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W E E K L Y D I G E S T 11 J a N U a R Y – 17 J a N U A

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W E E K L Y D I G E S T 11 J a N U a R Y – 17 J a N U A A B O U T I N T E G R I T Y U K Integrity UK is an organisation committed to preventing extremism through innovative approaches to promoting integration, cohesion and social reconciliation within the MENA region and the UK. W E E K L Y D I G E S T 11 J A N U A R Y – 17 J A N U A R Y S Y R I A Politics Ceasefire in Idlib Collapses Shortly After It Comes into Effect The ceasefire in Greater Idlib mediated between Russia and Turkey came into effect on 00:01 Sunday (12th January), but with little impact on the ground where fighting continued virtually unabated. Despite the outright and immediate collapse of the ceasefire, world powers maintained a tone of optimism, with the United States Secretary of States, Mike Pompeo, praising the Turkish efforts to facilitate a ceasefire. The optimism appeared to wane by Tuesday (14th January), however, with the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, warning the Syrian Government against continued military operations by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in the region. Expressing hope that the ceasefire in Idlib will last, Erdoğan threatened to intervene against the efforts to break the ceasefire. The US Government similarly criticised Damascus and Moscow for the continued military operations in the region and the targeting of civilian facilities. Although Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, minimised the extent of the crisis on Wednesday (15th January), Thursday saw reports of him announcing that the ceasefire had indeed collapsed and that the Opposition would need to fend for itself. Other reports also indicated that Çavuşoğlu had conceded that the Opposition would withdraw from the areas east of the strategic M5 Highway. However, these claims mainly emerged on social media, with no official confirmation on the matter. However, these reports coincided with the SAA resuming its ground offensive in Idlib. Syrian and Turkish Intelligence Chiefs Meet in Moscow Despite Erdoğan's comments, there are some signs of continued communication between Damascus and Ankara. The Director of Turkey's National Intelligence Organisation (MİT), Hakan Fidan, who visited Moscow earlier this week, met with Ali Mamlouk, the head of the Syrian National Security Office, on Monday (13th January). The Syrian state news agency SANA claimed that the meeting, mediated by Russia, saw Mamlouk demand that Turkey withdraw from Syria, aid in “the freeing of Idlib from terrorists and heavy arms” and opening the parts of the M4 and M5 Highways that remain out of service. While no official readout of the meeting was issued, Turkish Defence Minister, Hulusi Akar, who was present in Moscow with Fidan, said that the meeting was in the name of “preserving Turkish interests”. Akar noted that back- channel diplomacy between Ankara and Damascus occurs regularly, minimising the significance of the talks. However, Reuters claimed that the two intelligence officials discussed the means of mutual cooperation against the People's Protection Units (YPG). Although the YPG, part of the wider Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has broadly partnered with Damascus due to mutual hostility against Turkey, talks with Damascus towards a political solution have faltered, likely motivating Damascus to seek alternative approaches. For further information, contact Integrity UK on: [email protected] or +44 207 879 9979 The UNSC Agrees to a Six-Month Extension of Aid Mandate In news that will be of some relief to displaced Syrians and aid groups, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to renew Resolution 2165 during an emergency session last Friday evening (10th January), just hours before it would have expired. The Resolution, which issues mandate to the UN for delivering aid into Syria, was only agreed following several alterations in line with Moscow's demands to prevent another veto. The renewal is for only six months instead of a year and the largely defunct Ramtha Border Crossing with Jordan and the Yaroubiyeh Border Crossing with Iraq were not given authorisation, with all aid, instead, authorised for only the Bab al-Salam and Bab al-Hawa Border Crossings with Turkey. While Idlib- based activists, in particular, expressed satisfaction at the outcome, noting that the move will enable aid to be delivered to the region at a time of heightened displacement, others have expressed concerns that the difficulty renewing the resolution may spell trouble in the future. With Russia having gained the concession of the UNSC towards its demands, activists warned that the reduced entry for aid, which will hit the areas held by the SDF hardest, may soon extend to other areas. Concerns About the Spillover of the Syrian Conflict into Libya Continues Speaking on Tuesday morning, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, warned that “extremists” in Idlib are moving to Libya, adding that preventing Libya from turning into a second Syria is vital. Despite this, Lavrov made no references to the reports of Turkey transferring SNA fighters to Libya. Similar comments were made by King Abdullah of Jordan who warned on Monday that the Islamic State (IS) was regrouping in the Middle East and added that many foreign militants in Idlib are now in Libya. Subsequently on Wednesday, the British newspaper, the Guardian, claimed that Turkey was offering citizenship to the fighters of the Syrian National Army (SNA) who agree to join the fight in Idlib. Çavuşoğlu commented on these rumours on Thursday, describing them as untrue. Economics Syrian Pound Enters a State of Meltdown, Triggering Discontent Across Syria For much of the week, the value of the Syrian Pound against the US Dollar continued. Over the weekend, the Pound crossed the SYP1,000 to $1 threshold, reaching SYP1,240 against $1 by Thursday evening. The deteriorating situation appears to be causing discontent across Syria. Activists in Damascus reported that food prices in the city and other Government-held areas have risen sharply in recent days. An opinion piece in the pro-Government Tishreen newspaper also warned that people would soon be buying food in ounces instead of kilograms. In Suweida, crowds gathered in the city centre, chanting “We Want to Live”, protesting the skyrocketing food prices, deteriorating living conditions and what they view as neglect by Damascus. Protesters also criticised Bouthaina Shaaban, the Presidential Media Adviser who claimed earlier in the week that the Syrian economy is doing “50 times better” than it did in 2011. Indeed, much of the Pro-Government press was criticised for failing to provide accurate information about the crisis. The situation was also commented on by prominent politicians. Ilham Ahmed, the Co-Chair of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), warned on Wednesday that due to the destruction of Syria's industrial capacity during the war and sanctions, Syria is facing famine and called on the international community to take action. The President of the Syrian Opposition's National Council (SNC), Anas Abdah, noted on the same day that averting an economic catastrophe can only be achieved through a political solution and a genuine transition, noting that Syria lost $400 billion over the course of nine years of war. Security Idlib Ceasefire Collapses Amidst Renewed Bombardment and Ground Offensives Despite efforts by Turkey to implement a ceasefire, the Greater Idlib region witnessed a steady uptick of shelling and airstrikes by the SAA and Russian and Syrian aircraft, with heavy civilian casualties reported in For further information, contact Integrity UK on: [email protected] or +44 207 879 9979 Idlib City in particular after an airstrike targeted a busy market, killing around 25 and injuring over 60 people. Following intense bombardment in the Ma’arat Nu’man area, the SAA resumed its ground offensive that has been halted over the past two weeks, making gradual gains in the villages between the Abu al- Duhur Airbase and the M5 Highway. Escalation was also reported in western Aleppo where skirmishes and shelling between the Government and Opposition forces were reported. While the SAA has not launched a ground offensive in the region so far, there is widespread expectation that the bombardment of the area is aimed at laying the groundwork for a new offensive in the region. Daraa Witnesses Severe Escalation and Unrest Daraa Province witnessed a sharp escalation of attacks over the weekend. On Friday evening, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported a series of attacks against members of the Syrian intelligence agencies in the region. Subsequently on Saturday (11th January), the SOHR reported that 20 SAA soldiers in Nahta were captured by local rebels following the arrest of a local individual by security forces. A similar incident was reported in Karak where eight soldiers manning three checkpoints were taken captive. With tensions growing, a number of groups affiliating themselves with the regional insurgent movement, Popular Resistance, declared the towns of Nahta, Tasil, Da'el, Tafas and the surrounding areas as “military zones”, with the SAA instituting a blockade around Nahta itself. With security incidents continuing over the rest of the weekend, the Russian Military Police (RMP) was been deployed in the area in a bid to prevent further escalation and secure the release of those who have been taken captive. Despite these measures, however, attacks in the region continued, particularly in Sanamain which, according to observers, has descended into a state of lawlessness, with rebel fighters operating with relative impunity. IS-Linked Attacks Across Eastern Syria Continue IS militants intensified their targeting of both the SAA and the SDF over the course of the week. In the SDF- held areas, attacks have remained relatively low-intensity. However, Basira, in particular, is witnessing severe tensions amidst reports of IS militants intimidating locals openly, as well as an IED attack at the Basira Bridge on Tuesday that killed three SDF fighters.
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