Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby
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Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby Chair: The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, MP Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 3 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 25 November 2014 HC 795 44599_00_HC 795_ISC_book.indb 1 21/11/2014 18:34 © Crown copyright 2014 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence v.2. To view this licence visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/2/ or email [email protected] Where third party material has been identified, permission from the respective copyright holder must be sought. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] Print ISBN 9781474112499 Web ISBN 9781474112505 Printed in the UK by the Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID: 20111405 11/14 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum. 44599_00_HC 795_ISC_book.indb 2 21/11/2014 18:34 THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, MP (Chair) The Rt. Hon. Hazel Blears, MP Mr Mark Field, MP The Rt. Hon. Lord Butler KG GCB CVO The Rt. Hon. George Howarth, MP The Rt. Hon. Sir Menzies Campbell CH CBE QC, MP Dr Julian Lewis, MP The Rt. Hon. Paul Goggins, MP (until January 2014) The Most Hon. The Marquess of Ms Fiona Mactaggart, MP (from May 2014) Lothian QC PC The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) is a statutory committee of Parliament that has responsibility for oversight of the UK intelligence community. The Committee was originally established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and has recently been reformed, and its powers reinforced, by the Justice and Security Act 2013. The Committee oversees the intelligence and security activities of the UK, including the policies, expenditure, administration and operations1 of the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Committee also scrutinises the work of other parts of the UK intelligence community, including the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office; Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence; and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office. The Committee consists of nine Members drawn from both Houses of Parliament. The Chair is elected by its Members. The Members of the Committee are subject to section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 and are routinely given access to highly classified material in carrying out their duties. The Committee sets its own agenda and work programme. It takes evidence from Government Ministers, the Heads of the intelligence and security Agencies, officials from the intelligence community, and other witnesses as required. The Committee is supported in its work by an independent Secretariat and an Investigator. It also has access to legal, technical and financial expertise where necessary. The Committee produces an Annual Report on the discharge of its functions. The Committee may also produce Reports on specific investigations. Prior to the Committee publishing its Reports, sensitive material that would damage national security is blanked out (‘redacted’). This is indicated by *** in the text. The intelligence and security Agencies may request the redaction of material in a Report if its publication would damage their work, for example by revealing their targets, methods, sources or operational capabilities. The Committee considers these requests for redaction carefully. The Agencies have to demonstrate clearly how publication of the material in question would be damaging before the Committee agrees to redact it. The Committee aims to ensure that only the minimum of text is redacted from a Report. The Committee believes that it is important that Parliament and the public should be able to see where information had to be redacted. This means that the published Report is the same as the classified version sent to the Prime Minister (albeit with redactions). The Committee also prepares from time to time wholly confidential reports which it submits to the Prime Minister. 1 Subject to the criteria set out in section 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013. 44599_00_HC 795_ISC_book.indb 3 21/11/2014 18:34 44599_00_HC 795_ISC_book.indb 4 21/11/2014 18:34 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 COULD IT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? ................................................................... 4 MICHAEL ADEBOLAJO ............................................................................................. 9 OPERATION ASH: FIRST IDENTIFICATION OF ADEBOLAJO .......................... 13 OPERATION ASH: PROSCRIBED ORGANISATIONS .......................................... 16 OPERATION ASH: CLOSURE ................................................................................. 19 Adebolajo on Programme AMAZON ....................................................................... 19 MANAGING LOW LEVEL SUBJECTS OF INTEREST ......................................... 21 Programme AMAZON (2007–2010) ....................................................................... 21 Programme BELAYA and Programme CONGO (2008–2012) ................................ 23 Programme DANUBE (2013 – present) .................................................................. 24 ADEBOLAJO’S ARREST IN KENYA ...................................................................... 25 SIS INVOLVEMENT: OPERATIONAL LEAD ........................................................ 27 ADEBOLAJO’S RETURN TO THE UK: OPERATION BEECH ............................. 30 MI5 actions after his arrest ..................................................................................... 31 Delays in opening an investigation ......................................................................... 33 Operation BEECH .................................................................................................. 34 OPERATION CEDAR: INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION ......................................... 36 Communications data ............................................................................................. 36 Surveillance ............................................................................................................. 37 Agent tasking ........................................................................................................... 37 Liaison with the police ............................................................................................ 37 Further intrusive coverage ...................................................................................... 38 Intelligence gathering operation ............................................................................. 39 Summary of Operation CEDAR .............................................................................. 39 MOVE TO OPERATION DOGWOOD ...................................................................... 40 Technical operation ................................................................................................. 40 WHAT ELSE COULD MI5 HAVE DONE? .............................................................. 42 Security awareness .................................................................................................. 42 ALLEGATIONS OF RECRUITMENT AND HARASSMENT ................................ 44 Allegations of recruitment ....................................................................................... 44 Allegations of harassment ....................................................................................... 45 Assessments of Adebolajo’s mental health .............................................................. 46 OPERATION ELM: POSSIBLE DISRUPTION AND END OF COVERAGE ......... 48 Reinstatement of intrusive coverage........................................................................ 48 Disruption opportunities: violent confrontation and drug dealing ........................ 48 Violent confrontation ............................................................................................... 49 Drug dealing ........................................................................................................... 50 Reduction of intrusive coverage .............................................................................. 51 DEALING WITH RECURRING SUBJECTS OF INTEREST ................................. 52 44599_00_HC 795_ISC_book.indb 5 21/11/2014 18:34 MICHAEL ADEBOWALE ........................................................................................... 55 INITIAL INTELLIGENCE: EXTREMIST MATERIAL ONLINE ........................... 59 Extremist media and Inspire magazine ................................................................... 59 (i) Interest in extremist media ................................................................................. 60 (ii) Engagement with extremist media ..................................................................... 61 OPERATION FIR: DELAYS AND THE DIGINT TEAM ......................................... 62 (i) Time taken to identify Adebowale ......................................................................