ which has inspired hope into the hearts of the millions of our countrymen’.54 Referring to the Jagirdars, he hinted at the plans of his government to cut the privileges of those ‘who have ridden the back of the poor people so long and fed and fattened on him’. The system of landlordism had not only hampered in the growth of agricultural production and improvement in the standard of living of the peasants but also had led to the moral degradation of the large number of people living under it. The first preference of the government therefore was to abolish all the feudal privileges and improve the lot of peasants. In this regard an order was passed which resumed all jagirs, Muafis and muqarraris except those made for religious purposes.55

Jagirs were granted to individuals mostly on the basis of three categories:

I. Those tenable during the lifetime of grantees II. Those tenable during the pleasure of Maharaja and could be resumed by Maharaja anytime. These jagirs included the descendants of some petty chiefs who were granted these jagirs as part of the maintenance allowance. III. Those enjoyable generation after generation Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Jagirs of category I amounted to a mere Rs 21/8/- and those of category II to Rs 5,39,891/- Jagir grants of category III were to the tune of Rs 85, 024/- approximately. The concern before the government was that the resumption of all the grants would put some of the grantees in financial trouble in the absence of alternative sources of income. It was therefore decided to continue the grants under class I as they carried a

53 Wolf Ladejinsky, ‘Land Reform Observations in Kashmir, November 1952’ in Louis J. Walinsky, ed., Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business: The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky, New York, 1977, p. 183. 54 Text of Sheikh Abdullah’s Broadcast from Jammu Radio, 21 March 1948, JKA, Srinagar. 55 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Department of Information, Land Reforms in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 1, Accession No. 1090/G/ACC, JKA, Srinagar.

102 petty sum while the grants under class II and III were resumed with the provision that those who needed maintenance allowance for want of alternative sources of income should apply for the same within three months of the resumption order.56 The State was in a state of stringent financial situation and it was not deemed advisable to continue the grants when almost all the grantees were well off and had other sources of income. In the light of these arguments, the Revenue Minister issued the order:

It is hereby ordered that all Jagir grants tenable during the pleasure of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur or held in perpetuity subject to the general condition of loyalty or other expressed condition be resumed with effect from 1st Baisakh 2005 (13 April 1948) provided that the application of such grantees as may deserve maintenance allowance for want of adequate source of income or for other reasons be entertained if submitted within a period of three months from the date of resumption order and that each such case be investigated and decided on merits.57

With the resumption of jagirs, the jagirdars were not entitled to receive any payment either in cash or kind from their jagirs and all the assigned revenue had to be deposited in the government treasury.58 In addition, the rights and privileges of the jagirdars were abolished which included: Right of recovery of Kahcharai fees within the jagir area, rights of the state in undemarcated forests, right of holding residual Khalisa land, rights of exemption from obtaining state subject certificates and shooting rights.59

The muafi grants were of two categories- religious and non-religious. The grants to the religious institutions were left intact but they were not allowed to collect a part of the revenue in kind. They had to collect the revenue in cash which had to be assessed as per settlementMaulana rates.60 TheAzad grants Library,held for Aligarh non-religious Muslim purposes University were resumed. The resumption of 396 jagirs and muafis resulted in the addition of Rs 6,24,915 to the public treasury.61 The resumption of Muqarrari grants posed difficulties for the

56 Memorandum for Orders in Council, No. 8/V, Dated 17 April 1948, JKA, Srinagar. 57 Council Order No. 6-H of 1951 Dated 17 April 1948, Revenue Department, JKA, Srinagar. 58 Circular No. 70-73, Dated 18 August 1948, Revenue Department, JKA, Srinagar 59 Order No. 749-C of 1949 Dated 31st August 1949, General Department, JKA, Srinagar. 60 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50: An account of the Activities of the three year of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Jammu, 1951, p. 68. 61 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, In Ninety Days: A Brief Account of Agrarian Reforms Launched by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s Government in Kashmir, Jammu, 1948, p. 8, Accession No. 1090/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar.

103 government. With a total number of Mukarridars being 2,347, these grants were given to different individuals in their personal capacity or to institutions like temples, mosques and shrines for their upkeep. The total amount of Muqarraris was about Rs 1, 77, 921/- approximately. Out of these, Muqarraris held by religious institutions amounted to Rs 33, 903/9/2. Personal Muqarraris amounted to Rs 1, 44, 617/12/3. Some Muqarraris were held by the servants of religious institutions, monks or persons of sanctity. These had become hereditary without any liability for any service contingent on the enjoyment of the grant and therefore ceased to have any religious character.62 The Muqarrari holders who received cash grants resorted to a very exploitative and discriminatory practice. While realizing grain from the peasant in lieu of cash assignment, he was allowed a flat rate of -/14/6 as against the market rate of Rs 10 per maund. Ironically in case of default, the tenant had to pay the price of the undelivered quantity of grain at the market price of Rs 10/- per maund.63 After taking a close perusal of these grants and their concessions, the government went ahead with their resumption. With regard to the Muqarraris enjoyed by the religious institutions, it was decided to continue them, to be paid by the Dharmarth Department. Consequently, the following order was issued by the government:

All Muqarraris tenable during the pleasure of his highness, or held in perpetuity, or in lieu of some political or specific service or during life time be resumed with effect from 1st Baisakh 2005, save such Muqarraris as are held by religious institutions, which be continued and paid by the Dharmarth Department who may exercise their discretion as to the continuance or otherwise of such of them as they deem fit, and that those which are held in lieu of the services of Zakhbani and Kishtabani be continued as heretofore.64

BesidesMaulana regular jagirs Azad, there Library, were two Aligarh jurisdictional Muslimjagirs Universityin the Jammu province- Poonch and .65 These were ruled by Rajas who accepted the suzerainty of Maharaja and worked in subordinate capacity. They ruled in an authoritarian way and crushed the people under heavy taxation. The Raja of Chenani had dispossessed his

62 Circular Order No. 1, 19th Sawan 2007 (3 August 1950), 2nd Publication, Revenue Department, JKA, Srinagar. 63 In Ninety Days, p. 10. 64 Memorandum for Orders in Council, No. 22-V, Dated 29 May 1948, Revenue Department, JKA, Srinagar. 65 The jagir of Chenani had an area of 95 sq. miles and consisted of fourty seven villages with a population of 12000 people. With an annual income of Rs 40, 000, the Raja though allotted a share of 15% actually used to get more than 33%. This was besides his income from personal land and rents which amounted to Rs 36000 per annum, Beg, Golden Harvests, p. 209.

104 people of their property and made them virtually slaves in their own lands. It had become a cesspool of autocratic rule and corruption.66 In his memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, Sheikh Abdullah termed the Chenani rule as ‘a typical illustration of mal-administration’.67 With unlimited powers, the jagirdar monopolized trade, illegally ejected tenant farmers and sold land on flimsy grounds. Within one month of the assumption of power by the popular government, on 5 April 1948 the administration of the jagir of Chenani was completely taken over by the State government and was merged with the . The jurisdiction of the Wazir, Tehsildar and other district officers, hitherto not applicable, was extended to the jagir.68 The Raja was given a monthly allowance of Rs 200 for himself and Rs 100 for his family.69 With the liquidation of Chenani thousands of people were freed from slavery and autocratic rule.

The abolition of jagirdari system and the cessation of feudal privileges improved the position of the government exchequer by saving Rs 7 lakhs per annum.70 The peasant was relieved of the burden to pay the assigned revenue to the landlord in kind which amounted to Rs 3 ¼ lakh. More than 4200 acres of land which had been granted to jagirdars for self-cultivation and residential purposes were released in favour of the peasants for cultivation.71 Apart from strengthening the economic position of the cultivators, it has been observed that the resumption of feudal assignments helped in the ‘psychological upliftment of the peasants who had been crushed and exploited by the landlords for a century.72 The vicious parasitical land relationship was put to a stop. The peasants could feel an air of freedom for themselves and realize that the new government, unlike the previous regime, was working for the welfare of emaciated labourer in the field and was determined to end their misery and poverty. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

66 Sardar Budh Singh, Jagir Shahi Ka Post Mortem, Srinagar, n. d., p. 27. 67 Lakhanpal, Essential Documents, p. 33. 68 In Ninety Days, p. 9. 69 Afzal Beg, Golden Harvests, p. 211. 70 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Land Reforms: A Review of the Working of the Land Reforms with Special Reference to Big Landed Estates Abolition Act for the period ending July, 1952, in Jammu and Kashmir state, Jammu, p. 4, Accession No. 2006/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 71 Ibid. 72 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Revenue, Effects of Land Reforms in Kashmir, File No. S/586/53, Register 1, Box No. 53, JKA, Srinagar. Interview with the contemporary peasants also revealed that their confidence against the landlords had increased as they no longer felt themselves as serfs working on landlords’ lands without any rights.

105 Tenancy Reforms

The government was conscious of the depreciating conditions of the tenants. The incidence of tenancy in the State had increased as the landlords who owned thousands of acres of land did not cultivate the land themselves and leased the same to the poor cultivators. Though the tenants toiled hard on the lands, they only got the nominal wages and the bulk of the produce was appropriated by the landlords. The cultivator did not enjoy any protection and on default in the payment of revenue or on mere whims of the landlord, he could be evicted from his land making his condition worse than a slave.73 The Dogra State remained indifferent to the sufferings of the tenants and routinely upheld the rights of the landlord in case of any dispute.74 It was only lately in 1923 that the Government paid some attention to the large scale illegal eviction of tenants from their lands and passed the Tenancy Act. Dividing the tenants into four categories, it granted the right of protected tenancy to the majority of tenants who did not enjoy occupancy rights.75 According to the new law, no tenant could be ejected from his land unless he rendered the land unfit for cultivation or was unable to pay the rent arrears despite a decree ordering the same. He could be ejected if the landlord required the land for his personal cultivation with the condition that he had to do the same within six months.76 However, notwithstanding the Government protection, the landlords continued to evict the tenants-at-will and increased the rent arbitrarily.77 The tenant had the option to take legal recourse but he was afraid of going against the powerful landlord who could always use his muscle and monetary power to manipulate the legal process. Justice, therefore, became distant for the poor tenant who always feared to loose in the complex judicial processes.

After assuming power, the National Conference Government under Sheikh Abdullah Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University launched the second phase of agrarian reforms aimed at improving the condition of tenants. The Government passed a series of amendment acts in the form of Jammu

73 Showkat Ahmad Naik, ‘Land Reform Measures in Kashmir during Dogra Rule’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 72, Part-I, 2011, pp. 587-603. 74 Afzal Beg, Golden Harvests, p. 220. 75 The tenants were categorized on the basis of timing of their possession of land: Those who gained possession before or in 1880 were classified as first category, between 1880 and 1894 as second, between 1894 and 1906 as third and the last category of those who gained land after 1906. D. N. Dhar, Kashmir- The Land and its Management: From Ancient to Modern Times, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 145-46. 76 J&K Tenancy Act, 1923, Register No. 1281, JKA, Srinagar. 77 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, pp. 230-31.

106 and Kashmir Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 2005, 2007 (Samvat Era) and Ordinances to amend the Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act of 1980. The different features of these Acts were:

1. Tenants (Stay of Ejectment) Ordinance, No. XXIII of 2004 was passed which provided for stay of all ejectment proceedings against a tenant in any revenue court for a period of one year and held that no suit shall be entertained for the ejectment of a tenant during the period.78 This was promulgated to prevent the landlord from evicting the tenant on grounds of reclaiming the land for self-cultivation. Summary reinstatements were provided for the tenants who had been wrongfully ejected after April 1947. Ejectment orders by any court against the tenants who had acquired the status of protected tenants were not to be executed after 18th November 1947.79

2. The tenant was granted protection against interference in cultivation to the extent of 17 kanals of abi and 33 kanals of khushki in the Kashmir Province, including the Frontier Districts of Ladakh and Gilgit and 33 kanals of abi or 65 kanals of khushki land in the Jammu Province80 He was granted protection against eviction if he had held the land continuously for a period of seven months preceding the date of commencement of the Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy (Amendment) Act (VII of 2005) or had personally cultivated the land during the said period.81 In case the tenant cultivated more than the prescribed limit of land he was given the option of selecting the tenancy lands as per his choice.

3. TenantsMaulana who were Azad in possessionLibrary, ofAligarh land in theMuslim Samvat University year 1937 in the Kashmir Province, 1935 in the Jammu Province, or 1942 in the Districts of Ladakh and Gilgit were declared to be permanent occupancy tenants.82

78 Ordinance No. XXIII of 2004, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 11th Chet 2004 (23 March 1948), No. 496, JKA, Srinagar. 79 Land Reforms, A Review of the Working of the Land Reforms, pp. 5-6. 80 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, On the Road to New Kashmir, Jammu, p. 2, Accession No. 1241/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 81 Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 2007, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 12th Baisakh 2007 (24 April 1950), No. 25, p. 33, JKA, Srinagar. 82 Ibid., p. 32.

107 They could not be evicted from their lands except through special court decrees in which a landlord had to fully justify the eviction.

4. With a view to improve the economic position of the tenant and make him reap the benefits of his toil, it was provided that in case of abi crops no landlord owning more than 100 kanals of land can recover more than 25% of the produce from the tenants in abi land and no more than 33% in case of khushki crops. If the landlord did not provide agricultural implements, seeds and cattle to the tenant, the whole produce from the field would go to the tenant.83 The landlords were liable to get ½ of the produce in case of his tenancies did not exceed 12 ½ acres. The landlord could not enhance the rent beyond the prescribed limit.

5. The provision of evicting tenants on the grounds of reclaiming the land for self-cultivation was greatly misused by the landlords who in collusion with the corrupt revenue officials used to get such lands entered as khudkashta even when they employed rented labour for their cultivation. The new Act held that khudkashta entries in favour of the proprietors owning more than 100 kanals of land shall be presumed to be untrue.84

The total cultivable area in the state was 2.2 million acres out of which 7 lakh acres were cultivated by the tenants.85 As a result of these sweeping reforms about 3/5th of the peasantry was empowered and their financial position was secured. Consequently, they were no longer at the mercy of the dominating landlords.

After tenancy reforms the Government turned its attention towards the problem of indebtedness. Before Lawrence’s Settlement agricultural indebtedness was very marginalMaulanain Kashmir Azad. Lawrence Library, has attested Aligarh to the Muslim fact that University ‘the Banya of India was practically unknown in Kashmir’.86 The credit mechanism was carried out by Wanis or Baqals who had their retail shops in the villages and used to supply the villagers with the daily necessities of salt, oil and sugar etc. and in return got fruits and grain, evaluated at lower rates than prevalent in the market.87 However, after the Lawrence’s

83 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Revenue, Onward Kashmir, pp. 4-5, Accession No. 456/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 84 Ibid., p. 5. 85 Land Reforms, A Review of the Working of the Land Reforms, p. 6. 86 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, p. 387. 87 Ibid., p. 5.

108 Settlement agricultural indebtedness increased to a large extent. The primary reason possibly was the obligation to pay part of the land revenue in cash. Given the fact that cash nexus had not much developed in rural areas to the extent that trade was carried out in barter,88 the partial collection of revenue in cash created problems for the agriculturists. In the 1920s indebtedness had risen to significant proportions, affecting more than 70% of the rural population.89 This led to the promulgation of Agriculturists’ Relief Act in 1927 for ‘freeing agriculturists from the clutches of moneylenders and protecting them from usurious rates of interests’.90 The Act laid down that the interest charged should not be more than 50% which was to be paid in instalments. However, due to the faulty implementation of the Act and innovative techniques resorted to by the moneylenders, it failed to reduce rural indebtedness. In a ‘typical’ Kashmiri village, as observed by a British writer in 1946, ‘every household was in debt, and the usual rate of interest was 48%’.91 Not only peasants but artisans, craftsmen and manual labourers also faced the problem of indebtedness. As late as 1949, the extent of urban indebtedness in the state was about 56 lakhs and of rural indebtedness about 310 lakhs,92 which amounted to a per capita average of 48 Rupees.93 The worst part was that 80% of the debt was incurred for purely unproductive purposes and continued to increase since it could not create any means of its own repayment.94 In the frontier region of Ladakh the problem of indebtedness was more acute. More than 90% of the population was under debt and had to pay the interest rate at more than 25% per annum. The main creditors were the Buddhist monasteries who exploited the religious sentiments of common masses by charging huge rates of interest.95

The new Government found the existing legislation to be ill-equipped to deal with the problem in anMaulana efficient manner. Azad The Library, first step Aligarh undertaken Muslim by the government University was to

88 Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 146. 89 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 253. 90 Glancy Commission Report, pp. 35-36. 91 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 5 Years, p. 10, Accession No. 293/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 92 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 2006 (13th April 1949-12 April 1950), Jammu, 1952, p.38. 93 Times of India, 21 April 1950. 94 Mirza Afzal Beg, Relief to the Distressed Debtor: A Review of the Working of the Distressed Debtors’ Relief Act, 2006, p. 1, JKA, Srinagar. 95 Jammu and Kashmir Government, Towards Solvency, A Review of the Distressed Debtors’ Relief and the Restitution of the Mortgaged Properties Act in the Jammu and Kashmir State for the period ending 15th April 1952, Jammu, p. 10, Accession No. 592/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar.

109 promulgate an ordinance called the Temporary Stay of Realization of Debts Ordinance (No. XXI) of 2004 which stayed the commencement or continuance of any suit or proceedings for the realization of debt for one year. It excluded the non- commercial debts exceeding Rs 2000. To give relief to a wider section of the society, it included within its purview debt cases against peasants, artisans and craftsmen, manual and factory labourers and hanjis.96 The realisation of debts was delayed for another six months as a result of the ordinance. In 1950 the government passed the Distressed Debtors’ Relief Act, No. XVI of 2006 which provided for setting up of Debt Conciliation Boards for the settlement of debts not exceeding Rs 5000. Every creditor and debtor had to approach the Conciliation Board for settling the debt.97 The purpose of establishing the Boards and not taking the assistance of Civil courts for adjudication on debts was due to the fact that the procedure in courts was complicated and time taking. It required the services of a professional lawyer who charged hefty amounts as his fee. The majority of the debtors were poor peasants and artisans who had neither time nor money to waste in the complicated court processes. The constitution of Conciliation Boards was aimed at disposing the cases swiftly and providing justice to the victim at very nominal costs.98

The Government established 10 Debt Conciliation Boards- 2 for Srinagar, 1 each for Udhampur, Jammu, Kathua, Baramulla, Anantnag, Samba, Pulwama and Kulgam. The Boards started to hear and dispose of the applications filed before them from 6th November 1950.99 Under the provisions of the Act, the Conciliation Board, in the first instance, was to attempt to bring about a settlement amicably between the creditor and the debtor, failing which the Board was to make its own award considering all the circumstances including the past history of the loan and the equities of the particular case.100MaulanaThe Boards Azad had toLibrary, adjudicate Aligarh on the genuineness Muslim University and enforceability of the debts and if the debtor could prove that he had paid to the creditor the principal amount and half of the principal sum (50% of the interest), the latter’s claim was dismissed and he had to refund the debtor any amount paid in excess of 150% of the

96 Ordinance No. XXI of 2004, 18th February 1948, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 11th Chet 2004 (23 March 1948), JKA, Srinagar. 97 The Jammu and Kashmir Distressed Debtors’ Relief Act, No. XVI of 2006, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 29th Baisakh 2007 (11 May 1950). 98 The Boards charged only a nominal (compared to the civil courts) and fixed fee of Rs 2. 99 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 2007 (13th April 1950-12th April 1951), Jammu, 2010, p.81. 100 Towards Solvency, p. 2.

110 principal.101 The Boards fixed easy instalments for the repayment of debts, ranging from Rs 10 per harvest to Rs 225 with the average period of repayment being 12 years. This relieved the poor debtors of the harassment from of the creditors. The following table gives an account of the working of the Conciliation Boards:

Table 3.1: Working of the Debt Conciliation Boards in the State

Name of the Total Total Total Amount of Amount of debt Board Applications Disposals debt as claimed (in as scaled down Received Rs) (in Rs) Srinagar No. 1 3,675 3,162 12,85,187 2,81,222 Srinagar No. 2 6,276 4,769 16,08,079/10/8 3,72,826/15/- Srinagar No. 3 1,031 515 1,63,300/9/- 63,760/8/- Anantnag 3,613 3,166 5,31,637/15/6½ 2,16,819/5/3 Pulwama 1,846 1,738 4,51,257/-/6 1,08,042/8/- Baramulla 2,003 2,002 6,46,177/-/- 1,18,564/- Kulgam 3,986 3,439 9,42,498/3/1½ 1,65,469/3/1½ Samba 2,582 2.397 5,80,058/- 2,11,037/- Jammu 7,358 5,756 18,16,663/12/10 4,21,062/3/-

Kathua 3,591 3,561 8,37,837/- 2,07,943/-/4 Udhampur 5,334 4,135 7,96,339/5/7½ 1,37,119/1/4 Total 41,295 34640 96,59,035/9/3½ 23,03,866/-/6½ Source: Towards Solvency: A Review of the Distressed Debtors’ Relief and the Restitution of the Mortgaged Properties Act in the Jammu and Kashmir State for the period ending 15th April 1952.

Out of 41,295 cases, about 34,640 cases involving a debt of Rs 96.6 lakhs were disposed of and the total debt was scaled down to Rs 23 lakhs which represented a reduction of 77Maulana percent. By Azad June 1953,Library, the number Aligarh of cases Muslim scrutinised University by the Boards rose to 48, 195 involving a debt of Rs 1,11,22,054 which was scaled down by 80 per cent.102 Further, the statistics showed that the most reliable source for taking debt was the non-professional class which included village shopkeepers and petty Government servants while the professional moneylending class contributed 47% to the rural credit. The Boards faced difficulties in ascertaining the claims of the creditors since they seldom gave written acknowledgements of the amount of debt taken, rates of

101 Mirza Afzal Beg, Relief to the Distressed Debtor, p. 2. 102 Hindustan Times, 10 June 1953.

111 interest and the instalments paid by the illiterate debtor-peasant.103 To further provide relief to the debtors, the Government promulgated the Jammu and Kashmir Restitution of Mortgaged Properties Act (No. XVII of 2006) which provided for restitution of mortgaged properties. This Act applied in the cases where the principal or the value of goods did not exceed Rs 10,000. Under the Act, the court could order extinction of the mortgage and restore possession rights of the mortgaged property if it found that the mortgagee had enjoyed the valve of the benefits equalling or exceeding the cost of improvements, if any, affected by such mortgagee in accordance with the terms of the mortgage plus 1 ½ times the principal money or the pecuniary valve of the goods actually advanced. In case of any due amount the interest was to be charged on the principal money at a rate not higher than 6 per cent per annum.104 As a result of the implementation of the Act, immovable property worth Rs 3.7 million was resituated which had been mortgaged by 34,000 persons.105 The presumption that the process of conciliation and scaling down of debts did not deteriorate the relations between the creditor and debtor was far from true. The sources of the rural credit dried up and the Government did not provide adequate alternatives. The peasants were in continuous need of credit for carrying on their agricultural operations like procurement of seeds, agricultural implements, cattle and fodder. The moneylenders stopped lending money to the peasants apprehending losses as there was the possibility of debts being scaled down. This put the peasant in great distress.106 The Agricultural Credit Societies established by the Government could not cater to the rural sector fully. It was difficult for a poor peasant to secure a loan from these Societies. Further, the moneylenders devised crafty methods to exploit the poor peasants in need of debt. The Jammu National Conference passed a resolution stating that the peasants were made to sign documents, in the presence of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University magistrates for authenticity, holding them responsible for double the amounts than was actually lent.107

103 Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, New York, 1955, p. 159. 104 Towards Solvency, pp. 11-2. 105 Land Reforms in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 1. 106 Commenting on the void created by the scaling down of debts, Hindustan Times wrote, ‘the cancellation of agricultural indebtedness, with the stroke of a pen, has left a serious void in the rural credit system which the regime has been unable to fill, with the result that more often than not, the new owner has no money to buy a bullock or agricultural implements with’, Hindustan Times, 23 May 1953. 107 ‘Economic Chaos in Kashmir’, Kashmir Today Series–4, Delhi, 1950, p. 43, Accession No. 55468, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (Henceforth NMML).

112 Land to the Tiller

With the abolition of feudal privileges and the launching of a series of tenancy reforms the National Conference Government went on to launch the most sweeping and radical land reforms which thoroughly transformed the agrarian structure of the state. Naya Kashmir document had envisioned the abolition of landlordism and land to the tiller as the basis of the state’s agricultural plan. The question of agrarian reforms had assumed cardinal importance after the independence of India and in the light of radical agrarian movements in Tebhaga and Telangana, the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee in its 1949 Report had recommended the restructuring of agrarian relations within the parliamentary-constitutional framework.108 However, it was the Political Thesis adopted by the Communist Party of India at its Second Congress held at Calcutta in 1948 that gave the slogan of ‘land to the tiller’.109 Sheikh Abdullah, who was influenced by the Socialist ideology, was determined to institute the reforms within or without the constitutional framework. The earlier reforms, no doubt, did help in improving the conditions of peasantry, but these did not involve any radical restructuring of the agrarian system of the state. These merely re-defined the relationship between the landlords and their tenants. The jagirdari system had resulted in the evil of absentee landlordism which not only robbed the state treasury but also led to the ruination of agriculture. In the entire state there were about 1,25,000 absentee landlords who held 16.4% of the cultivable area of the state. On the other hand around 8 lakh cultivating peasants held only 31.6% of the land while there were more than 3 lakh peasants who did not own land at all and worked as landless labourers.110 Among the landlords there were some who owned more than 3000 kanals of land. For example, there were 2,358 jagirdars who among themselves 111 owned aroundMaulana 2,285,752 Azadkanals Library,of land. AligarhThis is Muslim significant University as average farm holdings in Kashmir ranged from 1 to 2.5 acres. Even as late as 1953, 42% of the total land holdings were below one hectare.112 Appendix I gives a list of jagirdars who owned above 3000 kanals of land.

108 Ronald J. Herring, Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reforms in South Asia, Delhi, 1983, p. 155. 109 Indian Council of Social Science Research, A Survey of Research in Economics, Vol. IV, Part II, Agriculture, Bombay, 1975, p. 35. 110 Critical Review of Land Reforms, Revenue Department, AR No. 1139, p. 13, JKA, Srinagar. 111 Afzal Beg, Golden Harvests, p. 233. 112 Siddhartha Prakash, ‘The political economy of Kashmir since 1947’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000, p. 322.

113 After the initial phase of reforms was over, the government proceeded with its programme of land to the tiller. On 11th April 1949, a Land to the Tiller Committee was setup under the chairmanship of Mirza Afzal Beg (Revenue Minister). The Committee included two Government members, G M Sadiq (Development Minister) and G L Dogra (Finance Minister); three non-official members, Thakar Kartar Singh from Jammu, Khawaja Ghulam Ahmad Mir (Zaildar, Sallar Anantnag) and Ghulam Qadir War of Sopore representing the cultivators.113 The Committee was entrusted to examine and report on the mechanism to be followed for transferring the land to the tiller. It drew a questionnaire inviting suggestions from the public by the end of Jeth 2006 (June 1949).114 The questionnaire included:115

1. What maximum amount should a landowner be permitted to hold? 2. Under which circumstances and on what conditions should a landowner be allowed to hold more than the maximum amount of land? 3. On what terms and in what manner should a land held by a landowner in excess of the maximum amount of land be acquired and transferred to the tiller of the land? 4. With what incidents of tenure should such lands as are transferred to the tiller be clothed? 5. What class or classes of tillers should get preference in the matter of transference of the excess land acquired from the existing land owners? 6. What should be the size of an economic holding in regard to different classes of land and the safeguards that should be adopted in the initial allotment of the excess land acquired from landowners to ensure that no holding is left less than

thatMaulana of the economic Azad size?Library, Aligarh Muslim University 7. What safeguards are necessary to secure against the fragmentation or sub- infuedation of economic holdings? 8. What methods will you suggest to secure efficient and full utilization of land resources in the state?

113 Council Order No. 262-C of 1949, Dated 11 April 1949, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, No. 3, JKA, Srinagar. 114 Land to the Tiller Questionnaire, Secretary Land Reforms Committee, 25th April 1949, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 16th Baisakh 2006, No. 3, JKA, Srinagar. 115 Ibid.

114 9. What steps should be taken towards the development of an organised community of peasant proprietors in the state?

The Committee noted that very few suggestions came within the prescribed time limit and the deadline had to be extended time and again. Further, suggestions did not come from all the quarters of the population. One possible explanation could be that the majority of the population of the state was illiterate who could not understand the questionnaire which was either in English or Urdu, they could not respond to it. The literate population consisted of the upper classes- Pirzadas, Pandits and the jagirdars. Almost all of them had landed interests and owned land in excess of the possible maximum limit. They were bound to loose under the Land to the Tiller programme and therefore preferred to remain silent by not giving their suggestions to the Committee.116 However, the Government also did not wish to hear negative suggestions from the public. In a petition to Nehru, Jammu and Kashmir Zamindar Association alleged that it had fixed a conference from 28-30 Jeth to prepare replies to the questionnaire issued by the Committee. The Government was committed not to allow the conference and detained the General Secretary of the Association Pandit Bishambar Nath Negru.117 Sheikh Abdullah was consistently petitioned by Zamindars and Jagirdars to consider the expropriation of land as it would be detrimental to those landlords who had invested in land and purchased it worth crores of rupees after the passage of Land Alienation Act. They held that it would be unfair to target only the jagirdars as men of other properties had also amassed enormous wealth in the form of spare houses, shops, factories and deposits of gold.118 However, notwithstanding anything the Committee went ahead with its task and tentatively drew up an outline of the Proposed Agricultural Plan for the state while inviting further suggestions from the public regardingMaulana the compensation Azad Library, and nature Aligarh of land Muslim rights to be University transferred. The Plan declared the State ownership of all the lands in the state and every occupier of the land was recognized as ‘holder’. The maximum land to be retained was 8 acres in the Kashmir Province and 12 acres in the Jammu province with not more than 12 kanals for residential purposes.119 While the Committee’s work was still in progress,

116 Land Reforms Committee, Revenue Secretariat, 10th April 1950, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 15th Baisakh 2007 (27 April 1950). 117 Ministry of States, File No. 1(2)-K/48, NAI. 118 Ibid. 119 Proposed Agricultural Plan, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, No. 3, 15th Baisakh 2007.

115 Sheikh Abdullah made a historic speech in Lal Chowk Srinagar on 13th July (Martyr’s Day) 1950. While referring to the sacrifices made by the people of the state for achieving the goal of freedom, he highlighted the contribution of National Conference government in reforming the agricultural sector. He announced that landlords possessing more than 125 acres of land shall retain only 20 acres for personal cultivation while the remaining would be transferred to the actual tillers in ownership.120 The people of the Poonch illaqa who were treated as only assamis were conferred with the proprietary rights in land and Malikana to the State was abolished.121

Following on the announcement the Government passed the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act (Act XVII of 2007) on 17th October 1950. Described as the peasants’ ‘Magna Carta’122 this was a revolutionary act and a step towards restructuring the entire agrarian scenario of the State. Under the provisions of the Act every proprietor was allowed to retain only 22 ¾ acres of land with 20 acres for agriculture and the rest for residential purposes or vegetable gardening.123 The Act excluded the bedzars, safedazars, orchards, grass farms, fuel reserves and unculturable waste from forfeiture.124 The ownership rights in lands beyond the prescribed limit was extinguished and transferred to the actual tillers of the land, provided that they were state subjects as defined in the Judicial Department Notification No. 1-L/84, dated 20 April 1927. While the Agricultural Plan had defined the tiller in ambiguous terms as a person who wholly or partially depends on agriculture as his source of livelihood and contributes towards production from land, the Act clearly defined a tiller to avoid any confusion:

A person who tills land with his own hands, and with reference to the land held Maulanaby a proprietor Azad has, Library, on the date Aligarh of the commencement Muslim University of this Act, been in cultivating possession of such land and includes a tenant who, after Ist Baisakh, 2004, has been ejected otherwise than in due course of law or has ceased to cultivate the land owing to reasons beyond his control; but does not include: a) a

120 Abolition of Big Landlordism. 121 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Press Information Bureau, One Step Forward in Poonch: Announcement made by Jammu and Kashmir Government, Srinagar, Accession No. 550/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 122 Hindustan Standard, 20 September 1952. 123 Josef Korbel, ‘The National Conference Administration of Kashmir 1949-1954’, Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1954, p. 284. 124 Liquidation of Landlordism in Jammu and Kashmir, Press Information Bureau, Accession No. 546/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar.

116 trespasser; b) a servant who is paid in cash or kind for his services; c) a person who is not the actual beneficiary and d) a hired labourer.125

The Act transferred in ownership all the rights, titles and interests of the expropriator of land, including wells (excluding private wells), ponds, pathways, water-channels, tanks and trees other than the orchards and water-mill, to the tiller without any encumbrances. To ensure that the expropriation is not halted by any legal process, the interest of proprietor in forfeited lands was not liable to attachment or sale in execution of any court decree, and all grants and titles to such lands were terminated. The Act declared all the transfers of land made, title or possession declaration by any court after 1st Baisakh, 2005 (April 13th, 1947) as null and void if it was found that such transfer or declaration had been made malafide.126 This provision ensured safeguards against the evasion and circumvention of the law. Without the prior permission of the government no self-cultivating proprietor who held the land between 2 and 12 acres could alienate his land. The holdings were made inalienable so that these did not get fragmented into uneconomic holdings which would have diminished the yield and reduced the possibilities of collective farming.

No tiller was allowed to possess more than 20 acres of land, including the land he already possessed and what was transferred to him, in proprietorship. The land in excess of the ceiling limit on which the proprietorship right was expropriated and which was not in the cultivating possession of any tiller was vested in the state. The state used this land for the settlement of landless peasants and agricultural labourers.127 The government aimed to nationalize the untenanted lands and develop collective or cooperative farming to benefit the poor and landless peasants.128 The Act was also made applicable on the lands owned by the Enemy Agents129 and evacuees which had alreadyMaulana forfeited Azad to the Library, state. The Aligarh tiller-owner Muslim was liable University for payment of land revenue and cesses assessed on the land transferred to him, together with a surcharge of four annas per rupee of land revenue as Land Development Cess which

125 The Big Landed Estates Abolition Act (Act XVII of 2007), Jammu, 2010, p. 2. 126 Ibid., Sections 7&8. 127 Land Reforms: A Review, p. 8. 128 Afzal Beg, Golden Harvests, p. 243. 129 Enemy Agent was a person, though not operating as member of enemy armed force (Pakistan or Azad Kashmir) but was employed by or worked for or acted on the instructions received from the enemy, Enemy Agents Ordinance (XIX of 2004), The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, No. 49b, 11th Chet 2004 (23 March 1948).

117 the state aimed to utilise for rehabilitating the cultivators and improving the land that was passed on to them.130

The proprietor was given the right to choose his retainable unit of 22 ¾ acres of land to ensure smooth transfer of the excess land to the tillers. In case he did not do so, the government through its officials would reserve land for him which was to be deemed as if it had been selected by the proprietor himself.131 The right to ownership was liable to be extinguished and the land escheated to the state if any proprietor died intestate or transferred his land without due permission or a tiller-owner sublet his land continuously for two harvests.132 This was done to stop the backdoor entry of non-cultivating class into the agrarian sector and protect the land from getting subinfeudated. A contingent of 29 Special Tehsildars, 29 Girdawars, 116 Patwaris, 29 clerks, 58 peons supervised by the Land Reforms Officer with appellate authority was created to implement the Act, the work of which was started first in Kashmir from 16th Kathik 2007 (1 November 1950).133 The changes brought about by the application of the Act were properly incorporated in the revenue records to avoid any confusion with regard to the title, nature of the land and tenancy details.134

With regard to the compensation to be paid to the expropriators of land, the Act provided for the question to be settled by the Constituent Assembly of the state. Till the Assembly settled the issue, it was decided by the government to provide annuity to the expropriators. An amount equivalent to 3/4th of the land revenue assessed on the expropriated land for the first year, 2/3rd of such land revenue for the second year and ½ for the third and subsequent years. But in no case should the annuity amount exceed Rs 3000 per annum, with the Shamilat excluded from the payment.135 However, it was very rarely that the expropriators were paid any annuity because the peasantsMaulana failed to pay Azad the landLibrary, taxes to Aligarh the government Muslim as they University faced acute scarcity of cash.136 On 6th November 1951 the Land Compensation Committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly to look into the question of compensation. The state was facing a financial crisis in the wake of economic dislocation caused by the tribal

130 The Big Landed Estates Abolition Act (Act XVII of 2007, Section 5 (2). 131 Ibid., Section 14 (b). 132 Critical Review of Land Reforms, Revenue Department, File No. 1139, p. 12, JKA, Srinagar. 133 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 2007 13th April 1950-12th April 1951), Jammu, 2010, pp. 79-80. 134 Ibid. 135 Land Reforms- A Review, p. 17. 136 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 211.

118 invasion and the consequent political developments. The state was not in a position to pay to the landlords for the expropriated lands. Therefore even prior to the establishment of the Compensation Committee it was a forgone conclusion that no compensation will be paid to the expropriators. To give a legal sanctity to the non- compensation and the fact that the Government was not deciding the issue arbitrarily, the matter was put before the Constituent Assembly. The Committee submitted its report on 22nd March 1952 and held that the payment of compensation to the expropriated landowners was, both on principle and policy, not desirable. While rejecting the claims of the landowners, the report held that this class had progressed at the expense and labour of the poor cultivator and they had forcibly confiscated the lands originally owned by the indigenous cultivators.137 Holding on the sovereign power of the state to appropriate any land without paying any compensation thereof, the Constituent Assembly adopted the final resolution on 29th March 1952 accepting the recommendations of the Committee and directed that no compensation should be paid to the landlords for expropriated lands.138

As a result of the enactment of the Act, enormous amount of land were expropriated and transferred to the tillers. By the end of May 1953, about 1,98,444 acres of land were transferred in ownership rights to 1,66,919 tillers, with 6,07,443 dependents throughout the state. During the same period, 1,04,418 acres of land were vested in the state which was to be transferred to the landless labourers and utilised for the improvement of land.139 Appendix II gives a detailed report of the land expropriated and transferred in each tehsil and district.

Notwithstanding the impressive statistics the working of the land reforms has to be seen in the light of contemporary social and economic conditions. The statistics could be misleadingMaulana and cannot giveAzad the Library, exact picture Aligarh of the transformation Muslim University heralded by the reforms.140 The official records present a rosy picture of the working of the reforms and their impact by holding that it completely transformed the agrarian sector without mentioning its limitations. Though the Act was very progressive in nature, but it failed to produce the desired results primarily because of two reasons. In the first

137 Report of the Land Compensation Committee, 1951-52, Jammu, 1952, pp. 25-27. 138 Resolution No. 7, Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, 29th March 1952, Assembly Records, JKA, Srinagar. 139 Hindustan Times, 10 June 1953. 140 Daniel Thorner, ‘The Kashmir Land Reforms: Some Personal Impressions’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. V, No. 12, September 1953, p. 1002.

119 instance, there were loopholes and limitations within the Act itself which provided enough scope for manipulations. As pointed out by P. K. Bardhan with regard to the limitations of land reforms in India which hold true for Kashmir also, ‘Laws were frequently enacted with deliberate loopholes and tell-tale exemptions designed to induce fictitious transfers of land to close and distant relatives and to keep the permissible retentions high’.141 Second, the Act was not implemented in letter and spirit. To review the working of land reforms, particularly in Kandi areas, the Government appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice Janki Nath Wazir, Chief Justice of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court which was to submit its report in two months.142 The Committee pointed out the limitations in the legislation and suggested measures for the effective implementation of the Act.

The fixing of 22 ¾ acres as the ceiling limit was too high an economic unit when the average landholding in Kashmir did not go beyond two acres. The rationale adopted by the Government was that land would be cultivated by the owners themselves without feeling the necessity of employing tenants. However, it was found that it was not possible for an owner to cultivate himself the land beyond 65 kanals.143 Even Daniel Thorner points out that the limit was exceedingly high as no peasant, barring the absentee landlords, possessed the land, including his ancestral land and land held for tenancy, beyond 14 kanals.144 The taking of 22 ¾ acres as a unit was too high by any yardstick. Keeping a lower limit of ceiling would certainly have made more land available for redistribution among the landless tenants and labourers. Further, the unit was fixed uniformly for the entire state without giving due regard to the geographical and locational differences, climatic conditions, availability of irrigation facilities, and productivity of the soil which varied from Kashmir to Jammu and Ladakh. Even within Maulanaa particular Azadgeographical Library, area the Aligarh producti Muslimvity of the Universitysoil may vary, more so as one goes from class to class. For instance, while the Government had fixed the average productivity of one kanal at 1 Kharwar and 6 traks for the plains of Kashmir valley, it was only 1 Kharwar for kandi areas.145 In Jammu the fertility of soil was

141 P. K. Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India, New Delhi, 1984, p. 256. 142 Cabinet Order No. 128-C, Dated 2nd February 1953, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 8th Phagan 2009 (19 February 1953). 143 Government of .Jammu and Kashmir, Report of the Inquiry Committee Appointed to Examine the Working of Land Reforms, Price Control etc., Jammu, 1953, p. 14. (Henceforth Wazir Committee Report). 144 Thorner, The Kashmir Land Reforms, p. 999. 145 Wazir Committee Report, p. 10.

120 lower which had been acknowledged by the Government while implementing the tenancy reforms.146 While the tenants in Kashmir were granted protection against eviction in 17 kanals of abi and 33 kanals of khushki land, it was double for the tenant of Jammu province. Rather than fixing the ceiling on the basis of acreage, it would have been more prudent if the government had fixed it on the basis of land revenue which took into consideration the productivity of the land. Further the Government did not undertake any proper survey of the land and the nature of proprietorship and tenancy rights prior to the introduction of reforms. Therefore, there was an element of arbitrariness in choosing a uniform holding for the entire state. It was because of this fact that the Wazir Committee recommended a ceiling of 34 acres for Jammu province.147

On the other hand no limit was placed on the size of the holdings of the protected tenants which led to instances of where these tenants illegally sublet their lands. Having already got the ownership rights on 100 kanals of land, the tenants leased out their newly acquired land as a result of the expropriation and were able to own the land in excess of the ceiling limit. Thus while the old landowners were expropriated, a new class of landowners came into existence who successfully manipulated the flaws within the Act for their benefit.148 Those tenants who themselves owned lands and also worked as tenants over the estates of landlords with protection against ejectment began to show diminishing interest in their tenancies which not only went against the spirit of law but also adversely impacted the entire production process.149

Under the provisions of the Act the proprietor was given the right to choose his retainable portion of land and transfer the rest to tenants or the state as the case may be. While this gave the landlords an honourable position vis-à-vis the other agrarian classes, it turnedMaulana out to Azad be a major Library, limitation Aligarhessentially Muslimjeopardising Universitythe entire programme of land reforms. The landlords chose the best lands for themselves and left some poor quality land for the tenants. When Daniel Thorner toured the villages to assess the implementation of the Act, the villagers complained to him that the landlords parted with the worst lands and marshy areas to them while keeping the

146 Ladejinsky, Land Reform Observations in Kashmir, p. 181. 147 Ibid., p. 34. 148 Meenakshi Moza, Agrarian Relations in Jammu and Kashmir: A Case Study of two Districts, Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru, 1985, p. 69. 149 Javeed ul Aziz, Economic History of Modern Kashmir, p. 74.

121 resourceful lands with themselves.150 The landlords began harassing the tenants and extorted money from them, which at times was higher than the compensatory price, for excluding their lands from the unit of 182 kanals to be held by them for themselves.151 For ceiling limits the Act had fixed individual as a unit rather than the family as a whole. To evade from expropriation the landlords resorted to a novel method. Having got wind of the impending reforms, the landlords, through specious legal ways, broke up their joint families, though practically they continued to remain under one roof, so that every member was entitled to 182 kanals of land. They also alienated their lands in favour of their relations by means of partition deeds and gifts and got the collusive decrees passed by the Civil Courts to that effect.152 The tiller- owners had to face another difficulty in that they were not allowed to sell their newly acquired lands which made their ownership a nominal one. Wazir Committee recommended that there should be no restriction with regard to the transfer of land by a proprietor.153

It was in 1933 that the Maharaja’s Government granted proprietary rights to the peasants of Kashmir. This was followed by the large scale sale and transfer of lands from the indebted peasantry into the hands of the rich and influential landlords especially Pandits who had plenty of unutilized capital to invest in land. However, barely after a decade Land to the Tiller Act deprived these sections of their lifetime investments by refusing to acknowledge them as a separate category of landlords, different from the hereditary landlords and those who had owned lands merely because of the royal boon. Their lands were expropriated which resulted in seething discontentment among them, majority of whom were the Kashmiri Pandits.154

The exemption of orchards, fuel and fodder reserves from the ceiling limit is beyond comprehension.Maulana The Azad official Library, sources areAligarh silent as Muslim to why these University were exempted from the provisions of the Act. One plausible reason may be that since the horticulture sector was highly profitable, the government did not want to disturb it by subjecting it to claims and counter claims. Bringing the orchards within the purview of the legislation would have further alienated the landlord class. The Act was a balancing

150 Thorner, The Kashmir Land Reforms, pp. 999-1001. 151 Qasim, My Life and Times, p. 45. 152 Economic Chaos in Kashmir, p. 36. 153 Recommendation VI, Wazir Committee Report, p. 33. 154 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 503.

122 one, a compromising formula evolved to distribute some land among the tenants while not completely disturbing the agrarian structure. Moreover, there is a possibility that the Government wanted to give an edge to the Kashmir-based landlords over their Jammu counterparts since the apple orchards could not be cultivated in the Jammu region because of climatic and topographical differences. It were the Kashmiri Pandits who owned more horticultural land than other classes and they constituted the majority of the bureaucracy which was the moving spirit behind these legislations. The Government could not think of isolating this politically important class and therefore gave concessions to them. Notwithstanding the reasons behind the exemption, the provision proved to be a loophole in the land reform by providing opportunity to the landlords to bypass the ceiling limit. There were many instances of overnight conversion of agricultural lands into orchards and the same were got confirmed through revenue records.155

Another important factor which marred the effect of this legislation was its faulty implementation. The reforms were executed by the local bureaucracy which was traditionally corrupt. No doubt the Government created a special contingent of staff for its implementation but they were no different from their counterparts. The association of National Conference workers with the implementation at the local level was intended to keep a check on the former. However, ‘the two elements cooperated all too well, with and for each other, at the expense of the 'actual tiller’.156 Since the reforms were advertised and publicised long before being enacted into laws, lower revenue officials were able to effect changes in the village revenue papers, thereby exploiting the cultivators. Reforms were a boon for the Patwaris who charged heavy bribes for effecting changes in the revenue records at the expense of the actual cultivators. TheyMaulana could do Azad so as Library, the records, Aligarh which had Muslim not been University updated from a number of years were faulty and incomplete.157 The tribal invasion and the consequent disruption had made the task difficult and the officials could easily exploit the situation.

155 Nisar Ali, Agricultural Development and Income Distribution, New Delhi, 1985, p. 58. 156 Daniel Thorner, The Agrarian Prospect in India, Delhi, 1976, p. 53. 157 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Report on the Proposed Agricultural Policy of the Jammu and Kashmir State, June 1956, p. 9, Accession No. 253/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar.

123 A nexus was developed between the rich landlords and the revenue officials who worked in collision to rob both the state and the peasant. The revenue authorities did not distribute the land fairly. People with money and political influence succeeded in getting the best lands, even above the ceiling limit. The workers of National Conference misused the political power and not only got the lands transferred in their own names but also to their relatives and friends.158 The tillers were forced to pay heavy bribes which in cases were more than the actual compensation.159 This nepotism and corruption at the site of implementation ensured that the already influential and substantial people benefitted from the reforms. Petty tenants and landless labourers who were too poor to pay heavy bribes failed to get any lands.160 Therefore far from emancipating the poor peasant, the reforms strengthened the position of already entrenched rich landowners and the bureaucracy which disrupted the rural sector by leading to the creation of neolandlordism and a new class structure comprising of ‘commercially orientated landowners, land speculators, bureaucrats, houseboat owners, transporters and bootleggers wielding both money and political power’.161 The fact that the reforms failed to completely uproot the absentee landlordism is attested by the National Sample Survey. Despite enacting the progressive reforms the percentage of absentee landlords in the state was as high as 11.47 percent as compared to the all India average of 2.15 percent. The cultivators of the state owned 63.72 per cent of the land as against 83.66 percent throughout the country.162 The problem with the reforms was that these were thrust from above without taking into consideration all aspects of agrarian structure.

Notwithstanding the limitations of the Act, the reforms led to the emancipation of the peasantry and succeeded in freeing them from the clutches of absentee landlords. The peasantsMaulanawere freed Azad after Library, decades of Aligarh exploitation Muslim and their University position was stabilized. Having got the ownership they could till their lands with interest and make investments for the development of the same. This is clearly evident from the growth

158 Thorner, The Kashmir Land Reforms, p. 1001. Mir Qasim, member of the Constituent Assembly who was closely associated with the reforms right from the beginning lamented that ‘It was a revolutionary programme which had fallen prey to large scale corruption’, Qasim, My Life and Times, p. 45. 159 Statement of Ram Piara Saraf in the Constituent Assembly, Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly (Official Report), Vol. I (1951-1955), p. 300. 160 Thorner, The Kashmir Land Reforms, p. 1002. 161 Prakash, Political Economy, p. 322. 162 National Sample Survey, Eighth Round, Report on the Land Holdings, (Some Aspects of Ownership Holdings), No. 59, July 1954 cited in Moza, Agrarian Relations in Jammu And Kashmir, p. 70.

124 in agricultural production after the reforms. Besides economic benefits, the reforms had a psychological impact on the peasantry. Notwithstanding his illiteracy, the peasant was more aware of his rights and obligations and his relationship with the landlord. The empowerment of the peasant is clearly evident from their reported conversations with Daniel Thorner and Ladejinsky.163 With the economic gains and revival of self-confidence the peasants found enhanced opportunities for development and freedom from the whims and fancies of jagirdars.164

The reforms had enormous political consequences. The position of Sheikh Abdullah was more firmly entrenched in the countryside. The peasants were generously acknowledging that it was Sheikh Abdullah who was behind the reforms and without him it would have been a dream.165 His popularity touched new heights and he began to be considered a ‘messiah’166 by the common masses.167 This popularity was to support him in his years of ‘political waywardness’. On the other hand, these reforms alienated the Hindu landlords of the state who believed that the reforms were communal in nature to weaken the Hindus as the majority of the jagirs were held by them.168 They dubbed the reforms as anti-Hindu and launched a sustained movement against Sheikh Abdullah. This also embittered the relations between Sheikh Abdullah and Delhi as the anti-reformists found support from some quarters in Delhi which eventually led to the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953.

Development of Agriculture

Since agriculture was the mainstay of the economy of the state it was important that measures be undertaken for its growth and development. On the eve of the formation of the Popular Government, agriculture in the state was characterized by stagnation, less productivityMaulana and the lowAzad purchasing Library, power Aligarh of the people Muslim associated University with it. The Government sponsored various reforms like abolition of landlordism, tenancy reforms and land to the tiller led to restructuring of the agrarian relations. However, these reforms could not completely overhaul the agriculture partly because the peasants

163 Ladejinsky, Land Reform Observations in Kashmir, p. 188. 164 Effects of Land Reforms in Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of States, File No. F. 17 (9)-K/54, NAI. 165 Ladejinsky, Land Reform Observations in Kashmir, p. 182. 166 Bose, Roots of Conflict, p. 28. 167 The respect for Sheikh Abdullah by the peasants is evident from the fact that even today the elderly rural people vote for National Conference. They believe that their vote is actually for Sheikh Abdullah who freed them from the chains of slavery, Interview with a number of peasants aged 90 and above. 168 Refer to Appendix I.

125 lacked technological know-how and continued to use archaic and traditional methods of farming. These obstacles along with the climatic constraints were the reasons behind low yield per acre and consequently, the state had to import foodgrains worth lakhs of rupees and people were also compelled to move to the plains of Punjab in search of work during winter months. The food situation further worsened as a result of the tribal raids and the subsequent devastation. The following tables give an idea of the food situation in the state:

Table 3.2: Food situation in the State: Kashmir Province

Total Production Total Consumption Deficit (in maunds) Paddy 65,81,674 64,15,720 18,34,046 Wheat 2,52,052 28,76,092 26,24,040 Maize 23,56,202 28,76,092 5,19,890 Total 91,89,928 1,41,67,904 49,77,976

Jammu Province

Total Production Total Consumption Deficit (in maunds) Paddy 9,23,051 17,45,116 8,22,065 Wheat 10,32,303 45,64,725 35,32,482 Maize 13,24,286 29,45,456 16,21,170 Total 32,79,640 92,55,357 50,75,717 Grand Total 1,24,69,568 2,34,23,261 1,09,53,693

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University To meet the deficit the government had to import foodgrains from outside the State, particularly Punjab:

Year Rice (in maunds) Wheat (in maunds) Maize (in maunds) 1948-49 79,380 (valued at 5,37,880 (valued at Rs 21,43,260) Rs 1,12,95,480) 1949-50 2,45,280 (valued at 11,34,280 (valued 1,19,924 (valued at Rs 66,22,560 at Rs 2,15,51,320) Rs 18,28,840) Source: Short Term Plan for the Development of Jammu and Kashmir State, p. 38.

126 The priority of the Government, therefore, was to increase the food production by making as much land available for food crops as possible. The First Five Year Plan169 prioritized the agriculture and aimed at making the state self-sufficient in food grains. Surveys revealed that about 475,767 acres of culturable wasteland was available within the state. In the Jammu province 50000 acres of land were lying fallow which could be brought under cultivation and did not require any specific measures.170 Therefore, the Government made a comprehensive plan to increase the food supply of the state by:171

1) Extension of irrigation facilities through construction of canals 2) Adoption of land reclamation measures 3) Anti-flood projects; and 4) Launching of anti-erosion measures.

Moving on systematically, the Government launched Grow More Food Scheme172 in April 1948 with a view to bring cultivable wasteland under plough. The Scheme envisaged that all Nautor Najaiz areas, Khalisa waste lands, areas under control of military farms and rakhs and all tracts of wastelands in demarcated and undemarcated forests to be brought under cultivation.173 The Government aimed to bring 6-8 lakh kanals of land under plough which was estimated to yield about 9-12 lakh Kharwars of foodgrains.174 The progress was visible in the very first years as 23,200 acres and 6193 acres of land were allotted in 1948-49 and 1949-50, respectively which resulted in the increase of food grain production by 2,00,000 maunds.175 The progress was despite the fact that there were severe floods in 1948 and 1950 and almost 50 percent of the crops had been completely washed away from the lands newly brought under

169 The Government initially adopted a Five Year Plan amounting to Rs 20.13 crore for the period 1953-54 to 1957Maulana-58. On the Azad recommendations Library, of theAligarh Planning CommissionMuslim ofUniversity India, the Plan was recast for the same period as India’s Five Year Plan, from 1951-52 to 1955-56 and was revised at Rs 13 crore, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Department of Planning and Development, The First Five Year Plan. 170 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 2005 (13th April 1948-12th April 1949). 171 Short Term Plan for the Development of Jammu and Kashmir State, Ministry of States, File No. 16(19)-K/51, NAI. 172 The Scheme was initially started by the Government of India in 1943-44 as an urgent adhoc measure to tackle the food crisis which had emerged as a result of the World War II. It was revised in 1949 with the aim of attaining self-sufficiency by the end of 1951, Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Grow More Food Enquiry Committee: Background Note on G. M. F Campaign, 1952. 173 Council Order No. 48-C of 17th April 1948, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette. 174 In Ninety Days, p. 17. 175 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, pp. v-vi.

127 cultivation.176 The Scheme was also marred by faulty implementation due to certain malpractices and corruption. In many areas land allotted for cultivation under the Scheme was occupied by big Zamindars who already had sufficient areas with them. Though the Government passed strict instructions that land under the Scheme should preferably be given to the landless or those who had insufficient lands, the practice continued in many areas.177 The influential landlords could easily grab the lands by bribing the revenue officials. The poor peasants were afraid of lodging complaints against the nexus of landlords and officials for fear of reprisals.

The Government also turned its attention towards modernizing the agriculture through the introduction of Hybrid seeds and chemical fertilisers. Model Farms and Research Centres were established throughout the state to carry out experiments for evolving high yielding varieties of different crops through selection and acclimatization, studies with regard to the nature of soil, implements of production, different kinds of manuring and the rotation of crops. These Centres included Pratap Model Farm (Srinagar), Gole Summander Farm, Kawa Farm, Kathua Farm, March Farm and Poni and Gramwalla Farm.178 As a result of continuous experimentation a number of high variety seeds were evolved which included: China Paddy seed, N. P4, 591 C (wheat seed), Double Hybrid and 20P (maize seed). About 420 maunds of China Paddy seed were loaned to the peasants during 1949-50 and in turn over 10,000 maunds were secured from them.179 While the introduction of China Paddy seeds doubled the yield, the maize variety increased the yield 5 or 10 times of the yield of the local variety.180 With their extension to many areas of the state the result was that the state was not only moving towards its goal of self-sufficiency but was also increasing the income of the cultivators. With a view to enhance the scope and functioningMaulana of Research Azad Centres, Library, the First Aligarh Five Year Muslim Plan envisioned University the expansion of the Model Farms by establishment of tehsil farms in both the provinces.181 Rice Research Scheme was launched in the state in 1949 under the expert guidance of scientists from Indian Council of Agricultural Research. The Scheme was aimed at

176 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, On the Road to New Kashmir, p, 11, Accession No. 1241/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 177 Complaints about Allotment of Land under Grow More Food Scheme, Revenue Department, File No. 150, Register No. 3, Box No. 11, JKA, Srinagar. 178 Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 2006 (13th April 1949-12th April 1950), p. 38. 179 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 81. 180 Short Term Plan, p. 33. 181 The First Five Year Plan, p. 16.

128 evolving high yielding paddy seeds, acclimatizing of Indian and foreign seeds keeping in view the topography and climate of the plains as well as hills and introduction of Hybrid varieties in the state.182 Under the Scheme various Chinese varieties were acclimatized like China 972, China 988, China 1039, China 1007, R 566, 3073, and M. 5729. These not only resulted in higher yields but were also more fertilizer-friendly and resistant to diseases.183

The use of inorganic fertilizers was practically non-existent in Kashmir and the peasants relied on animal dung, slit clods and night soil for manuring their fields. Though the First Five Year Plan envisaged the use of inorganic fertilizers on a large scale to augment the production, practically the use was very restricted. This was due to the fact that the chemical fertilizers were costly and the peasant did not have enough means to procure these. The Government started a wide publicity programme to educate the masses about the benefits of chemical fertilizers. Simultaneously the fertilizers were provided to the peasants on subsidy and deferred payments.184 About 250 tons of Ammonia Sulphate were imported and supplied to the farmers between 1947 and 1950. The government launched a rigorous drive to put the entire process of Farm Yard Manure-collection, conservation and application on modern lines. During the initial three years more than 5000 manure pits were dug up which was supplemented by the manufacture of compost. All this was supplied to the peasants free of cost.185 Green manuring, which increased the yield of rice by about 30 percent was introduced in both the provinces. Lentil, Moong, Sunhemp and Gowara seeds were obtained from different regions for the purpose. To popularize the use of green manuring and demonstration of its benefits to the peasants, programmes were attempted and a comprehensive scheme at the cost of Rs 4,20,000 was launched. Under the piloMaulanat project 10,000 Azad acres Library, of land in Aligarh the Kashmir Muslim province University and 11,000 acres in Jammu province were adopted for producing rice and wheat.186

However, notwithstanding the Government initiatives, it was found that the peasant was reluctant to give up his traditional methods of farming in favour of the modern

182 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Department of Information, The Rice Research Scheme Jammu and Kashmir State: Summary of the Progress Report for the Year 1949-50, pp. 1-2. 183 Javeed ul Aziz, Economic History of Modern Kashmir, pp. 104-05. 184 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Directorate of Information, Kashmir: A Decade of Progress, 1958, p. 8, Accession No. 55609, NMML. 185 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 80. 186 Short Term Plan, p. 37.

129 ones. He continued to sow traditional seeds and use archaic agricultural implements for carrying out agricultural operations. Even when the benefits of modern techniques in seeds and fertilisers were quite evident, the peasants were apprehensive of adopting the same.187 Given the overall superstitious nature of Kashmiris, the peasants falsely believed that their methods of cultivation were the best. When the fertilisers were first introduced by the Government, the peasants refused to use them. Even when the officials practically demonstrated their use and gave incentives to the peasants, the results were not encouraging. In view of the stiff resistance of the peasants towards new techniques, officials were forced to compel the peasants to use the fertilisers and fearing punishment the latter slowly began to use them.188

Irrigation Projects

The Dogra state paid little attention to the expansion of irrigation facilities. In the absence of an adequate organisation to carry out irrigation expansion, the state restricted its activities to collecting irrigation taxes, abiana. The indifference of the government is evident from the fact that while the income from irrigation for the year 1946-47 was Rs 3.85 lakhs, it only spent Rs 1.16 lakhs for developing the same.189 The development of irrigational infrastructure, therefore, was accorded high priority by the new Government and a huge amount (Rs 372.34 lakhs) was spent during the First Five Year Plan on augmenting the irrigation potential of the state. The Plan noted that the development of irrigation facilities was imperative for the development of agriculture since only 56.1% of the cultivated land in Kashmir and 20.4% of cultivated land in Jammu was irrigated.190 The Grow More Food Scheme and the ambition to make the state self-sufficient in food grain production would not have been possible without making adequate requirements for irrigation. Realising this Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University urgency the first step taken by the Government was to separate the Irrigation Department from the Public Works Department in March 1949. It began to function as a separate entity and was made incharge of irrigation, Hydro-electric works and

187 Ibid., p. 34. 188 After experimenting with the fertilisers and seeing the results these acquired a great degree of popularity among the peasants. Even today the peasants recall the ‘khand khaad’ as the fertilisers were called, with nostalgia, Interview with Ghulam Hassan Naik, Retired School Headmaster, Kokergund Yaripora, Kulgam. 189 Kashmir: A Decade of Progress, p. 16. 190 Ibid., p. 39.

130 flood protection measures.191 The activities of the Department revolved around two things: 1) Repairing of old canals and construction of new canals in areas which were not served by any source of water supply; 2) Remodelling of zamindari kuhls on modern and scientific lines.192 The administrative control of the zamindari kuhls was placed in the hands of the Director General Rural Department and necessary repairs were carried out through the Revenue Agency.193 The Irrigation Department used to get paltry sums (Rs 4,00,000 in 1946-47) from the Government for carrying out its operations including the capital works. The Nationalist Government, despite financial stringency allotted huge grants to the Department enabling it to transform the rural scenario: Rs 16,40,000 in 1947-48, Rs 42,65,000 in 1949-50 and Rs 63,23,000 in 1951-52.194 Besides repairing the old canals, the Government undertook the construction of a number of new canals which not only augmented the irrigation potential of the state but also helped in the generation of hydro-electricity. The canals irrigated an extensive area of 31,500 acres of land:195

1. Zainpora Canal: Constructed at the cost of Rs 8,00,000 the canal along with its tributaries was 19 miles long. It had the potential of irrigating about 9500 acres of land.196 2. Sumbal Canal: The construction of Sumbal canal was started in January 1950 and was completed within 1 ½ years at a cost of Rs 6,000,00. It irrigated around 7000 acres of land which had in the past continuously suffered from droughts, resulting in very low productivity of even khushki crops. 3. Udhampur Canal: It was a hydel-cum-irrigation project with the capacity to generate about 2000 KWs of power and irrigate 2500 acres of highly arid land.

191 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 97. 192 Kuhls were theMaulana main source Azadof water Library,supply in the AligarhKashmir valley Muslim and about University 80% of the irrigated land was supplied water by these kuhls. But their construction had been done in an unscientific and haphazard manner and many of them had got disconnected from their water heads. These needed to be repaired and put under technical supervision. 193 Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 2005, p. 59. 194 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jammu and Kashmir Today, 1952, p. 24, Accession No. 56196, NMML. 195 Information collected from Administration Reports of 1948-49, 1950-51, 1952-53 and 1953-54 and various Government publications. 196 Interestingly, illiterate villagers of the area received the news of the construction of canal in a very cold manner. They believed that it was impossible for the canal to irrigate the karewas of the area and make the paddy cultivation possible as these were located in difficult terrains and that only maize could be cultivated on them. They termed the project as a hoax to fool the people in believing that the Government was working for the benefit of the peasants. When the water finally ran through the canal the villagers were overjoyed and raised the slogans of Sher-i-Kashmir Zindabad, Interview with Ghulam Hassan Naik.

131 4. Kishtwar Canal: It was one of the challenging projects keeping in view the highly difficult terrain of vertical cliffs and hard rocks. It was 23 miles long and irrigated an area of 5000 acres. To provide immediate relief to the famine- stricken areas of the Kashmir Plateau, the canal was opened piecemeal from year to year. 5. Awantipora canal: It was completed at a cost of Rs 8,22,000 and provided irrigation to 6000 acres of land. 6. Sindh Hydroelectric-cum-irrigation scheme: To harness the water potentiality of river Sindh this scheme was launched to generate 12000 KWs of electricity and through its 10 mile long canal irrigate around 1500 acres of land.

The Government also launched a number of lift irrigation schemes under which lift irrigation stations were established to irrigate the wudar lands. These stations were established at Padgampora, Barsu, Delina, Ladura and Parimpora.197 The impact of these measures was that by 1953 about 7,26,406 acres of land were irrigated through canals and zamindari kuhls.198 Notwithstanding the ambitious plans of the Government, the effectiveness of the schemes was marred by the official nepotism and corruption. It was the kith and kin of National Conference stalwarts who were allotted contracts for the construction of these canals.199 Because of the use of substandard materials and faulty construction and mismanagement, these could not benefit the state as they should have.200 However, these canals strengthened the irrigation infrastructure of the state and helped in the development of agriculture. It was because of this strong infrastructure that the successive governments were able to undertake measures for the development of the same. After the First Five Year Plan the focus of the governments was on small irrigation schemes and the management and repairingMaulana of the Azad already Library, constructed Aligarh canals. Muslim University

The cumulative impact of the measures undertaken by the Government was that the agriculture of the state got strengthened and was put on a sound footing. The entire production process was influenced which changed the agrarian relations and helped in the evolution of Kashmiri society. As a result of the extension of irrigation facilities

197 Techno-Economic Survey of Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, 1969, p. 25. 198 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 2010 (13th April 1953-12th April 1954), p. 133. 199 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 503. 200 Martand, 20 May 1953.

132 more land was brought under the plough and the productivity was increased. The impact was quite visible in the production of foodgrains which showed an average increase at the rate of 9.6% annually while the population only grew at the rate of 0.94% per annum.201 The state was slowly but consistently moving towards its avowed goal of self-sufficiency in foodgrains, thereby reducing the dependence of the state on the imports. The following tables show the extra yield of food grains and the increase in the total cropped area in the state obtained as a result of extension of irrigation facilities:

Table 3.3: Extra yield of food grains in lakh mounds due to extension of irrigation facilities.

Crop 1947 1953 Paddy 11.76 2.24 Wheat 3.20 - Maize 1.68 0.11 Other Crops 7.84 0.09 Total 24.48 2.44 Source: Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Directorate of Information, Kashmir: A Decade of Progress, p. 16.

Table 3.4: Increase in Total Cropped Area

Year Total area Area not fit for Cultivable area Cultivated area including cultivation not under forests (in cultivation acres) 1949-50 56,23,940 33,24,047 6,38,381 18,33,839 1950-51 Maulana56,86,215 Azad Library,32,36,476 Aligarh24,49,739 Muslim University18,71,478 1953-54 59,10,674 33,01,518 26,09,156 17,78,683 Source: Administration Reports for the years 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1953-54.

Progress in Animal Husbandry

Livestock formed an important part of the agrarian economy of the state. The presence of lush green pastures and meadows and abundance of water resources made possible the raising of livestock. With more than 75% of the population directly

201 Javeed-ul-Aziz, Economic History of Modern Kashmir, p. 139.

133 dependent on agriculture, livestock was an important allied activity and formed one of the important sources of additional income for the rural population. Besides providing food and milk, the cattle were an important source of manure and transportation. It was because of this fact that the state abounded in livestock population. The cattle population of the state per 100 acres of cultivated land (180) was more than twice the All-India average of 67 and many time more than other countries (38 for Holland and 25 for Egypt).202 According to the Livestock Census of 1945, the livestock population in the state was:

Bulls Bullocks Cows Young Stock 2,374 5,36,113 6,31,718 6,54,503 Source: Administration Report for the year 1945-46.

However, the problem faced by the state was that most of the cattle population was emaciated and of very poor breed. There was a huge burden on the state’s pasture lands and feeding the cattle was a challenging task in the absence of adequate arrangements.203 The poor genetic make-up of the cattle because of promiscuous breeding did not make them as useful as they could be, thus affecting the overall economy of the state. Notwithstanding the huge numbers, there was no dairy industry worth the name in the state. Despite huge potential the state imported dairy products from outside. Even the per capita consumption of milk in the state was 7.5 oz. while the all-India average was 10.4 oz.204 It was only in 1930s that the Dogra state turned its attention towards improving this sector of the economy. However, the efforts were half-hearted and had minimal impact. The state established two breeding farms one each at Srinagar and Jammu to bring qualitative improvement in the livestock through cross breeding.205 A Civil Veterinary Department was also set up to provide Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University veterinary care to Maharaja’s cavalry. The experiment could not achieve much success owing to two reasons: (a) two farms were insufficient for the entire state where the cattle population ran in lakhs; (b) the primary focus of the farms and Veterinary Department was the livestock owned by the Maharaja. For a common man these centres were beyond reach, both physically and in terms of access. Therefore

202 First Five Year Plan, p. 18. 203 Department of Information and Broadcasting, Riyasat Jammu Kashmir Mein Afzaish-i-Mavaishan, pp. 3-4, Accession No. 581/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 204 Short Term Plan, p. 49. 205 F. A. Kaloo, ‘Animal Husbandry in Retrospect’ in Government of Jammu and Kashmir, ed., Fifty Years of Animal Husbandry in Kashmir 1947-1998, Srinagar, p. 3.

134 this sector did not witness any substantial development in the pre-independence period. Till 1943 the percentage of livestock per Gross Area Sown increased by only 11.65%.206

The real development in the sector was witnessed with the formation of Popular Government in 1948. The Government undertook various measures to ensure holistic development of the livestock and the people associated with it. In the first a full- fledged Department of Animal Husbandry replaced the Civil Veterinary Department with a provision made for the technical training of its personnel. To improve and expand the services of the Department budget allocation to it was increased from Rs 2.64 lakhs to Rs 3.58 lakhs in 1953.207 The Department established dispensaries at all important rural centres throughout the state where treatment to ailing and diseased animals was given. Mobile field staff was appointed to provide treatment and impart useful information to the villagers regarding prevention and spread of contagious diseases. Arrangements for inoculations and vaccinations against various diseases like Rinderpest, Anthrax, Ranikhet, Rabies and foot and mouth diseases were made by the Department. Financed by Indian Council of Agricultural Research, the Government launched the Veterinary Disease Investigation Scheme to make surveys of various contagious diseases like Tuberculosis in cattle and lungworm diseases in sheep and goats and suggest measures for their treatment and control.208 Talks by veterinary experts were given on the radio and fairly good amount of literature was distributed on important subjects pertaining to cattle improvement.209

The real challenges faced by the government were on two fronts- reducing the number of livestock for effective maintenance and improvement in the quality of the cattle. A sustained campaign of castration was launched to remove the unproductive and high consumingMaulana cattle. Azad A number Library, of experiments Aligarh were Muslim performed University to raise better breeds of livestock. The First Five Year Plan envisaged establishing two Central Research Farms for breeding purposes and for research in respect of feeding, fodder and disease control. Also village breeding centres for extending the benefit of research on farms to the rural areas was planned. Consequently Central Cattle

206 Asra Hamdani, ‘Marginalisation of Reforms: A Historical Study of Land Reforms in Jammu and Kashmir (1931-1988)’, Social Scientist, Vol. 44, No. 11/12, 2016, p. 45. 207 Riyasat Jammu Kashmir Mein Afzaish-i- Mavaishan, p. 5. 208 Administration Report for S. 2007 (1950-51), p. 95. 209 Jammu and Kashmir Today, p. 44.

135 Breeding and Cow Research Farms were established at Chashmashahi (Srinagar) and Belicharana (Jammu). Besides 12 Tehsil units and 42 sub-units were established throughout the state.210 Forty Sindhi bulls were issued to different centres in the Kashmir province for cross-breeding purposes. For Jammu province 23 Dhani bulls were issued which were later on replaced by 51 bulls of Hariani breed.211 Key Village Scheme was launched for the villages with a population of 500 or more breed-able cows and buffaloes wherein Sindhi and Haryani breeds were provided for breeding.212 Experiments were also carried out regarding selective breeding of local cattle at Chashmashahi and Belicharana farms. Breeding bulls were stationed at hospitals and dispensaries for easy availability for the purpose of insemination.213 Artificial Insemination of cows was also taken up towards the closing of 1953 at both Srinagar and Jammu Veterinary hospitals. In the first about 70 cows were artificially inseminated.214

Sheep Breeding

Kashmir was known as a wool producing country and many of the products Kashmir was famous for-shawls, carpets, namdahs, were dependent on the wool. Kashmir had a blooming population of sheep but it was continuously receding. While the state had a sheep population of 20 lakhs as per the Sheep census of 1940, these had receded to 15 lakhs in 1945. The tribal depredations further reduced their numbers as they took away large flocks of sheep with them. It was apprehended that if the receding continued at the same pace the number of sheep would be reduced drastically and wool would be a rare article in Kashmir.215 Further, the local breeds of sheep in Kashmir were less productive as they weighed light and produced kempy and medullated wool. To evolve better breeds of sheep and study the related issues like Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University feeding, grazing, nutrition and disease investigation and control, a Central Sheep Breeding and Research Farm was established at Banihal.216 After extensive research it was found that the rams imported from America (Purebred Rambouilet), Australia and New Zealand (Marino) easily adapted to the climate of Kashmir. Accordingly

210 First Five Year Plan, p. 50. 211 Kashmir: A Decade of Progress, p. 10. 212 Kaloo, Fifty Years of Animal Husbandry in Kashmir, pp. 4-5. 213 Kashmir: A Decade of Progress, p. 10. 214 Administration Report for 1953-54, p. 151. 215 Short Term Plan, p. 51. 216 First Five Year Plan

136 cross-breeding of local sheep with the imported rams was introduced which after years of experimentation led to the evolution of Kashmir Marino.217 Sheep breeding farms were also established at Anderwan and . The Gujjar and Bakerwal communities who were exclusively dependent on sheep and goat rearing for their livelihood were provided rams at subsidized prices.

As a result of the measures undertaken by the Government there was marked increase in the quality of the livestock and their usefulness in the agricultural sector. Compared to pre-1947 period there was a decrease in the number of livestock, primarily due to the disruption caused by the tribal invasion and due to the sustained castration campaign of the Government. The number of livestock per gross area sown showed a steady progress in the post-1947 period. The growth rate of bullocks and ploughs per gross area sown was also on the positive side, though after 1953 the progress was more remarkable. The growth rate of bullocks per gross area sown was 0.202 per cent which was an increase of 0.13 per cent from the pre-1947 period.218 In terms of the availability of milk and mutton though the Government initiatives improved the situation to a certain extent, the development of a dairy industry in the state was still not at the required level. State continued to depend on the imports for meeting the mutton and wool requirements. The reforms initiated by the Government suffered from certain limitations which inhibited the growth of self-sufficient agricultural and allied sectors. The reforms remained largely confined to important towns and villages and failed to reach the majority of the villagers. The demonstration and extension service could not yield the desired results as there was shortage of the service personnel which made the policy implementation difficult at the gross roots level. The infrastructure created by the Government was insufficient in view of the increasing populationMaulana of the Azad state. Library,Establishment Aligarh of a few Muslim hospitals University and dispensaries were not adequate to tackle the needs of the livestock which numbered in lakhs and was spread over a vast geographical area. There was a paucity of the breeding farms and the absence of a cheap technology at the village level inhibited the optimum use of the animal products, thereby restricting the scope of the development of animal husbandry in the state.

217 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir: Fifty Years, Srinagar, 1998, p. 333. 218 Agricultural Statistics of India, Vol. II.

137 Development of Industries

After agriculture, industry formed the second most important sector of the economy of Jammu and Kashmir. Industries, particularly small scale industries provided employment to the largest number of people after agriculture. The Dogra state maintained an apathetic and even hostile attitude towards the development of modern industries in the state. Even the cottage and handicraft industries which had earned Kashmir a place of pride in the international market witnessed stagnation. Exorbitant taxation, official corruption and the lack of visionary policies resulted in the underdevelopment of the industrial sector of the state. The new government was not oblivious of the need for industrialising the state. Industrialisation was imperative for strengthening the economy of the state which would provide employment to a large number of people and relieve the burden on agriculture since in the absence of a well organised secondary sector the majority of the people thronged to agriculture and allied activities. Jammu and Kashmir had a huge industrial potential in terms of the availability of natural resources. The state had immense scope for hydro-electric development due to the presence of many perennial rivers. The state had also huge reserves of mineral wealth which largely remained untapped.219

When the National Conference formed the Government in 1948 situation was not favourable for the development of industries. Partition led to political disturbances and had seriously disrupted the economy of the state. On the eve of the partition the state had three highways and four waterways which linked it with the outside world.220 The rivers as well as the highways connected the state with West Punjab which formed part of Pakistan. Partition resulted in the closure of these lifelines of the state and brought the external trade to a halt. The industries of the state were Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University heavily dependent on the West Punjab markets for raw materials. The closure of the roads put the industries of Kashmir in a great stress as there was no adequate alternative arrangement. The Srinagar- Jammu road via Banihal remained closed for

219 The survey of C. S. Middlemiss, Superintendent of the Jammu and Kashmir Mineral Department, in 1929 had highlighted the vast potential of mineral resources in the state. There were huge reserves of precious stones like Sapphire, ruby, beryl and aquamarine; coal, lignite, iron ore, graphite, gypsum, bauxite, led, copper, zinc and gold reserves, C. S. Middlemiss, Mineral Survey Reports- Ore Deposits of Lead, Copper, Zinc, Iron and other Metals in Jammu and Kashmir State, Bombay, 1929. 220 Jehlum Valley Road from Srinagar to Kohala; Banihal Road from Srinagar to Sialkot and Abbotabad Road from Domel to Abbotabad. The river waterways were Sindh, Jehlum, Chenab and Ravi.

138 many months due to heavy snowfall.221 The only rail-head connecting Jammu with Sialkot was also closed which led to transportation problems. The absence of a rail link to the major portions of the state was one of the most serious obstacles to the industrial development.222 Further, the tribal invasion had brought the administrative machinery to a standstill and law and order problems had increased. The main focus of the Government, therefore, was to restore normalcy and maintain law and order which resulted in an increase of expenditure by Rs 65.4 lakhs. The First Five Year Plan allocated Rs 103.5 lakhs to army while a mere 35.61 lakhs was allotted to the industry.223 The political uncertainty in the state after the Ceasefire Agreement between India and Pakistan had a particular bearing on the industrial development of the state. With an undecided future and the sword of plebiscite hanging over, the state could not attract the private capital. Article 370 also acted as a hindrance in attracting Indian capitalists since in the absence of the right to own property in Kashmir they could not risk the security of their investments.224 With limited resources at its disposal, the challenges before the Nationalist Government were manifold. Therefore the main focus was laid on taking the existing industries out of the trauma of partition and stagnation and organising them on modern lines.225

Timber Industry

Kashmir was rich in forests which covered about 1/8th of the total area of the state. The total area under the control of the Forest Department was 10,368.52 square miles and comprised of:226

1. Demarcated Forests: 10,201.95 sq. miles 2. Partially Demarcated Forests: 33.74 sq. miles 3. UndemarcatedMaulana Forests: Azad Library, Aligarh 132.83 sq. Muslim miles University Before partition it was the premier industry of the state and generated a huge income for the government. The export of timber was a government monopoly and used to form one of the main items of income in the state budget. Timber was floated down

221 Economic Chaos in Kashmir, pp. 1-9. 222 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Report of the Development Review Committee, Srinagar, 1975, p. 3. 223 Prakash, The political economy of Kashmir since 1947, p. 326. 224 Article 370 of the Indian Constitution grants special status to Jammu and Kashmir within India. For details see Chapter 4 of this Thesis, pp. 9-15. 225 First Five Year Plan. 226 Administration Report for 1949-50, p. 54.

139 the Chenab and Jehlum rivers to Jehlum and Wazirabad towns of Punjab from where it was distributed to different areas. Besides timber, minor forest products and their industries like honey, wax and fibre etc. provided a vast field for the employment of skilled and unskilled labour. The demand for Kashmir’s timber had increased considerably during the World War II and provided a stable income to the Government. The following statistics give an idea of the income that accrued to the state from the export of wood and timber:227

Year Income (in lakhs of Rupees) 1944-45 240.0 1945-46 260.0 1946-47 285.0

The timber exported from Kashmir mainly consisted of Deodar, Fir and Kail which was exported in the form of logs and sleepers. The major portion of the timber was purchased by the Indian Railways while fir was in demand in Bombay and other industrial towns.228 However, this lucrative trade was brought to a halt as a result of the partition when the rivers could not carry timber to West Punjab. This caused huge financial losses to the state government as a huge quantity of wood and timber remained unsold in the state. The Sale Depots established at Pathankot could not compensate the losses as there was a diminishing demand for kail and deodar while cheap timber like chir and fir had little buyers.229 The losses faced by the state can be gauged from the fact that the income of the Forest Department dwindled from 1,01,74,210 in 1946 to Rs 27,88,089 and Rs 29,15,163 in 1947 and 1948 respectively.230 To keep the industry from collapse and safeguard against serious drops of revenue of the Kashmir state it was deemed essential to find markets for the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University timber. The Government made arrangements for dispatching timber through the official transport service at a prohibitive cost. Since the entire timber trade was in the hands of non-Muslims of Punjab who migrated to India, the Government encouraged

227 Note on the Economic Dependence of the Jammu and Kashmir State on India, Ministry of States, File No. 13(5)-K/50, NAI. 228 Note on the Economic Resources of the Jammu and Kashmir State, Ministry of States, File No. 16(28)-K/50, NAI. 229 Enquiry from the Jammu and Kashmir Government regarding the Possibility of the Sale of Timber from Kashmir Forests to Pakistan, Ministry of States, File No., 13(3)-K/1950. 230 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2005 (1948), Jammu, 1950, p. i.

140 them to revitalise the trade.231 The Government was keen to find new markets for the sale of timber. Since there was shortage of timber in Pakistan, the state government requested the Ministry of States of the Government of India to arrange for the sale of the timber to Pakistan. Timber from the forests of Southern Kashmir could be floated down through river Chenab to Pakistan at very nominal costs.232

With the partition disturbances the whole trade had to be reorganised. It was not possible to send timber in log form to Pathankot which was the new distribution centre for Kashmir timber. It was therefore decided to send the timber in sawn form as scantlings.233 The system of the forest exploitation as evolved by the Government was that of marking trees in advance and selling forest lots on a lumpsum basis.234 On the eve of partition the Kashmir lessees had huge quantities of timber in the West Punjab depots and huge stocks were in transit which resulted in losses to the tune of 2.5 to 3 crores of Rupees.235 The Government granted liberal remissions in royalties to these lessees which helped in the revival of the trade. The remission in royalty amounted to over Rs 75,00,000. With a view to prevent the timber from downstreaming to Pakistan through rivers, the Government undertook construction of booms at , and Maitra at a cost of Rs 1.40 lakhs.236 However, the main hindrance in the revival of timber trade to pre-partitions levels was the absence of cheap transportation. Though a considerable quantity of the timber was consumed by the Defence Department for the construction of military huts in the state, the major portion of the trade was carried out with Pathankot. The timber from Chenab was floated down to Akhnoor wherefrom it was transported to Jammu through the Ranbir canal. Sometimes timber from Kashmir was transported in military trucks which returned empty from Kashmir. However, full advantage could not be taken of such free freight dueMaulana to lack of Azad coordination Library, from Aligarh the military Muslim authorities. University237 The entire transport in the state was monopolised by the state owned Transport Department. It had a fleet of 500 vehicles which ran throughout the state, especially the Srinagar-

231 Economic Chaos in Kashmir, p. 6. 232 Ministry of States, File No., 13(3)-K/1950. 233 Progress Report on Forest Administration for S. 2005, p. 15. 234 His Highness Government, Jammu and Kashmir, Report of the Forest Enquiry Committee, Jammu, 1939. 235 Progress Report on Forest Administration for S. 2005, p. 16. 236 Ibid. 237 Ibid., p. 2.

141 Jammu highway.238 In the absence of private competition the transportation charges were high which resulted in inflation and serious losses to external trade. The transport constraints faced by the industry is evident from the fact that a log of wood weighing two maunds, valued between Rs 10 to 20 incurred transportation charges of Rs 10 upto Pathankot while the freight charges through waterways was a mere four annas.239 The Government granted substantial aid to the forest lessees through concessions in freight of timber, remission of road toll and supply of foodgrains for labour employed by the lessees.240 The impact of the measures was that the industry was slowly recovering from the losses and was adding to the income of the state. It is reflected in the income and expenditure pattern of the Department over the years. However, though there was a steady progress in the surplus revenues the industry could not recover to its fullest capacity:

Table 3.5: Progress of the Timber Industry

Year Receipts Expenditure Surplus Growth Rate (in Rs) (in Rs) (in Rs) (in %) 1945 1,12,80,217 26,47,241 86,52,976 1946 1,01,74,210 25,46,171 76,28,039 -13.44 1947 27,88,084 18,05,794 9,82,290 -676.57 1948 29,17,689 19,82,003 9,75,686 -0.67 1949 51,65,880 24,35,211 27,30,669 +179.87 1950 47,72,825 22,84,205 24,88,620 -9.73 1951 63,05,161 26,41,222 37,08,939 +49.03 1953 75,64,394 29,97,296 45,67,098 +23.14 1954 80,20,693 30,38,660 49,82,033 +9.08 Source:MaulanaForest Administration Azad Library, Reports from Aligarh 1945 to 1954 Muslim. University

Two major industries were associated with the Forest Department: The Jammu Resin and Turpentine Factory and the Kashmir Willows. The working of these factories received a major setback as a result of the communal disturbances in Jammu. The whole Muslim labour and staff fled from the factories which resulted in their closure. These were no longer located on the railheads and their disadvantageous locations

238 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 216. 239 Economic Chaos in Kashmir, p. 6. 240 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2007, Jammu, 1954, p. 38.

142 resulted in serious disruptions.241 It was in 1948 that the factories could be started again and steadily these factories began to show progress in terms of production and profits. Resin tapping in the forests increased from 44,202 maunds in 1953 to 67,169 in 1954.242 To popularise and step up resin sales in the inland market three regional agencies were formulated for Southern, Northern and Western zones.243 The Government also set up a Joinery Mill at Pampore to solve the difficulty of exporting all timber to outside and to provide employment to the highly skilled labour in Kashmir. Sponsored by the Stenberg Corporation of Sweden, it was expected to turn out 100 finished doors and windows on a daily basis.244

Development of Cottage and Small Scale Industries

The cottage industry was the single biggest industry in the state and provided employment to about 3,00,000 people, including both whole time and part time workers.245 The handicraft products of Kashmir- shawls, embroideries, carpets, papier-machie and wood-carving had attained international fame and found markets throughout the world. During the initial phase of the Dogra period exorbitant taxation and anti-craft state policies adversely influenced these industries and led to their decline. It was only in the later period that the Dogra state took steps towards modernising the cottage industries through technological innovations. Closely associated with the handicraft industries was the fate of tourism in Kashmir. Most of the handicraft items found their buyers in the Indian and foreign tourists visiting Kashmir in the summer months. The development of cottage industries was, therefore, intricately connected with the development of tourism in Kashmir.

Srinagar was the chief industrial centre of the state. An estimated 34310 workers were engaged in differentMaulana industrial Azad crafts Library, in the city Aligarh of Srinagar Muslim which Universitywas 27.8% of its working population and 5.8% of the working population of the Kashmir province.246 It was therefore imperative for the Government to develop the cottage industries so as to maintain a high level of employment. The Government devoted considerable

241 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2008, p. 33. 242 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2010, p. 65. 243 Ibid., p. 66. 244 Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2007, p. 46. 245 Agricultural Labour Enquiry in Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of States, p. 2., File No. 19(26)- K/52, 246 First Five Year Plan.

143 attention to their development and earmarked an amount of Rs 50 lakh in the First Five Year Plan. The main problems faced by the industry were related to the modernisation of the techniques of production, marketing of the manufactured goods and the welfare of the workers.247

To improve the production techniques the Government set up instruction centres where training was imparted in the art of designing and the actual processes of production. With a view to modernise the industry and bring professionalism, students who passed their secondary school and had a taste for art were admitted to Special Training School, established one each at Srinagar and Jammu, where training on modern lines was imparted in wood work, Paper machie, needle-work embroidery, basket weaving and applied art.248 The Government also constituted a Cottage Industries Board in 1949 under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister. The functions of the Board were:249

1. To devise ways and means for protecting local industries 2. To organise industries on cooperative lines 3. To standardise the processes of production 4. To encourage consumption of local products within the state and 5. To make suitable arrangements for marketing such products and facilitate their export.

The main difficulties faced by the cottage industries of the state, as studied by the Board were the procurement of raw materials, particularly raw wool and cotton yarn and the availability of adequate markets.250 To cope up with the problem of raw materials the Government passed an order which prohibited the export of certain raw 251 materialsMaulana like pasham Azadwool Library,from the state.AligarhFurther, Muslim assistance University in procurement was provided in respect of certain industries like shawl, pashmina, steel, plastics and handloom by arranging import licences and quotas through the Government of India.252 The lack of proper marketing facilities, more so the loss of West Punjab

247 Short Term Plan, p. 9. 248 Department of Information, Riyasat Jammu wa Kashmir mein Sanati Tarqi, p. 3, Accession No. 568/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 249 Cabinet Order No. 1081-C of 1949, Dated 17th December 1949, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, No. 38, JKA, Srinagar. 250 Recognition of the Cottage Industries Board, File No. 207, Register 27, Box 07, JKA, Srinagar. 251 Administration Report for S. 2007, p. 134. 252 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 119.

144 markets after partition bore heavily on this sector as it was linked to seasonal variations of the flow of tourists. Primarily, the main customers of the Kashmir handicrafts were the Indian and foreign tourists who visited Kashmir during summer months. Once winter set in, the crafts found limited buyers. Moreover very few tourists visited Kashmir after 1947 due to political uncertainty.253 In the changed circumstances it was necessary to make adequate alternative arrangements for marketing of goods. The First Five Year Plan proposed to establish a direct contact between the cottage industries and technical institutions on the one hand and the markets in India and abroad on the other.254 With a view to promote the indigenous industries the Government issued an order which barred the purchase of articles produced and manufactured locally from outside the state.255 The traders were asked to organise themselves into a cooperative society to handle the supply and marketing of handicraft goods. An advance of Rs 2,00,000 was made by the Government to the Union (Kashmir Arts Emporium), besides the free services of experts in industry and commerce.256 The Emporium set up its branches at Delhi, Bombay and Shimla and later also at Jammu, , Calcutta, Amritsar and Dehradun. With the expansion of Emporium activities, the Government took over its reins in November 1949 and framed plans for extending its scope and field. In the very first year business to the tune of Rs 9,00,000 was conducted by the Emporia.257 The Emporium dealt in carpets, chain-stitch rugs, shawls and embroidery, silks, woollens including pashmina, gabbas and namdas, wood carving and papier-mâché, silverware and jewellery, metal goods including sticks and carving sets, leather and fur goods and also Kashmir honey and saffron.258 Initially it functioned only as a marketing organisation but under the Five Year Plan emphasis was laid on organising production with a careful blending of traditional and new designs. By the end of the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Plan 70 production units had been set up which employed more than 1500 workers and provided job to 1000 artisans and craftsmen under the system of purchases.259 These measures introduced an element of standardisation in handicraft products and

253 This is revealed by the fact that while 14,568 tourists had visited the state in 1947, the number came down to 6,783 in 1950, Kashmir-A Decade of Progress, p. 45. 254 First Five Year Plan. 255 Recognition of the Cottage Industries Board. 256 Jammu and Kashmir Today, p. 29. 257 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 119. 258 Jammu and Kashmir Today, p. 29. 259 Riyasat Jammu wa Kashmir mein Sanati Tarqi, p. 5.

145 rationalised the prices which increased their demand both locally as well as in outer markets. Inter alia, the organisation of production through emporia improved the conditions of handicraft workers who lived in miserable conditions. They worked as sweated labour and were exclusively managed by the financiers. A Survey found that a highly skilled worker in embroidery industry did not earn more than 10-12 annas a day.260 The emporia led to the establishment of autonomous units of production and eliminated the financier, thereby initiating direct contact between the worker and market. This considerably improved the latter’s economic position vis-à-vis providing him job security and effecting increase in his wages. The following data shows the overall improvement in the cottage industries vis-à-vis sales, augmentation in production and increase in wage earnings after the establishment of Emporia:

Table 3.6: Progress of cottage industries

Category 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 No. of Centres 35 50 55 70 No. of Skilled and 400 800 1300 1500 Semi-skilled workers Indirect employment 1700 1450 1200 1000 Progress Registered Rs 22 lakhs Rs 23 lakhs Rs 25 lakhs Rs 31 lakhs in Sales Exports -- -- Rs 3,25,000 Rs 3,80,000

Table: 3.7: Increase in workers’ wages

Category of workers Wages before Wages after Increase Emporia Emporia percentage Carpet weavers 36 pies/100p knots 54 pies/100p knots 50% Staple workers Rs 1/10/ per day Rs 2/5/6 per day 45% Pashmina weavers Rs -/12/- per day Rs 1/7/- per day 45% WoodcarversMaulana Azad Library,Rs 1/4/- per Aligarh day RsMuslim 2/8/- per University day 100% Papier-mâché workers Rs 1/8/- per day Rs 2/8/- per day 80% Pashmina embroidery Rs 1/4/- per day Rs 2/4/- per day 80% workers Raffal embroidery Rs -/12/- per day Rs 1/4/- per day 60% workers Chain Stitch Rs 1/4/- per day Rs 2/4/- per day 80% embroidery workers Source: Annual Administration Reports, Short Term Plan for Development of Jammu and Kashmir State, Kashmir-A Decade of Progress and Jammu and Kashmir Today.

260 Department of Information, Plan for the Development of Cottage Industries, Srinagar, n. d. p. 6, JKA, Srinagar.

146 Silk industry

Silk industry occupied an important place in the economy of the state. Kashmir was one of the principal silk producing regions in India during 18th and 19th centuries.261 Kashmir filatures were the largest in the world for a single unit of production and produced one of the finest qualities of silk. It was not only a reliable source of income for the state but also provided employment to a large number of people. The Government had established two factories each at Srinagar and Jammu which employed 2,692 workers on a perennial basis and 52, 457 seasonal workers while 10,948 workers were females.262 However, there were various loopholes in the functioning of the industry. The installation capacity of the Srinagar factory was underutilised which resulted in either dismissal of labour or shutting down of the factory occasionally. The factory had irregular and inadequate supply of cocoons.263 To increase the production of cocoons, the Government increased the price paid to the cultivator for his cocoons by 21%, which was an increase of Rs 10.264 It was hoped that price increase would encourage the cultivator to take more interest in cocoon production and increase the demand for leaf. To increase the leaf yield of mulberry trees the First Five Year Plan proposed large scale pruning and shaping of the existing plantations, preservation of methods by rejuvenation of trees and use of manures.265

The machinery used for the production of raw silk was Italian and was about 25 years old. It had worn out and lost its efficiency which adversely affected the quality of fabrics. To remove this longstanding handicap a fresh plant which cost Rs 5/6 lakhs was ordered from France.266 With the installation of the new plant not only was the quality of fabrics improved but also new designs could be introduced. To encourage the local silk weaving industry the export of raw silk was practically stopped and the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University whole turn-out was consumed in local looms. This gave a fillip to the local looms and gave employment to more than 6000 weavers.267 With the consumption of raw silk in local looms there arose scarcity of raw materials. The Government arranged the import of raw silk from Japan and China, besides importing the best and most

261 John Murray, Indian Trade Enquiry: Reports on Jute and Silk, London, 1921, p. 36. 262 Short Term Plan, p. 75. 263 Ibid., p. 76. 264 Agricultural Labour Enquiry, p. 2. 265 First Five Year Plan. 266 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 121. 267 Ibid., p. 120.

147 dependable silk worm eggs from these countries. To help the destitute silk workers who were unable to purchase the raw materials from the market and to remove the intermediaries between them and market, the Government supplied raw silk, free of cost to the handlooms. During the year 1948-49 about 3,967 lbs. of raw silk was supplied to the workers who could not afford to purchase their quota.268 The process of silk weaving in handlooms and factories left behind a large amount of silk waste. Experiments were undertaken for the proper utilisation of different qualities of silk wastes and an efficient system of production was evolved. Known as the Matka silk industry (later drawn silk), the waste was subject to a number of processes to obtain the yarn. Though the yarn obtained was of a low quality, it provided employment to more than 1000 destitute women at different centres of Srinagar city.269 The Government intervention in the industry helped it to overcome the adverse impact of partition and put it on a sound basis. There was a marked increase in the quantity of silk production, revenue generated by the industry and the workers’ wages:

Table 3.8: Progress of Silk Industry

Year Revenue Expenditure Production (in lbs.)

1946-47 Rs 43,38,071 Rs 20,33,142 1,90,850

1953-54 Rs 43,47,766 Rs 32,40,700 2,09,238 Source: Kashmir: A Decade of Progress, p. 25.

Towards Co-operative Association: Local-self Government and Co- operatives

In 1947 Kashmir was preponderantly an agricultural country with 86 % of its populationMaulana living Azad in rural Library, areas. The Aligarh development Muslim of the University State was not possible without ensuring the development of rural areas. No doubt, as a result of the land reform measures and schemes for the development of agriculture the conditions of the peasants showed an improvement, the rural life had to be brought into the mainstream of the development agenda of the State. After the formation of the Popular Government a plethora of measures were undertaken to revitalise the rural life in accordance with the Plan of New Kashmir. In a first, a separate Department for Rural

268 Administration Report for S. 2005, pp. 98-9. 269 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 120.

148 Affairs was carved out for coordinating various activities affecting rural life. The achievements of the Government in the arena of empowering the local self- government were related to three aspects:270

1. Empowerment of Panchayats 2. Establishment of Tehsil and District Councils with elected representatives to look after civic work 3. Election of Zaildars and Numberdars

The institution of Panchayat had been introduced in the State in 1936 to decentralise the administration and ensure participation of the locals in the governance at a limited level. Their primary function was to arrange small improvement works in different villages and settle petty civil and criminal cases. There were 631 Panchayats in the State which had become defunct as a result of the political tribulations in 1947. The new Government held elections in 1948 to purge these bodies of the existing evils and shortcomings and free them from the control of landlords, moneylenders and grain- dealers.271 The Government boosted that as a result of the elections, Panchayats had been transformed into democratic institutions representing the true aspirations of the people. However, this seems to be far from the truth as the same influential sections of the rural society comprising of landlords, moneylenders, powerful National Conference workers continued to dominate the village life. They were able to exercise their money and muscle power on the peasants for getting re-elected. Through the mercenaries, always at their disposal, they could coerce the peasant into submission.272

In the previous regime Panchayats were set up in a haphazard manner with no uniformity in Maulanathe number ofAzad villages Library, or the size Aligarh of population. Muslim The UniversityDepartment began reconstitution of the Panchayats on the principle of having a Panchayat for every Patwar Halqa in which case a specified area and specified villages came in the administration of a particular Panchayat.273 The reconstitution of the Panchayats satisfied the demands of people and covered large areas under its jurisdiction with the result that the number of Panchayats in 1951-52 reached 800. To enlarge the functions

270 Jammu and Kashmir Today, p. 39. 271 Administration Report for S. 2005, pp. 60-61. 272 Interview with Haji Habibullah Sheikh, ex-numberdar, aged 100 years. 273 Annual Report on the working of Panchayats for the Year 1949-50, p. 2, Revenue Department, File No. RD-86/51, JKA, Srinagar.

149 of the Panchayats and make them the focal points of village life, the Panchayat Act was revised in 1952. It gave more powers and functions to the Panchayats which included collection of revenue for and on behalf of the Government, levy taxes in cash and kind, delegation of municipal functions, vesting of the management of plantations, minor kuhls and roads in the local Panchayats, introduction of Tehsil Panchayat Boards, building works, improvement of irrigation, make provisions for pure drinking water by constructing ponds and wells, raising of bunds and flood protection measures.274 Though all the powers were not delegated to the Panchayats, they did some commendable work in the upliftment of villages. The Panchayats organised labour on the Hallasheri275 basis and undertook construction work at the local level. New roads were constructed and old roads were repaired. During 1950-51, 19 roads covering a length of 35 miles were repaired at a cost of Rs 23,390. Further, 52 roads covering a length of 120 miles were newly constructed on Hallasheri basis by the Zamindars in their respective localities.276 Works like de-silting of the kuhls, de-watering of submerged areas, raising of the protection bunds of the rivers, planting of willow trees on the raised bunds for strengthening them and turning the trees into an investment, bringing of wasteland under cultivation, digging of manure pits and introduction of new variety of seeds were also undertaken by the Panchayats on a regular basis.277 The cumulative impact of the measures was that the schemes of the Government reached to the village level as a result of which the village life was enriched.

Zaildars and Lamberdars functioned as important officials at the village level. Their main function was the collection of land revenue and represented the village proprietors in their dealings with the Government. The offices had become hereditary and workedMaulana in close Azad nexus Library, with the revenueAligarh department Muslim as University an engine of oppression upon the masses.278 The officials were notorious for their corruption, tyranny and exploitation of the rural peasantry. Being economically well off and mostly

274 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, Jammu and Kashmir August 53-August 54: A Review of the Achievements of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, p. 21, Accession No. 5776, NMML. 275 Under this system groups of villagers used to do the work voluntarily without receiving any remuneration from the Government. However, sometimes when the voluntary work was not forthcoming force was used to extract labour which made it akin to forced labour. 276 Administration Report for S. 2007, pp. 107-08. 277 Annual Report on the working of Panchayats, pp. 2-4. 278 Order regarding Zaildars and Numberdars, No. F. 622/48/820, Dated 20 December 1948, Revenue Secretariat, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 3rd Poh 2005.

150 comprising of big landlords, they were the most feared persons in the villages. Zaildar moved with his contingent of men on horses and threatened the villagers.279 The Government endeavoured to reform the offices by making the posts elective. The official publications give the impression that the measure brought immense relief to the rural population who participated actively in the elections.280 The claims cannot, however, be substantiated as the same influential persons emerged victorious in the elections and continued to dominate the rural life. Later in pursuance of the resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly of the State on 25 November 1952, the system of Zaildari was abolished in the State with effect from Ist Baisakh 2009 (13 April 1952).281

With a view to associate the representatives of rural population with the governance of the State and ensure greater cooperation between the officers and people of the countryside, the Government set up Tehsil Councils in every Tehsil of the State. The National Conference Tehsil President was to function as the Chairman of the Council, Tehsildar as the Convener and five others as members who were to be selected by the Revenue Minister on the recommendations of the General Secretary of the National Conference. The District Councils was to consist of all the Tehsil Presidents and the Tehsildars of the District with the District President of the National Conference as Chairman and the Wazir Wazarat as Convener.282 The Councils were required to exercise supervision in the execution of Government orders. These were also to render assistance in the distribution of food, flood and other reliefs as also in the administration of sanitation, cooperation, irrigation and labour welfare. The formation of the Councils put immense power in the hands of the National Conference office bearers and they were sure to misuse their power. It strengthened the National Conference atMaulana the grassroots Azad level. Library, The Government Aligarh did Muslim not maintain University any difference from the Party which began to influence all the decisions of the Government. The

279 Interview with Mohammad Iqbal Mir, grandson of Gh Mohammad Mir, an influential Zaildar of Kulgam Tehsil. Zaildars lived in spacious multi-storied houses with many servants. Zaildars could demand anything from the peasants and the refusal to abide would land them in trouble. It was very often that the Zaildars’ horses would roam freely and destroy the crops of the peasants. The peasants would never muster enough courage to complaint against the Zaildars. The fear of the Lamberdars (also called Mukdam) is depicted in a common Kashmiri saying: Mukdamas ne brunh kin, Gudis ne paet kin (It is dangerous to walk in the front of a Mukdam and in the back of a horse). 280 On the Road to New Kashmir, pp. 2-3. 281 Cabinet Order No. 214-C of 1953, Dated 18 February 1953, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 22nd Phagan 2009 (5 March 1953). 282 In Ninety Days, pp. 19-20.

151 State was a pure case of One Party system as all other parties were not allowed to have a say in the functioning of the government. The National Conference members would interfere in the administration unjustifiably. It would have also opened the gates of bribery and corruption and intimidation of the opponents as the failure to pay a bribe or not subscribing to the official ideology would result in the work not being done.

Co-operative Movement

The history of the co-operative movement in the State goes back to the reign of Maharaja Pratap Singh who prepared a plan for the development of co-operatives in 1912-13. The primary function of the co-operatives was to provide agricultural credit to the peasants so as to save them from the clutches of moneylenders who had become active from the time of Lawrence’s Settlement in 1893-94. In 1913-14, the Government organised Agricultural Co-operative Societies in different parts of Jammu province with a Central Bank at Jammu whose main objective was to distribute the money as loans obtained from deposits from members and loans from the Government.283 The co-operatives were under the control of the Government and thus could not associate more people with them. There was also greater focus on the development of agricultural co-operative for advancing loans to agriculturists. The formation of Agricultural Societies, therefore, was on rise and their number increased from 93 in 1913-14 to 338 in 1915-16 with a working capital of Rs 2,46,487.284 By 1918-19 the number of such societies rose to 648. The year also saw the extension of co-operatives to the industrial sector with the establishment of three industrial cooperative societies.285 Since then, the number of industrial societies continued to rise. However, the movement continued predominantly as a credit movement but Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University these could not protect the farmers from the exploitation of moneylenders as these could only provide partial credit needs and the peasant continued to fall back on the moneylenders for fulfilling the demands of rural credit.286 As a result of serious inflation during the World War II, co-operative stores were established which

283 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 1970 (1912-13), p. 40. 284 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 1972, p. 41. 285 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 1975, p. 21. 286 Mahfoozur Rahman, Co-operative Credit and Agricultural Development: A Study with Reference to Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi, 1974, p. 28.

152 provided goods at fair prices but soon these collapsed as a result of shortage of supplies. Co-operative farming was also introduced through which 43,145 acres of land was consolidated till 1947.287

The tribal invasion had an adverse impact on the Co-operative movement in the State. Many Societies became defunct and due to disturbances a huge amount of dues could not be collected. Records were destroyed and some of the Co-operative members suffered terribly in the loss of material assets and loans advanced to them became doubtful of recovery. Repayments to Central banks fell down and there was loss of capital and membership to the Societies.288 With the formation of the National Conference Government efforts were made to revitalise the movement. It was realised that the Co-operative movement had not taken roots among the masses because of its certain limitations. A strong need was felt for the inclusion of entire community life under the ambit of co-operatives so as to further economic welfare and not just restrict its activities to the providing of credit facilities.289 The first thing the Government did was to de-officialise the Co-operatives. To guide the policy of the movement and formulate schemes for national development, a Co-operative Council was composed from amongst the co-operators. The principle of election was enunciated as co- operators of each revenue district were to elect one representative for the Council.290 To make it more relevant to the contemporary challenges, the Government decided:291

1. Scaling down of outstanding debts against the members to the extent of their repaying capacity. The reduced debt was to be repaid over a number of years 2. To take surrenders of lands and leasing the same to the members for cultivation 3. To supply crop finance and the necessaries of life 4. Encouraging of repayment in kind. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University To bring the entire village into its fold and ensure speedy and fair distribution of essential commodities, the Government transferred the work of the distribution of these commodities to the Co-operative Societies. A network of Multi-purpose Co- operative Societies was organised in each Patwar Halqa of the State. Besides

287 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 288 Activities of the Co-operative Department, Rural Development Department, Register 1, Box No. 21, File No. RD-64/51, JKA, Srinagar. 289 Ibid. 290 Administration Report for S. 2005, pp. 64-65. 291 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 77.

153 supplying the necessaries of life, these were to afford financial assistance and marketing facilities.292 These Societies drew their supplies from the Co-operative Stores which, in turn, were fed by the Central Institution, Kashmir Peoples’ Co- operative Service Ltd., Srinagar. By April 1950, 336 Societies had been established in the State with a membership of 44,411 and paid-up share capital of Rs 2,04,218.293 The Government also financed the Co-operatives by providing a loan of Rs 20 lakh. As a result of the establishment of Societies the procurement and distribution system was made efficient and even people from the remotest corners were brought within the ambit of the Co-operatives. They could easily procure the controlled commodities like sugar, salt, kerosene oil, cloth, yarn, paper and edible oil at affordable rates.294 The Government also strengthened the Agricultural Societies. Loans were advanced to the peasants for the payment of land revenue, purchase of seeds and agricultural implements, purchase of cattle and construction of buildings. With the expansion of the Multi-purpose Societies the work of Co-operative stores became unwieldy and in order to relieve them, a federation of Multi-purpose Societies into Co-operative Unions was organised. The Unions acted as distributing agencies and were located at convenient places.295

In order to provide work to the artisans and marketing facilities to the manufactured goods, the Co-operative Department organised Industrial Co-operatives or Induscos for which the Government provided financial assistance. Among the prominent Societies were: The Sheep and Goat Skin Workers’ Society, Carpet Weavers’ Society, Pashmina Workers’ Society, Chain Stitch and Tapestry Workers’ Society, Papier Machie Workers’ Society and the Wood Carvers’ Society. These Societies purchased raw materials which was converted to finished products by the workers who were not only paidMaulana adequately Azad for their Library, labour but Aligarh also shared Muslim the profits. University The articles were sent to the Emporia and Sales Agents at different cities across India.296 The position of the Co-operatives and their strength in the State at the end of 1950-51 can be gleaned from the following table:

292 On the Road to New Kashmir, p. 4. 293 5 Years, pp. 13-14. By May 1953 there were more than 600 Multi-purpose Societies, 100 Co- operative Units and 11 big Co-operative Stores. Khalid, 24 May 1953. 294 Activities of the Co-operative Department, pp. 1-2. 295 Ibid. 296 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 79.

154 Table 3.9: Strength of co-operatives by the end of 1950-51.

Province Kind of Societies No. of No. of Share Net profit Societies members Capital of the year Paid-up (in (in Rs) Rs) Central Banks 3 2,025 2,49,700 30,714 Agricultural 1571 1,18,171 10,51,459 4,41,069 Kashmir Societies Non-Agricultural 597 21,551 2,61,899 1,04,604 Societies Total 2171 1,41,747 15,63,058 5,76,387 Central Banks 6 1,005 1,73,392 14,713 Agricultural 920 22,543 4,21,141 19,037 Jammu Societies Non-Agricultural 191 7,250 1,66,211 2,981 Societies Total 1,117 30,793 7,60,744 36,731 Grand Total 3,288 1,72,545 23,23,802 6,13,118 Source: Jammu and Kashmir Today, pp. 41-42

Notwithstanding the fact that the co-operatives sought to ease the life of the common masses particularly the peasantry, in practice it failed to develop roots among the masses. Its effect was marred by corruption, favouritism and official intervention.297 The Multi-purpose Societies did not really become multi-purpose in the sense that only controlled commodities were sold through these. These could not extend their area of work beyond these commodities to trade and do business as per the demands of the commodities. Even within the controlled commodities the price was comparativelyMaulana high as it included Azad Library,the profit not Aligarh only of Muslimthe Supplies University Department but of the Co-operative as well. In May 1953 the price of sugar was lowered as the percentage of Co-operative profit was reduced.298 One of their main functions was to provide credit to the peasantry so that they were relieved from the clutches of moneylenders. But in practice it was not easy to secure a loan from the Co-operatives. The Co-operatives were under the control of National Conference workers and bribes had to be paid to them to secure the loans. Even everyone, barring the relatives and

297 Department of Information, Riyasat mein Imdad-i-Bahimi ki Anjumanu ka Phailaw, Accession No. 586/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 298 Khalid, 24 May 1953.

155 friends of National Conference workers, was not able to get the controlled commodities.299 There were many cases of embezzlement of funds and the Bakshi Government promised a thorough investigation into them.300 The most serious grievances of the people were against the food procurement policy of the Co- operatives. To facilitate distribution of rations in the rural areas, the Government empowered Co-operatives to undertake procurement of foodgrains from the peasants under khush-kharid system. The officials would arbitrarily declare all or part of the peasant’s produce as surplus and force him to sell that ‘happily’ to the Co-operatives at the rates much below the market price. However, the same foodstuff instead of being distributed among the rural poor was sold in the black-market where the peasants had to buy their own produce at the rate of Rs 20 to Rs 32 per Kharwar which they had sold at a meagre Rs 9 per Kharwar.301 This made the movement a den of corruption and highly unpopular in the rural areas. Khidmat, the official organ of the National Conference also supported the claims that the Co-operatives were oppressing the people in the name of khush-kharid and called for an enquiry into the charges of corruption and fund embezzlement.302 Wazir Committee noted that the movement had lost all the prestige, respect and confidence in the rural population who in an unequivocal voice wanted to be relieved from its tyranny.303 Because of the monopolistic powers of the Co-operatives on the essential commodities, people lost their bargaining power and despite grievances they had to buy the commodities from these shops. The resentment against this policy has survived in a Kashmiri folk saying: Nun ti’il gasi ne akiy wane’ gachun (Salt and oil should not be bought from one shop only).304 The Co-operatives also became a tool in the hands of National Conference to silence and muzzle the voices of opposition. Any person who did not agree with the policies of National Conference or whose loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University was questionable was denied the rations on the pretext that he was an anti-national. It was particularly used to suppress and coerce into submission the Muslim Conference supporters or those persons who questioned State’s accession to India and were in

299 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 502. 300 Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Averts National Disaster, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s Call to People, p. 12, Accession No. 537/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 301 Thorner, The Kashmir Land Reforms, p. 1002. 302 Khidmat, 10 September 1952. 303 Wazir Committee Report, p. 49. 304 Aijaz Ashraf Wani, What Happened to Governance in Kashmir?, New Delhi, 2019, p. 103.

156 favour of Pakistan. Ghulam Ahmad Mahjoor, the ‘national’ poet of Kashmir who used to shower praises on Sheikh Abdullah and National Conference echoed:305

Nonas gous National wanas Dopham guad ral Hindustanas seth Zoo Jan wandha Hindustanas Dil Chum Pakistanis seth

(‘I went to a National Conference shop to buy salt. They told me to first merge with India. I would sacrifice my life for India but my heart lies with Pakistan’).

Development of Education and Health

The importance of education in the development of a nation can hardly be underestimated. National Conference during its days of struggle had urged the Dogra State to extend the facilities for mass education. Naya Kashmir Plan laid great emphasis on an active and progressive policy of education, linked to the National Economic Plan for the all-round development of the State. It envisaged setting up of the National Educational Council for preparing the scheme of education based on the creation of a national university, Statistical Institute, Technical Colleges and Research Institutes, Degree Colleges, network of primary, middle and secondary schools and adult education centres.306 After the formation of the Popular Government education and its reorganisation received an impetus and attempts were made to re-orient the entire education system in terms of Naya Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah devoted personal attention to the education sector which was evident from the fact that he kept this portfolio with himself as he believed that mass education was imperative if the people of the State were to attain prosperity and enlightenment.307 As a result of the Partition and the consequentMaulana disturbances, Azad entire Library, education Aligarh system Muslim had been thrownUniversity out of gear. School buildings were destroyed and many of these were used as bunkers by the army and for stationing the refugees. Schools had to be re-opened in the areas cleared of the raiders, refugee teachers had to be provided with jobs and new schools had to be set

305 Sanaullah Bhat, Kashmir in Flames: An Untold Story of Kashmir’s Political Affairs, Srinagar, 1981, p. 34. The verse also depicts the dilemma and dissensions in the minds of the common Kashmiris who were uncertain about their future. They were caught between the divided loyalties, of choosing between India and Pakistan. While they could see practical benefits in associating with India but their emotions, derived from the religious affinity, were possibly with Pakistan. 306 New Kashmir, pp. 38-39. 307 Wani, What Happened to Governance in Kashmir?, p. 60.

157 up in refugee camps.308 The question of affiliation of the schools and colleges of the State arose as these were affiliated to the Punjab University which became part of Pakistan. The focus of the Government, therefore, was on creating a network of schools throughout the State and augmenting the educational infrastructure, providing educational access to the refugees, establishment of colleges and teachers’ training centres, publishing of textbooks and creation of a script for Kashmiri, reorganisation of education to bring it in tune with Naya Kashmir and above all the establishment of a University as an affiliating institution.

As a result of the disturbances in Punjab which was the main supplier of textbooks to Kashmir, there were practically no textbooks in Kashmir and whatever reached through Banihal found place in the black market. The Government felt the need of re- writing textbooks in accordance with the new syllabus which sought to bring education into integral relation with the interest and psychology of the child as also with the realities of his socio-economic environment.309 Consequently, a Textbook Advisory Board was constituted in November 1948 under the chairmanship of Sheikh Abdullah with Maulana Masoodi, G. A. Ashai, Freda Bedi and Dr. Phil Edmonds as members with a view to compile textbooks that would infuse a liberal and progressive outlook in the younger generation.310 The Committee was successful in printing and marketing its own textbooks. 96 books on different subjects were compiled in different languages and around 3,00,000 copies were brought out every year.311 It eradicated the chances of corruption as selected panels of authors were set up who elected their own conveners and handed the manuscripts in less than six weeks. As a result of the determined efforts, not only were textbooks easily and cheaply available but also educationally more interesting and socially more relevant.312 Another issue before Maulanathe Education Azad Department Library, was Aligarh that of the Muslim medium Universityof instruction in schools. Naya Kashmir Plan had envisaged that education would be imparted through mother tongue in all the Primary Schools.313 The Government was convinced of the soundness of the principle and therefore set up two expert committees on the subject viz. a Language and a Script Committee to examine and perfect the Kashmiri script. It

308 Jammu and Kashmir Today, p. 5. 309 Ibid. 310 Council Order No. 916-C of 1948, 25 November 1948, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 11th Maghar 2005 (26 November 1948). 311 Administration Report for S. 2006, p. 93. 312 Ibid. 313 New Kashmir, p. 39.

158 consisted of G. A. Ashai, G. H. Beg Arif, J. L. Kaul and S. K. Toshakhani. The Committee recommended the Perso- (Naskh style) and introduced the necessary letter symbols which adequately expressed the characteristic Kashmiri phonetics.314 They also wrote the first book in the language. The perfection of the Kashmiri script made it possible to introduce Kashmiri as a medium of instruction in the 1st and 2nd Primary classes from April 1949. By 1953 it had been extended to all the Primary classes of the Kashmiri-speaking regions.315 To instruct teachers in the new script, a Script Training Centre was set up at S. P. High School with 40 teachers as trainees who received instructions from the members of the Script Sub-Committee. With a view to popularise the Script, these 40 teachers were deputed to 40 training centres located at 40 different places throughout the Valley for training the Primary teachers and other interested persons.316 Similarly, Dogri was introduced in the Primary Schools of Jammu. However, after the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah the new Government under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad did away with the use of Kashmiri language as the medium of instruction at the primary level, for it believed that Kashmiri and Dogri lacked uniform scripts and the adoption of different languages in the State encouraged regionalism and thwarted the process of ‘national integration’.317 Thereafter only Urdu began to be used at the Primary level.318

With the snapping of links with the Punjab University, the Education Department instituted its own Middle standard examination for girls.319 The need for the establishment of University in the State was, therefore, strongly felt as the Schools and Colleges were left without affiliation. Sardar Patel had suggested Sheikh Abdullah to get affiliated with the University of but he was in favour of State’s own university. He was apprehensive that Urdu would become a casualty and sub-standard materialMaulana for differentAzad Library, courses would Aligarh be supplied Muslim if they University affiliated with a university from outside the State.320 Consequently, The Jammu and Kashmir

314 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 4 Years, p. 5, Accession No. 501/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 315 5 Years, p. 5. 316 Administration Report for S. 2006, p. 94. 317 P. N. Pushp, ‘Kashmiri and the Linguistic Predicament of the State’, in P. N. Pushp and K. Warikoo, eds., Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh: Linguistic Predicament, Delhi, 1996, pp. 172-73 cited in Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 319. 318 Ibid. 319 S. L. Seru, History and Growth of Education in Jammu and Kashmir (1872-1973), Srinagar, 1973, pp. 142-43. 320 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 353.

159 University Act was passed under which a university was established on 2 November 1948 with G. A. Ashai as its first Registrar. It was to function as a teaching and examining university.321 While presenting the inaugural address Sheikh Abdullah emphasised rich literary and cultural heritage of Kashmir and expressed hope that in near future the University would emerge as a centre of excellence whose research and guidance would help in solving the problems of the State.322 Kazmi Committee noted that the founding of the University was ‘symbolic of a spirit that was radiant in those dark days; it was an act of faith’.323

After the appointment of Assadullah Kazmi as the Director of Education there was remarkable progress in the field of education. He instituted a number of experiments related to the reorganisation of schools, checking wastage, Refresher courses for teachers and starting of Multi-purpose Schools. Educational conferences were organised at various places to acquaint people with the importance of education. In 1949 an Educational Officers’ Conference was held at Srinagar to find ways and means to implement the scheme of social education, improve inspection work and suggest measures for the improvement of children health in schools. The conference was fruitful in devising schemes for social and infant education.324 In pursuance of the decisions taken at the Conference, Social education was started in the State as an experimental measure in October 1949.325 The Scheme was aimed not only at imparting literacy to the masses but also at training them into the new way of life so as to enable them to take the fullest advantage of the social and economic advancement of New Kashmir. After proper surveys 40 education centres were selected, 20 each in Jammu and Kashmir provinces, and almost all were located in rural areas.326 Social workers meant to teach the adults were imparted short courses of trainingMaulana to ensure efficiency.Azad Library, The training Aligarh included Muslim methods University and techniques of adult literacy and various aspects of community service like personal care and hygiene, village sanitation, common diseases, child and patient care, civics, citizenship and

321 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 5. 322 Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, Hazrat Qaid-i-Azam Sher-i-Kashmir Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah Wazir-i-Azam Jammu wa Kashmir ka Khutba, Jammu wa Kashmir University ka Rasm-i-Iftitah, 2 November 1948, Accession No. 425/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 323 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Educational Reorganisation Committee Report, Jammu, 1950, p. 2. 324 Administration Report for S. 2006, pp. 90-1. 325 Ibid. 326 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 4.

160 cooperation, village economics, agriculture and rural occupation and general knowledge with special reference to New Kashmir.327 By organising fairs, folk festivals and recreational activities the Community centres not only raised awareness among the masses but also infused a new life into the village life. However, the ambitious project could not expand into new areas in view of the paucity of funds. Sometimes cooperation from the local populace was lacking given the fact that the rural people were mostly involved in agricultural activities and could not spare enough time to receive education. It was also a time-consuming process as most of the adults were more than 35 years of age and were very slow to read and grasp things. Nevertheless, within the limited budget of Rs 30,000 per year and adverse circumstances the achievements of the Centres were satisfactory. Between 1949 and 1951 more than 11000 adults attained literacy.328

With a view to combine textual knowledge with the practical training, vocational instruction was started in a number of schools. Industrial classes were opened in numerous girls’ schools where they received training in important crafts like knitting, weaving and dress making.329 The Government also established two Multi-purpose schools, one each in Srinagar and Jammu with a view to fulfil the needs of those who did not intend to pursue university education and bring education closer to the prevalent socio-economic order. The schools were designed to provide secondary education as per the tastes of the pupils. Many subjects like agriculture, spinning, weaving, embroidery, papier-mâché, wood carving and crafts like smithy and carpentry were introduced as optional subjects for the matriculation examination.330 A. Kazmi also experimented with a project of stimulating popular interest in education and creating a sense of belongingness by constructing school buildings with the help of local population.Maulana Under Azad the schemeLibrary, while Aligarh the Government Muslim throughUniversity Education Department gave land, timber and a little money, the rest was done by the people themselves.331 With a view to associate the people with the functioning of the Education Department the Government constituted Village School Committees, Tehsil and District Education Boards. The main functions of these bodies were to

327 Kashmir Bureau of Information, Social Education in Jammu and Kashmir, pp. 4-5, Accession No. 555/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 328 Ibid., p. 6. 329 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, pp. 4-5. 330 Administration Report for S. 2006, p. 94. 331 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, p. 5.

161 mobilise public opinion for education, to create and encourage local initiative and enterprise for the growth and expansion of education and to make recommendations to the Government regarding adequacy and suitability of school buildings and equipment, general health of scholars and the measures to ensure efficiency and discipline.332 There was absence of Kindergarten system of education in the State which resulted in the wastage of precious years of a child. In 1949 three model infant schools were started which admitted children at the age of 3 and kept them for 2 years. The technique followed was the one evolved by Madame Montessori. However, given the paucity of funds the equipment was prepared by the schools from the locally available material. The experiment was successful and during 1950-51, 120 infant classes were started throughout the State.333 The effective implementation of these measures depended on the efficiency of the teachers. To ensure that the teachers remain abreast with the latest techniques and methods in the theory and practice of education, Refresher courses were started by the Education Department at different places in Jammu and Srinagar wherein experts from different departments delivered lectures.334

The relative success of different measures encouraged Government to take steps for re-orientation of the educational policy and re-organisation of the existing educational system. In August 1950 the Government appointed an Educational Reorganisation Committee under the Chairmanship of A. Kazmi, Director of Education and fourteen other members.335 The terms of its reference were:336

1. To define aims and objectives of education at its various stages in Kashmir 2. To survey Primary, Secondary and post-secondary education in the State 3. To recommend measures to bring education in closer touch with the present socioMaulana-economic Azad order. Library, Aligarh Muslim University

The Committee submitted its final report in January 1951 and made various recommendations which included: Kindergarten to be a two-year course, Primary School, to be called the Central School to be an independent unit, and would be a 7-

332 Council Order No. 1387-C of 1950, Dated 18 November 1950, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 28th Poh, 2007 (12 January 1951). 333 Administration Report for S. 2007, p. 27. 334 Administration Report for S. 2006, pp. 92-93. 335 Order No. 831-C of 1950, 2nd August 1950, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, Ist Bhadon 2007 (17 August 1950). 336 Ibid.

162 year course, Secondary education to be a 4-year course to be organised as a self- sufficient unit with diversification of education.337 The Government immediately started implementing the new scheme. More than 200 rural kindergartens, 120 community centres for Social Education, various Multi-purpose High Schools in rural and urban areas and a supervisory Directorate of Physical Education were established. 20 new High Schools and 60 Central and Middle Schools were set up. To revitalise the Primary Schools numerous mobile training squads were set up.338 On the recommendations of the Committee salaries for teachers were enhanced which not only led to increased efficiency but also enhanced their social prestige which inter alia became an encouraging factor for the people to educate their children. Higher education gained an impetus with the reorganisation of S. P. College and A. S. College into 4-year full- fledged Degree Colleges. Post-graduation classes were started in Geology and Economics at G. M. College Jammu. Many schools in Anantnag were amalgamated and raised to the status of Intermediate College. High School in Sopore was made an Intermediate College with Rural Economics, Agriculture and Cooperation and Weaving as special subjects. One of the most significant steps in the arena of women education was the establishment of a Women Intermediate College at Srinagar with Music and Domestic Science as special elective subjects.339

As a result of the measures undertaken by the Government there was a visible increase in the number of Schools, Colleges and Vocational Centres. The enrolment in these institutions was also on rise as can be gleaned from the Table below. However, notwithstanding the increase in the number of Schools, it was reported that the standard of education was being compromised.340 Private enterprise was discouraged and the grantsMaulana-in-aid to private Azad schools Library, was eitherAligarh stooped Muslim or drastically University reduced on the pretext that quality was not being maintained in these schools. It was also alleged that the Government charged hefty fees from the students which became a hindrance in the expansion of education.341 Development of education made great strides during the Bakshi’s Government. Education was made free in the State which benefitted about 1.25 lakh students, cuts and grants-in aid were restored and budget for

337 Educational Reorganisation Committee Report, pp. 4-31. 338 Administration Reports for S. 2007, 2008 and 2009. 339 Administration Report for S. 2007, p. 27. 340 Khidmat, 23 March 1953 cited in Vashishth, Sheikh Abdullah Then and Now, p. 77. 341 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 493.

163 education wa increased by around 30% which resulted in the mushroom growth of schools and colleges in the State.342

Table 3.10: Growth in educational institutions and student enrolment

Year No. of Institutions* Enrolment Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Cost per pupil 1947-48 1497 338 1835 128140 17793 145933 Rs 22.95 1948-49 1177 267 1444 71975 19731 91706 Rs 34.16 1949-50 1281 253 1534 82838 15575 99313 Rs 38.18 1950-51 1101 229 1330 92203 15030 107233 Rs 27.71 1951-52 1058 219 1277 111473 19513 131003 Rs 24.64 1952-53 1048 208 1256 98557 18082 116639 Rs 34.42 1953-54 1291 200 1668^ 109649 14404 127353 Rs 34.50 Source: Administrative Reports for 1947-48, 1948-49, 1949-50, 1950-51, 1951-52,1952-53 and 1953-54. * Includes Colleges, High Schools, Middle, Central and Basic Schools, Primary Schools, Maktabs, Pathshalas and Training Schools ^ Includes 177 Maktabs and Pathshalas with 3300 scholars on roll

Healthcare

Naya Kashmir had attached great importance to the safeguarding of Public Health and had envisaged the formation of a National Public Health Council and a National Health Charter. It promised extension of Health facilities with one doctor for every 1500 people and a first-aid post in every village.343 However, the formation of the Government by National Conference did not witness anything remarkable in the field of health services in the State. Almost all the promises remained unfulfilled and practicallyMaulana almost noAzaddifference Library, could Aligarh be made Muslimfrom the situation University prevailing during the Dogra period. Tribal raids caused serious dislocation in the State and threw hospitals and dispensaries out of gear. Hospital equipment was equipped and the number of dispensaries in the State fell from 194 to 122.344 The influx of thousands of refugees created fears of an epidemic and the health machinery of the State was geared towards minimising the loss of life. An isolation Hospital was organised in Srinagar for Cholera cases and mobile dispensaries for serving the rural areas were set

342 Jammu and Kashmir, August 53-August 54, pp. 11-2. 343 New Kashmir, p. 37. 344 Administration Report for S. 2005, p. 135.

164 up. Despite shortage of the medical staff 200,000 inoculations were performed and within 45 days Cholera was brought under control.345 There had been rising cases of Tuberculosis in Srinagar and outskirts and a survey revealed about 10,000 cases of active T. B. The Government opened a Chest Diseases Hospital in Srinagar with a capacity of 50 beds which was later increased to 100. The Sanatorium at Tangmarg was also re-opened. With the help of B. C. G team of World Health Organisation a vaccination campaign was launched in the State and more than 100,000 people were vaccinated.346 Quinine was also distributed to fight cases of malaria. Since the hospitals lacked proper medical equipment, Rs 1 lakh was spent for procuring X-ray equipment, ultraviolet ray lamps and electro-cardiogram. The existing laboratories of the two main hospitals (Srinagar and Jammu) and municipalities were poorly equipped and lacked adequate staff. The Government set up two central laboratories, one each at Srinagar and Jammu, with adequate staff which made it possible to carry out tests of advanced pathological, bio-chemical and bacteriological examinations besides food and water analysis. Blood banks were established at all the main hospitals of the State. Arrangements were made for the maintenance of children health through the opening of 3 ante-natal centres in the city of Srinagar which not only gave advice and treatment but also provided nourishments to the children.347

The Medical Department was reorganised and two Chief Medical Officers were appointed for the provinces of Kashmir and Jammu. They were not only to make extensive tours of the State but also to make suggestions for the improvement of healthcare and give advanced medical and surgical aid to the people of the outlying areas. Since there was absence of any Medical College in the State, many persons were sent to attain training in India and abroad. Increased facilities were provided to the doctors toMaulana go outside theAzad country Library, for special Aligarhised training. Muslim For trainingUniversity of nurses, the Government established two classes in Srinagar and Jammu. Refresher courses were also started at the main hospitals to acquaint the doctors with the latest techniques in the medical science.348 The Government convened a Health Conference which was attended by the Doctors, Hakims and Vaids, a plan of action was arrived at to improve health service in the State. A Committee under the Chairmanship of

345 Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-50, pp. 181-2. 346 5 Years, p. 17. 347 Jammu and Kashmir Today, p. 21. 348 4 Years, pp. 17-18.

165 Health Minister and comprising of officials and non-officials was appointed to investigate and examine the healthcare system in rural areas and suggest ways and means for improving it.349

The efforts of the Government were far from being totally satisfactory. The main healthcare system was functional in the cities of Srinagar and Jammu which also had a number of Missionary hospitals. Due to the long distances involved, the people of the rural areas did not benefit from the system and they continued to depend on the traditional system of healthcare which was dominated by Hakims and Vaids. There was lack of awareness about the modern healthcare system and people were superstitious regarding its use.350 The Government dispensaries were very few in number and could not cater to the needs of the large population. There was shortage of doctors in the State and many dispensaries established by the Government could not take off due to non-availability of doctors. As a result, many dispensaries were closed and alternative arrangements were not made. The Government failed to create healthcare infrastructure in the State as a result of which modern healthcare facilities were non-existent for a large chunk of population. The Government admitted that since 1948 thirty six hospitals had been closed while only 13 new ones were established, for there were neither doctors nor buildings for housing the hospitals.351 Khidmat, the official organ of National Conference commented on the sorry state of public healthcare in the State, ‘There is no satisfactory arrangement for medical aid in the countryside. For thirty or even forty miles no dispensary is to be seen. It is disheartening that at places both allopathic as well as Unani and Ayurvedic dispensaries have been closed down’.352 That there was no drastic change in the system from 1947 is evident from the following table: Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Table 3.11: Healthcare system in 1947 and 1953

Genre/Facilities 1947 1953 Expenditure 18.94 lakhs 20.87 lakhs Number of Specialists 10 10 Number of Doctors 113 139

349 Administration Report for S. 2007, p. 116. 350 Tyndale Biscoe, Autobiography, London, 1951, pp. 93-97. 351 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 495. 352 Khidmat, 26 September 1952 cited in Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 495.

166 Bed Strength 600 750 Hospitals 4 4 District Hospital Nil Nil Allopathic - 64 Ayurvedic/Unani 85 54 T. B. Clinics Nil Nil Staff Nurses and 179 138 Midwives Compounders, 239 205 Theatre Assistants Laboratory, Dental 17 34 and X-ray Assistants Hakims, Vaids and 105 107 Dawasazs Vaccinators 39 35 Sanitary Inspectors Nil 4 X-ray facilities Central Hospitals at Central Hospitals at Srinagar and Jammu; Srinagar and Jammu; Chest Diseases Hospital Chest Diseases Hospital Srinagar Srinagar Dental facilities Central Hospitals at Central Hospitals at Srinagar and Jammu Srinagar and Jammu Surgical facilities Central Hospitals at Central Hospitals at Srinagar and Jammu Srinagar and Jammu Anti-Rabic facilities Central Hospitals at Central Hospitals at Srinagar and Jammu Srinagar and Jammu Mobile Medical Unit Nil Nil Mobile Eye unit Nil Nil Venereal organisationMaulana AzadNil Library, Aligarh MuslimOne clinic University at Jammu Typhus organisation Nil Nil Source: Kashmir: A Decade of Progress

Financial Mismanagement and the Resultant Crisis

The formation of the Popular Government under Sheikh Abdullah had raised the expectations of the people, particularly the Muslims. It was hoped that the pro-people Government would usher an era of happiness and prosperity in the State, free from the exploitation and discrimination that was prevalent in the Dogra regime. National

167 Conference itself had raised the hopes of people for a better future under it by constructing a strong critique of the political and economic policies of the Dogra State while also giving wide publicity to its programme of Naya Kashmir which was hailed as the ‘peoples’ manifesto. The Popular Government enacted various measures aimed at the economic emancipation of the people and ending the century long oppression and exploitation. Indeed, as a result of the protective discrimination, the share of Muslims in the gazetted services increased from 30% in 1947 to 50% in 1953.353 The land reform and debt conciliation measures benefitted the poor peasants of the State. However, despite these measures the Government failed to completely transform the State which had to go through a period of financial crisis. The crisis may be explained as a result of two factors. The Government had to operate in an environment of structural constraints. Tribal invasion had wreaked havoc in the State and its economic ties with the outside world, which went through Pakistan, were snapped. There was a total breakdown of the communication system. The internationalisation of the Kashmir Dispute and the consequent political uncertainty in the State, fissiparous movements within the State and the fact that the Government had to operate under the shadow of war between two countries combined together to act as active hindrances in the economic development of the State. Secondly, there was a serious mismanagement and faulty implementation of the policies by the Government. National Conference had no experience of running the administration and as Sheikh Abdullah himself confessed that they had committed mistakes as from the jails they were suddenly called over to take the reins of administration.354 Because of rampant corruption and nepotism in the State and the Government’s inability to curb it, the economic policies failed to produce the desired results and led to dissatisfaction among the people. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The most serious grievances of the people were related to the food rationing system of the Government. It was a continuation of the Dogra State under which the peasants had to part with a part of the produce and hand it over to the Government at fixed rates which were very low. Called as Mujwaza, the foodgrains were then distributed among the urban population at controlled rates.355 The practice was discriminatory and

353 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol. II, p. 1217. 354 Sheikh Abdullah’s Address to the General Council of the National Conference in June 1951, Ministry of States, File No. 1(8)-K/51, NAI. 355 Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir, p. 407.

168 fed the urban population at the cost of poor peasantry. If after parting away 40 or 50 % of his produce as Mujwaza, the peasant needed any foodgrains for feeding his family he had to buy the same from the open market where the price of the paddy ranged from Rs 25 to Rs 30 per Kharwar. Even the meagre price paid to the peasant for Mujwaza (Rs 9 per Kharwar) was spread over many instalments over a period of years.356 The exploitation by the Co-operatives in the name of khush-kharidi has already been mentioned. Due to meagre means and his sole dependence on the foodgrains he produced but taken away by the Government, the peasant was forced to take loan from the moneylender at exorbitant rates of interest or mortgage his property for purchasing the paddy from the open market. Wazir Committee noted that those peasants who could barely produce for three months were subjected to the levy of Mujwaza. Besides, the officials collected more than the sanctioned produce and did not use standard weights and scales at the time of collection. The advances were not paid to the peasant directly but through Lamberdars who not only delayed the payment but also demanded his share.357 While collecting the Mujwaza the peasant was subjected to harsh treatment and humiliation by the revenue officials. Money was forcefully extorted from the peasants and on their inability to pay the Mujwaza, they would receive a beating from the police and were even arrested.358 There was no change in the officials’ attitude due to change of the Government. The contemporary peasants recall that the mere mention of the officials would make them shiver who would not only abuse them verbally but also physically assault them in case of resistance. They had hoped that ‘Sheikh Sahib’s sarkar’ would relieve them of the oppression but no such change was visible. The officials would even search all the utensils at the homes to see if the peasant had hidden any grains.359 Further, the accounts of the Mujwaza were not well maintained and the grains meant for the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University rations were found in the black-market. There were many instances of embezzlement of funds. In 1952 the National Conference branches at Kulgam and Badgam were openly castigated for the corruption and black-marketing.360 Interestingly, intelligence reports refer to the corrupt practices adopted by the officials while collecting the Mujwaza. They misused the name of Ministers and threatened the peasants. In

356 Thorner, The Kashmir Land Reforms, p. 1002. 357 Wazir Committee Report, pp. 111-2. 358 Qasim, My Life and Times, pp. 45-6. 359 Interview with Haji Habibullah Sheikh, Ab Rehman Bhat, Ab Khaliq Lone–peasants aged 90+ years. 360 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 501.

169 Dialgam Anantnag, Akbar Lone, the incharge of Mujwaza collection would exact one to two Kharwars of grain in excess of the sanctioned quantity from the peasants on the plea that the excess had to be spent on the alleged forthcoming marriage of Revenue Minister’s daughter.361 To add to the miseries of the people, the Government enacted the Rice and Maize Control in Anantnag and Baramulla Districts under which no peasant would sell the produce until he had not paid the requisite Mujwaza to the Government. In case of any delay his entire produce was liable to be confiscated. The Order also banned the export of these articles.362 This seriously undermined the position of the peasant and he was left entirely at the mercy of the Government. Given the malpractices and corruption, he could never hope to sell his surplus produce in the open market which would have fetched him more than double the amount the Government paid him reluctantly and in instalments.

The defective food policy of the Government also created discontent among the people of the State. Kashmir was already deficit in the production of foodgrains and the Government policies like Grow More Food were yet to show their impact. The serious drought and floods in 1949 and 1950 created serious shortage of foodgrains in the State and the Kashmir Government failed to tackle the situation. It passed the Foodgrains (Import Control) Order, 2006 (1949) under which the import of foodgrains into the State was banned. There was also a ban on the import of foodgrains into the city of Srinagar.363 Further, restrictions were put on the quantity of the essential articles (rice, wheat and maize) to be possessed by the people.364 The rations distributed by the Government among the city population were meagre-4 traks of shali and 2 seers of atta per head per month. For distribution of the rations the Government divided the people into two categories. Those people whose income was more thanMaulana Rs 300 perAzad month Library, were to receive Aligarh the rationsMuslim as per University the rate list: Rice-Rs 33 per man, wheat-Rs 26 per mān and maize-Rs 22 per mān. Those whose income was below Rs 300 were to receive: Rice –Rs 14 per mān, wheat-Rs 14 per mān and maize-

361 Miscellaneous Confidential Reports on Kashmir, Dated 28 November 1949, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Home, File No. No. 7267, JKA, Srinagar. 362 Cabinet Order No. 224-C of 1952, Dated 10 March 1952, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 22nd Chet 2008 (3 April 1952). 363 Cabinet Order No. 920-C of 1949, Dated 22 October 1949, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 18th Kathik 2006 (3 November 1949). 364 Essential Articles Restricted Acquisition Order, 2005, Issued under Cabinet Order No. 181-C of 1949, Dated 11 March 1949, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 19th Chet 2005.

170 Rs 12 per mān.365 Coupled with the ban, this resulted in serious hardships for the people of Srinagar. Eyewitness accounts give horrifying details of the hardships faced by the people. Munshi Ishaq mentions that the women of Srinagar used to go to the city outskirts on a daily basis, collect foodgrains, cook them and bring the cooked food for their families.366 There was resentment among the people and for the first time hartals were organised against Sheikh Abdullah. The Government suppressed the agitation and dubbed the demonstrators as Fifth Columnists and Yousuf Shahi Brigade.367 Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Hamadani, District President of the National Conference had submitted a memorandum to the Government holding that the people of Srinagar were brewing in discontentment due to scarcity of grains and due to non- availability of food children were dying. He requested that the sanctioned rations be increased to 4 ½ trak per head.368 The Government, however, remained unmoved. The only solution before the Government was to import large quantities of foodgrains from Punjab and other States through the Government of India which were distributed at cheap rates. The losses were then reimbursed by the Government of India as subsidy and relief to the State under the head ‘Aid to Kashmir’.369 Due to corruption and mismanagement even the large scale imports and Mujwaza collection failed to improve the food situation in the State. The problem was aggravated and shortage of the grains resulted in food riots in the State. Government food depots were looted and in many cases, National Conference leaders themselves led the riots.370 It was in this context that Sheikh Abdullah advised people to consume potatoes rather than rice as these were as nutritious as any other stuff.371 He thus earned the epithet of ‘Aloo Bub’. He actually wanted the State to be self-reliant and not be dependent on the import of foodgrains from other parts of India. To set the example he himself began to eat

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 365 Cabinet Order No. 448-C of 1949, Dated 8 June 1949, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 26th Jeth 2008 (9 June 1951). 366 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 215. 367 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. IV, p. 75. 368 Watan Farosh Haar Gaye, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s Speech in the Legislative Assembly on 5 March 1955, Accession No. 562/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 369 Ministry of States, File No. 3(39)-K/49, NAI. For example, During 1949-50, 7,39,030 mān of foodgrains were imported from India. The average cost including the freight charges was Rs 33 per mān out of which Rs 19 per mān was given as subsidy by the Government, Watan Farosh Haar Gaye, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s Speech in the Legislative Assembly on 5 March 1955, pp. 4-5. 370 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol II, p. 1228. As a result of participation in the demonstrations and inciting people against the Government, many members including Mir Qasim were suspended from the basic membership of the Party, Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, p. 77. 371 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 345.

171 ‘makai waath’ (maize-gruel).372 However, the slogan was farcical as the State had lost its connectivity with the outer world and its resources were insufficient. Nevertheless, Food austerity measures were recommended and the Government passed the Food Distribution (on Functions) Restriction Order, 2006 which restricted the number of guests on the occasion of marriage ceremonies in the State. According to the Act, a person acting as host on behalf of the bride’s side could entertain not more than 48 guests while as the bridegroom’s side could not entertain more than 24 persons.373 Sheikh Abdullah became a pun of criticism throughout the State and was targeted for his ant-people food policies. However, this measure was not restricted to Kashmir only as the same measures were recommended in the Government of India sponsored Food Ministers’ Conference in August 1949.374 After the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah it was the new Government under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad which gave people respite from the food crisis. Compulsory Mujwaza was abolished and the price of voluntary procurement of paddy was increased to Rs 10 per Kharwar. Restrictions on the movement, sale and purchase of paddy were removed which not only led to increase in the supply of foodgrains in the State but also curtailed the practice of profiteering and black-marketing. Further, the sanctioned ration scale for Srinagar was increased from 4 to 5 trak.375 These measures gave people a sigh of relief and increased the popularity of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.

The Government’s policy of nationalisation also led to resentment among the business class of the State. The Government became a monopolised service provider which not only gave a great setback to the private enterprise but also led to rising costs in the State. The Transport Department owned a fleet of 450 vehicles and plied on Jammu- Srinagar line.376 Ostensibly, the Government monopolised transport in order to save the peopleMaulana from the Azad clutches Library, of capitalists Aligarh and pr Muslimofiteers. Bakshi University held that the move was in the interests of thousands of labourers and workers as it would free them from the exploitation of bus-owners.377 However, in practice the monopoly worked against

372 Ibid. Makai Waath is prepared from the maize which is grinded and mixed with water. In the times of grave food crisis, Kashmiris used to consume this. It symbolised acute poverty of the masses. It is known to have medicinal properties and was prescribed by the Hakims during illness. 373 Cabinet Order No. 976-C of 1949, Dated 8 November 1949, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 2nd Maghar 2006 (17 November 1949). 374 Ministry of States, File No. 14(43)-K/49, NAI. 375 Jammu and Kashmir, August 53-August 54, p. 9. 376 5 Years, p. 7. 377 Khalid, 18 January 1949.

172 the interests of the people. The private transporters were thrown out of employment and in the absence of any competition, the Government charged arbitrarily. The freight charges were at least 50% more.378 There were voices of dissent against the Government’s policies. The Jammu Chamber of Commerce was very vocal in criticising the Government move as it believed that it had led to the exploitation of the masses due to rise of prices. On a number of occasions, its president Girdhari Lal Anand expressed dissatisfaction regarding the nationalisation schemes of the Government which had made the people poorer. He demanded that at least the private transporters should be allowed to ply on the local roads.379 While addressing the annual session of the Chamber of Commerce he held that if the Government de- rationed petrol and made it available to the private transporters as the same way it was available for the Government transport, they would carry the goods in 50% less freight than what the Government charged. It would have a good effect on the prices and would relieve the masses. He also alleged that the Government transporters were misusing the petrol and were actually consuming ‘people’s blood’ in their jeeps.380 The Kashmir Chamber of Commerce also submitted a memorandum to the government and demanded ‘immediate abolition of state trading; effective decontrol of all commodities; introduction of free and healthy competition in purchase, distribution, and sale; removal of restrictions on private transport; and cancellation of existing monopolistic licenses in favour of a few individuals and firms’.381

The continuation of the Custom tax after 1947 also aggravated the financial crisis in the State. While all other states, including Azad Kashmir, had abolished the internal customs it continued to be levied in Kashmir. In some cases the rate of taxation for the goods imported into the State had been increased by 200% which led to increase in their sellingMaulana price.382 Consequently,Azad Library, demands Aligarh were Muslim raised for University the abolition of custom tax as it had pushed up the cost of living within the State. Girdhari Lal Anand strongly pitched for the end of custom cordon as it was acting as a hindrance on the trading operations in the State and minimising the profit margin of the traders.383 Later, Praja Parishad also opposed the continuation of the Customs Department and

378 Hindustan Times, 2 May 1953. 379 Chand, Jammu, 21 April 1952. 380 Chand, 24 September 1952. 381 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 216. 382 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 492 383 Chand, 24 September 1952.

173 called for closer financial integration with India. However, the Government rejected the demands of the abolition of Customs as it would put the State in financial stringency. It held that the economy of the State was trying to emerge from the shock of tribal raids which had seriously disrupted it. Forest sale had dwindled and a large amount was spent on the relief and rehabilitation of refugees. Customs was the only reliable source of revenue for the Government as it alone accounted for nearly one- third of the State’s revenues. If it was abolished it would constitute as a serious threat to the solvency of the State.384 It rejected the charge that the Customs was seriously interfering with the trade and commerce and was making goods cost-prohibitive in the State. A strange explanation was offered that the Customs had been prevalent in the State since 1870 and people have become accustomed to the paying of the tax. Hence the argument that it created disparity in price levels was not tenable.385 The Government was not ready to part away its financial autonomy. It was Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad who after becoming the Prime Minister abolished the customs barrier. As a result, the State incurred a loss of Rs 176 lakhs which the Government of India compensated by allocating Rs 250 lakhs to the State during the year 1954-55.386

One of the apparent reasons for the financial crisis in the State was the prevalence of rampant corruption. Sheikh Abdullah’s Government failed to curb it and on the contrary, through its policies encouraged it. The prevalence of corruption in the State during the Dogra period was an established fact and National Conference had strongly voiced its opposition to it. A corrupt-free administration was one of the major planks of the National Conference movement. However, after the formation of the Popular Government, the corruption and nepotism not only did not end but increased in magnitude and scope. The reason that there was political uncertainty in the State which Maulana made Sheikh Azad Abdullah Library, depend Aligarh on the supportMuslim of University corrupt elements387 only partially explains the phenomenon. Sheikh Abdullah directly as well as indirectly supported corruption in the State which permeated through all the levels of administration. He was reluctant to take action against the corrupt elements which involved most of his close associates. The fact that the same corrupt bureaucrats and the officials continued in offices after the take-over of Sheikh Abdullah required some

384 Kashmir Bureau of Information, Why Customs, New Delhi, 1953, pp. 1-3, Accession No. 508/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 385 Ibid, p. 2 386 Ministry of States, File No. 15(17)-K/54, NAI. 387 Wani, What Happened to Governance in Kashmir?, p. 109.

174 drastic changes which were not forthcoming. Immediately coming into power, the fortunes of National Conference leaders as well as workers turned for good. The leaders began to appoint their kith and kin on the coveted posts of State Administration, bypassing all the rules for eligibility and qualification.388 Big state contracts were also given to their relatives. In this aspect, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad made the most progress. He came from a very humble background but soon he helped his brothers become one of the richest families in Srinagar, owning such properties as cinemas, hotels and workshops throughout the State. They came to be popularly called as BBC (Bakshi Brothers’ Corporation).389 As incharge of the Supplies and Transport Departments, Bakshi made a huge amount of money. Sheikh Abdullah was aware of the corrupt practices of Bakshi as he received numerous complaints against him. He knew that Bakshi was helping his relatives ‘as much as he could’.390 But he downplayed the complaints because of Bakshi’s worth as an organiser and his indispensability in the maintenance of law and order in the State.391 On complaining against Bakshi, Sheikh told Munshi Ishaq if he had a better alternative to Bakshi he would take action against him.392 It was alleged that Sheikh Abdullah himself did not lag behind in appointing his relatives to positions of authority. He appointed his son- in-law Khwaja Ali Shah first as the Governor of Kashmir and then as Deputy Revenue Minister. His step-brother Colonel Ghulam Qadir was appointed to the position of Deputy Tourism Minister.393 He bought for himself an expensive air- conditioned Cadillac car and became a point of criticism in the public circles as the State was passing through a phase of financial crisis.394 Ajit Prasad Jain, the Relief and Rehabilitation Minister mentions that Sheikh Abdullah demanded Rs 20 lakh from him but was unable to give exact details of the number of refugees or the purpose for which such huge amount was needed. On Nehru’s insistence the amount was given to Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

388 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, pp. 235-7. 389 In 1965 a Commission of Enquiry was appointed to look into the charges of corruption against Bakshi. The Commission noted that in1947 the assets of Bakshi and his family did not amount to more than Rs 10,000 with monthly income not beyond Rs 850. It noted that as Deputy Prime Minister (1948-53) he had embezzled a huge amount of money and indulged in nepotism and favouritism, Ayyangar Commission Report: Press Comments, Kashmir Research and Study Group, Srinagar, Accession No. 16761, NMML. 390 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 323. 391 Ibid. 392 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 237. 393 Ibid. 394 Qayoom, Kashmir ka Siyasi Inqilab, pp. 55-6.

175 him but no accounts were kept.395 G. M. Sadiq alleged that Sheikh Abdullah remained more concerned about his chair and the welfare of his kith and kin. Sheikh had insisted Sadiq, the then Development and Forest Minister to give compensation to his brother Sheikh Mohi-ud-din who allegedly had acquired losses in the timber trade during Quit Kashmir Movement while in reality he had not.396 The Government made large-scale appointments in all the Departments though it had to govern lesser area and population as compared to the Dogra period. 39 Secretaries, Deputy and Under Secretaries were appointed when in 1947 the number did not go beyond 8.397 National Conference workers and relatives of the leaders were appointed to these positions which not only put financial burden on the State but also increased the scope of corruption in the State. On the other hand, the employees continued to be a discontented lot as their salaries were meagre. The promise of National Conference that the minimum salaries would be fixed at Rs 100 per month remained unfulfilled as the lower rung officials continued to draw salaries of Rs 30-35 per month. The Government cited financial crunch for not being able to increase the salaries.398 The meagre salaries coupled with the rising costs of living led to increase of corruption incidents among the officials. There were demands from many sections, including National Conference legislators that the salaries should be increased to minimise corruption at the lower rungs of administration.399

After the formation of Popular Ministry there remained no difference between the Party and the Government. There emerged a race among the Partymen for acquiring offices in the Government. The Party became more and more powerful and influenced all the decisions of the Government. Upto the formation of the Constituent Assembly the Ministers were responsible to the General Council of the National Conference.400 At the Maulanalower rung Azadthe National Library, Conference AligarhHalqa MuslimCommittees University emerged as the main sources of patronage and power. These Committees were responsible for verifying the character and antecedents of the recruits to the Jammu and Kashmir Militia.401 It was

395 Ajit Prasad Jain, Kashmir What Really Happened, Bombay, 1972, pp. 59-60. 396 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 235. 397 Munshi Ishaq, Choudhwin Sadi ke Ibtidaee aur Wasti Dour ke Chand Iqtibasaat, Srinagar, 1951, pp. 63-4. 398 Bazaz, Struggle for Freedom, pp. 489-90. 399 Chand, 26 May 1952. 400 Khalid, 24 November 1951. 401 Ministry of States, File No. 5(3)-K/49, NAI.

176 through them the people were provided ration cards.402 They played a prominent role in the collection of Mujwaza and Khush-kharid and the functioning of Co-operative Stores. The common masses considered the Halqa Committee as representing the Government and brought their grievances before it. No wonder then, the Government was called the ‘Halqa President ’.403 Their corruption and atrocious attitude in the collection of Mujwaza and the functioning of co-operatives has already been mentioned. Along with misusing their position, they practically lived off the peasants and took bribes for accompanying them to the Government offices. They also indulged in immoral activities and subjected the common masses to different kinds of tyrannies.404 When the State witnessed devastating floods in 1950, the Government constituted a Central Flood Relief Committee under the chairmanship of Sheikh Abdullah.405 The Committee recommended a price rise of 2 ana per Rupee in all the commodities barring salt, sugar and cloth, increase of 50% in Entertainment tax and every State employee and pensioner was to contribute 1/12th of his salary for six months to the Flood Sufferers’ Relief Fund.406 It gave an opportunity to the National Conference workers to extract money forcefully from the people. Those who refused to pay the demanded amount were beaten to pulp. Among the victims were reputed traders, lawyers and teachers.407 There were allegations that the collected amount was never distributed among the deserving people. A large amount of it was embezzled by the National Conference workers and distributed among their relatives. No reliable information was provided as to what happened to the funds and whether the entire amount was spent on the flood relief or not. Though Sheikh Abdullah held that out of Rs 5,37,394 collected, only Rs 2,26,211 was disbursed as loans to the sufferers while the rest was deposited in Bank, he did not provide the reasons for not distributing the entire amount among the sufferers as also on what accounts the remaining amount Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University was spent.408

The prevalence of corruption in the State was so widespread that even the Government acknowledged it. Mirza Afzal Beg, the Revenue Minister wrote in a

402 Khalid, 18 November 1951 403 Butt, Kashmir in Flames, p. 48. 404 Munshi Ishaq, Choudhwin Sadi, pp. 71-2. 405 Cabinet Order No. 1140-C of 1950, Dated 17 October 1950, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 17th Kathik 2007 (2 November 1950). 406 Khidmat, 29 September 1950. 407 Economic Chaos in Kashmir, p. 24. 408 Ministry of States, File No. 1(18)-K/51, NAI.

177 newspaper article that corruption had assumed the form of an epidemic in the State and the Government had failed to curb the menace. He, however, blamed the people for giving bribes and not reporting about the incidents of corruption.409 Though the Government began taking action in some serious cases, it was not consistent and hardly acted as a deterrent. Many employees were forced to retire prematurely, their promotions withheld or suspended.410 With a view to take ‘effective steps for the prevention of bribery and corruption’ in the State, the Government constituted an Anti-Corruption Committee under the chairmanship of Sheikh Abdullah and Chief Secretary and Inspector General of Police as members. It was to watch and supervise the conduct the public servants, receive complaints of corruption, institute departmental enquiries and recommend action against the errant officials.411 The Bureau filed 80 cases of corruption against the officials but in 90% of the cases no witnesses turned out as a result of which the cases could not be proved in the courts of law. In many cases witnesses had agreed to give evidence before the courts but at the eleventh hour failed to turn up. The use of money and force by the alleged officials cannot be ruled out. As a result the Bureau had to be closed.412

With such economic policies of the Government and their ineffective implementation and financial mismanagement, there was a financial crisis in the State. The common masses had to bear huge hardships and their standard of living failed to improve. The dream of Naya Kashmir for an economically vibrant Jammu and Kashmir with the people living a happy and prosperous life proved to be too idealistic to be implemented. The times certainly changed for the National Conference leaders and workers who used the newly-gained power to their fullest advantage. The situation has been depicted by the contemporary poet Mahjoor who wrote a poem titled ‘Aazadi’:Maulana413 Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

Let us all offer thanksgiving, For Freedom has come to us; It's after ages that she has beamed Her radiance on us.

409 Chand, 9 June 1952. 410 Khalid, 24 November 1951. 411 Order No. 1232-C of 1952, Dated 14 November 1952, General Department, Register No. 25, Basta No.46, File No. G. B. 612-M/52, JKA, Srinagar 412 Ministry of States, File No. 1(18)-K/51, NAI. 413 Trilokinath Raina, An Anthology of Modern Kashmiri Verse (1930-1960), Poona, 1972, pp. 75-77.

178 In western climes Freedom comes With a shower of light and grace, But dry, sterile thunder is all She has for our own soil.

Poverty and starvation, Repression and lawlessness, It's with these happy blessings That she has come to us.

Freedom, being of heavenly birth, Can't move from door to door; You'll find her camping in the homes Of a chosen few alone.

She says she will not tolerate Any wealth in private hands; That's why they are wringing capital Out of the hands of everyone.

There's mourning in every house But in sequestered bowers Our rulers, like bridegrooms, Are in alliance win Freedom.

Nabir Sheikh knows what Freedom means, For his wife was whisked away. He went on complaining until She bore Freedom in a new home!

They searched her armpits seven times To see if she was hiding rice; In a basket covered with a shawl The peasant's wife brought Freedom home.

There's restlessness in every heart, But no one dare speak out - Afraid that with their free expression Freedom may be annoyed. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

179 CHAPTER 4

Political Developments in the State and Relations with India

The formation of ‘Popular Government’ on 5th March 1948 did not solve the complex issue of the Maharaja-Sheikh relationship. It was because of the continuous pressure exerted by the Indian Government, in particular Nehru and the anti-Maharaja wave in the State, largely in the Kashmir valley that the Maharaja gave his consent for appointing Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister of the State. However, Maharaja viewed his appointment as a mere temporary provision and he hoped that as soon as the conditions become favourable he would be able to exercise his powers without any hindrance.1 On the other hand, Sheikh Abdullah was keen to see that Maharaja was divested of all his powers and full authority be transferred to the popular Government. This difference in perspectives embittered the relations between them.2 Sheikh Abdullah launched a tirade against the Maharaja for fleeing from the Kashmir valley on the eve of Tribal invasion and for his direct role in the massacre of Muslims in Jammu.3 There were serious differences between the two in political and administrative matters. They espoused divergent views and followed quite different policies. Maharaja did not like any interference of the cabinet with regard to the Reserved Subjects.4 He was even opposed to these being discussed in the cabinet meetings and displayed his displeasure.5 In particular was the issue of State Forces and land reform measures proposed to be undertaken by the Government. Sheikh Abdullah demanded that the administrative control of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces, of which the Maharaja was Commander-in-Chief be transferred to the Indian Army.6 Maharaja was not ready to part away with the last remnants of his power and he opposedMaulana the move Azad, justifying Library, his stand Aligarh on the Muslimbasis of the University interests of the State. He

1 This position is clearly evident in the Maharaja’s correspondence with Patel and other leaders. Frustrated with the turn of events in Kashmir and his ouster from real power, Maharaja threatened to revoke the accession with India, Maharaja’s Letter to Sardar Patel, 31 January 1948, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945-50, Vol. 1, Document 124, pp. 158-164. 2 Sheikh Abdullah held that his tussle with Maharaja was because the latter was ‘anxious to rule and not prepared merely to reign’, Hindustan Times, 1 October 1948. 3 Refer to Chapter 2 of the thesis, pp. 17-20. 4 These included affairs of the royal family, Privy Purse, Private Estates, pensions, Tawaza (hospitality) department, jagirs and State forces etc. 5 Singh, Heir Apparent, pp. 84-85. Nehru called the Maharaja’s position as ‘absurd’ and held that it was the prerogative of the cabinet to discuss and consider every subject, including the reserved ones as ‘every matter is intimately related to another and cannot be separated’, Nehru’s Letter to Maharaja, 3 April 1948, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 5, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 268-9. 6 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 83. 180 held that the transfer of the forces to Indian Army would become a propaganda tool in the hands of Pakistan to propagate that the State had been merged completely with the Indian Union. Further, in case of Plebiscite and the vacation of Indian Army, State Forces could be used to maintain control over the State.7 However, Sheikh Abdullah was determined to wrest the control of State Forces from Maharaja. He accused the State Forces of systematically committing heinous crimes like rapes, molestations and atrocities against the common masses. In particular, it was alleged that the Forces were involved in the killing of Muslims in the Valley itself, under the direct sponsorship of Maharaja’s officials.8 Maharaja rejected these charges and held that action had already been taken in the cases where it was recommended. In a direct meeting with Maharaja on 5 August 1948, Sheikh Abdullah suggested Popular control of the Forces with Bakshi as the Army Minister while the Maharaja could continue as the Commander-in-Chief. When Maharaja replied that the issue was before States Ministry Sheikh roared, ‘If the States Ministry wants me to drown myself in the Dal, I for one am not going to do so’.9 Nehru also had a poor opinion of the State Forces which had lost all morale and discipline and was in a ‘hopeless mess’.10 He was particularly distressed by their cowardly behaviour in Ladakh when soldiers had deserted their units and handed over all the ammunition to enemy.11 He supported Sheikh Abdullah’s position that the Forces should be operationally, organisationally and administratively under the command of the Indian Army. If they were allowed to remain under the control of Maharaja, Nehru believed, they would cause tremendous nuisance and would do more harm than good.12 With Nehru on the side of Sheikh Abdullah who had decided to stop all the salary and allowances to the Forces from 16 August 1948,13 Maharaja could not withhold the transfer for long and finally in September 1948 the control of the forces was fully handed over to the Indian Army Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University with the provision that steps would be taken to reorganise and rebuild the army so that the State would have a properly organised army to fall back on.

7 Maharaja’s reply to Sheikh Abdullah’s Memorandum, Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 84. 8 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 211. 9 Maharaja’s Note of his Talks with Sheikh and Bakshi on 5 August 1948, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 170, pp. 213-15. Emphasis mine. 10 Nehru’s Letter to Patel, 5 June 1948, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 6, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 206-07. 11 Ibid. 12 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 159, p. 204. 13 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 84. 181 Maharaja was also not happy with the Government’s decision to resume all the jagirs. Maharaja contended that the Jagirs was a reserved subject under the Constitution Act and the Government could not take any decision without his prior approval.14 Since the jagirs functioned as the instruments of social and political control, Maharaja was not ready to reframe them. Their resumption would mean weakening of the loyal structure created by Maharaja for strengthening his authority. Maharaja also feared that all-out resumption would lead to widespread discontent and ill feelings against his person and throne. He was ready to resume jagirs of those found guilty of disloyalty or order the jagirdars to contribute one year’s income towards the State to help the Government in meeting the financial stringency.15 Patel feared that the resumption of jagirs without compensation would create avoidable discontent and unhappiness. He advised Sheikh Abdullah not to push on with the measure as jagirdars, majority of whom happened to be the non-Muslims would be alienated from the Government.16 Nehru also advised a cautious approach.17 Even after the Cabinet passed the order recommending resumption of jagirs, the same was not confirmed by Maharaja. The matter had to be referred to the States Ministry.18

Fortunately for Sheikh Abdullah the Indian Government, particularly Nehru supported him in his tussle with the Maharaja. Besides the merits of his arguments, supporting Sheikh Abdullah was also a compulsion for the Indian Government. India’s chances in Kashmir heavily relied on the goodwill and support of Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference. Kashmir was being deliberated upon in the Security Council and there were continued talks of holding plebiscite in Kashmir to determine its future.19 India could not afford to annoy Sheikh Abdullah as he appeared indispensable for India. Writing to Nehru from Srinagar in 1948, Indira Gandhi said that ‘theyMaulana say that Azadonly Sheikh Library, Saheb Aligarh is confident Muslim of winning University the plebiscite’.20 This consideration was instrumental in shaping India’s relationship with Sheikh Abdullah.

14 SWJN, Vol. 6, p. 198. 15 Jagirs in Kashmir-Question of Resumption, Ministry of States, File No. 1(3)-K(S)/48, NAI. 16 Patel’s Letter to V. P. Menon, 4 May 1948, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 143, pp. 182-3. 17 Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 19 May 1948, SWJN, Vol. 6, pp. 197-98. 18 Ibid. 19 Security Council passed a number of resolutions which held that the future of Kashmir was to be decided through the democratic method of a fair and impartial plebiscite, Resolution of 21 April 1948, No. 47(1948), S/726, Security Council Official Reports. 20 , ed., Two Alone, Two Together: Letters between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, 1922-64, New Delhi, 2005, p. 517. 182 Nehru confessed that Sheikh was thoroughly discourteous to the Maharaja21 but he did not express it openly. Instead he called upon Maharaja to strengthen the hands of Sheikh Abdullah and support him in his endeavours, and held that ‘if he (Sheikh) is weakened in any way, our whole case becomes weak and no amount of legal argument can help us’.22 When the tension between the two refused to die down Nehru called the Maharaja a ‘fool’ and a visionless person who was acting ‘against his own interests’.23 However, there was a marked difference in the approaches of the two stalwarts, Nehru and Patel, towards Kashmir. Nehru was more concerned about India’s international commitments and preserving the prestige through strengthening of Popular Government. He believed in secularism and was quite critical of the feudal establishment. Sheikh Abdullah held similar views and the two had identical approach towards democracy. Therefore, Nehru’s Kashmir policy revolved around Sheikh Abdullah. On the other hand, Patel did not hold the same radical views on religion, politics and economic restructuring as did Nehru. If Nehru maintained a pro-Sheikh approach, Patel was more inclined towards Maharaja’s cause. Maharaja maintained close correspondence with Patel who also espoused his cause.24 He frequently wrote to Sheikh Abdullah to improve the relations with Maharaja and consult him on important matters.25 The difference in the approaches of Nehru and Patel is evident from the fact that while the former always criticised Maharaja for his feudal and archaic views, Patel reprimanded Sheikh Abdullah for neglecting the wishes and interests of Maharaja and interfering in his domain. With regard to the future of the State Forces, Patel held a clearly opposite viewpoint to Nehru. He was opposed to the transfer of their control to the Indian Army for the same reasons as were highlighted by Maharaja.26 After the formation of Popular Government Maharaja withdrew from the active participation in the affairs of the State and confined himself to his palace. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University He became inaccessible both to the public and to his ministers. He camped in Jammu

21 Nehru’s Letter to Patel, 12 May 1948, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 149, pp. 188-9. 22 Nehru’s Letter to the Maharaja, 3 April 1948, SWJN, Vol. 5, pp. 268-9. 23 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 21 May 1948, SWJN, Vol. 6, pp. 198-9. 24 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 86. This is substantiated by the fact that after the accession of the State to India, Maharaja frequently wrote letters to Patel. His correspondence with Nehru was indirect, only through Patel which is evident from Sardar Patel’s Correspondence and SWJN. 25 Patel’s letter to Nehru, 4 June 1948, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 153, pp. 192-3. 26 Ibid. 183 even when the political and military headquarters were functioning from Srinagar.27 Instead of deliberating the issues with his ministers on his own, Maharaja always turned to Patel and complained to him. This worsened the matters and weakened the possibilities of concord between Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah.

The tension between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah reached to an impasse in September 1948 when Sheikh Abdullah addressed a press conference in which he made serious allegations against Maharaja. Maharaja was accused of obstructing the administrative mechanism of the State by holding up the reforms.28 Particular reference was made to his dilly dallying tactics regarding resumption of jagirs and tenancy reforms. No doubt the administrative control of the State Forces had been transferred to the Indian Army but the much need reorganisation of the forces had not been taken up.29 Sheikh Abdullah held that Maharaja had ‘strong friends’ in Delhi who supported him to forestall the implementation of the revolutionary programme of Naya Kashmir.30 Sheikh accused Maharaja of direct complicity in the massacre of Muslims in Jammu and called him to face a public enquiry.31 The press conference produced political ferment in Delhi. Patel was greatly perturbed by the news and he shot angry letters to both Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah, calling upon Sheikh Abdullah to behave maturely. Patel expressed his displeasure and took strong exception to Sheikh Abdullah’s tirade against Maharaja at the press conference without prior consultation with the States Ministry. Patel defended Maharaja as ‘powerless to resist’ and accused Sheikh of having embarrassed the Indian Government by his ‘grossly prejudiced views’. He reprimanded Sheikh for failing to understand their viewpoint or ‘to strike a new line as demanded by the changed situation’.32 This was the beginning

27 NehruMaulana had to persuade Azad Maharaja Library, directly and Aligarh through Patel Muslim and Gopalaswamy University Ayyengar to move to Srinagar as his absence from there had psychological implications and was creating a lot of suspicion. Nehru also complained that it was difficult to consult Maharaja who also did not attend the phone calls, Nehru’s Letters to Gopalaswamy, Patel and Maharaja, SWJN, Vol. 6, pp. 201-205. 28 Ajit Bhattacharjea, Wounded Valley, p. 177. 29 Statesman, 30 September 1949. 30 Ibid. 31 Sheikh Abdullah had already demanded a full-fledged enquiry into the happenings of Jammu. The enquiry was instituted but had to be stopped after the Indian Government held that it would be inopportune given the political circumstances prevailing in the State. The enquiry against the Maharaja would provide food to the Pakistani propaganda machinery which would also weaken India’s case in the Security Council. Interesting is the stand of Patel on the alleged role of Maharaja in the Muslim massacre. He rejected an open enquiry against him and instead told Sheikh to be grateful to Maharaja for signing the Instrument of Accession with India. Patel’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 10 October 1948, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 189, p. 243. 32 Ibid., pp. 241-45. 184 of the rift between Sheikh Abdullah and the Indian Government. While Sheikh believed that the Indian Government was not giving him a free hand to completely transform the State, the latter began to lose trust in him and question his loyalty towards India.

Sheikh Abdullah’s position was weakened by the fact that he did not enjoy the same popularity in Jammu as he did in Kashmir. The people of Jammu, particularly the Dogras were supportive of the Maharaja’s cause and wanted him to continue as the ruler of the State. Keeping in view this constraint Sheikh Abdullah could not ignore the Maharaja in entirety. While in Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah launched frontal attacks against the person and throne of Maharaja, for he drew his popularity from the anti- Maharaja ire. But he softened his tone when addressing the people of Jammu. In a series of speeches delivered to the people of Jammu on 16th, 17th and 18th November 1947, Sheikh Abdullah tried to appease the people of Jammu by saying that he wanted Maharaja to be the king of not just two or three districts of Jammu but of the entire State.33 He even tried to exonerate them from the alleged killing of Jammu Muslims.34 This dichotomy in Sheikh Abdullah’s policies continued to remain but it failed in effecting rapprochement between the two geographical regions with divergent religious and political interests. Moreover, despite Sheikh Abdullah’s appeasement the rift between him and Maharaja refused to die down and began to be expressed more clearly. Addressing a press conference in Delhi, calling pressmen as ‘my comrades-in-arms’, Sheikh said that ‘his struggle with Maharaja was still going on, because the latter was anxious to rule and was not prepared merely to reign’ and that if Maharaja tried to retain any power in his hands, conflict would continue.35 In January 1949 Sheikh Abdullah demanded that Maharaja should abdicate the throne and live outsideMaulana the State alongAzad with Library, his family Aligarh and entourage Muslim and theUniversity issue related to the future of the dynasty be settled by the Constituent Assembly of the State.36 Patel noted that the problem of Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah was ‘bristling with difficulties’.37 The Government of India could hardly afford to annoy Sheikh Abdullah and it was decided to keep the Maharaja away from the State for some time. Intelligence reports had pointed out Maharaja’s complicity in carrying out propaganda

33 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 331. 34 Ibid. 35 Hindustan Times, 30 September 1949. 36 Sheikh Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 359. 37 Chopra, Thematic Volumes on Sardar Patel, p. 130. 185 against Sheikh Abdullah purely on communal basis and the misuse of Dharmarth funds by him.38 More importantly, the Indian Government was unnerved by the hostile utterances of Sheikh Abdullah. In an interview to Michael Davidson of the London Observer, published in the Scotsman on 14 April 1949, Sheikh Abdullah said:

Accession to either side cannot bring peace. We want to live in friendship with both the Dominions. Perhaps a middle path between them with economic co- operation with each will be the only way of doing it. However, an independent Kashmir must be guaranteed not only by India and Pakistan but also by Great Britain, the and other members of the United Nations.39

The interview created huge resentment against Sheikh Abdullah in India and was termed in parliamentary circles as ‘ill-timed, indiscretion’.40 Nehru found it ‘very distressing’ and was taken aback. He at once summoned Sheikh Abdullah to Delhi to issue a clarification. While addressing a press conference on 17th May 1949 at Delhi, Sheikh Abdullah reiterated his faith in India and dismissed the idea of independence as day dreaming and held that it was impossible for Kashmir to survive as an independent entity keeping in view its limited resources and the political temper of the countries concerned. He held that the idea of independence was not only theoretical and academic but also meaningless.41 Nehru displayed a very poor opinion of Sheikh Abdullah and held that he lacked political foresight and had a ‘knack of saying the wrong thing’.42 However, it made the Indian Government realise the necessity of strengthening Sheikh Abdullah vis-à-vis Maharaja and removing every kind of impediment in his functioning. Nehru wrote to Gopalaswamy Ayyangar on 16 April 1949 that ‘the question of Maharaja must be tackled very soon….his presence there is a continuous source of trouble’.43 Nehru believed that the tussle between the MaharajaMaulana and Sheikh Azad was Library,not only having Aligarh a bad Muslim impact in University the State but it was also demoralising the army.44

38 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 10, p. 239. 39 Times of India, 13 May 1949. 40 Times of India, 15 May 1949. 41 The Hindu, 18 May 1949. 42 Nehru’s Letter to Krishna Menon, 14 May 1949, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 11, New Delhi, 1991, p. 117. 43 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 10, New Delhi, 1990, p. 237. 44 Nehru’s Letter to Patel, 17 April 1949, SWJN, Vol. 10, p. 239. 186 In view of the changed circumstances even the well-wishers of Maharaja, including Patel could not salvage the situation in his favour. All his reservations were kept aside and the demand of Sheikh Abdullah regarding Maharaja’s abdication was eventually fulfilled. Nehru impressed upon Patel the necessity of keeping Maharaja outside the State so that the internal situation of Kashmir improves. Patel sent many messages to Maharaja, calling him to visit Delhi ‘as early as possible’.45 Maharaja had got a blink of the impending situation and he did not respond to multiple summons from Patel. Finally Maharaja reached Delhi on 28th April and had multiple discussions with Patel regarding his absence from the State. Patel impressed upon him that in view of his bitter relations with Sheikh Abdullah and the situation created by the impending plebiscite, it would be in the interests of all if he, along with Maharani, remained absent from the State for some time and make his son, Yuvraj Karan Singh the regent. Patel noted that they were taken aback and there was a sense of shock and bewilderment in them.46 Karan Singh writes that the Maharaja was stunned and emerged from the meeting ‘ashen-faced’ while his mother was ‘fighting desperately to keep back her tears’.47 Maharaja had no option but to come to terms with the changed circumstances. He accepted leaving the State for 4-5 months but held that his absence should not be construed as abdication. 48 Further, he wanted multiple assurances from the Government of India regarding his position and the future of his rule. He demanded an end to the vilification campaign against him and the protection of his private estates. He wanted Maharani to stay with Yuvraj but Patel held that under the circumstances it would be better if she remained with Maharaja.49 Maharaja’s decision to leave the State had a tremendous psychological impact on the people of Kashmir, particularly the Muslims. It signified the willingness, albeit forced one, on part of the ruler to bow to the will of the people.50 The position of Sheikh Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Abdullah was greatly strengthened as the biggest impediment in his way of exercising his powers was removed and he rose to become the unrivalled ruler of Kashmir. An amount of Rs 15 lakh per annum was fixed as privy purse of Maharaja, out of which

45 Telegram to Maharaja Hari Singh, 18 April 1949, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 265. 46 Patel’s Letter to Nehru, 11 May 1949, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 216, p. 268. 47 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 92. 48 Maharaja’s Letter to Patel, 6 May 1949, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 216, pp. 269-271. 49 Ibid. 50 Times of India, 30 May 1949. 187 Rs 6 lakh was to be paid by the State government while Rs 9 lakh would be borne by the Government of India, which was to be debited to the account of ‘Aid to Kashmir’.51 Further, though the Maharaja believed that his period of absence from the State would be short, not more than 4-5 months, in practical his temporary leave turned out to be a permanent one. Only his dead body was to return to the State in 1961.52

Maharaja Hari Singh issued a proclamation on 9th June 1949 authorising Yuvraj Karan Singh to carry on all his functions, legislative, executive and judicial, in the State during his ‘temporary’ absence for ‘reasons of health’.53 On his arrival to Srinagar Yuvraj was personally received by Sheikh Abdullah and the members of his cabinet.54 The appointment of Karan Singh as regent signified the change in the political circumstances and gave the signal that his father could no longer remain in the State. He described his relations with Sheikh Abdullah as ‘excellent’ and was prepared to remain a constitutional ruler.55 There were many ups and downs in his endeavour to maintain harmonious relationship with Sheikh Abdullah while he also had to ensure the support of Nehru and Patel in Delhi. Karan Singh tried to ‘steer a middle path between appearing subservient to the Sheikh on the one hand and offending him and Jawaharlal on the other’.56

Negotiating Article 370 and Relations with the Indian Union

The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India limited the jurisdiction of the Central Government to three subjects-defence, foreign affairs and communications.57 The Union Parliament could make laws for the State in respect of these three matters only. The internal sovereignty continued to remain with the Maharaja, a provision provided by the Maulanaclause 8 of Azadthe Instrument Library, of AccessionAligarh itself.Muslim58 Sheikh University Abdullah had made a spirited advocacy of the State’s accession to India on the basis of ideological affinity.

51 Ministry of States, File No. 3(27)-K/49, NAI. 52 Maharaja Hari Singh died in exile in Bombay on 26 April 1961. As per his desire his ashes, instead of being consigned to water, were scattered over Jammu, Somnath Wakhlu, Hari Singh: The Maharaja, the Man, the Times : A Biography of Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir State (1895-1961), New Delhi, 2004, p. 254 53 The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 7th Har 2006. 54 ‘Kashmir Prince Takes Over’, Times of India, 21 June 1949. 55 Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 221. 56 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 104. 57 White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, pp. 46-8. 58 Adarsh Sein Anand, The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir: Its Developments and Comments, Delhi, 1980, p. 88. 188 He had thrown his full weight behind the Maharaja’s decision to accede to India and continued to echo his support for India quite often.59 He regarded the accession to India final, irrevocable and unalterable. In 1948 the National Conference ratified the accession to India in an open session. In a press conference at Delhi in 1948 immediately after being appointed as the Prime Minister by the Maharaja, Sheikh Abdullah declared that ‘we have decided to work with and die for India’.60 However, Sheikh Abdullah clearly made a difference between accession and integration. He stood for limited accession and was prepared to enter into relationship with India on the basis of three subjects only, with the State retaining sovereignty in all other internal matters. While aligning with India he wanted to retain the maximum possible autonomy so as to safeguard the unique political and religious profile of his State. He did not find any collision or contradiction in his dual roles of being an Indian and a Kashmiri Nationalist. For him both complimented each other and if India continued to tread on its set goals of secularism and democratic liberalism, Kashmir’s unique identity would get preserved by default. He criticised those elements who wanted Centre’s authority to apply to the State in toto and held that they were in effect weakening that vital relationship.61 He was able to affect the ouster of Maharaja from the State with the active connivance of the Indian Government. This brought forth the question of the future relationship of the State with India and Kashmir’s position in the Indian Constitution. Jammu and Kashmir was the only State, due to its peculiar circumstances, which ‘negotiated’ the terms of its membership with the Indian Union.62 The negotiations were held for several months, from May to October 1949, between the representatives of the Indian and Kashmir Governments. The nature of the negotiations clearly point out the difference in the approaches and motives of the two governments. While the Indian Government wanted to apply the maximum Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University possible provisions of the Indian Constitution to the State even within the avowed status of special position, Sheikh Abdullah favoured minimum possible application of the Constitution, limited to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession. For Sheikh Abdullah India was an ally of Kashmir, not necessarily its integral part. The perspectival differences are evident as while ‘the rest of the nation regarded it just as another instance of the process of integration of the princely States. But for the

59 Menon, The Story of the Integration, p. 382. 60 Statesman, 7 March 1948. 61 Times of India, 19 April 1952. 62 A. G. Noorani, Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, 2011, p. 1. 189 Kashmir Muslims it was an enabling provision to seek the help of a powerful neighbour to protect their identity from an aggressor.’63 In trying to retain the maximum possible autonomy for the State he earned the ire of Indian leaders, particularly Patel and Ayyangar. He got the draft of Article 306-A concerning the State revised a number of times as he did not wish to leave even a little space for the Indian Government to infringe on the autonomous status of the State. If in the end he was outwitted by Ayyangar, it was through a mild deception which he failed to speculate.

The first attempt on the part of Kashmir Government to spell out the relationship the State was to have with India was on 3 January 1949 when Sheikh Abdullah sent a long memorandum to Sardar Patel which was signed by all the members of his cabinet. The memorandum demanded that the accession should be limited to the three central subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications; the Constituent Assembly of the State should be given the freedom to frame the constitution in accordance with the wishes of the people; the State army should be transferred to the Popular Ministry and all the citizens of the State should have equal opportunities of service in the Indian Army.64 Patel rejected the proposals outright which so enraged the Kashmir leaders that a vilification campaign was launched against him, alleging that he was supporting Maharaja and obstructing the Kashmir Government in its political and economic reforms.65 On Sheikh’s insistence that they were ‘adamant’ to clear certain essential matters, Nehru wrote to him that ‘this is not the right time to raise these questions’ in view of the critical situation arising out of the UN deliberations as it was likely to upset the ‘delicate balance’.66 Detailed deliberations were held in Delhi between the representatives of the Indian and Kashmir GovernmentsMaulana on 15 Azadth and Library,16th May 1949. Aligarh Nehru Muslimstated that University the Indian Government had no objection to the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the State as the State had acceded in respect of only three subjects and it was up to the Constituent

63 Balraj Puri, ‘The Challenge of Kashmir’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 4, 27 January 1990, p. 191. 64 Mohan Krishan Teng, Kashmir: Article 370, New Delhi, 1990, repr., 2002, pp. 48-9. 65 Ibid. 66 Nehru’s Letter to Patel, 12 January 1949, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 9, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 197- 199. It was in this letter that Nehru for the first time expressed to Sheikh that the business of plebiscite was far away and there was a possibility of it not taking place at all. However, he warned that this should not be said publicly. 190 Assembly to determine what other subjects would it accede to.67 Regarding the equality of opportunity to the State Subjects for service in the Indian Army, Nehru stipulated that the equality of opportunity for employment was a Fundamental Right in the draft of the new constitution.68 He advised Sheikh Abdullah to exercise constraint and avoid raising controversial issues in public.69 There was a general agreement on the broad contours of the relationship between the centre and the State. Besides the provision of a Constituent Assembly which was not only to frame a constitution for the State but was to determine what other subjects, besides the three enumerated in the Instrument of Accession, would be transferred to the central government, it was accepted that the provisions related to Citizenship, Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of the State Policy would be uniformly applicable to the State.70 Jammu and Kashmir was to nominate four representatives to the Constituent Assembly of India to fulfil its obligations as a constituent unit of India, though by then the bulk of the Constitution had been adopted. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar held consultations with Sheikh Abdullah and after drafting of the list the same was sent to Dehradun for Maharaja’s endorsement.71 Gopalaswamy moved a motion in the Constituent Assembly on 27th May and proposed that ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 4, all the seats allotted to the State of Kashmir may be filled by nomination and the representatives of the State to be chosen to fill such seats may be nominated by the Ruler of Kashmir on the advice of his Prime Minister’.72 Nehru seconded him by saying that though it was not desirable for the members to come through nomination, yet it was not altogether incorrect as they had been recommended by the Popular Government as against some of the members being nominated by the rulers merely on the basis of their discretion.73 Consequently on 16th June the four representatives formally joined the Constituent Assembly of India.74 Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Pakistan lodged a protest with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan arguing that the move was aimed at changing the position of Kashmir unilaterally.

67 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 219, p. 276. 68 Ibid., p. 277. 69 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 18 May 1949, SWJN, Vol. 11, pp. 121-22. 70 Santosh Kaul, Kashmir’s Constitutional Status, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 35-6. 71 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 221, p. 278. The list included Sheikh Abdullah, Moti Ram Bagda, Mirza Afzal Beg and Maulana Syeed Masoodi. 72 Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Official Report, Vol. VIII, 16 May to 16 June 1949, p. 357. 73 Ibid., pp. 371-2. 74 Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, New Delhi, 1966, p. 365. Sheikh Abdullah was personally received by Nehru and seated him next to him, Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 357. 191 Though the Commission held that on purely legal grounds India was justified, it forwarded Pakistan’s protest to Indian Government.75 India’s reply reiterated its position on the future of Kashmir by saying that the move did not alter the Government’s determination to decide the issue of accession by the ‘freely declared will’ of the people of the State. It was simply to provide an opportunity to the people of the State to participate in the framing of the constitution. Whenever the State decided to opt out of the Union its representation in the Indian Parliament would automatically cease.76 Nevertheless, the participation of the representatives of Kashmir in the Constituent Assembly and the subsequent deliberations related to Article 370 greatly influenced the legal position of Kashmir in the Indian Union.77

On the basis of negotiations with the Kashmir leaders in Delhi a draft Article 306-A was framed to be incorporated in the Constitution of India. The Draft stipulated that:78

1. The provisions of the Constitution of India related to the Part B States would not be applicable to the State; 2. A Constituent Assembly would be convened in the State to draft a constitution of the State; 3. The Union would exercise powers with regard to the subjects specified in the Instrument of Accession, in consultation with the State Government and ‘such other subjects as would be specified by the President of India in concurrence with the State Government’; 4. Provisions of the Constitution related to the territories of India, Citizenship, Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy would apply to the State; 5. The other provisions would apply to the State with such exceptions as would be Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University mutually agreed upon between the Government of India and the State Government; 6. The President of India would have the power to modify, restrict or suspend the operation of the provisions of Article 306-A on the recommendations made by the Constituent Assembly of the State.

75 A. G. Noorani, The Kashmir Question, Bombay, 1964, p. 45. 76 ‘India’s Action Justified’, Times of India, 2 July 1949. 77 Noorani, The Kashmir Question, p. 44. 78 Teng, Kashmir: Article 370, p. 67. 192 However, the Working Committee of the National Conference refused to approve the Draft. They were against the application of the provisions of the Constitution other than defence, foreign affairs and communications. Reservations were expressed with regard to the application of Citizenship, Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy (Part II, III and IV respectively) as these would prejudice the domiciliary State Subject rules prevalent in the State.79 Further, since the preamble of the Draft stipulated that the provisions were to be temporary with the Constituent Assembly empowered to terminate the Article, they feared that it would pave way for the full application of the Constitution of India. It failed to provide them the ‘ironclad guarantees of autonomy’ they desired.80 Sheikh Abdullah sent an alternative draft to Ayyangar which held that only such provisions of the Constitution would apply to the State which are directly related to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession and that the Parliament could legislate with regard to the State on ‘those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which are declared by the President, in consultation with the Government of the State, to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of that State to the Dominion of India’.81 The Government of the State was defined as the Maharaja acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers as at present constituted and not on his individual discretion or judgement.82 The changes suggested by Sheikh Abdullah came as a rude shock to Ayyangar. He was ‘distressed’ and in the absence of Nehru found himself weighted with the responsibility of finding solution to the imbroglio which he believed was created ‘without adequate excuse’.83 He held detailed discussions with Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues at Delhi on the proposed changes. He wrote to Patel that he did not find any substance in their objections to the draft of Article 306- A, though he made certain minor changes in the draft to make it acceptable to Sheikh Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Abdullah while at the same time not compromising with the stand of the Government of India.84 Patel was furious at the ‘substantial’ changes in the original draft,

79 Ibid., pp. 67-8. 80 Ajit Bhattacharjea, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: Tragic Hero of Kashmir, New Delhi, 2008, p. 123. 81 K. M. Munshi, Indian Constitutional Documents: Munshi Papers, Vol. II, Bombay, 1967, pp. 519- 20. 82 Ibid., p. 50. 83 Ayyangar’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 15 October 1949, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 304-05. 84 Ayyangar’s Letter to Patel, 15 October 1949, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 243, p. 302. 193 particularly with regard to the non-applicability of Part III and Part IV and criticised Sheikh Abdullah for backing out of the agreement and showing no regard to the Indian Government and its Prime Minister who had gone all out to accommodate him.85 The draft failed to allay the fears of Sheikh Abdullah as it continued to have the provision of the applicability of Part II of the Constitution of India to the State. Further, no doubt it contained the clause that the concurrence of the Government was mandatory for the President to specify any matter in the Union and Concurrent Lists as corresponding to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession, but the Government of the State was not defined as had been desired by Sheikh Abdullah. He wrote to Ayyangar that the draft ‘went far beyond the sphere in respect of which we had acceded to India’.86 After another round of negotiations with Afzal Beg a draft was prepared by Ayyangar which was agreed by both the parties. While the provisions of Article 1 were applied in relation to the State, it was excluded from the applicability of Part II. The Government of the State was defined in clearer terms as the ‘person for the time being recognised by the Union as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers appointed under the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the 5th March 1948’.87 On 17th October Ayyangar made a detailed exposition of the Article 370 (306-A in the Draft) in the Constituent Assembly. While moving the Article Ayyangar held that he had made a change in the agreed draft which had been circulated in the House. In the definition of the Government of the State which meant Maharaja acting on the advice of Council of Ministers, he substituted the words ‘for the time being in office’ for the word ‘appointed’. Referring to the chequered history of Kashmir and abnormal conditions prevailing there, he held that the situation was not favourable for its fuller integration with India but expressed hope that in ‘due course even Jammu and Kashmir will Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University become ripe for the same sort of integration as has taken place in the case of other States’.88 Barring a small intervention by Maulana Hasrat Mohani, the Article was adopted unanimously without a single dissident voice or any kind of criticism. The representatives of Jammu and Kashmir also did not raise any kind of objection on the

85 Ibid., Document 244, p. 305. 86 Teng, Kashmir: Article 370, p. 72. 87 Munshi, Indian Constitutional Documents: Munshi Papers, Vol. II, pp. 518-19. 88 Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Official Report, Vol. X, col. 10.154.288, http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/Volume/10/1949-10-17, accessed on 22 May 2019. 194 extent, content and language of Article 306-A.89 The Article 370 as it was passed by the Constituent Assembly is given in Annexure III.

The unilateral change effected by Ayyangar in the mutually agreed draft was not appreciated by Sheikh Abdullah. In an angry letter to Ayyangar, Sheikh Abdullah charged him of deceiving him by making changes in the draft without consulting him and his colleagues. He requested him to ‘rectify the position’ to avoid any unpleasant situation.90 In case the change was not done he threatened to resign along with his colleagues from the Constituent Assembly.91 Ayyangar was shocked to receive Sheikh’s ‘ultimatum’. He held that the change was ‘trivial’ and did in no way constitute the ‘slightest change in sense or substance’.92 However, Patel’s letter to Nehru makes it amply clear that the ‘trivial’ change had been effected deliberately after a great deal of discussion. The substitution of the word ‘appointed’ by ‘for the time being in office’ ensured that not only was Sheikh’s Ministry covered in it but any subsequent ministries which might be appointed under the Maharaja’s Proclamation of 5 March 1948.93 Had the change not been effected it would have made Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal in 1953 impossible.94

The issue of the Proclamation by Yuvraj Karan Singh regarding acceptance of the new Constitution as drafted by the Constituent Assembly of India became a bone of contention between Sheikh Abdullah on the one hand and Karan Singh and Indian Government on the other. The draft of the Proclamation was framed by the Ministry of States. Sheikh Abdullah favoured an amendment in the proposed Proclamation so as to make it consistent with the stand the Government of India had taken with regard to the accession issue. He proposed that in the operative part of the Proclamation after the words ‘that the Constitution of India…shall…govern the constitutional Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University relationship between this State and the contemplated Union of India and shall be enforced in this State by me, my heirs and successors in accordance with the tenor of its provisions’ the words should be added as ‘subject to ratification by the will of the

89 K. L. Bhatia, Constitutional and Legal Status of Jammu Kashmir, New Delhi, 2015, p. 8. 90 Sheikh Abdullah’s Letter to Ayyangar, 17 October 1949, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 245, pp. 306-08. 91 Ibid. 92 Ayyangar’s reply to Sheikh Abdullah, 18 October 1949, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 308-10. 93 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 246, p. 310. 94 Noorani, Article 370, p. 5. Noorani believes that the change was an ‘unfortunate breach which created distrust’. 195 people of the State expressed through a Constituent Assembly to be elected on the principle of adult franchise.95 Ministry of States objected to the addition of these words to the Proclamation as the condition would lay the question of accession open to charge that it was conditional and therefore invalid. It would provide fodder to Pakistani propaganda and run counter to the stand taken by the Government of India that the accession was final and complete and not conditional or provisional in the legal sense, though it was committed to get it ratified by the people. Furthermore by putting this condition into the Proclamation India would expose itself to the charge that after agreeing to the plebiscite in Kashmir under UN auspices it was unilaterally announcing other method of testing the will of the people.96 However, Sheikh Abdullah was adamant at having the condition attached to the Proclamation. He sent his legal adviser Mr. Shah Miri, an ex-judge of Jammu and Kashmir High Court to hold consultations with the Ministry of States. Shah Miri held that while the proposed proclamation might remain unaltered, the Yuvraj should issue another proclamation in which he should make the declaration as suggested by him. The alteration in the words, he said, would have no effect on the question of accession and would not make it conditional or provisional. The declaration would contain the words that ‘I further State that as soon as conditions return to normal, I shall convene a Constituent Assembly of the State to be elected on the principle of adult franchise for the purpose of framing a constitution of the State and that this Constituent Assembly will have the option of deciding whether the State will opt out of the Union of India or not’.97 The Government of India’s legal opinion on the suggested amendment was that it made the matter more conditional than before.98 Sheikh Abdullah held that the course was not acceptable to them and that Yuvraj cannot issue the Proclamation without their advice.99 Since 25th November had been fixed as the date for Karan Singh’s Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Proclamation, it was decided to go ahead without adding the provision as suggested by Sheikh Abdullah.100 On 25th November Yuvraj Karan Singh issued the

95 Ministry of States, File No. 1(4)-K/49. 96 Vishnu Sahay’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 23 November 1949, Ministry of States, File No. 1(4)- K/49. 97 D. O. No. F.1(6)-KS/49, Ministry of States, File No. 1(4)-K/49. 98 Vishnu Sahay’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 24 November 1949, D. O. No. F.1(6)-KS/49, Ministry of States, File No. 1(4)-K/49. 99 Sheikh Abdullah’s Letter to Vishnu Sahay, 1 December 1949, D. O. No. 1/C, Ministry of States, File No. 1(4)-K/49. 100 D. O. No. F. 1(4)-K/49, 21 December 1949, Ministry of States, File No. 1(4)-K/49. 196 Proclamation regarding acceptance of the Indian Constitution for the State.101 Sheikh Abdullah was very disappointed and noted his dissent in an angry letter sent to Vishnu Sahay. He termed the Proclamation unconstitutional as it had not been submitted to the Yuvraj by the Jammu and Kashmir Government. The Yuvraj was accused of transgressing his powers by not acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers.102 Sheikh Abdullah held that unless the Proclamation was amended and the words as suggested by him embodied in it, it would not be possible for his Government to be a party to the Proclamation or have it published in the Government Gazette.103 The Government of India was unmoved and the matter came to a rest with the publication of the Proclamation in the Government Gazette. Thus, in confronting the Union Government Sheikh Abdullah’s disagreements hardly carried any weight and he had to succumb before the pressure. Had Nehru been on the scene Sheikh’s reservations might have been addressed to a certain degree. The nature of the agreement thus reached by Patel and Ayyengar in Nehru’s absence restricted the latter’s broader vision about Kashmir’s autonomy.104 Later, on 26th January 1950 the President of India issued his first order under Article 370 applying the Constitution of India to Jammu and Kashmir.105

Constituent Assembly and the Making of Delhi Agreement

Kashmir issue had been under discussion in the Security Council since January 1948 when India formally approached United Nations to help India and Pakistan in reaching a settlement. After detailed deliberations Security Council passed a number of Resolutions calling for a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir. However, soon Kashmir became a pawn in power politics and the real issue began to be neglected. National Conference, right from the beginning rejected UN Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University proposals and held that it had no right to interfere in the affairs of the State as it had acceded to India on the basis of its free will. A special convention of the National Conference was held on 12 October 1948 which passed an 1800-word resolution

101 Government of India, White Paper on Indian States, Delhi, 1950, pp. 371-72. 102 D. O. No. A-Miscl/49, Ministry of States, File No. 1(4)-K/49. 103 Ibid. 104 Subrata K. Mitra, ‘Nehru's policy towards Kashmir: Bringing politics Back in again’, The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1997, pp. 55-74. 105 The detailed enumeration of different entries of the Constitution applicable to the State again created a controversy. The State Government had reservations vis-à-vis many items and sent amendments to the States Ministry. Ministry of States, File No. 1(2)-K/50, NAI. 197 demanding permanent accession of the State to India on the basis of Naya Kashmir plan.106 There was a strong feeling against the referendum and Sheikh Abdullah had made appeals of boycotting the Commission and holding demonstrations against it.107 Nehru calmed Sheikh Abdullah and urged him not to oppose the idea of referendum. Instead he urged Sheikh to popularise the belief that the Kashmiris themselves through their heroic resistance were deciding the issue.108 With most of the international opinion hostile to India vis-à-vis Kashmir, Nehru was keen to find corridors of support. Meanwhile Sir Owen Dixon had been appointed as mediator by the Security Council in 1950.109 In his report he held that the solution to Kashmir Dispute lay in partition and a limited plebiscite restricted to the Kashmir valley.110 India emphatically refused to agree to any such provision. In its General Council meeting of 27 October 1950 rejecting the Dixon Plan, National Conference maintained that the future of the State depended on the sovereign will of the people expressed freely and democratically. It held that United Nations’ indecision had condemned the people of the State to ‘agonizing uncertainty’ and the time had come up to put an end to this ‘indeterminate State of drift and indecision’.111 It passed a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly ‘based upon adult suffrage and embracing all sections of the people and all the constituent units of the State for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir’.112 Maharaja’s proclamation of 5 March 1948 had included a provision for convening a National Assembly which would also frame the constitution of the State.113 B. N. Mullick has claimed that the idea of convening Constituent Assembly was originally conceived by Gopalaswamy Ayyangar.114 India hoped that if the Constituent Assembly of the State ratified the accession to India, it would make the question of plebiscite redundant and give India political edge over Pakistan in the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

106 Times of India, 13 October 1948. 107 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 21 November 1947, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 4, New Delhi, 1986, p. 336. 108 Ibid., p. 337. 109 Resolution of 14 March 1950, No. 80(1950), S/1469, Security Council Official Reports. 110 S/1791 of 15 September 1950. For a detailed analysis of the content and relevance of the Dixon Report, see, A. G. Noorani, ‘The Dixon Plan, Frontline, Vol. 19, Issue 21, October 12-25, 2002. 111 Constituent Assembly for Jammu and Kashmir State, Resolution adopted by the General Council of the All J & K National Conference on the 27th October 1950, Accession No. 502/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 112 Ibid. 113 Mysore Model might have been in the mind of Maharaja when he referred to the constitution, Lamb, Disputed Legacy, p. 191 114 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 21. 198 United Nations.115 Therefore Nehru gave his fullest support to Sheikh Abdullah on the issue of Constituent Assembly. As early as September 1948 Nehru wrote to Sheikh Abdullah that a new constitution for the State should be framed by a fully elected assembly.116

The National Conference Government began to make preparations for the convening of Constituent Assembly. Alarmed that the Assembly would declare its permanent affiliation to India, Pakistan vehemently raised the issue before the Security Council arguing that it would prejudice the final determination of the State’s future.117 The Security Council passed a Resolution on 30 March 1951 holding that ‘the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people, expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.’118 It also declared that the Constituent Assembly or any of its action ‘would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle’.119 In response, B. N. Rau, Leader of the Indian Delegation to the Security Council ruled out that Constituent Assembly was an alternative to the UN-held plebiscite.120 Nehru reiterated his Government’s stand in press conferences in New Delhi on 13 March and 11 June 1951 and in his address to the National Conference workers in Srinagar. He declared that the holding of elections did not challenge the Security Council Resolutions and that India would abide by the UN decisions.121 Notwithstanding his public pronouncements, Nehru gave a go ahead to the Kashmir Government regarding the Assembly. In a letter to Sheikh Abdullah on 22 May 1951 Nehru wrote that there were no two opinions regarding the importance of Constituent Assembly and ‘that we must proceed with it,

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 115 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 123. 116 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 7, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 320-21. 117 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 221. 118 Resolution of 30 March 1951, No. 91(1951), S/2017/Rev. 1, Security Council Official Reports, https://undocs.org/S/RES/91(1951), accessed on 15 April 2018. 119 Ibid. 120 Noorani, Kashmir Dispute, pp. 20-21. 121 Khidmat, 3 April 1951; Times of India, 12 June 1951. Notwithstanding his disillusionment with the Security Council, Nehru continued to show belief in UN-sponsored plebiscite in his public pronouncements. He stuck to his policy that the decision of the Constituent Assembly of the State regarding accession would not be binding on India. Addressing a press conference at New Delhi on 21 June 1952 Nehru said that ‘when the Constituent Assembly met in Kashmir for the first time…it was their intention to pass a resolution forthwith confirming the accession to India. We asked them not to do it so as not to be embarrassed before the United Nations’, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 18, New Delhi, 1996, p. 408. 199 despite all opposition’.122 There were also calls of boycotting the Assembly elections. Kashmir Democratic Union, led by Prem Nath Bazaz held that the convening of the Constituent Assembly would create stumbling blocks in the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir Dispute and maintained that the Assembly would be a big farce and could in no way be a representative body of the people.123 It called upon the people of Kashmir to peacefully non-cooperate with the Government to defeat its sinister designs.124 Sheikh Abdullah on his part was undaunted by the Security Council Resolution and India’s stand. Speaking at Calcutta in 1950 Sheikh said that whatever Pakistan may say or do the people of Kashmir would frame their constitution and take vital decisions with regard to their future.125 He advised his workers not to get perturbed by the dissident voices raised thousands of miles away and rather strain every effort to bring to fruition their decision.126 Pakistan was perturbed by the pronouncements of Sheikh Abdullah and his resolve to go ahead with the elections. There were rallying cries of Jihad against India. There were intelligence reports that Pakistan would launch an offensive as soon as elections begin.127 This created panic and the border residents began to leave for safer areas. The Government deployed army in large numbers in the border areas. However, the situation soon subsided and returned to normal.128

There emerged a controversy with regard to the issue of proclamation. Maharaja was keen that the proclamation should be issued by him and not the regent. It was only after the direct intervention of the Ministry of States which convinced Maharaja regarding the urgency of the matter that the latter allowed Karan Singh to issue the proclamation.129 Consequently, on 20 April 1951 Yuvraj Karan Singh issued a proclamation regarding ‘forthwith’ convening of a Constituent Assembly to be elected on the Maulanabasis of adult Azad franchise Library, with every AligarhState subjectMuslimnot Universityless than 21 years of age

122 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 16, Part 1, New Delhi, 1994, p. 378. Nehru wrote to Vijayalakhshmi Pandit and Krishna Menon that they were going ahead with the Constituent Assembly whatever Whitehall or the State Department might feel, SWJN, Vol. 16, Part 1, pp. 380-82. 123 Big Farce of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir: Decision to Non-cooperate, Resolution adopted by the Kashmir Democratic Union on 20 April 1951. 124 Ibid. 125 Abdul Aziz, Sheikh Abdullah: Many Voices- Many Faces, Srinagar, n.d., Accession No. 1327/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 126 Khidmat, 3 April 1951. 127 Ministry of States, File No. 8(21)-K/51, NAI. 128 Ibid. 129 Singh, Heir Apparent, pp. 125-27. 200 eligible to cast vote.130 The State was to be divided into territorial constituencies each containing a population of 40,000. The voting was to be done through secret ballot.131

The Delimitation Committee, constituted for demarcating electoral constituencies, divided the State into 100 constituencies- 43 for Kashmir province, 30 for Jammu and 2 for Ladakh while 25 seats were reserved for the people of ‘Azad Kashmir’.132 Electoral rolls were prepared and the total number of voters was 16,30,594 out of a population of 29,52,785. Kashmir had the highest number of voters (9,07,561), followed by Jammu with 6,58,317 voters and Ladakh with 48,040 voters.133 Elections were to be held in the month of September (10, 21 and 30 September respectively for Ladakh, Kashmir and Jammu provinces) for which a notification was issued by Yuvraj on 5th September 1951.134 In the ensuing elections National Conference won all the 75 seats. However, it has been observed that ‘the manner in which this election was conducted made a mockery of any pretence of a democratic process, and set a grim precedent for future free and fair elections’ in Jammu and Kashmir.135 It has been held that such was the atmosphere of intimidation and terror in the State that anti- India parties like Muslim Conference and Kisan Mazdoor party could not muster enough courage to participate in the elections.136

National Conference formed a Central Election Committee under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad which nominated the candidates for representing National Conference.137 Being head of the committee, Bakshi was given an opportunity to select candidates from among his favourites, many of whom were illiterates and were his yes-men.138 They were to pay back the debt to Bakshi by unanimously declaring their support to him after the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953.139 National Conference did intensive campaigning and used the Government machinery for carrying out Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

130 The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, No. 22, Dated 19th Baisakh 2008 (2 May 1951). 131 Ibid. 132 Tarif Naaz, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: A Victim of Betrayal, Srinagar, 2011, p. 113. 133 Hindustan Times, 22 August 1951. 134 The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette (Extraordinary), No. 20(a), Dated 5th September 1951. 135 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, p. 56. 136 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 230. Though Sheikh Abdullah mentions that he wanted opposition parties to join the fray but the way those candidates were treated clearly signaled that National Conference did not tolerate any dissident voice, Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 364. 137 Khalid, 19 August 1951. 138 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 231. 139 After the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, the Constituent Assembly passed a vote of confidence in favour of Bakshi. For details, see, Chapter 5 of this thesis. 201 propaganda work in its favour. It has been observed that one of the important features of its campaign was intimidation and terror against the opponents. It was not ready to tolerate any voice challenging the dominance of National Conference. Addressing an election meeting at Jammu, Maulana Masoodi held that any vote cast in favour of any party other than National Conference would actually be the vote for Liaquat Ali Khan.140 Bakshi summoned Kashmiri Pandits to his residence and told them to visit Jammu and influence Praja Parishad members to withdraw from the elections.141 Many persons who wanted to contest elections were threatened by the National Conference. The dread in Srinagar was that the Government would bring to bear all the foul means to make it impossible for an independent to stand or succeed.142 Fourty three nominees of National Conference in Kashmir province and Ladakh were returned unopposed one week before the election date.143 There were chances of a contest in only two seats- Baramulla where Giani Sant Singh had stood against Harbans Singh of National Conference and Habba Kadal Srinagar where Shiv Narain Fotedar contested against Shamlal Saraf of National Conference.144

There were many allegations against National Conference that it was keen to avoid any contest and therefore resorted to foul means and threatening. Giani Sant Singh held that his workers were threatened by the police and people were warned of dire consequences in case they voted for him.145 He was offered an amount of Rs 300 per month by the Kashmir Government in case he withdrew his name from the contest. But he refused to budge as he believed that Sheikh Abdullah backtracked on his words.146 It was after he began to get threats for his life that he withdrew his name one day before the election.147 Shiv Narain Fotedar was also accused National Conference leaders of threatening him. Addressing an election rally at Habba Kadal Chowk, Mirza MaulanaAfzal Beg warned Azad Kashmiri Library, Pandits Aligarh that if Muslim they did notUniversity vote for Shamlal Saraf they would be thrown out of the State. He also threatened Fotedar to withdraw in

140 Ranbir, 16 August 1951. 141 Letter by Jialal Jalali to Shyamlal Jalali, Military Intelligence Directorate, 14 September 1951, NAI. 142 Ibid. 143 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, pp. 221-22. 144 Intelligence Reports regarding Elections to Constituent Assembly in Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of States, File No. 8(25)-K/51, NAI. 145 Sant Singh’s Letter to Daily Milap, Military Intelligence Directorate, 24 September 1951, NAI. 146 Sant Singh’s Letter to S. Singh, Intercepted by Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of States, File No. 8(25)-K/51, NAI. 147 Ibid. 202 order to safeguard his life and honour.148 Fotedar was also offered a large sum of money and promise of a big post in the Government. Consequently he also withdrew his name.149 As a reward he was later appointed as the Deputy Chairman of the Constituent Assembly.150 Thus in all the 45 seats of Kashmir and Ladakh National Conference won without facing a single ballot test.

The real competition National Conference expected was from Jammu where the Praja Parishad Party had taken a strong anti-Kashmir and anti-National Conference position. Due to the possibilities of a real contest the atmosphere of Jammu was charged and there was a good deal of electoral activity. The Praja Parishad dubbed National Conference as a communal party and made sweeping Statements against Sheikh Abdullah. However, it had the sympathy of only those Hindus who were influenced by RSS.151 The main points in their election campaigning were the full application of the Indian Constitution to the State, return of Maharaja and compensation to the expropriated landlords.152 However, the social base of Praja Parishad was very limited and it also lacked sufficient funds and machinery to carry out extensive campaigning. It had bought one old jeep for election purposes but the issue of petrol to this jeep was stopped by the Government.153 Despite its limitations it decided to field its candidates in twenty eight of the thirty seats of the Jammu province.154 However, National Conference wanted to disallow Praja Parishad any chances of a fair competition. For example, Bakshi frankly told A. G. Rajadhyaksha, Assistant Director, Intelligence Bureau that the success of Praja Parishad would go against the national interests of India as it would produce negative repercussions in the Valley.155 He held that Prem Nath Dogra, president of the Parishad should not contest elections at any cost as he was a rank communalist and an RSS member. Bakshi was readyMaulana to give Azad five Library, to six seats Aligarh to the Muslim Parishad University if they stood as independents. If his proposals were not accepted, Bakshi stated, he would resort to all

148 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 230. 149 Intelligence Reports regarding Elections to Constituent Assembly in Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of States, File No. 8(25)-K/51, NAI. 150 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 230. 151 For a detailed account of the ideology and policies of the Praja Parishad, refer to Chapter 5 of the Thesis. 152 Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, p. 110. 153 A. D. Kashmir’s Tour Note of Jammu Province, Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of States, File No. 8(25)-K/51, NAI 154 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, p. 55. 155 A. D. Kashmir’s Tour Note of Jammu Province, Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of States, File No. 8(25)-K/51, NAI. 203 means, including hooliganism to stop their election as ‘everything was fair in love and war’.156 The nomination papers of thirteen Parishad candidates were rejected on the ‘flimsiest grounds and under pressure from the government’.157 The grounds of the rejection were baffling. Authorities pointed out that the nomination papers were improperly presented, spelling of names in the nomination papers did not tally with the voters list, some of the candidates were underage by one day while some candidates were told that their State subject certificates were not in order.158 In reaction Praja Parishad announced a boycott of the elections because of ‘the illegal practices and official interference, wholesale rejections of Parishad nomination papers’.159 Prem Nath Dogra called for a judicial enquiry into the rejection of the nomination papers and the entire exercise of the elections. He alleged gross irregularities in the delimitation of constituencies wherein Hindu majority areas were deliberately turned into Muslim majority constituencies and the separate dates of election for Jammu and Kashmir regions was to provide National Conference an advantage over its opponents.160 It has been held that had the Parishad contested the elections they certainly would have won some of the seats in Hindu-majority areas which were strongly pro-India and anti-Abdullah.161 This confined the elections to only two constituencies-Akhnoor and Kanachak where 40% polling was recorded and National Conference candidates emerged victorious. Thus, notwithstanding the accusations of malpractices, National Conference was able to win all the seventy five seats without facing any real competition. Korbel commented that ‘no dictator could do better’.162 It has been argued that the manner in which the elections were conducted pictured a very grim reality of Kashmir. National Conference was not prepared to give even one seat to its opponents. Intolerance of opposition was to remain the hallmark of the Nationalist Government and it resulted in the establishment of a Party State.163 Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Indeed, National Conference was proud of its success as a result of the adoption of One Leader (Sheikh Abdullah), One Party (National Conference) and one Programme

156 Ibid. 157 Times of India, 27 September 1951. 158 Letter from Girdhari Lal Sharma to Pandit Panna Lal, Censored, Ministry of States, File No. 8(25)- K/51, NAI 159 The Times, London, 13 October 1951 cited in Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 222. 160 P. S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, New Delhi, 1994, p. 115. 161 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 23. 162 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 222. 163 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, p. 46. 204 (Naya Kashmir).164 Having won the elections unopposed, National Conference was robbed of the opportunity to assess almost accurate percentage of its following and measure of success attending the grant of voting rights to all adults. It goes to the fairness of the Dogra State that despite its autocratic and undemocratic character elections were never rigged. Even when the relations between Maharaja and National Conference were the bitterest, the latter was able to campaign freely and win seats as per its strength. Never was the complaint made by any party, including National Conference, that it was disallowed by the State to exercise its rights freely. The onus of the forestalling of the democratic process in the State also lies on the Government of India. It was aware of the authoritarian behaviour of the National Conference Government. Intelligence reports had continuously pointed out that the elections were unfair and partial but the Government did nothing to prevent it. It was content with the fact that through the elections, notwithstanding their alleged rigged nature, Kashmir was going to ratify its accession to India. When Balraj Puri, a political activist from Jammu who had earlier submitted a memorandum to the Government of India to strengthen the hands of Sheikh Abdullah against reactionary elements including Maharaja,165 appealed Nehru to allow anti-National Conference parties to function freely in the State because of India’s commitment to a liberal democracy, he was astonished to hear that ‘India’s Kashmir policy revolved around Abdullah, and therefore nothing should be done to weaken him’.166 This set a wrong precedent for the future Governments of Jammu and Kashmir that as long as they remain pro-India in their rants and actions, they need not worry about the democratic fairness. The election results also raised eyebrows abroad as the international media questioned the impartiality of the polls. The London Times described the results as ‘farcical’ in an editorial titled as ‘No Fair Vote’.167 Pakistan also dismissed the elections as ‘fraud’ Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University and a ‘farce’.168

Sheikh Abdullah saw the Assembly as a continuation of the freedom struggle which would guarantee that the State gets the maximum possible autonomy and does not just

164 Commenting on the success of National Conference in elections, Khalid in its editorial held that it was because of its commitment to these ideals that National Conference emerged victorious in the elections. It further stated that the future of the State laid in these ideals, Khalid, 29 October 1951. 165 Memorandum by Balraj Puri, President J & K Youth Conference, Ministry of States, File No. 14(36)-K/49, NAI 166 Cited in Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, p. 57. 167 Noorani, The Kashmir Question, p. 58. 168 Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, p. 366. 205 become another Indian State.169 The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on 31st October 1951 at Srinagar and unanimously elected Maulana Masoodi as the pro- tem chairman of the Assembly. The Next day G M Sadiq was elected the president of the Assembly.170 Sheikh Abdullah inaugurated the Assembly on 5th November and made an impressive speech which summarised the politics of Kashmir in a rational way. First he enumerated the tasks which the Constituent Assembly had to perform:171

1. Framing of the Constitution 2. To decide on the status of the Dogra dynasty 3. To consider the issue of compensation to expropriated landlords 4. To declare its reasoned conclusion regarding accession.

Sheikh Abdullah declared that while framing the Constitution they should be guided by the highest principals of the democratic constitutions of the world-liberty, equality and social justice.172 Regarding the issue of Accession, he discussed all the three options viz. India, Pakistan and independence as these were envisaged by the British proclamation related to the Princely States. He made a detailed review of each alternative and pointed out their pros and cons. ‘As a realist, he said, I am conscious that nothing is all black or all white, and there are many facets to each of the prepositions before us.’173 Making a pitch for accession to India, he held that it was the ‘kinship of ideals which determined the strength of ties between two States’.174 India had set before herself the goals of secularism and liberal democracy which single it out as one of the progressive States. The continued accession of Kashmir to India, he believed, would defeat communalist tendencies in India and act as a safeguard against India becoming a religious (Hindu) State. He refused to call Pakistan a Muslim State as it was only a camouflage, a screen to dupe the common Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University man.175 In practice it was a feudal and a reactionary State ‘in which a clique is trying by these methods to maintain itself in power’. He argued that from political, economic

169 Lamb, Disputed Legacy, p. 193. 170 Teng, Kashmir: Article 370, p. 88. 171 Christopher Thomas, Faultline Kashmir, p. 206. 172 Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Official Report, Part 1, Vol. I (1951-55), pp. 85-6. 173 Ibid., p. 105. 174 Ibid. Sheikh Abdullah enumerated seven arguments in favour of India: democracy, secularism, common struggle for freedom, possibility of land reforms in India and economic development of the State as a result of association with India-providing market to Kashmiri goods and export of consumer goods and assisting Kashmir’s administration. 175 Ibid., p. 108. 206 and religious point of view Pakistan was not the best choice for the State.176 Sheikh called the option of independence ‘attractive’ but held that in the absence of powerful guarantors who would protect them from the acts of aggression, it would be an impractical idea.177 His wholehearted pitch for accession to India was to change very soon as the communal elements in the State raised their ugly head, nurtured by their masters in India.178

It was the Article 370 and the consequent negotiations between the Government of India and the State Government that provisions were made for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly in the State. It was to lay down the statutory provisions for regulating the relationship between the centre and the State.179 However, the National Conference leaders viewed the formation of the Assembly as independent of the Constitution of India which derived its powers from the people of the State, who were not necessarily part of the people of India. Therefore, it had a separate charge of determining the finality of the accession to India. Called as the ‘Doctrine of Double Charge’, mere reviewing of the accession amounted to the repudiation of the accession to India.180 It also implied that the applicability of the Indian Constitution would solely depend on the terms specified by the Constituent Assembly of the State.

The Assembly constituted various committees like Advisory committee, Basic Principles Committee and Drafting Committee to draft the constitution. The most important of these was the Basic Principles Committee which was to provide the fundamental guidelines for the functioning of the Government. The Committee submitted its interim report on 10th June 1952 with regard to the basic character and shape of the future constitution of the State.181 It recommended that the future constitution of the State should be democratic, the institution of hereditary rulership Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University should be terminated and head of the State should be elective.182 Commenting on the need to abolish monarchy, the report held that monarchy was the relic of feudal system based on mass exploitation of country’s resources and labour for the self- aggrandizement of an individual and his limited class. As the sovereignty must reside

176 Ibid., pp. 109-10. 177 Ibid., p. 110. 178 Thomas, Faultline Kashmir, p. 207. 179 Kaul, Kashmir’s Constitutional Status, p. 49. 180 Teng, Kashmir: Article 370, pp. 95-6. 181 Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Official Report , pp. 463-66. 182 Mohan Krishan Teng, Ram Krishan Kaul Bhat and Santosh Kaul, Kashmir: Constitutional History and Documents, New Delhi, 1977, p. 575. 207 in the people, monarchy was opposed to the aspirations of the people and its continuance would be the imposition of an anachronism.183 D. P. Dhar moved a resolution demanding that the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee be implemented through the Drafting Committee within a period of one month.184 However, the Government of India viewed with suspicion the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly and its resolution of the abolition of monarchy.185 It was feared that the Constituent Assembly might question the relationship of the State with India itself which would lead to a very precarious situation.

The Resolution created uproar in India and the press particularly highlighted the issue. The main contention was that the call of an elected head for the State was against provisions of the Indian Constitution which provided for a Governor to be appointed by the President. It impinged upon the provisions of Article 370 by virtue of which the State Government had been construed to mean ‘The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers’.186 To apply the provision as proposed by the Kashmir’s Constituent Assembly would necessitate changes in Article 370. Nehru, being connected to the developments in Kashmir very intimately, was the most worried person as he was apprehensive that the Constituent Assembly might take a wrong turn. In principle he did not disagree with the Resolution of Constituent Assembly as the views regarding the abolition of monarchy had since long been echoed by Sheikh Abdullah a number of times. But he feared that the proposal to abolish the Dogra dynasty would disturb many people in Kashmir (obviously referring to the Praja Parishad people who were pro-Maharaja) and create international complications for India. In a rather worried note on 3 June 1952, Nehru held that though, in principle, the Constituent Assembly had every right to make any kind ofMaulana constitution Azad for the Library,State and Aligarh deal with Muslim the question University of headship, the main issue was that how the change was going to affect Kashmir’s relationship with India.187 He argued that since it was Maharaja who had signed the Instrument of Accession with India, his deposition by the Constituent Assembly might have an impact on the question of accession. More so, he feared, it might weaken India’s case

183 Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Official Report, pp. 465. 184 Ibid., p. 552. 185 Sheikh Abdullah commented that the Centre suspected their intentions as a ‘jealous husband suspects his pretty and exuberant wife’, Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 367. 186 Teng, Kashmir: Article 370, pp. 107-08. 187 Nehru’s Note on Proposed Constitutional Changes in Kashmir, 3 June 1952, SWJN, Vol. 18, pp. 394-97. 208 in the United Nations.188 He advised ‘caution’ on the part of Kashmir Government and held that the Assembly should lay down certain basic principles of the constitution and not give effect to them piecemeal. When it was done with the entire exercise of the drafting, effect could be given after duly deliberating all the issues in the light of the circumstances.189 Nehru also held that if the Assembly was discussing the future setup it should also deliberate the question of accession to India. This was the first change noticeable in Nehru vis-à-vis Kashmir. He had time and again reiterated that the decision of the Constituent Assembly regarding the accession issue would not be binding on India. But now the changing circumstances were beginning to effect a change in his policy. In a subsequent letter to Sheikh Abdullah Nehru discussed the issue of the abolition of monarchy in detail. He accepted that the decision would have an immense psychological effect on the people of Kashmir, Azad Kashmir and even Pakistan and would signify an end to a century of tyranny and oppression. However, Nehru feared that the resolution would indirectly affect the question of Kashmir’s accession to India as the person who as ruler and head of the State acceded to India would himself be removed which was bound to have legal implications.190 Moreover, the decision was bound to affect Kashmir’s legal and constitutional relationship with India. Since Maharaja was recognised by the President of India and was supposed to be governor of the State, the change, more so without making necessary amendments in the Indian Constitution, would result in legal conflict and disharmony. Nehru, therefore advised Sheikh Abdullah to postpone the consideration of the matter by the Assembly.191 To enable the Indian Government to make necessary adjustments vis-à- vis Constituent Assembly’s decision, it was decided to postpone the deliberations by a month.192 It was in this context that Nehru sent an important Note to Sheikh Abdullah. Nehru clearly made a volte-face about his position on Kashmir. Notwithstanding his Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University public pronouncements and international commitments, Nehru said that as early as 1948 he had changed his mind vis-à-vis holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir as pre- conditions set by the UN could never be fulfilled. The only acceptable and practical solution, Nehru said, was the status quo with Pakistan controlling the Azad Kashmir and India holding on to its side of the Cease-fire Line. He urged Sheikh Abdullah to

188 Ibid., p. 396. 189 Ibid., p. 395. 190 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 5 June 1952, SWJN, Vol. 18, p. 399. 191 Ibid., p. 401. 192 Ibid., p. 401fn. 209 be committed and develop a firm and clear outlook as ‘doubts in the minds of leaders percolate to their followers and to the people generally’.193 Nehru also displayed a poor opinion of the people of Kashmir who he believed were not a virile people and were soft and addicted to easy living. The only thing they needed, Nehru said, was efficient administration and cheap food.194 This important Note clearly displays the changing policy of Nehru vis-à-vis Kashmir. National interests of India were coming into conflict with the regional interests of Kashmir and for Nehru India was first.

Sheikh Abdullah did not agree with Nehru’s preposition that the decision to abolish the monarchy would prove harmful or unpleasant. It would rather prove, he believed, advantageous and stabilise India’s position at the international level.195 Considerable rupture had already been caused in the Indo-Kashmir relationship because of Sheikh Abdullah’s many hostile utterances and his constant refusal to integrate with India in a more comprehensive manner. In April 1952 Gopalaswamy Ayyanagar visited Jammu to effect financial integration of the State with India through the extension of the jurisdiction of Comptroller and Auditor General of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.196 This move was resented by Sheikh Abdullah who accused the Government of India of making him ‘sign a promissory note in their favour’.197 Ever since Sheikh Abdullah’s highly provocative speech at Ranbirsingh Pura,198 Nehru remained perturbed about Kashmir. He had already got disillusioned with the United Nations and its sincerity in solving the Kashmir Dispute. He now remained more preoccupied with the developments in Kashmir. A delegation of the Kashmir Government led by Mirza Afzal Beg and including Maulana Syeed and D. P. Dhar arrived in Delhi on 14 June 1952. Extensive deliberations were held with the Government of India with regard to issue of the abolition of monarchy, State’s entitlementsMaulana to have Azad its own Library, flag, jurisdiction Aligarh ofMuslim Supreme University Court and the financial integration of the State.199 Nehru regarded most of these matters as trivial and held that the larger question before them was that what was the position of the Jammu and

193 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 19, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 322-330. 194 Ibid., p. 328. 195 SWJN, Vol. 18, p. 401fn. 196 Ibid., p. 400fn. 197 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, pp. 24-25. 198 Sheikh called the attempts to integrate Kashmir fully with India as ‘unrealistic, childish, and savouring of lunacy’, The Hindu, 12 April 1952. 199 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India and Kashmir- Constitutional Aspect, p. 6, Accession No. 545/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 210 Kashmir State in the Indian Union and therefore, before the Constitution of Kashmir was finalized it was important to clarify the relationship of Kashmir to India.200 He was to repeat the same argument in a press conference at New Delhi. He held that the basic thing was the present and future connection of Kashmir with India in the context of Kashmir being a constituent unit of the Republic of India.201 It was a master stroke on the part of Nehru. While the Kashmir delegation had actually come to take New Delhi into confidence with related to the deposition of Maharaja, Nehru’s sharp insight took them to the larger issue of Kashmir’s relationship with India. The Kashmir Government was not ready to move beyond the three subjects on which Maharaja had acceded to India viz. defence, communications and foreign affairs. Even Sheikh Abdullah had written to the Kashmir Affairs section of the Ministry of States that they should not be asked to send information in regard to Parliament questions on the subjects in respect of which Union Government was not competent to make laws for the State.202 But now the delegation found that it was unable to reach to a conclusion without opening on the subjects other than defence, communications and foreign affairs. The budging of the Kashmir Government from their avowed position signified a victory for Nehru.

Another issue which created significant confusion in Delhi was related to the State Flag. On 7th June 1952 Sheikh Abdullah moved a resolution in the Constituent Assembly which held that ‘the National Flag of the Jammu and Kashmir State shall be rectangular in shape and red in colour with three equidistant vertical strip of equal width next to the staff and a white plough in the middle with its handle facing the strips. The ratio of width to the length of flag shall be 2:3’.203 He spoke in detail about the historical importance of the flag and held that it symbolized the ambitions, desires, aims and aspiratMaulanaions of the Azad people Library, of the State Aligarhand at Muslim the same timeUniversity preserved the distinctive growth and character of the National Movement. It was argued that the Flag embodied the basic programme of National Conference which was the upliftment of the downtrodden sections of the society. Red colour of the flag represented peasants and workers, the three lines stood for the three geographical and

200 Nehru’s Note to Azad, Ayyangar and Katju, 19 June 1952, SWJN, Vol. 18, pp. 402-03. 201 Ibid., p. 407. 202 Ministry of States, File No. 15(15)-K/50, NAI. 203 Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Official Report, p. 379. 211 cultural regions of the State-Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh.204 All the members including Kaushak Bakula from Ladakh spoke in support of the need for a separate flag for the State keeping in view the historical freedom struggle and the sentiments of the people. The Resolution was unanimously passed by the Assembly, barring one amendment from Mir Qasim by which the word ‘National’ was removed from it.205 By having its own flag the Government gave a message that it was not ready to merge completely with the Indian Union and was to retain its autonomous character and separate identity. The Resolution created resentment in India and was construed to mean that by having a separate flag the Kashmir Government was disrespecting the National Flag of India.206 It was also argued that it led to the birth of separatist tendencies in the people of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah issued clarifications that the State Flag was in no way a rival to the National Flag which would continue to occupy a supremely distinctive place in the State.207 It was not a substitute for the Union Flag and had only replaced the flag of autocracy and feudalism (Maharaja’s Flag).208 In a press conference at New Delhi when Nehru was asked about the State Flag he replied that the provision of a separate flag for Jammu and Kashmir did not necessarily violate the sovereignty of India as long as the State recognised the national flag of India and used it on all major occasions of national and international importance.209

Bhartiya Jana Sangh criticised the Government for the resolutions of the Constituent Assembly as it held that these were a ‘clear violation of India’s sovereignty and the spirit of India’s Constitution’.210 Nehru was also impatient that the relationship of Kashmir with India should be extended to the issues beyond those stipulated by the Instrument of Accession as there was a scope for extension. For him it was the President and the Constitution of India that mattered than any ruler and their dignity and authorityMaulana should Azad be left Library, intact.211 HeAligarh advised MuslimKashmir GovernmentUniversitythat it should

204 Ibid., p. 383. 205 Ibid., pp. 384-414. 206 Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, File No. 5/2/52-KP, NAI. 207 The Hindu, 11 August 1952. 208 Kashmir Bureau of Information, The Flag Issue, New Delhi, n. d., p. 4, Accession No. 56161, NMML. 209 Hindustan Times, 22 June 1952. He was to echo the same views while replying to Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee in the Parliament that the National flag was the dominant flag and State flag a subordinate one. 210 Resolution by the Central Working Committee of Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Delhi, 14 June 1952, Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-1980: Internal Affairs, Vol. 4, New Delhi, 2005, p. 115. 211 Nehru’s Letter to Rajendra Prasad, 19 June 1952, SWJN, Vol. 18, pp. 404. 212 not take any step affecting the Constitution of India without reference and concurrence of the Indian Government as the same had been convened in consultation with them and with their goodwill.212 In a note prepared on 3 July 1952 Nehru delineated in detail the issues of contention and his stand on them. He believed that Supreme Court should be the highest appellate court for Kashmir also and should not only concern with the subjects of accession but with Fundamental Rights and others issues as well. The National Flag must be the symbol of authority in Kashmir and there should be a measure of financial integration with the Union.213 Sheikh Abdullah’s contention was that while National Flag with due respect would be flown on formal occasions only, the State Flag would be flown on all occasions. Regarding the extension of the jurisdiction of Supreme Court, he was a bit reserved. The presence of a vibrant judicial system within the State and the fact that Delhi was very distant from Kashmir (which meant that access to the Court was physically limited) did not necessitate that the State should come under the purview of the Court. Most importantly, he was apprehensive that the Supreme Court would impede in the implementation of many revolutionary measures launched by the Government like the abolition of landlordism without any compensation.214 Detailed discussions continued between the representatives of the Indian Government-Nehru, Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, K. N. Katju and Maulana Azad and the Kashmir Delegation comprising of Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi, Afzal Beg, Girdhari Lal Dogra and D. P. Dhar and all the issues related to the Centre-State relationship were discussed. At one point of time the negotiations seemed to break down as Sheikh Abdullah found that the two sides held completely different viewpoints regarding the State and the applicability of Indian Constitution. He decided to cancel the talks and booked his train ticket to Jammu.215 It was only after Ayyangar assured him that as long as Nehru was the Prime Minister, Sheikh could Maulanaexpect anything. Azad216 TheLibrary, talks continued Aligarh and Muslim the result University of these detailed negotiations was the Delhi Agreement whose main features were:217

212 Ibid., pp. 403-05. 213 SWJN, Vol. 18, pp. 423-24. 214 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 367. Nehru agreed in principle with Sheikh Abdullah. In India the speedy implementation of land reforms had been halted due to litigations in courts regarding the infringement of the Fundamental Right to own property. 215 Qasim, My Life and Times, p. 56. 216 Ibid. 217 The information is based on the Note drafted by Nehru, Constitutional Relationship of Kashmir with India, SWJN, Vol. 19, pp. 211-17; Nehru’s Statement on Kashmir in Lok Sabha on 24 July 1952, The Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vol. IV, Part II, cols.. 4501- 4520 and Times of India, 25 July 1952. 213 1. Head of the State: It was agreed that the Head of the State shall be recognized by the President of India on the recommendations of the State Legislature and shall hold office during his pleasure. He was to hold office for a term of five years from the date he entered upon his office. He shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.

2. Citizenship: It was decided that the persons who have their domicile in the Jammu and Kashmir State would be the citizens of India. Kashmir delegation was anxious that the rights and privileges given to the State Subjects should be preserved. To allay their fears a clause was added to the effect that ‘The State Legislature shall have power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the State, more especially in regard to the acquisition of immovable property, appointments to services and like matters’. Further, all those citizens of the State who went to Pakistan because of the disturbances of 1947 would be entitled to rights, privileges and obligations of citizenship on their return.

3. Supreme Court: It would have original jurisdiction in respect of disputes mentioned in Article 131 of the Indian Constitution and those Fundamental Rights which are agreed to by the State. The Government of India recommended that the Advisory Tribunal in the State should be abolished and Supreme Court should be the final court of appeal in all civil and criminal matters. The Kashmir delegation demanded some more time to consider this.

4. Fundamental Rights: Application of Fundamental Rights was agreed to but withMaulana a provision Azad that Library, these should Aligarh not come Muslim in the way University of land reforms or the State’s special powers to deal with the peculiar situations arising as a result of war. Government of India would have no objection to the inclusion of Fundamental Rights in the State Constitution itself if they did not conflict with those in the Constitution of India.

5. National Flag: The State was allowed to have its separate flag for historical and sentimental reasons but the National Flag would be supreme and have same status and position in the State as in the rest of India. It was decided that the Constituent Assembly would clear the position of National Flag in the State.

214 6. President of India: The power to reprieve and commute death sentences was vested in him.

7. Financial Integration: The principle of financial integration was agreed to but since this involved far-reaching consequences details would be worked out after careful and objective examination of the subject.

8. Emergency Powers: Kashmir delegation objected to the application of Article 352 which was related to the proclamation of emergency by the President of India on grounds of war, external aggression or internal disturbances. They were apprehensive that Article 352 might be applied even in case of a petty internal disorder. To allay their fears it was agreed that Article 352 would be applied subject to the provision that ‘but in regard to internal disturbances at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State’.

9. Residuary Powers: It was decided that the residuary powers will vest in the State itself as against the Centre in all other States. This position was compatible with the Article 370.

Addressing the Lok Sabha on 24th July, Nehru held that the relationship with Kashmir was fluid and it was necessary to arrive at certain common ground. He called the agreement satisfactory which was in consonance with both the wishes of the people of Kashmir as well as the Constitution of India.218 On 7th August 1952 there was a detailed debate in the Parliament on the Delhi Agreement.219 While most of the members supported the Agreement and held that it preserved the unity of India while at the same time fulfilling the aspirations of the people of Kashmir, there were some dissenting voices also, particularly belonging to the Right-wing parties. N. B. Khare of the Hindu Maulana Mahasabha Azadexpressed Library,that the Aligarh Agreement Muslim had not University only violated the Constitution of India but had also lowered the prestige of the President of India. He held that India had ‘gracefully abandoned herself into the loving arms of Kashmir’.220 Dr S. P. Mookerjee also criticized the Agreement as creating dual authority in the

218 The Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vol. I, No. 1, Part II, 24 July 1952, col. 4520. 219 The Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vol. I, No. 1, Part II, 7 August 1952, cols. 5775-5922. 220 Ibid., col. 5808. 215 country and neglecting the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Ladakh regions.221 Deploring Article 370, Delhi Agreement and a separate constitution for Jammu and Kashmir, Mookerjee held:

Sheikh Abdullah has secured the most unreasonable of his demands without conceding anything substantial...It has all along been a surrender of interests of India…It is repetition of the usual story of appeasement of Muslim intransigence and communal separatism. This is not likely to gain Kashmir for India but will certainly endanger the security and development of Jammu and Kashmir.222

In Kashmir valley, though the Agreement was sold as a victory of the people of the State, it met with severe criticism in Delhi and Jammu.223 Several newspapers like The Hindu and Amrita Bazar Patrika held that the Agreement was a complete surrender of Nehru before Sheikh Abdullah.224 Nehru defended the Agreement pointing out the peculiar conditions in the State which necessitated limited integration and posing full faith in Sheikh Abdullah.

Sheikh Abdullah hailed the agreement as an ‘important watershed in the formulation of our constitutional relations with the Indian Union’225 and held that it symbolized the ‘union of hearts which no power on earth could loosen’.226 There was, however, a delay in the implementation of the Agreement primarily because it was not clear whether the President would issue a single notification under Article 370 for all the points in the Agreement or a succession of orders dealing with the questions piecemeal as and when these were cleared by the Constituent Assembly of the State. Nehru was of the opinion that to avoid discordance or legal difficulty it was more prudent to issue a single notification. However, since the Constituent Assembly did not resolve all the issues at one time and instead proceeded piecemeal with more Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University stress on the application of the order concerning the Head of the State, Sheikh Abdullah was in favour of a succession of notifications.227 Nehru impressed upon

221 Ibid., cols, 5885-5899. 222 Organiser, Vol. 5, No. 51, 4 August 1953 quoted in Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952- 1980: History of Jana Sangh, Vol. 6, New Delhi, 2006, p. 145. 223 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, pp. 243-44. The Government publicized that the Agreement was a guarantor of Kashmir’s internal autonomy. A grand reception was organised for the Kashmir delegation on their return and a huge procession was carried from Batwara to Amira Kadal. 224 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 5/1/51-KP, NAI. 225 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 368. 226 Speech while addressing Congress MPs on 25 July 1952, SWJN, Vol. 19, p. 217. 227 Nehru’s Correspondence with Sheikh Abdullah, SWJN, Vol. 19, pp. 254-61. 216 Sheikh Abdullah the necessity of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly accepting the points of agreement to avoid any distrust.228 Consequently on 11th August 1952 Sheikh Abdullah spelt out the agreement of the State’s association with India in the Constituent Assembly. Celebrating the kinship of ideals between India and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah pleaded that the Agreement should not be appraised ‘academically’ but in the proper context of the State’s extraordinary circumstances. He also warned against the arbitrary alteration of State’s relationship with India and held that it would have serious consequences. Though each side had to make compromises, Sheikh said, his main consideration ‘was to secure a position for the State which would be consistent with the requirements of maximum autonomy for the local organs of State power…..while discharging obligations as a unit of the federation’.229 Having the points of agreement passed by the Assembly steps were taken to apply the most important part concerning the Head of the State. On 20th August 1952 the Assembly passed the resolution that the Head of the State, to be designated as Sadr-i-Riyasat would be elected by the Legislative Assembly of the State for a term of five years and he would be recognised by the President of the Indian Union.230 Regarding the choice for Sadr-i-Riyasat, Sheikh Abdullah had already signalled his preference for Yuvraj Karan Singh in his inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly by saying that he was ‘impressed by his intelligence, his board outlook and his keen desire to serve the country. These qualities of the Yuvraj single him out as a fit choice for the honour of being chosen the first Head of the State’.231 However, it was not only the good qualities in Karan Singh which made him the best choice for Sadr-i-Riyasat, the more important were the political implications of his election. The people of Jammu had felt disenchanted with the removal of Maharaja who construed his forced abdication as the beginning of unabated rule of Kashmiri Muslims. Under the present Kashmir Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Government they felt neglected as they alleged that they had not any say in the governance of the State. They had started a movement for the complete integration of the State with India under the banner of Praja Parishad. It was hoped that the ‘election’ of Karan Singh would be a ‘balancing and stabilizing factor’ and appease the people of Jammu.232 Moreover, it would keep the constitutional authority within

228 Ibid., pp. 310-312. 229 Times of India, 12 August 1952. 230 Kaul, Kashmir’s Constitutional Status, p. 54. 231 Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Official Report, p. 94. 232 Nehru’s Letter to Bakshi, 30 July 1952, SWJN, Vol. 19, p. 259. 217 the family of Maharaja which would avoid any legal discord regarding the issue of accession. The Kashmir Government was willing to recognise Karan Singh as a ‘fitting symbol’.233 However, Karan Singh was reluctant to accept the office of elected headship of the State. He was under tremendous pressure from the Dogras who did not want him to accept the office as he would become merely a rubber stamp and puppet of Sheikh Abdullah.234 Maharaja was also very furious and frequently wrote to the States Ministry that his rights should be safeguarded.235 This invited him a very sharp rebuke from Nehru. He criticised Maharaja’s approach as impractical and held that he did not come in the basic picture of the crisis of Kashmir. The only assurance, Nehru said, they could give him was that ‘the first place will be given always to the rights of the people and to the wishes of the people’.236 This persuaded Maharaja that his days were gone and he decided to abdicate in favour of his son on 16 September 1952. This lessened the burden of Karan Singh to a certain extent but his reservations did not end. He frequently wrote to Nehru about his difficulties in accepting the offer of Kashmir Government. He even suggested a referendum on whether the people wished a member of the Dogra dynasty to be the Head of the State or elect someone periodically.237 Nehru was surprised and held that it would be impossible from the local and international point of view and advised him to accept the arrangement without resorting to unwanted delays.238 Nehru also referred to some perplexity in dealing with Sheikh Abdullah and the indispensability of Karan Singh to be on the scene to help Indian Government.239

On 12 November 1952 the Constituent Assembly formally amended the Constitution of the State and replaced the Maharaja’s rulership with an elected Headship, designated as Sadr-i-Riyasat.240 On 15 November, Karan Singh was elected as the first Sadr-i-MaulanaRiyasat of the AzadState Library,for a period Aligarh of five years. MuslimHe was University administered the oath of

233 Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 223. 234 Singh, Heir Apparent, pp. 130-37. Sheikh Abdullah on his part also pressurised Karan Singh to accept the offer. In case of his refusal the Government had thought of making Sardar Budh Singh the Sadr-i-Riyasat. 235 SWJN, Vol. 18, p. 425. 236 Nehru’s Letter to Maharaja, 5 July 1952, SWJN, Vol. 18, p. 428. 237 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 138. 238 Nehru’s Letter to Karan Singh, 9 September 1952, SWJN, Vol. 19, pp. 337-40. 239 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 145. Nehru was apprehensive that Karan Singh’s non-acceptance would be injurious. It would ‘harm the cause of Kashmir generally and more especially the very Jammu Hindus whom he seeks to protect’, Nehru’s Letter to K. N. Katju, 9 November 1952, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 20, New Delhi, 1997, p. 397 240 Jammu and Kashmir Constitution (Amendment) Act 2009 (1952), Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Official Report, pp. 719-721. 218 office by Chief Justice Wazir Janki Nath on 17 November at the Rajgarh Palace in Srinagar.241 The President of India accepted the recommendations of the Legislative Assembly and recognised Yuvraj Karan Singh as the Sadr-i-Riyasat of the State.242 In view of the change effected by the application of Jammu and Kashmir Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2009 and the assumption of office by the Sadr-i-Riyasat, Sheikh Abdullah tendered his resignation along with his cabinet to Sadr-i-Riyasat who accepted the resignations. After Sheikh Abdullah was unanimously re-elected the Leader of the Parliamentary Party, the Sadr-i-Riyasat invited him to form the new government.243 The termination of the Dogra monarchy had tremendous psychological impact on the people of Kashmir. They could feel a sense of liberation after a century of oppression and deprivation. The hated Dogras were no more the masters of Kashmir. However, Prem Nath Bazaz criticised the Nationalist Government for following a policy of appeasement of ‘Hindu communalism and Dogra Nationalism’ and betraying the people of the State as the scion of the Dogra dynasty continued to hold office.244 While the Government was quick to implement the provisions regarding the Head of the State, it procrastinated implementation of other provisions. Sheikh Abdullah ‘used the Agreement to wring what he needed from Delhi and had no intention of honouring his side of the bargain.’245 The non-implementation created suspicion and resentment not only in Jammu but in the Government of India also which began to question the nationalism of Sheikh Abdullah. The trust deficit ultimately culminated in the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953, barely twelve months after the signing of the Delhi Agreement.

The Farce of Freedom: Government and the People’s Freedom

With the removal of Maharaja Hari Singh all the hindrances for Sheikh Abdullah’s Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Government were cleared and the ascendancy of National Conference confirmed in the State. Sheikh Abdullah had been blaming Maharaja for all the ills of the State and now he could implement his policies without any major obstacle. However, the Government was functioning in an emergency and tended to concentrate more powers in the hands of the ruling party which ultimately narrowed down to one individual and

241 Khalid, 15-18 November 1952. 242 Ministry of States, File No. 1(9)-K/52, NAI. 243 Election of Sadr-i-Riyasat for J & K State, Home Department, Register 7, Part III, Basta 43, JKA, Srinagar. 244 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 580. 245 Thomas, Faultline Kashmir, p. 214. 219 his group of confidants. With the concentration of power in the hands of the Government and with no real accountability, at least in the initial period, there were allegations of gross misuse of power and authority with little room for ‘internal dissent’.246 No difference was made between the Party and the Government and the administration became a handmaid of National Conference.247 It has been held that Sheikh Abdullah ruled the State as a ‘party-State fiefdom of the National Conference’.248 The Government believed in One Party, One Programme and One Leader. It did not tolerate the rise of any dissident voice against its policies and therefore a healthy opposition could not emerge in the State.249 Anyone who did not subscribe to the official ideology was targeted by the Government through its armed brigades-National Militia, Peace Brigade and Home Guards. It goes to the credit of Dogra State that despite being an undemocratic monarchy it allowed different political parties to exist and grow which professed anti-Dogra ideology. The National Conference Government came in the name of restoring the civil and political rights of the people but ended up suppressing them.250 Sheikh Abdullah had already depicted his intolerance during the days of his tussle with Muslim Conference. Contemporaries recall that after becoming the Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah developed dictatorial traits in his personality and an element of unusual egotism and self-conceit. He did not even like the genuine criticism of his policies.251 Those persons or parties who did not subscribe to his ideology regarding accession to India were targeted and suppressed.252 On the eve of Partition a number of political parties functioned in the State. After the National Conference came to power, no other political party was allowed to function. Thousands of workers belonging to the parties other than National Conference were detained in different jails of the State. In jails they were treated like ordinary criminals and subjected to different kinds of tortures. Beating of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University political opponents, applying of hot iron to their bare skins, blackening of faces with

246 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, Cambridge, 2008, p. 33. 247 In the absence of any legislature, General Council of the National Conference used to perform the functions of the Legislative Assembly and Ministers were answerable to it. It had been decided that the General Council would meet twice a year and seek answers from the Ministers regarding State administration, Statesman, 29 September, 1949. 248 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, p. 46. 249 Balraj Puri, ‘Back to Future’, Times of India, 19 October 2009. 250 Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 313. 251 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, pp. 237-41. 252 Prem Nath Bazaz, ‘Truth About Kashmir’, Pakistan Times, 22 October 1950. 220 mud and cow dung and other methods of inhuman torture were applied to them.253 A Special Staff was created under a Police Officer, Ghulam Qadir Ganderbali to keep a vigil on the people and suppress the critics of the State.254 His name sent shivers down the spine of people as he became notorious for his methods of torture and suppression which included throwing hot potatoes into the mouth of his opponents and branding them with hot irons.255 There were hundreds of public complaints against him but Sheikh Abdullah turned a deaf ear towards them.256 R C Kak, the ex-Prime Minister of the State who had displayed his opposition to the accession of the State to India in 1947 was publicly accused of having Pakistani leanings and arrested. Trial was started against him in April 1948 and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment and a fine of Rs 10,000.257 However, on the intervention of Nehru he was externed from the State as his presence was deemed to be ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and tranquillity’.258 Prem Nath Bazaz, a vocal critique of National Conference was detained in November 1947 for ‘welcoming the tribals’. He filed a Habeas Corpus petition in the High Court and after many months was released and externed in August 1950.259 Muslim Conference had particularly to bear the brunt of official repression. Its leaders and supporters were hounded and arrested.260 Those whom Sheikh Abdulla was afraid of being a challenge to his popularity were detained and banished to Azad Kashmir. These included Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, Maulvi Abdur Rahim, Maulvi Noor-ud-din and others.261 Muslim Conference localities were kept under strict supervision and any voice raised against National Conference was ruthlessly suppressed.262

To counter the pro-Pakistan sentiments in the State Enemy Agents Ordinance was promulgated which provided for the trial and punishment of ‘Enemy Agents’, defined as the personsMaulanawho acted onAzad instructions Library, received Aligarh from theMuslim enemy. UniversityThe Act provided

253 Kashmir Democratic Union, Does India Defend Freedom or Fascism in Kashmir, Delhi, 1952, p. 9, Accession No. 36315, NMML. 254 Altaf Hussain Para, The Making of Modern Kashmir: Sheikh Abdullah and the Politics of the State, London and New York, 2019, p. 163. 255 Qasim, My Life and Times, p. 82. 256 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 241. 257 Ministry of States, File No. 19 (11)-K/52. 258 Ibid. 259 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 11/5/50-KP, NAI. 260 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 192. 261 Butt, Kashmir in Flames, pp. 46-47. 262 For details refer to Chapter 2 of the Thesis, pp. 8-9. 221 for death sentence and rigorous imprisonment for life for the enemy agents.263 Listening to Radio Pakistan was banned and anyone accused of the same was arrested along with the radio set under the said Ordinance.264 The Government also banned the import of Khewra salt into the State to stop the propaganda by Pakistan that Kashmir was dependent on Pakistani salt. That the Ordinance was grossly misused by the authorities is evident from the fact that the mere presence of Pakistani rock salt or a letter from a relative in Pakistan was the sufficient ground to be arrested.265 Movement of the people within and outside the State was also controlled in the name of maintaining law and order. Under the Egress and Internal Movement (Control) Ordinance, 2005, persons in the State were not allowed to proceed to a destination outside the State.266 Notwithstanding the criticism against the National Conference Government it might be argued that given the war-like conditions in the State and the political uncertainty regarding the future, the Government was keen to win support for its decision regarding Accession to India. If the pro-Pakistan or anti-India parties were allowed to function freely in the State, it might have jeopardized the Government and created more political instability in the State. However, the Government went too far in this regard and did not allow any opposition, pro-India that might be, to function which not only discredited the Government but also created space for the emergence of reactionary and essentially communal organisations in the State.267

Naya Kashmir Plan had envisaged the freedom of speech, press, assembly and meetings and freedom of street processions and demonstrations.268 In brazen violation of its own promises, National Conference suppressed the civil liberties and human rights of the majority of the population. Freedom of opinion or association was non- existent except for the members of National Conference.269 The Government made no secret Maulanaabout its policy Azad of suppressionLibrary, Aligarh of civil liberties. Muslim When University Mirza Afzal Beg, the Revenue Minister was asked about providing liberties to the people, he rejected the demand holding that the majority of the people in the State were uneducated and it

263 Ordinance No. VIII (Enemy Agents Ordinance) of 2005, The Jammu and Kashmir Gazette, 12th Magh 2005 (25 January 1949). 264 Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 415. 265 Qayoom, Kashmir ka Siyasi Inqilab, Vo. III, pp. 77-80. 266 Ordinance No. V of 2005, The Jammu and Kashmir Gazette, 12th Magh 2005. 267 Cf. pp. 20-3. 268 New Kashmir, p. 13. 269 Kashmir Democratic Union, Voice of Suppressed Kashmir, Delhi, pp. 10-12, Accession No. 56220, NMML. 222 was not feasible to grant them the rights until they were not sure that these won’t be used for anti-State activities.270 Dark laws like Defence of India Rules and Public Security Act, 2003 which were enacted during the Dogra regime to prevent the free expression of public opinion and under which National Conference leaders themselves had been detained, continued to be in vogue. Under the Acts, suspected persons could be detained and arrested without any warrant.271 Arbitrary arrests and detentions were a common sight which were easily justified by the Government in the name of anti-State and anti-national activities. Krishan Dev Sethi, a member of the Constituent Assembly mentions that unnamed arrest warrant order copies signed by the Magistrates used to lie in the pockets of the National Conference workers who arrested any person they liked.272 A question was put forward by R. L. Malviya in the Constituent Assembly of India as to whether it was true that a large number of people in Kashmir were being kept in detention without trial for non-violent activities. However, the question was not allowed citing the reason that it would be embarrassing to answer the question.273 Statesman of Calcutta commented that there were signs of the establishment of a Police State as there were ‘futile notices in restaurants forbidding political conversations when everybody talks politics; more 'Public Safety' prisoners than are healthy’.274 Sanaullah Bhat laments:

Those who fought for twenty years against injustice, oppression and undemocratic style of administration imposed by Dogra rule, the very people, after having gained power, did not hesitate in suppressing with heavy hand any voice that was raised against their misdeeds.275

With regard to the freedom of press it has been alleged that it was practically non- existent. Before 1947 more than 50 newspapers were published from Jammu and Srinagar. NationalMaulana Conference Azad had Library, been a strong Aligarh advocate Muslim of the University freedom of press right from its inception and it was hoped that it would usher a new phase of press freedom. However, after coming to power the National Conference Government muzzled the voice of press. Newspapers critical of the Government were stopped by

270 A Reply to Critics: Text of the Speech of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Prime Minister, Jammu and Kashmir in the State Assembly on 5 March 1955, Kashmir Today Series-I, Accession No. 547/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 271 Ministry of States, File No. 1(18)-K/49, NAI. 272 Sethi, Yaad-i-Rafta, Delhi, 1986, p. 57. 273 Ministry of States, File No. 15 (23)-K/49, NAI 274 Statesman, 1 March 1949. 275 Butt, Kashmir in Flames, p. 49. 223 high-handed methods of pre-censorship or forced to suspend publication by underhand means.276 No less than 35 newspapers were banned in the State.277 Official advertisements were only given to the newspapers supporting the policies of the Government. If any newspaper did not agree with the policies of the Government, it was dubbed as pro-Pakistan and Fifth Columnist. This curtailed the scope of even healthy criticism. Khalid wrote in an editorial that keeping in view the history of National Conference, press was very optimistic that the Press Act would be amended giving more freedom to the newspapers. But the way National Conference had conducted itself, it held, not only had the Government policy been a continuation of the Dogra regime but even worse than that.278 Kashmir Journalists Association submitted a memorandum to the Government demanding freedom to a healthy criticism and freedom from being called ‘enemy agents’.279 The Government also banned the entry of all newspapers from Pakistan as well as the newspapers of communal organisations like Milap, Pratap, Organiser, Hind Samachar and the Daily Prabhat.280

The conduct of the first ‘Popular Government’ vis-à-vis the granting of democratic rights and intolerance of dissent was unconstitutional and set a bad precedent for future. The Government of India was aware of the subversion of democratic rights in Kashmir but it maintained silence. The freedom and liberty of the people as well as the right to a democratic opposition was sacrificed at the altar of national interests–not to annoy Sheikh Abdullah too much as the same might minimise chances of India in Kashmir. As long as the Government was pro-India, the divergences from the democratic and constitutional traditions were tolerated, apparently because the measures were believed to strengthen Indian support in Kashmir. Nehru confessed to Patel thMaulanaat in dealing Azad with Library, the situation Aligarh in Kashmir, Muslim rules University and regulations were not always followed by Bakshi.281 It was only when Sheikh Abdullah directed his tirade against India and questioned the State’s Accession that Nehru held that the conduct of the Government had been undemocratic. It was then argued as a justification for the

276 Does India Defend Freedom or Fascism in Kashmir, p. 5 277 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 15/1/53-KP, NAI. 278 Khalid, 29 September 1952 279 Ibid. 280 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 15/1/53-KP, NAI. 281 SWJN, Vol. 6, p. 196. 224 unconstitutional dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah.282 In terms of civil liberties and human rights, therefore, the National Conference Government proved to be more a continuity than change. The freedom, in this particular aspect, promised to the people turned out to be a farce. The contrast between the expectations and the actual performance of the Government has been depicted by Mahjoor in one of his poems, O Golden Oriole:283

O golden oriole, winter's gone, Gay spring has come again! Step out and feast your weary eyes On the myriad flowers abloom.

Born in a cage where the candle Of your life has guttered low, Shed your fear, and spreading wings, Learn flight in God's free air.

Flowering plants have spread their arms; Perch on the bough your fancy takes; But with an alien as your gardener, This freedom won't remain. Know how precious midsummer is; Don't let your youth run waste! Pour the wine of universal love, For all men are friends, not foes.

Goodness does not discriminate Between the high and the low; There's no greatness in lavishing bounty On one's own kin alone.

Strength lies not in severe reprisals Nor in cruel revenge; You can win over bitterest foes With the force of love alone.

Hawks have left your garden, Maulana AzadAnd Library, birds are all Aligarh in song - Muslim University But if you yourself turn a hawk, How futile was this change!

Naive indeed is your faith to see As saviours and redeemers Interloping birds that burn With envy of your lot.

282 Cf. Chapter 5 of the Thesis, pp. 71-2. 283 Raina, An Anthology of Modern Kashmiri Verse (1930-1960), pp. 79-81. 225 The earthworm knows how the hoopoe bites - Not others unaffected - This grand high-turbaned bird who has A retinue of hawks and crows.

The Wular Lake is still in flood, The North Wind howling strong; The shore is far away, and you Must steer your course with care.

Mahjoor has always sung love songs In freedom in his garden. 'This is no way', the new bulbuls say, 'He must enter a cage!'

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

226 CHAPTER 5

Opposition to National Conference Government and the Dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah

The accession of the State to India in October 1947 created peculiar circumstances which demanded changes in the basic political structure of the State. Maharaja reluctantly invited Sheikh Abdullah to function as the Emergency Administrator of the State who after a few months also became his Prime Minister.1 The accession crisis and the consequent internationalization of the Kashmir Dispute as a result of India’s complaint in the Security Council put the entire limelight on Kashmir. Indeed, it was the valley of Kashmir which was prized bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Jammu found scant references, most often in connection with the massacre of Muslims. Maharaja had formed a vital link between the provinces of Kashmir and Jammu. With his ouster from real power, the vital link broke which adversely affected the relations between the two provinces. Maharaja was forced to leave the State and transfer full power to Sheikh Abdullah. Maharaja’s abdication in favour of his son, Karan Singh created resentment among the people of Jammu, particularly Dogras who construed the move as an attack on their pride.2 In the changed circumstances, many representations were sent to the President and requesting them to ensure the return of Maharaja to the State. For example, on 30 August 1950 Shri Amar Kshatriya Prautik Sabha, claiming to contain representations from sixteen villages of Jammu sent a memorandum to the President urging him to use his good offices for Maharaja’s return.3 On 3 December 1950 Provincial Agriculturists Association, Jammu impressed upon the President the necessity of Maharaja’s return to the MaulanaState. It held Azad that the Library, people of AligarhJammu resented Muslim his abdication University which meant an unabated ‘Muslim rule’.4 However, not all the people favoured the Maharaja unconditionally. Even before Sheikh Abdullah had formally demanded the abdication of Maharaja, All Jammu National Youth Conference comprising of Dogra young men from Jammu demanded complete abolition of monarchy and the transfer of power to

1 Discussed earlier in Chapter 2, pp. 3-5 and pp. 18-23. 2 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 29. 3 Ministry of States, File No., 1(31)-K/50, NAI. 4 Ibid. 227 the people of Jammu.5 National Conference in March 1948 demanded abdication of Maharaja and sought amendment in Naya Kashmir manifesto regarding deletion of the provision of constitutional ruler for the State.6

Opposition in Jammu-Emergence of Praja Parishad Party

It has been held that the transfer of power from Jammu-based Maharaja to Kashmir- based leadership created Hindu-Muslim dichotomy. According to this view, Hindu- Muslim hiatus embittered the relations between the two regions and created a psychological vacuum in Jammu.7 The new dispensation failed to win the confidence of the people of Jammu who began to feel discriminated and alienated from the corridors of power. As a result of the Maharaja’s ouster from the State and the consequent vacuum in Jammu, no alternative arrangement at filling the vacuum was made. There was no political organisation worth the name in Jammu. Dogra Sabha functioned more as a socio-cultural organisation and took least interest in political affairs.8 Rajya Hindu Sabha was a political party but it functioned as a coterie of Maharaja. It comprised of Maharaja’s henchmen and royal officials and had no real presence among the common masses.9 National Conference also could not extend its influence to the Jammu region possibly because of its pro-Kashmir stance and commitment to an anti-Dogra ideology. After Maharaja’s abdication an opportunity was created for National Conference to fill the vacuum and win the trust and confidence of the people of Jammu. But it failed to stabilise itself owing to repeated and arbitrary changes in the functionaries of the local committees of the Conference in the absence of trust in them. No regular elections were allowed to be held in the Jammu National Conference and the ad-hoc committees succeeded one after the other which prevented the emergence of a stable leadership.10 The fact that all of its Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University important office-bearers-president, vice-president, general secretary and treasurer belonged to the Valley, it was very unlikely that it could strengthen its organisational

5 Balraj Puri, Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation, New Delhi, 1981, p. 87. 6 Ranbir, 13 March 1948. 7 Balraj Puri, Kashmir Towards Insurgency, New Delhi, 1993, p. 27. 8 Balraj Madhok, Kashmir: The Storm Centre of the World, Texas, 1992, p. 25. e-book accessed at www.ikashmir.net, 9 Balraj Puri, ‘The Question of Accession’, Epilogue, Vol. 4, No. 11, November 2010, pp. 4-6. 10 Gurcharan Singh Bhatia, ‘Sheikh Abdullah and Praja Parishad: Striking Similarities in Approach’, Kashmir Affairs, No. 3, January to February 1960, p. 20. 228 base and attain popularity among the people of Jammu.11 Whatever representation was given to Jammu in the Working Committee it was monopolised either by the communists or the Government supporters. The sense of deprivation as a result of negligible share in political power and the failure of democratic-secular parties to make political inroads created sufficient space for reactionary and communal parties to nurture their existence. One such party was All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad. It was founded in November 1947 soon after the tribal invasion of the State and claimed to represent the Hindus of Jammu. A key role in its formation was played by Balraj Madhok and Prem Nath Dogra. The latter was the first Sangh chalak in the State and continued to be so till the RSS was declared illegal in the State by Sheikh Abdullah’s Government on account of its active role in the massacre of Muslims in Jammu.12 He was a Samyalpuri Brahman who were known for their loyalty to the Maharaja. The Praja Parishad was established under the direct influence of Maharaja to fight the democratic movement of Kashmir and its influence on Jammu.13 As per Balraj Madhok, who provided ideological strength to it, the objective of Praja Parishad was ‘to achieve full integration of Jammu and Kashmir State with the rest of India like other acceding States and safeguard the legitimate democratic rights of the people of Jammu from the Communist-dominated anti-Dogra Government of Sheikh Abdullah’.14 The Parishad remained true to its avowed objectives and left no stone unturned to disrupt Sheikh Abdullah’s Government. It emerged as a ‘rallying forum of regional discontent which was a coalition of hurt regional pride, protest against arbitrary rule, a sense of insecurity about the future of the State, vested interests and communal sentiments’.15 Sheikh Abdullah’s Government undertook a number of measures which were not only were regarded as sidelining of Jammu but also raised apprehensions among the Hindus that the Government was working to ‘Islamicize’ Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University the administration. Hindu-majority Udhampur district was broken to form a Muslim- majority district of Doda which ‘formed a wedge between the Buddhist Ladakh and

11 Balraj Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, New Delhi, 2008, p. 29. 12 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-80: History of Jana Sangh, Vol. 6, New Delhi, 2006, p. 169. 13 Letter by an unknown person in Jammu to S. Khushwant Singh, Bar-at-law, New Delhi, Caught in Censorship, Reports about Praja Parishad and other Parties, Ministry of States, File No., 8(3)-K/53, NAI. 14 Balraj Madhok, Kashmir: Centre of New Alignments, New Delhi, 1963, p. 38. Emphasis mine. 15 Puri, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 96. 229 Hindu Jammu’.16 Research Department had been closed down and Urdu was made compulsory throughout the State though it was not the mother tongue of any part of the State.17 With the merger of State Forces’ with the Indian Army, a large number of the personnel from Jammu were thrown out of their jobs. The Army Fund of the State which disbursed annual funds to the families of the Forces’ personnel was suddenly stopped. Further, their pension scale was half of the Indian Army scale.18 These discontented persons became an easy target of the Parishad propaganda which fully exploited the apprehensions and raised the cry of Jammu in danger and Hindus in danger.

The leadership of the Parishad was provided by landlords, moneylenders, wealthy officials and businessmen who were the active supporters of Maharaja.19 Most of them had been affiliated with the RSS and alleged to have been involved in communal activities. Indeed the Parishad had been formed by some dissident RSS workers led by Mr. Hans Raj.20 When Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated in 1948 members of the RSS in Jammu openly celebrated the event and distributed sweets among its members.21 With the subsequent ban on RSS its leaders and cadres swelled the ranks of Praja Parishad. Parishad started its campaign in February 1949 with the publication of posters highlighting the sacrifices of its members in repulsing the tribal invasion.22 It started a vilification campaign against Sheikh Abdullah for being a ‘communalist’ and neglecting the interests of Dogra Hindus.23 They buttressed Sheikh Abdullah’s image as a fundamentalist anti-Hindu Kashmiri Muslim and did not acknowledge his role in the accession of Muslim-majority Kashmir to India. For them it was the ‘Hindu Maharaja’ and ‘Hindu Jammu’ that mattered. No wonder then, the Parishad leaders vehemently opposed Maharaja’s abdication and posed their full faith in him. They protestedMaulana against theAzad ill treatmentLibrary, metedAligarh out Muslim to him by University the Nationalist Government and resolved that in order to ensure the unity of different regions and to

16 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Kashmir Problem and Jammu Satyagrah: An Objective Study, Delhi, n.d., Accession No. 15386, NMML. 17 Ibid. 18 Surjeet Singh, Kashmir and Its Future, n. d., p. 27, Accession No. 102145, NMML. 19 Sethi, Yaad-i-Rafta, p. 65. 20 Balraj Puri, ‘Sangh’s Influence on India’s Kashmir Policy’, Kashmir Affairs, No. 3, January to February 1960, p. 26. 21 Sheikh Abdullah’s Statement to Ansari-November 1949, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, File No. 421/1948-KP, NAI. 22 Rashid Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, 1949-53, Vol. IV, Srinagar, 1993, pp. 42-3. 23 Ibid. 230 maintain the integrity of the State, the retention of Maharaja as the constitutional ruler of the State was ‘essential and eminently desirable’.24 To strengthen its membership, the Parishad consistently exploited the name of Maharaja as the same not only won it support of the pro-Maharaja people but also gave it a legitimacy to function. Maharani Tara Devi herself directed the membership campaign of the Parishad and it was held that if the people of Jammu did not unite under the banner of Praja Parishad they would continue to suffer under the anti-Dogra rule of Sheikh Abdullah who wanted to dethrone Hari Singh and himself become the Maharaja.25 Maharaja fell for the false propaganda carried out by Parishad in his name and began to support it. Intelligence reports pointed out that the Maharaja financed the Parishad and misused the Dharmarth funds to carry out propaganda in his favour.26

Praja Parishad voiced its opposition against the land reform measures undertaken by the Nationalist Government. Since the party was composed of landlords and depended on them for financial support, it was unlikely that the programme of the abolition of landlordism would be acceptable to them. However, they did not openly oppose the reforms lest they should be dubbed as reactionaries and anti-peasants. While agreeing in principle with the policy of Land to the Tiller, it did not endorse the mechanism of the implementation of the law. It criticised the expropriation of landlords without compensation as ‘inhuman’ and unconstitutional and held that they should be provided adequate means to earn their livelihood.27 It stood for proper planning and fixing the economic unit according to the productive capacity of the land. Lands held by religious institutions and trusts should be exempted from expropriation.28 When Sheikh Abdullah’s Government refused to entertain their pleas and went ahead with the reforms without compensating the landlords, Praja Parishad dubbed the reforms as communalMaulana as most Azad of the Library,landlords Aligarh were Hindus, Muslim notwithstanding University the fact that 2,50,000 Dalits of the Jammu province acquired land as a result of the expropriation.29 They approached Sardar Patel for intervention who advised the Kashmir Government not to push on with the measure as non-payment of compensation was contrary to the

24 Resolutions adopted by Praja Parishad on 10th and 11th November 1951, Reports regarding Praja Parishad, Ministry of States, File No. 8(8)-K/51, NAI. 25 Tribune, 12 May 1949. 26 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 262. 27 Resolutions adopted by Praja Parishad on 10th and 11th November 1951, Reports regarding Praja Parishad, Ministry of States, File No. 8(8)-K/51, NAI. 28 All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad, Programme, Jammu, Accession No. 5226, NMML. 29 Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, p. 161. 231 stand taken by the Government of India.30 One major grievance of Parishad was the alleged step-motherly treatment to the Jammu province and the dominance of Kashmiri Muslims and under-representation of Hindus in the Government jobs.31 However, the statistics published by the Government do not indicate any discrimination on the grounds of religion. Hindus continued to dominate the Government service sector and held more posts, both gazetted and non-gazetted, than their proportion in the population:

Table 5.1: Representation of different communities in Government Services

Gazetted Non-Gazetted Menials Muslims 163 4943 2090 Hindus 361 9281 2156 Sikhs 23 769 268 Others 11 436 155 Source: Hakim Parshuram Nagar, Is Abdullah Government Anti-Hindu, Jammu, p. 2, Accession No. 55912, NMML. Further, most important posts were held by the Hindus which included Chief Justice, Principal Secretary, Chief Engineer (Electrical and Mechanical), Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Home Secretary, Director of Industries, Chief Conservator of forests, Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Director Public Health and Veterinary besides many Secretaries and Special Secretaries.32 Jammu Hindus also held 11 out of 18 inter-Provincial posts while the posts held by Kashmiris in Jammu were only three.33 The alleged differential treatment to Jammu Province also does not hold ground as it received more allocations in the State Budget compared to the Kashmir Province.34 However, Parishad alleged that the Government did not publishMaulana the comparative Azad figuresLibrary, of employment Aligarh Muslim in pre and University post 26 October 1947 as it had removed old and experienced non-Muslims from various branches of administration and replaced them with Muslims. The list of 22 non-Muslims holding key posts had all been appointed during the Dogra period and Kashmir Government, it

30 Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Document 143, pp. 182-83. 31 Resolutions adopted by Praja Parishad on 10th and 11th November 1951, Reports regarding Praja Parishad, Ministry of States, File No. 8(8)-K/51, NAI. 32 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., pp. 5-9. 232 argued, should not take credit for that.35 The Government’s claim that Jammu got more allocations in the State budget could not be justified as out of about 33 heads in the annual budget, only 8 were mentioned. In the more important items of expenditure like education, forests, health and industries, Kashmir got a lion’s share while Jammu was neglected.36

The politics of Praja Parishad was based on the apprehensions of Kashmiri Muslim domination and the resultant sidelining of the interests of the Hindus of Jammu. It believed that the secularism of Sheikh Abdullah was only a camouflage and his loyalty to India was questionable. It was sure that the Muslims of Kashmir would never vote for India in the proposed plebiscite as they would throw their lot with their co-religionists of Pakistan. These fears were buttressed by the propaganda carried out by Pakistan as well as the comments of the foreign journalists on Kashmir.37 Many Indian leaders who visited Kashmir during the period also were doubtful about possibility of India’s chances in Kashmir. In February 1949 Mihir Lal Chattopadhyay and Raghu Vira, members of the Indian Constituent Assembly visited Jammu and held deliberations with the people. In their reports submitted to the Government of India they talked about the step-motherly treatment meted out to the Hindus of Jammu and recommended the appointment of a Commission to look into their grievances.38 Mihir Lal levied pointed out cases of corruption and maltreatment of Hindus against the Kashmir Government and held that the Hindus believed that 90 percent of the Muslims would vote for Pakistan in a plebiscite.39 Another member of the Constituent Assembly, Shibbanlal Saxena also painted a very grim picture of Kashmir after his visit in mid-1949. He wrote to Patel that it was ‘midsummer madness’ to believe that India would win the plebiscite in Kashmir and held that no doubt Sheikh Abdullah Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 35 Hori Lal Saxena, The Iron Curtain in Kashmir, New Delhi, 1949, pp. 17-19, Accession No. 56341, NMML. 36 Ibid., p. 22. 37 Most of the comments in foreign press about Kashmir were favourable to Pakistan. These held that since Kashmir was a Muslim-majority State it would vote for Pakistan in the proposed plebiscite as the religious emotions would hold sway. Refer to Chapter 2 of the thesis, pp. 30-1. 38 Sheikh Abdullah had already expressed his dissent at the ‘unauthorized’ arrival of the members who, he believed, tried to fan communal sentiments in Jammu by meeting the communal leaders and trying to organise a public meeting at the behest of Praja Parishad. The members were accompanied by Kaviraj Vishnu Gupta against whom a warrant of arrest was pending in the State for his role in the communal activities, Sheikh’s Letter to Nehru, 16 February 1949, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 10, New Delhi, 1990, p. 233fn. Nehru rejected the appointment of any commission as he believed that the Hindus of Jammu had a bad record for communalism and ‘had lost touch with the reality’, Nehru’s Letter to Raghu Vira, 24 February 1949, SWJN, Vol. 10, p. 234. 39 Saxena, The Iron Curtain in Kashmir, p. 1. 233 had influence over the Muslim masses but ‘just as in spite of Gandhiji’s and Jawaharlalji’s advocacy of Hindustani, the masses would vote for Hindi, so nobody can hope to win the plebiscite in Kashmir’.40 Such reports and assessments increased the fear psychosis among the people of Jammu. They were afraid that in case of the plebiscite for the entire State Jammu would go to Pakistan which was unacceptable to them. When Sir Owen Dixon came to Kashmir with his scheme of the division of the State and a plebiscite for the Kashmir valley only, Praja Parishad raised the slogan of zonal plebiscite. Balraj Madhok, the main ideologue of the Parishad held that Dixon’s proposals were eminently reasonable as he ‘made some practical suggestions about the solution of the problem in the light of the actual realities’.41 Parishad, therefore, became an ardent protagonist of the partition of the State on the basis of zonal plebiscite and the integration of Jammu and Ladakh with India. Zonal plebiscite would allow them, and not the pro-Pakistan Kashmiri Muslims, to decide the fate of their region. Curiously enough, the Communists under Comrade Dhanwantri supported the Parishad demand of separate Jammu and formed Democratic Youth League to boost up opposition against Sheikh Abdullah.42 The campaign created serious disturbances in the State and led to law and order problems. The Government moved swiftly and arrested many Parishad leaders including its seventy-year-old president, Prem Nath Dogra under section 3 of the Public Security Act.43 The arrest of the leaders put brakes on the agitation to a certain extent. The Parishad sought Patel’s intervention to get the leaders released as it had ‘created alarming situation throughout the State’ with people expressing their resentment through hartals and demonstrations.44 Ayyangar tried to impress upon the Kashmir Government to release the prisoners in order to diffuse the situation. But the Government refused to treat the

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

40 Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 231, p. 286. 41 Madhok, Kashmir: Centre of New Alignments, pp. 115-17. It is significant that the Parishad’s agitations against the Government and its demand for the partition of the State coincided with the arrival of UN representatives to Kashmir or with their submission of reports to the Security Council, Surjeet, Kashmir and its Future, p. 26. 42 Jagan Nath Sathu, Red Menace in Kashmir, New Delhi, n. d., p. 7, Accession No. 56249, NMML. 43 Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, p. 195. 44 Parishad’s Telegram to Patel, 15 February 1949, Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 259-60. Patel was indignant at the action of the Government in arresting some ‘non-Muslims’ and expressed that the Kashmir Government was behaving like an independent State as if the Government of India had abdicated their functions, Letter to Ayyangar, 17 February 1949, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. I, Document 206, p. 259. 234 Parishad prisoners separately when hundreds of pro-Pakistan supporters in the State had been detained in different jails of Jammu.45

On 23 June 1949, the Parishad launched a satyagrah demanding provincial autonomy for Jammu within the State, handing over of the State’s administration to the States Ministry and the release of political prisoners.46 The reasons it gave for launching the satyagrah were that all the constitutional means to get the grievances redressed had not borne fruit and there was no end to the ‘vindictive and insulting attitude and the demoralising policy of the State Government towards the people of Jammu’.47 The Parishad received support from some reactionary organisations of Delhi and East Punjab which sent its volunteers to court arrests at Delhi, Amritsar, Jalandhar and Gurdaspur. 48 The agitation continued for many months and hundreds of Parishad supporters, including many women were arrested by the Government.49 Kashmir Government was under tremendous pressure to reconcile with the Parishad. However, Nehru gave his all-out support to the Kashmir Government in dealing with the Parishad agitation. He was opposed to the idea of zonal plebiscite and held that such kind of propaganda was harmful for India as Jammu province was not running away from India in any way. The real prize, he believed, they were fighting for was the valley of Kashmir.50 Nehru was ‘astonished’ at the folly of an ‘exceedingly irresponsible satyagrah’ which was playing into the hands of Pakistan.51 However, simultaneously Nehru advised Sheikh Abdullah to tone down the repressive activities of the Government and release the prisoners which included a large number of women.52 The Government took certain steps against the Parishad agitation which compelled it to search for a dignified exit. Its president Lala Roopchand Nanda was prosecuted and awarded a sentence of 13 months and Rs 500 as fine.53 He submitted a writtenMaulana apology to Azadthe Government Library, and Aligarh held that Muslimthe agitation University was a result of the false propaganda carried within and outside the State by anti-national elements. He stressed

45 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. IV, pp. 43-44. 46 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 12, New Delhi, 1991, p. 354 fn. 47 Saxena, The Iron Curtain, p. 5. 48 Nehru’s Letter to Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad, 14 August 1949, SWJN, Vol. 12, p. 358. 49 Saxena, The Iron Curtain, p. 6. 50 Nehru’s Letter to Patel, 17 April 1949, SWJN, Vol. 10, pp. 238-39. 51 Letter to Bhimsen Sachar, 5 August 1949, SWJN, Vol. 12, pp. 357-58. Nehru requested Bhimsen to take effective steps to stop the propaganda carried out in the towns of Punjab in favour of Praja Parishad. 52 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 17 August 1949, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 13, New Delhi, 1992, p. 211. 53 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, pp. 47-8. 235 on the need for a united effort to solve the problems of the State.54 In October 1949 the Parishad called off the agitation unconditionally and its leaders were released at the intervention of Pandit Mauli Chander Sharma, one of the influential RSS leaders.55 It is instructive to note that the Parishad agitations synchronised with the arrival of UN Missions to Kashmir. For example, when Dixon and Graham arrived in the State as Mediators of the UN in Kashmir, Parishad started its Satyagrah against the Government. This apparent coincidence was possibly to create the impression that Sheikh Abdullah did not represent the people of Jammu.56

When the Government’s announced elections for the Constituent Assembly in the State, Praja Parishad decided to contest. It decided to field its candidates for twenty eight of thirty seats in the Jammu region although its popularity was limited to a few parts.57 However, Parishad alleged that the Government adopted all means, fair and foul, to prevent its candidates from entering the Constituent Assembly. Prem Nath Dogra, the president of the Parishad addressed a press conference in New Delhi on 6 October 1951 and made accusations of the highest order against the Kashmir Government regarding irregularities in the elections and the misuse of official machinery. He alleged that while nomination papers were being filed in Kashmir final voter lists were still not available in the Jammu province.58 Second allegation was that it was only after National Conference was assured of forty four ‘unopposed’ seats in Kashmir that the dates for nomination in Jammu province were announced, with the ‘deliberate intention of influencing the elections’ there.59 It was further alleged that no representation was given to the Parishad in the Delimitation Committee which so fixed the constituencies that all the strongholds of the Parishad were broken up into fragments while the principles of contiguity and compactness were thrown to the wind to benefit the Maulana ruling party. Azad60 The Library, most ‘atrocious’ Aligarh attem Muslimpt against University the Parishad was made by rejecting 41 out of the 65 nominations filed by it for 27 seats ‘on the most flimsy grounds’ while not a single nomination paper of any National Conference

54 Ibid. 55 Balraj Puri, Jammu: A Clue to Kashmir Tangle, Delhi, 1966, p. 34. 56 Intelligence Report regarding Praja Parishad Party, Ministry of States, Kashmir Section, File No. 8(3)-K/53, NAI, New Delhi. 57 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, pp. 55-6 58 All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad Working Committee, Praja Parishad Stand Explained, Jammu, n. d., pp. 4-5, Accession No. 56280, NMML. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., p. 5. 236 candidate was rejected, though a number of objections had been filed by the Parishad. In many cases the nominations were rejected on the ground that the proposers and seconders of the candidates were not able to produce State Subject certificates.61 Parishad demanded a judicial enquiry into the rejection of the nomination papers of its candidates and held that the elections be held under the supervision of a Supreme Court Judge to ensure fair play and impartiality.62 When its demands were not met, it decided to boycott elections. Having been denied the possibility of joining the Constituent Assembly which it construed as its ‘political murder’, the Parishad again trained its guns at the Kashmir Government and launched a serious propaganda. It now focussed on the question of accession and held that it was a fait accompli and its legality and validity was beyond question. Any attempt to bring in any limitation in it ‘would not be tolerated’ as it held that it would be detrimental to the interests of the people and.63 The viewpoint was a clear opposite to the National Conference stand which believed that the accession had to be ratified by the people. While delineating on the broad objectives of the Constituent Assembly Sheikh Abdullah had held that the Assembly would give its full consideration to the three alternatives regarding the future of the State-India, Pakistan or Independence and would declare its ‘reasoned conclusion regarding accession’.64 Therefore, the clash between the Parishad and National Conference was inevitable. The Parishad also opposed the framing of a separate constitution for the State. It demanded abrogation of Article 370 and the fuller application of the Indian Constitution to the State as had been applied to other Part B States.65 By taking up the issue of accession and application of Indian Constitution to the State without any reservations, the Parishad sought to extend its influence beyond the borders of the State. They hoped that these slogans would make Parishad look more pro-Indian and give it legitimacy to operate in the Indian political Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University system as supporting these demands would be akin to the furtherance of national interests. However, Nehru was very critical of the Parishad’s politics and believed that it was negating all the good work they had done in Kashmir. Kashmir was passing through a crisis and to make these demands was ‘peculiarly irresponsible and utterly

61 Ibid., pp. 9-12. 62 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Kashmir Problem and Jammu Satyagrah, p. 22. 63 Resolutions of Praja Parishad on 10th and 11th November 1951, Ministry of States, File No. 8(6)- K/51, NAI. 64 Sheikh Abdullah’s Speech in the Constituent Assembly on 5 November 1951, Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Debates Official Report, p. 85. 65 Resolution on 10 November 1951, Ministry of States, File No. 8(6)-K/51, NAI. 237 wrong.’66 He called the Parishad agitation ‘misconceived’ and harmful and held that instead of strengthening India’s position in Kashmir, it was hampering the national interests as the agitation was bound to produce repercussions in the valley of Kashmir.67 He advised Prem Nath Dogra to shun ‘narrow communalism’ and support the Government and cooperate with National Conference.68 There were also some saner voices in Jammu who criticised the Parishad movement as detrimental to the interests of the State. Prominent among them were Lala Mulk Raj Saraf, editor of The Ranbir, and Balraj Puri. They issued statements against Parishad and held that it was playing into the hands of Pakistan and were more dangerous than the tribals.69

The Parishad agitation marked the first rupture of Jammu with the Kashmir valley. The National Conference Government failed to redress the genuine grievances of the people of Jammu and did not try to create alternative mechanisms for outlet of the dissent either through strengthening of the National Conference party in Jammu or encouraging a democratic and secular opposition party to emerge. The suspicion of Jammu leaders and the refusal to acknowledge and accommodate the diverse nature of Jammu through imposition of the interests of Kashmir created suspicions and discontentment among the people of Jammu which was exploited by the Praja Parishad. There were minimal efforts at attempting reconciliation and the absence of a coordinated dialogue with the protesting leaders only aggravated the problem. Instead of looking for the causes of dissent and trying to rectify the same, the Government dubbed the Parishad protest as communal and reactionary which further limited any chance of reconciliation. On the other hand, by holding Sheikh Abdullah responsible for all the political tribulations and economic plight of Jammu, the Parishad did not understand the unique circumstances prevailing in Kashmir. By espousing the cause of the JammuMaulana Hindus alone Azad (and Library, Ladakhi Buddhists Aligarh later) Muslim and seeking University to frame its politics in the communal framework, even when some of its demands were secular, it turned the entire question of Kashmir Dispute into Hindu versus Muslim and Kashmir versus Jammu. Being reactionary it was not able to reconcile itself with the broad changes taking place in the State in which power had been transferred from a feudal and authoritarian ruler to a government with popular support. It could only view the

66 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 16 Part II, New Delhi, 1994, p. 240. 67 National Herald, Lucknow, 4 October 1951. 68 Ibid. 69 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, pp. 50-51. 238 revolutionary change as transfer of power in the Hindu-Muslim context. Parishad wanted Sheikh Abdullah to settle the question of accession without any delay notwithstanding the deliberations in the Security Council and the Indian leaders’ oft repeated assurances to the world community that there would not be any unilateral attempts at solving the Dispute. It has been argued that because of the parochial outlook of Praja Parishad, it failed to assess the entire situation in an objective manner. Parishad also failed to develop into a mass movement because of its limited social base and basically communal outlook which had no space for either the Muslims of Jammu or Kashmir.70 Parishad had no sound economic or political programme but based its appeal on desultory combination of religion and region. Its influence was confined to a few places, localities, castes and classes. It could not attain popularity among the Muslims, Sikhs and Dalits of Jammu who constituted 60 percent of the population.71 It had to also share its following with other parties like Communists, Praja Socialist Party and Congress.72 Despite its limited popularity it came to be considered as the principal party in Jammu, primarily because of two reasons: Its programme got wide publicity because of the fact that Kashmir was always in news and any opposition to it got ample attention in the national and international media. Further, Parishad could easily appeal to the patriotism of the majority of the Indians. Since it demanded complete merger of the State with India, its demands could not be declared as illegal or anti-national which would easily win it the sympathy and support of the people of India. However, notwithstanding the attention it got, the fanning of inter-provincial and inter-communal jealousies was bound to create repercussions in Kashmir which led to dissensions and resulted in political upheavals in the State.73

DiscontentMaulana in Ladakh Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

Ladakh formed the north-east frontier of Kashmir and was of considerable strategic importance. Bound on the north by the Karakoram range, on the east by Tibet, on the south by the Himalayas and on the west by Pakistan-held (Baltistan), Ladakh consisted of an enormous range of mountains and glaciers, rocky river valleys and high plateaus. With an area of about 36000 square miles, Ladakh was the largest

70 Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, p. 110. 71 Puri, Jammu: A Clue to Kashmir Tangle, p. 31. 72 Ibid. 73 Times of India, 7 August 1951. 239 district in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.74 It was divided into two parts-Leh tehsil with a majority of Buddhists and Kargil tehsil dominated by the Shia Muslims. The rough terrain of Ladakh with lofty sand plains and ragged granite ridges prevented the economic development of the region which was characterised by appalling poverty, mass ignorance and gross social evils.75 Agriculture was primitive and less productive with most of the land controlled by the Buddhist Monasteries. The region’s depravation could be judged from the fact that the average annual income of a family from all sources was a meagre Rs 58 in Leh tehsil and Rs 42 in Kargil tehsil while the expenditure was more than Rs 60.76 Being in close proximity with Central Asia and Tibet, Ladakh functioned as an important trade centre with Tibet and Sinkiang. However, as a result of partition and the communist regime in Sinkiang, the trade suffered a great deal and adversely affected the economy of the region. The discontinuance and stoppage of trade caravans from Sinkiang resulted in unemployment and the rising of prices of the articles of daily consumption.77 A bottle of Kerosene oil was sold for Rs 10 to Rs 16.78

The formation of the Popular Government in 1948 did not lead to the beginning of an era of prosperity in Ladakh as the new dispensation had ‘little interest’ in the regions other than Kashmir and particularly possessed scant knowledge of Ladakh.79 The Government put forward interesting reasons for not starting a development scheme in Ladakh. It held that the population was scarce and people in general were backward and contented with what they had and did not view favourably any development schemes if called upon to contribute towards it. People were uneducated and had no great incentive to give development schemes a serious thought.80 However, notwithstanding the Government’s justifications there was always room for economic development throughMaulana developme Azadnt Library, of agriculture Aligarh by extension Muslim of irrigationUniversity schemes and introduction of better and new crops, exploring mineral wealth, limited hydro-

74 Lamb, Disputed Legacy, p. 196. 75 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 228. 76 Kaushak Bakula, Ladakh and its Problems: Articles published by Amrita Bazar Patrika on Ladakh in 1952, Srinagar, 1953, pp. 7-8, Accession No. 20087, Research and Publications Division, Srinagar. 77 Memorandum submitted to the Ministry of States, Government of India, 15 October 1950, Ministry of States, 1(33)-K/50, NAI. The Government held that no doubt it had caused disruptions but no widespread unemployment took place as it were mostly the traders from Hoshiarpur (Punjab) and Lahul who were affected. 78 Bakula, Ladakh and its Problems, p. 9. 79 Lamb, Disputed Legacy, p. 195. 80 Note on Economic Development of Ladakh, Ministry of States, Kashmir Section, File No. 8(9)-K/51, NAI. 240 electric schemes and above all the extension of modern education.81 There was one area where the Government intervened to improve the conditions of people. The people of Ladakh were generally illiterate and the modern education had not touched even a fringe of its population. The Government opened many elementary schools in different locations and also a high school at Leh.82 However, a few schools failed to cater to the needs of the vast population which was scattered over vast areas. Further, while 90% of the Buddhist population in Ladakh was literate in Bodhi-Tibetan language, the medium of instruction in the schools was Urdu which was resented by the people.83 The Government also discontinued the Frontier scholarships which had been sanctioned by the Dogra Government for children of backward areas. The grants-in-aid provided to the three primary schools run by Buddhists, Shias and Sunnis was also discontinued by the Kashmir Government.84 Most of the schemes framed by the Government for the economic development of Ladakh never took off and remained on paper because of the paucity of funds which meant that the people continued to live in appalling poverty. The fact that Ladakh was not mentioned ‘even once’ in the first post-Independence budget of the State and did not receive any special allocation resulted in a feeling of dissatisfaction among the Ladakhis against the Kashmir Government and became a contributing factor in the emergence of political alienation.85

The revolutionary land reform measures undertaken by the Government had little impact in Ladakh. Most of the landholdings in Ladakh were small, well below the ceiling limit of 182 kanals. Only twenty one holdings were found to be exceeding the ceiling limit which belonged to some aristocratic families.86 As was the case with the rest of the State, most of the proprietors divided their joint families into individual units enablingMaulana each Azad member Library, to retain 182Aligarh kanals ofMuslim land which University drastically reduced the number of proprietors who were affected by the Act to ten.87 The main target of the Act was the Buddhist Monasteries which possessed vast tracts of land, much above

81 Ibid. 82 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 229. 83 Bakula, Ladakh and its Problems, pp. 10-11. 84 Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, p. 111. 85 Shridhar Kaul and H. N. Kaul, Ladakh through the Ages: Towards a New Identity, New Delhi, 1992, p. 195. 86 H. N. Kaul, Rediscovery of Ladakh, New Delhi, 1998, p. 209. 87 Martijn Van Beek, ‘Beyond Identity Fetishism: “Communal” Conflict in Ladakh and the Limits of Autonomy’, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2000, pp. 525-69. 241 the ceiling limit, acquired as a result of the donations by the lay devotees. The monasteries rented the land to the tenants under most exploitative conditions. Around 25,000 kanals of land was attached to the monasteries on which about 2000 Lamas depended. The application of the Act would have drastically reduced the powers of the church and transferred the land in ownership to the poor tenants. However, there were strong voices of protest against the application of the Act by All-Ladakh Gonpa Association and Youngmen’s Buddhist Association, the representative bodies of the Buddhists of Ladakh. Under pressure from the Buddhist lamas that the personal possession of the monastic lands was tantamount to religious sacrilege which would destroy Buddhist religion and culture, the peasants refused to take possession of the expropriated lands.88 However, there were also many peasants who wanted to benefit from the Government legislation and were ready to cultivate the monastic lands as owners. A petition was sent by thirty-nine tenants who cultivated land of the Gumpas to the Chief Administrative Officer, Ladakh requesting that they should be allowed to be the sole proprietors of the respective Gumpas and the lands attached to them. However, this was resented by the Buddhists and a meeting was convened on 9 May 1951 to condemn the action of the petitioners.89 A delegation of the Buddhists, comprising of Kaushak Bakula (Head Lama of Ladakh), Sonam Wangyal (a representative of the local Zamindars), Nawang Glyachan (representative of the Hemis Gumpa) and Konthong Sonam (representative of the Phiang Gumpa) was sent to the Kashmir Government to request it not to implement the legislation but the response of the Government was not favourable.90 They approached Nehru and tried to impress upon him that resumption of the Gumpa lands would put the Buddhist institution of Sangha in great stress which would culminate in the decline of Buddhism in the region. They warned of grave consequences if the direct interference Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University of the Government in their religion was not stopped. Nehru wrote to Sheikh Abdullah that a way out should be found without doing injury to the law while at the same time not upsetting the system prevalent in Ladakh.91 It was on the direct intervention of

88 Wazir Committee noted that tenants unanimously desired that the Gumpa lands should be exempted from the Act as the Gumpas used the lands for ‘educational, religious and charitable purposes and for feeding the poor and the needy’ and the resumption of these lands would hurt their religious sentiments, Wazir Committee Report, pp. 30-1. 89 Ministry of States, File No. 8(9)-K/51, NAI. 90 Report No. 1647/GSI (Z) dated 9 April 1951 from Liason Officer Leh, Ministry of States, File No. 1(33)-K/50, NAI. 91 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 1 December 1950, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 15 Part II, New Delhi, 1993, p. 273. 242 Nehru that the Kashmir Government suspended the application of the Act to the Gumpas.92

The Buddhist population of Ladakh was also critical of the Kashmir Government policies which it believed led to the marginalisation of Ladakh. The Gumpas did not receive any financial assistance from the Government for repairing and restoring their glory. Zanskar, which had borne the brunt of tribal repression and had a large number of Buddhist refugees, was craving for attention. The Kashmir Government did not take adequate steps to rehabilitate the refugees.93 The Civil Administrator of Ladakh, Khwaja Ghulam Qadir was alleged to have anti-Buddhist bias and involved in nepotism and corruption. He shielded Sitan Phunsuk, Tehsildar of Ladakh against whom the people had complaints of grave nature. He was accused of fraudulently obtaining many maunds of butter and hundreds of sheep and goats from the people on the pretence that the same was required for the Army but was then sold by him in black market.94 The Ladakhi Buddhists resented the presence of Kashmiri Muslim officers in the administration and alleged that they were not being given their due share in the Government appointments. They were persistent in their demand that keeping in view the fact that the socio-political setup of Ladakh was unique, the services for which local talent was available should not be manned by outsiders.95 However, the ‘talent’ was not available because Ladakh was very backward in education and hence the demand could not be fulfilled overnight. Despite this, the Ladakhi Buddhists were not as unrepresented in the services as they pointed out to be. Their share in the services was in accordance with the proportion of their population. Out of the total posts of 172 in the Ladakh district in the departments of Police, revenue, education, health, veterinary, public works, forests and customs, 74 posts were representedMaulana by Azad the Muslims Library, (both Aligarh Kashmiri Muslimand Ladakhi University Muslims) and 77 by the Buddhists.96 The fact, however, remained that the top posts in administration were either manned by Kashmiri Pandits or Kashmiri Muslims. The alleged maladministration in Ladakh coupled with the Government’s insistence on the application of the Land Reforms Act on the Gumpas, the Ladakhi Buddhists felt

92 H. N. Kaul, Rediscovery of Ladakh, p. 210. 93 Kaul and Kaul, Ladakh Through the Ages, p. 183. 94 Intelligence Report on Ladakh, No. 18/A. K/50, Ministry of States, File No. 1(33)-K/50, NAI. 95 Ladakh and its Problems, p. 18. 96 Intelligence Bureau Report, Copy of D. O. Letter No. I/State/51 dated 3 March 1951, Ministry of States, File No. 1(33)-K/50, NAI. 243 neglected and marginalised and sought to carve out their separate entity, independent of the Kashmir valley but within the Union of India. They began to talk of the perceived danger of the communists and the necessity, therefore, of Ladakh’s close association with India. On the eve of Nehru’s visit to Ladakh in 1949, the Buddhists were unequivocal in seeking the ‘bosom…of gracious mother (India)’ for the betterment of the region.97 Lhasa was the spiritual home of the Ladakhi Buddhists who owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama of Tibet. To enhance their bargaining power with Sheikh Abdullah and the Government of India, the Lamas of Ladakh toyed with the idea of joining neighbouring Tibet.98 The ‘idea’ was possibly only a threat since they were aware of the precarious position of the Dalai Lama after the communist shadow over Tibet. In an interview with the correspondent of Amrita Bazar Patrika, Kaushak Bakula accepted that there were nostalgic longings among the Ladakhis for a political union with Tibet but India was still the idol of their hearts as wisdom demanded stronger ties with India in view of the sweeping changes in Tibet.99

In May 1949 a delegation of the Ladakh Buddhist Association under the presidentship of Chhewang Rigzin visited Delhi and presented a memorandum to Nehru asserting the right of the people of Ladakh to a separate nationhood on the basis of race, language, religion and culture and therefore their inherent right to choose their destiny. It made a strong case for the region’s closer integration with India, notwithstanding the result of any plebiscite, to ‘receive more nutriment for growth’ while at the same time repudiating the Kashmir’s dominance over it by arguing that the Treaty of Amritsar which had bound together the two regions had lapsed and Ladakh was free to decide about its future.100 It demanded that Ladakh should be allowed to join either Jammu province or East Punjab as that was the only guarantee of their futureMaulana progress and Azad development. Library,Interestingly, Aligarh Muslimthe delegation University expressed full confidence in Sheikh Abdullah.101 In a subsequent memorandum to Nehru in December 1950, the Ladakhi Buddhists again asserted their unique identity and resented the dominance of the Kashmir Government. They held that they were being governed as a colony of Kashmir with no say in the affairs of their governance as they

97 Sonam Chosjor, ‘Beyond Kashmir: Understanding Ladakh’ in Rekha Chowdhary, ed., Identity Politics in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, 2010, p. 140. 98 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 230. 99 Ladakh and Its Problems, p. 23. 100 The full text of the memorandum is given in Balraj Madhok, Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh: Problem and Solution, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 37-9. 101 Times of India, 4 May 1949. 244 were neither represented in the Government nor in the Working Committee of the National Conference.102 Nehru was sympathetic to their demands and assured them of fair treatment. But he ruled out any separate arrangement for Ladakh as that would seriously affect the nature of the Kashmir Dispute.103 This was the reason that the Ladakhi delegation (s) did not press its demand for granting Union Territory status to Ladakh as that would hamper the ‘national interests’ of India.104

In view of the overall nature of the Kashmir Dispute and the political developments in Tibet, Nehru believed that it was of considerable importance that how Ladakh was treated. On the one hand he gave assurances to the people of Ladakh that they need not worry about their future as Ladakh was an integral part of India and was connected to it by political, cultural and religious ties.105 While addressing the people of Ladakh, Nehru reiterated his pledge that no discrimination would be done with them and their living conditions would be improved with stress on education, healthcare, industries and development of agriculture.106 On the other hand he expected Sheikh Abdullah to listen to them and try to redress their genuine grievances. He advised Sheikh Abdullah to handle Ladakh with great care and ensure that the people were contented else they would find excuses to intrigue with Tibet. He wrote:

This sensation (that Ladakh has been neglected) has to go and they must be made to feel that they are common sharers in the freedom of the State and that they are going to profit by it. They should have the sensation of doing things by themselves, that is, of a measure of self-government. Where possible, Ladakhis might be appointed to offices of responsibility and responsible positions in Ladakh….they may even act foolishly….(but it was) important to remove any Maulanatrace of bitterness Azad and Library, resentment Aligarhfrom their mMusliminds.107 University Despite the assurances given by Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah the discontent in Ladakh continued to grow and reached a boiling point in the latter half of 1952 when strong demands were raised for the separation of Ladakh from Kashmir. However, possibly

102 Memorandum by Konchok Sonam Gergan and Nawang Gyalts San, Ministry of States, File No. 1(33)-K/50, NAI. 103 Martijn Van Beek, ‘True Patriots: Justifying Autonomy for Ladakh’, Himalayan Research Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1998, p. 39. 104 Ibid. 105 Hindustan Times, 8 July 1949. 106 National Herald, 9 July 1949. 107 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 29 November 1949, SWJN, Vol 15 Part II, pp. 271-72. 245 Ladakh suffered from three drawbacks which did not put enough pressure on the Kashmir Government: its sparse population, inability to have meaningful contacts with mainland India and the remoteness from the State’s twin political centres- Srinagar and Jammu.108

Praja Parishad ‘Satyagrah’: Support from India, Government Response and the Changing Attitude of Sheikh Abdullah

Sheikh Abdullah was the most ardent supporter of Kashmir’s accession to India as he found uniformity of ideals with it. India was a democratic and secular country with a progressive leadership which convinced Sheikh Abdullah that his programme of Naya Kashmir could be implemented only in India and not in Pakistan which was dominated by feudal elements and reactionaries. Further, he could imagine for himself a better position in India in view of his close relationship with Congress particularly Nehru, while his relationship with Muslim League and Jinnah was far from cordial. Sheikh Abdullah gave his all-out support to Maharaja’s request to the Indian Government for accession to it. Sheikh Abdullah’s conviction for India was strong and deep rooted. His decision to support India was not made in a huff but was rather taken consciously as there existed a deeper ideological unity with India and its leaders.109 He believed that Kashmir could fulfil its political and ideological aspirations only by linking its destiny with India which had pledged itself to the goal of secular democracy. Addressing a press conference in Delhi, Sheikh declared, ‘we have burnt our boats. There is no place in Kashmir for a theocratic State. Kashmir will never make a plaything of India’s honour’.110 Initially he was opposed to the idea of plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people as he believed that the National Conference had supported the accession to India and therefore there was no question Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University of choosing between India and Pakistan. Addressing the Security Council on behalf of India in February 1948, Sheikh Abdullah held that Kashmir had lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India and Pakistan had no right to question the accession. He requested the Council not to ‘confuse the point’ in dispute

108 Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, p. 137. 109 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 12. 110 National Herald, 19 June 1948. 246 and rather ask Pakistan to stop assisting the raiders.111 Sheikh even contemplated a boycott of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and proposed to hold demonstrations against it but desisted after Nehru advised against it.112 For him accession was final, irrevocable and unalterable. His support for India remained unwavered at least till 1952 when fissures began to be developed in his ideals vis-à-vis India. He found that his hopes of India as a secular country where communal forces would have no place were belied as the Government failed in completely suppressing these forces. While presenting his inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly, Sheikh referred to the assertion of certain communal tendencies in India which might turn it into a religious State but he expressed hope that the continued accession of Kashmir to India would defeat these tendencies.113 This belief and commitment to India was to change in 1953 when he lost hope in India’s secularism and began to feel that the fate of Kashmir might not be safe in India.

Sheikh Abdullah watched with concern the political developments in India where the rightist groups were trying to assert themselves and were successful, to a certain extent, in sidelining the Leftists in the Congress including Nehru. Dr. Rajendra Prasad had been elected the President of India despite Nehru’s opposition. An overtly pro- Hindu, Purshottam Das Tandon was elected the Congress president notwithstanding stiff opposition from Nehru who ultimately threatened to resign in case he was not replaced.114 The formation of Bhartiya Jana Sangh in 1951 gave new life to the forces and institutionalised communalism in India given the fact that it drew its leadership and cadres from the RSS.115 In its very first manifesto, Jana Sangh unequivocally opposed any special position to Kashmir and held that ‘it should be integratedMaulana with Bharat Azadlike Library, other acceding Aligarh States. Muslim116 Sheikh University Abdullah could not remain oblivious of these developments and his strong conviction for India began to develop cracks. In June 1949 G. M. Ashai, the first Registrar of the Kashmir

111 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Kashmir’s Appeal to World Conscience: Text of the Speech Delivered by Sheikh Abdullah at the 241st meeting of the Security Council held at Lake Success on February 5, 1948, Accession No. 3373/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 112 SWJN, Vol. 4, p. 337. 113 Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Debates Official Report, pp. 107-08. 114 Ajit Bhattacharjea, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, pp. 160-61. 115 Walter Andersen, ‘The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh: IV: Jan Sangh and Other Organisations’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 14, 1972, pp. 724–727. 116 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-80: Policies and Manifestoes, Vol. 1, New Delhi, 2005, p. 292. 247 University presented a report to Sheikh Abdullah after his visit to India and alleged that the Muslims did not feel safe in India as they were being treated as second class citizens.117 The report created suspicion in the mind of Sheikh Abdullah who feared that the unique identity of the Kashmiri Muslims might not be safeguarded if the communal forces started dominating India. Though Sheikh Abdullah did not publicly pronounce his resentment against India at least till mid-1952, he was feeling a sense of dissatisfaction. His apprehensions regarding the future of the Kashmiri Muslims in India were aggravated by the fact that their representation in the services which fell under the jurisdiction of the Central Government (Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication) was only nominal. From 1947 very few of them had found employment in these Departments and Sheikh Abdullah believed that the Muslims were deliberately being kept away from these services.118 There was news of a secret official circular which held that the Muslims of Kashmir should not be recruited in Indian Army.119 No other development influenced the mind of Sheikh Abdullah vis-à- vis India as did the Praja Parishad agitation. With each satyagrah of the Praja Parishad and the support it garnered from the Right-wing Hindu parties, Sheikh Abdullah wavered and his faith in India weakened. No doubt, he had Nehru beside him whom he regarded as the icon of secularism and the only hope that India would not turn into a religious State but the continuous agitation of Praja Parishad poisoned his mind also and he also began to lose his trust in Sheikh. The trust deficit embittered the relations between the two and ultimately culminated in the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah.

Praja Parishad was determined to provide a stiff opposition to the National Conference. It was looking for opportunities to corner Sheikh Abdullah. On 15th January 1952 some students demonstrated and raised objections against the hoisting of National ConferencMaulanae flag Azad alongside Library, the Indian Aligarh Flag Muslimin an official University function at the Gandhi Memorial College Jammu for which the protesting students were penalised.120 A huge procession was taken out on 8th February in sympathy with the penalised students who had resorted to hunger strike since 29th of January. The procession proceeded towards Secretariat and was lathicharged several times by the police. The incident was followed by 72-hour curfew in Jammu city which was literally handed

117 Mullick, My years with Nehru, p. 11. 118 Ateeq Siddiqi, Sheikh Abdullah, Kashmir aur Hum, Delhi, 1967, p. 58, Accession No. 2660/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 119 Sach, Jammu, 17 January 1958. 120 Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, p. 196. 248 over to the army.121 The Government issued a press note and charged the Praja Parishad of instigating the students with a design ‘to subvert authority and bring into existence chaotic condition in the State’.122 This was followed by large scale arrest of Parishad leaders and workers including its President, Prem Nath Dogra. Praja Parishad rejected the Government accusations as ‘wilful misrepresentation’ and held that it had nothing to do with the student movement.123 The Working Committee passed a resolution on 25 February and called for the appointment of an impartial commission to probe the Jammu incident and the complicity of Parishad.124 The Parishad received support from Indian Right-wing groups and media unleashed a false propaganda targeting Sheikh Abdullah for the violence and for arresting the Parishad leaders ‘unnecessarily’. To clear his Government’s position Sheikh Abdullah made his maiden speech in the Indian Parliament on 5 March 1952 and held that the activities of the Parishad were subversive and that his Government would not spare ‘any brand of communalism’ in the State. He assured the members of Parliament that the detained students would be released after they give an undertaking that they would not indulge in unlawful activities.125 Consequently, the Government released the arrested students while the Parishad leaders continued to be behind the bars. Ayyangar visited Jammu in April to a rousing welcome by Sheikh Abdullah who paid a glowing tribute to Ayyangar for the advice and assistance he had rendered to the State.126 It was on his insistence that the Parishad leaders were released unconditionally as a gesture of goodwill.127 It has been argued that the release of Parishad prisoners at the behest of Ayyangar influenced the politics of the State in two ways. It not only strengthened the Praja Parishad but also encouraged it to launch further movements against the Government as in the event of repression it could fall back upon the Government of India which was influenced by the media. Further, the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

121 Resolution of Bhartiya Jana Sangh’s Central Working Committee, 10 February 1952, Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-80: Internal Affairs, Vol. 4, New Delhi, 2005, p. 114. See also, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu Disturbances-February 1952, Accession No. 507/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 122 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 13 February 1952. 123 All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad, A Case for an open Enquiry, New Delhi, 1953, Accession No. 56240, NMML. 124 Ibid. 125 Times of India, 6 March 1952. 126 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. IV, p. 245. 127 Ibid. 249 Indian Government’s intervention gave legitimacy to the Parishad.128 On the other hand, Sheikh Abdullah disliked the intervention of Indian Government in the internal affairs of the State as it strengthened his enemies who were vitiating the atmosphere of the State. His disliking soon turned into frustration which found its vent in his Ranbirsingh Pora speech on 11 April 1952. Sheikh Abdullah’s speech was full of anger, suspicion, threats and warnings. He castigated the communal forces of India for trying to attack the special position of Kashmir and warned against the extension of Indian Constitution in toto to the State, which he described as ‘unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy’.129 Kashmir would integrate fully with India only, he said, when there was complete elimination of communalism. He held:

Many Kashmiris are apprehensive as to what will happen to them and their position if, for instance, something happens to Pandit Nehru….I would like to warn those who talk lightly of Kashmir’s complete accession to India in all subjects that they are fanning fires of conflict once again…We have accepted India in regard to defence, foreign affairs and communication and not in respect of other subjects because we wanted some kind of autonomy for ourselves in internal matters. Now some people here and in the Indian press also have started questioning our very fundamental right to shape our destiny in our own way. They do not tell us what will happen to Kashmir if there is a resurgence of communalism in India and how in those circumstances we are to convince the Muslims of Kashmir that India does not intend to swallow up Kashmir.130

The speech was widely reported in both Indian and foreign press, particularly Pakistan which tried to draw political mileage out of Sheikh’s changing attitudes towards India.131 The speech dropped a bombshell and created sensation in the Indian political circles. Indians interpreted it as confirming to threatening of separation from Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University India. The press vehemently criticised Sheikh Abdullah for using Indian tax payers’

128 The Statements issued by the Parishad leaders after their release clearly bear out that their spirits were high to oppose the Kashmir Government tooth and nail. The Parishad members publicly talked of deposing Sheikh Abdullah’s Government, Kashmir Bureau of Information, Satyagrah Without Truth, New Delhi, 1973, Accession No. 56290, NMML. 129 The Hindu, 12 April 1952. 130 The Hindu, 12 April 1952; Bhattacharjea, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, pp. 161-62; Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, pp. 247-50. 131 Pakistan’s happiness over the speech of Sheikh Abdullah has been noted in the letter of Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Mohan Sinha Mehta to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File No. M/52/1911/107, NAI. To mollify India, Sheikh Abdullah later warned Pakistan not to be ‘over-jubilant’ at his utterances and to ‘desist from reading too much into them, for they were sure to be disappointed’, Times of India, 19 April 1952. 250 money to promote secession from India. References to Indian communalism were deemed as hurtful and provocative and Sheikh was advised to cease behaving like a prima donna.132 Sheikh Abdullah was undaunted by the criticism of Indian press against him and he reiterated his stand that Kashmir’s relationship with India was restricted to defence, foreign affairs and communication. ‘Bouquets and brickbats, he said, will never deflect us from our principles and the path we have chosen for ourselves’.133 Addressing a gathering at Hazratbal, he said that Kashmir was free and autonomous in all but three subjects and wanted to maintain relationship with India on the basis of mutual understanding. He came down heavily on those who held that Kashmir was dependent on India as ‘it would be better to die than submit to the taunt that India was our bread-giver. Kashmir is not eager for India’s money, trade or armed aid’.134 Nehru’s immediate reaction to the speech was reflected in his public speech on the Jallianwala Bagh Day at New Delhi. While he held that he was ‘not very happy’ with the ‘tone and manner’ of his speech, he tried to exonerate Sheikh Abdullah by criticising Praja Parishad which had been creating disturbances in the State.135 He was particularly distressed by his lumping of India and Pakistan together which he believed was most unwise.136 In a letter to Sheikh Abdullah on 25 April, Nehru wrote, ‘I have not the wish or the heart to argue about this (intimidation of Kashmir by India)….I have deeply felt about Kashmir, because it represented to me many things and many principles’.137 Cornered by the public rebuttal of his speech (es) by his close confidante and most trusted person (Nehru) and the constant criticism in India, Sheikh Abdullah realised that he had spoken too much and therefore some kind of conciliatory approach was necessary to assuage the disturbed feelings in India. He found an easy scapegoat in the press which had ‘viciously’ distorted his speech because of his alleged refusal to provide PTI (Press Trust of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University India) with financial assistance for opening a branch in Kashmir.138 To cool down the matters, an official version of his RS Pora speech was released which held that it was not Sheikh Abdullah who had any misgivings as to what would happen to Kashmir if

132 ‘Indian Political Notes: The Sheikh Saheb Drops Bricks’, Times of India, 15 April 1952. S. P. Mookerjee criticised Sheikh’s speech as a ‘strange and sinister statement calculated to strengthen the hands of Pakistan’, National Herald, 13 April 1952. 133 Times of India, 19 April 1952. 134 Times of India, 26 April 1952. 135 Hindustan Times, 14 April 1952. 136 Nehru’s Letter to Ayyangar, 12 April 1952, SWJN, Vol. 18, p. 383. 137 SWJN, Vol. 18, p. 388. 138 Sarvapalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. II, 1947-56, Cambridge, 1979, p. 119. 251 something happened to Nehru. Rather these feelings were expressed by the enemies of the State and had wrongly been attributed to him.139 However, the ‘authorized’ versions of Sheikh’s speech (es) failed to change Nehru’s attitude and both exchanged some angry letters, each complaining of being ‘gravely wronged’ and having changed the ideals. Nehru felt that it was impossible that every speech of Sheikh was wrongly reported and that some were ‘supposed to be authorized versions’.140 This was possibly the beginning of appearance of faultlines in growing misunderstanding between Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah. The issue brought forth the differences between the two with regard to Kashmir and had the potential of increasing animosity between the two. While Nehru was ready to accommodate Sheikh Abdullah’s concerns with the hope that as soon as conditions turn favourable Kashmir would integrate more closely with India. But when Sheikh Abdullah questioned the very relationship with India and rejected any hope of complete integration with India as ‘savouring of lunacy’, Nehru was quick to express his disapproval and forced Sheikh Abdullah to backtrack on his Statements. Though an open breach was avoided, yet the relationship between the two did not remain the same. During the course of negotiations in July 1952, Nehru is reported to have urged Sheikh Abdullah to display unambiguous loyalty to India as ‘Sheikh Saheb if you do not stand with us shoulder to shoulder, we shall cast a chain of gold around your neck’. Sheikh was quick to retort that if he even tried to do that he would lose Kashmir forever.141 It was the beginning of long drawn disagreements and eventually Nehru, through roping in of Sheikh’s close friends, was successful against Sheikh Abdullah.

Sheikh Abdullah’s hostile utterances against India were a perfect fodder for Praja Parishad which was looking for opportunities to corner the Government. The further stimulus was Maulanaprovided by Azadthe Kashmir Library, Constituent Aligarh Assembly Muslim decisions University which were resented by both the Indian Government and Praja Parishad. The Basic Principles Committee presented an interim report to the Assembly on 10 June 1952 and recommended the abolition of monarchy and the provision of an elected head for the State.142 The adoption of a separate flag for the State also created misgivings in the

139 Hindustan Times, 14 April 1952 140 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 2 May 1952, SWJN, Vol. 18, pp. 389-90. To avoid any further arguments which might lead to the some unwanted situation, it was decided to put the issue to rest, Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 7 May 1952, SWJN, Vol. 18, p. 390. 141 Abdullah, Aatish-i-Chinar, p. 542. 142 Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Debates Official Report, pp. 463-66. 252 political circles and the same was construed as leading to separatism. In June 1952 Praja Parishad submitted a memorandum to the President of India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and demanded the fuller application of Indian Constitution, including the provisions of Fundamental Rights and National Flag to Jammu. On 26 June it organised a big demonstration outside the Parliament to reinforce its demand.143 Parishad’s demand was supported by the newly formed Bhartiya Jana Sangh leaders like Dr. S. P. Mookerjee, N. B. Khare and N. C. Chaterjee. Inside the Parliament they criticised the Government’s handling of Kashmir and questioned Sheikh Abdullah’s nationalism and secularism. Chaterjee held that India had spent more than Rs 150 crores on Kashmir and it should not be allowed to function as a ‘republic within a republic’ while neglecting the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Ladakh.144 Dr. Mookerjee tore into the Kashmir policy of Nehru and held that the ideas of ‘Kashmiri nationalism’ and ‘sovereign Kashmir’ should not be tolerated as these would pave the way for disintegration of India. He appealed Nehru to ‘exercise his influence, his goodwill, his power of persuasiveness and whatever he possesses and thereby persuade Sheikh Abdullah and others to remain with India as a constituent unit’.145 But in case they remained intransigent and are not ready to integrate with India except in three subjects, echoing Parishad demand, he said, ‘let us devise a scheme by which the people of Jammu and Ladakh may have the full liberty to decide whether they will integrate fully with India. Let him have a loose integration only with regard to Kashmir valley.’146 Nehru found himself cornered and while replying to the debate he delineated the history of Kashmir in detail and blamed the present State of affairs on the Maharaja and United Nations which had complicated the matters. Brushing aside the integration of Kashmir on the basis of compulsion and coercion, Nehru reiterated his pledge that it was the people of Kashmir only who would decide and if their Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University decision was not to remain with India, though it might pain India, they had to accept it.147 Nehru was thus able to pacify his listeners but at the same time ‘left them guessing’.148

143 Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, p. 197. 144 Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vol. I, Part II, cols. 2533-2536. 145 Dr. Mookerjee’s speech in the Parliament on 26 June 1952, Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vol. I, Part II, col. 2583. 146 Ibid., cols. 2582-83. 147 Nehru’s Reply to the debate on 26 June 1952, Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vol. II, Part II, cols. 2583-95. 148 Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 167. 253 To remove the uncertainty regarding the relationship of the State with India, detailed negotiations were held between the representatives of the Indian and State Governments which led to an unwritten modus vivendi known as the Delhi Agreement the contents of which were read by Nehru in the Indian Parliament on 24 July and Sheikh Abdullah to the State Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1952.149 While the State Government tried to ‘sell’ the Agreement as a victory for the people of the State, in essence, notwithstanding the fact that the Government was successful in resisting the Indian Government’s attempts to apply the jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights to the State, it was the victory for Indian Government and Praja Parishad as earlier it was Article 370 which governed the State’s relationship with India with the Centre’s jurisdiction restricted to the three subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications, the Delhi Agreement extended the Centre’s authority to new areas. The discontent against the Agreement was clearly visible in the Kashmir Valley and a meeting of the National Conference workers was ‘hurriedly’ convened to interpret its provisions favourably.150 The National Conference leaders, including Sheikh Abdullah undertook tours throughout the State to make the people aware of the contents of the Agreement. They emphasised that the Agreement was not a ‘surrender’ by the Kashmir Government as had been propagated by ‘enemy agents’ but was a victory as while gaining all the advantages of a federation, they were able to maintain a large measure of autonomy unlike other States of India.151 When the State Constituent Assembly deliberated on the contents of the Agreement, almost all the members unanimously heralded the Agreement as a victory for the people of the State which had granted them the desired quantum of autonomy. Only one member, Hakim Habibullah expressed some concerns with regard to the reports in some Indian newspapers that certain provisions of the Indian Constitution could be applied to the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University State by the President of India despite Article 370 and the Delhi Agreement. Sheikh did not like the criticism and he allegedly slapped the member outside the Assembly.152

Delhi Agreement was not viewed favourably by the Right-wing nationalist parties of India who interpreted it as a surrender of the Indian Government. They expressed

149 Bose, Roots of Conflict, p. 61. For the contents of the Agreement refer to Chapter 4 of this Thesis. 150 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol II, p. 1204. 151 Times of India, 19 August 1952. 152 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. IV, pp. 290-92. 254 fears that the formalisation of autonomy for the State would not only create separatism in the State but would also set a dangerous precedent for the ‘disruptionist and anti-national forces’ in other parts of India. They alleged that it was a betrayal of trust put in India by the Maharaja, betrayal of the sacrifices of the Indian soldiers and betrayal of the Indian taxpayers and the common man of India.153 Amrita Bazar Patrika held that the Agreement was not in consonance with the Constitution of India and had altogether overlooked the sentiments and demands of the people of Jammu and Ladakh.154 The most discontented with the Delhi Agreement was the Praja Parishad which resented the limited application of the Indian Constitution to the State. Calling the Agreement as ‘unholy’ and ‘fraud’, Parishad held that it was as a ‘surrender at the altar of communal intransigence and separatism of Sheikh Abdullah. It is a fraud on the Indian public and an attack on the Indian Constitution’.155 It feared that the grant of autonomy to Kashmir would open the floodgates of separatism in other parts of India as well. Tearing into the voices of Kashmir being a republic within a republic, sovereign in character, Parishad called it a mockery and held that Sheikh Abdullah wanted India ‘to spend money for its maintenance, keep military for its defence, build roads for its transport facilities and to waste and squander money for its external relations but with no right to the citizens of India to move freely in the State’.156 In the second week of August, Parishad held its convention at Udhampur which was participated by prominent leaders of Jana Sangh including Dr. Mookerjee. The participation of Dr. Mookerjee brought a new life in the Parishad Party and gave it legitimacy to operate on an all-India level. Mookerjee declared that the Parishad demands were just and patriotic and held that Hum Vidhan Lenge Ya Balidan Denge (We will get the constitution of India or I will lay down my life for it).157 The convention passed a resolution demanding that in case the State Government was not Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University willing to integrate the State fully with India, without any reservations, the Government of India should take necessary steps to effect the fuller integration of Jammu and Ladakh provinces with India so that the people of these regions are saved

153 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Kashmir Problem and Jammu Satyagrah, pp. 27-28. 154 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 26 July 1952. It held that by virtue of the autonomy, Kashmir was neither A, B or C class State, it was ‘Triple A’, Amrita Bazar Patrika, 29 July 1952. 155 All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad, Nehru-Abdullah Pact: An Unholy Agreement and a Fraud, p. 6, Accession No. HD326, NMML. 156 All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad, Jammu Rejects a Separate Constitution for Jammu and Kashmir State, Delhi, 1952, p. 11, Accession No. 56243, NMML. 157 Balraj Madhok, Portrait of a Martyr: Biography of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerji, Bombay, 1969, p. 160. 255 from Kashmiri octopus.158 It hoped that the acceptance of their demand would ‘bring Kashmiri leaders to their senses and Kashmir will become part of Bharat’.159

The State Government was quick to implement those provisions which symbolised its autonomy and separation from India, like the provisions related to the separate flag and Head of the State. Hereditary Dogra rule was abolished and Karan Singh was unanimously elected as the first Sadr-i-Riyasat of the State. However, the Government did not implement other provisions of the Pact related to the application of Fundamental Rights and the extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India to the State which created doubts and fears among the people of Jammu and Parishad threatened of launching a Satyagrah against the Government.160 Nehru on the one hand rejected the Parishad demand of closer integration of Jammu and Ladakh with India on the ground that it would mean ‘surrendering Kashmir immediately to Pakistan’.161 Jammu and Kashmir had to hold together as if Jammu was separated, Kashmir would go and if Kashmir went to Pakistan, Jammu’s position would be very precarious.162 On the other hand, he also tried to persuade Sheikh Abdullah to apply other provisions of the Delhi Agreement so as to remove the misgivings in the minds of the people of Jammu. With the Government’s procrastination, Praja Parishad decided to launch a satyagrah for the fuller integration of the State with India and launched a mass campaign on 17th November 1952 against Sheikh Abdullah.163 The demands of the Parishad included complete integration of whole State with India, if not whole State then Jammu and Ladakh be merged fully with India, abrogation of Article 370, full application of the Constitution of India to the State, extension of Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, removal of custom barriers between Kashmir and India, re-elections for the Constituent Assembly and formation of an impartial tribunal to investigate chargesMaulana of corruption Azad Library,against the AligarhState Government. Muslim164 UniversityOpposing Sheikh Abdullah’s ambiguous policies and his support and opposition to India in the same breath, it held that if Sheikh Abdullah believed in Indian secularism and nationalism,

158 Times of India, 11 August 1952. 159 Jammu Rejects a Separate Constitution, p. 14. 160 Bazaz, Struggle for Freedom, p. 579. 161 Nehru’s Note on Kashmir at , 25 August 1952, SWJN, Vol. 19, p. 327. 162 Ibid. 163 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 21, New Delhi, 1997, p. 13 fn. 164 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-80: History of Jana Sangh, Vol. 6, pp. 147-8. See also, Nasir A. Naqash and G. M. Shah, Kashmir from Crisis to Crisis, New Delhi, 1997, p. 101. 256 why didn’t he integrate fully with India and what was the need for separate constitution.165 It coined a slogan:166

Ek Desh Mein Do Vidhan Ek Desh Mein Do Nishan Ek Desh Mein Do Pradhan Nahin Chalenge, Nahin Chalenge

(There cannot and should not be two constitutions, two flags and two Presidents in the same country)

When Karan Singh, after being appointed as the Sadr-i-Riyasat, arrived at Jammu on 24th November, he was greeted with ‘derisive and hostile slogans and the city, from the airport right up to the palace gates was a sea of black flags’.167 The Parishad workers intimidated the shopkeepers, looted festoons and buntings and pulled down arches of welcome which had been erected in honour of Karan Singh. This was despite the appeal made by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad that Karan Singh being the Head of the State should be treated above party interests and considerations.168 This was followed by violent protests and demonstrations in which Parishad workers attacked Government buildings including schools, bridges, revenue offices and police headquarters. Parishad leaders made highly provocative statements, targeting the Government in general and Sheikh Abdullah in particular. They talked of ‘sucking the blood of National Conference’ and ‘shaking Abdullah’s and Nehru’s Governments’.169 They held that Sheikh Abdullah was not acceptable to them and their ways were separate from that of Kashmir.170 The Government responded with repression-lathi charges, tear shelling and large scale arrest of the Parishad leaders and workers including its President Prem Nath Dogra. To curb the agitation the Government soughtMaulana assistance fromAzad the Library, Punjab Police Aligarh which Muslim sent tear University gas squads and a large number of policemen. By 8th December more than 400 Parishad members had been arrested by the Government.171 To add to the concerns of the Government the Parishad

165 Ashutosh Varshney, ‘Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir has been a Problem’ in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Boulder, 1992, p. 213. 166 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Kashmir Problem and Jammu Satyagrah, p. 42. 167 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 149. 168 Satyagrah Without Truth, p. 11. 169 Kashmir Bureau of Information, Without Comment, Delhi, n. d., NMML. 170 ‘Speech delivered by Madan Lal, Secretary City Praja Parishad at Samba’, Without Comment, p. 2. 171 Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, p. 166. 257 agitation was given an All India character by organisations like Jana Sangh, Akali Dal and Hindu Mahasabha which provided moral and material support to the satyagrah. With its spread beyond the borders of the State, the target of the communal organisations now included the Central Government, particularly Nehru who was cornered on the triumvirate issues of Kashmir, East Bengal refugees and the issue of cow slaughter.172

Ladakh which had on numerous occasions expressed its dissatisfaction against the Government began to revive its opposition to the dominance of Kashmir. In his maiden speech to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, Kaushak Bakula pointed out that ‘the people of Ladakh have been feeling the weight of their shackles but have supressed their groans till now’.173 His speech was full of complaints against the Government which was not spending a ‘single paisa’ in the area.174 He referred to the changes taking place in the new world and held that ‘to expect that the people of Ladakh can remain unaffected and unaware of these global and regional movements and will continue to act and present themselves as deaf and dumb and without expectations, is unreasonable’.175 He began to demand greater autonomy within India, failing which he threatened of joining Tibet ‘as a last course’.176 When the Praja Parishad launched satyagrah against the Government, Ladakh also intensified its demands for a closer integration with India. Bakula believed that if Kashmir was to carve its own destiny, it was imperative that Ladakh should maintain closer ties with India as it had nothing in common with Kashmir and its unique culture and political identity could be safeguarded only within India.177

Nehru was not oblivious of the dangers posed by Parishad agitation and the impact it was to have on the minds of Sheikh Abdullah and the Kashmiri Muslims. He tried to Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University convince his audience that the Parishad ‘satyagrah’178 was in essence a communal and reactionary agitation against the secular, progressive and popular reforms of Sheikh

172 Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, p. 122. 173 Kaul, Ladakh Through the Ages, p. 195. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid., pp. 194-99. 176 The Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 1952 cited in Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 230. 177 Martijn van Beek, ‘Beyond Identity Fetishism: “Communal” Conflict in Ladakh and the Limits of Autonomy’, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2000, p. 536. 178 Nehru questioned the very use of the term for the agitation, ‘I have never come across anything more remote from satyagrah than what is taking place in Jammu and Kashmir’, Statement in Parliament on 4 December 1952, Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), 1952, Vol. VI, Part II, cols. 1572-75. 258 Abdullah, particularly his land reforms which had hit hard the landlords of Jammu. He requested Home Ministry to initiate a thorough enquiry into the Jammu disturbances and the support Parishad received from Punjab and Delhi.179 While addressing the Parliament on 12 December, Nehru castigated the communal forces for disrespecting the Parliament by supporting the agitation which was ‘objectionable, anti-social, reactionary and subversive’.180 He was apprehensive that if the agitation continued unabated it would have serious repercussions and instead of bringing about a closer integration of the State with India, as desired by the Parishad and its supporters, it would break up the State and the only winner would be Pakistan.181 The situation was so gruesome that Nehru likened the events to those of the traumatic days of July-August 1947 when the country was passing through a communal orgy and law and order machinery had collapsed completely.182 He wished to deal with the agitators firmly and make no compromise on the principle they had fought for. He was even prepared to personally visit the troubled Jammu but the Kashmir Government did not show great enthusiasm.183 However, Nehru’s commitment for Kashmir and his avarice of the reactionary movement in Jammu was not shared by his colleagues, particularly the Home Ministry which made his appeals and concern fall on deaf ears. Organised Jathas of Sangh volunteers from and Madhya Bharat came to Delhi and courted arrest. Nehru exhorted Chief Ministers of the States to remain vigilant and not allow the communalists to vitiate the atmosphere.184 He, however, felt that enough was not being done to suppress them. K. N. Katju, the Home Minister was ‘long past his prime’ and there were many officials who shared sympathy with the reactionary elements. Nehru could not hide his disenchantment with the Chief Ministers and the communal officials who were not sincerely helping in suppressing the agitation when he wrote that ‘I am so disgusted with their methods that I feel reluctant in even seeing Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University them’.185 For the first time it looked like Nehru was being sidelined and his continuous appeals and emotional outbursts failed to make any impact. He pinned all his hopes on Sheikh Abdullah to prevent the situation going out of hand. While writing to

179 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 20, New Delhi, 1997, pp. 367-68. 180 Statement in Parliament on 12 December 1952, Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), 1952, Vol. Ill, Part I, cols. 1450-55. 181 Nehru’s Letter to Chief Ministers, 19 December 1952, G. Parthasarathi, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964, Vol. 3, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 198-99. 182 Nehru’s Letter to K. N. Katju, 4 January 1953, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 21, pp. 170-71. 183 Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, Vol. II, p. 124. 184 Parthasarathi, Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, Vol. 3, pp. 242-46 185 SWJN, Vol. 21, pp. 170-71. 259 Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru on the one hand criticised the ‘reactionary character’ of the movement and on the other advised Sheikh Abdullah to redress the genuine grievances of the people of Jammu and not to give the impression as if Jammu was being treated as a subordinate part of the State. The approach of the Government, he said, should not be restricted to controlling the situation by restoring law and order only, but through personal rapport and winning the hearts by going to the ‘heart of the seat of trouble’.186 Nehru believed that the best way to assuage the hurt feelings of the people of Jammu was to implement all the provisions of Delhi Agreement, postpone the confiscation of Maharaja’s orchards, considering the low fertility of Jammu lands while implementing the land reforms, appointment of a Commission of Enquiry to look into the Jammu grievances and the flying of Union Flag side by side with the State Flag.187

The Kashmir Government did not act on Nehru’s advice and failed in building a personal rapport with the Parishad agitators. Sheikh Abdullah refused to personally meet Prem Nath Dogra on the ground that he had no truck with a communal person. He even turned down the request of 25 non-party leaders of Jammu for reconciliation with Parishad without ‘standing on false prestige’.188 They were officially dubbed as ‘agents of vested interests’ as the investigation of the Government revealed that 17 of these ‘non-party’ men were well known landlords of Jammu while 5 others represented banking and moneylending interests.189 The repression and the arrests failed to contain the situation and protests and demonstrations in defiance of the Government orders were a common sight.190 The Government also launched a propaganda campaign to vilify the Parishad and justify the Government stand. A number of pamphlets were issued by the Government like Jammu Situation-An Objective Analysis,Maulana Searchlight Azad Library, on Jammu Aligarh Agitation, Muslim India University and Kashmir- Constitutional Aspect, Why Customs, Without Comment and The Flag Issue besides many press releases and propaganda on radio. The focus of the propaganda was to present a balanced picture of the political situation in the State and subject Parishad allegations to a critical scrutiny. The Constitutional aspect of the relationship with

186 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 5 January 1953, SWJN, Vol. 21, p. 173. 187 Nehru’s Letters to Sheikh Abdullah on 1, 5 and 30 January 1953, SWJN, Vol. 21, p. 169, pp. 172-76 and 188-90. 188 Delhi Express, Delhi, 9 January 1953. 189 Times of India, 10 January 1953. 190 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol. II, p. 1207. 260 India was reiterated and it was held that the special status to the State was in essence a guarantee against encroachments from the Centre.191 Trying to remove the misgivings that the State had a separate flag in opposition to the National Flag, it was held that it was only to honour the sentiments associated with the freedom struggle that a separate flag was kept while as it was in no way a rival to the Union Flag and was only subordinate to it.192 The Parishad’s criticism that non-Muslims were meted a step motherly treatment in Government services was nullified by publishing the statistics which clearly showed that non-Muslims continued to enjoy most of the Government jobs, both in Gazetted and non-Gazetted categories.193 To delegitimise the movement and wean the gullible illiterate people away from the satyagrah, the Government published Statements issued by prominent citizens, mostly Hindus from Jammu who criticised the agitation as ‘untimely’, ‘conspiracy’, ‘enemies of refugees’, ‘foreign inspired’, ‘fraud’, ‘unwarranted’, ‘harmful’ and a movement ‘helpful to enemy’.194 Parishad’s demand for a separate home for Dogras was likened to the Muslim League demand of separate homeland for Muslims. It was dubbed as a movement of aggressive Hindu communalism with dangerous repercussions for the Muslims of Kashmir and ultimately for India.195 One important feature that pervaded through all the Government propaganda was that the Parishad and its communal ideology was held responsible for the disturbances in the State. It was held that the progressive reforms initiated by the Government related to land, debt, army and administration had hit hard the feudal elements and these disgruntled landlords, vested interests and demobbed Rajputs wished to sabotage the reforms by communalising the same. Indeed, the Parishad was supported by these elements in the hope that fuller integration with India would, for example, mean that landlords would receive compensation for their confiscated lands and consumers would get cheap items as Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

191 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India and Kashmir-Constitutional Aspect, Accession No. 545/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 192 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, The Flag Issue, New Delhi, n. d., Accession No. 56161, NMML. 193 Kashmir Bureau of Information, Jammu Situation: An Objective Analysis, Accession No. 553/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 194 Praja Parishad Thro’ Many Eyes, Part II, Jammu, n. d., Accession No. 473/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 195 Major Piyar Singh, Praja Parishad Movement in Jammu: A Stab in India’s Back, Jammu, 1952, Accession No. 474/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 261 customs cordon would be abolished.196 The Government only half-heartedly acknowledged that genuine grievances did exist and that there was a need to redress the same. Thus the Government’s understanding of the nature of the agitation seriously coloured its tactics to tackle the same. It was noted by a leading English newspaper that the Government should try to understand as to why a peasant of Jammu to whom land was transferred without any compensation, the indebted peasants and workers who had benefitted from the Government legislations had thrown themselves behind the agitation.197 The Government’s failure to redress the genuine grievances in Jammu could be one of the reasons behind the expansion of the zone of agitation in Jammu. Though lately the Government appointed a Commission to look into the grievances of the people of Jammu, the Parishad refused to withdraw its agitation, alleging that its terms of reference were narrow and its composition was defective.198

It is a fact that the Jammu agitation, in the wake of Government repression would not have survived for so long had it not received support from some right-wing parties of India whose moral and material support also ensured that the agitation continued to get the desired space in the national press. For the time being, all other issues related to food crisis, refugee problem and the issue of language disappeared and Kashmir became a rallying cry. The issue of Jammu was over-prioritised and it was made to look like a grave national problem even though the agitation was confined to a small part of Jammu province, particularly the non-Muslim majority areas of Jammu district proper, Udhampur, Kathua and Samba. In December 1952 Jana Sangh authorized its President, Dr. Mookerjee to approach the Indian Government for redress, failing which he was to give all-India character to the Jammu satyagrah.199 The first annual Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 196 Kashmir Bureau of Information, Searchlight on Jammu Agitation, New Delhi, 1953, pp. 12-13, Accession No. 56199, NMML. Banerjee as early as 1949 held that for politico-social reasons Jammu Hindus would demand closer integration to India as that would give him protection from more stern reforms of Sheikh Abdullah-led Government like abolition of landlordism, expropriation without compensation and cancellation of debts etc. J. K. Banerjee, I Report on Kashmir, Calcutta, n. d., p. 63, Accession No. 260/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 197 Times of India, 11 February 1953. 198 An Enquiry Commission was appointed by the Government under the Chairmanship of Justice Janki Nath Wazir, Chief Justice of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court to look into the working of land reforms, price control, rehabilitation of displaced persons and ex-servicemen. Cabinet Order No. 128-C, Dated 2nd February 1953, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, 8th Phagan 2009 (19 February 1953). 199 Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, p. 203. Mookerjee had already got actively involved in Kashmir. His call for observing December 14 as Jammu and Kashmir Day was celebrated throughout the country, Madhok, Life of a Martyr, p. 194. 262 session of the Jana Sangh held at Kanpur in December 1952 expressed its disapproval of the policies pursued by the Indian Government vis-à-vis Kashmir.200 It passed a resolution expressing ‘sympathy and solidarity’ with the Praja Parishad Movement and paid ‘tributes to those martyrs who laid down their lives for holding the National Flag high in their hands’.201 It also suggested the convening of a round-table conference of Parishad, Kashmir Government and ‘recognised’ leaders of India to evolve a solution of the problem through direct talks. The Working Committee was authorised to give an all-India character to the Jammu movement if the Government failed to take immediate steps to ease the situation.202 The demand was supported by Hindu Mahasabha, Akali Dal and Ramrajya Parishad who forged a united front with Jana Sangh to launch an all-India campaign in favour of the Jammu agitation.203 Dr. Mookerjee tried to put pressure on the Government by demanding that the State should integrate fully with India and if that was not possible, Jammu and Ladakh should be given the right to accede in toto to India, ‘with the help of Kashmir if Kashmir cooperates, without Kashmir if it does not and inspite of Kashmir if it opposes’.204 He carried on a ‘protracted’ correspondence (9 January 1953 to 23 February 1953) with Nehru on the one hand and Sheikh Abdullah on the other to arrive at a decision regarding Kashmir. In his correspondence, Dr. Mookerjee indicted Nehru’s Kashmir policy and insisted that the issue of Kashmir should be settled once for all and instead of depending on the United Nations for its settlement, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly should pass a resolution and finalise the accession with India; Delhi Agreement should be implemented within a stated time, release of Parishad prisoners and withdrawal of vindictive punishments against them, appointment of an impartial commission to look into the grievances of the people of Jammu related to economic advance, employment, rehabilitation of refugees and division of border Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University districts on communal lines; finalisation of the policy regarding ‘liberation and occupation of the Pakistan-held territory’ and a joint meeting of the representatives of the Government of India, Kashmir Government and Praja Parishad leaders.205 Nehru

200 Hindustan Standard, 1 January 1953. 201 Resolution at All India Session, Kanpur, 31 December 1952, Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-1980: Internal Affairs, Vol. 4, p. 117. 202 Ibid., p. 118. 203 Hindustan Times, 6 January 1953. 204 N. L. Gupta, RSS and Kashmir, New Delhi, p. 10, Accession No. 10763, NMML. 205 Mridula Sarabhai, Integrate Kashmir: Mookerjee - Nehru and Abdullah Correspondence, 1953, Accession No. 16596, NMML. 263 reiterated that the Parishad agitation was not only communal but was supported by communal and narrow-minded elements in India. Parishad was trying to decide a very complicated constitutional question by means of war and unless they do not stop the agitation there was no question of releasing the prisoners or holding talks with the Parishad.206 He requested Mookerjee to exercise his influence with the Parishad in stopping the agitation as this was directly related to the national integrity of India.207 Mookerjee charged Sheikh Abdullah with creating a separate status for himself and his State and ‘consciously or unconsciously you are creating a new sovereignty for Jammu and Kashmir State. India has been torn into two by the two-nation theory. You are now developing a three-nation theory, the third being Kashmiri nation’.208 Sheikh Abdullah rejected his charges and castigated Parishad and its supporters for their communal outlook and refused to recognise the Party for deliberations whose basic conception regarding the structure of the State was at variance with theirs.209 As a result the protracted correspondence could not achieve the objective and was, therefore, aborted. S. Radhakrishnan, the Vice-President of India tried to act as intermediary between Nehru and Mookerjee but it failed to diffuse the situation.210 The failure of the talks saw intensification of the agitation in Delhi and Punjab by the triumvirate of Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad with most of the demonstrators coming from Uttar Pradesh. Nehru was told that among the arrested persons 700 were from UP alone.211 Though the Government resorted to stern measures to suppress the agitation, the political atmosphere of India was charged which left behind a trail of bitterness and directly influenced the political developments in Jammu and Kashmir.

The unitary concept of majoritarian nationalism and sovereignty disseminated by the Parishad and Maulanaits supporters Azad in India Library, challenged Aligarh the notions Muslim of liberal University democracy for the Kashmiri Muslims by proposing to do away with the special provisions and autonomy of the State and subjecting them to the rule of a centralised State.212 The

206 Nehru’s Reply to Dr. Mookerjee on 5, 10, 12 and 15 February, Nehru-Mookerjee and Abdullah Correspondence, pp. 8-31. 207 Ibid. 208 Dr. Mookerjee’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 13 February 1953, Nehru-Mookerjee and Abdullah Correspondence, pp. 55-6. 209 Nehru-Mookerjee and Abdullah Correspondence, pp. 59-76. 210 Madhok, Life of a Martyr, p. 216. 211 SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 22, New Delhi, 1998, p. 184. 212 Nyla Ali Khan, Islam, Women and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan, New York, 2010, p. 67. 264 agitation coupled with the failure and weaknesses of the Kashmir Government and the attitude of the Government of India combined together to have a direct impact upon the thinking of the Valley Muslims. A sense of uncertainty was created in their minds regarding the future shape and disposition of the State.213 Barring some isolated voices, the Indian democratic movement failed in countering the communal propaganda and reactionary activities in the country. This failure ensured that firm and unshakable ties could not develop between Kashmir and Indian people’s movements.214 Nehru was not oblivious of the potential dangers of Sangh’s communalism and its impact on the Muslims of Kashmir. He admitted that as a result of the Parishad and Jana Sangh agitation they had become frightened and their resolve to be attached to India has been weakened.215 This ‘fear’ of India increased manifold after the death of Dr Mookerjee when cries were heard for the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah. Nehru wrote:

For the first time public cries are raised in Kashmir that the Indian Army should get out. If I feel strongly on this subject, you will understand me. Nothing more harmful to our cause in the State could have been done even by our enemies. It is for me almost a personal tragedy.216

The basic question that a common Kashmiri asked was that the Indian secularism might be safe in Nehru’s India, but what was the guarantee that Kashmir would get a fair deal after him given the fact that the communal elements in India hadn’t even listened to his appeals for calm and peace. Simultaneously, the pro-Pakistan elements in the State could easily exploit the fears and apprehensions of the people into an anti- India propaganda and draw political mileage out of it.217 The Parishad’s satyagrah found ample space in the Pakistani media which initiated a sustained propaganda targetingMaulanathe Muslims Azad of Library, the Valley Aligarh and held Muslimthat their University future was not safe in a ‘Hindu’ India where the majoritarian communalism could easily wipe out Kashmiri Muslims and erase their unique identity.218 This certainly strengthened the pro-

213 Surjeet, Kashmir and its Future, p. 28. 214 Ibid. 215 Letter to B. C. Roy, 29 June 1953, SWJN, Vol. 22, p. 204. 216 Ibid. 217 Interview with Munshi Ghulam Hassan, Retired Chairman, Jammu and Kashmir Bank. 218 This is clearly evident from the press reports and radio broadcasts from Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Radio broadcasts like Dawat-e-Haq, Zarb-e-Kalim, Dhol-Ka-Pol and Katrev Imarat etc. were popular in the Valley and their Statements were highly provocative. The text of many broadcasts has been given in Kashmir Bureau of Information, Without Comment. 265 Pakistan elements in the State and paved the way for the formation of an overtly pro- Pakistan political party in the State, Kashmir Political Conference which stood for outright accession of the State to Pakistan.219 The manifesto of the Party declared its aims and objectives to root out corruption, nepotism and favouritism in the Government services, withdrawal of ‘foreign’ troops’ and holding of a free plebiscite. It openly raised the slogan of ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ and called out the people of Kashmir to support the State’s accession to Pakistan while assuring the minorities of the protection of life, property and religion in Pakistan.220 It was for the first time after the State’s accession to India that pro-Pakistan slogans were raised in the Kashmir valley by one of the prominent erstwhile leaders of National Conference which signified the disenchantment of the people with India. The pro-Pakistan mood was also echoed by a number of newspapers which sprang up during the period. Newspapers like Al-Haq and Jamhoor asserted that the future of Kashmir was tied to Pakistan as it had geographical, economic, religious and cultural ties with it. More so, the recent developments in and outside the State were testimony to the fact that the future of Kashmiri Muslims was safe in Pakistan only.221

The Parishad’s agitation and the support it received from the communal parties in India had a direct influence on the thinking of Sheikh Abdullah vis-à-vis India. He had been an ardent supporter of Indian democracy and secularism and was determined about the safety of the future of Kashmir within India. However, the rise of the communal forces weakened his resolve. The ambivalence showed by the Indian Government in dealing with the communalists belied his hopes that India would ‘desist from doing anything that smacked of communalism’.222 While the Two-Nation theory had received its first major setback in Kashmir in 1947, the Parishad agitation proved its thesisMaulana and ‘anti Azad-thesis Library, of what Aligarh the freedom Muslim struggle University of Kashmir had animated and stood for between 1939 and 1947’.223 Further, there was now a clear divergence between the stands taken by the Indian and Kashmir Governments vis-à- vis the future of the State. Sheikh Abdullah stood for limited accession and was of the

219 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 19. The Party was formed on 23 June 1953 by Ghulam Mohi-ud- din Karra, one of the close associates of Sheikh Abdullah and a moving force of the underground Quit Kashmir Movement in 1946. 220 Fortnightly Intelligence Report for the Period ending June, 1953, Ministry of States, Government of India, File No. 8(18)-K/53, NAI. 221 Taseer, Tehreek-i- Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. IV, p. 334. 222 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 388. 223 Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, pp. 44-5. 266 view that Kashmir would continue to retain the ‘ironclads of autonomy’, for the Government of India it was just a matter of time when Kashmir would integrate with India like the rest of States. This was the reason why the Indian leaders took the pacts with Kashmir, including the Delhi Agreement, as tentative. This was bound to create confusion in Sheikh Abdullah and sowed the seeds of mistrust.224 He made many conflicting statements and warned that the Parishad satyagrah had created doubts in the minds of Kashmiri Muslims regarding their future in India. He feared that the intentions of the Indian Government had changed vis-à-vis Kashmir even as the future of the State was yet to be decided. He became apprehensive as to what would happen to them when the question of accession was settled. Indian Government might effect a complete merger of the State or even, in the event of communalists forming the Government, change the demographic character of the State by doing away with the State Subject laws or by settling the non-Muslim refugees in Kashmir.225 As a result of these apprehensions and the developments within and outside the State, the basis of the nationalist traits was shaken in Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah began to rethink on Kashmir’s accession and relationship with India.226 For the first time he began to differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims and his conception of the Kashmiri identity excluded the non-Muslims and the regions of Jammu and Ladakh. He held that he would not stand in the way of Jammu and Ladakh seceding from Kashmir.227 It were the Kashmiri Muslims, Sheikh said, who had to decide about the accession and not the non-Muslims and that he had to convince the former that their future was safe in India.228 Sheikh Abdullah began to feel that as a result of the rising communalism in India and the discrimination against Muslims he was not in a position to convince the Kashmiri Muslims that their future was safe in India. As a natural corollary, Pakistan appeared to be the dream destination for the educated unemployed Muslims who Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University believed, at least, that their interests would be safeguarded.229 His anti-India stance as also the emphasising of Kashmir’s internal autonomy was widely acclaimed

224 Mir Qasim writes that Sheikh Abdullah had begun to feel that the Centre had bad intentions with regard to Kashmir and was trying to merge it completely with India. Sheikh Abdullah was aghast at the Central leaders who interpreted the word ‘chosen’ head as nominated which actually meant elected, Qasim, My Life and Times, pp. 56-60. 225 Khwaja Ghulam Mohammad, Sheikh Abdullah ki Wazarat ke Zawaal ke Asbaab, Srinagar, n. d., p. 60, Accession No. 578/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 226 Prakash Chandra, ‘National Question in Kashmir’, Social Scientist, Vol. 13, No. 6, June 1985, p. 50. 227 Times of India, 27 April 1952. 228 Puri, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 231. 229 S. R. Bakshi, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, New Delhi, 1998, p. 101. 267 throughout the Valley. He was given a warm reception on his return from Jammu after his R. S. Pora speech and many spontaneous demonstrations were held in support of his stand. Scores of resolutions were passed congratulating him for his ‘changed attitude towards India’.230 As a result of these developments, the popular mood was turning in favour of Pakistan which began to be expressed publicly after the formation of Political Conference. Though the top leadership of the Conference, including its founder Mohi-ud-din Karra was arrested by the Government, the pro- Pakistan sentiment refused to die down and began to be expressed openly. Even slogans in favour of Pakistan were raised in the National Conference rallies including Hazratbal, the bastion of Sheikh Abdullah. The important aspect was that the slogans were raised in the presence of Sheikh Abdullah who not only did nothing to stop these but also encouraged these elements by holding that the people had every right to raise pro-Pakistan slogans as the issue of Kashmir had not been yet decided.231 Sheikh Abdullah could not remain isolated from the pro-Pakistan mood and he began to feel that in order to remain relevant in Kashmir, to reclaim his ‘lost’ popularity as a result of his advocacy for India and to command the support of the Muslims he had to let the sentiment exist and indirectly support it by not taking action against the people expressing it, in contrast to his earlier policies when mere listening to the Pakistan or Azad Kashmir Radio would land a person in jail. However, he was not simply responding to the popular mood but was an architect of the same through questioning India’s secularism and the safety of Kashmir’s future in it.

With his political faith in India wavering, Sheikh Abdullah sought to give certain concessions to the separatist factions in Jammu and Ladakh. He firmly ruled out the division of the State as he believed that that Kashmir and Jammu could not exist apart and both had Maulana to sink or swimAzad together. Library, However, Aligarh he wasMuslim prepared University to consider the granting of autonomy to different regions within the State. He had already signalled to this effect as early as July 1952 and had the tacit approval of Nehru in this regard.232 On 17 April 1953 in a broadcast from Radio Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah said that in order to remove the fears of domination of one region over the other and to pave way for the ‘voluntary union and consolidation’ of the people of the State, the Government

230 M. Y. Saraf, ‘Occupied Kashmir at the Threshold of a Storm’, Pakistan Times, 8 June 1952 in Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. 5/1/51-KP, NAI. 231 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 248 232 Nehru’s Press Conference on 24 July 1952, SWJN, Vol. 19, p. 250. 268 had decided to grant autonomy to different units of the State.233 Accordingly, the Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly was instructed to thoroughly study the possibility of extending autonomy to each province of the State. A plan was drawn up to establish five autonomous regions within the State: The Valley of Kashmir, Jammu, Ladakh, Gilgit and Poonch (comprising of Mirpur, Poonch, and Muzaffarabad which were part of Azad Kashmir). Because of their dense population and relative importance, it was proposed that Kashmir and Jammu were to have separate Legislative Assemblies and Council of Ministers to govern the regional affairs. Ladakh was to have lesser degree of autonomy with the provision for an elected district council.234 The State was to be designated as ‘Autonomous Federated Unit of the Republic of India’.235 The Plan sought to preserve the organic unity of the State and at the same time provided an outlet to the ‘local’ patriotism of the different regions. However, the Plan failed to get universal approval and reservations were expressed on account of the uneven demographic composition of certain regions which the Plan failed to address. in the Jammu region had a Muslim majority most of whom were ethnically Kashmiris. They refused to be bracketed with the ‘Dogra Hindus and preferred to stay with the Valley Muslims’.236 Further, the Plan left intact Srinagar’s ‘immense powers of superintendence’ and failed to answer the most vital question related to the complete merger of the State with India.237 Notwithstanding the limitations of the Plan, it presented an opportunity to solve the complex internal dimension of the Kashmir Conflict. Parishad refused to accept the Plan and instead felt encouraged by what it could term as the Government’s surrender and therefore intensified its agitation.238

Dr Mookerjee gave a new life to the Parishad’s agitation when he decided to visit JammuMaulana to personally Azad examine Library, the situation. Aligarh He hadMuslim deliberately University decided to enter the State without any permit and therefore Nehru had no qualms in recommending his arrest.239 However, Nehru’s determination was not followed by the Punjab officials

233 Vidhya Bhushan, State Politics and Government: Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu, 1985, p. 184. 234 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, p. 63. 235 The Hindu, 27 April 1953. 236 Prem Nath Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible, New Delhi, 1967, p. 151. 237 Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, p. 205. 238 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 234. 239 Nehru’s Letter to K. N. Katju, SWJN, Vol. 22, pp. 183-84. Sheikh Abdullah had already communicated to Mookerjee that time was not opportune for his visit to Kashmir, Times of India, 10 May 1953. 269 who instead of arresting Mookerjee allowed him to enter the State on 11 May only to be arrested by the Kashmir Government. Sheikh Abdullah smelled a conspiracy in allowing Dr Mookerjee to enter the State and held that the aim might have been to create a misunderstanding and put entire onus of any future development on the Kashmir Government.240 Jana Sangh also alleged that the move to arrest Mookerjee in Kashmir and not in Punjab was a conspiracy hatched by the Central, Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab Governments to deliberately push him to a territory where Mookerjee had ‘none of the legal protections that were available to him outside Jammu and Kashmir’.241 However, notwithstanding the charge, Nehru strongly denounced the action of allowing Mookerjee to enter Kashmir and wrote to his Home Minister that such ‘soft’ attitude was discrediting them and was encouraging the reactionary elements rather than acting as deterrence.242 Mookerjee on his part hoped to liken his visit and subsequent arrest to the Quit Kashmir agitation of 1946 when Nehru, after hearing of the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah had visited the State despite the prohibitive orders by Maharaja Hari Singh and had got himself arrested. His arrest was followed by protest demonstrations against Maharaja throughout the country.243 Certainly Mookerjee had the entire episode in mind and hoped to discredit Sheikh Abdullah and attain popularity for himself and the cause he represented.244 Defying the orders of the Kashmir Government, Mookerjee and his associates, Gurudutt Vaid and Tara Chand entered into the State territory and were detained by the Police under Section 3 of the Public Security Act on the ground that their presence in the State constituted a grave threat to the public peace and tranquillity.245 His arrest was followed by protest demonstrations in and outside the State. There was large scale influx of Jana Sangh supporters from outside the State who entered the State without permits and tried to disrupt the law and order.246 He was put up in a bungalow near Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Nishat and was provided with all sorts of comforts. Prem Nath Dogra was also shifted to the place to give him company.247 There were reports that Mookerjee was contemplating to end the agitation and reach a compromise with the Government.

240 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 377. 241 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-80: History of Jana Sangh, Vol. 6, pp. 153-55. 242 Nehru’s Letter to K. N. Katju, 16 May 1953, SWJN, Vol. 22, p. 185 243 Refer to Chapter 1 of the Thesis, pp. 27-8. 244 Madhok, Life of a Martyr, p. 231. 245 Times of India, 12 May 1953. 246 Fortnightly Intelligence Reports for the period ending May 15, ending May, ending June 15 and ending June 1953, Ministry of States, Government of India, File No. 8(18)-K/53, NAI. 247 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, pp. 118-19. 270 However, his plans were cut short by his death on 23rd June as a result of cardiac arrest.248 His dead body was flown with all courtesies. Sheikh Abdullah personally went to the airport and put a white Kashmiri shawl on the dead body.249 Tributes flowed to him from all walks of political life and his sacrifices for the Kashmir cause were highlighted.250 Nehru paid a rich tribute to him in the Parliament and supported the adjournment of House as a mark of respect for his demise.251

The death of Dr Mookerjee raised a storm of indignation throughout India, particularly Bengal where even the opponents of Mookerjee were aghast at the manner of his death. Jayaprakash Narayan called his death a national tragedy and charged the Government with criminal negligence.252 Even Nehru was not spared for siding with the Kashmir Government and shielding Sheikh Abdullah, who the agitated Indians believed was the real culprit behind the death of Dr Mookerjee. A wave of indignation spread throughout India with the people raising provocative slogans- Abdullah ko phansi do (Hang Abdullah), Dr Mookerjee ka kaun qatil-Nehru aur Abdullah (Who killed Dr Mookerjee-Nehru and Abdullah) and Khoon ka badla khoon se lo (Seek blood for blood).253 Jana Sangh called his death as ‘the greatest blot on the Government of Free India’ and held that the ‘responsibility for Dr Mookerji’s arrest, detention and death in jail primarily and fully lies on the shoulders of Nehru Government. It is now for the Government to establish its innocence in the matter by placing all the facts and evidence before the public’.254 Dr. B. C. Roy also wrote a number of letters to Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru and demanded a Commission of Enquiry comprising M.R. Jayakar or H.N. Kunzru, a judge of the Supreme Court and the Director-General of Health Services, to appease the demand of the public’ who had been emotionally wound up as a result of the ‘unnatural’ death of Dr Mookerjee. While Maulana Sheikh had Azad no hesitation Library, in accepting Aligarh an Muslim enquiry,255 UniversityNehru while expressing sympathy with the people rejected the demands of an enquiry, holding that it would

248 Madhok, Life of a Martyr, p. 231. 249 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 379. Munshi Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 252 mentions that Sheikh Abdullah also tied a permit to the dead body of Dr Mookerjee which seems very unlikely. 250 Times of India, 24 June 1953. 251 Parliamentary Debates: House of The People (Official Report), Vol. VI, No. 1, cols. 1-6. 252 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 8 July 1953. 253 Quoted in Nehru’s Letter to Jayaprakash Narayan, 29 July 1953, Balraj Puri, JP on Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, 2005, p. 36. 254 Resolution of Jana Sangh’s Central Working Committee, Delhi, 4 July 1953, Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-1980: Internal Affairs, Vol. 4, pp. 109-10. 255 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 380. 271 give rise to undue suspicions as internal conditions were not favourable in Kashmir.256 Praja Parishad was infuriated to the point of desperation and took out protest processions in all important towns of the Jammu province alleging that Mookerjee’s death was the result of a conspiracy.257 It also decided to suspend the agitation for thirteen days which was decided as the period of mourning for Dr. Mookerjee.258 The death of Dr Mookerjee removed the chances of a compromise and catalysed the downfall of Sheikh Abdullah.

Rupture in Nehru-Sheikh Relations

Nehru had been the greatest supporter of Sheikh Abdullah and his demands for greater autonomy. Partly responsible for his support were the friendly ties between the two but most importantly, Nehru needed Sheikh Abdullah to win over Kashmir as he strongly believed that only he could deliver Kashmir to India. In his support to Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru had gone against many adverse intelligence reports and the advices of his most trusted friends, including Patel. However, by 1953 discernible changes could be seen in Nehru’s attitude. The continued Parishad agitation and the involvement of leaders like Dr. Mookerjee, J. P. Narayan and Acharya Kripalani in it ostensibly troubled Nehru. Though he tried to put brakes on the movement both through motivation and by recommending the use of force, the agitation refused to die down. The main problem possibly was that on the face of it, the Parishad demands appeared to be convincingly democratic as they stood for upholding the unity of India and stood against the disintegration of the Indian Republic. Prima facie they seemed to safeguard the national interests and therefore it was not easy to dub them anti- nationals per se. The Parishad demand to integrate Kashmir more closely with India had a patriotic appeal and the Indians could easily associate themselves with the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University demand. One of the important aspects of the Parishad agitation was that it went beyond criticising Sheikh Abdullah or Kashmir Government and directly questioned Nehru’s handling of Kashmir affairs. It presented an opportunity to the opposition to corner Nehru’s Government vis-à-vis many domestic issues and his handling of the foreign affairs. Dr Mookerjee was candid in telling Nehru that the Jammu satyagrah was part of his continuous feud with him as Prime Minister as his leadership had

256 Nehru’s Letters to B. C. Roy, 29 June 1953, SWJN, Vol. 22, pp. 202-08. 257 Fortnightly Intelligence Report for the period ending June 1953, Ministry of States, File No. 8(18)- K/53, NAI. 258 Ibid. 272 become a ‘national liability’.259 Nehru’s appeals to his opponents to stop looking at Kashmir through personal prism and rather understand its intricacies went unheeded. In view of the developments in the State, pressure was mounting on Nehru as he himself was blamed for all the mess in Kashmir. Sheikh’s intransigence regarding the implementation of the Delhi Agreement anguished Nehru. He admitted to Karan Singh that he had no answer to his critics as to why the Agreement was not being implemented.260 Answering a question in the Rajya Sabha, Nehru admitted that the non-implementation of the Agreement had led to a discontentment. He also held that it was up to the people of Kashmir to decide about their future and the Government of India could not compel them to accept its view point.261 In one of his last letters to Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru made a strong pitch for the implementation of Delhi Agreement and castigated Sheikh for undue delay which had only given rise to doubts and criticism in India. In a sharp tone Nehru wrote that he had ‘no idea whatever of what your committees are doing’ and he failed to understand that why the matter was kept hanging in mid-air and let the ‘wretched and reprehensible’ activity to continue.262 Nehru was dismayed at the ‘changed’ behaviour of Sheikh Abdullah and he did not quite understand whether Sheikh was still in favour of India. His suspicion and uncertainty vis-à-vis Kashmir is clearly evident from his letter to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad when he wrote that ‘I feel quite helpless about this Kashmir issue because I do not know where I stand’.263 He was to repeat the same bitterly to Sheikh Abdullah prior to his departure to London for attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference ‘I have not the ghost of a notion of what I am going to say to him (Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan) about this because, apart from larger issues, I do not even know for certain what the present position is vis-à-vis India'.264 While dealing with the situation Nehru found himself alone and this took a Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University toll on his relationship with Sheikh Abdullah who became an easy scapegoat. The first expression of his frustration with Sheikh Abdullah was on March 1st 1953 when he wrote to Maulana Azad that Sheikh Abdullah’s mind was so utterly confused that he

259 Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, p. 123. 260 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 154. 261 Discussion in Rajya Sabha, 10 April 1953, Parliamentary Debates: Council of States (Official Report), Vol. III, 9 to 22 April 1953, cols. 2587-2591. 262 Nehru’s Letter to Sheikh Abdullah, 27 April 1953, SWJN, Vol. 22, pp. 212-13. 263 Letter to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, 27 April 1953, Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, p. 127. 264 Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, p. 129. 273 didn’t know what to do.265 On the other hand Sheikh also began to feel that there was an ‘about-face’ on the part of the Government of India and Nehru was succumbing to the right wing pressures.266 One of the important and unfortunate facets of this widening chasm between the two was that in the preceding months of Sheikh’s dismissal and arrest, little direct correspondence was maintained between the two. Nehru chose to deal with Sheikh Abdullah through intermediaries-Maulana Azad and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai who could not match Nehru’s deep personal interest and emotional attachment with Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah. The criticism of opposition parties and Nehru’s failure to persuade Sheikh Abdullah only increased the mistrust between the two. Sheikh Abdullah also began to find a ‘changed’ Nehru and he gave a cold response to his multiple requests to visit Delhi.267 The relationship that had been decisive in making Kashmir a part of India and influencing its politics for more than a decade had now been corroded beyond repair and threatened the future of Kashmir with India. In the end Nehru, with his immense powers and national prestige was able to effect the ouster of a ‘regional’ leader through a well-crafted plan which involved both the close friends of Sheikh Abdullah and his rivals.

With the reciprocal change of attitude of Sheikh Abdullah towards India and Nehru’s towards Sheikh Abdullah and the consequent chasm between the two, events moved with lightening rapidity between May and August 1953 which created uncertainty not only in New Delhi but also in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah had started hinting at his displeasure with India and the possible alternatives for Kashmir. He did not only question Kashmir’s accession to India but also toyed with the idea of independence.268 However, the idea of an independent Kashmir was not new and can be gauged from Sheikh’s mind and the popular mood as early as October 1947 when the State was yet to accede to India.MaulanaAfter accession Azad Library, to India he Aligarhreferred to Muslim the option Universitysecretly as well as publicly. In February 1948 when Sheikh Abdullah travelled to the US as part of the Indian delegation to the United Nations, he expressly defended India’s position in Kashmir. But privately he spoke to Warren Austin, the US representative at the UN

265 SWJN, Vol. 21, p. 210. Nehru was perturbed by Sheikh Abdullah’s display of ambivalence and unwillingness in dealing with the situation and he began to feel that Sheikh Abdullah was not listening to him. He was to repeat his displeasure in a letter to Vijayalakhshmi Pandit on 3 March, ‘he is in a complete jam and is very disheartened about everything’, Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, p. 125. 266 Y. D. Gundevia, The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah, New Delhi, 1974, p. 110. 267 M. O. Mathai, My Days with Nehru, New Delhi, 1979, p. 240. 268 , ed., Makers of Modern Asia, Cambridge, 2014, p. 130. 274 that there was the option of independence for Kashmir as ‘he did not want his people torn by dissension between the two countries. It would be better if Kashmir were independent and could seek American and British aid for developing the country’.269 Though immediately Austin did not encourage Sheikh Abdullah, the State Department later held that if independence would settle the Kashmir Dispute it would not oppose it completely.270 While in the US Sheikh Abdullah also told the Pakistani delegation that the best acceptable face saving solution was that Kashmir should be an independent State free from India and Pakistan.271 Throughout 1949 and 1950 he recalled his views on independence of the State in conversation with the foreign ambassadors and news correspondents but retracted his statements when confronted by the Indian Government, particularly Nehru.272 Most of the foreign correspondents who interviewed Sheikh Abdullah before and after his dismissal came to the conclusion that Sheikh preferred an independent Kashmir if it was guaranteed by the leading nations of the world including India and Pakistan.273 That he did not lose sight of the option is evident from the fact that while delineating on the options before the State in the Constituent Assembly he talked about the prospects of an independent Kashmir but in the same breath dismissed it as impracticable. In the summer of 1953 Sheikh Abdullah no longer enjoyed the confidence of his most trusted and confidant friend, Nehru. The political mood in India was not favourable to him and therefore any ‘adventure’ was to be viewed very seriously. In May 1953 US Democratic leader Adlai Stevenson who was on a private visit to South Asia spent a few days in Srinagar where he held frank discussions with Sheikh Abdullah.274 The meeting fuelled speculations in India and it was alleged that Stevenson expressed sympathy for Sheikh’s idea of independence and assured him of US support.275 Conspiracy theories started doing rounds that US was ready to support Sheikh Abdullah in return for Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University American air bases in Kashmir. Stevenson himself denied any conspiracy and held that he had found in Sheikh Abdullah a ‘partiality for India’ and a ‘casual’ suggestion regarding independence which he did not encourage.276 The US official position was

269 Quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States: South Asia, 1948, Vol. 5, pp. 292-93. 270 Howard B. Schaffer, The Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir, Washington, 2009, p. 19. 271 Taseer, The Kashmir of Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah, p. 51. 272 Refer to Chapter 4, pp. 6-7. 273 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. IV/19/310/1958-KP, NAI. 274 Schaffer, The Limits of Influence, p. 40. 275 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 237. 276 Ibid., p. 40. 275 clearly stated by Mr. G. V. Allen, US Ambassador to India who held that the ‘U.S. government is not interfering in Kashmir and that any loose talk by private Americans regarding independence is fully repudiated’.277 Notwithstanding the official repudiation by the US, India continued to believe that something was being done behind the doors to malign India. Nehru’s belated statement in the Parliament on the issue echoed the prevalent ambivalence and suspicion and thus failed to clear the confusion. He held that Kashmir being a highly strategic area, there have been individual interferences, if not governmental, in it. Many countries were interested in Kashmir which collected information about it through intelligence.278 The suspicions have to be seen in the context of a report by Robert Trumbull in the New York Times on 5 July 1953, published by the Times of India on 10 July, which quoted US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles as saying that the best solution of the Kashmir Dispute was the independence for the Valley, guaranteed by both the nations and the partition of the rest of the State along the Cease-fire Line.279 According to the formula, Pakistan would get the Azad Kashmir which comprised of one-fourth of the total area of the State and contained one-fifth of the population. India would get the Jammu province and Ladakh.280 Though the Report was dismissed by both India and Pakistan, it raised eyebrows in India and suspicions of the supposed disloyalty of Sheikh Abdullah to India got strengthened. It was in this context that Nehru visited Srinagar in mid-May and advised Sheikh Abdullah to summon the Assembly and confirm the State’s accession to India.281 This came as a rude shock to Sheikh as it was Nehru who had earlier stopped them from ratifying the accession. Sheikh was to recall later in an interview to Shabistan Urdu Digest, Translated and Published as The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah that the Indian Government was going back on the promises made to him and the people of Kashmir which not only meant a loss of prestige but also raised Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University questions regarding the safety of Kashmiri Muslims who would be ‘lost in the vastness of India’.282 Sheikh Abdullah had now clearly switched from compromise to

277 Schaffer, America’s Role in Kashmir, p. 41. 278 Nehru’s Statement in Parliament, 17 September 1953, Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vol. IV, No. 32, col. 3997. As for as the role of Stevenson was concerned, Nehru held that he could not be blamed in any way, notwithstanding the deep interest shown by the American Embassy in Kashmir, Nehru’s Letter to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, 3 October 1953, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 24, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 387-88. 279 Times of India, 10 July 1953. 280 Ibid. See also, Map 10, p. x. 281 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 370. 282 Gundevia, The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah, pp. 40-46. 276 confrontation and refused to accept Nehru’s suggestion that there was a middle course between ‘full integration’ and ‘full autonomy’. He insisted that the only solution acceptable to the people of Kashmir was the one which granted them maximum freedom.283 Pertinent to mention, the Communists had been supporting Sheikh Abdullah as an agent against imperialism and Indian capitalism and were amply represented in his administration.284 However, when the news started doing rounds that Sheikh Abdullah was planning to make Kashmir independent with the support of the US, the Communists changed their attitude. Further, by this time a new era of Indo-Soviet friendship had started which the communists could not ignore. A resolution passed by the Party’s Central Committee in July 1953 viewed with ‘grave concern reports from Kashmir that some leading personalities of the Sheikh Abdullah group and its supporters have made public declarations that the State of Kashmir should be made independent of India’.285 While giving up the support for an independent Kashmir and ‘unreservedly accepting the State’s accession to India’, the Communist Party tried to satisfy the autonomous urge of Kashmiris by holding that Kashmir should be allowed to retain ‘this status of virtual independence within the framework of the Indian Union’.286 In the light of the Resolution when Sheikh Abdullah called upon Sadiq and Girdhari Lal Dogra to explain their position, they reaffirmed their loyalty to him and the party and held that they were communists only by approach and were not bound by the resolution.287 It was one of the many concoctions and dualistic approaches resorted to by these leaders as they professed their loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah while simultaneously hatched the conspiracy against him in connivance with the Indian Government. Only a few days later they openly revolted against their master.

InternalMaulana Dynamics Azad of Kashmir Library, and Aligarh the Response Muslim of CentreUniversity

In such charged political atmosphere the Working Committee of the National Conference met under the presidentship of Sheikh Abdullah on 18 May to hold deliberations regarding the future of the State. Krishan Dev Sethi mentions in his autobiography that the Working Committee got divided into two groups and

283 Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, p. 127. 284 Kashmir Democratic Union, Rise of Communism in Kashmir, Delhi, 1952, pp. 96-32, Accession No. 9180, NMML. 285 Balraj Puri, Communism in Kashmir, Calcutta, 1961, p. 19, Accession No. HD 3598, NMML. 286 Surjeet Singh, Kashmir and its Future, p. 36. 287 Puri, Communism in Kashmir, p. 20. 277 sometimes held separate meetings. One group, under Sheikh Abdullah and including Afzal Beg, Sofi Akbar, Khwaja Mubarak Shah, Abdul Gani Goni and Ghulam Mohi- ud-din Hamadani favoured an alternative to the accession to India, which might also include independence. The other group included all the Hindu members (Girdhari Lal Dogra, Dhar, Saraf, and Sardar Budd Singh) besides Bakshi, Maulana Masoodi, Sadiq and Mir Qasim stood for continued accession to India under the existing arrangements.288 After prolonged discussions the Committee held that so long as the State’s future was uncertain it was impossible to have internal stability.289 A Sub- Committee of eight members290 was appointed to explore a settlement to the Kashmir Dispute which was to be referred to the General Council of the National Conference for approval. In its final session held on 9 June 1953 the committee put forward the following proposals regarding an honourable and peaceful solution of the Kashmir Dispute:291

a) Overall plebiscite for the whole State b) Independence of the whole State c) Independence of the whole State with joint control of foreign affairs d) Dixon Plan with independence for the plebiscite area

Bakshi was of the opinion that the proposal (d) above should be put up first as the ‘only practicable, advantageous and honourable’ solution of the Dispute. However, on Masoodi’s suggestion the given order of preference was adhered to. G. M. Sadiq recommended an overall plebiscite if an agency would be constituted of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Union and China to supervise and conduct the plebiscite, failing which a supervisory commission comprising all the members of the Security Council should ensure free and fair plebiscite in the State. 292 One fails to Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University understand why many of the members including Bakshi and Sadiq who later made a volte-face against Sheikh Abdullah opposed neither the deliberations nor the final outcome of the sub-Committee. If they had ‘substantial differences’ with Sheikh Abdullah they could have easily opposed the final decision of the sub-Committee

288 Sethi, Yaad-i-Rafta, p. 71. 289 A. G. Noorani, ‘How and Why Nehru and Abdullah Fell out’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 5, January 30-Feb 5, 1999, pp. 268-72. 290 Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza Afzal Beg, G. M. Sadiq, Shamlal Saraf, Maulana Masoodi, Sardar Budh Singh and Girdhari Lal Dogra. 291 Minutes quoted in the letter of Sheikh Abdullah to Sadiq on 26 September 1956, Mridula Sarabhai, Sheikh-Sadiq correspondence (August to October 1956), New Delhi, 1956, p. 18. 292 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 373. 278 given the fact that six out of eight members of the Committee were on their side. How was it possible to take the decisions on the basis of unanimity as has been maintained by Sheikh Abdullah.293 The confusion has led Noorani to the conclusion that the statement that Bakshi and Sadiq differed substantially from Sheikh Abdullah is inaccurate and is not substantiated by the sources.294 Further, had Bakshi serious differences with the outcome of the Committee he would not have been sent by Sheikh Abdullah along with Beg to acquaint the centre about its decisions.295 However, behind the doors they gave the impression to New Delhi that they were against the sub-Committee proposals which only increased its mistrust with Sheikh Abdullah. Significantly, Maulana Masoodi dismissed the rumours of a rift within the cabinet and held that the Working Committee had unanimously passed a resolution expressing its confidence in the Delhi Agreement and had passed instructions to the National Conference party in the Constituent Assembly to make necessary steps for the implementation of rest of the provisions of Delhi Agreement.296

Nehru was kept aware about the deliberations of the sub-Committee and its final report.297 He viewed the proceedings disapprovingly and blamed Sheikh Abdullah for lack of clarity which resulted in the persistence of the ‘irritating’ problem.298 His reactions to the developing crisis can be gauged from his Statement to the Lok Sabha on 17 September 1953. He said that he was ‘surprised and disturbed to see what was happening there’ while advising the National Conference leaders to ‘pull together’.299 He outrightly dismissed the idea of independent Kashmir and held that he would give Kashmir to Pakistan on a platter rather than allow it to be a headache between the two countries.300 He advised Maulana Azad to visit Kashmir in the hope that Sheikh Abdullah could be persuaded to soften his tone. When Maulana Azad visited Kashmir in JuneMaulana1953 he was Azad ignored Library, by Sheikh Aligarh Abdullah Muslimand humiliated University by Kashmiris. While delivering his post-Eid speech at Srinagar Eidgah, Sheikh Abdullah symbolically called upon the people not to listen to his speech.301 When the latter started talking

293 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 117. 294 Noorani, The Kashmir Dispute, Vol. II, p. 403. 295 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 384. That Bakshi was sent by Sheikh Abdullah is also proved by the latter’s letter to Maulana Azad on 9 July. 296 Khalid, 31 May 1953. 297 A. G. Noorani, ‘Brought to Heel’, Frontline, Vol. 25, No. 18, August 30 –September 12, 2008. 298 Nehru’s Letter to G. S. Bajpai, 11 June 1953, SWJN, Vol. 22, p. 191. 299 Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vo. IV, No. 32, col. 3993. 300 Qasim, My Life and Times, p. 61. 301 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 245. 279 about the benefits of Kashmir’s accession to India, people raised slogans against him and called him a traitor. Humiliated and failing in his mission, Azad recommended the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah before he could commit more mischief.302 He was supported by Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, Minister incharge of Kashmir Affairs, who had also received a rebuff at the hands of Sheikh Abdullah.303 Karan Singh was also apparently disturbed by the changing attitude of Sheikh Abdullah in view of the proceedings of the Working Committee. He wrote a letter to Nehru apprising him of the situation and held that Sheikh ‘cannot be allowed’ to go back upon his solemn commitments with India. He demanded Nehru’s immediate attention for a ‘final and decisive’ solution. In his autobiography Karan Singh ends the note here.304 But in his select correspondence, few more lines are added as ‘I have requested Dr. Katju to arrange for the Government of India Intelligence service here to keep in close touch with me as that will greatly help me in correctly appraising this unstable and most unpredictable situation’.305 This Note is very significant as it contains the hints regarding beginning of the conspiracy that saw the downfall of Sheikh Abdullah.

With the situation reaching an impasse and all attempts at reconciliation failing, Nehru made one of the last attempts to woo Sheikh Abdullah. His continuous appeals to Sheikh Abdullah to visit Delhi for reconciliation were turned down by the latter. Sheikh held that he was too busy to visit Delhi and there were occasions when personal relationships had to be sacrificed at the altar of national interests.306 On 29 June he wrote a lengthy letter,307 one of his last, to Sheikh Abdullah in a tone which was in clear contrast to his earlier correspondences. Sheikh Abdullah replied to the letter on 4 July308 and made a point-by-point refutation of Nehru’s criticism. While renewing his invitation to Sheikh Abdullah to visit Delhi along with Bakshi, Beg and Maulana MasoodiMaulana, Nehru Azad began Library, by trying Aligarh to impress Muslim Sheikh AbdullahUniversity with the prowess and importance of India in Asia and Europe where ‘our’ help was sought by

302 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 37. 303 Kidwai had expressed desire to visit Kashmir to effect reconciliation with Sheikh Abdullah but was discouraged by the latter as Sheikh believed that situation had deteriorated to such an extent that it was not possible for Kidwai to set things right, Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 382. 304 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 155. 305 Jawaid Alam, ed., Jammu and Kashmir 1949-64: Select Correspondence between Jawaharlal Nehru and Karan Singh, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 114-16. Emphasis Mine. 306 B. M. Kaul, The Untold Story, Bombay, 1967, p. 139 307 SWJN, Vol. 22, pp. 193-199. 308 Sandeep Bamzai, Bonfire of Kashmiryat: Deconstructing the Accession, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 179- 84. 280 ministers and others. He reminded Sheikh of his Note of 25 August 1952 in which Nehru had clearly made a volte-face about his position on Kashmir and had practically nullified the possibility of a plebiscite.309 This important Note revealed the dual policies or real politic of Nehru who in his public and official pronouncements always paid a lip service to the plebiscite and the rights of the Kashmiri people while privately going back on all his commitments. Sheikh Abdullah could not have remained unmoved with this revealing Note. It certainly would have increased his uncertainties and doubts that if India could go back on its basic promises, what was the guarantee that the special status and autonomy of Kashmir would be safeguarded in future. Nevertheless, by invoking the Note of 1952 now, almost after a year when the relations between the two were at its lowest ebb and when Sheikh Abdullah was full of doubts and had time and again displayed his displeasure with India, Nehru wanted to impress upon him the non-feasibility of plebiscite and the only honourable solution as the continued accession to India. Nehru rejected Sheikh Abdullah’s contention that only two courses were available for them-full integration or full autonomy. He suggested a middle course which meant integration with a measure of autonomy as specified in the Delhi Agreement and expressed surprise that the settlement was by-passed and repudiated.310 Nehru’s contention that if Delhi Agreement could be overridden, then any other agreement could also be repudiated would not have escaped Sheikh Abdullah’s attention. That it only increased his suspicions is evident from his reply which said that the Indian leaders publicly abjured the guarantees provided by the Indian Constitution by holding that these arrangements, including Article 370, were temporary and when the time was ripe these could be wiped off the Constitution.311 Nehru cast aspersions on the secular attitude of Sheikh Abdullah which was akin to communalising a secular demand for Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University autonomy and ‘wounding to one whose secular credentials were as impeccable as Nehru’s’.312 Questioning Nehru’s practicality of secularism, Sheikh Abdullah replied that ‘in spite of you and many others, the ideals of secular democracy are not much in evidence in so far as treatment to Kashmiri Muslim is concerned’.313 Nehru also accused that the Kashmir Government was not harmonious and was pulling in

309 SWJN, Vol. 19, pp. 322-330. 310 SWJN, Vol. 22, p. 196. 311 Bamzai, Bonfire of Kashmiryat, p. 181. 312 Noorani, The Kashmir Dispute, p. 404. 313 Bamzai, Bonfire of Kashmiryat, pp. 182-83. 281 different directions.314 Sheikh dismissed the charge as baseless and held that there was no difference of opinion among his colleagues so far as the basic principles were concerned. Nehru did not hesitate to mention that if his ‘conscience’ or an ‘overriding national interest’ required, then he would have no option but to part ways with Sheikh Abdullah which was a clear hint about the future developments.315 The most intriguing part of this correspondence was that it was full of accusations and counter-accusations and very few attempts were made to arrive at a common ground. Nehru instead of placating Sheikh Abdullah as he had been doing since 1947 questioned his integrity and secularism. While he displayed patience and understanding of Sheikh Abdullah’s problems in his letters to B. C. Roy on the same date,316 he was not conciliatory to Sheikh Abdullah. He downgraded or underestimated the impact of the Praja Parishad and the rising communal tendencies in India on Sheikh Abdullah. Further, Nehru remained stuck to the implementation of Delhi Agreement and did not give sufficient firm assurances to Sheikh Abdullah that the autonomy granted to Kashmir would be safeguarded at any cost as it was clear, even to one of the staunchest critics of Sheikh Abdullah, B. N. Mullick that Sheikh Abdullah was favouring a special status, just short of independence.317

With the parleys failing between Nehru and Abdullah, Maulana Azad stepped in to attempt reconciliation. He wrote a letter to Sheikh Abdullah on 9 July and assured him that the special position of Kashmir would be made permanent without any reservations:

What I am telling you now is as a personal friend. There is only one way of safeguarding the future well-being of the people of Kashmir and that is the way which we laid down in 1949 and which you had then accepted. Hold steadfastly to this wayMaulana and be assured Azad that Library, you will never Aligarh have to Muslimregret it.318 University

The belated assurance from Azad, not Nehru, failed to satisfy Sheikh Abdullah. The reasons for the same have been given by the latter in his reply on 16 July 1953.319 Sheikh Abdullah held that the special position of the State was based on Article 370 but doubts were created among the people of Kashmir by expressing time and again

314 SWJN, Vol. 22, p. 198. 315 Ibid., p. 199. 316 Ibid., pp. 203-09. 317 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 39. 318 Azad to Abdullah, 9 July 1953 cited in Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, p. 131. 319 The full text of the letter is given in Noorani, Article 370, pp. 232-36. 282 that the special treatment of Kashmir was provisional and that the ultimate objective of the Government of India was to secure the complete merger of the State with India at an appropriate time. Such Statements were bound to create repercussions in the Valley. Sheikh said that if the declaration regarding the permanency of Kashmir’s special position had been made at an ‘appropriate’ time, it would have strengthened their hands and unified public opinion in the State. Now it was too late as the declaration would not dispel the fears of the people of Kashmir. The letter contains one of the important statements which dispels many conspiracy theories regarding Sheikh Abdullah that he had made up his mind for independence on the basis of the Sub- Committee report and was not prepared to make any compromise on that. Sheikh wrote to Azad to seriously consider and examine high-power committee recommendations and in case he did not find these proposals practicable, ‘then you should put forth your own proposal keeping in view the importance of internal and external aspects of the matter’.320 This reveals that Sheikh Abdullah was prepared to listen and deliberate on the matter. However, the Government of India chose to stop persuading Sheikh Abdullah and instead silence him through force.

Sheikh Abdullah Out of Control

With the channels of communication drying up and the rising uncertainty in the State, both the Indian Government and Sheikh Abdullah began to move in completely opposite directions. Sheikh Abdullah began expressing a ‘muddled assortment of viewpoints’.321 He trained his guns at India and not only questioned the accession but also Indian secularism and democratic values. His references to India were in the most hostile terms. On the occasion of Jumat-ul-vida322 Sheikh Abdullah addressed a post- prayer meeting at Jamia Masjid and held that accession to India was provisional Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University subject to the outcome of a plebiscite. He said, ‘Historians will write that I made a huge mistake in 1947 but I was not a traitor’.323 After his speech people raised slogans of Raishumari Zindabad (Long Live Plebiscite).324 Addressing the National Conference workers at Mujahid Manzil on 12 July 1953, Sheikh Abdullah said that the foundations of the relationship between India and Kashmir had shaken and the

320 Ibid., p. 236. 321 Thomas, Faultline Kashmir, p. 216. 322 The last Friday of the month of Ramadan-ninth month of the Islamic calendar. 323 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 249. 324 Ibid. 283 responsibility went to the Praja Parishad. Calling upon India and Pakistan to remove their external differences over Kashmir, Sheikh spoke that the solution for Kashmir should be acceptable to 40 lakh Kashmiris.325 While speaking at Khanyar on the occasion of Martyr’s Day which was attended by many foreigners including Mr. Richard Leach, First Secretary of the American Embassy in India, Sheikh Abdullah castigated the communal forces in India for supporting Praja Parishad agitation and held that it was for the attainment of freedom, honour and prosperity that Kashmiris had made sacrifices and not for becoming an appendage to either India or Pakistan. The goal of achieving independence, he said, should not be lost sight of. 326 On 30 July he addressed a crowd of peasants and said that Kashmir should not merge with any country and should seek goodwill of both India and Pakistan.327 The mention of Pakistan and India in the same breath was a clear change in his earlier approach when he talked of Pakistan as an aggressor.328 On another occasion he said, ‘communal happenings of last year have shaken the foundation of our relationship with Indian Union, and the responsibility for this does not lie at our door but on those sections in India who are attempting to force the State to merge with India’.329 Referring to the discrimination against Muslims in Defence and Posts and Telegraph Services, Sheikh Abdullah said that he could not convince Muslims regarding the safety of their future in India. He questioned the accession itself by saying that it was forced on Kashmir because of India’s refusal to help without accession. Making a plea for good relations with both the countries, he assured his audience that his party was in search of a solution in which was hidden the secret of happiness and prosperity.330 Mirza Afzal Beg also delivered many hostile speeches. In his speeches at Lolab and Khanyar he told people to side-line what he said in public and act upon what he said in secret.331 These hostile utterances were widely reported in the Indian media and their Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University exaggerated versions created an uproar throughout India with the voices calling for Sheikh’s dismissal before he could do something detrimental to India. It has been

325 Khalid, 16 July 1953. 326 Khidmat, 15 July 1953. 327 Norman D. Palmer, ‘The Changing Scene in Kashmir’, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, No. 12, Nov., 1953, pp. 157-163. 328 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, London, 1996, p. 184. 329 Hindustan Times, 24 July 1953. 330 Sheikh’s speech on 31 July at Ganderbal, Ghulam Mohammad Mir Rajpori and Manohar Nath Kaul, Conspiracy in Kashmir, pp. 64-67, Accession No. 306/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 331 Watan Farosh Haar Gaye: Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s Speech in the Legislative Assembly on 5 March 1955, Accession No. 562/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 284 argued that the response of the Indian Government, Nehru of course the main actor, was two pronged. It encouraged the dissension within the ranks of National Conference and then using some of the dissenters, through a well-orchestrated plan, in undermining Sheikh Abdullah. The Government also sought to build a national consensus on the issue of Kashmir and remove opposition to its policies. In this regard Nehru made a sympathetic appeal to the Praja Parishad and its supporters to end the agitation as it was injuring the cause of Jammu and Kashmir and India.332 He displayed an understanding of the problems of Jammu which he believed could be solved through peaceful and democratic means. The appeal had its desired impact and the satyagrah for the complete integration of Kashmir with India was called off as the parties involved believed that the ‘movement has achieved the purpose of impressing on the government and on the country the urgent necessity of tackling the problem in an objective manner’.333 Prem Nath Dogra said in an interview that one of the objectives of the agitation was achieved as Nehru had recognised the Jammu leadership. Further, they withdrew the agitation to give Nehru a chance to set things right as they were guided the patriotic urge to strengthen Nehru’s hands in his talks with Mohammad Ali.334 Mullick attempts to take credit for the withdrawal of the agitation as he holds that it was he who, with Nehru’s support, persuaded people regarding the same.335 His frequent meetings with Bakshi and Dhar and cold attitude towards Sheikh Abdullah during the fateful days give an indication of the Centre’s plans. The appeal and suspension of the agitation has, therefore, much to do with the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah.

In the summer of 1953 there were rumours of a rift between Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. The apparent cause was the difference in their perspectivesMaulana regarding Azad the Library,Kashmir issue Aligarh. Bakshi Muslim was a strong University advocate of Kashmir’s permanent accession to India. His conviction for India though was not based on strong ideological grounds as that of Sheikh Abdullah,336 he was pragmatic and found practical benefits for Kashmir in its association with India. Therefore, when Sheikh Abdullah began to question Kashmir’s permanent association with India, Bakshi stood

332 National Herald, 3 July 1953 333 Hindustan Times, 8 July 1953 334 Leader, Allahabad, 19 July 1953. 335 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 32. 336 Ibid., p. 14. 285 steadfast in his loyalty to India.337 The beginning of the rift can be located to 25 March 1953 when Bakshi in his capacity as the Deputy Prime Minister issued a condolence message to the families whose kith had been killed in Government action during the course of the Praja Parishad agitation.338 Sheikh Abdullah expressed his displeasure at Bakshi’s step which amounted to giving legitimacy to the Parishad movement, given the fact that Sheikh was against any display of leniency towards Parishad and its supporters. With the formation of Political Conference and the consequent arrest of its leaders following open pro-Pakistan slogans, there were rumours that Sheikh Abdullah was against their arrest and it was Bakshi who passed orders for their detention. The news of the rift within the Cabinet spread like a wildfire and Bakshi bore the brunt of public criticism and accusations.339 Sheikh Abdullah downplayed the rumours and clarified in a National Conference Workers’ meeting at Mujahid Manzil that the decision was taken unanimously by the Cabinet and Bakshi in his capacity as incharge of law and order had only implemented the orders. He also said that he had full confidence in Bakshi.340 Bakshi also tried to stop the ‘baseless’ news of his alleged disagreements with Sheikh Abdullah and held that it was the work of Pakistani agents to spread lies and falsehood. Expressing his loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah, he said that it was part of the faith for National Conference workers to consider Sheikh as their ‘only’ leader.341 However, the rumours ceased to stop and only led to further speculations. By this time the Government of India stepped in to not only encourage the rift but also engineer it further as it had begun to become disillusioned with Sheikh Abdullah because of his anti-India rant. Sheikh had now become unreliable and it had to create a parallel leadership in Kashmir which would not only bring the anti-India propaganda to a stop but also bring Kashmir closer to India. With Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah drifting apart, Bakshi came closer to Nehru. When Nehru visited Kashmir in Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University the month of May, the coldness between him and Sheikh Abdullah was clearly evident while Sheikh Abdullah found Nehru confidentially talking to Bakshi and his trusted

337 O. N. Kak, Khalid-i-Kashmir Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad Through My Eyes, pp. 72-73, Accession No. 12033, Research and Publications Department, Srinagar. 338 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, p. 326. 339 Khalid, 24 June 1953. 340 Ibid. 341 Khalid, 15 June 1953. Bakshi was to reiterate his loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah on another occasion when the latter called him to clarify his speech in which he had said that the accession to India was final and irrevocable. Bakshi said that Islam has five basic principles but he believes in six. The sixth one was the belief in Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership, Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 250. 286 men.342 The occasion to strengthen the newly developed friendship was provided when Sheikh Abdullah sent Bakshi along with Afzal Beg and D. P. Dhar to Delhi to acquaint the Centre about the report of the sub-Committee. While Beg returned, Bakshi and Dhar stayed back for a few more days during which they discussed the modus operandi for the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah.343 It was also alleged that Bakshi held negotiations with the leaders of Jana Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha wherein the developments in Kashmir were discussed and assurances were given by Bakshi to them. It was reported that Bakshi told them to be patient as steps would be taken before October to ‘remove the barriers that stand in the way of fuller unity between Kashmir and the rest of India’.344 His parleys with the leaders got confirmed when after becoming the Prime Minister, Bakshi in his first speech at Jammu called Prem Nath Dogra a fatherly figure and said that he had been fighting the same battle as Dogra for the past two years.345 After his return to Kashmir he was a changed man and began to show disrespect to Sheikh Abdullah.346 He began to tour different parts of the Valley and addressed meetings in which he rebuffed Sheikh Abdullah’s changed attitude towards India. He also maintained a close contact with Karan Singh and acquainted him about his differences with Sheikh Abdullah.347 Sheikh Abdullah had received many reports about Bakshi that he was conspiring against him and was publicly denouncing his view point. However, Sheikh always brushed aside the reports as he believed that Bakshi won’t deceive him. Further, whenever Sheikh showed the reports to Bakshi, he would always swear his allegiance and loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah.348

The rift was no more hidden now and began to be expressed openly throughout the Valley. While Sheikh Abdullah continued to have hold in Srinagar and Ganderbal on accountMaulana of his successful Azad Library, use of shrines Aligarh and Muslim mosques forUniversity carrying out political

342 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 371. 343 Balraj Puri, ‘Kashmir and Rest of India: First Emotional Rupture’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 49, December 6- 12, 2006, pp. 5143-5145. 344 The Pioneer, 21 July 1953. 345 Sethi, Yaad-i-Rafta, p. 77. 346 Immediately after Bakshi’s return from Delhi Sheikh Abdullah came to meet him. Unexpectedly Bakshi did not welcome him and when he was asked the reason for discourtesy he pointed towards his foot and held that Sheikh deserved this, Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 252. 347 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 156. 348 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 385. Only a few days before his dismissal, Bakshi reiterated his loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah. When on one occasion the latter called Bakshi to clarify his speech in which he had said that the accession to India was final and irrevocable, Bakshi said that Islam had five basic principles but he believed in six. The sixth one was his belief in Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership and loyalty to him, Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 250. 287 activities, Bakshi addressed numerous meetings in Baramulla and South Kashmir. Intelligence reports for the month of July clearly point out the differences between the two factions. Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg in their speeches criticised India and stressed on the right of the people of Kashmir to decide their future. On the other hand, Bakshi and Sadiq admonished the ‘opportunists’ and told their supporters that Kashmir was bound to India through the instrument of Accession and Delhi Agreement.349 G. M. Sadiq called Sheikh’s idea of an independent Kashmir childish which would convert Kashmir into a cockpit of international intrigue. He held that Kashmir’s betterment lied in its association with India.350 Bakshi addressed a series of meetings in Shopian and Kulgam and vehemently criticised Sheikh Abdullah’s position. He said that ‘Kashmiris would defend at the cost of their lives the State's accession to India and a special position granted to Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Constitution’.351 Pitching strongly for continued association with India due to its secular democracy, economic and social programme, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist traditions, Bakshi while addressing a public meeting at Kulgam on 30 July expressed that any slogan or threat that seeks to disturb Kashmir’s relationship with India would land it in political servitude and economic bankruptcy.352 The conflicting statements by the leaders created confusion among the people of Kashmir. They were panic-stricken as a result of rumours and extensive propaganda. The confusion can be gleaned from the multiplicity of voices they heard on a daily basis: Sheikh Abdullah’s group sold the dream of independence as the panacea for all the economic and political ills of Kashmir, Communists advised people not to be carried away by the slogan of independence as it was a camouflage for Anglo-American imperialistic foothold in Kashmir, Muslim Conference353 and Political Conference promised the advent of Pakistan in a month354 and Bakshi group told them that the future of Kashmir was tied Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University with India. Therefore, not only was there rift within the cabinet, but also without it. Conflicting Statements by the leaders created conflicting loyalties which led to social

349 Intelligence Reports for the period ending July 1953, Ministry of States, File No. 8(18)-K/53, NAI. 350 Khalid, 24 July 1953. 351 Hindustan Times, 27 July 1953. 352 Rajpori and Kaul, Conspiracy in Kashmir, pp. 69-70. 353 After 1947 Muslim Conference was not functioning in the State. It was revived on 2 August 1953. Its officiating president, Mohammad Amin, brother of Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah declared that the Conference was revived to awaken the Muslims from lethargy in an effective but constitutional manner. It demanded withdrawal of foreign troops from the State and a free and fair plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir, Times of India, 3 August 1953. 354 Intelligence Reports for the period ending July 1953, Ministry of States, File No. 8(18)-K/53, NAI. 288 conflict. Quarrels, skirmishes, abuses and mud-slinging became order of the day, given the fact that every leader had his constituency of supporters who were least tolerant, like their leaders, towards the opposite view point. It was in this context that Sheikh Abdullah declared at a meeting on 7 August that in order to stop the disruptive elements he would convey his view point to the general public and throw light on all the problems on the day of Eid (21 August). He also called a meeting of the Working Committee and General Council of National Conference on 24 and 26 August respectively.355 Before he could do that, he was dismissed and arrested within a few days.

Sheikh Abdullah had prepared a speech in Urdu which he was to deliver on 21 August on the occasion of Eid. In the undelivered speech Sheikh Abdullah bemoaned the uncertainty and suspense in the State as a result of conflicting viewpoints which was not only encouraging corruption but also hindering the economic development of the State. Referring to the provisional nature of the Accession to India and the incapability of the Constituent Assembly of the State to ratify it given the fact that one-third of the State’s population was unrepresented in it and its decision, as India itself accepted, would not be binding on either India or Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah held that though he stood by the Delhi Agreement but since it flowed from the Accession, it was temporary and interim. He talked about his inability to motivate the Muslims, the prime stakeholders, about the security of their future as a result of the Parishad agitation and communal tendencies in India. Reiterating his commitment to the Instrument of Accession and Delhi Agreement, Sheikh asked: a) Whether the public opinion in India, Jammu and Ladakh would accept the relationship as final with no scope for alteration; b) Would international factors not change the relationship; c) WouldMaulana all sections Azad of the Library,State’s population Aligarh benefitMuslim from University such relationship while overcoming the geographical and natural barriers. This speech lays bare the charge that Sheikh Abdullah was to repudiate Accession and declare Kashmir an independent State on the fateful day.356 Later, in an interview to the Shabistan Urdu Digest, Sheikh also dismissed the charge as baseless and without holding any ground.357 The real reasons for his dismissal, Sheikh Abdullah said in an interview to Blitz, Bombay on 18 January 1958, were that Delhi was losing faith in his leadership, creating suspicions

355 Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, p. 207. 356 Nyla Ali Khan, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s Reflections on Kashmir, New York, 2018, pp. 39-42. 357 Gundevia, The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah, pp. 45-6. 289 without any justification and conspiring with his own people to throw him out. Sheikh said that he had even offered to Maulana Masoodi to step down if Bakshi or anybody else was more acceptable to Delhi but what happened on 9 August broke the link he had built with his blood and sacrifice over the past two decades.358

The major factor that became decisive in the final outcome of the tussle between Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi was the support of the Central Government, particularly Nehru. Nehru had already become disenchanted with Sheikh Abdullah on account of his hostile utterances against India so much so that he wrote to Bajpai that ‘I really cannot explain his new attitude except on the uncharitable assumption that he has lost grip of his mind’.359 All lines of communication between them had dried up which only closed the doors for reconciliation. On the other hand, in the light of changing circumstances Nehru’s preference for Bakshi had increased and he began to maintain close contact with him. Bakshi on his part sought to win the confidence of Nehru by continuously criticising Sheikh Abdullah for the new line he had taken up. In a letter to Nehru on 17 July 1953 Bakshi held Sheikh Abdullah responsible for the factionalism in the Government and National Conference which had led to the breakdown of administrative machinery in the State. He ‘requested’ that ‘this development had got to be arrested somewhere and that too very quickly’.360 Simultaneously, D. P. Dhar became a frequent visitor to New Delhi where he acquainted Nehru with the political situation of Kashmir and the conflict within the Cabinet.361 Nehru was bearing the brunt of criticism in India as it was held that Nehru had reposed unlimited trust in Sheikh Abdullah which the latter was misusing. There were voices for the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah else India would have to wash its hands off Kashmir. On the international side, bilateral negotiations were held between Nehru and MohammadMaulana Ali, Azad the Prime Library, Minister Aligarh of Pakistan Muslim at Karachi University between 25 and 27 July 1953. Pakistan was eager to have a settlement and made 'quite plaintive and almost pathetic' appeals for settling the Kashmir issue’.362 Though nothing convincing could come out of the negotiations, it was decided to hold further deliberations at Delhi. Given the hostile situation in Kashmir when the public opinion was decidedly anti-India, even Nehru conceded that India would lose if a plebiscite was held at this

358 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. IV/16/307/KP/57, NAI. 359 Letter to G. S. Bajpai, 30 July 1953, SWJN, Second Series, Vol. 23, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 295-97. 360 SWJN, Vol. 23, p. 290. 361 Kaul, The Untold Story, pp. 137-39. 362 Nehru’s Letter to Bakshi, 30 July 1953, SWJN, Vo. 23, pp. 300-03. 290 time and India could not hold onto Kashmir ‘at the point of a bayonet’.363 The situation therefore necessitated the taking of drastic steps in Kashmir so that the anti-India feeling was arrested which would give India a moral high in its negotiations with Pakistan. It was therefore not a coincidence that a few days after his return from Karachi Nehru prepared an important Note on 31 July, recorded by his Private Secretary, M. O. Mathai, which spelt out the line of action to be taken in Kashmir, including the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah.364

The Final Assault

Events in Kashmir moved fast with Sheikh Abdullah acting openly and Bakshi and his group in secrecy. On 7 August during a stormy Cabinet session, Sheikh Abdullah demanded the resignation of Shamlal Saraf, Minister for Health, Development and Local Self-Government and Jails on the grounds of serious administrative complaints regarding the working of the departments under him.365 By demanding the resignation of the member who was opposed to his new line of thinking, Sheikh Abdullah hoped to replace him with a person who would support him in his endeavours. The rift between Sheikh and Saraf had become imminent on August 3 when Sheikh Abdullah was addressing a workers’ meeting and held that only Muslims had to decide about the future of the State to which Saraf reacted and expressed views which were not palatable to Sheikh and his new line of thinking.366 Saraf refused to resign and sent a letter to Sheikh Abdullah in which he described charges against him as baseless and frivolous.367 He accused Sheikh Abdullah of repudiating the established policies of National Conference regarding the relationship of the State with India through his inflammatory speeches in the public and authoritarian attitude in the Cabinet.368 Sheikh Abdullah had not expected a refusal to resign from Saraf and the consequent political Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University crisis in the State. He was unaware about the fact that Saraf along with Bakshi and Dogra were conniving against him with the support of Karan Singh and Central

363 Nehru’s Letter to B.C. Roy, 29 June 1953, SWJN, Vol. 22, p. 203. 364 SWJN, Vol. 23, pp. 303-05. 365 Times of India, 8 August 1953. There were some serious corruption charges against Shamlal Saraf himself and Sheikh Abdullah had taken a strong note of those, Siddiqi, Sheikh Abdullah, Kashmir aur hum, pp. 73-77. 366 Sadiq Ali and Madhu Limaye, Report on Kashmir, New Delhi, 1954, p. 11. 367 Times of India, 9 August 1953 368 Singh, Heir Apparent, pp. 158-59. 291 Government.369 Sheikh’s act alarmed the Bakshi group as they were afraid that they might also be targeted. They submitted a long memorandum to Sheikh Abdullah on 8 August and accused him of taking arbitrary measures against the wishes of majority of the Cabinet members which was against the principle of joint responsibility and collective functioning of the Cabinet.370 They talked of pronounced difference of opinion with regard to certain matters and alleged that their voice was being muzzled and they were sidelined. Most importantly, they accused Sheikh of arbitrarily rupturing the relationship of the State with India, the relationship of which he himself was the chief architect. Because of the lack of a strict supervision on the functioning of the administration, there was large-scale corruption, nepotism, inefficiency and wanton wastage of resources. They pronounced that as a result of the discord, Cabinet had lost the confidence of the people.371 It is strange that Sheikh Abdullah received both the memorandum and the order of dismissal at the same time in the dead of the night at Gulmarg.372 Pertinent to mention, only two days before Sheikh’s dismissal Maulana Masoodi deprecated reports about the people’s loss of confidence in Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership. He maintained that Sheikh Abdullah continued to be undisputed leader of Kashmir.373 Nevertheless, everything was meticulously planned so as not give a breathing space to Sheikh Abdullah. In the afternoon of 8 August Sheikh Abdullah visited Sadr-i-Riyasat to update him about the latest situation. Regarding the discussions, Karan Singh and Sheikh Abdullah present conflicting statements in their autobiographies. Karan Singh writes that he expressed distress at the lack of homogeneity within the Cabinet and suggested convening of the Cabinet meeting at his residence ‘that evening’ but Sheikh Abdullah side-tracked his suggestion.374 Whereas Sheikh Abdullah mentions that Karan Singh advised him to convene the Cabinet ‘weekend over’.375 Later after his first release from prison Sheikh Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Abdullah refuted the news that Karan Singh had advised him to convene the Cabinet

369 A few hours before his dismissal Sheikh Abdullah wrote a letter to Maulana Masoodi (on 8 August) giving details about the incidents which led him to demand the resignation of Sham Lal Saraf. He showed complete ignorance of any conspiracy when he said, ‘I am going to Gulmarg for two days and shall return on Monday. Conditions are good and there is nothing to worry about....Rest everything is fine’, Suresh K. Sharma and S. R. Bakshi, Sheikh Abdullah and Kashmir, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 210-13. Karan Singh also mentions that Sheikh Abdullah was completely unaware of the developments, Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 163. 370 Times of India, 10 August 1953. 371 Ibid. 372 Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 125. 373 Times of India, 7 August 1953. 374 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 160. 375 Abdullah, The Blazing Chinar, p. 398. 292 meeting immediately. Rather it had been decided to decide the issue on 10 August.376 Sheikh Abdullah had planned to visit Gulmarg and the intelligence agencies reported that he was going to meet some emissary from Pakistan.377 Bakshi and Dhar feared that with help from Pakistan Sheikh would arrest them and declare Kashmir as independent.378 However, this was a blatant lie as Sheikh Abdullah did not leave for Gulmarg all of a sudden but had announced his plans well in advance. The charge also never figured, not even in Nehru’s papers.379 After Sheikh Abdullah went to Gulmarg Karan Singh sent him the dismissal order with a covering letter on 8 August which said that owing to the dissensions within the Cabinet and the inability of Sheikh Abdullah to forge unity in it, the Council of Ministers headed by Sheikh Abdullah has been dismissed. The order issued by the Sadr-e-Riyasat gave several reasons for the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah:380

1. Acute differences of opinion between members of the Government on political, economic and administrative issues and public expression of the differences 2. Opposition of the majority of the Cabinet members to the Prime Minister and because of the lack of unity of purpose and action, it has lost the confidence of the people and jeopardized the unity, prosperity and stability of the State 3. Increase in the economic distress making honest and efficient administration impracticable.

A look at the reasons clearly establishes that none of these formed a sufficient ground to dismiss a democratically elected Government. Sheikh Abdullah had lost the confidence of the majority of the Cabinet and not the Constituent Assembly to which he was responsible and that alone could pass a vote of no-confidence against him. Besides, Sheikh Abdullah had lost the confidence of New Delhi which was the most Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University significant cause of his downfall. Mir Qasim sums up, ‘Whenever New Delhi feels a leader in Kashmir is getting too big for his shoes, it employs Machiavellian methods to

376 Siddiqi, Sheikh Abdullah, Kashmir aur Hum, pp.77-8. 377 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 44. 378 Kaul, The Untold Story, p. 143. 379 A. G. Noorani, ‘The Legacy of 1953’, Frontline, Volume 25, Issue 17, Aug. 16-29, 2008. The charge was also refuted by Sham Lal Wat, Director Visitors’ Bureau who was accompanying Sheikh Abdullah on his trip to Gulmarg. He held that a meeting had been fixed for 9 August in advance at Gulmarg to discuss the widening of Gulmarg Road which was also to be attended by Chief Secretary and Chief Engineer, Siddiqi, Sheikh Abdullah, Kashmir aur Hum, p. 79. 380 Singh, Heir Apparent, pp. 161-63. 293 cut him to size’.381 Karan Singh’s claim that he had acted in a ‘democratic and constitutional’ manner fails all the logic in which the parliamentary democracies function. To dismiss a Government on the basis of divergence within the Cabinet was no sufficient ground as ‘no government in India, Central or State, is free from this divergence’.382 The real course should have been to summon the Constituent Assembly and ascertain if Sheikh Abdullah stands the test of the floor. However, New Delhi was sure that if given a chance, Sheikh Abdullah would come out victorious and therefore he was dismissed arbitrarily, throwing all the democratic processes to dust. The dismissal, therefore, was illegal and unconstitutional. The dismissal was enacted in the name of the people of Kashmir but ‘by no stretch of the imagination could the locking up of Abdullah (sic) and the appointment of a new Cabinet be regarded as the will of the people’.383 Sheikh Abdullah was arrested under the Public Security Act, the same Act which he had been using against his opponents ruthlessly. He was charged with disruptionism, corruption, nepotism, maladministration and establishing foreign contacts of a kind dangerous to the peace of the State.384 He was sent to Udhampur where he was lodged at Tara Nivas. After his dismissal, Karan Singh invited Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad to form the new cabinet immediately in order to avoid a political and administrative vacuum.385

The news of the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah spread like wild fire and protest demonstrations were held in the Kashmir Valley and Doda and Kishtwar regions which continued for three weeks.386 There was uncertainty everywhere and in many areas Militia men deserted their forces and joined the demonstrators. At many places demonstrations turned violent and attacked Government offices, bridges and army establishments. Mir Qasim held that Srinagar was in total chaos with Bakshi’s own house beingMaulanaattacked .Azad387 Sadiq Library, Ali and Madhu Aligarh Limaye Muslim of the Praja University Socialist Party, who visited Kashmir on 25 September and remained there for a fortnight, testify to the large scale demonstrations in the Valley. Everywhere slogans of Sher-i-Kashmir Zindabad and Pakistan Zindabad were raised.388 Army and Police had already been

381 Qasim, My Life and Times, p. 119. 382 Noorani, Article 370, p. 11. 383 Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 241. 384 Times of India, 10 August 1953. 385 Karan Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 164. 386 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 46. 387 Qasim, My Life and Times, p. 70. 388 Ali and Limaye, Report on Kashmir, pp. 17-18. 294 alerted and the demonstrations were ruthlessly suppressed. In the wake of Army orders ‘shoot to kill’, a large number of persons were killed and wounded.389 Mullick puts the number of killings at 60390 but the number was fairly large in the wake of huge demonstrations and ruthless suppression throughout the Valley, with large cases, particularly in rural areas being unreported.391 The Government later appointed Justice Jialal Kilam Commission to enquire into the killings after 9 August 1953 but its report was never published. Munshi Ishaq claims that he came to know from authentic sources that the Commission had put the number of killings at 2000.392 A large number of persons were thrown behind the bars which included the workers of National Conference, legislators and Government officials whose loyalty to the new dispensation was suspected. Sheikh Abdullah’s dwindling popularity reached to its zenith and he attained the status of a martyr who was sacrificed at the altar of India.

There has been a controversy with regard to the role of Nehru in the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. This has primarily arisen because of Nehru’s insistence that the developments in Kashmir took place on their own, without his interference. On 9 August Nehru wrote to the President of India that he (and his Government) had not interfered with the ‘internal’ happenings in the State.393 While briefing the Parliament on the situation in Kashmir, Nehru stressed on the fact that it was completely an internal affair and their advice was ‘neither sought nor given’. He held that Indian Army personnel was not involved in any way.394 He was to repeat the same line in his address to the Chief Ministers on 22 August that in no way did he interfere in the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah except that his advice was that constitutional procedures should be followed. Nehru’s biographer S. Gopal also maintained that Nehru did not interfere in the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah and his only intervention was that ‘on hearingMaulana that the majorityAzad Library, group in Aligarh the Cabinet Muslim had requested University the local military commander for movement of troops, to order that the Indian army should not be involved’.395 Karan Singh also give the impression that the decision to sack Abdullah

389 Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir, p. 173. 390 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 46. 391 Mirza Afzal Beg later mentioned in the Assembly that 1500 people had been killed in the Government action. Bakshi rejected the stats and held that 36 people were killed, Watan Farosh Haar Gaye. 392 Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 254. 393 Letter to Rajendra Prasad, SWJN, Vol. 23, pp. 309-10. 394 Nehru’s Statement regarding Kashmir Situation on 10 August 1953, Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vol. VI, Part II, cols. 439-446. 395 Gopal, Nehru: A biography, p. 132. 295 and arrest him was taken by him, in consultation with Bakshi, Dhar, B. M. Kaul and others. He also holds that all the preparations regarding the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah were done by D. P. Dhar in ‘three days’.396 However, the claims are not substantiated by the sources, including the personal papers of Nehru. It appears to be very difficult that Nehru was not involved in the developments in Kashmir given the kind of relationship he had developed with Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah. He was deeply and emotionally attached to Sheikh Abdullah and all major developments in the State since 1947 had taken with place with his connivance and support. No one, including a relative non-entity Karan Singh, would have dared to take such drastic steps without the prior directions of Nehru. The Note recorded by M. O. Mathai clearly showed the path to be followed:

The present drift and the resulting confusion cannot be allowed to go on…..a brief memorandum might be prepared and placed before the Cabinet….The main point clarified in the memorandum should be the future of the State which has given rise o so much argument in public recently…..If the minority refuse to abide by it, the continuation of the present Government becomes impossible. The Head of the States should be informed accordingly. He should ask for the resignation of the Government….I will be desirable not to allow any marked lapse of time between the demand for resignation and the formation of the new Government….If the resignations are not forthcoming, he should have an order ready for the dismissal of the Government….Immediately he should entrust the formation of the new government to the other person….The new Government should meet (immediately)….should issue Statements to the public stating the facts and indicating their policy, including their economic policy…..It may be desirable to arrest one or two such persons who are known to be corrupt, even before Maulanathe steps indicated Azad above Library, are taken…All Aligarh necessary Muslim steps shouldUniversity be taken for the preservation of law and order…Such assistance as may be considered necessary for the maintenance of law and order should be available….Immediate first steps should be the removal of certain well-known corrupt officers etc., suspension of others whose loyalty is doubted.397

The events in Kashmir on 8 August exactly followed the same trajectory- memorandum by the Cabinet, Karan Singh’s demand of resignation from Sheikh Abdullah, his dismissal, formation of new Government, arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and

396 Singh, Heir Apparent, p. 161. 397 SWJN, Vol. 23, pp. 303-05. 296 his associates, Bakshi’s Statement to the public and announcement of economic policy and extensive arrangements for the maintenance of law and order. It can hardly be a coincidence and clearly proves the compliance of Nehru in the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah.

Nehru’s complicity is also proved by the accounts of B. N. Mullick, the Intelligence Officer, Ajit Prasad Jain and B. M. Kaul. Elaborate planning was done in New Delhi to execute the ‘Exercise’ to its minute detail as New Delhi was aware that any mismanagement would land it in trouble. Mullick gives a detailed account of the operation. He mentions that it was Pandit Nehru who in consultation with Rafi Ahmad Kidwai ordered the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. In order to oversee the operation special persons who were close to Nehru and Kidwai were deputed to Srinagar. They included D. W. Mehra, Deputy Director of Intelligence Bureau who was instructed to assume control of the Jammu and Kashmir Police Force if need arose; Brigadier B. M. Kaul was entrusted the task of passing the information about the impending operation to the Corps Commander, Lt. Gen Hiralal Atal for mobilising the army; Ajit Prasad Jain was sent to Srinagar to watch the developments and inform New Delhi accordingly.398 B. M. Kaul confirms that around 25 July when Dhar presented a disturbing report about the dissensions within the Cabinet, Nehru recommended the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah after holding discussions with Kidwai and told him to go to Srinagar to help them in this mission.399 Kaul, however, comments that Nehru instructed that notwithstanding anything, Sheikh Abdullah should not be arrested under any circumstances as they won’t be able to justify his arrest before the world community.400 Ajit Prasad Jain wrote his account which was first published by the Bombay monthly, Imprint in June 1972. He wrote that when KidwaiMaulana told him toAzad visit Library, Srinagar to Aligarh execute Muslim the dismissal University and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, he wanted to get the confirmation of Nehru since that action in Kashmir involved international ramifications. Nehru not only gave his consent but also gave him instructions in simple and unambiguous words which had already been written on a piece of paper.401 He rejects Kaul’s assertion that Nehru was against the arrest of

398 Mullick, My Years with Nehru, pp. 41-43. 399 Kaul, The Untold Story, pp. 144. 400 Ibid. 401 Jain, Kashmir: What Really Happened, pp. 112-13. This is corroborated by the account of M. O. Mathai, Nehru’s Special Secretary, who claims that on Nehru’s orders he typed an unsigned ‘Memorandum of Instruction’. This was to be delivered to Karan Singh through Ajit Prasad Jain, 297 Sheikh Abdullah. Jain wrote that ‘Nehru certainly wanted the responsibility for the action against the Sheikh to rest with Kashmiri leaders but he would not resist any action, including Abdullah’s arrest, which they considered unnecessary’.402

Nehru’s claim that the Indian Army was not involved in any way is contradicted by the account of Lt. Gen. Hiralal Atal, the then Corps Commander at Udhampur who gives a detailed account of the involvement of the army.403 He writes that he was personally summoned by Nehru and told to give all ‘possible advice, guidance and assistance’ in the successful execution of the operation. According to a well outlined plan sizeable troops were stationed in Srinagar to meet any challenges to ‘internal security’. He gives reference to the visit of an officer from the Adjutant General’s Branch who was on a secret mission and frequently met Karan Singh, Bakshi, Dhar and others while carrying a ‘largish sum of money’. It had been decided that the army would be the sole incharge of the after-arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues who would be lodged at Udhampur, which was readily prepared for the same. Troops were stationed all along the road to meet any eventuality. Atal received compliments from Bakshi and his Commander for the successful execution of the ‘exercise’. Thus, Nehru’s claims are contradicted by the persons who were directly involved in the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah at the behest of Nehru. It is clear that Nehru, in calling the developments in Kashmir an internal affair and denying his involvement in the same, was lying to the President, Parliament and Chief Ministers of the States.

Bakshi was reluctant to assume the charge of the Prime Ministership till he got the news that Sheikh Abdullah had been arrested. He was afraid that if Sheikh Abdullah was left free he could not maintain the administration.404 He, along with Girdhari Lal Dogra as the second Minister, was sworn in on 9 August at 4:35 am by the Sadr-i- Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Riyasat.405 Later he broadcasted a speech from Radio Kashmir, Srinagar in which he broke the news about the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. He charged Sheikh of betraying the country’s interests by aligning with foreign powers for carving out an

instructing him to dismiss Sheikh Abdullah and appoint Bakshi in his place, Mathai, My Days with Nehru, p. 241. 402 Jain, Kashmir: What Really Happened, p. 119. Emphasis mine. 403 The subsequent statements are from his book, Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir, pp. 156-183. 404 Gopal, Nehru: A Biography, p. 133 405 Times of India, 10 August 1953. 298 independent State.406 He referred to the indissoluble links of the State with India and praised its beneficence for spending huge amounts in Kashmir and generating employment opportunities for the local populace. Trying to placate the people of Jammu and Ladakh, he pledged that all the three regions would equally benefit from the policies of the Government and their genuine grievance would be redressed. He also announced some ameliorative measures which included: 1) Mujwaza to be rationalised –Kandi areas not to be assessed to Mujwaza and small peasants to be exempted from it; 2) Price of shali was reduced; 3) Reorganisation of Cooperatives; 4) Arrangement of alternative credit agencies; 5) Implementation of Wazir Committee Recommendations; 6) Promotion of trade and better amenities to tourists; 7) Labour welfare measures and employment opportunities.407 From the tone of his speech, it was clearly evident that he was ‘halting, quivering and diddery (sic)’.408 The guilt of conspiring against his most trusted friend might have been haunting him. Nevertheless, he assumed the reins of the Government and started legitimising his takeover by luring the people with promises of a better life. Great stress was laid on the machinations of the foreign powers, particularly the US in Kashmir. G. M. Sadiq held that he had got ample proof that Sheikh Abdullah was conspiring with these powers to destabilise the State.409 The Communist Party of India while welcoming the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah and the formation of new Government called this as the culmination of developments in Kashmir since the visit of Adlai Stevenson.410 While giving air to the theory of ‘foreign hand’, the Government actually wanted to justify its ‘unconstitutional’ action and win the support of the gullible masses. It is noteworthy that the broadcast speech of Bakshi was authored by two well-known Communist leaders-Dr. K. M. Ashraf and Dr. J. N. Bhan.411 Another aspect of legitimising his Government was to get the support of the National Conference and Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University the Constituent Assembly. A special Convention of the General Council of the National Conference was held on 12, 13 and 14 September at Emporium Garden

406 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Averts National Disaster, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s Call to People, Accession No. 537/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 407 Ibid. 408 Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir, p. 181. 409 Mohi-ud-din, Kashmir 1931 se 1977 tak, p. 131. 410 Times of India, 10 August 1953. The Communists later issued a detailed Statement on the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in which reference was made to the foreign hands in Kashmir, Cross Road, Bombay, 16 August 1953. 411 Puri, Communism in Kashmir, p. 20. 299 Srinagar. On the third day a written Resolution was passed which carried the signatures of seventy out of one hundred twelve members of the General Council and fourty five out of 75 Members of Assembly.412 The Resolution Stated that in the interests of the nation and the national movement the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah was inevitable and expressed confidence in the new Government which was to function in the light of Naya Kashmir. Replacing Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi was unanimously elected as the President of the Party.413 The Assembly Party of the National Conference removed Sheikh Abdullah from the leadership of the Party and elected Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as the Leader in the Legislature. The Legislative Assembly met on 5 October and unanimously adopted the motion moved by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad:

This Assembly records its deep appreciation for the timely action taken by the Sadr-i-Riyasat by his order dated 8thAugust, 1953 and thereafter in asking me to form the present Ministry. This Assembly further pledges its full support to and expresses its complete faith and confidence in the present Ministry.414

However, there had been some opposition also which the new Government, like its predecessor, did not allow to be voiced. Twelve members of the House had prepared a memorandum to be submitted before the Assembly, seeking a report on the reasons responsible for the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. When Bakshi got to know of the memorandum he threatened the members of dire consequences.415 Many of the members who spoke in favour of the new Ministry had been released from jails the very same day or the day before.416 The twentieth session of the National Conference was held from 30 October to 2 November 1954 at Srinagar after a gap of four years. Seven hundred fifty delegates attended the Session and discussed the political and economic situationMaulana of the StateAzadin Library,the pre and Aligarh post-Sheikh Muslim Abdullah University period. It passed a Political Resolution calling the people to fight against the imperialist intrigues and

412 Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, p. 403. 413 Ibid., pp. 401-03. Munshi Ishaq alleges that only a few people had turned to attend the Convention. The Party, with full cooperation of the Bakshi Government, transported Gujjars and people from far-off and backward villages to Srinagar and gave them free meals for participation in the Convention, Ishaq, Nidaa-e-Haque, p. 260. 414 Jammu and Kashmir Government, Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, Unanimous Vote of Confidence in Bakshi Government, Accession No. 544/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 415 Mohi-ud-din, Kashmir 1931 se 1977 tak, p. 131. 416 Ali and Limaye, Report on Kashmir, p. 20. 300 expressed full confidence in the Bakshi’s Government.417 Having got support of the Party as well as the Legislature Bakshi consolidated his position and with adequate monetary help from India undertook some important measures related to economy, tourism, trade and education which ameliorated the conditions of the people. Bakshi’s period also saw the beginning of closer integration of the State with India. Delhi Agreement was implemented and the State’s accession to India was ratified.418 The voices of dissent were muzzled more effectively than before and his period saw corruption and nepotism reaching zenith, with Bakshi himself leading from the front. There was continuous rigging of elections and all democratic processes and traditions were thrown to dust.419

Reaction in India and Pakistan

The dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah brought a sea change in the attitude of Pakistan towards him. From a villain, Sheikh overnight became a hero in Pakistan. He was praised for his valour, determination and self-sacrifice. His dismissal was interpreted as a betrayal by ‘Hindu’ Nehru and was used to impress the people of Kashmir that if India betrayed its most trusted leader, what was the guarantee that Kashmiri ‘Muslims’ would remain safe in India.420 Immediately after the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent a telegram to Nehru on 10 August and expressed that entire Pakistan had been gravely disturbed and distressed by the developments and happenings in Kashmir.421 Later, he visited Delhi where on 20 August a joint press communiqué was issued by both the Prime Ministers resolving to settle Kashmir as per the wishes of the people to be ascertained through a fair and impartial plebiscite. It was also decided that the Plebiscite Administrator would be appointed by the end of April 1954.422 Despite the declaration, protests were held in almost all parts of Pakistan Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

417 Twentieth Session of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference Proceedings, Srinagar, 1954, Accession No. 56261, NMML. 418 Noorani, The Kashmir Question, p. 73. 419 Rekha Chowdhary, Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of Identity and Separatism, New York, 2016, pp. 34-5. 420 Press Reports on Kashmir, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, File No. 309/IV/9/1/59-KP, NAI. 421 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, Negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India regarding the Kashmir Dispute (June 1953 to September 1954), 1954, Accession No. 56088, NMML. 422 Josef Korbel, ‘The Kashmir Dispute After Six Years’, International Organization, Vol. 7, No. 4, Nov., 1953, pp. 498-510. The later events proved that Nehru was not sincere in his declaration and he only wanted the situation to cool down to evade the international pressure as a result of the situation in Kashmir. He wrote to Karan Singh on 21 August, ‘But for some kind of an agreement 301 in support of Sheikh Abdullah and rallying cries for launching Jihad against India could be heard. Fatima Jinnah, sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah led protests in Karachi and appealed Pakistani to render their services for the freedom of Kashmir.423 As a result of the Pakistan support, pro-Pakistan sentiment gained strength in the Valley and began to be expressed openly. Simultaneously, the dismissal affected an emotional rupture in Kashmir-India relations and sowed the seeds of discord and mistrust. It came to be widely believed that India would never let the democracy flourish in Kashmir and Kashmiris would never be given the right to decide their future. An opinion survey conducted by Balraj Puri on the impact of Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal confirmed that an overwhelming majority of both the communities, Hindus and Muslims, of the State (86.35 per cent Muslims and 71.42 per cent Hindus of the Valley and 93.33 per cent of Muslims and 82.60 per cent of Hindu in the Jammu province) believed that the dismissal alienated the Muslims of Kashmir from the rest the India.424 The dismissal further deteriorated the relations between the Hindus and Muslims of the Valley. The Kashmiri Pandits had rallied behind Sheikh Abdullah as he took the State to India and as long as he swore his unconditional allegiance to India they supported him in unequivocal terms.425 When Sheikh Abdullah began to express doubts about India and gave ambiguous statements, the Pandits feared for their safety. Therefore, when his dismissal was announced, they expressed satisfaction and ‘clapped and hug one another’.426 Thus it began to be widely believed that all Pandits were for Bakshi and India which certainly brought them at loggerheads with the the supporters of Sheikh Abdullah.

Indian newspapers reported a ‘sober’ satisfaction in Delhi on the news of the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah and described the ‘action’ as timely.427 It seemed to temporarily unite all the oppositionMaulana parties Azad on Library, Kashmir. N.Aligarh C. Chatterjee, Muslim President University of the Hindu

between us and Pakistan, the matter would inevitably have been raised in the UN immediately and they might well have sent down their representative to Kashmir. All this would have kept the agitation and made it glow. It is all these considerations that made us agree to the Statement that has been issued’, SWJN, Vol. 23, pp. 346-47. 423 Dawn, 17 August 1953 cited in Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 243. 424 Balraj Puri, ‘August 1953: An Opinion Survey’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 13, No. 27, Jul. 8, 1978, pp. 1095-1096. 425 When the Praja Parishad agitation was at its peak, the Pandits passed a resolution condemning the Parishad agitation and expressed full confidence in the National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah, Ministry of States, File No. 8(3)-K/53, NAI. 426 Mohammad Ishaq Khan, ‘Evolution of My Identity Vis-à-Vis Islam and Kashmir in Khan’ in Nyla Ali Khan, ed., The Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society and Polity, New York, 2012, p. 14. 427 Times of India, 10 August 1953. 302 Mahasabha held that it was the ‘first step in the right direction’ as ‘any further vacillation would have had far reaching consequences’.428 Bhartiya Jana Sangh expressed its satisfaction at the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah who it believed had ‘begun to dream of making Jammu and Kashmir a virtually independent Sheikhdom for himself’.429 Trying to take credit for launching a movement to ‘make the blind and deaf statesmanship see what was going on under its very nose’, it held that it was because of the sacrifices of Dr Mookerjee that the country was saved from a ‘second dismemberment’.430 It also demanded a ‘public trial’ of Sheikh Abdullah for ‘treachery and anti-national activities’.431

The dismissal and detention of Sheikh Abdullah also brought immense changes in the policy and attitude of India towards Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi. Yesterday’s lions had to be villainised so as to justify the action which had created great resentment among the masses. International media had criticised Indian action in Kashmir and called for a plebiscite to resolve the dispute.432 To save India from the embarrassment at international level, instructions were passed on to the Indian Embassies regarding the course to be adopted on Sheikh’s dismissal. It was to be held that the developments in Kashmir had strictly followed constitutional lines, and that Indian Army had taken no part in maintaining law and order. The photographs by the foreign correspondents of the Indian Army involvement should be contested by holding that it was actually the local Police and Militia whose uniform resembled with that of the Indian Army.433 Nehru also emphatically rejected the participation of Indian Army in his Statement to the Parliament on 17 September 1953.434 The new Government of Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad published books and pamphlets in which those speeches of Sheikh Abdullah were included in which he had criticized Pakistan and praised India, thereby questioningMaulana his now Azad anti-India Library, stance. 435AligarhSheikh wasMuslim accused University of ‘unusual egotism’ and ‘self-conceit’ and it was held that dictatorial trends had become part of his

428 Ibid. 429 Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-1980: Defence and External Affairs, Vol. 4, New Delhi, 2005, p. 108. 430 Resolution at All India Session, Bombay, 25 January, 1954, Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-1980: Internal Affairs, Vol. 4, p. 101. 431 Resolution at All India General Council, 15 August 1953, Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Party Document, 1952-1980: Internal Affairs, Vol. 4, p. 112. 432 New York Times, 14 August 1953 vide Times of India, 17 August 1953. 433 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File No. PIII/53/99152/107, NAI. 434 Parliamentary Debates: House of the People (Official Report), Vo. IV, No. 32, col. 4161. 435 Muhammad Shafi Qureshi, Jab Ilhaq Huwa Tha, Acc. No. 1350/G/ACC, JKA Srinagar. 303 personality.436 Propaganda was launched against him and his image was maligned so as to minimize his influence among the masses. In this context, the title of a booklet, Sheikh Abdullah: Many Voices Many Faces437 is significant. The culmination of this propaganda was his implication in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.438 Sheikh’s vilification was accompanied by the lionization of Bakshi. Praises were showered on him the way he had appeased the public. Unlike Sheikh he did not change his sides quite often but was consistent in his secular attitude and opposition to Pakistan. He worked practically for the welfare of the people rather than paying lip service to the Kashmir Dispute.439 This was aimed at creating his better image in the minds of the common Kashmiris and the people of India, which would ultimately justify the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah and put confidence in Bakshi’s Government.

The other aspect of creating legitimacy for Bakshi’s rule was to attempt to project his Government as economically more progressive than the Sheikh Abdullah’s Government. This was accomplished by seeking to transform his promises into reality through a closer political and economic integration with India in lieu of which Bakshi received ample monetary assistance from the Central Government. He was successful, to a large extent, in raising the standard of living of the people while at the same the State became largely dependent on the Indian Government which also undermined the Naya Kashmir’s goal of economic self-sufficiency.440

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

436 ‘Sheikh Abdullah- Past, Present and Future’, Sandesh, 30 December 1957, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Publicity, File No. IV/16/307/KP/57, NAI. 437 Abdul Aziz, Sheikh Abdullah: Many Voices Many Faces, Accession. No. 1327/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. 438 Sheikh Abdullah and his close associates were accused of conspiring to bring about the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. A case was filed against them but it could not be proved in the court of law, Mullick, My years with Nehru, pp. 64-106. 439 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad- A Study, pp. 4-13, Accession No. 538/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. It contained viewpoints of newspaper correspondents like Times of India, The Current Magazine, Hindustan Times and Manchester Guardian. 440 Hafsa Kanjwal, Building a New Kashmir: Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad and the Politics of State- Formation in a Disputed Territory (1953-1963), pp. 48-9, Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, The University of Michigan, 2017. 304 CONCLUSION

In the present study an attempt has been made to study the functioning of the first National Conference Government in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and evaluate its socio-economic and political policies and their impact in and outside the State. It has been argued that the first post-Colonial Government in the State and its policy of nation-building was to a large extent influenced by the contested legacy of the Dogra State. Under the Dogra Maharajas, the State experienced unmitigated autocratic rule which was also characterised by regional bias. The rulers followed a policy of exploitation and discrimination against their subjects in general and Muslims in particular who also were marginalised as the State neglected them in its quest for legitimacy which included purported Rajput lineage, Hindu scriptures, customs and traditions. The State maintained its role as a ‘bulwark against reaction’ and denied freedom of press and intolerated any kind of political activity in the State. However, within the limited space conceded by the Dogra State, political consciousness started emerging as a result of internal and external factors which paved the way for the formation of Muslim Conference in the State. Sheikh Abdullah took the centre stage in the resistance movement. It has been argued that Sheikh Abdullah’s emergence as a popular leader was primarily because of three factors. His personal sacrifices and sufferings against the Dogra State at a time when elites of the State were busy in swearing their loyalty and allegiance to the Dogra Maharaja accorded him prominence among the people. Second, he made a careful mixture of religion and politics for mobilising the masses. His recitation of the verses of Holy Quran at every public meeting, his speeches at shrines and mosques across the Valley and organising of religious processions attached a religious aura around his personality. This was not in a voidMaulana as the Dogra Azad State Library, was couched Aligarh in religious Muslim terms University and the response to it followed the same trajectory. He also successfully wove the grievances of different sections of the population into a well-knit criticism of the Dogra State at a time when the State was passing through an economic slowdown. It has been contended that the conversion of Muslim Conference into National Conference no doubt widened the scope of the organisation but practically very few non-Muslims joined it. The movement not only lost its indigenous character as both National Conference and the revived Muslim Conference became closely associated with the Congress and Muslim League respectively, but also sowed the seeds of dissension among the Muslims

305 which proved inimical in the larger interests of the State. It has been shown that the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah did not go uncontested. There were many pockets of support for Muslim Conference and other political parties. Many opportunities came in their way to undermine the influence of National Conference but in the absence of a sound organisation and vibrant leadership these could prove no match for Sheikh Abdullah. Also, the failure to affect an internal concord proved disastrous for the future of the State. Sheikh Abdullah’s Quit Kashmir Movement, though revolutionary and unprecedented, was ill-timed as it deprived Kashmir of the leadership at a time when the fate of the Princely States was being decided.

In the run-up to the Accession crisis, it has been argued that Nehru gave personal attention to Kashmir because of its strategic location and in effect a ‘miniature Pakistan’ which would not only strengthen India’s frontier but also its secularism. Jinnah and Muslim League failed to develop a coherent policy vis-à-vis Kashmir and most importantly, remained hostile to Sheikh Abdullah. After his release from prison Sheikh Abdullah pretended ambivalence but echoed his support for India. Maharaja’s administration became decidedly pro-India and the Tribal invasion accelerated the State’s accession to India which was accepted on the condition of referendum, never to take place.

The issue of Kashmir became internationalised and engaged India and Pakistan in a war that did not remain confine to the military alone but percolated to all the aspects of socio-economic and political life. It was the Kashmir valley that was prized and fought for. Neither was Pakistan interested in Hindu majority areas of Jammu nor was India interested in the areas under Pakistani control. The Tribal invasion and the flight of Maharaja from Kashmir had paralysed the administrative machinery in the State Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University and there was complete breakdown of law and order. To fill the void and woo the Kashmiris Sheikh Abdullah was appointed as the Chief Emergency Administrator, the position he got after swearing his allegiance to Maharaja, under the very Treaty he had dubbed as a ‘Sale Deed’. In November 1947, a massacre of Muslims began in Jammu which was aided and abetted by the Dogra Forces and administration. Maharaja’s complicity in the massacre further embittered his relations with Sheikh Abdullah who charged him with genocide of Muslims. The Government of India, particularly Nehru seriously felt the adverse impact of the massacre on the Muslims of Kashmir who were sure to be alienated. He supported Sheikh Abdullah against 306 Maharaja. It has been held that supporting Sheikh Abdullah was a political compulsion for Nehru. India’s case in Kashmir relied on Sheikh Abdullah and they could not afford to alienate him. The sword of plebiscite was hanging and for India to succeed, Kashmiris were to be won through Sheikh Abdullah as they strongly believed that only Sheikh could win them a vote. For India, Kashmir was Sheikh Abdullah and everything was to be done to strengthen him. No amount of excuse from Maharaja, who had also the support of Patel, was accepted. It was in this context that he was pressurised to appoint Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister of the State.

The formation of Popular Government was the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Kashmir. For the first time since 1846 a Muslim was appointed to the post of Prime Minister. Whilst being the Administrator, Sheikh Abdullah tried to bring order to the chaotic state by uplifting the morale of the common masses and tactfully managing the refugee crisis and taking steps for their rehabilitation. With the formation of Kashmir Militia, Kashmiris were given the right to join the army and display their martial capabilities, hitherto denied to them. Gender barriers were broken as the women were given the opportunity to join the Militia and fight side by side with men. The presence of armed squads at the disposal of National Conference confirmed its political ascendency in the State.

The formation of the Popular Government was a victory for the people of Kashmir, a liberating exercise, in concord with the Indian Government. National Conference sought to build its hegemony among the common masses by launching a strong criticism of Pakistan and its support to the ‘inhuman’ and barbaric tribals. India’s beneficence was acknowledged and its unbreakable ties with Kashmir highlighted. The Government propaganda had the dual purpose of legitimising the Popular Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Government and creating support for its decision of acceding to India. However, the State project of hegemonising the masses was never complete and the Government had to resort to other methods, including intimidation and terror, to effect submission.

The National Conference Government sought to transform the socio-economic structure of the State, in consonance with the promises made in New Kashmir Plan. It has been argued that the Government had to operate in an unfavourable political and economic context which acted as a structural constraint in the effective formulation and implementation of economic policies. Highways had been closed, trade had come

307 to a halt, food crisis was brewing and war was being fought between two dominions. With the UN Security Council Resolutions calling for plebiscite, the political uncertainty only increased and adversely affected the economic development of the State. Given such adverse conditions, the achievements of the Government were quite remarkable. The agrarian reforms launched by the Government initiated the agrarian transformation of the State. The feudal agrarian relations were liquidated and a new era of peasant emancipation began. Debt worth millions of rupees was liquidated. Without paying any compensation, thousands of landless peasants became owners of the lands they had cultivated for decades without due rights. These were the most revolutionary reforms in the whole of Indian Subcontinent. The reforms not only emancipated the peasants economically but also psychologically. The ‘feudal mind’ was shackled and it was hoped that the common masses would live a life free of exploitation and feudal degeneration. However, the lacunas in the reform Acts and loopholes in their implementation marred their impact. The uniform application of the reforms in all the regions with diverse geographical, topographical and agricultural conditions was illogical. The Land to the Tiller Act made Kashmir Valley the standard and the other regions were viewed through its prism. More benefits were reaped by the National Conference workers, their relatives and already influential sections of the society. The poor peasants in most of the cases got barren, less fertile and lands with no sources of irrigation. The Study has shown how the compulsory procurement of Mujwaza became a tool of oppression and corruption, with the National Conference workers and officials looting the common peasants in the name of feeding urban population. While the peasants were made owners of the lands, their control over their produce was snatched. The Government organised Co-operatives with the aim of bringing entire village life within its fold. But these failed to strike Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University roots and became a hot-bed of corruption and black-marketing. Their monopoly of the supply system became a tool in the hands of the Government to muzzle the voices of opposition as anyone whose loyalty to the Government was questionable was denied the commodities. The defective food rationing policy of the Government created resentment among the urban sections of population. But by attempting to restructure the agrarian setup of the state and trying to clear the roadblocks, the Government created a platform for the future dispensations to transform the entire agrarian structure in toto. The effective State intervention would have reduced the

308 limitations of the reforms but with the political uncertainty and the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah the progress was halted.

The Government showed an active interest in the development of agriculture and allied activities. Primary focus was laid on the extension of area under cultivation and enhancing the quality of the crops grown. This was achieved through the introduction of high yield seeds, manures and fertilisers and the development of agricultural infrastructure by constructing a network of irrigation canals, tanks and wells. There was a marked increase in the productivity of the soil and the State was slowly but steadily moving to its avowed goal of attaining self-reliance in food production. Though the Government did not undertake a massive industrialisation of the State, it framed policies and programmes to develop the already existing industries like timber, cottage and small-scale industries and the Silk Industry. Partition and the accompanying destruction had a very adverse impact on these industries and many of the industrial plants had to be shut down. The Government focussed on revitalising these industries by actively intervening in raw material procurement and by providing suitable marketing facilities through establishing emporia. As a result, these industries were able to sustain and generate huge income for the state. Further, Panchayat system was strengthened and the institutions of Lumberdari and Zaildari were thrown open to elections. Efforts were made in the field of education and healthcare. A University was established in the State and expenditure on education was increased with a focus on re-organising the entire educational structure. However, there was widespread corruption and nepotism in the State and coupled with financial mismanagement as a result of political-capitalist-bureaucratic nexus, a financial crisis emerged in the State. The Government failed to tackle corruption and instead, directly as wellMaulana as indirectly, Azad promoted Library, it by resorting Aligarh to favouritism.Muslim UniversityThe State monopoly of the transport and Distribution and Supply system with strict control of the means of production and distribution discouraged the private capital which impeded in the industrial development of the state. The dream of New Kashmir to govern State on Socialist lines proved to be too idealistic to be implemented in which the political uncertainty and untimely removal of Sheikh Abdullah played a dominating role.

It has been argued that the Government of India’s relations with the National Conference Government were determined by the indispensability of Sheikh Abdullah

309 for India. For Indian Government, particularly Nehru Kashmir was more than a fight for territory. It was a battle of ideas, of secularism against communalism and religious bigotry. Therefore, India was more accommodative vis-à-vis Kashmir and was prepared to guarantee a certain amount of autonomy to it but not at the cost of national interests. Sheikh Abdullah on his part was against the complete merger of Kashmir with India and wanted to have ironclads of autonomy to preserve its unique identity. The framing of Article 370, though fraught with many controversies, was an attempt at reaching a settlement vis-à-vis centre-state relations. The negotiations point out the differences in the motives of two governments. While Indian Government was seeking to apply as many provisions of the Constitution as possible, Sheikh Abdullah was reluctant to move beyond the subjects defined in the Instrument of Accession. The Study discusses how Sheikh Abdullah was outclassed by the duo of Sardar Patel and Gopalaswamy Ayyangar who unilaterally made a change in the draft of Article 370 which had a direct bearing on the future developments in the State. Article 370 fulfilled the Central Government’s objective of formalising relations with Kashmir while at the same time addressed the concerns of the State Government by granting the State a special status and limiting the centre’s jurisdiction to a few subjects agreed to by the State Government. The State was given a special concession to frame its own constitution through a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise. India hoped to strengthen its case in the United Nations by arguing that under India Kashmiris themselves were deciding their fate, which might then be argued as a substitute to the plebiscite as it was done later. However, the manner in which elections were conducted made a ‘mockery of any pretence of a democratic process’ and clearly indicated that the National Conference was not ready to concede any space to the opposition groups. Nomination papers of the opposition candidates Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University were rejected on flimsily grounds and those who passed through this phase were intimidated and threatened to quit. The whole process set a bad precedent for the future elections in Kashmir. Nevertheless the convening of the Constituent Assembly was a unique achievement of the National Conference Government. The ‘hand- picked’ Constituent Assembly took some revolutionary decisions affecting the future of Kashmir. It put the last nail in the Dogra Dynasty by abolishing the monarchy and substituted it with an elected head for the State, unknown to other States of India. A separate flag and National Anthem for the State symbolized the ambitions, desires, aims, aspirations and freedom movement of the people of the State. 310 The Study discusses the policies of the National Conference Government vis-à-vis the granting and protection of basic civil and political rights and argues that taking advantage of the emergency it concentrated large powers in its hands which led to their abuse and misuse. It did not tolerate any voice of dissent and ruthlessly suppressed the opposition groups, particularly the pro-Pakistan elements. Those who differed with Sheikh Abdullah on the question of State’s accession and relationship with India were arbitrarily thrown either into jails or pushed into Pakistan. The Government used the Militia for carrying out its suppressive activities. They misused their power not only for silencing the political opponents but also for terrorising the common masses. They indulged in theft, looting of Government properties and sexual harassment. The suppression of press and civilian rights led to the diminution in the popularity of the Popular Government. The freedom they had been waiting for in the hope that they would be liberated turned out to be farcical and in essence a continuation, even worse, of the Dogra rule. It has been argued that the Indian Government turned a blind eye to the authoritarian tendencies of the National Conference Government and supported it in crushing the anti-India elements. Like the National Conference Government it did not favour any opposition, democratic that might be, as the same might weaken Sheikh Abdullah, the gamble of India in Kashmir. As long as Sheikh Abdullah showered songs of praise on India, he was not only acceptable but his digressions from democratic traditions were tolerated. When he questioned India his wings were cut in the name of maintaining peace and harmony in the State.

An attempt has been made to understand the multi-polar character of the Jammu and Kashmir State which found ample expression during the rule of the National ConferenceMaulana Government Azad. WLibrary,ith divergent Aligarh political Muslim and economic University regional interests the State began to pull in different directions. As a result of post-1947 developments, Kashmir came to attain a position of importance. The Government failed to maintain the inter-regional balance in the State which led to divisions and dissensions. Naya Kashmir also came to be looked as more pro-Kashmir and hence it also failed to unite the masses. While the Kashmiri Muslims expressed happiness at the abolition of Dogra monarchy, the same was resented by the Dogras of Jammu. The failure to develop and encourage a secular alternative to the National Conference led to the rise of communal forces in the State. Praja Parishad, a party of reactionaries, ex-royal

311 officials, landlords, businessmen and moneylenders, based its politics on the purported fear of Kashmiri Muslim domination and the resultant sidelining of the interests of the Hindus of Jammu. It communalised the secular reforms of the Government, particularly the land reforms, and advocated partition of the State on regional basis. Parishad also voiced its opposition to Article 370 and advocated full integration of the State with India. Ladakh also raised voice against the sidelining of its interests by the Government. Its main grievances were related to the implementation of land reforms on Gumpas, educational backwardness, step-motherly treatment in the allocation of funds and under-representation in Government services. However, the movement in Ladakh was less vocal. The Government failed to redress the genuine grievances of the people and contended itself with de-legitimising and suppressing the discontentment.

It was in this context that Delhi Agreement was announced which was an attempt at integrating Kashmir with India in a more comprehensive manner. Union’s jurisdiction was extended to the State in many subjects other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession. The Study shows that it was a win-win situation for India and not too pleasant for National Conference which is evident from its procrastination regarding applying most of the provisions of the Agreement. The fact that the National Conference had earlier strongly opposed the application of centre’s jurisdiction in matters other than defence, communications and foreign affairs clearly suggests that Sheikh Abdullah had lost his appeal with the Central Government to a certain extent. His towering personality was beginning to tumble both within and outside the state.

The Study discusses how the Parishad satyagrah and the support it received from communal parties of India alarmed Sheikh Abdullah and the Muslims of Kashmir. At Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University one point of time Sheikh Abdullah regarded the accession of Kashmir to India as final and irrevocable and had ruled out any plebiscite. But the changing circumstances made him apprehensive about the future of the State as he did not find sufficient guarantees for the protection of the special identity of the State despite receiving support from Nehru against the reactionary and communal elements whose voice was lonely and not supported by his Ministries. It has been argued that the Kashmiri Muslims began to feel difference in the theory and practice of Indian Secularism. Sheikh found it difficult to persuade them about the benefits of aligning with India. The political uncertainty also adversely affected the economy of the State as not only was a huge 312 amount spent in the suppression of anti-Government protests but also the frequent closure of the only highway fuelled financial crisis.

Sheikh Abdullah’s popularity was dwindling and pro-Pakistan sentiment was gaining strength in the Valley. The Study analyses that Sheikh Abdullah not only reacted to the situation but also aggravated it by giving conflicting statements. He began to question the finality of accession to India and started talking about India in hostile terms-the only way he found he could regain his lost popularity. There were rumours and reports that Sheikh was planning to carve out an independent entity. Though he expressly denied the accusations, his ambivalent speeches created the impression that an independent course was both possible as well as worth seeking. It has been argued that Sheikh Abdullah’s fiddling with independence idea was a result of many factors. He did not find the Indian Government giving him a free hand in running the administration as he had expected and time and again was subjected to hindrances and questions regarding his policies. Coupled with the agitation which had the support in mainland India and the consequent repercussions in the Valley, he was desperate to rise on the tide and advocate a course by which he hoped to wrest, at least, an autonomous position. However, there was rift within his Cabinet as New Delhi began to create parallel and alternative leadership to Sheikh Abdullah. His relationship with Nehru was corroded and the mutual trust and confidence faded away. Little direct correspondence was maintained and intermediaries took the centre stage which minimised the chances of reconciliation. Accusations and counter-accusations increased and New Delhi began to feel that Sheikh Abdullah was out of its control. A conspiracy was hatched which included the most trusted colleagues of Sheikh Abdullah and he was unconstitutionally dismissed from the Prime Ministership of the State andMaulana arrested. AzadThe Study Library, has shown Aligarh that the Muslimcomplicity University of his most trusted friend, Nehru in the undemocratic dismissal and arrest was direct and beyond any question.

The dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah was a severe blow by India to the democratic traditions in Kashmir which continued unabatedly in the post-1953 period. It sowed the seeds of discord and ruptured the relations of the Kashmiri Muslims with the rest of India. After 1953 all the Prime Ministers and Chief Ministers of the State were puppets of New Delhi. They remained in power, through a continuous shaming of electoral processes, the practice Sheikh himself had introduced with support from Nehru. Unlike Sheikh Abdullah, the puppet leaders did not dare to disagree with the 313 Central Government and the process to dilute the State’s autonomy was started. Legitimate but unfavourable and critical voices were muzzled and the State was ruled with an iron hand, throwing to dust all the democratic processes and traditions. The result was that democracy never got strengthened in the State and coupled with the fact that the Kashmir Dispute remained unsolved, the lava of the pent-up turmoil found expression in late 1980s when the ‘docile’ and ‘peace-loving’ Kashmiris started an armed insurgency against India.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

314 Bibliography

Only those works which have actually been cited in the Thesis have been mentioned here. I.Manuscript Sources

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330 4. Jammu and Kashmir Information Department, Srinagar a) National and Vernacular Newspaper Collection b) Press Notes

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333 –––––––––, Educational Reorganisation Committee Report, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, S. 2007. –––––––––, Fifty Years of Animal Husbandry in Kashmir, 1947-1998, Animal Husbandry Department, Srinagar. –––––––––, Hazrat Qaid-i-Azam Sher-i-Kashmir Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah Wazir- i-Azam Jammu wa Kashmir ka Khutba, Jammu wa Kashmir University ka Rasm-i-Iftitah, 2 November 1948, Accession No. 425/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Hind aur Kashmir Naqabl-i-Taqseem hain, 1949, Accession No. 518/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Hindustan se Apna Nata, Accession No. 496/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, In Ninety Days: A Brief Account of Agrarian Reforms Launched by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s Government in Kashmir, Jammu, 1948, Accession No. 1090/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Jammu and Kashmir 1947-50: An Account of Activities of first Three years of Sheikh Abdullah’s Government, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1951. –––––––––, Jammu and Kashmir August 53-August 54: A Review of the Achievements of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Accession No. 5776, NMML. –––––––––, Jammu and Kashmir Today, 1952, Accession No. 56196, NMML. –––––––––, Jammu and Kashmir: Fifty Years, Department of Information, Srinagar, 1998. –––––––––, Jammu Disturbances-February 1952, Accession No. 507/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University –––––––––, Jammu ki Surathaal ka Jaiza, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1952. –––––––––, Kashmir Averts National Disaster, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s Call to People, Accession No. 537/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Kashmir Averts National Disaster, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s Call to People, Accession No. 537/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Kashmir: A Decade of Progress, 1958, Accession No. 55609, NMML.

334 –––––––––, Land Reforms in Jammu and Kashmir, Accession No. 1090/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Land Reforms: A Review of the Working of the Land Reforms with Special Reference to Big Landed Estates Abolition Act for the period ending July, 1952, in Jammu and Kashmir state, Jammu, Accession No. 2006/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Liquidation of Landlordism in Jammu and Kashmir, Accession No. 546/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India and Kashmir- Constitutional Aspect, Accession No. 545/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, On the Road to New Kashmir, Accession No. 1241/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, One Step Forward in Poonch: Announcement made by Jammu and Kashmir Government, Srinagar, Accession No. 550/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Onward Kashmir, Accession No. 456/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2003, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1950. –––––––––, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2005 (1948), Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1950. –––––––––, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2007, Jammu, 1954. –––––––––, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 2008 (ending 13 April 1952), Jammu, 1951. –––––––––, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for S. 2010, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1955. –––––––––, Progress Report on Forest Administration in Jammu and Kashmir for 1954-55, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu. –––––––––, Real Azad Kashmir, Accession No. 1292/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Report of the Committee Appointed to Formulate Proposals for Recruitment to Government Service, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1946.

335 –––––––––, Report of the Development Review Committee, Srinagar, 1975. –––––––––, Report of the Inquiry Committee Appointed to Examine the Working of Land Reforms, Price Control etc., Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1953. –––––––––, Report of the Unemployment Commission, August 1937, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu. –––––––––, Report on the Proposed Agricultural Policy of the Jammu and Kashmir State, June 1956, Accession No. 253/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Riyasat Jammu wa Kashmir mein Sanati Tarqi, Accession No. 568/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Social Education in Jammu and Kashmir, Accession No. 555/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, The Flag Issue, New Delhi, n. d., Accession No. 56161, NMML. –––––––––, The Rice Research Scheme for Jammu and Kashmir State for Ist April 1944 to March 1945, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1946. –––––––––, The Rice Research Scheme, Jammu and Kashmir State: Summary of the Progress Report for the Year 1949-50, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Towards Solvency, A Review of the Distressed Debtors’ Relief and the Restitution of the Mortgaged Properties Act in the Jammu and Kashmir State for the period ending 15th April 1952, Jammu, Accession No. 592/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Why Customs, New Delhi, 1953, Accession No. 508/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, Negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India regarding the Kashmir Dispute (June Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 1953 to September 1954), 1954, Accession No. 56088, NMML. His Highness Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Annual Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir Sericulture Department, S. 1997-98, Ranbir Government Pres, Jammu, 1942. –––––––––, Trade Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State, S. 1989-90, Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, Srinagar, 1934. –––––––––, Orders on the Recommendations Contained in the Glancy Commission Report, 2nd Edition, Jammu, 1933.

336 –––––––––, Report of the Forest Enquiry Committee, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1939. Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly (Official Report), Part I, Vol. I (1951- 1955). Jammu and Kashmir Government, Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, Unanimous Vote of Confidence in Bakshi Government, Accession No. 544/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Kashmir Bureau of Information, Jammu Situation: An Objective Analysis, Accession No. 553/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Kashmir Bureau of Information, New Kashmir, with an Introduction by Sheikh Md. Abdullah, New Delhi, n.d. –––––––––, Praja Parishad Thro’ Many Eyes, Part II, National Publishing House, Jammu, n. d., Accession No. 473/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. –––––––––, Satyagrah Without Truth, New Delhi, 1973, Accession No. 56290, NMML. –––––––––, Searchlight on Jammu Agitation, New Delhi, 1953, Accession No. 56199, NMML. –––––––––, Without Comment, NMML. Kaye, J. L., Note on the Assessment Report on the Minor Jagir Villages situated in the Valley of Kashmir, Lahore, 1897. Marti, R., Report of the International Red Cross regarding the Conditions of Refugees in the Jammu and Kashmir State, Ministry of States, File No. 7(63)- K/49, NAI. Middlemiss, C. S., Mineral Survey Reports-Ore Deposits of Lead, Copper, Zinc, Iron Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University and other Metals in Jammu and Kashmir State, The Times of India Press, Bombay, 1929. Mohammad, Bakshi Ghulam, Qanoon saz Assembly Ek ba-Ikhtiyar Idara, Department of Information, Srinagar, Accession No. 572/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Murray, John, Indian Trade Enquiry: Reports on Jute and Silk, Imperial Institute, London, 1921. Nath, Shri Ganga, Commission Report on Administration of Jammu and Kashmir State, Jammu, 1944.

337 National Council of Applied Economic Research, Techno-Economic Survey of Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, 1969. Parliamentary Debates: Council of States Official Report. Parliamentary Debates: House of the People Official Report. Proposed Agricultural Plan, 1950, The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, No. 3, 15th Baisakh 2007. Report of the Land Compensation Committee, 1951-52, Jammu, 1952. Sahay, Baghwan, ed., Jammu and Kashmir, 1969 Guide, Universal Publications, Srinagar, 1969. Sharp Committee Report, Calcutta, 1916. The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazettes (1947-54). Through Blood, Sweat and Tears: An Account of the Activities of the Emergency Administration from October 31, 1947 to March 5, 1948, Accession No. 641/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. United Nations Organisation, Security Council Official Reports, accessed on https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0. United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part I, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1948. Wingate, A, Preliminary Report of Settlement Operations in Kashmir and Jammu, W. Ball & Co., Lahore, 1888.

2. Census Reports, Treaties and Gazetteers Aitchison, C. U, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries (revised and continued up to 1929),: Jammu and Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Kashmir, Sikkim, Assam and Burma, Vol. XII, Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, 1931. Bates, Charles Ellison, A Gazetteer of Kashmir and the Adjoining Districts of Kishtwar, Baderwah, Jammu, Nowshera, Punch and the Valley of Kishanganga, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, Calcutta, 1873. Khan, Khan Bahadur Munshi Ghulam Ahmed, Census of India, 1901, Vol. XXIII, Kashmir, Part 1: Report, The Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1902.

338 Wreford, R. G., ed., Census of India 1941, Vol. XXII, Jammu & Kashmir State, Pt. III, Village Tables, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1943.

3. Documents of Political Parties and Associations A Reply to Critics: Text of the Speech of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Prime Minister, Jammu and Kashmir in the State Assembly on 5 March 1955, Kashmir Today Series-I, Accession No. 547/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad Kashmir’s Appeal to World Conscience: Text of the Speech Delivered by Sheikh Abdullah at the 241st meeting of the Security Council held at Lake Success on February 5, 1948, Accession No. 3373/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Abolition of Big Landlordism: Text of the Announcement made by Sheikh Abdullah on Martyr’s Day at Lal Chowk, Srinagar, 13 July 1950, Accession No. 559/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Ali, Sadiq and Limaye, Madhu, Report on Kashmir, Praja Socialist Publication, New Delhi, 1954, Accession No. 9204, NMML. All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad Working Committee, Praja Parishad Stand Explained, Jammu, n. d., Accession No. 56280, NMML. All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad, A Case for an open Enquiry, New Delhi, 1953, Accession No. 56240, NMML. –––––––––, Jammu Rejects a Separate Constitution for Jammu and Kashmir State, Delhi, 1952, Accession No. 56243, NMML. –––––––––, Nehru-Abdullah Pact: An Unholy Agreement and a Fraud, Accession No. HD326, NMML. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University –––––––––, Programme, Jammu, Accession No. 5226, NMML. Amrita Bazar Patrika, Kashmir After August 9, 1953, Lala Rookh Publications, Srinagar. Aziz, Abdul, Sheikh Abdullah: Many Voices- Many faces, Srinagar, n.d., Accession No. 1327/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Kashmir Problem and Jammu Satyagrah: An Objective Study, Delhi, n.d., Accession No. 15386, NMML.

339 Big Farce of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir: Decision to Non-cooperate, Resolution adopted by the Kashmir Democratic Union on 20 April 1951. Dawat-e-Fikr: Ek Dard-e-Dil Rakhne Wale Musalman Ke Qalam se, Accession No. 459/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Gupta, N. L., RSS and Kashmir, New Delhi, Accession No. 10763, NMML. Hum ne Pakistan mein Kya Dekha: Chaar Kashmiri Musalmanon ke Chashm deed Halaat, Accession No. 439/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Hussain, Dr Zakir, Kashmir ke Mutaliq Bharti Muslim Rehnumaon ka Tawajja Nama, Accession No. 446/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Hussain, Dr Zakir, Indian Muslim Leaders Memorandum on Kashmir, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 1951, Accession No. 55601, NMML. Kak, O. N., Khalid-i-Kashmir Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad Through My Eyes, Accession No. 12033, Research and Publications Department, Srinagar. Kashmir Democratic Union, Does India Defend Freedom or Fascism in Kashmir, Delhi, 1952, Accession No. 36315, NMML. –––––––––, Rise of Communism in Kashmir, Delhi, 1952, Accession No. 9180, NMML. –––––––––, Voice of Suppressed Kashmir, Delhi, 1963, Accession No. 56220, NMML. –––––––––, Economic Chaos in Kashmir, Kashmir Today Series–4, Delhi, 1950. Kaushak Bakula, Ladakh and its Problems: Articles published by Amrita Bazar Patrika on Ladakh in 1952, Srinagar, 1953, Accession No. 20087, Oriental Research Library, Srinagar. Khwaja Ghulam Mohammad, Sheikh Abdullah ki Wazarat ke Zawaal ke Asbaab, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Accession No. 578/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Text of Maulana Syeed Masoodi’s Speech in the Indian Parliament, 11 August 1951, Accession No. 463/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Nagar, Hakim Parshuram, Is Abdullah Government Anti-Hindu, Jammu, Accession No. 55912, NMML. National Conference Working Committee, Hind ke Aayeen Mein Hamari Makhsoos Position, Accession No. 445/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar.

340 Proceedings of the Annual Session of All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, Srinagar, 1951, Accession No. 409/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Puri, Balraj, Communism in Kashmir, Calcutta, 1961, Accession No. HD 3598, NMML. Qureshi, Muhammad Shafi, Jab Ilhaq Huwa Tha, Acc. No. 1350/G/ACC, JKA, Srinagar. Rajpori, Ghulam Mohammad Mir and Kaul, Manohar Nath, Conspiracy in Kashmir, Accession No. 306/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Sangh, Bhartiya Jana, Party Document, 1952-80: Policies and Manifestoes, Vol. 1, Bharatiya Janata Party, New Delhi, 2005. –––––––––, Party Document, 1952-80: Defence and External Affairs, Vol. 3, Bharatiya Janata Party, New Delhi, 2005. –––––––––, Party Document, 1952-80: Internal Affairs, Vol. 4, Bharatiya Janata Party, New Delhi, 2005. –––––––––, Party Document, 1952-80: History of Jana Sangh, Vol. 6, Bharatiya Janata Party, New Delhi, 2006. Sathu, Jagan Nath, Red Menace in Kashmir, Kashmir Democratic Union, New Delhi, n. d., Accession No. 56249, NMML. Saxena, Hori Lal, The Iron Curtain in Kashmir, The Nationalist Office, New Delhi, 1949, Accession No. 56341, NMML. Singh, Major Piyar, Praja Parishad Movement in Jammu: A Stab in India’s Back, Jammu, 1952, Accession No. 474/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar. Singh, Sardar Budh, Jagir Shahi Ka Post Mortem, Srinagar. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Singh, Surjeet, Kashmir and Its Future, Communist Party of India, New Delhi, 1955 Accession No. 102145, NMML. State Versus Sheikh Abdullah: Kashmir on Trial, The Lion Press, Lahore, 1947. Tariq, Ali Mohammad, ‘Qaid-i-Millat’ Ghulam Abbas Aur Muslim Conference, Accession No. 493/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library JKA, Srinagar. Text of Speech of Sheikh Abdullah on the 2nd Anniversary of Radio Kashmir, 1 July 1950, Accession No. 697/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar.

341 Twentieth Session of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference: Proceedings, Lala Rookh Publications, Srinagar, 1954, Accession No. 56261, NMML. Watan Farosh Haar Gaye, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s Speech in the Legislative Assembly on 5 March 1955, Accession No. 562/G/ACC, Archives Reference Library, JKA, Srinagar.

4. Autobiographies/ Memoirs/Biographies Abbas, Chaudhary Ghulam, Kashmakash, Kashmir Studies Foundation, Srinagar, 2001. Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Ali Mohammad and Sons, Srinagar, 1986. –––––––––, Flames of the Chinar, An Autobiography, Abridged and translated by Khushwant Singh, Viking, New Delhi, 1993. –––––––––, The Blazing Chinar: An Autobiography, Translated by Mohammad Amin, Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2013. Atal, Hira Lal, Nehru's Emissary to Kashmir October 1947, Army Educational Stores, New Delhi, 1972. Balraj Madhok, Portrait of a Martyr: Biography of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerji, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1969. Bhattacharjea, Ajit, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: Tragic Hero of Kashmir, Roli Books, New Delhi, 2008. Biscoe, C. E. Tyndale, Autobiography, Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd., London, 1951. Gopal, Sarvepalli, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol 2, 1947-56, Press, Cambridge, 1979. Ishaq, Munshi Mohammad, Nidaa-e-Haque, Srinagar, Kashmir Book Foundation, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 2014 Jain, Ajit Prasad, Kashmir What Really Happened, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1972. Kaul, B. M., The Untold Story, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1967. Khan, Nyla Ali, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s Reflections on Kashmir, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018. Mahajan, Mehr Chand, Looking Back: The Autobiography of M. C. Mahajan, Asia Publishing, London, 1963.

342 Mathai, M. O., My Days with Nehru, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979. Mullick, B. N., My Years with Nehru: Kashmir, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1971. Panikkar, K. M., Gulab Singh (1792-1858): Founder of Kashmir, Martin Hopkinson Ltd., London, 1930. Qasim, Mir, My Life and Times, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1992. Sethi, Krishan Dev, Yaad-i-Rafta, Jadd-o-Jahad Publications, Delhi, 1986. Singh, Karan, Heir Apparent-An Autobiography, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982. Taseer, C. Bilqees, The Kashmir of Sheikh Abdullah, Feroz Sons, Lahore, 1986, repr., Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2005. Tendulkar, D. G., Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, 1947-48, Vol. 8, Publications Division, Government of India, New Delhi, 1963. Wakhlu, Somnath, Hari Singh: The Maharaja, the Man, the Times : A Biography of Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir State (1895-1961), National Publishing House, New Delhi, 2004.

5. Selected/Collected Works/Correspondences Alam, Jawaid, ed., Jammu and Kashmir 1949-64: Select Correspondence between Jawaharlal Nehru and Karan Singh, Viking, New Delhi, 2006. Durga Das, ed., Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945-50: New Light on Kashmir, Vol. I, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1971. Gandhi, Mahatma, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 98, Publications Division, Delhi, 1988. Gandhi, Sonia, ed., Two Alone, Two Together: Letters between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, 1922-64, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2005. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Integrate Kashmir: Mookerjee-Nehru and Abdullah Correspondence, Publicity Department Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Delhi, 1953, Accession No. HD1914, NMML. Munshi, K. M., Indian Constitutional Documents: Munshi Papers, Vol. II, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1967. Nehru, Jawaharlal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vols. 1 to 26, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi.

343 Parthasarathi, G., ed., Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964, Vol. 3, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1987. Sarabhai, Mridula, Sheikh-Sadiq correspondence (August to October 1956), Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1956.

6. Dissertations and Theses Aziz, Javeed Ul, Economic History of modern Kashmir with Special Reference to Agriculture (1947-1989), Ph. D Thesis, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, 2010. Kanjwal, Hafsa, Building a New Kashmir: Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad and the Politics of State-Formation in a Disputed Territory (1953-1963)’, Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, The University of Michigan, 2017. Lone, Suhail ul Rehman, Indian National Movement and the Freedom Struggle of Jammu and Kashmir (1931-1947 A.D.), Unpublished Dissertation, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 2013. Moza, Meenakshi, Agrarian Relations in Jammu And Kashmir: A Case Study of two Districts, Ph. D Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1985. Para, Altaf Hussain, Emergence of Modern Kashmir: A Study of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s Role, Ph. D Thesis, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, 2008. Pir, Ali Mohd, British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1947), PhD Thesis, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 2013. Wani, Showkat Ahmad, Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah and His Contribution to Political Development in Jammu and Kashmir, Ph. D Thesis, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 2013.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 7. Newspapers and Periodicals

a. English

Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore Cross Road, Bombay Dawn, Karachi Delhi Express, Delhi Greater Kashmir, Srinagar

344 Hindustan Standard, Calcutta Hindustan Times, New Delhi Hitvada, Nagpur Kashmir Life, Srinagar Leader, Allahabad National Herald, Lucknow Observer, Lahore Pakistan Times, Lahore Statesman, Calcutta The Hindu, Madras The Pioneer, Allahabad The Times of India, New Delhi The Times, London The Tribune, Lahore

b. Urdu

Alfazl, Qadian Chand, Jammu Inqilab, Lahore Javed, Jammu Javed, Srinagar Khalid, Srinagar Khidmat, Srinagar Martand, Srinagar Ranbir, Jammu Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Sach, Jammu Vitasta, Srinagar Zamindar, Lahore

8. Interviews

Munshi Ghulam Hassan, Son of Munshi Mohammad Ishaq (close associate of Sheikh Abdullah and three time president of Plebiscite Front).

345 Ghulam Hassan Naik, Retired School Headmaster and witness to contemporary developments. Haji Habibullah Sheikh, Ab Rehman Bhat, Ab Khaliq Lone-peasants from South Kashmir who benefitted from Land to the Tiller Act. Gh Ahmad Mir, a dispossessed landlord of Shopian. Mohammad Iqbal Mir, grandson of Gh Mohammad Mir, an influential Zaildar of Kulgam.

9. Published Books and Articles a) Articles Ahmad, Khalid Bashir, ‘Jammu 1947: Tales of Bloodshed’, Greater Kashmir, 5 November 2014. –––––––––, ‘Jammu Massacre: Role of Jammu in the freedom struggle has not been acknowledged', Greater Kashmir, 5 November 2015. –––––––––, ‘Survivor of a Massacre’, Greater Kashmir, 22 July 2017. Ahmad, Parvez, ‘Nature of Land Rights in Kashmir under Dogras-1846-1947’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 64, 2003. Andersen, Walter, ‘The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh: IV: Jan Sangh and Other Organisations’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 14, 1972. Beek, Martijn Van, ‘Beyond Identity Fetishism: Communal Conflict in Ladakh and the Limits of Autonomy’, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2000. –––––––––, ‘True Patriots: Justifying Autonomy for Ladakh’, Himalayan Research Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1998. Bhat, Safeer Ahmad, ‘Jammu and Kashmir on the Eve of Partition- A Study of MaulanaPolitical Conditions’, Azad Library,South Aligarh Asian Studies Muslim- A Research University Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, July–December 2017. Bhatia, Gurcharan Singh, ‘Sheikh Abdullah and Praja Parishad: Striking Similarities in Approach’, Kashmir Affairs, No. 3, January to February 1960. Chandra, Prakash, ‘National Question in Kashmir’, Social Scientist, Vol. 13, No. 6, June 1985. Chatta, Illays, ‘Terrible Fate: ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of Jammu’ Muslims in 1947’, Journal of Pakistan Vision, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009.

346 Snedden, Christopher, ‘What happened to Muslims in Jammu? Local identity, “the massacre” of 1947’ and the roots of the ‘Kashmir problem’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2001. Aslam, Mohamed, ‘Land Reforms in Jammu and Kashmir’, Social Scientist, Vol. 6, No. 4, Nov., 1977. Dhar, O.N., ‘Land Reforms in Kashmir’, Indian Affairs Record, Vol. III, No. 4, May, 1957. Hamdani, Asra, ‘Marginalisation of Reforms: A Historical Study of Land Reforms in Jammu and Kashmir (1931-1988)’, Social Scientist, Vol. 44, No. 11/12, 2016. Korbel, Josef, ‘The Kashmir Dispute After Six Years’, International Organization, Vol. 7, No. 4, Nov., 1953. –––––––––, ‘The National Conference Administration of Kashmir 1949-1954’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1954. Mitra, Subrata K., ‘Nehru's policy towards Kashmir: Bringing politics Back in again’, The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1997. Naik, Showkat Ahmad, ‘Landlords, Peasants and the Dogra rule in Kashmir’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 73, 2012. –––––––––, ‘Land Reform Measures in Kashmir during Dogra Rule’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 72, Part-I, 2011. Noorani, A. G., ‘Brought to Heel’, Frontline, Vol. 25, No. 18, Aug. 30 –Sep. 12, 2008. –––––––––, ‘How and Why Nehru and Abdullah Fell out’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 5, Jan. 30-Feb.5, 1999. –––––––––, ‘The Legacy of 1953’, Frontline, Volume 25, Issue 17, Aug. 16-29, 2008. –––––––––, ‘Kak and Sheikh’, Frontline, Volume 27, Issue 18, Aug.28-Sep.10, 2010. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University –––––––––, ‘The Dixon Plan, Frontline, Vol. 19, Issue 21, October 12-25, 2002. Palmer, Norman D., ‘The Changing Scene in Kashmir’, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, No. 12, Nov., 1953. Prakash, Siddhartha, ‘The Political Economy of Kashmir since 1947’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000. Puri, Balraj, ‘Kashmir and Rest of India: First Emotional Rupture’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 49, Dec.6- 12, 2006. –––––––––, ‘August 1953: An Opinion Survey’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 13, No. 27, Jul. 8, 1978.

347 –––––––––, Kashmir Affairs, Vol. 3, 1961. –––––––––, ‘Sangh’s Influence on India’s Kashmir Policy’, Kashmir Affairs, No. 3, Jan.-Feb.1960. –––––––––, ‘The Challenge of Kashmir’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 4, 27, January 1990. –––––––––, ‘The Question of Accession’, Epilogue, Vol. 4, No. 11, November 2010. Sanyal, Sukla, ‘Legitimizing Violence: Seditious Propaganda and Revolutionary Pamphlets in Bengal, 1908-1918’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 67, No. 3, August 2008. Saraf, M. Y., ‘Occupied Kashmir at the Threshold of a Storm’, Pakistan Times, 8 June 1952. Thakur, Nisar Ahmed, ‘3 survivors recount horrors of Jammu genocide’, Greater Kashmir, 6 November 2008. Thorner, Daniel, ‘The Kashmir Land Reforms: Some Personal Impressions’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. V, No. 12, September 1953. Whitehead, Andrew, ‘The People’s Militia: Communists and Kashmiri Nationalism in the 1940s’, Twentieth Century Communism: A Journal of International History, No. 2, 2010. Handoo, Bilal, ‘1947: First Blood’, Kashmir Life, 2 November, 2015. Ahad, Abdul, Kashmir amid propaganda, Greater Kashmir, 7 May 2015. ‘Jammu 1947’, Kashmir Life, Srinagar, 17 November 2015. Muhammad, Z. G., ‘Shortwave 62.3’, Greater Kashmir, 24 April 2016 –––––––––, ‘Of Zarb-e-Kaleem Days’, Greater Kashmir, 21 August 2016.

b) Books Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Abbott, Freeland, Islam and Pakistan, Cornell University Press, New York, 1968. Akbar, M. J., Kashmir Behind the Vale, Viking, New Delhi, 2002. Ali, Chaudhary Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan, Press, New York, 1967. Ali, Nisar, Agricultural Development and Income Distribution, Rima Publishing House, New Delhi, 1985. Anand, Adarsh Sein, The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir: Its Developments and Comments, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1980.

348 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London, 1991. Bakshi, S. R., Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Anmol Publishing House, New Delhi, 1998. Bamzai, P. N. K., Culture and Political History of Kashmir, MD Publications, New Delhi, 1994. Bamzai, Sandeep, Bonfire of Kashmiryat: Deconstructing the Accession, Rupa and Company, New Delhi, 2006. Bardhan, P. K., The Political Economy of Development in India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1984. Bazaz, Prem Nath, Azad Kashmir: A Democratic Socialist Conception, Feroz Sons, Lahore, 1951, repr., Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2005.

–––––––––, Daughters of Vitasta: A History of Kashmiri Women from Early Times to the Present Day, Pamposh Publications, New Delhi, 1969.

–––––––––, Inside Kashmir, Kashmir Publishing Company, Srinagar, 1941. –––––––––, Kashmir in Crucible, Pamposh Publications, New Delhi, 1967. –––––––––, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir-Cultural and Political from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, Kashmir Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1954. Behera, Navnita Chadha, Demystifying Kashmir, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D. C., 2006.

Bhat, Sanaullah, Kashmir in Flames: An Untold Story of Kashmir’s Political Affairs, Ali Mohammad and Sons, Srinagar, 1981. Bhatia, K. L., MaulanaConstitutional Azad and Legal Library, Status Aligarhof Jammu MuslimKashmir, New University Delhi, 2015. Bhattacharjea, Ajit, Kashmir: The Wounded Valley, UBS Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 1994. Bhushan, Vidhya, State Politics and Government: Jammu and Kashmir, Jay Kay Book House, Jammu, 1985. Birdwood, Lord, Two Nations and Kashmir, Robert Hale, London, 1956, repr., Gulshan Publishing House, Srinagar, 2005.

349 Biscoe, Tyndale, Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade, Seeley, Service and Co. Limited, London, 1922. Bose, Sumantra, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003. Brecher, Michael, The Struggle for Kashmir, Oxford University Press, New York, 1953. Carter, Lionel, Partition Observed: British Official Reports From South Asia, 16 October - 31 December 1947, Manohar Books, New Delhi, 2011. Chopra, P. N., Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel-Kashmir and Hyderabad, Konark Publishers, Delhi, 2002. Chowdhary, Rekha, ed., Identity Politics in Jammu and Kashmir, Vitasta Publishing, New Delhi, 2010.

–––––––––, Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of Identity and Separatism, Routledge, New York, 2016. Crooke, William, A Glossary of North Indian Peasant Life, edited by Shahid Amin, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989. Dhar, D. N., Kashmir- The Land and its Management: From Ancient to Modern Times, Kanishka Publishers, New Delhi, 2004. Durrani, Abdul Qayoom, Sahafat-i-Kashmir, Izhar Sons, Lahore, 2004.

Ernst, Waltraud and Pati, Biswamoy, eds., India’s Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism, Routledge, London, 2007.

Ganai, Muhammad Yusuf, Kashmiri’s Struggle for Independence (1931-1939), Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2003. Ganguly,Maulana Sumit, The AzadCrisis Library, in Kashmir: Aligarh Portents Muslimof War, Hopes University of Peace, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008. Gopal, Sarvepalli, Nehru: An Anthology, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980. Guha, Ramachandra, ed., Makers of Modern Asia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014. Gundevia, Y. D., The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah, Palit and Palit Publishers, New Delhi, 1974. Gupta, Jyoti Bhushan Das, Jammu and Kashmir, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1968.

350 Gupta, Sisir, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966. Hangloo, R. L., Agrarian System of Kashmir, 1846-1889, Commonwealth Publishers, New Delhi, 1995. Hasan, Khalid and Rad, Rehmatullah, eds., Memory Lane to Jammu, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 2004. Hasan, Mohibbul, Kashmir under the Sultans, Iran Society, Calcutta, 1959. Hassnain, Fida Mohammad, Freedom Struggle in Kashmir, Rima Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988. Herring, Ronald J., Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reforms in South Asia, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1983. Hussain, Mirza Shafiq, Kashmiri Musalmanun ki Siyasi Jadujahad 1931-39: Muntakhab Dastawaizat, National Institute of Research, History, and Culture, Islamabad, 1985. Indian Council of Social Science Research, A Survey of Research in Economics, Vol. IV, Part II, Agriculture, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1975. Ishaq, Munshi, Choudhwin Sadi ke Ibtidaee aur Wasti Dour ke Chand Iqtibasaat, Srinagar, 1951. Jalal, Ayesha, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850, Routledge, London, 2000.

–––––––––, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014. Jha, Prem Shankar, Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History, Oxford University Press,Maulana New Delhi, Azad1996. Library, Aligarh Muslim University Kaul, H. N., Rediscovery of Ladakh, Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1998. Kaul, R. N., Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah- A Political Phoenix, Sterling Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, 1985.

Kaul, Santosh, Kashmir’s Constitutional Status, Anmol Publications, New Delhi, 1999. Kaul, Shridhar and Kaul, H. N., Ladakh through the Ages: Towards a New Identity, New Delhi, Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1992.

351 Khan, Ghulam Hassan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940, Light and Life Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, repr., Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2009. Khan, Mohammad Ishaq, History of Srinagar (1846-1947)-A History in Socio- Cultural Change, Aamir Publications, Srinagar, 1978. Khan, Nyla Ali, ed., The Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society and Polity, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012.

–––––––––, Islam, Women and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010. Khan, Sardar M. Ibrahim, The Kashmir Saga, 1965, Revised and Enlarged Edition, Verinag Publishers Mirpur, 1990. Kilam, Jia Lal, A History of Kashmiri Pandits, Gandhi Memorial College, Srinagar, 1955. Korbel, Joseph, Danger in Kashmir, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1954. Koul, Gwasha Lal, Kashmir Through the Ages, 5000 B.C. to 1954 A.D.: A Historical Survey, Chronicle Publishing House, Srinagar, 1954. Lakhanpal, P. L., Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute, International Publications, New Delhi, 1958, repr., 1995. Lamb, Alastair, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury, 1994.

–––––––––, Crisis in Kashmir-1947 to 1966, Routledge and Keagan Paul, London, 1966.

–––––––––, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury, 1991. Lawrence,Maulana Walter R.,AzadThe ValleyLibrary, of Kashmir Aligarh, Henry Muslim Frowde, University London, 1895. Madhok, Balraj, Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh: Problem and Solution, Reliance Publishing House, New Delhi, 1987.

–––––––––, Kashmir: Centre of New Alignments, Deepak Prakashan, Delhi, 1963. –––––––––, Kashmir: The Storm Centre of the World, A. Ghosh, Texas, 1992. Mattoo, Abdul Majid, Kashmir under the Mughals (1586-1752), Golden Horde Enterprises, Srinagar, 1988.

352 Menon, V. P., The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, Orient Longmans, Calcutta, 1956. Misri, M.L. and Bhat M. S, Poverty, Planning and Economic Change in Jammu and Kashmir, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1994. Mufti, Gulzar, Kashmir in Sickness and in Health, Patridge India, New Delhi, 2013. Naaz, Tarif, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: A Victim of betrayal, Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2011. Naqash, Nasir A., and Shah, G. M., Kashmir from Crisis to Crisis, APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 1997. Noorani, A. G., Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2011.

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353 Rahman, Mahfoozur, Co-operative Credit and Agricultural Development: A Study with Reference to Jammu and Kashmir, Sultan Chand & Sons, Delhi, 1974. Rai, Mridu, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir, Permanent Black, Delhi, 2004. Raina, Trilokinath, An Anthology of Modern Kashmiri Verse (1930-1960), Sangam Press, Poona, 1972. Ram, Diwan Kirpa, Gulzar-i-Kashmir, Kohinoor Publications, Lahore, 1856. Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Vol. I and II, Feroz Sons Ltd., Lahore, 1977, repr., 2005. Saxena, H. L., Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Kashmir Muddle, The Nationalist Office, New Delhi, 1949.

Schaffer, Howard B., The Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D. C., 2009. Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, I. B. Tauris, London, 2003.

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–––––––––, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 2015. Stephens, Ian, Pakistan, Ernest Benn Ltd., London, 1963. Sufi, G. M. D., Kashir, Being a History of Kashmir from the Earliest Times to Our Own, University of Panjab, Lahore, 1948.

354 Sufi, Ghulam Mohiuddin, Kashmir 1931 se 1977 Tak, Snober Publications, Srinagar, 1980. Symonds, Richard, The Making of Pakistan, Faber and Faber, London, 1950. Taseer, Rashid, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, (4 Vols.), Muhafiz Publications, Srinagar, 1966. Teng, Mohan Krishan, Bhat, Ram Krishan Kaul and Kaul, Santosh, eds., Kashmir: Constitutional History and Documents, Light and Life Publishers, New Delhi, 1977. Teng, Mohan Krishan, Kashmir: Article 370, Anmol Publications, New Delhi, 1990, repr., 2002. Tharp, Robert, Cashmir Misgovernment, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1870. Thomas, Christopher, Faultline Kashmir, Brunel Academic Publishers, Middlesex, 2000. Thomas, Raju G. C., ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992. Thorner, Daniel, The Agrarian Prospect in India, 2nd. ed., Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1976. Vashisht, Satish, Sheikh Abdullah Then and Now, Maulik Sahitya Prakashan, Delhi, 1968. Verma, P. S., Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1994. Walinsky, Louis J., ed., Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business: The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky, Oxford University Press, New York, 1977. Wani, Aijaz Ashraf, What Happened to Governance in Kashmir?, Oxford University Press, MaulanaNew Delhi, 2019.Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University White, M. Bourke, Halfway to Freedom, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1949. Whitehead, Andrew, A Mission in Kashmir, Viking, New Delhi, 2007. Wilcox, Wayne A., Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation, Columbia University Press, Columbia, 1963. Zutshi, Chitralekha, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir, Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2003. Zutshi, U. K., Emergence of Political Awakening in Kashmir, Manohar Publications, Delhi, 1986.

355 (The Cover of the Naya Kashmir Plan which became a Bible for the National Conference echoed the communist influence in its imagery and colour)

(The Tribals Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim Universitywho attacked Kashmir in 1947)

321 (Kashmir Accedes to India: Hindustan Times, 28 October 1947)

(The National Militia formed by National Conference to defend Srinagar from tribal onslaught) Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

322 (Nehru inspecting the Women’s Self Defence Corps)

(The Children’s Militia with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad)

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

323 (People in large numbers attending the swearing in ceremony of Sheikh Abdullah)

(Jawaharlal Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah and Maulana Azad in a Boat Procession in Srinagar in Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim1948 University)

324 (A November 1949 photograph showing Sheikh Abdullah ploughing in a field as part of his ‘Grow More Food programme’)

(Sheikh Abdullah announcing the Land to Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim Universitythe Tiller Programme on 13th July 1950)

325 (Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg signing the Land to the Tiller Ordinance)

(Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh MuslimSheikh University Abdullah in the Constituent Assembly of India)

326 (Sheikh Abdullah at the Royal Place in a composed posture, apparently showing Kashmir's new ruler as the old order-the princely family, and its portraits - is being dismantled and moved out. Courtesy: http://www.kashmirconnected.com/resources/sheikh-abdullah-at-the-palace)

(National Anthem of Kashmir published by Khalid)

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

327 (Khalid, 8 February 1949 popularising the ideal of One Leader, One Organisation and One Programme)

(Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah after finalising the Delhi Agreement)

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

328 (Dismissal and Arrest of Sheikh Abdullah: Times of India, 10 August 1953)

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

329 APPENDIX I List of landlords who held more than 3000 kanals of land as jagirs S. No. Name of the Landlord Tehsil (where land was Land (in kanals) held) 1 Raja Saheb of Chenani Ramban 1,13,655 Udhampur 1,86,406 Total 3,00,061 2 Shrimati Vidyawati Pulwama 11,621 Shahr Khas 732 Badgam 3200 Sopore 8,704 Baramulla 11,932 Handwara 26,838 Kulgam 7,441 Kathua 3,990 Basohli 23,770 Ranbirsingh Pora 8,012 Total 1,06,240 3 Wazir Ramsarandass Jammu 4,427 Jasmergarh 9,092 Kulgam 7,484 Badgam 554 Baramulla 11,330 Total 32,847 4 Hemis Gumpa Ladakh 16,768 5 Wazir Tej Ram Akhnoor 5,775 Maulana Azad Library, AligarhSopore Muslim University3,169 Handwara 914 Pulwama 1,173 Badgam 32 Anantnag 2,097 Shahr Khas 449 Baderwah 1,627 Jammu 712 Total 15,975

315 6 Sardar Kishan Singh Shahr Khas 107 Jammu 2,056 Ram Nagar 6,261 Sopore 3,787 Handwara 2,082 Total 14,293 7 Dewan Dhanpat Rai Basohli 1,407 Ranbirsingh Pora 3,944 Baramulla 4,554 Badgam 3,200 Kathua 1,007 Total 14,112 8 Thakur Kartar Singh Akhnoor 2,233 Sopore 2,791 Pulwama 2,275 Kulgam 351 Total 7,650 9 Pandit Shyam Sundar Lal Kulgam 2,413 Dhar Anantnag 566 Pulwama 914 Shahr Khas 777 Badgam 1,098 Baramulla 3,283 Sopore 1,361 Total 10,412 10 Anant Ram Jammu 9,944 11 KishanMaulana Singh Azad Library,Reasi Aligarh Muslim9,611 University 12 Chain Singh Jasmergarh 9,602 13 Chaudhary Ghulam Mustafa Akhnoor 9,018 14 Upendar Kishen Kaul Anantnag 490 Badgam 5,703 Kulgam 1,240 Srinagar 729 Total 8,162 15 Ringdam Gumpa Kargil 8,141 16 Ram Ditta Kathua 7,751

316 17 Sant Ram Kathua 7,463 18 Musmat Parsinnu Samba 7,248 19 Chaudhary Rasilla Kathua 7,197 20 Faqiro Thakar Samba 6,907 21 Sardar Moti Ram Kathua 6,447 22 Khanqah Baba Siam-ud-din Baramulla 5,856 Sahib Rishi 23 Tigna Gumpa Ladakh 5,606 24 Bhilo Thakar Kathua 5,386 25 Pandit Balakak Dhar Pulwama 734 Sopore 4410 Total 5,144 26 Raja Sahab of Stoke Ladakh 5,071 27 Ziarat Pir Dastgeer Saheb Pulwama 4,483 28 Khuda Baksh Kathua 4,277 29 Ahmad Mir Pulwama 4,202 30 Musmat Ashraf Begum Shahr Khas 856 Pulwama 2,989 Badgam 70 Total 3,915

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

317 APPENDIX II

Working of Land to the Tiller Act: Amount of land transferred to the tillers and vested in the State till July 1952.

Name of the Amount of Vested in Total No. of Mutation Amount of Increase in Tehsil land the State (in Kanals) mutations fee Land land transferred (in registered realised Developm revenue to the Kanals) (in Rs) ent Fund registered tillers (in charged (in (in Rs) Kanals) Rs) Anantnag 17,822 9,180 27,002 2,994 4,965 2,039 134 Kulgam 44,209 9,678 53,887 4,543 8,721 6,021 1,663 Pulwama 41,057 9,906 50,963 4,278 9,573 4,602 1,689 Srinagar 25,798 6,960 32,758 4,208 7,185 3,260 875 Badgam 28,799 7,708 36,508 4,700 8,009 3,210 1,196 Baramulla 76,858 1,408 78,267 5,554 11,789 7,607 1,442 Sopore 58,362 2,430 60,793 5,812 11,497 7,200 355 Handwara 40,794 607 41,401 4,462 9,010 2,809 1,303 Ladakh 1,682 898 2,580 306 529 95 39 Kargil 1,025 488 1,514 3 597 38 8 Uri 386 624 1,011 362 92 56 …….. Kishtwar 10,020 18,707 28,728 1,489 3,385 452 387 Bhadarwah 22,231 17,211 39,443 2,777 3,867 1,153 92 Ramban 46,074 5,458 51,532 2,539 4,972 1,202 929 Udhampur 63,090 15,320 78,411 3,246 6,524 4,206 636 Reasi 58,422 32,254 90,676 2,416 4,575 1,502 316 Ramnagar 23,690 13,591 37,281 2,507 3,431 1,113 171 Jammu 54,405 13,424 67,829 3,267 6,956 3,798 22 Akhnoor 63,116 31,213 94,330 3,940 7,302 1,195 472 Samba 51,897 56,684 1,08,581 3,178 5,475 2,144 312 R. S. Pora 70,579 11,758 82,337 3,900 7,246 6,010 1,223 Kathua Maulana54,351 19Azad,998 Library,74,350 Aligarh2,156 Muslim5,473 University4,814 2,506 Basohli 29,385 22,575 51,960 2,843 4,634 1,291 377 Jasmergarh 63,394 26,275 89,669 3,825 8,551 5,791 384 Rajauri 64,920 15,969 80,890 4,273 1,3628 1,129 550 Naushera 45,754 23,866 69,620 2,712 4,295 1,307 63 Mendhar 538 1,306 1,844 947 1,049 74 65 Haveli 1,087 6,920 8,015 755 734 82 64 Total 10,59,757 3,82,434 14,42,192 82,992 1,64,502 74,179 17,288

318 Appendix III

The text of Article 370 as it was passed by the Constituent Assembly of India.

Article 306A

(1) Not withstanding anything contained in this Constitution.

(a) The provisions of article 211A of this Constitution shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(b) The power of Parliament to make laws for the State shall be limited to:

(i) Those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India are the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State; and

(ii) Such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify;

Explanation :- For the purposes of this article, the government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the Union as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers, for the time being in office, under the Maharaja's Proclamation, dated the fifth day of March, 1948.

(c) The provisions of Article 1 of this Constitution shall apply in relation to the State;

(d) SuchMaulana of the other Azad provision Library, of this AligarhConstitution Muslim and subject University to such exceptions and modifications shall apply in relation to the State as the President may by order specify:

Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State aforesaid shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State:

Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding provision shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.

319 (2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in sub-clause (b) (ii) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of clause (1) was given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding clause of this article, the President may, by public notification declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify:

Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification'.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

320