State of European Democracy. a Critical Literature Review

Home , Substantive democracy

NATIONAL AND KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL STUDIES FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Essay for M.A. in International and European Studies

State of European Democracy. A critical literature review.

Supervisor

Emer. Prof. Panagiotis Ioakeimides

Student

Παναγιώτης J. Δήμας

A.M. 16902

ATHENS

2017

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4

CHAPTER 1. Why Democracy for Europe? …..…………………………………………………..… 6 1.1. Defining and measuring Democracy...... 7 1.2. Measuring Democracy in Europe………………………………….. 8 1.3. Understanding Democracy…………………………. 11

CHAPTER 2. Methodological Issues ……….…...…………………………………………………… 18

CHAPTER 3. The ‘Democratic Account’. A critical evaluation of main contributions ……………………………………….…. …………………………………………………………………………..... 22 3.1. Section One. The Institutional edifice…………………. 24

3.1. Section Two. Theoretical contributions and accounts…………. 26

CHAPTER 4. The ‘Structural Democratic Deficit Account’. A critical evaluation of main contributions. …………………………………………………………………..………………….…. 32

CHAPTER 5. The prospects for EU democracy- policy proposals ……………………… 37

REFERENCES ……………………………………………..……………………………………………………… 41

INTRODUCTION

What constitutes a democracy in the 21st century? Nowadays, this is a multi-billion dollar question. Especially after the collapse of ‘frenzy economics’ and illiterate financial paradigms that shaped the post-Soviet Union World. Grand debates, yet in a ‘tentative and hesitant bubble’, about the re-introduction of politics and democracy in mainstream politics flourish in post-2007/8 literature. However, this ‘hesitant bubble’ on the one hand is understandable for those who are in the top of the wealth pyramid (a.k.a. the ‘winners’) and provocative and crazy for those at the bottom (a.k.a. the ‘losers’). The fact that modern democracy is related with some normative concepts of equity, justice, accountability, transparency and redistribution of power, it is understandable for the difficulty of discussing such issues, given the political economic literature (the mainstream literature readable by policy-makers) that recommends a paradigm shift in post-WWII global institutions and economic governance. The European Project could not be left outside of this grand debate; as for some thinkers European constitutional project might provide, once again, the new model for global governance as once did with the nation-state.

To this end, the essay’s scope is to provide a critical appraisal about the ‘State of Democracy’ in EU. In so doing, it embarks on an overwhelming journey to explore, evaluate and finally critically analyse a devastating, yet exciting and much wanting literature. A literature that can be described as highly discursive in nature, over expanding in terms of disciplines and subdisciplines, epistemologically fragmented; namely, there is no consensus either in philosophical/normative terms or in methodological outputs etc.

In the first chapter, the student introduces the concept of Democracy in Europe. The main question asked is ‘why democracy in Europe’ anyway? How democracy is related with European affairs, its tradition(s), its history etc.? This chapter aims at discussing the concept in relation with Europe itself. It is a background chapter of introducing the normative side of theories of democracy; while alongside is presenting a Comparativist view of how Democracy has expanded in Europe and the World. Finally, by putting democracy as a concept in a European Polity perspective, this chapter answers why Democracy is the ‘finalité’ of EU Polity; and what it is left unknown is to conclude in the ‘finalité’ of the model of democracy. Thus, we know that EU is going to be democratic, but we do not know what kind of democracy.

The second chapter discusses ‘methodological issues’. Following a checklist from the highly praised textbook of Robson and McCartan (2016) is developing a scientifically sound critical literature review. The chapter introduces epistemological threats that strives to avoid. That way is sensitive not only with common epistemological issues, such as validity and reliability but also ethics and transparency. The latter is deemed crucial and the student presents the whole procedure of how he managed his project from the beginning to the end.

The third chapter deals with the ‘Democratic Account’ of the EU Project. Concisely, this chapter critically appraises the arguments that stand that “the claim that the EU is undemocratic is fallacious” (Laffan, 1999:347). Moreover, discusses and examines critically the arguments exhibited by the proponents of the ‘democratic account’. Notwithstanding

4 the fact that the student is a proponent of the ‘democratic account’ himself, however he went in great lengths to be impartial and unbiased.

It follows that chapter four discusses the ‘Structural Deficit Account’. It introduces the main arguments and proponents of this account. From a vast and ubiquitous1 literature, the student distinguished the best thinkers of this account (repetitive citations) and presented their arguments in a fashion that can be comparative to the previous chapter. In order to remain unbiased, he carefully evaluated each argument for its centricity to the contributors overall argumentation, while keeping in mind its centricity to ‘democratic deficits’ (overall) literature. Mainly, and due to the evolving nature of the EU; namely treaty revisions, he incorporated the arguments in their purest form, i.e. normative nature. Therefore, he did not include arguments that due to Treaty revision have been remedied or that empirically tested cannot be the case anymore.

Finally, the last chapter comprises policy recommendations. The student provides the gist of the pompous, mind-boggling, yet thrilling literature that he covered during the limited time provided by the faculty’s regulation.

1 Ubiquitous in the sense that ‘democratic deficit’ account is more popular to the public, through media, talk shows etc. Also perhaps, due to the EU scapegoating norm; a norm that has been exercised from national governments for their government failures. ‘Scapegoating in EU’ is a well- documented phenomenon in EU literature. See also, Juncker’s (2016: 8) annual Speech addressing the State of the Union: “We have to stop with the same old story that success is national, and failure European. Or our common project will not survive”.

Chapter 1. Why Democracy in Europe?

Democracy. A delicate notion, a noble idea(l) that sprung, developed, cultivated, defended, forgotten, revived over centuries in Europe2. Now perhaps is being transformed into something new and better for the Europeans. It seems that Democracy is the final destination for Europe and its modern Polity. This noble dream, at times of abnormality, of provocative (all-kind of) inequalities still endures and permeates by and large European societies.

Why though Europeans insist on Democracy? A difficult question to answer properly. Dauntingly overwhelming the answer might be, one could seek a response in the depth of European history and European thought. Erudite thinkers in Europe ‘revived’ democracy during the Renaissance and Enlightment eras and vested it with a positive look in order this kind of polity to safeguard their (new) emerging values and interests. The claim stands that Democracy was not invented or reinvented in Europe, but rather forged and cultivated in the European perplexed state of affairs. Borrowing from the Marxist account, the democratic political edifice was built on European fundamental values that sprung from the ‘millennial idleness’ of the rule of Christianity (Hobsbawm, 1996; Siedentop, 2000; especially Kaiser, 2007).

Overall, democracy has a troubled history to say the least. In its historical millennial course, we witness a slow shift-away from a critical view, negative indeed, from the most prominent thinkers of the time (Aristotle) to a new, rehabilitated noble idea that linked liberalism with other values during the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras. Thus, from Athenian Democracy that “the poor will have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, the will of the majority is supreme” (Aristotle in Coleman, 2000; Sabine, 1963), we moved to a rehabilitated, modern version of Democracy that safeguards the modern values in the West. Its subsequent revival continued in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, until it reached the positive account that we associate it with today.

However, what is a Democracy for a European or for a Westerner? One of the best definitions that encapsulate the understandings and transformations of perceptions about democracy in the West was Abraham Lincoln’s famous statement in his address after the battle of Gettysburg in 1863, that (modern) ‘Democracy is government of the people, by the people, for the people’. Democracy ‘of the people’ referred to the idea of representativeness. The notion of ‘by the people’ emphasized that it must be these elected representatives that actually hold the power of decision-making in a democracy. The power that way should not escape to some other unelected body. Finally, Lincoln also emphasized that democracy should promote the interests of the people and not some private interests (‘for the people’). In this way, Lincoln recaps the different elements of modern representative democracy and how they relate to each other.

From this brief overview we can see that democracy may be a longstanding idea but it has not always been considered in a positive light; there is clash of perception between the classic era (Athens) and the modern one (West Europe). However, the basic idea that

2 Some excellent works on European history are the following: Mazower, 2000; Milza and Berstein, History of Europe [3 volumes in Greek] and Eric Hobsbawm (1996).

6 democracy is concerned with giving citizens political equality and placing power in the hands of the people rather than in the hands of elites (aristocracy) remains the case today even if we now mainly understand democracy in terms of representative democracy, given the fact of bigger states.

1.1. Defining and measuring Democracy.

In modern social science, if one wants to set a theory, he or she must strive for some empirical evidence that test the theory’s hypotheses. And in order the measurement to be valid the theory must define the concept that examines. In political science, there are two main types of definitions of democracy: a. the ‘procedural’ and b. the ‘substantive’ definitions (Hix and Whiting, 2012).

Robert Dahl’s (1971) defines democracy as political equality, which gives everyone an equal voice in saying how a state should be governed. He then specified what procedures or institutions were required to deliver democratic political equality. According to Dahl’s (1971) definition, if anyone of these features is absent, then that society is a non-democracy: a. free and fair elections, b. universal suffrage, c. the policies a government passes depend on the election result d. citizens have the right to stand as candidates, e. freedom of expression and information, f. freedom of association (also see Hix and Whiting, 2012).

Earlier, Karl Popper (1966) in his minimal definition stated that if a citizen had the power to remove a government from power that is what it takes to be considered a democracy. Popper again gave emphasis on the procedures required to underpin democracy. Both Popper and Dahl wanted to provide definitions that could make possible comparative studies over polities and allow political scientists rank, evaluate and measure democracies.

As everything in science, the ‘procedural’ definitions of democracy were criticized from the proponents of a more ‘substantive’ way of examining or theorizing democracy. Their main critic was that under a procedural definition, it is possible to find states that have all of these features in place, but without actually being a democracy (i.e. Singapore). Thus, ‘substantive’ scholars rebalanced the weight from a purely positivist and quantitative loop to a more qualitative and discursive framework.

In his seminal work, Schumpeter (1942) drew attention to the importance of political elites competing among each other to win the votes of citizens. He defined democracy as a system in which ‘individuals acquire the power to decide [political decisions] by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (1942, p.50). His definition is heavily embedded in an economic ontology3 (of viewing things). His democracy is characterized by rival groups of elites competing to govern and the people choosing between these rival groups.

Another scholar of ‘substantive’ democracy is Przeworski et.al. (2000) where he noted four different aspects that must exist in order a polity to be considered democratic; a. the chief executive is elected, b. the legislature is elected, c. there is more than one party competing in elections, and d. an alteration in power under identical electoral rules has taken place.

3 See further the Chapter 3, Part II in Schmidt, 2000 (Economic theory of democracy: Anthony Downs)

What is crucial though is that the analysis and literature from both worlds of definitions gives us the needed analytical framework in order to have a better and thorough understanding of democracy and more reliable classifications.

1.2. Measuring Democracy in Europe.

While the definitions are set, then valid, reliable, quantitative and qualitative measurement and analysis is possible. Of course, there are many International Organisations (IOs; such as UN, World Bank), Government bodies/agencies (i.e. CIA), Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs; such as Transparency International, Freedom House et.al.) or academic typologies that classify and rank polities around the globe. One of the most widely used and widely accepted measures of democracy is a substantive one called ‘Polity IV’4.

This research initiative provides a timeseries of annual measures of democracy and autocracy (two poles) for 184 countries from 1800 to present day. Now the new ‘Polity V’ research is under development and will include new data sets after 2010. This measure gives a score somewhere between -10 and +10 for each country where -10 means a country is as autocratic as possible while +10 means a country is as democratic as possible. However, to make it a little easier when it comes to measuring whether a country is democratic or not, many scholars have used the cut-off point of +6. So, if a country has a polity score of +6 or higher, we can consider it to be a democracy.

The student will provide some figures in order to present an overview of European democracy in (comparison to) the World. This comparative illustration of European democracies provides and back up the claim that democracy suits Europe best; or perhaps democracy and Europe is a matter of deeper consideration, if not a matter of (a common?) European political identity. There is a concrete originality between Europe and Democracy.

Figure 1.1 shows the rise in the number of democratic countries over time.

4 This provides an annual measure of democracy and autocracy for 184 countries from 1800 to the present day, giving it the longest time-series and the most number of countries of any of the measures of democracy used in political science. It is comprised of five separate measures which, when combined, capture whether the substance of democracy is present or absent within a system. The five measures it uses are: 1. Competitiveness of executive recruitment. 2. Openness of executive recruitment. 3. Constraints on the executive. 4. Regulation of political participations. 5. Competitiveness of political participation. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html

Figure 1.1: The rise of democracy. Data source: Polity IV, Center for Systemic Peace; www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

Clearly, the patterns show that the number of democratic states increases over time and given the rise of nation-state and the dissolution of former empires. Other immediate observable trend is the ‘backslide’ to other regimes. For instance, those happened in Europe during 1920s and 1930s. Further to this, it is worth mentioning Samuel Huntington’s (1993) three waves of democratization. Briefly, the first wave began in the nineteenth century and lasted until 1919, after the First World War. This was when many of the older west European and North American democracies emerged. However, the evolution of democracies crashed during the interwar period. Fascism, Nazism and autocracy emerged prior to the second wave of democracy, which began after the Second World War in 1945. The turbulence caused from the dissolution of empires was followed by the formation of new states that tried to introduce in their polities democratic lines of government. Although, parts of central, eastern and southern Europe became authoritarian systems at that time, influenced by USSR. The third wave of democracy then began in the 1960s and runs up until the present day. The 1960s marks the decolonization period of Europe in Africa and the Middle East. The ‘end of history’ (by Fukuyama) happened with the dissolution of USSR, perhaps the last autocratic empire in the world that gave birth to democracy in East and Central Europe. Huntington’s second and third wave is presented in figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2. Europe: Regimes by Type, 1946 – 2012. Data source: Polity IV, Center for Systemic Peace; Retrieved from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/europe2.htm

However and most importantly, where European democracy stands in the world? A comparative overlook is provided by the following figures 1.3 and 1.4. As one can see, Europeans have always enjoyed more democracy and best in quality terms in comparison with the West (Fig. 1.3.) and of course the rest of the World (see Fig. 1.4.). This premium status of quality of democracy in Europe, in comparison not merely with the World, but also with the West, is highly indicative for the originality of ‘Democratic Europe’. Democracy suits best Europe. Is a notion, an ideal, a contract, a political/constitutional settlement and a model of governance that was invented (or reinvented in its modern form) and forged in Europe. It is a European historic settlement among Europeans to govern their own affairs and their delicate (often controversial) political nature; i.e. to be self-governed (see Siedentop, 2000 and Kaiser, 2007).

Figure 1.3. Europe and the American Continent. Retrived from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/p4creports.html

Figure 1.4. Asia, the Pacific, Africa and the Middle East. Patterns of democracy in different regions of the world. Data source: Polity IV, Center for Systemic Peace; www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

All the above patterns raise the question why Democracy thrives in Europe best, in the West better and strives to consolidate itself in the rest of the World? This is what the student examines in the next section.

1.3. Understanding democracy.

Why democracy emerged as the winning polity worldwide that led Francis Fukuyama to declare the ‘end of history’? Accepting the fact that the pattern from now on is democracy and liberalism. In addition, why democracy thrives in the West and gasps in the rest of the world? The studies that have been occupied with such issues, coined the term ‘democratization’ in order to examine the process of becoming a democracy.

In general, there are three notable sets of explanations explaining the incentive that lead countries to transit into a democracy. The first highlights the prominence of strategic bargains between political elites and their citizens; the second distinguishes the importance of economic and social modernization; while the third examines cultural factors. Are all this three strands of factors that explain why democracy was chosen in the first place and thrives in Europe best? Perhaps. In the next three subsections, the student following Hix and Whiting (2012) background review on democratization theory (although in changed order from a micro to macro level/analysis) will exhibit why democracies are preferable (if not unavoidable) for societies that seek modernity, better levels of equality, better self- governance, maximized wealth production and finally longstanding political stability (in other words democratic consolidation). Moreover, and as Barrington Moore (1966 in Hix and Whiting, 2012: 37) noted “there were three paths to modernity and while some societies would follow the democratic path, others followed Fascism or Communism”, but in order to have the ‘whole package’ of benefits the better way is a matured democracy (consolidated).

1.3.1. Strategic bargains between political elites and citizens.

Strategic bargains theories examine the micro level of democratization; namely, they are concerned with the transition from an authoritarian status to a democratic one. They answer why and how democratization happens in a society. What are those societal forces that trigger the transition? Why regimes, holders of absolute power, allow such a transition? What is the angle behind this rationale, which actually let democracy happen?

The immediate answer is the ‘strategic bargain’ between the ruling elites and the rebellious large mass of coordinated citizens that demand for a substantive (i.e. political equality) constitutional change (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2009; North and Weingast, 1989). “The elites primarily want to protect their existing position of privilege and prevent revolution, while the mass of citizens want to redistribute wealth and power because they are generally poorer than the elites” (Hix and Whiting: 2012: 40).

Three interesting hypothesis occupy the ‘strategic bargain theory’ that are worth mentioning:

1. Elites in non-democracies cannot credibly commit to redistribute wealth without democratic institutions (for example, elections, majoritarian parliaments).

2. Higher wealth inequality raises the risk of democracy for nondemocratic elites, which leads to more efforts to suppress democracy.

3. Economic shocks lead to transitions to democracy, but not transitions away from democracy. This is because in non-democracies, the middle classes blame the elites for economic failure, whereas in democracies the middle classes blame the government of the day.

(Hix and Whiting, 2012: 41)

While the hypotheses have been tested through empirical studies, however, their salience for this essay resides on the fact that modern societies, with their perplexed, multi- polar/direction technological advancements and ever-changing complexity of their economies, demand stable and mature democracies in order to continue to flourish. Democracy seems to be the most efficient and effective constitutional settlement that produces those societal and political elements to establish and safeguard modernity.

Notwithstanding the fact that the latter consists in itself a general (new?) hypothesis that qualifies for an empirical research, however indirect empirical studies demonstrate that democracy and its vibrant political domain provide the social arena that is characterized by flexibility. The latter is perhaps the secret of democracy that establishes it as the most efficient political settlement. This we argue is what makes democracy of prerequisite for the future of Europe and its unknown constitutional settlement (i.e. model/ architecture of democracy).

1.3.2. Economic and Social modernization.

In the late 1950s emerged a group of thinkers that introduced in political science, a distinct (sub) discipline that is known as ‘modernization theory’. The main hypotheses of this theory claimed that: a. democracy is more common in rich countries than in poor countries, and b. transitions to dictatorship become less likely as wealth increases (see Hix and Whiting, 2012:172). Certainly, there is a correlation between wealth and democracy, but one cannot be sure what the right direction of this causal relation is; namely, democracy causes wealth or the opposite?

Both Acemogly/Robinson (2006: 53) and Clark et.al. (2012:180) show a positive direction between wealth and democracy. Namely, as GDP per capita increases the likelihood of having a democracy increases. Again, in his seminal contribution to the literature, Lipset (1959) argued that democracy is strongly related with modernization of a society. His main

13 position was that due to changing structures in the economy and society caused by modernization that would inevitably increase demand for democracy. He observed a changing pattern among traditional, later industrial and finally modern service providing economies. In traditional and barely industrialized countries, one can observe lower levels of education and subsequently a not-vibrant middle class. “This social structure allowed authoritarian government to thrive because such a society did not possess large groups of people who had the education, money or incentives to mobilise and demand political equality” (Hix and Whiting, 2012: 172). Once though a society upgrade its status to a democracy through modernization, then the social structure has a vibrant middle class with vested interest in maintaining the new regime for political equality and equal opportunities, and that way consolidating democracy.

1.3.3. Cultural factors.

This section investigates deep-rooted explanation(s) about Democracy in Europe. Notwithstanding the fact that the work done in this field concerns democracy as a concept and in general, however, the student will concentrate in Europe. In so doing, some brief comparative cases-examples that emphasize on why democracy suits (best) Europe, and why was reinvented and consolidated in Western European nation-states.

To begin with, it is painstakingly obvious that when one is embarking on studying Europe must comprehend that her/his endeavor will be a Sisyphean one. Europe writes. A lot. It is a vibrant continent that contemplates, criticizes on merely every rubric, issue and idea, to merely reject what does not suit its modus-vivendi or its long-standing, turbulent tradition(s). And not surprisingly, centuries later to adopt what had previously torridly and perhaps violently rejected and forgotten. To say the least, Europe resembles a crazy river, with its currents not abiding to physics law but at the same time, they make some sense.

That was the course of democracy in Europe. A polity that was marked and classified as a degenerated polity by Aristotle, a prominent European thinker, to be praised by Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill et.al., also salient modern European thinkers. A polity that was against a salient traditional value in Europe; of ‘areti’, of seeking virtue, the ‘aristo’ which was ‘logical’ (a second value) to lead the many. Thus, two core values, virtue of seeking excellence and rationality (of not being led by the aristocrats), were against democracy (led by the many but ignorants). By the 3rd century A.D. and onwards, emerging religious Europe and Christianity set an additional reason for the unsuitability of democracy on the continent.

Lipset (1959) argued that Catholicism is incongruous and discordant with democracy. The word of God, simply could not be disputed. God the shepherd leads the flock. The earlier debates on Catholicism echoed this (negative) perception about the relation between democracy and Christianity; and more precisely Catholicism. Modern studies, though, reflect different views about this intricate relationship. Siedentop (2000) makes good arguments about hidden values that were forged by Catholicism in a masked, silent and latent form. For

14 instance, he argues that due to Christianity and its inherent humanistic values, against the aristocratic, hierarchical values, Churches, a hierarchical institution themselves, and monasteries provided the ground for some equality and the chance to move up in society for the poor and the unprivileged. Every person is the God’s son. Thus, one that wanted to have education had the chance in a monastery around Europe. Abbey’s and monasteries had the privilege to hold the knowledge. This argument holds strong indeed. Europe’s escape from its millennial idleness started in the form of Church disputes over the ultimate truth of God’s word. Modernity in Europe started from the places and undisputable ‘institutions’ of God on the Continent. This is the ultimum European tragic irony.

In his controversial ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis, Huntington (1993) identifies many different civilizations in the world today, such as Western Christian, African, Islamic, Latin-American, Confucian and so on. He argues, “Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures’ (1993: 40). Again, here Huntington sees culture as a brake towards democracy. Yet again, we witness Islamic democracies in the World. Turkey is a good example. Albania, with the acclaimed majority of Muslim (!)5, is a democracy and on the track to consolidate its democratic polity. When at the same time, religious catholic Poland and Hungary seem to backslide in terms of the rule of law, which damages gravely the concept of western democracy.

Thus, the question is whether culture hinders democracy from emerging. The previous set of theories were pro-hindering. However, in the literature exists another set of theories that argue about a more active role of culture in creating and sustaining democracy. The seminal work of Almond and Verba (1963) maintained the argument that certain societies had a civic culture that sustained democracy. The key-concept here is trust. Trust seen as a value in society that promotes and safeguards cooperation among citizens and institutions. Specifically, Almond and Verba (1963: 357) maintain that “Constitution makers have designed formal structures of politics that attempt to enforce trustworthy behaviour, but without these attitudes of trust, such institutions may mean little. Social trust facilitates cooperation among the citizens in these nations and without it democratic politics is impossible’. They found four elements in the civic culture that are responsible for sustaining democracy. These elements were as follows: a. a belief that individuals can influence political decisions. b. High support for the existing political system. c. High levels of interpersonal trust. d. Preference for gradual societal change.

5 In his undergraduate dissertation, the student had the chance to study Albania thoroughly. The mainstream and majority of studies (Vickers, Mazower, Elbasani et.al.) argue that the country is basically secular due to a stronghold secular dictatorship imposed on Albanians that prohibited any kind of religious after WWII. Although, modern patterns related with terrorism and radicalism see a shift on the role of Muslim in the Albanian culture. Officially, successive Albanian governments declare their pride for an open society that promotes religious tolerance. That way, perhaps, religion does not affect seriously politics in the country.

Further to the above studies, Inglehart engaged modernization, economic development and culture in order to explain the democratization process. Therefore, Inglehart preserved Lipset’s main argument that economic development is important, but he differed from Lipset’s mechanical view that came in the form of a correlation between democratization and economic development. Istead, he argued that economic development formulated a new civic culture that is responsible for creating and sustaining democracy.

In general, two hypotheses live up to this set of theories:

a. Democracy is more common in some cultures (for example, western cultures) – which support democratic values such as individual liberty, freedom of expression, equality – than in others (for example, Islam, Confucianism). b. Economic development does not directly cause democracy, but rather economic development leads to cultural change and the emergence of a civic culture, which in turn leads to democracy. (Hix and Whiting, 2012: 38) As we have already addressed above, the empirical evidence does not fully support the hypotheses. In fact, Clark et.al. (2012: 238) found that in 1976, fourteen Catholic majority countries were coded as free and sixteen as not free our of a total forty-seven. But by 2004 we witness a different set of countries; out of a total of fifty-seven countries with Catholic majority, forty were noted as free and only three as not-free. Thus, empirical evidence do not support the first hypothesis.

About the second hypothesis, Inglehart and Welzel (2010) found that there are two dimensions of cultural values. Specifically, they made a distinction on the interests expressed by a country’s citizens. Those interests are expressed in a ‘survival’ or ‘self- expression’ mode. If a country’s citizens are in ‘survival’ mode their interests tend to emphasize on economic and physical security. Instead, when is a ‘self-expression’ mode, people are interested in participating in economic and political life; and demand freedom of expression, given the fact that already feel secure about their economic and physical status. Comprehensibly, the shift from survival to self-expression is closely related to economic development.

The second dimension is concerned with what values a country’s citizens live up to; traditional or secular-rational values. “Traditional values emphasize the significance of religious beliefs and traditional family values and they defer to authority. In contrast, secular-religious values reflect a decline in religious and traditional family values and a rise in a belief in the rights of the individual and a questioning of authority” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010).

As a consequence, non-democracies tend to be those countries identified in believing in traditional and survival values. This pattern led them to claim that “Modernisation favours democracy because it enhances ordinary people’s abilities and motivation to demand democracy, exerting increasing effective pressure on elites…[Economic development’s] impact on democracy is almost entirely transmitted through its tendency to bring increasing emphasis on self-expression values” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010: 561).

Therefore, one can find more evidence for the idea that a civic culture is central to creating and sustaining democracy, than the idea that some cultures are inherently anti-democratic. Perhaps, the latter fuels the exceptionalism of some European countries in protracting and

16 exporting their values to the world under conditionality mechanisms (Baracani, 2012). European Union, especially as seen in normative studies, can export its values and norms to the world, in order to make it more self-alike. Is it enough though to say that EU values are those found in its member-countries or there is some competition among m-s to infuse their values in the EU-platform and through the latter to revive their imperialism?

No matter what, a value-based EU integration is the best policy to further the ‘Project’ ahead. Value-based EU should stop from being perceived as merely the Commission’s ‘propaganda’; where in fact certain big m-s rule EU as a whole. Competing (national) values inside the EU should lead to common values that engage a common European conduct of behavior. At the same time, diversity, multi-culturalism versus a set of common European values should not be confused with self-governance options. Respecting distinct national (or even subnational values) do not prohibit for a larger set of common European values; recognized by EU citizens as such. Diversity and multi-culturalism are of paramount importance when one is contemplating about the future of Europe. However, the latter does not entail that Europe will never find a common culture to support its Polity. The project, despite its functionalist6 nature, should start to address in public European fora what really matters about its future Polity. This is why Larry Siedentop (2000), in his thought-provoking book just in the turn of the millennium, challenged Europeans among others, about the future of Democracy in Europe7. Clearly and purposefully, he left out technical aspects of democracy (government, governance and multi-level institution building) and focused in what really matters when one discusses on and contemplates over building a Polity. Europe is shifting a Polity paradigm; from nation-state to an n-paradigm8; perhaps an unprecedented one like once the nation-state.

6 Among others, see Rosamond, 2000 and Chryssochoou (2009) for a deep understanding over epistemological issues concerned with the European project and European studies. 7 The student found this excellent work deliverd by Kaiser (2007). The author provides a superb convincing account on “the role of European Christian democratic parties in the making of the European Union. Based on extensive archival research, it radically reconceptualises European integration in long-term historical perspective as the outcome of partisan competition of political ideologies and parties and their guiding ideas for the future of Europe”. 8 See among others Laffan (1999:347) where she notes that: “Just where this piecemeal process of democratization will take the system is far from clear”.

Chapter 2. ‘Methodological Issues’.

This chapter discusses methodological issues. It establishes the students deep concerns over three themes; a. a sound desk-based research design considering all threats and implications that are usually affiliated with such type of research, b. the safeguarding of ethical considerations and research integrity (Collins and McCartan, 2016: 92) and c. (procedural) transparency and accountability9 (Collins and McCartan, 2016:90).

First things first, it is clarified that this is ‘desk-based’ research project or more traditionally referred to as ‘library studies’ project, which according to Robson and McCartan (2016: 82) is a misnomer given the fact that the work “is often carried out using the Internet on laptop computers, not necessarily on desks or in libraries”.

This kind of research is preferable by Masters degree students; given the limited time and resources they usually have in their possession. Especially, for students in politics where primary, empirical research demands great resources (i.e. money, time, contacts, feasibility of collection of new data), which is not always available by government databases. Most importantly, “desk‐based studies are also planned as a precursor to empirical research or to complement it” (e.g. Badcock‐Walters & Kvalsvig, 2009 in Robson and McCartan, 2016:83). This is the case with this project. This essay is a background builder for the student’s ensuing Doctoral studies in Expertization in Public policy. Therefore, there is a personal incentive for the choice of this kind of research.

Moreover, research projects solely based on the review of existing research does not mean an easy task. In fact you “need to approach it with the same academic rigour as an empirical, primary‐research focused project […] that is carried out systematically, skeptically and ethically (Robson and McCartan, 2016:83). All the above concerns have been taken seriously into our account.

The latter also means that we decided, at an early phase of the project, what research question(s) we are trying to answer, although very broad at first. We concluded to start by examining ‘The State of Democracy in EU’; a working title that eventually never changed. This is our primary research question aiming to explore the democratic (evolving) status in EU. We tried to avoid the pitfalls found on Collins and McCartan textbook (2016:51); i.e. our topic to be too ambitious or the opposite too trivial. We focused therefore the research question methodologically. Namely, we decided to provide a critical appraise of the ‘State of Democracy in the EU’ after Maastricht Treaty. After all, these 25 years are the most crucial and insistent to discuss for Democracy, it terms of equality, and in terms of a final constitutional settlement. Thus, we limited the timeframe.

9 “To be transparent, you need to provide full details of the process you followed in carrying out the review. To be accountable, you need to consider its possible effects. You are responsible for the messages you give through publishing the review, particularly if you aim to influence practice, or make recommendations” (Collins and McCartan, 2016:90).

We also limited the scope of research. We tried to find the most prominent thinkers and most salient arguments. Ostensibly, finding them was the easy part. We spotted the names that had the most citations in the work of others and made us conclude who are the ‘best’ contributors and what they considered as the most critical for the literature to study. In order to retain the balance of the arguments stemming from the two confronting accounts (i.e. the Democratic account vs. the Democratic deficit account), we tried to redress, were needed, the arguments that had some substantial contribution in their own body of literature, without though changing the argument. In so doing, we clarified the centrality of each argument to its account literature (i.e. how critical is argument X to the democratic account). We also removed some arguments that were remedied by successive treaty revisions or that are deemed not so much important from the body of literature that they represent. This work is done quietly throughout the text. Very helpful was Moravskic’s and Majone’s critical, while they are proponents of the democratic account, review papers. Vivien Schmidt’s reviews were very insightful too. The student, a proponent of the ‘democratic account’ himself, strived to be impartial and unbiased. To this end, he organized a systematic search of arguments and contributors, as we described above.

Thus, the primary research question, with purposefully limited scope, proceeded in critical10 appraisal of the two opposing accounts; i.e. the ‘democratic account’ and the ‘structural democratic deficit account’.

This lengthy, narrative in tone, is performed after Collins and McCartans (2016) modern advice about a ‘procedural transparency’ over the handling of the modern projects; i.e. providing the supervisor(s) and the audience the chance to understand how one proceeded with his project. Issues such as threats to ethical standards, special difficulties managed by researcher for those who will replicate the project etc. are addressed properly

To this end, initial literature review through academic blogs (LSE Ideas etc., ‘Oxbridge’ Blogs etc., Arena/ Harvard/ EUI Florence Working papers), the renowned Project Syndicate website, indicated a critical mass of arguments and thinkers that had heavily contributed on our primary research question. This was the first wave of research (refinement).

Subsequently, we plunged in peer review papers. Firstly, we searched for those references that were ubiquitous during the first wave of research. Contributing authors like A. Moravcsik, Vivien and Manfred Schmidt, the ARENA group (A. Follesdall, E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum et.al.) and followed by some prominent thinkers like J. Habermas, D. Held, Oxford’s don Larry Siedentop, R. Dahl, A. Lijphart, S.M. Lipset et.al. All the above contributors provided the necessary erudition, given the fact that we started with no serious theoretical background.

In fact, the above waves of material searching happened in parallel with the early study of Manfred’s G. Schmidt exemplar book on ‘Theories of Democracies’ (2000 in Greek). A book that took us merely six month to study it cover to cover. A worth mentioning endeavor, due

10 The term ‘critical’ is sometimes affixed to ‘literature review’. A critical literature review is one which goes beyond simply describing the articles identified, and both analyses them and seeks to critically evaluate their quality. All worthwhile literature reviews should be critical in this sense” (Collins and McCartan, 2016:84).

19 to the very fact, that introduced the student in the overwhelming discipline of political science (by and large), and the (sub) disciplines of comparative politics, of democratization theories and of models of democracy. Most importantly, it provided us with a critical mass of knowledge in order to be able to evaluate what really matters on the torrent of arguments on constitutional settlements. I strongly believe that this project would be a mess, of confusing, incoherent set of arguments if the student had failed to cover Schmidt’s textbook, alongside Siedentop’s thought-provoking and highly praised book ‘Democracy in Europe’ (2000).

This essay ends with a final chapter entitled “The prospects for EU democracy- policy proposals”. Instead, of conclusions, our supervisor insisted on a chapter that recommends policy proposals. Nearly two weeks before the faculty’s deadline, we had to systemize a new effort to read a bulk of policy proposals that stemmed broadly from three groups of contributors; namely, the supranational level (notably the Commission’s proposals), the intergovernmental level (notably Franco-German proposals) and last but not least the academic level (notably, journals and think tanks). Although, we skimmed and read most of the material we did not referenced all of them. We could provide a list of bibliography (in its Anglo-Saxon meaning, namely not referenced but read as background reading), after the References list, but we deemed that it would not add something valuable, given the fact that a simple search (“future EU+ Democracy”) on JSTOR, Wiley and Taylor and Francis databases would return immediately the bulk of related journal articles. What is more, we must admit the crucial reading and use of multiple book reviews from experienced researchers; against which we controlled our understanding of the material covered. That enhanced the validity of our understanding over the arguments, especially at the beginning of the project. They were a great source of focusing and presenting the arguments found in the literature.

Finally, we did not reiterate the arguments found in our three level/ dimensional research. Instead, we proposed main exogenous factors that threat the quality of modern democracies. Globalization, uncontrollable, forces pose a serious threat to modern constitutional settlements. Our main proposal, concerned with the state of EU Democracy, lies in the fact that Europe is an evolving Project. The latter should not be seen ‘mechanistically’ in terms of structural institutional deficits that are (indeed) missing. In fact, the opposite should happen. The Project is right in its merit to evolve alongside the global changes. The EU should see its model as the new democratic standard that is shaped through its historical erudition, its value-based normative deliberations and its innovative modern concerns. This erudite deliberation taking into its account the long-standing European time continuum, if done correctly, it will set the new standards globally. ‘Empire EU’ become, once again, the global standards setter.

Below, follows a ‘rough’ Gant Chart that illustrates the student’s time allocation for this Project.

ACTIONS JANUARY-MAY JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER

Initial M.G. Schmidt Background (2000) Bulding Siedentop, Blogs etc.

Project Starts

Wave 1 Blogs, Think Searching and tanks, ‘Research Reading Gate’ skimming

Wave 2 Peer Journals, Books Review Reading and Book reviews

Sketch writing (chapters)

Writing Up Project Ends

Gant Chart. Rough action plan and time allocation. Produced by Panagiotis J. Dimas.

Chapter 3. The ‘Democratic Account’. A critical evaluation of main contributions.

This chapter discusses one of the two accounts that dominate the EU’s democratic debate. One debate that has been criticized by many as not sufficiently communicated to the European public, given the importance of the European project to lead the way towards a European Polity. However, ‘engaging the citizen’, through successive fora and means (newspapers, TV shows etc.) in order to increase public awareness it should not be misled in a normative sense, i.e. participatory democracy. The latter comprises a certain normative view about democracy that reflects certain Polity model (s).

In academia though, the above is not the case. During his desktop literature review, the student came across a ‘grand debate’ that entails many disciplines, proponents and critics. The debate can be characterized as a multi-dimensional fora that produces fragmented normative and empirical views about democracy at EU level; where the pros of the one view conclude to be the cons of the other view. Above all, the debate is a genuine social science research, i.e. it is highly discursive in its very nature. Fragmented in terms of epistemology, subsequently of ontology (philosophical); is dispersed in many disciplines and subdisciplines; and it is still ongoing with no trends of concluding somewhere or sometime.

A multiple cited review paper by Moravcsik (2004) argues that most ‘democratic deficit’ critics protract normative views against which they evaluate or score democracy and constitutional settlements. Moravcsik (2004: 337-8) distinguishes “four philosophical conceptions of democracy on which such a critique of the EU has been grounded – respectively, libertarian, pluralist, social democratic and deliberative democracy – and present empirical evidence to suggest that in each case the EU’s democratic credentials are well within the norm of advanced industrial democracies”. Specifically, he notes that:

“Though centralized electoral control and collective deliberation remain relatively weak and diffuse, constitutional and material restrictions on the EU’s mandate, inter- institutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the modest but increasing powers of the European Parliament are more than sufficient to assure that in most of what it does, EU policy-making is generally clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of Europeans”.

Moravcsik (2004: 338)

Moravcsik’s ‘democratic deficit’ defense is grounded in two elements; philosophical coherence and empirical evidence. The former provides the epistemological clarity and validity, i.e. a sound methodological endeavor in order the debate to conclude sometime soon. The latter provides the real data that makes the debate ‘pragmatically noteworthy11’ and against which philosophical views will be evaluated.

11 Moravcsik uses the term in italics ‘pragmatic viable’; meaning empirical evidence. The student deriving from the overall Moravcsik thinking and especially his overall literature and approach on EU,

This chapter unfolds in two sections of analysis. In the first section, the student develops the arguments concerned with the (ongoing) constitutional settlement in EU. How the EU’s architectural edifice works in terms of democratic normative views; although keeping in mind Moravcsik’s argument of the inherent threat on such an endeavor. It tries to understand what the ‘European Madisons’ are doing12? What is the rationale behind this ‘under construction’ architectural edifice13? Ineluctably, some quick reference on European integration theories becomes a prerequisite. In the section two, we will discuss praised normative theoretical contributions against which we ground the ‘democratic account’.

To begin with and according to the ‘Democratic Account’, EU is a sufficiently legitimized political entity and “there is little evidence that the EU suffers from a fundamental democratic deficit” (Moravcsik, 2004:362); given the fact that its constituent parts, i.e. its member-states (m-s), exhibit a high standard of democracy inside their borders. The latter is complemented by both decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Maastricht 1993 and Lisbon 2009). The judgement rules that the member-states are the “Herr der Verträge”14. No matter what, EU strives seriously in covering all-kind of deficits in its architectural design. The latter is supported by many experts in the field (see Gustavsson, 1998; Landfried, 1999 in Schmidt, 2000:479 among others cited).

Therefore, in the ‘Democratic account’ one can find serious thoughts over the legitimacy of EU. One standing argument holds that the European Community15/Union is created by successive treaties that were adopted and signed from democratically elected governments, and ratified by national parliaments. What is more, given the importance of EU widening rounds and of EU-deepening alongside, the EU’s democracy is enhanced accordingly in order to safeguard and protect the Project from overstretching. Indeed, serious democratic precautions were taken at the institutional level.

i.e. concerned with reality in EU, coined the term ‘pragmatically noteworthy’, meaning that the debate should be empirically sound, that means that must reflect reality in EU. 12 Moravcsik (2004: 348) takes a hint from Larry Siedentop’s (2000) renowned book ‘Democracy in Europe’. In which a chapter’s title asks, “Where are the Madisons for Europe?”. See also Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union’, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2001), pp. 603–24. 13 In this respect, Brigid Laffan (1999: 347) notes: “The process of democratizing the EU is animated by caution rather than big ideas and heroic struggle”, namely acknowledging the functionalist rationale behind the Project and providing an explanation for Jachtenfuchs’ (1998:42 and onwards) ‘process of uneven Europeanization’; where economic and legal integration is advanced while political integration strives to promote itself. Although, as Lafan (1999:347) shrewdly notes: “Increased saliency [she refers to post-Maastricht era and due to Euro introduction] has been accompanied by a level of politicization never before experienced by the EU”. 14 See in the reference list: 1. BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009 - 2 BvE 2/08 - paras. (1-421) and 2. BVerfG, Judgment on the Maastricht Treaty of October 12, 1993 - 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92. Also the press release for Lisbon Treaty. See also, Wieland (1994); Kiiver (2010), Lehmann (2010). 15 After the Lisbon Treaty the ‘European Community’ becomes ‘European Union’ expressing explicitly its legal personality (see Ioakeimides, 2010).

3.1. Section one. The institutional edifice.

The European Parliament (EP).

A co-legislature body (alongside the Council) that represents EU citizens (and their interests) and is directly elected since 1979. The EP acts together with the Council as a legislature, shares with the Council the budgetary power, exerts the democratic control over the institutions including the European Commission and approves the Commission members (EP official website, 2017; EP’s Brochure, 2017; Staab, 2011: 65-73). The EP’s power have been upgrading through successive rounds of Treaty revisions (Hix et.al., 2007: especially Part I; Staab, 2011:65). The latter means that the ‘Project’, under the careful deliberations of Functionalist rationale, is becoming gradually more sensitive and more cautious with the quality of EU’s democratic architecture. Even the symbolic ‘under construction’ architecture of EP’s building in Strasburg tell us this gradualist rationale about how we should see Democracy in Europe. Furthermore, the MEPs exhibit an ensurient professionalism of high- standards that guarantee best quality of representativeness; equivalent at least to the ones found at national parliaments (Veen, 2008.). The latter is supported by Hix et.al. (2007: 180) that argue ‘‘politics in the European Parliament is surprisingly like in other democratic parliaments’’.

The Council of the European Union.

The Council acts together with the Parliament as a legislature. It shares with the Parliament the budgetary power, ensures coordination of the broad economic and social policy, sets out guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and concludes international agreements. The Council legitimizes itself through the participation of democratically elected national governments in its structure. National governments have in their discretion veto power in certain (hi politics) areas and there are provisions in the Lisbon Treaty even for policies that are under Quality Majority Voting (QMV)16. However, decision-making process is complicated for the normal citizen. Since the European Constitution crisis in mid- 2000s, little has been done towards fixing the simplicity, transparency and equity; vital democratic principles. The constitutional crisis that led to an amending Treaty, i.e. the Lisbon Treaty, did not allow for major breakthroughs for the so much needed political advancement of the ‘Project’. The initial rationale behind Maastricht was another ‘Maastricht’ (following the Euro); alleged to be as “Maastricht 2.0”. Only this time, its substance would be a courageous political leap forward that would compensate for Maastricht 1.0. Notwithstanding the fact, that Maastricht Treaty is often affiliated with EMU and Euro17 that is not completely true. In Maastricht many changes in the architecture of the Community occurred18, but the significance of the Euro justifiably overshadowed not only the other ‘pillars’ but also the next two ‘supplementary Treaties’, that of Amsterdam and Nice. The

16 The Treaty of Lisbon mandates a change in voting system from 1 November 2014 for most cases to double majority Qualified Majority Voting, replacing the voting weights system. Decisions made by the council have to be taken by 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the EU's population (See Ioakeimides, 2010). 17 An excellent reference for the Euro negotiations is the salient book of Prof. Kevin Featherstone and Kenneth Dyson (2000). See also Moravcsik publications from 1993 and onward. 18 See Ioakeimides, 1995 [in Greek].

24 last two Treaties silently prepared the ground for ‘Maastricht 2.0’ that came in the form of ‘European Convention on the Future of Europe’ (in December 2001) which would produce a draft constitution for the European Union and for the Council to finalize and adopt (Moravcsik, 2004: 337). However, this time the political advancement that would shape the political identity of the Europeans forever, was campaigned poorly, briefly and miserably to the European citizens (!).

Acknowledging the turbulent European political history, the student’s position stands in the following mantra. ‘You do not campaign a Polity’. It is not a minor issue for the European political life. And perhaps, it is not merely a matter of the elite (the representatives but also the few in a society); neither is a matter of what is known as ‘permissive consensus’19, to pass a new a Polity that will undermine the long-standing, European nation-state20. Despite the fact, that according to recent Eurobarometers the European South trusts more the European Institutions than their National ones (Tsoukalis, 2016). A ‘reflection period’ over the political future of EU should had been set up perhaps since Maastricht Treaty, but in an substantial way. If that had happened then, now 27 years later, a whole generation would have been educated with the idea of Europe coming closer politically. After all, “political integration is a matter of identity and loyalty” (Wallace, 1990: 55) and Deutch’s (1954) ‘sense of community’ is not a simple task to achieve through monthly campaigns.

The European Commission.

The politically independent executive arm of the Union. It submits proposals for new legislation to the Parliament and Council, implements policies, administers the budget, ensures compliance with European law (a.k.a. the "guardian of the treaties"), and negotiates international agreements (European Commission Official Website: 2017; Staab: 2011: 47- 53). The Commission enjoys an indirect legitimatization. It is elected by the Council of Ministers and approved by the European Parliament.

“The European Parliament has the right to approve and dismiss the European Commission. Since 1994, commissioners-designate have been required to appear before an EP hearing. Under the Lisbon Treaty, EU heads of state propose a candidate for Commission President, taking into account the results of European elections. The candidate is elected by the EP. The EP ensures democratic control over the Commission, which regularly submits reports to Parliament including an annual report on EU activities and on the implementation of the budget. Once a year, the Commission President gives a State of the Union address to plenary. Parliament regularly invites the Commission to initiate new policies and the Commission is required to reply to oral and written questions from MEPs”.

European Parliament (2017), “Powers and Procedures”, Official Website.

19 See Hooghe and Marks (2008), Down and Wilson, 2008; Hurrelmann, 2007. 20 The European Integration is an elite driven Project (Tsoukalis, 2005; 2011; 2016). A lot has been written about how the European Project has progressed since its inception. The literature indicated a ‘permissive consensus’ that gradually lost its impetus (Katz and Wessels, 1999:232), especially after the introduction of Euro. Finally, the literature coined the new term ‘constraining dissensus’ in order to describe the new political reality about furthering the Project ahead.

Civil society and participatory policy-making.

What is more, outside the official European institutions, one can observe many different actors that influence, lobby, shape, enhance, expedite or apotheticaly21 halt, hinder, decelerate the official decision-making process. This partnership between the official decision-making bodies and the civil society, in the form of NGO’s, lobby firms, think tanks, (ad-hoc) expert groups, regional, national or subnational (trade) unions or even individuals, marks an evolving democratic norm and establishes a growing quality of democratic participation in the official decision-making process. The student made an effort to illustrate the decision-making process in the EU; borrowing elements from Europeanization approach (see Fig.3.1. below22).

3.2. Section two. Theoretical contributions and accounts.

Above, we described the ‘check and balances’ of three major EU institutions that comprise the EU’s political current standing, yet evolving, constitutional settlement. We also introduced broader actors that make significant contributions to the official decision-making process. As a consequence, the ‘democratic account’ it is supported by theoretical endeavors that describe the EU’s reality. This knotty, evolving decision-making process led Eichener (1998 in Schmidt 2000: 481) to infer to Dahl’s ‘polyarchy’ notion; namely, EU does not reflect a perfect democracy but approximates sufficiently its ideal standards (see also Moravcsik, 2004:337).

21 Apotheticaly means something that is expressed in negative terms. 22 The student admits that for the decision-making illustration in EU has been mainly influenced from the literature of Europeanization, Expertization literature and the book by Schendelen (2010) “More Machiavelli in Brussels. The Art of Lobbying the EU”.

Accordingly, in the realms of normative theories about EU’s architecture, we found Lijphart’s (1969:207-225; and 1993: 188-189) theory of ‘Consociationalism’ or ‘Consociational Democracy’. First things first, “consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart, 1969: 216). By taking into his account Grabiel A. Almond’s (1956) famous typology of political systems, he identifies three types of Western democratic system, in order to examine political stability and democratic consolidation. In the one hand, he distinguishes as ‘centripetal’ the Almond’s ‘Anglo-American’ (UK and USA) political systems that are known for their cultural homogeneity and political cohesion; main factors for democratic stability. Alongside, he categorizes also Scandinavian countries and Old commonwealth countries as ‘centripetal’. On the other hand, he distinguishes as ‘centrifugal’ the fragmented and unstable democracies, which include French Third and Fourth Republics, Italy, Weimar Germany, the Austrian First Republic etc. The latter are characterized by political fragmentation that is derived by cultural cleavages; distinct subcultures that erode societal and political cohesion (Lijphart, 1969: 222-225). Thus, we found consociationalism mainly in continental Europe, although both Almond and Lijphart (1969: 208) strongly support that one should not add geography as a distinct criterion. It is not a matter of geography, but instead a matter of the relationship between social structure and political culture on the one hand and political stability on the other hand.

From this early Comparativist view, one can exploit its rationale to understand EU’s architecture. Consociationalism seen as a political (government) structure that is characterized by a divided European society (many cultures and subcultures) in many socio- political sectors; it represents a guarantee for the socially acceptable regulation of public affairs, while taking seriously into its account self-governance. The means to establish a working consociationalism are: a. power-sharing vertically among many actors (mass society and elite level) and horizontally among member-states (m-s), b. autonomy and self-rule (subsidiarity principle), c. (principle of) proportionality of political representativeness and budgetary burden/sharing among member-states and d. veto for all stakeholders (mainly m- s; the national representatives) for vital interests. Clearly, as Lijphart (1969: 216) specifically noted, “in consociational democracies, politics is treated not as a game but as serious business”.

What is more, Lijphart (1969:214) recognized that “consociational democracy violates the principle of majority rule, but it does not deviate very much from normative democratic theory”. However, the question remains; is EU a consociational democracy? Chryssochoou (1998:217) maintains that EU is more than simple confederation because its political architecture surpasses the level of a simple confederation. Moreover, Vivien Schmidt (1999: Abstract), a ‘democratic deficit’ proponent, provides a more technical definition of EU: “The European Union is a supranational governance organization that is more federal than unitary but which, instead of a constitutionally established balance of powers, exhibits a dynamic confusion of powers”.

Notwithstanding definitional views and accounts, theory of consociationalism provides a credible stand against which EU can be studied for its democratic status and achievements. Firstly, EU’s societal structure is identified in consociationalism; namely, it is divided into a number of political areas, with particularly deep cleavages between them. In fact, so deep because those political areas are constituted in national states, they have serious autonomy and operate in completely different political systems. Not to mention the distinct lingual and

27 cultural heterogeneities. In fact, these deep cleavages find a common ground through politics and elite cooperation. Politics and elite cooperation that provide the necessary volition, have established an architectural design that makes governance (and government as in EU exclusive powers) possible in the EU level. After all, “the essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system” (Lijphart, 1969:213).

Furthermore, the ‘democratic account is supported by two theories: a. Theory of the ‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1996; 1997) and b. the Principal agent (contract) theory. The latter maintains that the state transfer, until the legislator recalls them back, a significant part of the decision-making power in institutions dominated by experts. The principal agent theory that emerged in the 1970s from the combined disciplines of economics and institutional theory, i.e. a cross-discipline account, provides a modern view in the direction of modern or postmodern democracies and their distinct characteristics that cannot be evaluated or analyzed by classical theories of democracy. Further to this, Agne (2007: Abstract) argues that “democratic states are unable to delegate authority to international organizations. Influential attempts to justify democratically such international bodies as the European Union by means of delegation are found to be untenable”.

In the same wavelength, this time from the (sub) disciplines of public policy and public management, Majone (1997: 140)23 discusses shift of paradigms in nation-state structures caused by globalization, increased international competition and deepening of regional entities (i.e. EMU and EU overall). Specifically, he maintains that “strategic adaptation to the new realities has resulted in a reduced role for the positive, interventionist state and a corresponding increase in the role of the regulatory state: rule making is replacing taxing and spending”. The above reality stifles political leaders for substantive structural changes. The shift paradigm happened in the late 1970s and brought the spotlight to a reforming competition among nations. EU, seen as a regional platform for managing global inputs and ‘government failures’ (Majone, 1996: Introduction and 1997:142), could not escape from this reality. Thus, the once era of regulation and state control (Post WWII Keynesianism) collapsed “under the pressure of powerful technological, economic and ideological forces, and dismantled or radically transformed. This is often referred to as 'deregulation'” (Majone, 1997: 143). In fact deregulation is misleading as empirical findings support the rather

23 Majone (1997:140) is very critical about the state of the art in public administration issues. He convincingly identifies (discipline and) subdiscipline fragmentation and lack of substantial empirical analysis. From hindsight, we know that modern contributions have succeeded to cover these shortcomings. However, the significance of this fragmentation lies, epistemologically, in the fact that when one is being critical about the democratic (or not) state of Union, that should be epistemologically solid. Fragmentations, empirical shortages etc. do not help towards validity of claims, especially when one discipline or subdiscipline proceed to (over) generalizations. Robson and McCartan (2016: 78) perceives the latter as a serious validity threat. Specifically, he maintains that: “Traditionally, changes in public policy and in governance structures have been treated, at best, as loosely connected processes to be analysed by separate subdisciplines, using different conceptual frameworks and analytic tools. This disjunction has greatly impoverished both public policy analysis and the study of public administration. Recent advances in the positive theory of institutions and in the political economy of public policy may eventually lead to general models capable of explaining both policy innovation and the corresponding structural changes. Meanwhile, however, the transformation of public policy and governance structures is proceeding at such a pace that the student of public policy cannot await the development of such models before trying to make sense of what is happening”. See also Moravcsik (2004:337), who is concerned with normative and empirical criteria for evaluation modern democracies and constitutional systems.

28 combination of deregulation and then re-regulation, possibly at a different level of governance. Over the years, European (re) regulation has grown not only qualitatively (regulation overdoses24), but also quantitatively with the emergence of new independent bodies that strike accountability and legitimacy issues in EU. The decline of positive (traditional) state shifted the traditional political arena. Now party politics inside the Parliament do not focus on budgetary allocations, but transferred to a new arena “where jurisdiction over the review and control of the regulatory process provides the main source of conflict” (Majone, 1997:151). Accordingly, in the European Union level, where “the contrast between member states and the EC executive over budgetary allocations pales by comparison with the conflict over the scope, level and methods of rule making” (Majone, 1997:151). The struggle over the control of European regulation and how the latter affects domestic regulation is well studied from ‘Europeanization approach’25.

However, Majone (1996;1997;1998) sees this strategic shift from positive to regulatory state, not as a democratic threat to societies but rather as ‘new standards of legitimacy and accountability’ that suit the modern state (Majone,1996; 1997:159-163). Traditional tool of democratic analysis, i.e. government and control by majority rule, nowadays rather look radical when they analyse and evaluate democratic realties in modern polities (Moravcsik, 2004:362). New norms, actors, bodies of governance if seen under ‘the majority rule’ might seem as democratically inappropriate or as ‘constitutional anomalies which do not fit well into the traditional framework of controls, checks and balances’ (Veljanovski, 1991:16 in Majone, 1997:159). However, “the regulatory state is characterised by pluralism, diffusion of power, and extensive delegation of tasks to non-majoritarian institutions like the independent agencies or commissions” (Majone, 1997:159). This alternative or ‘Madisonian’ model of democracy (versus Majoritarian or ‘populist’ according to Dahl (1956)) “aims to share, disperse, delegate and limit power’ (Majone, 1997:159). This non-majoritarian strategy comprises a modern response of policy-makers to cope with new realities and ‘complexities’ of modern political economies (see Held, 2004). Hence, we witness “attempts to restrain majority rule by placing public authority in the hands of officials who have limited or no direct accountability to either political majorities or minorities” (Majone, 1997:160).

Thus, Majone (1996; 1997) argues that we must see accountability and legitimacy through new lenses that are fairer and more valid to evaluate modern polities. Hence, he made a distinction between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ dimension of legitimacy. Specifically, he defines ‘procedural democracy as follows:

“Procedural legitimacy implies, among other things, that the agencies are created by democratically enacted statutes which define the agencies' legal authority and objectives; that the regulators are appointed by elected officials; that regulatory

24 Majone (1997:144) mentions: “The importance of rule making in the EC is shown, first, by the almost exponential growth, during the last three decades, of the number of directives and regulations produced by the Brussels authorities each year. As a result, by 1991 the EC was introducing into the corpus of French law more rules than the national authorities themselves: it has been estimated that today only 20 to 25 per cent of the legal norms applicable in France are issued by the national government without any previous consultation in Brussels” (Conseil d'Etat 1993). 25 The student had performed a literature review on the ‘Europeanization’ approach. He identified three seminal contributions for a state of the art on Europeanization. See the work of Risse, Caporaso and Cowels (2001; eds, especially introduction) Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) and Graziano and Vink (2007).

decision-making follows formal rules which often require public participation; finally, that agency decisions must be justified and are open to judicial review”.

Majone, 1997:160.

On the other hand, ‘substantive’ legitimacy exists only when formal institutions exhibit the capacity to engender and maintain the belief that they are the most appropriate ones for the functions entrusted to them” (Majone, 1997:161). Independent regulatory institutions should exhibit relevant criteria of substantive legitimacy, such as “policy consistency; the expertise and problem solving skills of the regulators; their ability to protect diffuse interests; professionalism; and most important, a clear definition of the objectives of the agency and of the limits within which the agency is expected to operate” (Majone, 1997:161).

After having established the new standard of democratic evaluation, Majone (1997:162) emphasizes that:

“[…]the delegation of important policy-making powers to independent institutions is democratically justified only in the sphere of efficiency issues, where reliance on expertise and on a problem-solving style of decision-making is more important than reliance on direct political accountability. Where redistributive concerns prevail, legitimacy can be ensured only by majoritarian means”.

Majone, 1997:162.

Most importantly, all the above describe a fortiori the EU level of governance, where government does not exist, but instead pluralistic governance is present largely. This way, complex political issues are left out of the turmoil caused by competition between the government and the opposition, so that appropriate actors can take care of the appropriate solutions, without though democratic threats to legitimacy and accountability. That way “independence and accountability can be reconciled by a combination of control mechanisms rather than oversight exercised from any fixed place in the political system”. This comprises the key normative problem in EU, when EU is seen as a regulatory state; namely “how agency independence and democratic accountability can be made complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than antithetical values” (Majone, 1997:163).

Finally, as we have already said the m-s are the “Herr der Verträge”, which means that they can resume the state of the Union as they wish, even dissolve it. However and most importantly, the state of the Union and its asymmetrical political level of integration vis-a-vis the economic one is a legitimate decision made by democratically elected governments and ratified by national parliaments. And even if the proponents of the ‘democratic deficit account’ still insist for democratic deficits in EU, then perhaps we can talk about a ‘legitimate democratic deficit’ (M. Schmidt, 2000:481).

Democracy in Europe is in a transition period with an unknown outcome of its final Polity model26. Therefore, it is unfair to judge squarely EU’s Democracy by taking snapshots of its

26 According to Ioakeimides (1995:27-41) the debate about the ‘finalité’ of the European political structure (Polity), comprise two major group of thinkers; the ‘agnostic’ ones and the ‘federalists’. The

30 reality and comparing with advanced democracies around the world (Moravcsik, 2004:336- 7). The fragmentation of the academic analysis or (over-) generalizations (see Moravcsik, 2004:338) fail when one argues that EU institutions indeed evolve. Especially when their evolution approximate the advanced democracies that often against which are compared to.

formers support that EU is a ‘suis generis polity’, a ‘shared rule polity’ that has no precedent in the world. They argue that Federalism is a little bit démodé. Thus, a new polity paradigm is wanted. The Federalists support the known Federalism approach.

Chapter 4. The ‘Structural Democratic Deficit Account’. A critical evaluation of main contributions

This Chapter discusses major arguments on the EU’s ‘structural democratic deficit account’. To this end, it introduces the other side of the ‘democratic account’; i.e. the main critical deliberations on EU’s democratic status. This group of critics on the EU’s democratic standards usually provide examination on normative democratic theories27, which according to Moravcsik (2004: 343) ‘such ideals are frankly utopian. They are not realized anywhere today, and not even in the ancient or Westminster-style systems sometimes held up as exemplars”.

According to Vivien Schmidt (2013: 2-4) the democratic deficit debate goes back nearly three decades (e.g., Beetham and Lord, 1998; Follesdal, 2006; Hix, 2008; Lord, 2004; Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002; Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2006; Williams, 1991 in Schmidt, 2013:1). Especially, after Maastricht Treaty and the “ill-advised intervention in [national] monetary policy that created the Euro (Moravcsik: 2016 review brief comment), which indeed created a new constitutional settlement with one core sovereign policy, the Euro, but also affected the state of Democracy in member-states. The democratic critics are concerned with three groups of (normative) issues. Some:

“[…]theorists focus primarily on the quality of what goes on inside EU governance, such as questions of authorization, representation and accountability (Beetham and Lord, 1998), others are more concerned with the quality of what goes in or comes out of EU governance, judging legitimacy primarily on the basis of policy outcomes (e.g., Caporaso and Tarrow, 2008; Majone, 1998; Menon and Weatherill, 2008; Moravcsik, 2002) or on citizens’ active participation and deliberation (e.g., Bellamy and Castiglione, 2003; Hix, 2008).

V. Schmidt, 2013:1

According to Dahl’s (1998: 115) book ‘On Democracy’ the EU is an elite-driven project that does not deserve to be called ‘democratic’. Specifically he notes:

“The European Union offers telling evidence. There, such nominally democratic structures as popular elections and a parliament are formally in place. Yet virtually all observers agree that a gigantic “democratic deficit” remains. Crucial decisions mainly come about through bargaining among political and bureaucratic elites. Limits are set not by democratic processes but mainly by what negotiators can get others to agree to and by considering the likely consequences for national and international markets.

27 See the last two chapters (17 and 18) on the collective work by Laura Cram, Desmond Dinan and Neill Nugent (1999). Specifically, Brigid Laffan (1999:330) notes: “The debate about democracy in the EU is based on the twin assumptions that the Union is a polity, however part-formed, and that it impinges to a growing extent on the institutions and practices of national democracies. The debate stems from strong normative concerns about contemporary governance both at the national and European levels”.

Bargaining, hierarchy, and markets determine the outcomes. Except to ratify the results, democratic processes hardly play a role”.

(Dahl, 1998: 115)

Dahl’s remedy for the above comes with a recommendation, which in fact he does not believe in for large-scale (international) political entities28: “To insure public debate, it would be necessary to create an international equivalent to national political competition by parties and individuals seeking office” (Dahl’s, 1998: 116). Thus, Dahl’s normative argument stands in two criteria: on the one hand from the citizens’ incapableness to control, influence effectively and exercise accountability on the new, modern realm of decision-making and on the other hand from a lack of public sphere or a political procedure to formulate European- wide political volition. Moreover, given the fact that the pattern of internationalization of politics and the emergence of unstoppable ‘complexity’ of the decision-making process leads him to conclude and coin the notion of ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl, 1971) and the emergence of new standards of democracies. He argues that we cannot expect democracy to be in its traditional, normative concept in large-scale international (if not global) political entities (like the EU).

Further to the above, another set of critical arguments stands in the recruiting process of high-ranking position in key institutions (notably the ECB). The critics maintain that the recruiting process in legislative and executive bodies in EU lacks transparency and it is performed by blurred negotiations (Nedergaard, 2007: 75-92). Not to mention the fact that the ‘eurocrats29’ of the Brussels and notably of Frankfurt (i.e. ECB) are perceived to be far away from democratic accountability. Especially, when the (huge) gap between the citizen and for instance the ECB, is highly provocative, in terms of indirect democratic accountability, through their elected representativeness, when it comes to their lack of veto power or the right to exit Euro (Katz and Wessels, 1999: 232 and onward).

Thus, the four democratic criteria – i.e. legitimacy, accountability, transparency and citizens’ participation - against which the critics of the ‘democratic account’ ground their arguments comprises the main framework of their contributions in the ‘democratic deficit’ literature. Again, Richter (1999 in Schmidt, 2000:485) argues about lack of a stable, tight democratic connection between a not-existing European government and citizenry.

A social-democrat normative view comes from Scharf (1999) who argues that EU’s regulatory competences have increased while at the same time the democratic tools to control them have remained constant or been reduced. In the same wavelength but bitter critically, Bach (1999a and 1999b in Schmidt, 2000:486) notes that at a supranational level has been created "to a great extent, a foreign and opposing democratic regime. […] this

28 His main argument stands in the fact that: “International organizations encompass large geographical domains. […] international organizations are therefore inherently unable to support direct democratic deliberation and decision”. […] My argument is simple and straightforward. In democratic countries . . . it is notoriously difficult for citizens to exercise direct control over many key decisions on foreign affairs. What grounds do we have for thinking, then, that citizens in different countries engaged in international systems can ever attain the degree of influence and control over decisions that they now exercise within their own countries? See his contribution in Robert Dahl, ‘Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View’, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker- Cordon (eds), Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 19–36. 29 A term for Commission officials first coined by Altiero Spinelli (1967). See footnote in Nedergaard, 2007:76). Also read whole Chapter 5 for an interesting report on EU Staffing.

33 regime is equivalent at the level of EU Member States, with a strong tendency of endogenous transfer of democratic structures and processes” (Bach, 1999b: 1). The latter enhances structural pathologies and deficits of Democracy, such as the continued existence of oligarchies, the condominium of invisible forces, the growing influence of experts, the bureaucracy and the tendency to supplant formalities of producing political volition (Bach 1999a and 1999b in Schmidt, 2000:486).

What is more, the voter turnout at European Parliament elections is another issue that concerns the proponents of the ‘Democratic deficit account’. The turnout has fallen consecutively at each election since 1979. Voter turnout in 2014 stood at 42.61% of all European voters (EP, 2017 “Election results”). The latter is usually explained normatively, namely the inexistence of European ‘demos’30, the inefficient European public fora, second- class, detached European party system, citizens apathy, (due to) low-politics competences in EU level etc. The existence or lack of the above, fuel the main arguments of European politicization (see though Laffan: 337; Risse, 201031). The remedies usually proposed lies in the upgrade of the European Parliament (see proposal by Siedentop, 2000 and Tsoukalis, 2016), with full competences to control the political process in EU and the European budget. That would render EP as a second chamber of national parliaments, discussing, controlling the competences that have been transferred at EU level.

However, the latter even if realized, still would not remedy the structural democratic deficit in EU. Because the deficit lies in Dahl’s (1971) two main dimensions of democracy as derived from his theory of polyarchy; namely, political participation of all adult citizens and a public sphere of political competition for the production of political volition. Briefly, the first argument on this category resides on the fact that EU's executive power is not elected by EU citizens or their elected representatives on the basis of a process of political will. Instead, it is appointed by the head of the governments of the Member States based on a complex, and most often opaque, negotiation process with the European Parliament. Secondarily, there is a problem with this form of parliamentarism, which, following the conferral of powers, did not equip the European Parliament with particularly effective functions of controlling its executive power and its budgetary behavior. Thirdly, there is a problem with the intermediaries of the EU’s political spectrum, namely European Parties. There is no vital interest in the issues that European parties are responsible for; nor are there any common European-wide Media that discuss the EU's political issues. Making this way, the European public sphere dull. Fourthly, there is a question of lack of leadership in the EU; where negative integration proceeds faster than positive integration, i.e. making rules for delicate politically issues that concern mostly the Europeans (welfare state issues etc.). Fifth, the EU lacks a “demos”. There are practical issues like the absence of a common language etc. that would make possible the politicization process (see Kielmansegg, 1996a:55 in M. Schmidt, 2000:487; Cheneval and Schimmelfenning, 2013; Nicolaïdis, 2013; Risse, 2016:225). Sixth,

30 See also the specific literature about the European ‘demos’ in footnote 31. 31 See especially Chapter 10 “European Democracy and Politicization” (pp. 226-242). Thomas Risse discusses the importance of a ‘Europeanized demos’ as a sine qua non factor for a European wide democracy. He expresses his view from Europeanization approach. See though a modern study, through the consociational interpretation of the EU, of Thomas Hale & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (2016:225), who ask: “Would politics in the European Union (EU) benefit from greater contestation over policy, or is the European public too diverse and divided to sustain the kinds of democratic procedures practiced in its Member States?” See also in this respect, Cheneval and Schimmelfenning, 2013; Majone, 2005; Nicolaïdis, 2013.

34 the peculiar, a.k.a. sui generis institutional organization, with regard to the decision-making process, becomes (and is seen as a) problem of legality in EU. What the ‘democratic account’ considers a constitutional ‘novelty’, regarding a novel process of decision-making that combines different level of governance (a supranational) and an intergovernmental (the nation-state) one, is considered in this respect as a problem32.

The latter is well-studied and presented in Vivien A. Schmidt’s (2006) exemplar work ‘Democracy in Europe’. As Caporaso (2007/8:671) reviewed, “the key question asked is how supranational institutions and policies have affected domestic institutions with regard to democratic practices (specifically see penultimate chapter 5 in V. Schmidt, 2006: 219; also Dimitrova, 2010: 326). Vivien Schmidt, through mixed disciplines and methodologies (Dimitrova, 2010:327), views EU as a ‘regional state’ (V. Schmidt, 2006: 8-45; Auel, 2008:171; Lord, 2008: 132) namely in EU there is a multi-level and multi-dimensional (i.e. EU seen as ‘compound polity’ (9), ‘contingent sovereignty’ (14) and ‘composite identity’ (17)) state of governance. “The problem faced by member states is not that democracy has changed in the transposition of decision making to Brussels but that "national ideas and discourse about democracy have not [changed]" to keep pace (Caporaso, 2008: 671; V. Schmidt, 2006: ix). This selective transposition of decision-making is allegedly known as ‘policy without politics’ in the EU level that has led to ‘politics without policy’ at the national level (see also Auel, 2008:171-2; Lord, 2008:133). The latter affects ‘structural democratic deficit account’ in the sense that:

“[…] those activities that might create input legitimacy are located at the national level (pressure groups, lobbying, parliamentary elections), while policymaking takes place at the supranational level. This gap between the input and output sides of democracy creates confusion about whom to hold responsible and makes legitimacy and accountability problematic. Prior to the question of "Who guards the guardians?" is the question who the guardians are and what they are guarding on behalf of whom”.

Caporaso, 2007/8: 671

Most importantly, V. Shmidt’s contribution put ‘discourse as prism’ if not ‘discourse as causal variable’ in a central position in order to explain democratic deficit in EU, although

“Most of the theoretical lifting is done by societal and institutional variables, particularly the centralization of state authority and fragmentation-centralization of societal interests, in combination with traditional workhorse variables such as electoral rules, executive autonomy, and federal-unitary organization”.

Caporaso, 2007/8: 672

Vivien Schmidt publishes a new article for post-crisis EU. In this paper she coins and introduces a new term in Sharpf’s ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy; that is ‘throughput’ legitimacy (See Schmidt’s, 2013: 4). Specifically, the article maintains that:

32 Actually, Vivien Schmidt (2006) wrote a whole book on this argument. See below.

“Scholars of the European Union have analyzed the EU’s legitimacy mainly in terms of two normative criteria: output effectiveness for the people and input participation by the people. This article argues that missing from this theorization is what goes on in the ‘black box’ of governance between input and output, or ‘throughput’. Throughput consists of governance processes with the people, analyzed in terms of their efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to interest consultation. This article defines and discusses this third normative criterion as well as the interaction effects of all three normative criteria”.

V. Schmidt, 2013: Abstract.

Post-crisis EU and the subsequent new macroeconomic and fiscal measures introduced, as either new macroeconomic tools or supervision mechanisms, have drawn fierce, yet understandable, criticism for eroding democracy in EU. An excellent, modern contribution in post-crisis EU management encapsulates all the inevitable (?) measures that were taken since 2010. Specifically, this edited volume highlights major challenges that EU crisis management has caused. Specifically:

“Fritz W. Scharpf convincingly shows that the political legitimacy of the present euro regime is extremely fragile, whereas Frank Schimmelfenning examines how the euro crisis has affected differentiated integration. The other chapters, by contrast, scrutinize the political consequences of the crisis with regard to distinct political actors. They elaborate on EU citizens’ complex attitudes toward the EU in the context of the crisis (Sara B. Hobolt), the Europeanization of the national political debate in the media (Hanspeter Kriesi and Edgar Grande), the difficulties that political opposition faces in times of executive-dominated emergency politics (Jonathan White), and the increasing involvement of national legislatures in EU politics (Tapio Raunio)”.

Stein-Zalai, 2015: 158.

All above contributions comprises the main thoughts that have the greatest impact over the democratic deficit status of the EU. What really matters in this account is the fragmented analysis, in terms of (sub-)disciplines, normative (philosophical) views, empirical shortcomings. The latter come as an unavoidable consequence of increased complexity in the global system. A system that is fragile and that democratic accountability is weak. The post-war global institutions are not effective in managing the situation. Bad politics, bad practices, criminal-guilty acts are constantly evading democratic accountability, while provocative lifestyles, golden-boy mindsets are not controllable, perhaps a little bit dizzy. The next final chapter, which was our supervisor’s demand, comes with policy recommendations, instead of ‘conclusions’. We will try to propose effective policy recommendations dealing the real problems.

Chapter 5. The prospects for EU democracy- policy proposals.

There is no doubt that in the West nowadays one can enjoy the best democracy humanity has ever experienced. No matter of a number of serious flaws expressed, as in all kind of inequalities, still the western citizen is experiencing unprecedented democratic liberties and ever-expanding human rights. Indeed, the ‘flaws’ affect unevenly the citizen and given the loss of their power to control policy-making, which is lost in the favor or necessity of the ‘expert’ rule (than representative political actors), then a structural and systemic issue arises that might endanger democracy gravely. The latter shapes the literature of ‘democratic deficit’ in western, highly complex, interdependent political economies. Such as the EU and its member-states.

Yet, globalization is everywhere, ubiquitous and unstoppable. Neither its substance is consumed uniformly nor it is perceived or it has affected countries and citizens in the same manner. ‘Connectivity’, expressed as multi-layer, multi-faceted interdependence among nations, or realized as means of individuals coming together, is a trend that perhaps shapes (or should shape) new perceptions about democracy. While economic complexity, innovation and competitiveness make expert rule and engagement an uncontested imperative.

Thus, informed policy-making, as an unavoidable mean to manage globalization, interdependence, economic complexity, innovation and overall multi-level and multi- dimensional connectivity, affects the citizens and their democratic control and legitimization of (national?) politics. ‘Expertization’ is deemed then, as a necessity that makes democratic accountability obsolete (in terms of immediate action) and at the same time wanting, perhaps more than ever.

The complexity of innovation and interdependence has increased the number of channels of how the ‘expert rule’ is infused in the formal decision-making process. Permanent bureaucracy is not enough. Highly specialized think tanks, political advisers, lobbyists, consultancy firms, advisory boards, ad hoc reports from IO’s and NGO’s give birth to the ‘experts’ that shall define the proper way of action. Formal and informal processes of managing interdependence, as long as secrecy and instant political action.

The specific organization of policy advice varies considerably across countries. For instance, the US ‘knowledge regime’ is characterized by competition among multiple private knowledge providers, whereas continental European countries rely more on policy knowledge from public and semi-public research organizations and standing advisory bodies33. Thus, there is a common ground that epistemic communities must have a say in

33 See further ARENA’s Research Project on Expertization in public policy, University of Oslo.

37 policy-making (a given), but there are variations on how we organize the expert knowledge in democratic procedures.

Specifically, in EU-level policy-making, the expert-rule is organized in all kind of agencies, working groups and committees, let alone lobbyists that push certain interests in policy formulation channels. We claim, the complexity of policies, technical in nature, leaves little room, if any room at all, to EU representatives (EMPs) to vote in favor of their constituents or purely ideological interests. The latter would be the European citizen and the quality of democracy in EU. The above usually comprises the mainstream account; namely, the ‘structural democratic deficit account’. However, as we have shown in Chapter three, the arguments are usually stressed in a normative, idealistic, if not utopian fashion that it is hard to find empirical equivalent in modern industrial political economy (Moravcsik, 2002; 2004; 2008).

As we have witnessed, post-crisis EU has indulged in grand debates about its future and the state of the Union. These debates are performed in three levels; i.e. the supranational, the intergovernmental and the academic. In the supranational level, we see the Commissions response. In a series of publications, in a very transparent position in Commission’s Home Website, we can engage indirectly (by informing officially ourselves) and directly (by posting on social media – Twitter #SOTEU and engaging in national public debates) in the crest of this grand debate, given the delay from the Franco-German elections. Very indicative are both the series of publications and the culminating speeches by Jean-Claude Junker (2016; 2017), on the direction that the Commissions wishes for the future of the European Union.

Specifically, the Commission publishes a series of factsheets on the State of the Union:

 A roadmap for a more United, Stronger and more Democratic Union  The Economic and Monetary Union today  A European Minister of Economy and Finance  EU Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS)  A European Labour Authority  Posting of Workers in the EU (equal treatment and pay in the Single Market)  Dual Quality of Food  Better Regulation (efficiency)  The EU’s Key Partnership with Africa (i.e. EU seen as an Empire? Or in the sense of a ‘Lebensraum’/ ‘Espace Vital’)  European Solidarity Corps: One Year On

It continues by publishing press material and white papers (i.e. discussing papers), in order to inform the European citizen through national media. Specifically,

 State of the Union 2017 - Trade Package: Commission unveils initiatives for a balanced and progressive trade policy  State of the Union 2017 - Trade Package: European Commission proposes framework for screening of foreign direct investment

 State of the Union 2017 - Democracy Package: Reform of Citizens' Initiative and Political Party funding  State of the Union 2017 – Industrial Policy Strategy: Investing in a smart, innovative and sustainable industry  State of the Union 2017 - Cybersecurity: Commission scales up EU's response to cyber-attacks  State of the Union 2017: A framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the EU

Clearly, merely by reading the respective titles, one understands what EU is all about. It is not just a political settlement. It is not a European-wide bureaucracy or worse another bureaucracy to make the delicate notion (to Europeans) of ‘self-governance’ complicated and overwhelming. It is not a ‘supermarket’ of policies for cherry-picking etc. It is all the above, altogether and more. It is the European platform for co-managing and dealing with globalization and overall complexity (of global, economic, socio-political, cyber-technological affairs etc.) that it generates (see also Tsoukalis, 2016). And this is a fact. A fact that should communicated seriously to every single European citizen. Standing alone, nationally, is not an option anymore. Period34.

The intergovernmental side of the debate entails the thoughts of the national member- states. Naturally, the French35 and the German having the most crucial say in it. What is important here, is the ‘come back’ of France in EU Politics and management of the Project, with the election of Pr. Emmanuel Macron. France, the premier of Continental Europe politics, was deafeningly silent during the crisis. The Academia literally emphasized its absence of providing the solutions and taking the wanting initiatives to protect the Project and through it the European citizens. However, the bill on the table was big. Traditionally, the real power of the Franco-German axel has not been the automated agreement over policy issues; in fact, the opposite happened, due to differentiated political and economic models (see Hall and Soskice, 2001). Instead, the real power of the automotive of the European Project resides in their successful way of meeting each other halfway. Again, we have seen what H.E. President Macron silently (due to forthcoming German elections) proposed from ancient Pnyx in Athens, from a symbolic place for democracy in Europe. We also have witnessed the German reaction, mainly concerned with the ‘macroeconomic union’ and the rules that the latter introduces. France proposes a moderate ‘macroeconomic/ fiscal federalism’. As Barry Eichengreen36 puts it, “This is essentially the bargain Macron has offered Merkel. To paraphrase: “I’ll undertake deep structural reforms if you agree to modest steps in the direction of fiscal federalism, completing the banking

34 See Juncker’s (2016:7) annual Speech: “The facts are plain: The world is getting bigger. And we are getting smaller”. This view is supported by most influential personalities in EU today. Among few of them, the student has witnessed the speech of Herman Van Rompuy in Institut Français d'Athènes, and Mario Monti’s who argued the same fact in this respect during a speech in 2014 Greek EU Presidency in Athens Megaron Music Hall. 35 See (at the end of Reference list) a series of newspapers publication worldwide about the French proposals for a “Rebuild or Relaunch of EU 2.0”. It seems the French is back on its traditional track to propose initiatives and manage politically the Project. While Germany reluctantly falls behind in being the watchdog for accountability and strict rules in what France proposes. 36 See his article on the Guardian, 11/9/2017.

39 union, and creating a European monetary fund.” Thus, Germany agrees to shield EMU; or in De Grawe’ (2013) expression “to put a roof in our villa”37.

The last but not least, is the academic contribution. One can come across a wide range of academic publications. There is indeed an overwhelming amount of serious publications that scrutinizes all proposals that the supranational and intergovernmental side have generated in their public announcements and official publications. A completely new dissertation, discussing and mapping this bulk of publication could be done. There is no point, of exhibiting the abundance of those arguments here.

The student wishes, though, to be completely straightforward in this respect. The state of Democracy in EU should not be viewed in a ‘mechanistic’ way; namely, in terms of how the power and accountability is dispersed through the system. In fact, we should view it in a broader sense. The best democratic constitutional systems in the world can be simply ‘hacked’ and make serious US academics wonder on Facebook posts ‘how on earth that happened?”. The freedom of expression and information (First Amendment, US) ‘hacked the mind of US citizens resulting in the so-called ‘fake news’. The Freedom of Personal Data and Privacy falls behind in terms ‘National Security’; the so-called Patriot Acts after 9/11. Drone wars; stealth killings and highly entrenched financial wars over political and economic renting make equality and participatory democracy a joke; a provocative word to describe, though, a surreal reality. The student’s proposals are very much in line with the Commission's proposals. Democracy must attack the markets’ neoliberal hypotheses that have been gravely challenged empirically in academic contributions. In the neoliberal world, the ‘invisible hand’ does not exist at all.

While we strived to be unbiased in chapters three and four, where the two opposing accounts unfold their arguments, we concluded to be proponents of the ‘democratic account’. That, does not mean that we reject the corpus of literature of the (opposing) ‘democratic deficit’ account. In fact the opposite, we accept (in principle) all major arguments, but at the end of the day, we agree with Moravcsik’s view that EU is a ‘Project’. It is a settlement full of political ‘lock-ins’ that demands time, that usually is not enough or is a missing option. Dauntingly, the European Project is something live, evolving and ‘under construction’. After all, both accounts agree that EU is en masse a ‘legitimate political settlement with structural democratic deficits’. Namely, EU has ‘legitimate deficits’ that reveal the political capabilities of the time beings. Once again, we should acknowledge what an erudite and old school architect of the European project once said:

“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”.

Jean Monnet.

True!

37 In De Grawe, 2013; ‘Roofless villa’ is one of many similes that describe EMU. First mentioned in De Grawe, 1999.

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List of Newspaper articles on the Future of Europe.

1. Bloomberg Politics, “Macron Calls for Democratic Conventions to Rebuild EU”. 7 September, 2017 by Gregory Viscusi. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-07/macron-calls-in-athens- for-democratic-conventions-to-rebuild-eu 2. Euobserver, “Macron seeks far-reaching EU overhaul”. 26 September, 2017. https://euobserver.com/institutional/139164 3. Financial Times, “Emmanuel Macron offers vision for Europe and lobs thunderbolt at IMF”. September 8, 2017 by Mehreen Khan in Brussels. https://www.ft.com/content/9cf31be8-947f-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0?mhq5j=e5 4. The Guardian, “Emmanuel Macron vows to transform France in Versailles speech”. 3 July 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/03/emmanuel-macron-to-set-out- his-vision-for-french-renaissance 5. The Guardian, “Emmanuel Macron calls for solidarity as he vows to lead EU rebuild”. 7 September 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/emmanuel-macron-calls-for- solidarity-as-he-vows-to-lead-eu-rebuild 6. The Guardian, “Can Macron and Merkel agree on how to fix the eurozone?”. 11 September 2017 by Barry Eichengreen. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/11/macron-merkel-eurozone- france-germany 7. The Guardian, “Macron lays out vision for 'profound' changes in post-Brexit EU”. 26 September, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/26/profound-transformation- macron-lays-out-vision-for-post-brexit-eu 8. The Independent, “Merkel and Macron back creation of eurozone finance minister and budget. The pair of world leaders say the eurozone needs closer integration”. 29 August 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/merkel-macron- eurozone-eu-budget-finance-minister-economy-a7918521.html 9. The Independent, “Emmanuel Macron vows to lead the ‘rebuilding’ of the EU”, 7 September 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/macron-eu-rebuilding-vow- speech-france-a7935456.html 10. The New York Times, “Emmanuel Macron, in Greece, Calls for ‘Rebuilding’ E.U.”. 7 September, 2017 by Niki Kitsantonis. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-greece- european-union.html?mcubz=0