Metcc Insight Pack - Contents
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Day 72 Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry 13 November 2018 (+44)207
Day 72 Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry 13 November 2018 1 Tuesday, 13 November 2018 1 an incident, and at that point I was neither in 2 (10.00 am) 2 a position to have good communications, neither had 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to 3 I been properly briefed as I would be at 04.10 when 4 today's hearing. 4 I came in. And also my location in a vehicle on 5 We are going to begin by hearing the rest of 5 a motorway was difficult as well. 6 Commander Jerome's evidence. 6 Q. You say in paragraph 46: 7 MR MILLETT: Good morning, Mr Chairman. Yes, we are. 7 "He briefed me on the nature of the incident, the 8 Can I please call Commander Jerome back. 8 command structure put in place, the resources being 9 NEIL JEROME (continued) 9 deployed, and the current status of the activations 10 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY (continued) 10 initiated on my earlier call." 11 MR MILLETT: Commander, good morning. 11 During that briefing, did he give you any further 12 A. Good morning. 12 new information about the incident? 13 Q. Thank you very much for coming back to us this morning. 13 A. Would it be okay to refer to my notes? 14 A. Thank you. 14 Q. Yes, of course. 15 Q. I am going to turn now to your involvement on the night, 15 A. Thank you. 16 or, rather, to turn back to it. 16 Q. Just so we know what those are, I think you're referring 17 Can I ask you, please, to go to page 13 of your 17 to the Jerome log, which is at MET00023289. -
Transcript – 29Th July 2021
Day 28 Open Session Jermaine Baker Inquiry- Main Hearings 29 July 2021 1 Thursday, 29 July 2021 1 Q. In terms of command and control, you are an operational 2 (10.00 am) 2 and tactical firearms commander, and you have performed 3 (The Inquiry began in closed session) 3 the role of firearms tactical adviser at all levels of 4 (11.45 am) 4 competence for in excess of 12 years? 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon -- no, good morning. 5 A. That is correct, yes. 6 MS BLACKWELL: We are almost in the afternoon, session, sir. 6 Q. You have also been a firearms instructor for the past 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 7 11 years, conducting firearms training between 8 MS BLACKWELL: May the witness be sworn, please? 8 operational deployments at various ranks prior to taking 9 THE CHAIRMAN: He may. 9 the role of CFI in November 2019? 10 MR PHILIP TAYLOR (sworn) 10 A. That's correct, yes. 11 Questions from MS BLACKWELL 11 Q. In addition to being the MPS CFI, you are also the CFI 12 MS BLACKWELL: Please sit down. 12 responsible for the national explosive method of entry 13 Thank you, is your full name Philip Taylor? 13 and national counter-terrorism specialist firearms 14 A. That's correct, yes. 14 officer network training being delivered across the UK? 15 Q. You are the chief firearms instructor for the 15 A. That's correct, yes. 16 Metropolitan Police Service? 16 Q. Thank you. 17 A. That's correct, yes. 17 In your capacity as the MPS CFI, you are responsible 18 Q. -
Proof of Evidence of Commander Kyle Gordon
THE MAYOR'S OFFICE FOR POLICING AND CRIME (PERIVALE) COMPULSORY PURCHASE ORDER 2020 PROOF OF EVIDENCE ON BEHALF OF THE ACQUIRING AUTHORITY IN RESPECT OF THE OPERATIONAL NEED FOR VRES, THE RISK OF OPERATIONAL FAILURE, THE LOCATION OF THE VRES SCHEME AND THE PROXIMITY TO LONDON AND THE NEED FOR THE VRES SCHEME ON ONE SITE COMMANDER KYLE GORDON, (MET OPERATIONS) 20 APRIL 2021 121072/126/28567153_1 1 OF 10 INTRODUCTION AND EXPERIENCE .......................................................... 3 SCOPE OF EVIDENCE ................................................................................ 3 STRATEGIC NEED FOR VRES SCHEME ................................................... 3 RISK OF OPERATIONAL FAILURE ............................................................ 6 SITE PROXIMITY TO LONDON ................................................................... 6 NEED FOR ONE SITE ................................................................................. 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ................................................................. 8 121072/126/28567153_1 2 OF 10 INTRODUCTION AND EXPERIENCE 1.1 My name is Kyle Gordon. The evidence which I have prepared and provide for this Inquiry is true and I confirm that the opinions expressed are my true and professional opinions. 1.2 I am a Commander of the Metropolitan Police Service with responsibility for ‘Uniformed Operations’ within the Metropolitan Police Service’s ‘Met Operations’ Business Group. I have command of all Firearms, Taskforce (Territorial Support Group, Mounted, Dog Support -
Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom Module III: the UK’S Counterterrorism Structure and the Pursuit of Terrorists
Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom Module III: The UK’s Counterterrorism Structure and the Pursuit of Terrorists PAUL JONATHAN SMITH CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY DEPT. OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Slide 1 Opening Credits Music Slide 2 Counterterrorism in the UK: Module III: Counterterrorism Structure and the Pursuit of Terrorists By Paul Jonathan Smith Slide 3 Domestic Counterterrorism Structure PURSUE is the fourth and final strand of CONTEST, the UK’s national counterterrorism policy. The British domestic counterterrorism structure is comprised of four elements: 1. The British Security Service (MI5): MI5 is the UK’s domestic security agency, which coordinates the collection and assessment of all UK domestic counterterrorism intelligence. 2. The Special Branches in each UK police force: These officers work in close cooperation with MI5 to collect counterterrorism intelligence within their local force area. 3. The Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorism Command: This unit, based in New Scotland Yard, coordinates the national police response to counterterrorism intelligence and supervises the collection of evidence for charging suspected terrorists. 4. The Crown Prosecution Service: This is the legal branch of experienced lawyers, called barristers, which receives counterterrorism evidence from police and represents the Crown in the prosecution of terrorists. Most counterterrorism cases are tried at the Central Criminal Court, commonly known as Old Bailey, in London. This structure relies on a clear understanding of each organisation’s role, a well-rehearsed interagency system that facilitates the appropriate handling of counterterrorism intelligence to generate compelling evidence, and a legal system that delivers successful convictions and protects sensitive operational sources and techniques, without losing “the hearts and minds” of the Muslim population. -
Road Safety – a Priority for Police and Crime Plans?
Road safety – A priority for police and crime plans? Action Vision Zero RoadPeace 20’s Plenty for Us December 2020 Contents 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 3 2. Key findings ..................................................................................................... 3 3. Going forward--Next generation of police and crime plans ............................. 5 Appendix A: Road safety in police and crime plans, England and Wales ................ 6 NORTH EAST REGION .......................................................................................................................... 6 Cleveland ........................................................................................................................................ 6 Durham .......................................................................................................................................... 6 Northumbria ................................................................................................................................... 6 YORKSHIRE AND THE HUMBER REGION .............................................................................................. 7 Humberside .................................................................................................................................... 7 North Yorkshire .............................................................................................................................. 7 South Yorkshire -
That's Wonderful, Thanks So Much. I'm Sure Imagine Can Clear up Your Not
From: Trump Baby < gmail.com> Sent: 04 July 2018 09:00 To: Cc: Simon Grinter Subject: Re: Trump Baby PSG flight 13th July - risk assessment Attachments: image004.png That’s wonderful, thanks so much. I’m sure Imagine can clear up your not unreasonable points about their numerical values lacking a key this morning also. Very best, Leo On Wed, 4 Jul 2018 at 08:32 < wyg.com> wrote: Good Morning Leo Thanks for that. I think that covers everything now. regards Associate Health and Safety Consultant WYG Executive Park, Avalon Way, Anstey, Leicester, LE7 7GR Tel: +44 116 234 Mob: +44 777 581 www.wyg.com WYG Management Services Limited. Registered in England number: 4807864. Registered Office: Arndale Court, Otley Road, Headingley, Leeds, West Yorkshire LS6 2UJ VAT No: 431-0326-08. The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location. The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location. The linked image cannot be displayed. The file The linked image cannot be displayed. The file The linked image cannot be displayed. The file The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link poin ts to the correct file and Verify that the link poin ts to the correct file and Verify that the link poin ts to the correct file and Verify that the link poin ts to the correct file and location. -
(LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual 3
LONDON RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual Version 10.1 (July 2019) LONDON RESILIENCE LESLP Manual Version 10.1 (July 2019) This version of the Major Incident Procedure Manual has been collated based on contributions by the following organisations: Metropolitan Police Service (Lead Author) British Transport Police City of London Police Environment Agency London Ambulance Service NHS Trust London Fire Brigade HM Coastguard, London Army HQ London District London Local Authorities London Resilience Group Port of London Authority Transport for London © LESLP All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the Metropolitan Police Service, acting on behalf of LESLP. LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP London Fire Brigade Headquarters 169 Union Street London SE1 0LL [email protected] www.london.gov.uk LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum. Page 2 of 60 LONDON RESILIENCE Introduction This document provides information about the London Resilience Partnership’s approach to a generic major incident, and additional capabilities needed to respond to specific incidents. It is designed to assist practitioners in the planning, training and exercising stages of preparing for emergencies, and to provide a reference document for use during incidents. -
The Metropolitan Police Service Approach to Corporate Resiliency
The Metropolitan Police Service Approach to Corporate Resiliency Chief Inspector Tim Marjason Metropolitan Police Service Emergency Preparedness OCU CO3 - Central Operations New Scotland Yard, London Central Operations C03 Emergency Preparedness OCU – Overview of Other Functions Emergency Procedures – Major Incident C&C Tactical Advice, Electronic Contingency Plans (ECP database), DVRI, Fuel, Telecommunications, Prisons, Flooding, etc. Partnership with the London Resilience Team (LRT). CBRN(e) – Policy and Coordination. Olympic/Paralympic Games 2012 - Consequence Management Strand, Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) Design, NOCC BC/SME advice. Profile of Metropolitan Police Service 34,000 Police Officers (27% of all UK Police Resources), 24,000 Police Support Staff, 9 Business Groups, 640 square miles, 7 million residents: • Territorial Policing (TP), Central Operations (CO) • Specialist Operations (S0) inc. CT - SO15 • Specialist Crime Directorate (SCD) • HR Directorate, Directorate of Information (DOI) • Directorate of Resources (DoR) • Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA) • Deputy Commissioners Command (DCC) Business Continuity Management (BCM/COOP) Defined as an holistic management process that identifies potential impacts that threaten the continued delivery of a service. It provides a framework for building resilience, together with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders and reputation. Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 The Metropolitan Police Service is the largest Category -
The National Intelligence Model: Minimum Standards
1 University of Portsmouth To what degree have the non-police public services adopted the National Intelligence Model? What benefits could the National Intelligence Model deliver? Nick Osborn The thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice of the University of Portsmouth. May 2012 i Abstract It is claimed that the National Intelligence Model (NIM) consolidated intelligence-led policing principles in investigative practice and decision making in British policing. Subsequently, encouraged by the Home Office, the NIM was adopted by a number of other public services with an investigative capability. However, that transfer took place without a sufficiently rigorous evaluation of the model’s value to the police service and without any meaningful analysis of its relevance to the investigative functions of other public sector agencies. This research examined the adoption of the NIM by three public sector bodies: The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), The Identity and Passport Service (IPS) and the Driving Standards Agency (DSA). It drew on archival materials, associated literature and the analysis of semi-structured interviews with the personnel of these and associated agencies. Research respondents also assessed a simplified version of the NIM that was designed to remove many of the original model’s inconsistencies and ambiguities. The research identified that the reviewed public services are not compliant with the NIM minimum standards and that the model has not delivered any meaningful improvement in the consistency of process, investigative efficiency, improved partnership working, or in fraud reduction in those agencies. -
WITNESS STATEMENT CJ Act 1967, S.9; MC Act 1980, Ss.5A(3)(A) and 5B; Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, Rule 27.1
MO I I (T) WITNESS STATEMENT CJ Act 1967, s.9; MC Act 1980, ss.5A(3)(a) and 5B; Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, Rule 27.1 Statement of Irmo Nicholas Thatcher URN: Age if under 18 Over 18 (if otrer113 insert 'ever IS') Occupation: Police Inspector This statement (consisting of 12 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and 1 make it knowing that, if it. is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if 1 have wilfully stated anything in it which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true. Signature: Date: 8)161 IT' Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded7 (supply witness details on rear) This statement is further to my statement dated 27th June 2017. I have been informed that I might be asked to give evidence to the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry and have been given the opportunity to add to my previous statement and expand on certain issues. Prior to writing this statement, I have now viewed my body worn video(BWV) from the night of the fire, for the first time since that night. Although the footage is a good aide memoir of what happened, it obviously does not convey what it felt like to be there, what it smelt like and what it sounded like. Sounds like a 'pop' on the BWV were like explosions as the building materials burnt, and then each explosion was followed by burning materials falling. The BWV feels like a 2D representation of what it was like to be there on the night. -
Metropolitan Police Service Business Plan Progress Update 2018-19
Metropolitan Police Service Business Plan progress update 2018-19, Quarter 1 (April to June 2018) 1- INTRODUCTION 2 Quarter 1 overview 2 2- TACKLING SERIOUS VIOLENCE 3 Violent crime 3 Terrorism 4 3- SAFEGUARDING 5 Child sexual exploitation and abuse 5 Serious sexual offences, stalking, harassment 5 Domestic Abuse 6 Modern slavery 6 4- ACQUISITIVE CRIME 6 Moped crime 6 Local crime priorities 7 5- ACHIEVING THE BEST OUTCOMES 7 Prevention and investigation 7 Responding to the public 7 6- DEVELOPING OUR KEY CAPABILITIES 8 Smarter working 8 Leadership 8 Estates 8 Page 1 1- Introduction Quarter 1 overview Operational policing in London is the responsibility End of year crime statistics were released in April, of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Cressida showing overall crime - total notifiable offences - Dick. increased by 6.4 per cent (777,458 to 827,225 offences). Many groups of offences remain lower The Met’s operational priorities are to: than they were in 2012. It is notable that the problems in London are not unique and indeed • Focus on what matters most to Londoners: many forces across the country are experiencing violent crime tops the public’s concerns and much higher rises than the capital. tackling it is a priority in order to protect Londoners. This includes terrorism, knife and We continue to be focused on violent crime, gun crime, sexual offending, domestic abuse investing additional resources and coordinating and safeguarding vulnerable people from actions across central and local commands, and predatory behaviour. with partners. Violence against the person was up • Achieve the best outcomes in the pursuit by 5.26 per cent (237,774 to 250,287 offences). -
The Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime and Metropolitan Police
The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and Metropolitan Police Service Public Access and Engagement Strategy Draft Strategy for Consultation July 2017 Foreword Our first priority is keeping Londoners safe. That means tackling the things that matter most to communities - terrorism, knife and gun crime, hate crime, sexual offending, domestic violence and protecting vulnerable people from predatory behaviour. We can have more impact on keeping people safe if we mobilise communities and involve local people in improving public safety and preventing crime. That means improving the way we engage with London’s communities and changing the ways people can access our services to meet changes in the public’s expectations. The backdrop to these ambitions is a prolonged period of reductions in funding for policing in London. On top of the £600 million already saved from the MPS budget, London’s police now need to deliver a further £400 million of savings over the next four years. £200 million of these have been identified, but a further £200 million still need to be found. Tackling this financial challenge forces us to make some tough choices, some of which are set out in this document. We are determined that choices made to deliver savings will, wherever possible, protect the front line and improve our response to the public, and that is the intention behind the plans set out in this document. In fact, in many cases, we believe we can replace a current offer which does not meet Londoners’ needs with a new one which is more suited to the way they want to engage with their public services.