The National Intelligence Model: Minimum Standards

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The National Intelligence Model: Minimum Standards 1 University of Portsmouth To what degree have the non-police public services adopted the National Intelligence Model? What benefits could the National Intelligence Model deliver? Nick Osborn The thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice of the University of Portsmouth. May 2012 i Abstract It is claimed that the National Intelligence Model (NIM) consolidated intelligence-led policing principles in investigative practice and decision making in British policing. Subsequently, encouraged by the Home Office, the NIM was adopted by a number of other public services with an investigative capability. However, that transfer took place without a sufficiently rigorous evaluation of the model’s value to the police service and without any meaningful analysis of its relevance to the investigative functions of other public sector agencies. This research examined the adoption of the NIM by three public sector bodies: The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), The Identity and Passport Service (IPS) and the Driving Standards Agency (DSA). It drew on archival materials, associated literature and the analysis of semi-structured interviews with the personnel of these and associated agencies. Research respondents also assessed a simplified version of the NIM that was designed to remove many of the original model’s inconsistencies and ambiguities. The research identified that the reviewed public services are not compliant with the NIM minimum standards and that the model has not delivered any meaningful improvement in the consistency of process, investigative efficiency, improved partnership working, or in fraud reduction in those agencies. The NIM failed because of perceived complexity, the language of the model and supplementary guidance; its exclusive ‘fit’ with the police; and a suspicion by the agencies’ personnel that its adoption was intended as a performance management and governance tool. Moreover, the revised version of the NIM’s minimum standards did not improve comprehension or conformity, or resolve the model’s perceived police bias. It was concluded that the model is not fit for purpose for the agencies studied and that an alternative model that is more finely tuned to the needs of those agencies is required. ii Contents List Abstract i List of Contents ii Figures and Tables vi List of acronyms and abbreviations viii A brief explanation of terms xi Chapter 1: Introduction Foundation of this research 1 Setting the scene 2 Problem statement 3 Rationale 5 Aims and objectives 6 Structure 6 Summary 7 Chapter 2: Origins, foundation and development of the NIM Introduction 8 Intelligence-led Policing 9 Post-Baumber and the Intelligence Cycle 11 The development of the Kent Police Model 14 NIM 16 The National Intelligence Model 16 Compliance with the NIM 19 The NIM: Tasking and Co-ordination 20 Intelligence Requirement 24 NIM as a model to encourage productive partnership 25 Statutory Partnerships 29 Summary 31 iii Chapter 3: Methodology Introduction 34 Contribution 34 Parameters, design, data collection and primary research 35 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 36 Identity and Passport Service (IPS) 36 Driving Standards Agency (DSA) 37 Research Design 38 Data collection 41 Primary Research 41 Sample, ethics and analysis 42 Ethical Issues 47 Content Analysis 48 Rationale and justification 49 Summary 50 Chapter 4: Background and related work Introduction 52 The NIM as national policy 52 Policy transfer 53 COMPSTAT 57 Community Policing 59 New Public Management 62 NPM - The 80s: ‘Economy, Efficiency’: 63 NPM - The 90s: ‘Effectiveness’: Audit and Inspection 64 NPM - The Police and Magistrates Court Act, 1994 and RIPA 2000 64 NPM - motive for the NIM; New Labour 67 NIM as a business model 69 The origins of intelligence 74 Criminal Intelligence 73 The NIM and crime reduction 75 Fraud in the Public Service 78 iv Organisational Change 80 Diffusion of Innovation 81 The NIM and the non-police public services 83 Summary 86 Chapter 5: Data Analysis: the results Introduction 89 Earlier research findings 89 Current research 92 Theme 1: compliance with the NIM; organisational and professional 92 Theme 2: establishing the impact the NIM has on fraud within the public service 97 Theme 3: the impact on partnership and joint working 103 Theme 4: NIM as a productive business model 105 Theme 5: the potential benefits to investigative efficiency or effectiveness? 106 Theme 6: review of the revised NIM minimum standards 108 Summary Discussion 109 Compliance and conformity 111 Impact on fraud 112 Partnership 114 Business model 116 Investigative efficiency and effectiveness 116 Revised NIM minimum standards 117 Chapter 6: Discussion and ‘The Way Forward’ Introduction 114 The issue of conformity 121 Suitability of the NIM to public service 125 Potential beneficial outcomes for the NIM 125 Fraud 127 Alternative intelligence-led processes 131 Summary 133 v Chapter 7: Conclusion Introduction 135 Origins, foundations and development of the NIM 135 Research methods and further research 136 Background and related work 136 The research 137 Addressing public service nonconformity 139 Summary 139 vi Appendices Appendix 1 Relationship between research aims and objectives 138 Appendix 2 Consultancy and Training activity within public service since 1996 139 Appendix 3 National Intelligence Model: revised Minimum Standards for public services 141 Appendix 4 Semi-structured Interview Protocol 161 Appendix 5 Police National Intelligence Model 5x5x5 Grading System 162 Appendix 6 A proposed Public Service Intelligence Process 165 Appendix 7 Recommendations 173 References 174 Annex 1 National Intelligence Model: Minimum Standards 204 Declaration Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award. vii Figures Figure 2.1: The Intelligence Cycle 14 Figure 2.2: The National Intelligence Model Business Process 18 Figure 2.3: The tasking and co-ordinating groups identified in the NIM 23 Figure A6.1: The Public Service Intelligence Process 145 Tables Table 2.1: Major National Databases in the Public Sector 28 Table 3.1: Interview respondents by public service and role 44 Table 3.2: Subjects who reviewed the NIM MS and Revised MS 45 Table 3.3: Subjects who did not review the NIM MS and revised MS 46 Table 3.4: Subjects who reviewed the NIM MS and revised MS providing written responses 46 Table 4.1 Time Line (1975-2006): development and potential policy transfer to the NIM 55 viii List of acronyms and abbreviations AC Assistant Commissioner ACAG (SOCA) Anti-Corruption Advisory Group ACFM Accredited Counter Fraud Manager ACFS Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers ACPOS Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland ANPR Automatic Number Plate Recognition BCU Borough Command Unit BIA Borders and Immigration Agency BVPI Best Value Performance Indicators CA Content Analysis CCTV Closed Circuit Television CDA Crime and Disorder Act, 1988 CDRP Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership CEOP Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre CHIS Covert Human Intelligence Sources CIFAS Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System CJX Criminal Justice Extranet COMPSTAT ‘Computer Statistics’ or ‘Comparative Statistics’ COMSTAT Alternative form of COMPSTAT CPIA Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act, 1996 CRB Criminal Records Bureau CSA Child Support Agency DAC Deputy Assistant Commissioner DCI Departmental Central Index DIM Daily Intelligence Meeting DMM Daily Management Meeting DPA Data Protection Act, 1998 DSA Driving Standards Agency DVLA Driver and Vehicle Licence Agency DWP Department for Work & Pensions EEA European Economic Area EU European Union FAQ frequently asked questions FIU Fraud Intelligence Unit FMI Fiscal Management Initiative FRISC Fraud Referral Information Scoring Card GMAC PBM Greater Manchester Against Crime Partnership Business Model ix GMPA Greater Manchester Police Authority GP General Practitioner GPMS Government Protective Marking Scheme GRO General Registry Office GSI Government Secure Internet HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary HMP Her Majesty’s Prison HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs HO Home Office HOSDB Home Office Scientific Development Branch HRA Human Rights Act, 1998 ILI Intelligence-led Investigation ILP Intelligence-led Policing IPS Identity and Passport service IM Investigation Manager IT Information Technology IU Intelligence Unit IUM Intelligence Unit meetings KPM Kent Policing Model MIRSAP Major Incident Room Standard Administration Procedure MFS Motoring and Freight Services MOPI Management of Police Information MoU Memorandum of Understanding MPA Metropolitan Police Authority MPS Metropolitan Police Service MS Minimum Standards MVSP Content analysis software tool NBM National Briefing Model NCALT National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies NCIS National Criminal intelligence Service NCPE National Committee for the Protection of Equality NCF National Crime Faculty NCS National Crime Squad NCM Neighbourhood Coordination meetings NFA No Further Action NHS ` National Health Authority NHSCR National Health Service Central registry NIM National Intelligence Model NPM New Public Management NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency x NPP National Policing Plan NSLEC National Specialist Law Enforcement Centre
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