Democracy Beyond Elections Government Accountability in the Media Age Gergana Dimova Challenges to Democracy in the 21St Century

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY SERIES EDITOR: HANSPETER KRIESI

Democracy Beyond Elections Government Accountability in the Media Age Gergana Dimova Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century

Series Editor Hanspeter Kriesi Department of Political and Social Science European University Institute San Domenico Di Fiesole, Firenze, Italy Democracy faces substantial challenges as we move into the 21st Century. The West faces malaise; multi-level governance structures pose democratic challenges; and the path of democratization rarely runs smoothly. This series examines democracy across the full range of these contemporary conditions. It publishes innovative research on established democracies, democratizing polities and democracy in multi-level governance structures. The series seeks to break down artifcial divisions between different disciplines, by simultaneously drawing on political communication, comparative politics, international relations, political theory, and political economy.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14889 Gergana Dimova Democracy Beyond Elections

Government Accountability in the Media Age Gergana Dimova Department of Applied Social Sciences, Forensics and Politics University of Winchester Winchester, UK

Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century ISBN 978-3-030-25293-9 ISBN 978-3-030-25294-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland For Atanas Dimov Acknowledgements

I wrote this book with one single goal in mind: to provide an organising outline for analysing exciting and important political events to my future readers. The motivating rationale was my belief that some pundits sometimes fall through the cracks of interdisciplinary thinking, when the times of media scandals and government investigations demand an inte- grative framework. So, perhaps, the biggest inspiration for the book is my imagined reader- engaged, ingenious and inquisitive. I would say that the book has lived three distinct lives: the frst during my Ph.D. at Harvard University, the second during my research scholarship at the University of Cambridge and then I went through a period, when I was trying to marry the methodological and analytical perspectives gleaned at the former and philosophical and theoretical views gained at the latter. I survived all these three lives thanks to my mentors and peers. My exploratory and dissertation writing life at Harvard University unfolded under the mentorship of Peter Hall, the chair of my Ph.D. dissertation committee. Professor Hall has a fair for intellectual exploration and patiently supervised me—and respectfully criticised me— through numerous drafts of the dissertation proposal. Because I reversed the methodological path, starting from the empirical problem of political scandals, instead of from an existing theoretical conundrum, it was important to have an authority fgure I deeply admired and who believed in the potential of gauging the intractable problem of political scandals in a methodologically and theoretically coherent way. I still remember

vii viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS when, having submitted the 20th draft of the proposal, he told me, “This could work”. These words by Peter Hall marked the beginning of this book. All four of my other dissertation advisors at Harvard University were invaluable. Professor Timothy Colton took the time to tutor me weekly on Russian politics and the knowledge about the post-Soviet region I gained then is refected in my chapters on Russia and Bulgaria. Jorge Dominguez has been helpful in promptly and meticulously commenting on each single draft. The insights of Susan Pharr were critical when I was clinging on the topic of political scandals and she had to vouch that corruption allegations were the single most important indicator of government popularity in Japan. Cindy Skach helped me navigate the diffcult times of being a young scholar and a woman. When I started my fellowship at St Catherine’s College at the University of Cambridge, I was immersed in a new and exciting world of the history of democracy and democratic theory as taught by John Dunn, David Runciman, John Thompson and Duncan Bell. I discovered that I was a closeted democratic theorist and I changed my main inquiry: instead of only asking “how are incumbents sanctioned for media allegations in different countries?”, I now also wanted to know “what do these patterns of investigations and sanctions mean for democracy?” Harald Wydra lent me the decisive moral and intellectual support during this time. The Master of St Catherine’s, Professor Jean Thomas, was instrumental in allowing me to complete two maternity leaves, thus not putting me in a position to choose between being a scholar or a mother. I am grateful to the whole governing body of St Catherine’s College for their humanity and support. During the third phase of writing this book, I came to the realisation that I, having been infuenced by the Harvard and Cambridge schools of thought, may have spread my wings too far. With media studies, public administration and democratic theory all jostling for their place in the book, I was bravely fghting to cut out a defnitive analytical narrative. Laurence Whitehead’s scholarship, as well as his insights, was critical at this stage. I am indebted to Frank Vibert for sharing his ideas about the “rise of the unelected” and for his encouragement. James Martel has been an amazing mentor ever since I took his undergraduate class at Amherst College. Albena Azmanova and Liliana Andonova are my role models. I thank John Keane for affliating me with the family of Sydney Democracy Project, since I emphasise “monitory democracy” so much. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix

I learnt a lot about “counter-democracy” from the long conversation with Pierre Rosanvallon in Paris in 2017. Wolfgang Merkel allowed me to explore my ideas in the context of “defective democracies” during a three-month stay at the Wissenschaftszentrum in Berlin. My special thanks go to Helene Landemore for discussing with me issues of “epistemic democracy” and for her support. Daniele Archibugi shared his ideas on “global democracy” and gave me advice on publishing. William Sheward has been a supportive mentor at the University of Winchester. Jean-Paul Gagnon and Mattew Wood gave me access to a platform to promote some of the book’s ideas. John McCormick, Matt Flinders, Paul t’Hart and Sean Hanley provided useful feedback at a certain point during the writing process. I thank Palgrave’s editors Ambra Finotello, Anne Birchley-Brun and Hanspeter Kriesi for their guidance and for carving a scholarly niche for an interdisciplinary approach to studying democracy. I am grateful to my peers for being smart, funny, understanding and insightful: Stan Markus, Andreas Umland, Mark Somos, Bruno Bonizzi, Dylan Donchev, Rumena Filipova, Anders Corr, Markus Miller, Vesela Hristova, Milena Savova, Snejina Zacharia, Maria Popova, Oxana Shevel, Kera Simeonova and Albena Kuyumdzhieva. My college professors and advisors deserve special thanks: Fred Moseley, Sarah Montgomery and Penny Gill. Lora Popova “discovered” my analytical and philosophical streak and forever remains my role model for a teacher. Ruslan Stefanov and Todor Yalamov collaborated with me at the Centre for the Study of Democracy in Bulgaria. Ruzha Smilova commented on the Bulgarian chapter. Todor Radev provided superb research assistance. The biggest gratitude goes to my family. I am inspired by my mother Marlena, a philosophy teacher, who has always viewed my education as a journey in intellectual creativity, not as a means to a (well paid) end. I thank my dad Radostin for always being there for me and my beau- tiful and clever sister Ana for giving me the perspective of the fnancial world. My grandmother Stefka is a wise woman, whose unconditional support saved me in many moments of self-doubt. I wrote this book in the hope that I can show my sons Manol and Martin that they need to use their talents and to work hard to contribute to society in the future. I am indebted to my husband Atanas for never doubting this project. This book is dedicated to him.

London, UK May 2019 Praise for Democracy Beyond Elections

“In an age of fake news and deep fake, this book couldn’t be more timely. Gergana Dimova assesses both the threat to and state of democracy in our highly mediatized era, and offers a far more resilient model of democratic responses to media scandals than we usually imagine even as her careful reading suggests the scope and endurance of the danger democracy is facing today.” —James Martel, Department of Political Science, San Francisco State University, USA

xi Contents

1 Government Accountability in the Media Age: How to Measure, Explain and Assess It? 1

Part I Explaining Government Accountability: A Model of Supply and Demand

2 The Media Age and Government Accountability: An Ambiguous Relationship 29

3 Supply of Accountability and the Accountability Turn 53

4 The Demand for Accountability and Public Fragmentation 79

Part II Evaluating Government Accountability: Methodological Considerations and Empirical Results

5 Accountability and Democracy: An Assessment 97

xiii xiv CONTENTS

6 De-parliamentarisation of Government Accountability in Germany: Crisis or Transformation of Democracy? 137

7 The Presidentialisation of Government Accountability in Russia: Crisis or Transformation of Democracy? 155

8 Judicialisation of Government Accountability in Bulgaria: Crisis or Transformation of Democracy? 179

Part III Democracy Analyzed Through the Lens of Accountability: Crisis or Transformation?

9 Democracy Through the Prism of Accountability: Comparison with Models of the Crisis and Transformation of Democracy 199

10 Contemporary Models of the Crisis of Democracy: Critical Overview Through a Demand and Supply Framework 223

11 Models of the Transformation of Democracy: Critical Overview Through a Demand and Supply Framework 257

Bibliography 291

Index 337 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Flowchart of the book’s argument 8 Fig. 1.2 Determinants of government accountability related to media allegations 12 Fig. 4.1 Demand changes: Problem of the multitude becomes the problem of the diversity 90 Fig. 5.1 A roadmap to connecting empirical measures of post-media government accountability to democracy 99 Fig. 5.2 Examples of two accountability pyramids 109 Fig. 5.3 Distribution of issues on the accountability agenda (N 1314) 114 = Fig. 5.4 How do governments respond to media allegations? (N 1314) 116 = Fig. 5.5 Three coding schemes of the dependent variable “Punitive Accountability” 118 Fig. 5.6 Incidence of sanctions imposed on the governments in Germany, Russia and Bulgaria (N 1314) 120 = Fig. 6.1 The accountability pyramid in Germany: relative sanctioning effectiveness of forums 140 Fig. 6.2 Impact of investigations on the severity of sanctions imposed on the government (N 467) 141 = Fig. 6.3 Incidence of investigations of media accusations levelled at the government in Germany in 1995–2005 (N 467) 144 = Fig. 6.4 Relationship between the number of articles critical of the government and the ratings of the government and the opposition (N 467) 149 =

xv xvi LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 7.1 The accountability pyramid in Russia: relative sanctioning effectiveness of forums 161 Fig. 7.2 Incidence of investigations of all media accusations levelled at the government in Russia during 1995–2005 (N 205) 163 = Fig. 7.3 Policy- and personnel-related categories of sanctions across countries (N 1314) 166 = Fig. 7.4 Impact of the type of investigations on the likelihood of various types of sanctions being imposed on the government in Russia (N 205) 167 = Fig. 8.1 Incidence of investigations of media accusations levelled at the government in Bulgaria (N 942) 181 = Fig. 8.2 The accountability pyramid in Bulgaria: relative sanctioning effectiveness of forums 182 Fig. 8.3 Incidence of investigations and the likelihood of sanctions (N 942) 187 = Fig. 8.4 Who makes the media accusations which end up in the judiciary? (N 942) 190 = Fig. 9.1 Relation between supply and demand 215 Fig. 10.1 The supply and demand framework applied to the models of the crisis of democracy 226 Fig. 11.1 The supply and demand framework applied to models of the transformation of democracy 285 List of Tables

Table 2.1 The double-sided effect of the media on demand and supply of accountability 31 Table 3.1 Forums to enforce accountability: logics and costs 67 Table 5.1 Theoretical criteria for evaluating accountability 101 Table 5.2 The multiple criteria for evaluating executive accountability beyond elections 111 Table 6.1 Impact of the type of investigation on the incidence of government sanctions for incompetence charges (N 364) 147 = Table 6.2 Impact of the type of investigation on the incidence of government sanctions for misconduct charges (N 103) (Party meetings are important only = in model 2, where sanctions are gradual) 148 Table 7.1 Impact of the type of investigation on the incidence of government sanctions for both incompetence and misconduct charges (N 205) 172 = Table 7.2 How the presidentialisation of accountability in Russia advances theoretical debates 174 Table 8.1 Assessment of judiciary mechanisms and accountability 183 Table 9.1 The model of democracy through the lens of accountability compared to models of the crisis and transformation of democracy 205 Table 10.1 Various perceptions of supply-based accounts of the crisis of democracy 229 Table 11.1 Changes in supply and demand in models of the transformation of democracy 259

xvii CHAPTER 1

Government Accountability in the Media Age: How to Measure, Explain and Assess It?

Democracy, accountability and the media have a diffcult relationship. It is hard to say whether media allegations levelled at government incumbents, and the subsequent investigations and sanctions of these media allegations, beneft or undermine democracy. On the one hand, it is entirely possible that governing elites use media scandals as an opportunity to threaten opponents and defect attention from unpopular policies. On the other hand, if the allegations are viable, the public benefts when the government offers more explanations, dismisses corrupt offcials or reverses controversial policies. Either way, a thorough study of government accountability in the aftermath of scandals could provide an important glimpse into the workings of democracy. The book poses three large queries: How do we know that the process of accountability is compromised? Who benefts from it? Are democracies and non-democracies likely to handle the accountability process differently? The study of media accusations, the accountability process and democracy is important both because of its prominent place in everyday media discourse and because of its scholarly signifcance for democratic theory. To begin with, there are too many unexamined presumptions about the infuence of media accusations on political life and democracy. Many of them espouse an overly narrow vision of democratic accountability, which only inquires how media allegations affect the dismissals and demotions of politicians (Berlinski et al. 2012). But it is important to highlight the fact that the investigation process that media accusations prompt is just

© The Author(s) 2020 1 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6_1 2 G. DIMOVA as important as potential dismissals. For example, it is not only instructive whether the allegations surrounding Russia’s interference in the 2016 US elections would lead to president Trump’s impeachment or not but how the investigative mechanisms in between have unfolded. The book, therefore, brings home the realisation that there are a myriad of phases, dimensions, back doors and windows of opportunities in the accountability process that could tilt, undermine or boost democratic accountability. For instance, it is important who plants the accusations in the media and thus who determines the accountability agenda; it is important who peddles these media charges further into accountability forums; it is important to gauge the trade-off between the high frequency of legislative investigations and their relative ineffectiveness; it is essential to understand how the incumbents could stonewall the process by verbal defections; and it is vital to understand how the various accountability forums compete and cooperate. Instead of focusing exclusively on the end result of a possible impeachment, it is essential to keep an eye on the range of intermediate sanctions, such as dismissing low-ranking offcials, demoting high-ranking incumbents, policy compromises. Additional lines of inquiry involve the question whether legislative hearings are public or not and how the incumbents use executive privilege and classifed information. Only a balanced, comprehensive perspective of this process could provide a convincing account of the link between scandals, government accountability and democracy. The book lays out the methodological groundwork for approaching situations of government accountability in the aftermath of media allegations. Its focus is broad and it seeks to understand and compare post-media accountability processes across various regimes. It relies on an original database of about 6000 media allegations emerging not only in the Western democracy of Germany but also in the managed democracy of Russia and in the transitional democracy of Bulgaria. Due to its comprehensive focus, its method and concepts are widely applicable beyond these three particular countries. It creates the conceptual framework that could address “signature” scandals, which seem to have the potential to rock and upend political power, such as the Snowden fles, Wikileaks, the MP expenses scandal, Spotlight, the Strauss Kahn sexual allegations, Watergate, the Lewinsky scandals and Trump’s allegations that former president Obama had tapped his phones. The inquiry is also signifcant because it contributes a fresh perspective to the rigorous discourse about the virtues and ailments of 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 3 democracy. There is no doubt that the democratic discourse is currently in its most turbulent phase. Pundits are nonplussed about the direction in which democracy is going, and we are bombarded daily by newspaper pronouncements about democracy’s suicide, the anxieties of democracy, democratic failure, democratic malaise and the collapse of the liberal world order. Harvard professor Malt (Walt 2016) is une- quivocal: “The world is entering a period where once-robust democracies have grown fragile. Now is the time to fgure out where we went wrong”. As a testimony to the rising public and scholarly anxiety, a simple Google search reveals that the words “crisis” and “democracy” produced only 15,000 results in 2000 but skyrocketed to more than 19 million results in 2016. This grave concern with democracy in the popular media has been matched by an avalanche of scholarly research. I review more than 150 models of the crisis and regeneration of democracy that have emerged since 1997. In very stark terms, this discourse could be framed as an opposition between the pessimistic view of the “disfgurement of democracy” (Urbinati 2014), “audience democracy” (Manin 1997) and “post-democracy” (Crouch 2004) against the more optimistic view of “international democracy” (Archibugi 2008; Held 2004), “deliberative democracy” (Dryzek 2002), “monitory democracy” (Keane 2013) and “counter-democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008). However, the feld is incredibly conficted within itself with opposing causes of the crisis of democracy existing side by side, such as an apathetic versus an overly demanding public, the retrenchment of the state versus the overextension of the state, the rise of technocratic leaders versus the rise of charismatic leaders, the emergence of the superstate versus the de-centralisation of the state. The impression of a congested condition of the democratic literature is vindicated by a laundry list of democratic illnesses, such as terrorism, the economic crisis of 2008, the rise of populism, the distrust of representative institutions, mass immigration and capitalism’s inherent contradictions, to which we have grown almost inured. The book introduces a new approach that studies democracy through the view of the post-media accountability process. This perspective seeks to drive forward the critical discourse beyond the familiar understandings of the crisis. It produces novel insights, which could be added to the existing conceptions and measurements of democracy. In general, the statistical results in the book demonstrate that the accountability process is a fertile ground for abuse by the political elites. Thus, democracy 4 G. DIMOVA in Bulgaria is considerably undermined by the fact that the offce of the prosecutor is used in post-media investigations to threaten opponents and create more legitimacy for the media accusations. In Russia, democracy is destabilised because the president monopolises the accountability process. Perhaps the presidentialisation of accountability is not a surprising fnding for scholars of Russia but the interesting part of this research is that it demonstrates the particular aspects in which presidentialisation takes place, such as the type of sanctions that incumbents face and the verbal answers that the incumbents give. The fndings about the accountability process in Germany show that parliaments may be ineffcient in sanctioning incumbents, but political parties outside parliaments can still have an infuence in the process. Despite the gloomy conclusions, the new perspective of democracy through the lens of post-media accountability provides some reasons for hope. There is a great degree of uncertainty in this process because it is multifaceted, there are many actors, the actors change and so do the issues. Thus, there are aspects that show that the broad and largely detrimental process of presidentialisation, judicialisation and de-parliamentarisation of accountability can actually have a silver lining. The empirical results demonstrate that some groups can affect the otherwise presidentialised accountability process in Russia by making their grievances public through the media, as the Navalny anti-corruption protests in March 2017 did. Furthermore, the fndings demonstrate how the judicialisation of accountability in Bulgaria can have a positive effect because it introduces a more factual public discourse, which centres on evidence and witnesses.

The Double-Sided Role of the Media in Government Accountability This analysis opens up by suggesting that the role of the media in government accountability should be re-evaluated and that, ultimately, it is overvalued. The main obstacle to understanding the role of the media is limiting the analysis to the idea that the media are mostly important in criticising the government publicly. This idea is usually attached to two broader contentions. The frst one is that investigative reporting, along with the bias, ownership and independence of the media, is of utmost 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 5 importance in publicising the accusations. This myth has been debunked by studies suggesting that the percentage of media allegations actually made by journalists is very slim (Jacobs and Schillemans 2016; Dimova 2012). Most of the time, media allegations actually refer to allegations made by the opposition or some other group which appear in the media but are not made by the media. Of course, the independence of the media in giving a platform to these accusations is instrumental, and that is why studies need to encompass different media systems, as the present study does. Nevertheless, the argument in the book conceives the media more as a platform than as an independent agent, which is of crucial importance for structuring the overall argument about media and accountability. The second contention is usually tied up to the debate about how the media changes the quality versus the quantity of information. This debate revolves around the antagonism between a “virtuous circle” hypothesis (Norris 2011; Zaller 2003; Schudson 2013), according to which the media provide more information so that the public can judge the government better, and a “video malaise” hypothesis (Debrix 2007; Van Zoonen 2005), according to which the media present senseless information, which only frustrates and turns off the public. My point is that this debate should be broadened beyond this particular dimension because the Media Age has changed not only the quality and quantity of information, but also the cost, accessibility, scale, immediacy and the type of information. These changes have made the media not only a channel but also a platform, an instrument and a forum that can be used or abused by the elites and the public. To reinstate the argument, apart from considerations of the journalistic culture and media ownership, the media is less of an independent actor than is generally presumed. There are high expectations that the Media Age has created a more demanding public and a more accountable government. The media supposedly improve account-giving by providing a platform to the government to furnish explanations to the public and to feel controlled by the public’s constant public gaze. A fast Internet service, affordable iPhones, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram allegedly make people more aware of government misconduct and more prepared to be proactive to seek redress for government misconduct. People could protest, as did the Indignagos in Spain and the Free Wall Street Movement in the USA. They could start Facebook campaigns like the Australian mother who 6 G. DIMOVA made the government introduce a new vaccination practice by posting about the death of her baby Riley Hughes on Facebook. Because of this Facebook campaign, the WA Government started a free whooping cough vaccination programme for pregnant women in their third trimester (ABC News, 13 January 2016). Overall, on the surface, the prospects for public demand in the Media Age seem splendid. These hopes about the salubrious effect of the Media Age on accountability might be infated, however. We need to ask the following questions: Is the “buzz” about new telecommunication technologies biasing our judgements about media and accountability? Are there just a few high-profle scandals, which affect accountability whereas the day-to-day business of media criticism is toothless? Are scandals just a temporary break from the mundane and otherwise inconsequential media scrutiny? The present inquiry is well positioned to evaluate these questions because it is based entirely on media accusations. One of the frst major realisations in this book, based on an overview of the literature, is that the Media Age could play out both ways. By putting together disparate strands of the accountability debate, the analysis suggests that the media could both support and undermine accountability. This double-sided role of the media manifests itself both in terms of public demand for accountability and the supply of accountability forums. On the supply side, the media could provide a platform where the account-holders give explanations to the citizens but they could also be used as a platform to avoid blame (tribune function). The media could make non-elected forums more sensitive to accountability concerns but it could also make the government prioritise its image over its policies (mediatisation function). Media revelations could make accountability forums start investigations of the government but they could also engage accountability forums in a race to the bottom trying to prove who will punish the government most (forum-connecting function). On the demand side, the media could give more information to the public, which could make the citizens more critical and aware of the government’s policies, but at the same time, the media could decrease the quality of information, thus turning people off thinking about politics through the endless fow of scandals and sensationalism (information function). The media outlets could be used by the public to express their dissatisfaction with the incumbents but they could also become beehive chambers where the public perpetuates its prejudices (marketplace of ideas function). The media could be a watchdog monitoring the elite but 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 7 it could also be an attack dog, which selectively reveals only the wrongdoing of those incumbents who the media disfavour (watchdog function). The double-sided role of the media translates into several conclusions. To begin with, it casts doubt on the popular impression that the Media Age can play a defnitive, rather than facilitating, role in democracy. It presents the big investigative stories as isolated cases whose infuence on accountability needs to be assessed with great caution. The most important takeaway, however, is that research on the media should pivot in a different direction. We should explore in-depth the role of the public demand for accountability and the availability and accessibility of accountability forums. The book spends a great deal of effort trying to decipher both demand and supply in the context of media and accountability.

Explaining Government Accountability: Public Demand for Accountability and the Supply of Accountability Forums I suggest that there are two main factors that relate to the accountability process after the accusations have surfaced in the media. These determinants are the degree to which the public demands accountability from the government and the accessibility, visibility and specifcity of accountability forums. The book proposes that public demand is gauged through the degree of public fragmentation and that the supply of the accountability forums can be measured through the notion of the “accountability turn”. Taken together, public demand (measured through public fragmentation) and the supply of accountability (measured through the accountability turn) determine how, when and for what accusations the incumbents are investigated and sanctioned. In methodological terms, demand and supply are the causal variables and the constellation of accountability patterns are the dependent variables. As the empirical case studies suggest, the various combinations of supply and demand produce various patterns of accountability arrangements, roughly estimated as judicialisation of accountability in Bulgaria, de-parliamentarisation of accountability in Germany and presidentialisation of accountability in Russia (Fig. 1.1). The “supply” notion in this context refers to the opportunities that people and the elites have to pursue the media claims through the courts, the EU, the audit chamber, public opinion and demonstrations. In some countries, these opportunities have grown because there are 8 G. DIMOVA

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Fig. 1.1 Flowchart of the book’s argument more accountability forums, which are more visible, more specialised and more accessible. The notion of the “accountability turn” measures the extent of the increase in the supply of opportunities for the public to participate in politics. The idea of an “accountability turn” presented here challenges established views about the new opportunities that people have acquired to participate in politics. These new opportunities are referred in the literature as “turns”. The accountability turn that I advocate is most similar to the notions of the monitory turn (Rosanvallon 2008; Keane 2009; Vibert 2007; McCormick 2011) and 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 9 the “Madisonian turn” (Bergman and Strøm 2011) because they place a great premium on distrust, monitoring and accountability. The “representative turn” (Näsström 2011; Saward 2010; Urbinati 2014) presents the biggest challenge and the most credible alternative to the “accountability turn”. According to the literature on the representative turn, the public arguably affects politics through ways associated with the electoral channel. It posits that both the actual act of casting the ballot and the whole procedure of elections are greatly benefcial because they refne the “representative claim”. It seems to me, however, that there are limits to the attempts to resuscitate elections as the sine qua non of accountability and representation. Elections can no longer be considered such an exclusive accountability mechanism for a variety of reasons: the manipulation of elections has failed to deliver satisfactory results even in Western democracies (Norris 2015); in transitional democracies, elections have failed to secure rights and values (Carothers 2002; Gehlbach and Simpser 2015); the international system has created several non-elected accountability forums for holding the government to account (Grant and Keohane 2005); due to the twin forces of globalisation and decentralisation, there has been an accountability revolution, which has seen the unprecedented multiplication of account-givers (Pierre and Peters 2000), the multiplication of accountability standards (Behn 2001) and the multiplication of accountability forums (Keohane 2003). For all these reasons, it is worth considering the emergence of the accountability turn as a valid alternative to the representative turn. The concept of an accountability turn is also different from some “turns” inherent in the models of the transformation of democracy. It is distinct in its emphasis that people can participate in politics not only through making policy and electing policy-makers but also by reversing and dismissing already existent policies and policy-makers. In other words, the accountability turn reinvents the place of accountability vis- à-vis representation in a way that most existing “turns” do not. Another major difference is that the accountability turn does not propose that people change their demands of the government in the course of holding it to account. By contrast, the “deliberative turn” (Dryzek 2002; Habermas 2001) presupposes that people become more considerate and more enlightened when participating in deliberative forums. Similarly, the international turn (Archibugi 2008; Held 2004) propounds that international forums, such as a world parliament, are constitutive; i.e. they make up the will of the individuals who participate in them. 10 G. DIMOVA

The “participatory turn” (Fung and Wright 2003) likewise arguably believes that participatory initiatives have an educational effect for the participants and thus help formulate their demands. Unlike the deliberative, international and participatory turn, the accountability turn assumes a public will, which is made by exogenous factors and is therefore predetermined. It hypothesises that party de-alignment, mediatisation, globalisation and de-centralisation are more important for the formation of public demand than various deliberative, international and participatory forums, which have more of an auxiliary function. In addition to the accountability turn, the notion of “public demand” is the second determinant of post-media government accountability. “Public demand” designates the ability and willingness of people to hold the incumbents to account for public allegations. I approach the notion of demand by embracing the idea that the public is arguably fragmented to various degrees. The idea of public fragmentation runs prominently in the literature but has received little attention as a solid body of thought (Tormey 2013; Riesman 2001; Urbinati 2014; Bauman 2000; Bennetts 2014). Public fragmentation is implicit in references to “the ungovern- ability of societies” (Stiegler 2011), the crisis of governability (Kohli 1991), the “growing complexity of issues” (Crouch 2004, 9), “malle- ability of the public will” (Schmitt 457), “disaggregated sovereignty” (Slaughter 2004), “divided sovereignty” (Pavel 2014), “fragmentation, heterogenization” of society (Papadopoulos 2013), “loss of collective organizational capacity in society” (Crouch 2004, 22), “strange multiplicity” (Tully 1995, 2), “individualised society”, “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2000, 168) and “complex sovereignty” (Rosanvallon 2008, 140–141). There are two opposing opinions as to how this fragmentation of the public will affect public demand for accountability. One thread of thought argues that disconnected publics are more demanding because they are more likely to pay attention to media allegations and because it is easier for smaller fractions to organise in groups (Rosanvallon 2008). These positive effects of public fragmentation have been contested by a group of scholars who argue that disconnected publics have shorter attention spans, their alliances are less durable and, most importantly, they are more likely to be co-opted by special interests (Papadopoulos 2013). I seek to advance and reposition the terms of this debate. Relying on the scholarship of Rosanvallon and Keane, I conjecture that the central issue is not so much whether public fragmentation would increase or 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 11 decrease demand. The central issue is that disconnected publics express demand in different ways.

Case Selection: Germany, Bulgaria and Russia At frst glance, Bulgaria, Russia and Germany seem like an unlikely trio for comparison. However, the juxtaposition of these three countries makes sense both in terms of the logic of democratic studies and methodological rigour. For too long, the studies of established and transitional democracies have been artifcially segregated. The subdivides in the discipline have pushed Germany (established democracy) and Russia (managed or authoritarian democracy) in different orbits of study, and Bulgaria has been mostly ignored as a worthwhile cause. The analytical insights that can be gleaned from such comparisons could be compelling. It is both interesting and instructive to compare how different regimes handle media allegations. Do authoritarian incumbents provide different verbal responses than democratic ones? Do they rely more on the prosecutor and less on the legislature for investigating the accusations? Are international bodies less of a factor in pursuing public accusations in authoritarian than in democratic countries? Do elites tend to beneft more from the post-media accountability process in Germany than in Russia? On the whole, where is the place of the accountability confguration in newly minted democracies as Bulgaria? The selection of Russia, Germany and Bulgaria also complies with the methodological requirements as they are selected on the independent variables (Geddes 1990). These three countries exhibit three different degrees on the two independent variables—the supply of accountability forums and the fragmentation of the public demand for accountability. Bulgaria is a case of a medium fragmentation of demand and a medium fragmentation of supply. Germany is a case of a highly fragmented (and possibly reconnected) demand and a highly fragmented supply of accountability forums. Russia stands for a case where demand is totalised and there are a limited number of accountability forums that people can use to hold the government to account. As a result, these three countries present three different outcomes of the interaction of supply and demand: presidentialisation of accountability in Russia, de-parliamentarisation of accountability in Germany and judicialisation of accountability in Bulgaria (Fig. 1.2). 12 G. DIMOVA

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Government Accountability for Media Accusations: How to Assess It? The fundamental methodological problem that hampers the study of government accountability for media accusations is that there is no independent and reliable way to establish whether the media allegations are true or false. In the absence of such information, the literature on accountability and democracy has invented several proxies to assess accountability arrangements. Perhaps the crudest approach is to equate accountability with democracy (Kaufmann et al. 2008; Mainwaring et al. 1997; Adsera et al. 2000). This approach posits that democratic outcomes presup- pose accountability and vice versa. This is clearly not the case as several studies have demonstrated that it is possible to have accountability without democracy (Tsai 2007). More nuanced approaches gauge accountability arrangements on the basis of the outcomes that they produce or the learning they stimulate (Bovens 2007). Despite the merits of this approach, it seems that the most detailed and direct method to assess accountability is based on gauging the investigations, sanctions and explanations given by incumbents (Pitkin 2004; Brandsma and Schillemans 2012; Goetz and Jenkins 2004; Flinders 2001). My methodological contribution is to refne and advance this third approach in four ways. First, I collect comprehensive regional data that allows me to operationalise these criteria. The database comprises more than 1634 media allegations containing around 5980 articles criticising 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 13 the government of Germany, Bulgaria and Russia in the period between 1995 and 2005. For each criticism, the database contains information who levelled the accusation at the government in the media (i.e. individuals, labour unions, journalists, etc.), whether and in which accountability forum the media accusation was investigated (e.g. courts, parliament, EU, etc.) and what sanctions, if any, the media accusation produced for the government (e.g. dismissal of a minister, overturn of a policy, etc.). The second methodological innovation is to consider all the dimensions of government accountability for media accusations together and to spot generalisable trends. This endeavour could be daunting because the researcher has to compare quantities of different nature, such as sanctions, sanctioning power, explanations and investigations. I single out fve dimensions: the type of sanctions, i.e. whether the person involved in the scandal faced verbal reprimand, dismissal, demotion or prison; the type of allegation, corruption or incompetence; the frequency of investigations by various accountability forums, such as the EU, national parliaments, the prosecutor or the courts; the type of answers that incumbents give, evasive, silent or defensive. The chief way in which I propose to refne existing measurements of accountability is to produce estimates of the sanctioning power of accountability forums. I call these measurements an “accountability pyramid”. The accountability pyramids are handy visual devices to compare the likelihood that various accountability forums are willing and able to sanction the government. These measurements result from regressing all investigations on the sanctions they produce. The regression coeffcients give an estimate which forums, when dealing with a media allegation, most often result in sanctions. The accountability pyramid incorporates these regression coeffcients. The top, height, width and the orientation of the pyramid are crucial indicators. The top of the pyramid shows which forum is most likely to sanction the government. The height of the pyramid shows the difference between the sanctioning powers of the least and most effective forum. The base of the pyramid shows how many accountability forums have similar sanctioning capacity. The orientation of the pyramid shows whether there are many very effective sanctioning forums or many ineffective sanctioning forums. The accountability pyramid and assessments of democracy are inti- mately connected. An acute awareness which forum produces most sanctions is enlightening because each accountability forum implies different trade-offs for democracy. The biggest trade-off is between forums, which 14 G. DIMOVA have democratic legitimacy, but lack specialised knowledge, such as parliaments, and the courts, which do not have democratic legitimacy but have specialised knowledge (Vibert 2007). However, there are other trade-offs. Public control bodies are legitimate and representative but may lack understanding of complex issues. International bodies can correct domestic biases but infringe on national autonomy. The accountability pyramid is a conceptual and methodological device that makes it possible to relate these trade-offs to each other. Another methodological contribution to assessing the relationship between accountability and the democracy is to integrate the empirical results in substantive theoretical debates about the role of the judiciary, parliament and president in accountability. In this stage of the research, the book makes the transition from accountability as an instrument to assessing accountability as a (democratic) virtue (Bovens 2010). This bridge between accountability as an instrument and accountability as a democratic virtue has not been crossed very often before. The reason is that the various phases and dimensions of accountability have been mostly studied in the public administration literature, while the debates about the EU accountability defcit, the role of parliaments and the judicialisation and presidentialisation of politics have taken place at various strands of comparative, international and democratic studies. Using the information gleaned from all indicators of post-media accountability, the book taps into four sub-debates. The frst one assesses the place of parliaments in holding the government to account. Ministerial accountability is considered the cornerstone of accountability in parliamentary democracies (Mulgan 2014, 552). Parliamentary questions, probes and committees are meant to serve as “police patrol” of the government (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). The opposition seeks to ask questions to reveal government weaknesses and to turn them into electoral gains (Finer 1957, 143; Saalfeld 2005, 343). Nevertheless, many studies argue that in actuality parliaments have been viewed as weak, toothless and blunt instruments of control (Finer 1957; Saalfeld 2005). My fndings lend credence to the theory that parliaments are too weak to sanction the government, as far as media allegations are concerned, but they also show that parliaments are very active in investigating the incumbents. The surprising discovery is that the political party continues to be an infuential element in the accountability process, despite the fact that parties do not fght their accountability battles in parliaments. The infuence of the political party is channelled through 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 15 its ability to make media allegations and to infuence sanctions through party meetings and through its popularity (Chapter 6). Another discussion that the book seeks to add to is whether judicialisation benefts the elites or the public. The dominant perception is that political parties turn to the judicial arena when their powers are roughly comparable and they cannot agree who is most dominant in parliament (Maravall and Przeworski 2003; Popova 2012; Ginsborg 2008; Solomon 2008). The more optimistic view is that the judicialisation of politics is a bottom-up process, which gives unrepresented minorities a chance to participate in politics (Peruzzotti 2006). According to this perspective, the courts can act as important channels for articulation of political demands (Shapiro 2013; Guarnieri 2003). In the light of this debate, the book measures the relative sanctioning capacities of judicial organs and defnes who resorts to the courts most often and why. My fndings show that the courts could increase the accessibility for the public because a substantial proportion of those who resort to the courts are citizens, not elites. The courts could also provide a better ft for certain grievances of the public and produce speedier and more defnitive decisions. Furthermore, the courts increase the contestability of media allegations, because they discuss them in the context of facts and evidence. On the negative side, however, the elites could use prosecutorial investigations to threaten their opponents, stonewall the investigation of opponents’ claims and legitimise their own counterclaims. A third debate that the book seeks to elucidate is whether the presidentialisation of politics has put the public at a disadvantage. The presidentialisation of politics in parliamentary systems refers to a process where prime ministers have gained control of much of the decision-making apparatus in cabinet, parliament and political parties (Peters 2011). Presidentialisation prioritises the leadership potential, the charisma, electoral techniques, media charisma and private life of the politicians at the front stage of politics. Policy astuteness, competence and knowledge take the back seat. The book contributes to the measurement of presidentialisation by gauging to what extent prime ministers and presidents control the investigation and sanctioning of their own governments in the wake of media allegations. It casts presidentialisation in the new light of accountability by inquiring to what extent presidents conduct investigations, reverse government policies and dismiss ministers, and how the president’s role compares to that of parliaments and courts. 16 G. DIMOVA

Democracy Through the Prism of Accountability: Crisis or Transformation? The last part of the book returns to the original question: Does the accountability process in the aftermath of media allegations point to a crisis or transformation of democracy? It concludes that democracy is in a state between crisis and transformation. This position is not a compromise but a nuanced view, which refects the reality of democratic paral- lelism, meaning that accountability has opened many possibilities that could be used by both the elites and the public. To be able to show how my model of democracy through the prism of accountability differs from and contributes to the democratic literature, it was imperative to fnd a ftting analytical framework. I chose to review the scholarship on democratic crisis and transformation through the framework of supply and demand. This framework has distinct advantages since it presents a viable way to compare the models in terms of their assumptions, their causes as well as the outcomes and manifestations of the crisis and transformation of democracy. To begin with, the model of democracy through accountability makes very different assumptions about “supply” from those inherent in the models of the crisis of democracy. While my model measures supply as an opportunity, the models of the crisis gauge supply as an outcome. In my model, supply is defned as the availability and costliness of the accountability forums, whereas the models of the crisis of democracy perceive supply as a welfare policy, monitory policy, economic growth, economic crisis, responsiveness of the representative institutions or personality traits of the leaders. If the former measures supply as an opportunity and the latter as an outcome, then it is no surprise that the models reach diametrically opposed conclusions about supply. The critics of democracy believe that the so-called supply is monogenic and limited, if not exhausted. By contrast, my model in line with the models of transformation of democracy, postulates that supply, depending on the context, could be extended. In terms of demand, my views challenge those of the critics of democracy who believe that demand is either too high or too low. As I mentioned above, it seems that this emphasis on whether the people expect too much or too little from the government is misplaced because the central concern is that the public is no longer uniform and it expresses its demands in different ways. As indicated earlier in the chapter, my 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 17 view of demand is also at odds with some models of the transformation of democracy, which posit that people’s demands change in the course of taking part in various initiatives. I believe that deliberative and other forums are less determining for public views than external processes, such as globalisation, decentralisation and mediatisation. Not only does the study offer different views of supply and demand than existing models, but it also suggests that the way supply and demand relate to each other is very different. Most models assume that the crisis of democracy arises from the mismatch between supply and demand. Broadly speaking, they subtract demand from supply. Thus, they tend to describe democratic decline as a gap, such as an opportunity gap (Putnam 2015), intergenerational gap (Ferguson 2012), dual control gap (Offe 2012), expectations gap (Flinders 2012), a confdence gap (Lipset 1987) or as a democratic defcit (Norris 2011). The models of the transformation of democracy take a different route. They believe, as was explained earlier, that supply determines demand. In the model proposed here, supply and demand are independent and interact on many levels. Diverse constellations of the public seek various specialised accountability forums and achieve various outcomes, depending on the accessibility and the independence of the forum, the type of issue and the association of individuals. The model is also well suited to refne and complement existing views of the manifestations of the crisis and transformation of democracy. The fndings tilt the conclusion closer to the pessimism of the critics of democracy rather than the optimism of the scholars arguing for the transformation of democracy. Apparently, the elites are more likely to beneft on average from the post-media accountability process. The study offers an alternative view which complements more established views of the crisis of democracy, which purport that the public is on the losing side because it has been rendered a passive spectator (“audience democracy” by Manin 1997), private frms have usurped control (“post-democracy” by Crouch 2004), experts and judges have replaced elected representatives (“technocracy” by Stie 2012 or “juristocracy” by Hirschl 2004), political parties cannot be channelling public demands effciently (“hollowed out democracy” Mair 2013) or because democracy has been “disfgured” because of populism, experts and charismatic leaders (populist, unpolitical, plebiscitarian democracy) (Urbinati 2014). The book adds to these perspectives by suggesting that democracy is in crisis because the accountability process allows the judiciary, 18 G. DIMOVA the president or parliament to play inappropriate roles. As mentioned above, I call these processes the judicialisation, presidentialisation and de-parliamentarisation of accountability. In this context, it is alarming that the prosecutor in Bulgaria is used to threaten political opponents and lend credibility to media allegations. It is also disconcerting that the German parliament has an active investigative but no sanctioning role. It is also disquieting that the Russian president is the single most important person deciding on the investigations and sanctions of alleged offcials. Yet, despite the gloomy conclusions, the fndings reveal several optimistic results, which are more in harmony with those of the apologists of democracy. This more sanguine line of research argues that democracy is not declining; it is in fact resurging. Participatory (Fung and Wright 2003) and deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2002) have reignited or sup- plemented electoral representation. Technological and media advances have opened new opportunities for communication of the public (“electronic republic” by Grossman 1996, “digital democracy” by Hindman 2008, “e-democracy” by Della Porta 2013, “demoicracy” by Nicolaïdis 2012 and “mediocracy” by Tassano 2006). Globalisation has created new leeway for re-connecting the people (“cosmopolitan democracy” by Archibugi 2008, “shareholder” by Dasgupta 2010, “stakeholder” democracy by Macdonald 2012). Lately, the family of transformationists has been joined by the models of “monitory democracy” (Keane 2013) and “counter-democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008), which suggest that the public can take advantage of non-electoral means to monitor the government. Adding to the more popular views above, my alternative take on the transformation of democracy is that people have benefted in some small but important ways from the post-media accountability process. For example, court investigations in Bulgaria have ushered in more evidence-based public discourse. In another example of a positive development, political parties in Germany continue to play a major role in accountability process not inside but outside parliament. Furthermore, as I mentioned before, the EU accountability defcit does not look as big as expected. The EU has considerable infuence in holding the government to account but its infuence is limited to matters of EU importance only. In Russia, the positive news is that the public could beneft by expressing its concerns with the government in the media. 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 19

How Can Democracy Be Saved? Keep an Eye on the Prosecutor, the Political Party and the Issues The book’s query, with its particular focus on accountability, reinstates the challenge that Rousseau posed in the “Social Contract”: “the people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing”… Is it true that “as soon as a nation appoints representatives, it is no longer free, it no longer exists” (Rousseau 1949 [1762], 85)? In other words, the book inquires: What are the limits of elections as the prime instrument that citizens possess to affect the government? Are the electors slaves to the elites who have won elections? Alternatively, can citizens overcome their slavery by holding the government to account beyond elections? Who takes advantage of non-electoral accountability mechanisms? This book’s response to Rousseau’s query is to reveal four potential weaknesses to watch for, when it comes to democracy seen through the lens of the media and accountability. The frst one is to beware of the infuence of the prosecutor. As the empirical fndings revealed, the prosecutor consistently comes as an infuential forum, either in terms of sanctioning power (Russia) or in terms of investigative power (Bulgaria). Especially, the Bulgarian case demonstrated that the prosecutor could be used effectively by the political elites to intimidate political opponents, despite the fact that the prosecutor lacks institutional levers to affect sanctions. In Russia, the prosecutor is sometimes considered an informal extension of the presidential offce. In some cases, however, the prosecutor can crack down government corruption. In Romania, for example, Kövesi’s prosecutorial investigations led to the resignations of the regional development minister Dragnea and the fnance minister Valcov (Today’s Zaman, 17 May 2015). Therefore, one great threat to democracy comes from having politically dependent prosecutors. Sometimes, the actual political independence of the prosecutor can lead to his de facto political dependence (Smilov 2015). The point is to recognise how to hold the prosecutor accountable and independent (Wright 2012). The other way to save democracy is to recognise the infuence of the political parties, even though parliamentary accountability in between elections might be declining. As the empirical chapter on Germany demonstrates, political parties are important instruments for gauging and predicting government approval in a two-party system. Furthermore, they can conduct investigations outside parliaments and they are the roadblocks that defne 20 G. DIMOVA investigations in a coalitional government. The third way to save democracy is to limit and watch the issues on which the EU exerts its authority. It is interesting to inquire to what extent the glimpse of democracy through the lens of accountability applies to democracy as a whole. The inquiry of this book is constrained by many parameters. It concentrates on accountability for media allegations as opposed to overall government accountability for media and non-media allegations. It focuses on accountability in between elections as opposed to accountability achieved through elections. It examines democracy through the lens of accountability rather than through the lens of representation. Therefore, the question is how the model of democracy through the prism of post-media accountability relates to electoral democracy as a whole. One conclusion that sprang out of my analysis is that democracy through accountability is an unpredictable, uncertain, informal and a multi-staged process. This fnding makes me wonder whether we have not entered a new type of democracy where there are no clear and consistent winners and losers. Whereas traditional accounts of electoral democracy present it as a zero-sum game, it seems to me that democracy beyond elections is G-zero game. The term “G-zero world”, coined by Bremmer (2013), postulates that the international system does not have clear leaders. There are several indicators that a G-zero democracy might be emerging. These indicators are particularly prominent in Rosanvallon’s writings on counter-democracy and Keane’s analysis of monitory democracy. Democracy has become something of a parallel reality where the elites might be beneftting in one respect but the public might be simultaneously beneftting in another respect. These indicators include: the rise of angry and vocal minorities, which break down the dichotomy of minority and majority; the emergence of monitoring as a way of participating in politics of its own, which undermines the dichotomy between exit and voice; and the breakdown of the principle of “many electors, one representative” into “one elector, many interests, many votes, many voices, many representatives” (Keane 2008, 10). Overall, these elements contribute to a heightened degree of uncertainty and informality. It remains to be seen to what extent they will transform democracy for good.

Outline of the Book The book is divided into three parts. The frst part integrates the question of government accountability and the media into a supply and demand framework. The goal of the frst three chapters is to establish the 1 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE … 21 relative unimportance of the media in pursuing government accountability for allegations made in the media (Chapter 2), to open the discussion to the opportunities that the public has to pursue these public accusations (Chapter 3) and to considerations of what the public expects from the government (Chapter 4). This frst part lays out the groundwork of a theoretical matrix that would integrate a large number of factors into a single, replicable and comprehensive analytical framework. The second part puts the theoretical framework of supply and demand to the empirical test. It uses three different countries, Russia, Bulgaria and Germany, as case studies because they provide the necessary variety of the independent variables “supply” and “demand”. Before the discussion delves into the specifcs of post-media government accountability in each country, it makes an overview of existing approaches to government accountability and explains how it differs from and builds upon them (Chapter 5). Then, it moves to discuss how the German incumbents are held accountable for media allegations. The German case showcases how parliament does not really have much sanctioning power in relation to media allegations (Chapter 6). The Russian chapter is instructive not so much because it shows that the president has monopoly over the post-media accountability process, but mainly because it unravels some surprising ways in which the president’s monopoly is manifested (Chapter 7). The case of Bulgaria fashes out the pivotal and often detrimental role of the prosecutor in the accountability process but it also reveals some positive sides of judicialisation (Chapter 8). The third part seeks to embed the empirical and theoretical fndings into a larger debate about the prospects for democracy. It summarises how the views gained through analysing democracy through the lens of accountability enrich existing understandings of the crisis and transformation of democracy (Chapter 9). Then, it goes into detail about how eminent contemporary models of the crisis of democracy (Chapter 10) and the transformation of democracy (Chapter 11) differ.

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Explaining Government Accountability: A Model of Supply and Demand CHAPTER 2

The Media Age and Government Accountability: An Ambiguous Relationship

Introduction: Why the “Media Age” Alone Cannot Explain Democratic Accountability It is very tempting to surmise that the Media Age has made governments more accountable. There are plenty of signs of increased accountability everywhere: former British Prime Minister Cameron and German Chancellor Merkel regularly use their Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts to explain their rationale about various policies to the public; the media published incriminating articles about the secret Panama offshore accounts of world leaders; the public daily uses the comments sections under articles, social media and blogging to express its dissatisfaction with the government. Therefore, it seems that the media ask more questions, the power-holders give more explanations, and the public judges the government in a more visible way (the so-called Facebook judges). Nevertheless, the benefcial effect of the media on government accountability is only one part of the story. The reverse side of the argument is that the elites and the public can use the opportunities created by the Media Age to subvert government accountability. Thus, instead of providing crucial information about their policies, the incumbents can use media outlets to defect blame and misrepresent the facts. The media, instead of serving as a watchdog for government transgressions, can just spit out sensational scandals, which convey very little useful information,

© The Author(s) 2020 29 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6_2 30 G. DIMOVA decrease public trust and alienate the public. Finally, media platforms, instead of serving as a marketplace where various groups can get more enlightened about government practices, just reinforce existing prejudices. Therefore, before we jump into conclusions about the connection between media and accountability, we have to ask: Is the media’s infuence pointing to a real increase in accountability or to the illusion of accountability? This chapter reviews the literature detailing the connection between the media and accountability and concludes that from a theoretical point of view the media can both increase and decrease government accountability. The challenge in analysing the impact of the Media Age on government accountability is to think about it both inclusively and systematically. It is necessary to connect various aspects of this relation and bounce these perspectives off each other. Above all, it is important to disentangle the supply and demand aspects of the media’s impact on accountability. The media can affect both demand and supply as they “stimulate actors to refect on their behaviour, trigger formal accountability by reporting on the behaviour of actors, amplify formal accountability as they report on it or act as an independent and informal accountability forum” (Jacobs and Schillemans 2016). This chapter reviews six functions of the media summarised by Kriesi et al. (2013) in the context of what I call the supply of accountability and the public demand for accountability. The notion of the “supply of accountability” refers to the elites’ opportunities to relay information directly to the public and to the opportunities that accountability forums have to investigate the government. The notion of the “public demand for accountability” refers to the ways that the media stimulate the public interest and public ability to hold the incumbents to account. The “publicity function” of the media, the “tribune function” of the media and the “forum connecting function” of the media supposedly affect the supply of accountability, which refers to the opportunities the elites have to give accounts and opportunities that accountability forums have to investigate the government for various wrongdoings. The “information function”, the “watchdog function” and “marketplace of ideas function” of the media affect the demand for accountability, which refers to the opportunities that people get to receive information about government wrongdoing, to criticise the government and to form coalitions to pursue government wrongdoing. The takeaway from the literature review is that each of these six functions can play out both positively and negatively with respect to accountability. The Media Age in and of 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 31

Table 2.1 The double-sided effect of the media on demand and supply of accountability

Media effect on the elites’ supply of Media effect on the public demand for accountability accountability

Tribune function vs. Forum function Information function: Virtuous circle vs. Increase supply: Incumbents use the media Vicious circle to explain themselves to the public (tribune Increase demand: People have more infor- function) mation about government transgressions (virtuous circle) Decrease supply: Incumbents use the media Decrease demand: People receive worthless to defect blame or manipulate the public to sensational information (vicious circle) their advantage (forum function) Mediatisation function Watchdog function vs. Attack function Increase supply: The media convey infor- Increase demand: The media monitor and mation from the public to the incum- reveal government indiscretions, or give a bents, which makes the incumbents more platform to others to reveal them (watch- responsive dog function) Decrease supply: Incumbents prioritise their Decrease demand: The media increase the public image over useful policies demand for accountability selectively only for the politicians which it does not favour (attack function) Forum connecting function Marketplace of ideas function Increase supply: Media revelations activate Increase demand: The media serve as a plat- accountability forums form for discussion and aggregate public demand at a lower cost Decrease supply: Media revelations put Decrease demand: The media bolster accountability forums in unnecessary pre-existing prejudices in the public competition itself is not enough to explain advances and regressions in government accountability. Based on this conclusion, I argue that we need to look for additional factors that defne public demand and supply. That is why the rest of the book turns its gaze to demand and supply (Table 2.1).

Media Allegations Are Usually Not Made by the Media One important consideration regarding the Media Age is that we need to look beyond the media simply as a watchdog that monitors the incumbents for incriminating behaviour and policies. Dimova (2012) shows that only a small part of all accusations are raised by investigative journalists. Jacobs and Schillemans (2016) have a similarly sobering 32 G. DIMOVA conclusion. Most of the allegations in the media are raised by the opposition or by some other warring actors. As I have argued elsewhere, the considerations of making an allegation far surpass journalistic vigour. The motivations for criticising the government in the media include monetary considerations and considerations of gaining political capital. These potential advantages are weighed against the risks that could be incurred because of following some informal media practices, the libel laws, the laws for classifed information, the accuser’s relationship to Secret Services, etc. (Dimova 2012; Yankova-Dimova 2013). That is why the term media allegations in this book refers to allegations made in the media but not exclusively by the media. Of course, the role of the media is important in giving venue and publicity to various allegations. In this respect, it is crucial to consider the independence of the sources and the ownership structure of the media in Russia, Germany and Bulgaria, as I do in appendix to Chapter 5. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the Media Age allows the people to make allegations online and through their blogs and so the origins of allegations should not be put down to journalistic enthusiasm only.

What Is the Media Age? The Media Age is usually defned as the plethora of opportunities that the fast technological progress in the communications industry has created. Whitehead (2015) defnes the “infosphere”, the reser- voir of the Media Age, as “global, instantaneous, insatiable, horizontal, and interactive”. The Media Age is synonymous with high-speed Internet, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter software. It stands for more affordable iPhones with better capabilities. It is responsible for a more diverse and readily available access to communication, a heightened use of telecommunication technology and a heightened awareness of using telecommunication technology. In the Media Age, newspapers are not printed in paper; they appear instantaneously online. Because Internet access is paid monthly, the citizen is not bound to read just one newspaper that she or he pays for. Instead of being locked to its coach for the evening news, the public can watch the latest political developments on its mobile device while travelling on the train. In the Media Age, politicians communicate with the public through open letters, press conferences and talk shows. The media can publish on the Internet the transcripts of secret conversations, live broadcasts 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 33 of political consultations and secret documents of offshore accounts. Thanks to the Media Age, the citizens have more opportunities to learn things that previously could appear only in print with the consent of media elites. Nowadays, people can fnd info whether a politician cheated on his university exams and satellite pictures showing where politicians live and how big their estate is. The telecommunications revolution has surpassed progress in other spheres of life and one can see people in distant places in Dubai weaving on cloth stances but talk- ing on iPhones. The implications of the technological advances of the Media Age are far-reaching. According to Thompson (1996, 81) the Media Age gave the privilege to know things about government to people who are not in geographical proximity to the rulers. The Media Age also changed the cost of information, as it suddenly appeared that information is less costly than other expenses, such as food, clothes and travel. On a more abstract level, Thompson envisages that the Media Age makes power more visible, it has obscured the boundaries between the public and the private spheres and it has increased the immediacy and geographical scale of the transmission of information. Keane (2014, 146–147) identifes similar characteristics of the Media Age: (1) it makes the tools of communication fexible and portable; (2) it decreases the cost and barriers to entry into the global system of communication; (3) it provides a number of independent information banks, such as Wikipedia; (4) it allows for the developments of cross-border public spheres; and (5) it enhances public scrutiny of power through political scandals, muckraking revelations and whistle-blowing. Building on these insights, I would argue that the Media Age changes information in the following nine aspects: (1) the quantity of information: people get more information; (2) the quality of information: information of personal nature is more readily available; (3) the specifcity of information: the public learns about policies and relationships in greater detail; (4) the costs of expressing information about public judgement: it is easier and less costly for the people to raise issues about the government; (5) the costs of accessing information: people have greater and cheaper access to information; (6) the immediacy of information: information is available almost immediately after a government takes a decision or an incumbent commits a blunder; (7) the scale of information: people get information on a global scale, not just locally; (8) the costs of the incumbents reaching the public through verbal messages decrease; and (9) the 34 G. DIMOVA costs of accountability forums’ learning about potential government misconduct and about other forums’ investigations also decrease. The big question, then, is how this change in information affects the way we hold the execut ives to account.

The Double-Sided Effects of the Media Age: A Worthy Line of Argument It is defnitely not a novel insight that the Media Age can have opposing effects on accountability. Nevertheless, the ways in which the contradictions of the Media Age on accountability play out are not entirely clear. I believe that the major reason behind the segmented view of the infuence of the Media Age is that the media interact with various stages and actors in the accountability process differently and so it is very hard to weave a common narrative. Keane (2013) is one of the scholars who have shown understanding of the trade-offs in the rise of media technologies and has argued that the result is an ultimate balancing act. He defnes the main features of the Media Age as “communicative abundance”. According to him, on the one hand, the media cement prejudices, encourage anonymity and allow media conglomerates to control the public. On the other hand, the Media Age enlightens the new citizens and makes them more aware of the limitations of their knowledge. Ultimately, Keane argues that the positive effects outweigh the negative effects and this predom- inance of enlightenment over manipulation is one of the chief developments that gave rise to monitory democracy. Here is a summary of Keane’s depiction of the mutually opposing infuence of the media on democracy. The negative effect of the rise of the Media Age is as follows: instead of promoting diversity, the Internet serves as echo-chambers, beehives, which plunge citizens in narcissistic narrow-mindedness (Keane 2013, 122); the Internet spawns a culture of anonymity entailing little sense of responsibility (Keane 2013, 126); media conglomerates have a damning effect on monitory citizens as they “massage their language, their common sense, their fantasies” (Keane 2013, 153–154); communicative abundance creates “gated communities”, which “lock citizens into pre-determined patterns of usage and their corresponding effects” (Keane 2013, 148); big corporations “manufacture consent” (Keane, 160), allow democratically elected governments to play media games and perpetrate dissimulation (175). 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 35

At the same time, however, Keane (2013, 103–106) argues that the positive effects of communicative abundance are also numerous: communicative abundance tutors people’s sense of pluralism and makes citizens more aware of the limits of their knowledge. It encourages people’s suspicions of unaccountable power. The networked information production systems tear down the walls erected by centrally controlled, top- down, capital-intensive production of information which was reserved for selected elites on a self-selected basis (Keane 2013, 142–143). Twitter and iPhones provide new sources of information even for major networks (Keane 2013, 139). Keane weighs these two alternative effects of the media and concludes that the positive effect of public enlightenment and the opportunities for public monitoring of power are bigger than the negative effect of power-holder’s control over the public through information technologies. Whitehead (2015) is also very cautious about announcing that the infosphere has defnitely positive or defnitely negative effects on accountability and democracy. He states, “Overall, therefore, the information revolution is already producing substantial effects on the content and nature of democratic government, including the centrality of state authority, the structure of party politics, and the nature of government accountability to its citizens… How well – or badly – all this turns out is under-determined. Much will depend on how well inherited political interests adjust to convulsive technical changes”. The remainder of the chapter takes up and juxtaposes Keane’s idea of the double-sided effects of the Media Age and Kriesi’s conceptualisations of the role of the media. I review the effects of the Media Age through the prism of supply and demand as the media can have an effect on the extent to which people seek accountability from the government, which I call demand, and then, the Media Age has an effect on the extent to which the government gives account to the public and is pursued for irresponsible behaviour, which I call supply. In my mind, this differentiation is crucial, because it goes to the heart of the ambiguity: the media give advantages to the public in holding the government to account, but at the same time it gives a tribune and a platform to the elites and the accountability forums, which can use it to avoid accountability. Schudson (2013, 57) presses this point by pointing out that while the citizen may beneft from the Internet, the elites could beneft even more. Therefore, it is important to have a sense of the trade-offs for the elites and the public: “If the internet gives to ordinary citizens new tools for gathering 36 G. DIMOVA information and expressing views, think of how much more it offers to political professionals who spend forty to eighty hours a week on politics, not forty to eighty minutes”. So, in the end, which one, the elites or the public beneft more from the opportunities provided by the Media Age? Given the importance of this question, it is quite surprising that this differentiation between supply and demand is so uncommon. Another reason for the confusion surrounding the effects of the Media Age is that the mechanisms of interaction between the media and the public and the specifc qualities of the Media Age are not understood precisely. When it comes to demand, the media can affect it by infuencing the quality, quantity and scope of information that people get (information function and watchdog function), or by regulating the access people have to expressing their criticism of the government (marketplace of ideas function). These are two very different types of interaction between the Media Age and demand. The interaction of the Media Age and the supply of accountability is no more straightforward. The Media Age can affect the costs of the incumbents’ reaching the public (tribune function), the costs of the public aggregating its dissatisfaction towards the incumbents (publicity function) and the costs of the accountability forums learning about their pursuit of government transgressions (forum connecting function). Therefore, the confusing effects arise from the different nature of the change in information. The third reason why the effects of the Media Age on accountability are so muddled is that even if we differentiate between the effects on supply and demand, the effects can play both positively and negatively for accountability. For example, the incumbents can use the media as a tribune to accept blame or to defect blame, the accountability forums can use the knowledge of government wrongdoing to start a competition for punishing dirt or they can build a cooperative network to pursue accountability, the incumbents can use the knowledge of public dissatisfaction expressed through the media to become more responsible or they can just become obsessed with their image. Furthermore, the public can use the media to educate itself or it can use the media to solidify its prejudices; the public can use the information acquired through the media to hold the power-holders to account or this information can make the public more apathetic. For these three reasons, my conclusion is that the Media Age in itself does not have an independent role but is co-dependent on the public, the elites and the accountability forums. That is why the remaining 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 37 chapters seek to enlarge the framework of the effects of the Media Age on accountability by dedicating separate chapters to public demand and the supply of accountability. These chapters talk about the way demand was changed due to globalisation, modernisation, marketisation, de-politicisation, protest movements and weak parties. The chapter on the determinants of supply of accountability weaves in the effects of the European Union, new public management, the implosion of elections and the upending of the democratisation paradigm.

The Media Age: Impact on the Public Demand for Government Accountability

“Information Function” of the Media: Double-Sided Effect on Public Demand for Accountability The information function of the media refers to the way the quality and quantity of information has shaped the public’s image of the incumbents. The information function can have two opposing effects on accountability. On the positive side, the Media Age emboldens public demand because people know more about alleged government transgressions and they can acquire that knowledge at a smaller cost. Alternatively, it decreases demand because, although the quantity of information is bigger, the quality of information is worse and people are put off by sensationalism. These two opposing effects of the increased quantity versus the decreased quality are embodied by two competing schools of “video malaise” and “virtuous circle”.

Positive Side of the Information Function of the Media: “Virtuous Circle” The information function of the media is one of the two most popular perspectives about the role of the media in democracy. This function posits that the media facilitate public demand for accountability because they level the information asymmetries between the government and the public. By default, the public can hold the incumbents to account only for transgressions it knows about and by default it knows very little. The information function of the media fulfls this role of informing the public of government transgressions. A “virtuous circle” ensues when the media provide important information that makes citizens more aware 38 G. DIMOVA of the political issues and a better-informed citizenry can hold the government to account more effectively (Hutchings 2003; Norris 2000). Norris (2000, 8) argues, “The use of the news media is positively associated with a wide range of indicators of political knowledge, trust, and mobilisation. People who watch more TV news, read more newspapers, surf the net, and pay attention to campaigns, are consistently more knowledgeable, trusting of government, and participatory”. According to this view, “a broadly and equitably informed citizenry helps assure a democracy that is both responsive and responsible” (Carpini and Keeter 1996, 1). Furthermore, there is “an erosion of the right to ignore. In an increasingly frictionless infosphere, it becomes progressively less credible to claim one did not know” (Floridi 2014 cited by Whitehead 2015). The “information function” of the media on public demand for accountability is also evident when it comes to entertaining information transmitted in political talk shows. When information is delivered in this easy-going manner, it decreases the public costs of making an effort to understand complex, abstract and boring issues. Because the costs of understanding government transgressions decrease, the demand for holding the incumbents to account supposedly should increase. For example, Riegert (2007) argues that fake news and humorous political talk have proven themselves viable forms of alternative reporting. Riegert further suggests that the evolution of political entertainment television, such as the Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report, provides for an informed, active and meaningful citizenship. The most spirited defence of the view that politicotainment increases the citizenship involvement with politics is put up by Zaller (2003). Zaller suggests that in a very specialised society, problems are too complicated and require a lot of time and skill to be properly understood. Politicotainment provides heuristics for deciphering this complex matter by providing enjoyable and low-cost summaries of the main problems. He bases his claim on Downs’s theory (1957) of the electoral marketplace and on Schudson’s idea of “The Good Citizen” (2010). Downs (1957, 222) says that political information is costly and that “most of the costs of gathering, selecting, transmitting, analysing, and even evaluating data can be shifted to others”. Similarly, Zaller (2003, 121) argues that “an intense, dramatic story that keeps up a ‘critical mass’ over one or several news cycles in all information media…breaks through the fog of disjointed news and engages the attention of the Monitorial Citizen”. Consequently, they should be more inclined to seek accountability. 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 39

Michael Schudson (2013, 50) argues that the idea that digital media will create better citizens, or in the language of this study will increase public demand, is mistaken because it is premised on the idea that a good citizen is an informed citizen. Schudson points out that there are three other aspects of a good citizen that the discussion of the digital media does not address. These are the democracy of rights, democracy of trust and democracy of partisanship. All these forms of democracy do not adopt approaches to citizenship that are information-centred. Therefore, to argue that by providing information, the Internet improves citizenship, is to rely on old concepts of democracy.

Negative Effect of the Information Function of the Media: “Vicious Circle” The negative view of the information function of the media purports that the quantity of information may have increased but its quality has decreased, thus decreasing rather than increasing public demand for accountability. The quality of information has deteriorated for a number of reasons. To begin with, information often lacks substance and is aimed at delivering sensational news. “Tabloid terror” creates an “emergency culture” that is not productive for dialogue (Debrix 2007). Information is frequently offered in a prejudiced way that fails to engage the opposite side of the debate. The personalisation of politics (Campus 2010), the celebritisation of politics (Ciaglia and Mazzoni 2015) and the show- fcation of politics (van Zoonen 2004) have decreased the quality of information by placing a premium on personalities rather than policies. According to Denby (2009), political entertainment delivers snark instead of satire, undervalues the importance of political questions and caricatures complex issues. Denby further argues that politicotainment breeds cynicism instead of constructive criticism. Edelman (1996) agrees that political entertainment does not enhance greater public engagement and in fact substitutes the critical reasoning abilities of the audience with a more light-hearted attitude. He calls this the “sleeper effect”, which means that the audience takes political talk shows less critically and this less critical attitude passes over to more serious news coverage where a more critical judgement is required. Instead of decreasing the costs (in terms of effort and time) of acquiring information, entertainment has upended the purpose of the political process. It has marred the boundary between the funny and the realistic and has allowed racism or bigotry to 40 G. DIMOVA come through. The most popular politicians are the most entertaining ones. “Jokes” cover up bad policies. This stream of thought poses the question: Can democracy laugh its way to its own death? One particularly troubling aspect is that sensationalism and political scandals damage the politicians’ reputations, and as a result of scandals, people start to distrust politicians. This distrust can lead to “a withdrawal from the political process, which may be expressed by a lack of interest in political issues and a disinclination to vote” (Thompson 2000, 256). The result of this low quality of information is that the public demand for accountability is not stimulated at all. Instead, the public ends up in a “video-malaise”. Flinders is particularly troubled by this negative role of the media in presenting the politicians in a bad light because he believes that this makes the public unft for appreciating the positive contributions of politicians. He argues, “The Telegraph’s exposure of the MPs expenses system in 2009 would probably reveal a negative balance sheet. [It appears to have] left all politicians as weak and cowering aspects of a rather dejected political aspect” (Flinders 2012, vii). This claim is questioned by Norris (2011, 187) who says: “Overall, while providing some limited support for the claims that scandal can damage confdence in government institutions… the results cannot be regarded as highly robust. The analysis therefore suggests the need for considerable caution and for further research into any general claims about how negative news or scandal coverage impacts public opinion”. The jury is still out whether scandal and political entertainment cause a vicious or a virtuous circle, which means that it is impossible to use the Media Age as the sole variable explaining democratic demand.

“Watchdog Function” of the Media: Double-Sided Effect on Public Demand for Accountability The watchdog function of the media refers to the media’s role in monitoring and revealing government indiscretions or to the media serving as a platform to others to reveal these indiscretions. It is one of the better-known functions of the media, which is touted as the “Fourth Estate”. Again, the watchdog function of the media has a double nature. On the positive side, the Media Age emboldens public demand for accountability because demand is increased since people know more about what the government is doing wrong. Alternatively, the media can be very selective and manipulative in revealing some scandals and not 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 41 others. In addition, on the negative side, people are less watchful because the available information is too much for them to process so they tune out or just take the negative news for granted. According to Kriesi et al. (2013), the media serve as a watchdog by monitoring and publicising the government’s misbehaviour and policy mistakes. The “watchdog function” of the media ties in well with Markovits and Silverstein’s (1991) view that media scandals are extended forms of democratic accountability. Thompson (2000, 254) also points out that the scandalisation of politics “can ensure that the activities of the political representatives are regularly scrutinised and rendered more accountable to the electorate”. Berlinski et al. (2012) suggest that the media revelations of politicians’ transgressions increase public disproval, which could be read as an increase in public demand for accountability. Depending on the disapproval that arises out of these media allegations, prime ministers dismiss the implicated incumbents, which is a positive effect of the media’s watchdog function on accountability. Slaughter (2014, 167) argues that Wikileaks served a watchdog function by making the public more aware of the “secretive policy making related to post 9/11 counterterrorism efforts and the conduct of US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq”. The downside of the watchdog function of the media is that the media might be selective in disclosing government wrongdoing. It can be less watchful, when it comes to politicians whom it favours and more watchful when it comes to politicians whose reputation it seeks to destroy. In the latter case, the media turn from a watchdog to an attack dog. The point is that the media fnd out about transgressions through investigative journalism in only a small percentage of the cases (Jacobs and Schillemans 2016). In the majority of cases, the journalists were given information by an informant who may choose to remain anonymous. Perhaps the best-known informant is Deep Throat in the Watergate scandal. Therefore, the question arises, whether these leaks of information, which serve as the basis of most scandals, are not well-or- chestrated attacks on the government by political opponents. In other words, the line between the media serving as a watchdog and the media serving as a platform for smear is thin, hard to prove and requires a huge amount of fnancial independence of the media. Given this thin boundary between a watchdog and an attack dog function of the media, it is very hard to differentiate between scandals that increase the demand for accountability, and make people more 42 G. DIMOVA watchful, and those that decrease demand, and make people distrustful and withdrawn. Currently, we lack a systematic method to differentiate between the effects of recent scandals such as the Clinton email server scandal (2016), Trump Golden showers scandal (2017), the Panama papers (2016), the Snowdon affair (2013), the MPs expenses scandal in the UK (2009), the child abuse by priest revealed by the Boston Globe (2002) and some landmark scandals, such as the Lewinsky affair (1996) and Watergate (1972).

“Marketplace of Ideas” Function of the Media: Double-Sided Effect on the Public Demand for Accountability The “marketplace of ideas” function of the media refers to the idea that the media offer a platform where the public can express criticism of the government, discuss issues and learn about policy and perspectives. Examples of such media platforms are online blogs, Facebook posts, commentary sections under Internet articles, Twitter accounts. This function of the media refers to the fact that the media offers many online platforms where the public can “meet” to argue, learn, criticise the government and form coalitions. The “marketplace of ideas” function can have two opposing effects on accountability. On the positive side, the Media Age emboldens public demand for accountability because it triggers accessibility to Internet spaces where people can criticise the government more easily. Alternatively, the Internet discussions decrease demand because they just confrm existing prejudices. One advantage of the marketplace function of the media is that it increases public demand because it decreases the costs of forming coalitions. Bennett and Segerberg (2014, 58) argue that the costs of forming digital coalitions are much smaller than the costs of conventional collective action. They call this communication through the digital media “connective action”. The costs of association have also decreased by allowing citizens to make their mind known instantaneously (Grossman 2000), through interactive and self-confgurable communication (Castells 2012) and through the possibility for ordinary people to co-generate the news (Shapiro and Jacobs 2011). In the same vein, Coleman and Freelon (2015, 183) agree that digitalisation decreases the costs of putting people together associated with the conventional collective action. 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 43

Another advantage of the marketplace of ideas function of the media is that it increases public demand because it decreases the costs of criticising the government and participating in politics. Shah et al. (2007) argue that the public use of conventional and online news encourages political consumerism indirectly through their infuence on political talk and environmental concerns. Grossman (1995, 6) suggests that interactive technology allows “millions of widely dispersed citizens to receive the information they need to carry out the business of government themselves, to gain admission to the political realm”. The media encourage demand by providing a forum for discussion, which engages not only political parties but also “interest groups, social movements, experts and individual citizens” (Kriesi 2013, 39). Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006, 256) view the media as a mobilising agent, which aggregates and channels social grievances levelled at the government. They note that the media “coverage of demonstrations… provided a channel to make certain voices known and to put moral pressure on political and judicial authorities”. Similarly, Esser (2013, 157) states that the media not only articulate the preferences of citizens but also channel them into institutions of preference aggregation. The “marketplace of ideas” function usually connects with deliberative models of democracy: “The cultivation of pluralism and diversity in the media is therefore an essential condition of the development of deliberative democracy” (Thompson 1995, 257). The market place function of the media is said to have a negative effect on public demand for accountability when media sources are owned by one group of people. This perspective posits that the Internet does not stimulate demand or enlighten the public because it is biased. It may be a market of ideas but it is a market dominated by a monopolist. In that Internet market, only one idea is sold— the idea that benefts the elites. Thus, instead of stimulating pluralism and awareness of the opposite sides of the debate, the Internet has become an instrument in the hands of the elites. Hindman (2008) argues that the Internet has not given greater voice to ordinary citizens (and increased demand) because powerful elites channel Internet traffc to just twenty most popular sites. Sunstein (2009) suggests that the diversity of Web sites allows people to visit only those that support their initial views, thus hin- dering dialogue and cementing prejudices. Schuler (2003, 72) states that there is a “digital divide” between those who effectively use electronic media and those who hardly know they exist”. He concludes that “there is nothing inherently democratic about digital technology” (73). 44 G. DIMOVA

Flinders (2012, 160) is convinced that “digital democracy has promised so much but delivered so little”. He echoes the above arguments that digital media “cultivate deep pools of social capital amongst like- minded individuals but has fared far worse in terms of building bridges among these groups” (162) and that it has not closed the knowledge gap but widened it (161). Flinders (2012, 165) argues particularly strongly that the Internet cannot enhance demand because it lacks the face-to- face factor. Crawford (2013) also suggests that audiences have become captives to large telecommunication monopolies. Similarly, Packard (2014) argues that the American media market is dominated by a few corporations, which facilitate rather than challenge limited perceptions of reality. Urbinati (2014, 69) purports that “it is an observable fact that [media] concentration exists in consolidated democracies and that this can be the site of a new form of “indirect despotism”. Keane (2013, 66) agrees with Urbinati that “the market is controlled by ten or so verti- cally integrated media conglomerates, most of them based in the United States”. Thus, understanding the concentration of media ownership is crucial to assessing the role of the media as a marketplace of ideas.

The Media Age and the Supply of Accountability This part of the chapter turns its gaze on the effects of the Media Age on supply of accountability, i.e. the opportunities that elites have to give or conceal information, fght intra-elite battles and the opportunities that various forums have to pursue elite accountability. Unlike the previous section, which dealt with the opportunities that the Media Age has created for the public, the focus here is entirely on the government and the accountability institutions.

“Tribune Function” of the Media: Double-Sided Effect on the Supply of Accountability The tribune function of the media refers to the opportunities that the media have created for enabling the incumbents to give accounts to the public. In an ideal world, the “tribune function” should increase the supply of accountability as it allows the power-holders to explain their actions and accept responsibility for their actions. For example, politicians use newspapers to write open letters to the public and to their opponents (Rancière 2007). They use entertainment talk shows to advance their position in important debates (Decker, 126). As Boin et al. (2008, 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 45

11) posit, “in liberal democracies, accountability regimes are designed to make political decision makers answerable for their actions to public forums. These forums possess certain powers- formal and informal-to interrogate, debate with and sanction decision-makers. These forums include parliaments, auditors, courts and the mass media”. March and Olson (1995, 141–181) also suggest that “account giving by political executives … is crucial as a feedback mechanism to establish popular control of government”. In these cases, accountability and blame avoidance are positively related when blame avoidance and the ensuing fnger-pointing (1) clarify the standards of good behaviour; (2) help allocate the real culprit; and (3) improve answerability and the fow of information (Hood 2014). In reality, however, the incumbents often instrumentalise the media forum to defect blame rather than explain themselves. In this scenario, the media decrease the supply of elite’s account-giving. They are a forum where the incumbents can avoid blame and an instrument in the hands of the elites for manipulating public opinion. Instead of the media being a tribune from which elites can give accounts to the public, the media are an instrument, which the elites use to navigate public opinion. The “tribune function” mostly relates to the blame shifting literature. According to the latter, the media provide a stage from which the government can avoid blame and claim credit (Hood 2014). In this respect, the tribune function of the media is similar to the “forum function”, which posits that the media are a battlefeld for intra-elite strug- gles. According to Ginsberg and Shefter (1991 cited in Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006, 251), “media exposés represent a crucial weapon of a form of politicization that makes mechanisms of accountability instrumental in discrediting political opponents”. In a similar vein, Boin et al. (2010, 707) argue that “the media provide another, complementary, venue for ‘frame warriors’ who seek to impose their defnition of the crisis through media representatives”. The forum function is the only one where media logic clearly takes over accountability logic. This ambiguous function of the media leaves us with the question, when does the media stop being a platform for giving accounts and starts being an instrument for manipulating the public?

“Mediatisation Function” of the Media: Double-Sided Effect on the Supply of Accountability The mediatisation function of the media refers to the process where non- elected institutions become more aware of their public image because 46 G. DIMOVA they know that the media will report on them. From the perspective of accountability, mediatisation can increase the supply of accountability forums because they will be more willing to pursue government misconduct that is reported in the media to pursue a more positive public image. In the “mediatisation function”, the media make non-representative institutions more sensitive to their public image. The media pressure makes non-elected institutions more sensitive to media coverage and public opinion (Djerf-Pierre and Pierre 2016; Schillemans 2016; Klinj 2016; Hasler et al. 2016; Friedrichsmeier and Marcinkowski 2016). In this way, mediatisation changes the nature of the institutional supply of representation because, arguably, it can make non-representative institutions more representative or more responsive. Because of the negative effects of mediatisation, Meyer (2002) argues that representative democracy has become “media democracy”. As non-elected institutions, such as courts, NGOs and supranational bodies, are exposed to media pressure, their behaviour changes (Alon-Barkat and Gilad 2016). Alternatively, mediatisation may decrease the supply of responsible policies as politicians become more focused on their media presence at the expense of long-term policies that could be criticised by the media. At this stage, mediatisation makes responsiveness more important than responsibility. Institutions become more risk-averse, narcissistic or “mission creeps” (Schillemans 2012, 149–150). Thus, the general fear is that mediatisation may “render non-elected institutions of accountability overly concerned with issues that are newsworthy but inconsequential to the detriment of important but less media-shiny issues” (Schillemans 2012, 16). Media attention can make offcials “over-responsible and over-blamed” (Hasler et al. 2016). Media logic affects accountability logic negatively when it makes politicians prioritise their self-pres- entational strategies over their competence in governing. Finally, media logic subjugates accountability logic as it widens the gap between the front stage of presenting policies and the backstage of making policies (Papadopoulos 2013, 49). Mediatisation is the process where politicians are driven by media logic rather than by consideration of public service. “Many wonder to what extent the mediatisation of politics diminishes its quality. Media skills may replace subject-matter expertise as the key element in a politician’s success, the increasing number of political talk shows on television might hasten the decline in the importance attached to parliaments, and mediatisation could lead to a phase of symbolic politics and populism and, by the same token, make it harder for 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 47 consensus-based and substantive politics to prevail over the longer term- because they lack media appeal” (Esser and Buechnel 2013, 405). Thus, mediatisation decreases public demand for accountability.

“Forum-Connecting Function” of the Media: Double-Sided Effect on the Supply of Accountability The forum connecting function of the media is the only one that relates to the accountability forums, not to the government or the public. It is least popular in the literature. The forum connecting function increases supply when the media report about the activity of one accountability forum (e.g. the court), and this spurs other forums, such the public opinion and the EU, to get on the case as well. Alternatively, it can decrease supply because forums start to compete with each other and create a climate of fault-fnding and negativity. The positive role of the forum connecting function on the supply of accountability relates to the cases when a media report about government wrongdoing levels the information symmetries between potential accountability forums. As they would want to be perceived by the public as responsive to allegations of government transgressions, the forums will be investigators that are more active and the supply of accountability forums will increase. This mechanism could be particularly helpful when one forum fails to investigate the government, and the other forums come to its help. They create a safety net. This view is compatible with the venue-shopping perspective of the media, which is under-theorised for no good reason. According to it, claims for accountability will appear in the public space because claim- ants seek out the venue where their claim is most likely to be successful. Venue shopping is the process where “to challenge a monopoly in one venue (such as the executive, or one type of government at a particular level), groups may seek an audience in another (the prosecutor, the courts, etc., which they reach through the media in this case)” (Cairney 2013). Venue shopping is the search for a decision setting that offers the best prospects for reaching one’s policy goals. It increases the supply of accountability because it increases the ft between the alleged government misconduct and the corresponding accountability forum. The negative side of the forum connection function of the media is that instead of connecting the forums through publicity, so that they support each other and make a safety net, the media puts the accountability forums in a race to prove who will hold the government most 48 G. DIMOVA accountable. Thus, the media creates the condition for putting the multiple accountability forums into a vicious circle of fault-fnding. “Accountability easily devolves into fault-fnding missions that derail into a climate of negativity or in sheer scapegoating. They compete as to which one is going to uncover more ‘dirt’ on the government” (Mulgan 2003, 3–4). Society will become obsessed with “rituals of verifcation” (Power 1997). Agents will outbid each other in their negative attention to public agencies. Related to the idea that multiple mechanisms create a climate of notorious competition and the idea that principals may play with agents is the idea of the blame games (Hood 2002; Behn 2001). In this respect, the forum connecting function of the media decrease the supply of accountability.

Conclusion: Has Government Accountability Benefited from the Media Age? The analysis puts forward the proposition that the innovations associated with the Media Age do not have an agency of their own. The Media Age should be thought of as a set of opportunities rather than as a set of specifc developments. The Media Age comes in the shape of various forums, instruments, channels and triggers. The direction that the developments will follow depends on the ability of the elites to take advantage of the media environment and on the ability of the public to use them to its own advantage. Just as the incumbents can give important information through the media, they can use the media to defect attention and intimidate their opponents. Similarly, just as people can use online forums to exchange information and broaden their views, they can use online sources to solidify their biases. Just as the increased fow of media information can be used to hold the governments accountable, its sensationalism can actually have the opposite effect by turning people off politics. The list, as detailed above, goes on. There is no doubt that the independence of media sources is of primary importance in holding the government to account. There is also little hesitation that investigative journalists need to continue to ask questions. Similarly, the media are an important source of information. However, the discourse on media and accountability has moved beyond the question of the quality of information, investigative questioning and media independence. The complexity of the Media Age necessitates further research into the public demand 2 THE MEDIA AGE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 49 for accountability and the government supply of accountability, which will ultimately determine the effect of the Media Age on accountability. That is why the remaining part of the argument in the book turns its gaze to public demand and government supply.

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Supply of Accountability and the Accountability Turn

The Supply of Accountability Forums: A New Explanatory Variable It is essential to consider seriously the notion of the “supply of accountability forums” because accountability forums embody various advantages and disadvantages and the public faces different costs for using them. The likelihood that the government would be punished and investigated, following media allegations, does not depend solely on the elites or the public, but on the available opportunities that the elites and the public have to pursue the allegations. Thus, if the public faces courts that are biased, when legal action is expensive, when there are no international audit bodies to counteract the lack of national audit bodies, then the lack of supply translates into poor accountability outcomes, even if the public is well organised and proactive. Conversely, if the public faces receptive legislatures, if the prosecutor is independent, if the accountability bodies are likely to respond to high-profle media allegations of the government, then accountability outcomes would be more satisfactory, even if the public is relatively passive. It is the interaction of supply and demand, rather than just supply or just demand, that determines the sanctions and investigations of the government. The importance of the supply of accountability forums is often ignored in the literature. As I explain in Chapter 10, some models of the crisis of democracy focus entirely on demand, not on supply (Flinders 2012;

Manin 1997). Those who are aware of the importance of supply defne supply too narrowly either in terms of economic goods that the government delivers to the public (Streeck 2014), in terms of state policies (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2015) or in terms of representative institutions (Papadopolous 2013). Those who consider supply in terms of accountability often limit the discussion to the accessibility of the courts (Maravall and Przeworski 2003) or the independence of the courts (Popova 2012). Of course, the courts provide the single most important alternative to holding the government accountable, in addition to elections and the legislature. However, to limit the discussion of supply to the courts does a great injustice to a wide range of bodies, such as international bodies, the prosecutor, internal governmental investigatory bodies, arm’s-length organisations, the Ombudsman and public opinion, which should defnitely be factored in. A comprehensive measure of accountability is badly needed (Rodan and Hughes 2014). This chapter seeks to fll this gap in the literature. Furthermore, I propose that we need to think of supply as a changing variable and that we can gauge the changeability of supply through the notion of the “accountabilityturn”. The accountability turn measures the degree to which accountability forums, such as courts, parliaments, audit chambers and EU institutions, have become more easily accessible and better ftted to address the specifc issue at hand. I argue that the emphasis on accountability mechanisms comes on the heels of the growing realisation of the limitations of elections and greater awareness of the recent accountability revolution.

First Cause of the Accountability Turn: Implosion of the Electoral Paradigm The accountabilityturn is tightly linked to the growing realisation that elections alone fail to guarantee a democratic government. There is no doubt that the electoral paradigm and the idea of electoral representation have constituted and remain the most fundamental part of democracy. In most political analyses, voting is emphasised as the central and essential process in achieving democratic goals (Nagel and Smith 2013). One of the assumptions of the Founding Fathers is that elections work because their regularity binds representatives to their constituents by promoting in public offcials a “habitual recollection of their dependency on the people” (Madison 1788). “The prospect of having to face the voters at 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 55 set intervals, in theory, encourages politicians to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease and when the exercise thereof is to be reviewed” (Holmes 2012). The accountabilityturn challenges the centrality of elections. It rides on the back of the realisation that elections have inherent limitations. It joins recent calls that “we should think beyond democracy as simply voting and elections” and that “voting is a relatively weak form of democratic accountability” (Warren 2014, 39). The call against elections has crystallised into blank statements that “our democracy is being wrecked by being limited to elections” (van Reybrouck 2016, 163). To begin with, even voters in established democracies never have complete information to form an opinion about the performance of the government: “the main diffculty in instructing governments what to do and in judging what they have done is that we, citizens, just do not know enough” (Przeworski et al. 1999, 8). Recent studies suggest that even if voters who are politically engaged and well-informed vote on the basis of political identities rather than on political facts. Such “exemplary” voters pick and twist the facts to adapt them to their preconceived visions of the incumbents, rather than to use the facts to correct their visions of the incumbents (Achen and Bartels 2016). The same study suggests that elections are not an entirely meritocratic mechanism because when the candidates have roughly equal chances, their odds for winning are determined by random events, such as economic downturns that are beyond the candidates’ control. Thus, the authors propound that it is a fundamental illusion that elections in the best democracies produce a responsive government. The problem with elections is not related to voters only. There is an actor-centred explanation, which suggests that politicians can intention- ally misrepresent facts to get themselves elected. Electoral campaigns are very open to manipulative electoral campaigning. Governments with bad performance are re-elected even in the established Western democracies. For example, Maravall (1997) pinpoints three electoral strategies that helped the Spanish government win three consecutive elections despite poor economic results: explaining policy fascos with the mistakes of previous governments, promising that the policies will produce results in the future, and underlying the lack of a viable alternative. More systematic causes for electoral failure relate to the electoral college, party fnance, voter turnout, the redistricting process and voting machines (Streb 2011). The accountabilityturn also arises out of the realisation that 56 G. DIMOVA electoral integrity is often unachievable. Norris (2015) propounds that elections are often unfair due to socioeconomic and international factors as well as reasons related to constitutional power-sharing and the agencies of electoral governance. The accountabilityturn was spearheaded by the disappointment that elections did not guarantee or bring about democracy in transitional countries. The transition paradigm was built around the notion that “achieving regular, genuine elections will not only confer democratic legitimacy on new governments but continuously deepen political participation and democratic accountability” (Carothers 2002, 15). The spread of democracy in the third and fourth waves of democratisation (Eastern Europe, Middle East) and in some Asian countries disproved the centrality of elections. Contrary to the initial expectations of the transitologists, elections failed to guarantee democracy: “in many ‘transitional countries,’ reasonably regular, genuine elections are held but political participation beyond voting remains shallow and governmental accountability is weak” (Carothers 2002, 15). The electoral paradigm was further eroded because instead of resolving conficts peacefully, elections have served in some cases “to recreate and rekindle ethnic confict” as “elections simply tally up who is majority and who is the minority. By themselves, they neither guarantee civility nor the subsequent accountability of the victors to their subjects” (Isaacharoff 2015, 5). Electoral authoritarianism, or the notion that elections can be part and parcel of authoritarian regimes, dealt a further blow to the centrality of the electoral paradigm. Elections increasingly began to coexist harmoni- ously with authoritarian regimes: “a large number of political regimes in the contemporary world… have established the institutional façades of democracy, including regular elections for the chief executive, in order to conceal (and reproduce) harsh realities of authoritarian governance” (Schedler 2006, 1). Schedler (2002) lists a long menu of techniques for electoral manipulation, which are particularly dangerous because they undermine democracy while creating the impression that elections bolster democratic. This surprising and strange union of elections and authoritarianism motivated scholars in the mid-1990s to come up with more than a number 550 subtypes of “democracy with adjectives”, such as “authoritarian democracy”, “neopatrimonial democracy”, “military-dominated democracy” and “protodemocracy” (Levitsky and Collier 1997). Salame (1994) talked about “democracy without democrats”. 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 57

Far from elections being intrinsically linked to democracy, studies have indicated that non-electoral accountability can bring about democracy and that non-democratic regimes can coexist with elections. In her analysis of rural China, Tsai (2007) described a phenomenon of “accountability without democracy”. She shows that although formal democratic institutions are weak, informal solidarity networks can hold the government accountable. The signifcance of this study, from the perspective of democracy and accountability, is to provide evidence that the centrality of elections is an exhausted paradigm. In her book with the telling title “From Elections to Democracy”, Rose-Ackerman (2005) suggests that elections in Poland and Hungary were insuffcient to build democracy. Just like Tsai, Ackerman juxtaposes the limited utility of the electoral model with the merits of extra-electoral accountability. On the back- ground of the disappointment with elections, the control of the prosecutor, the ombudsmen, audit offces, administrative and ordinary courts, constitutional tribunals, the presidency, civil society groups and the European Union are seen in a new and more positive light. Other developments indicated that elections are no longer the defning characteristic of even minimalist democracy. In his book on the Arab Spring in Egypt, Kandil (2013, 11) argues that elections were of little signifcance for democratisation as the distribution of power was decided independently of elections between the three main constellations of power—the military, the security and the old regime. Taylor (1996, 11) entertain the possibility that “elections may be in the process of being superseded in modern politics...If elections no longer provide a means for the circulation and renewal of elites, maybe something else is happen- ing”. In the eve of the continuous anti-government protests in Bulgaria, Ganev (2014, 33) defned the concept of “non-electoral democratic accountability”. Spirova (2014) contends that “elections have never made Bulgarians feel empowered”. Smyth (2006) also underscores the failure of electoral democracy to materialise into substantive democracy in Russia. She pinpoints “a growing set of democratic regimes that are either incapable or unwilling to generate democratic responsiveness in the face of competitive elections” (Smyth 2006, 2). There are a number of other factors that spelt the demise of the supremacy of the electoral paradigm. One of them was the acknowledgement that the vote is a very blunt tool for assigning accountability. It 58 G. DIMOVA gives the voters just one chance to reward or punish numerous government decisions. Citizens can vote for the government party as a whole, but not for specifc ministers or specifc policies. Peruzzotti (2014, 13) suggests that “If elections are the only legitimate channel of communication between citizens and their representative, the vote becomes an act of political”. The dichotomy between the necessity to vote for a bundle of policies and the fact that the elector actually only feels strongly about a few of those policies is yet another reason why “elections are not the quintessential feature of democratic representation”. Yet another problem with the vote is that it is a decentralised strategic action (Przeworski 1991, 12). This means that some voters vote pro- spectively, others vote retrospectively but they have no way to coordinate their votes (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006, 7). Furthermore, elections provide a rather delayed measure for holding the executive accountable. Citizens can vote only every four or fve years. This is a very long period of passivity, because instances of misconduct or incompetence happen on a continuous basis. “Elections… occur only periodically and their effectiveness at securing vertical accountability is unclear” (Grant and Keohane 2005, 31). The realisation that elections are not without faws enables the rise of the accountabilityturn. It puts an end to the monopoly of retrospective voting in elections as the only legitimate way to hold the government to account. It exposed “the weakness of retrospective voting as a method for aligning the interests of elected politicians with the interests and values of the electorate” and demonstrated that periodic elections fail to align the interests of politicians with the interests of voters (Holmes 2012). The discrediting of elections showed that there is no perfect overlap between procedural and substantive accountability (Fukuyama 2015, 11). This means that even if the procedure of electoral accountability is in place, that does not guarantee the presence of substantive accountability, and vice versa. It underscored the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in parliamentary prospective voting (Strøm and Bergman 2013, 24). It highlighted the need to search for solutions beyond elections. “Democracy must extend beyond elections to include the incessant questioning and examining of government by citizens between elections. The press, the opposition party, the court, NGOs and so forth are not condemned to be slaves on every day besides election day, but can protest, monitor, complain, and investigate every non- election day of the year” (Holmes 2012). 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 59

Altogether, Landemore (2017, 6) argues that elections used to be an instrument to keep the public away from making important policy decisions, and their appeal as a mechanism of public delegation of power has waned tremendously:

The argument that authorization at the voting booth and accountability through retrospective voting amounts to genuine rule of the people may have worked in the eighteenth century, when such a promise seemed radical compared with past and existing regimes. But today, at the beginning of the twenty-frst century, who can still argue this with a straight face? The reality is that representative government was mostly designed to main- tain the people at a safe distance from any actual decision- making power. Manin wrote that representative government, as a set of institutional principles, replaced the ability to hold offce that citizens enjoyed in Ancient Athens with the mere ability to consent to power. Expanding the franchise over the last two hundred years has allowed the advocates of representative government to call it representative democracy without altering this fundamental and problematic fact.

Thus, the monopoly of the electoral model of representation has been undermined. Grant and Keohane (2005, 39) claim that “we should resist the temptation to narrow the issue of accountability to that of democratic control”. Kröger and Friedrich (2013, 156) challenge the “fusion of democracy and representation” and the fact that representation has become the “sine qua non for democracy”. Other works from the public administration feld further acknowledge the limited power of representation and electoral accountability. Scott (2000, 38) argues for “recognizing the potential for additional or extended mechanisms of accountability in supplementing or displacing traditional accountability functions”.

Second Cause of the Accountability Turn: The Accountability Revolution The term “accountability revolution” (Brookings Institution 2013) refers to the explosion of studies linked to public accountability as well as the more intense use of accountability practices in real life. The accountability revolution renewed the intellectual interest in the possibilities that non-parliamentary and non-electoral accountability forums can serve as 60 G. DIMOVA a lever to control government’s policies and personnel. Many scholars agree that the start date of the accountability revolution is 1991, when Schmitter and Karl (1991, 75) “hit upon accountability as the key to… modern representative political democracy”. Public administration is the natural home for accountability studies, but around 1991, accountability began to slip from public administration to democratic theory. As Mulgan (2000, 555) points out, accountability is “a word that only a few decades ago was used only rarely…now crops up everywhere …carrying the burden of democratic governance”. In a similar vein, Power (1994) speaks of the “audit explosion”. The accountability revolution diversifed and expanded the supply of representation in three main ways. First, and most importantly, the accountability revolution diversifed the forums that potential accountability-holders can use to hold the government to account. Second, the accountability revolution drove the accountabilityturn by highlighting the importance of holding specifc ministers or parts of the government to account. Third, it acknowledged the importance of multiple logics and multiple criteria for holding the government to account. This diversifcation meant that new opportunities were created to pursue government accountability because the forums, the account-givers and the accountability criteria were more specifc. It also meant that there could be a better synergy between the account-holders, the nature of the claim and the specifc logic of the accountability forum. The accountability revolution is mainly linked to a paradigm in public administration called New Public Management, but it also connects with such developments as Europeanisation and decentralisation. The impact of the accountability revolution has been extensively researched in public administration studies but it has not been fully understood in the context of democratic theory. I would suggest that the accountability revolution laid the foundations of the accountabilityturn and challenged the dominance of the representativeturn. It suggested that accountability provides additional avenues for supplying the public with more representative, or at least more responsive, governance. It shifted the focus from representation that is widely considered to be at the very heart of democratic politics (Shapiro et al. 2010). It surmounted the common way of thinking that accountability contains only a very limited “tempting rightness” (Pitkin 1967) and made accountability “the hallmark of modern democratic governance” (Dubnick and Frederickson 2011, 329). 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 61

First Manifestation of the Accountability Turn: The Multiplication of the Accountability Forums The frst and most important impact of the accountability explosion is to underscore the salience of the various non-electoral and non-parliamentary channels through which the public can hold the government to account. Accountability has begun to be perceived as a multifaceted concept. There is “a growing fragmentation of our present day notions of public accountability” (Dowdle 2006, 2). This means that the number of forums or accountability mechanisms available to the public has increased. The awareness of the multiplication of accountability forums is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is intrinsically linked to the accountability revolution. Not long ago, Keohane (2003, 3) pointed out that “the literature on political accountability reminds its student of the old story about the blind man and the elephant”. Each man felt a different part of the elephant’s body and had a different impression of the whole animal… There is little awareness shown in many of these works of the other dimensions of this “elephant”. Flinders (2001, 20) concurred with Keohane that “there is a surprising lack of interest in the literature in competing codes of accountability”. The multiplication of accountability forums has been widely acknowledged. Schillemans (2008) lists 60 new mechanisms for accountability. In another study, Schillemans (2011) extrapolates 15 horizontal accountability mechanisms of Dutch agencies. Today, the study of government accountability is splintered in a multitude of non-intertwined studies of elections and parliament (Przeworski et al. 1999), European agencies and committees (Busuioc 2013; Bransdma 2007; Bovens et al. 2010), guangos and intergovernmental bodies (Bevir 2010; Papadopoulos 2007), public opinion (Hutchings 2003), NGOs (Edwards and Hulme 1996) and the courts (Hirschl 2004). Flinders notes that “there is a proliferation of principals or at least a growing sense of acknowledgement of the multiplicity of principals” (Flinders 2001, 20). He lists parliamentary, judicial, market, administrative and popular (electoral) accountability. Keohane (2003, 41) outlines eight types of accountability, depending on who holds the government to account: public reputational, electoral, participatory, legal, market, fscal, supervisory, hierarchical. Romzek and Dubnick (1987, 228) acknowledge legal, political, bureaucratic and professional. Rose-Ackerman (2005) refers to the simultaneous control of the government by the prosecutor, the ombudsmen, the audit offces, the administrative and ordinary courts, constitutional tribunals, the 62 G. DIMOVA presidency, civil society groups and the European Union. Schedler et al. (1999) look into accountability imposed by judicial review and Central Banks. Keane (2009) notes the birth of nearly one hundred new types of power-scrutinising institutions since 1945, a situation that he calls monitory democracy. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006, 27), basing his typology on O’Donnell, differentiates between balancing (executive, legislative, judicial), mandated (oversight agencies), societal (civic organisations, NGOs) and media and electoral types of accountability. Further testimony to the multiplication of accountability forums is provided by Salminen and Lehto (2012), who defne a political, bureaucratic and legal accountability. Bovens (2007) suggests that “new forms of accountability… include accountability to administrative forums, to citizens, clients, and civil society”. Sinclair (1995, 219) identifes fve forms of accountability- political, public, managerial, professional and personal. Olson (2013, 450) states that, “over time, the distribution of tasks, powers and responsibility among institutions and actors has changed. In addition to legislative and judicial scrutiny, there are independent auditors, ombudsmen and other complaint mechanisms, epistemic communities, think tanks, credit-rating and standard-setting agencies, tribunals and committees of inquiry operating at arm’s length from popular control”. Scott (2000, 465) acknowledges the importance of the non-electoral arenas for confict resolution: “Confict resolution is usually assumed to be located in electoral politics, with elected representatives as key actors. Empirical studies, however, call renewed attention to large scale, formally organized, professionalized and party autonomous public sector”. Olsen (2013, 462) suggests that “electoral and legislative processes and ministerial and hierarchical accountability are no longer dominant”. Busuioc (2013, 51) notes that there is an informal non-electoral control that complements the formal electoral control of the government. All these manifestations of the multiplication of accountability forums point to the birth of the accountability turn.

Second Manifestation of the Accountability Turn: The Multiplication of Account-Givers The accountability revolution has expanded the supply of accountability simply because the citizens can hold many agents to account, not just the government as a whole. Previously, the government was a unitary agent to be held accountable but nowadays there are many governmental and non-governmental bodies, which are held accountable. Agents have 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 63 multiplied because of the practices of disperse leadership, the New Public Management and decentralisation. This multiplication of agents complicated the singular representative chain. Arguably, it gave rise to the accountabilityturn as the representative turn is ill-equipped to respond to the challenges of multiple agents. The multiplication of accountability agents has taken several forms. Lodge (2013) talks about “dispersed systems of governing”. Kane and Patapan (2009, 2) argue that democratic leadership has become “dispersed” in the sense that “anyone in a democracy with a cause or a grievance, from a right-wing populist to a celebrity singer to a retired American president, may take up leadership role and effectively mobilize people either to support or challenge elected governments”. Dispersed leadership means that the boundaries of the traditional principal, the government, have been expanded to include non-elected, self-proclaimed or informal agents. The decentralisation of the state is one reason for the multiplication of agents. The social movements of the 1960s, the fscal crisis of the 1970s, internationalisation, European integration and technological change have been seen as causes of decentralisation (Cain et al. 2003, 1–11). Decentralisation followed two reform agendas. The neo-liberal agenda sees devolution of authority from a central to multiple authorities as a necessary step to creating a competitive market. The democratic accountability agenda sees decentralisation as producing easy and direct access of people in government (Ansell and Gingrich 2003, 140). The result of both agendas is that the number of agents that are held accountable increases. The New Public Management is particularly important for the multiplication of agents. It denotes broadly the government policies since the 1980s that aimed to modernise and render more effective the public sector (Hood 1991). This shift from a unitary government to a more pluralist governance (Pierre and Peters 2000) fragmented the traditional agent of accountability- the government. The fragmentation, agencifcation and specialisation of government services have produced additional agents of government accountability, such as quangoes (Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation) and arm’s-length agencies. According to Scott (2000, 50), because of the “dispersal of key sources of authority, information, expertise, and capacity to bestow legitimacy, …each of the principal actors has constantly to account for at least some of its actions to others within the space”. This proliferation of agents contributed to the accountability revolution, which spurred the accountability turn and the fragmentation of supply. 64 G. DIMOVA

Third Manifestation of the Accountability Turn: The Multiplication of Accountability Standards The accountability revolution brought greater awareness of the multiplication of the standards used to judge and hold the government to account. One example of multiple standards is the differentiation between fnancial accountability, accountability for fairness and accountability for performance and accountability for personal probity (Behn 2001). This multiplication of logics casts doubt on the electoral chain of accountability, which embodies mainly a political logic. The multiplication of accountability standards arose out of several phenomena. The diversifcation of government services has multiplied the criteria for holding the government to account. Koppell (2005) lists a fve- part typology of accountability: transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and responsiveness. Second, there is also a multiplication of the nature of the conduct. Actors are increasingly held accountable for a growing number of different types of outcomes, decision-making or performance. Furthermore, the issues for which governments can be held accountable have also diversifed. Some issues do not fall within the platform of political parties. They require expert knowledge or logic. Parliament defends the “public interest”. Judicial reasoning should be about whether the law is implemented. Some issues naturally fall between these two extremes.

The Supply of Accountability Forums: Implications The second part of the chapter below addresses the specifc characteristics of the supply of accountability forums. It argues that various accountability forums embody different trade-offs between some normative principles. Perhaps the major trade-off inherent in the choice of accountability forums is the one between democratic legitimacy and specialised knowledge, such as the choice between parliamentary bodies and judicial mechanisms. Another point of choice is the dilemma between international accountability bodies, which might infringe on national autonomy, and national ones, which might be representative of elite’s interests only. While the diversity of various logics presents a distinct option between normative alternatives, it also offers an opportunity for a great synergy between the specifc issue that troubles the public and the accountability forum. A more diversifed supply of accountability forums 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 65 offers expertise that is more specifc. Another distinct characteristic of the supply of accountability forums is that it offers distinct costs. The costs can be material, reputational and they vary for the elites and the public. They also vary depending on the salience of the media issue and the independence of the forums.

The Supply of Accountability Forums: Distinct Logics The supply of accountability forums is important because forums embody very different logics and very different trade-offs. The main and most infuential distinction between the accountability forums is democratic legitimacy versus specialised knowledge. On the one hand, scholars worry that non-elected forums are not representative to hold the incumbents to account. The ascendance of bureaucratic, international and arm’s-length forums is decried. Technocracy is considered the chief indicator of the crisis of democracy (Papadopoulos 2013, 19). The counter-argument is that while these forums are not elected, they have specialised knowledge. However, accountability forums entail other trade-offs as well: control versus integrity, performance versus justice and fairness (Dubnick and Frederickson 2011, xvii), effciency versus democracy, capacity versus willingness. The supply of accountability forums is important because forums vary in their suitability to pass judgements on different issues. Specifc issues are suitable for resolution of specifc forums. To consider the appropri- ateness of the forum, one must consider the nature of the issue. Vibert suggests that there are new kinds of disputes on the accountability agenda, which require new types of forums, embodying a new type of logic. According to Vibert (2007, 103), the old disputes were structured around capital and labour. By contrast, the new disputes revolve around the allocation of resources and cut across traditional lines. They require specialised knowledge, which the politicians either do not possess or do not understand. As a result, the new type of confict puts traditional representative institutions at a disadvantage and makes unelected forums more equipped to handle new issues. There is also a functional differentiation between the forums. Accountability forums have two functions: to solve problems and to serve as arenas for discussing values and principles (Vibert 2007, 101). As the new types of issues require more knowledge, 66 G. DIMOVA they are resolved by unelected bodies. However, the arena function, i.e. the discussion of values, remains in the domain of traditional representative institutions. They are the best arenas for identifying and weighing relevant values in society. This differentiation of the forums according to their specialisation and suitability to pass judgements on various issues is underscored by Schillemans and Bovens (2011, 3). They suggest that the emergence of new non-electoral forums of accountability is a welcome development which is better suited to respond to the challenges of modern complex governance. Table 3.1 reviews the distinct logics and trade-offs inherent in well- known forums of accountability. Legislative control is exercised by Members of Parliaments and presumably defends the interest of the electorate. Its chief advantage is that it is an effcient way for the electorate to delegate responsibility of executive oversight to a small number of people specialising in politics. The disadvantage of parliamentary control is that it often falls prey to party politics (Flinders 2001). Public control of the executive is the most democratic way to demand accountability from the government. It has communitarian logic and is considered the second most genuine manifestation of representative democracy after elections. The downside of this mode of controlling the government is that the costs for organising the public are high. Another disadvantage is that the public is often disinterested or uninformed about government issues to be a good judge of specifc government policies. Public control can lead to populism. Legal checks have the advantage of being rational and apolitical. They exhibit logical and methodical thinking. However, judicial mechanisms are inherently undemocratic because judges are not elected by citizens. Internal accountability introduces the logic of technical expertise. The advantage of this type of control is that it is apolitical because audit committees supposedly consist of bureaucrats and specialists. The downside is that some politicians adopt internal investigations as a way to avoid external accountability. International controls provide an external check on domestic controls of the government. International courts have the advantage that they provide an alternative forum, where underprivileged groups in a country can hold the government accountable. At the same time, international organisations are not popularly elected and they can infringe on legitimate national oversight mechanisms, such as the legislature and public opinion. Overall, the accountability turn makes us more aware of the logics and trade-off behind using specifc forums. 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 67

Table 3.1 Forums to enforce accountability: logics and costs

Advantages Disadvantages

Legislative • MPs are popularly elected, so • Legislatures follow a political control they have the right to defend the logic public interest against the intru- • Successful votes of no-confdence sions of the government may lead to dissolution of parlia- • MPs’ questioning is a quick and ment and political instability timely method to react to gov- • Legislative committees are often ernment misconduct. chaired by the majority party, • MPs’ questioning is a good which makes them ineffective way to shame the government mechanisms of government publicly oversight • Parliament can be effective as • It takes time and effort to select it can lift the immunity of the committees alleged ministers • There is no way to compel ministers to respond to parliamentary questions Legal control • Prosecutors are not politically • Prosecutors are not directly affliated elected and do not have a popular • Prosecutors are skilled in logical mandate to judge the government thinking and are trained to pro- • When the judiciary is appointed cess vast amounts of information by the government, it is less likely • Prosecutors understand impor- to be critical of it tant abstract concepts, such as • Prosecutors have little authority fairness and justice to sanction a minister under • Called witnesses are obliged to immunity testify • Ministers use judicial inquiries as • There are less coordination prob- a tool to distance themselves from lems in organizing judges than the alleged offence organizing MPs • Judges are not able to understand policy- specifc issues • Judicial reports are bland and unreadable • Judicial inquiries take a long time Public control • Public control of the government • There are large fxed costs in is the most genuine and direct organizing many people way of accountability • The public does not understand • The public is the best judge of its complex issues interests • The public does not have com- • The public is apolitical plete information, it often looks • Public accountability introduces for sensationalism communitarian logic

(continued) 68 G. DIMOVA

Table 3.1 (continued)

Advantages Disadvantages Internal • Equipped to deal with technical • There is no independent external control issues and details source for checking the executive • Fitted for decentralized states • Allows the ministers to avoid that have contracts with multiple blame by pinning it on lower agencies ranking offcials • Is an effcient way to solve prob- • Often used to parry off other lems timely investigations International • Allows the international forum to • Threatens national autonomy Control correct domestic biases, especially • Is out of touch with domestic in fragile democracies issues • Can serve as an outlet of minority groups that are suppressed in the country

The Supply of Accountability Forums: Distinct Costs It is also important to consider the supply of accountability forums because the costs for holding the government to account in different forums differ. When an account-seeker selects an accountability forum, he or she inevitably considers the time, resources, opportunity costs and the reputational effects of using the forums. The “accountability forums require substantial transaction costs” (Bovens and Schillemans 2011, 7) measured in terms of wages, resources, paperwork and processing data (Power 1997; Pollitt 2003; Hosby 2002). “The resources a forum possesses (i.e. time, expertise, administrative capacity, etc.), the presence of incentive to monitor (i.e. interest in the outcome of the delegation, professional reputation), or, on the contrary, the costs of oversight for the forum (e.g. sanctions can be politically costly) will all impact on how and whether the forum discharges its accountability obligations” (Busuioc 2013, 575). The forums also have opportunity costs as they require the time and attention of the highest-ranking offcials who are the busiest (Halachmi 2002). The overhead costs of using the forums results from attempts to assure accountability at a price that greatly exceeds the economic value of preventing possible transgressions (Halachmi 2014, 570). Finally, there is a difference between the economic and reputational costs: “elected offcials still cannot differentiate between the expected monetary (economic) value of adding additional levels of scrutiny and 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 69 oversight and the respective utilities that result from added accountability as a political symbol” (Halachmi 2014, 568). There is no doubt that accountability forums that are co-opted by the elites are more expensive for the public than independent courts, prosecutors, audit chambers, etc. Politically biased forums are unlikely to produce satisfying results for members of the general public (Popova 2012). They are costly in terms of opportunity costs as they offer little return to the investment of money and time. The costs for using accountability forums differ for political parties and for the public. Parliamentary forums cost the public an unbearable price in comparison with the costs that the political opposition in parliament needs to pay to use parliamentary means. For example, an elector has to lobby, write letters to his MP, organise publicity campaigns, seek connections and sometimes pay bribes, do favours or donate to election campaigns to get to make an MP ask a question in parliament. Conversely, for that MP the price of asking a question is measured mainly in terms of his time, attention and reputation. The costs of using the forums are different for the opposition and the ruling party. For example, some legislative instruments of accountability are out of the reach of some MPs. The opposition and the ruling party pay very different costs for using parliamentary means of control. For example, it is relatively less costly for an MP, from the opposition or from the ruling party, to ask a question during Question Time. However, it is impossible for a member of the opposition party, whatever costs he is willing and able to pay, to impose his judgement in a parliamentary committee, where the ruling party usually has a majority. Votes of co-confdence also require coordination costs between opposition parties. If the opposition is in the minority, votes of no-confdence are next to impossible to win. The costs for using accountability forums differ, depending on the salience of the issue. In highly salient media cases, the committees, the prosecutor and the government activate themselves. This activation of the accountability forums is entirely for free for individuals in particular and for civil society as a whole. Self-activation by the accountability forums means that they can skip the whole process of triggers, whistle-blowers, fre alarms and police controls, which they would have to perform in cases of issues of low salience. At the same time, highly salient allegations may cost the incumbents a lot in terms of reputation. Usually, 70 G. DIMOVA the more salient the issue, the higher the costs for the elites and the lower the costs for the public. The costs of using the accountability forums should be viewed not only in absolute but also in relative terms. For example, there is much disagreement whether using the courts is costly for the public or not. Some believe that using legal forms to hold the government to account requires resources that only the elites can afford (Maravall and Przeworski 2003; Papadopoulos 2013). Others believe that the courts are an affordable option for the public (Guarnieri et al. 2002; Shapiro 1988). In relative terms, whatever the costs of the legal option using the courts, it is still a more accessible alternative for an individual than using parliamentary means of control. Finally, the actual use of the accountability forum is costlier than the threat of taking the incumbent to account. It is much more costly to complete the full procedure of winning a case in court than just to send some materials to the prosecutor general over email. Thus, the accountability turn has highlighted the costs associated with using various forums.

The Accountability Turn vs. The Representative, Deliberative, Participatory and Other Turns The accountabilityturn is a notion I have coined to express the changes associated with the supply of accountability forums. The accountability turn is neither universal across all countries nor static across time in the same country. The accountability turn, which encompasses the notion of the perceived and real rise of supply of accountability forums, is manifested in two trends: (1) the costliness of the accountability forums, i.e. how much fnancial, reputational and other resources are necessary to pursue the allegation; (2) the specifcity of the accountability forums, i.e. how well suited the accountability forums are to pursue the allegation, and whether this specialisation comes at the cost of democratic legitimacy. The accountabilityturn is distinct from the various ways suggested by scholars to increase the supply of representation. They include the “representativeturn” (Kröger and Friedrich 2013; Näsström 2011), “the Madisonian turn” (Bergman and Strøm 2013), “the participatory turn” (Saurugger 2010), “the affective turn” (Hoggett and Thompson 2012), “the public turn” (Farmer 2013), “the deliberative turn” (Dryzek 2002) and democracy “after the deliberative turn” (Goodin 2008), the “creative turn” (Harris 2014), the “aesthetic turn” (Kompridis 2014). All of them are reviewed in detail in Chapter 11. 3 SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY TURN 71

The frst major difference that the accountabilityturn proposes is that people are no longer bound to interact with the power-holders exclusively through the representative channel. It places a more pronounced focus on the accountability channel vis-à-vis the representative channel. This shift from representation to accountability is substantial and far-reaching. The conventional way to respond to the shortage or pitfalls of representation is to advocate more representation, a defnition of the scope of election or alternative modes of representation. For example, the “representativeturn” (Kröger and Friedrich 2013; Näsström 2011) compensates for the limited supply of representation by reinventing the importance of the representative claim (Saward 2010) and by highlighting the signifcance of democratic proceduralism (Urbinati 2014). By contrast, the accountabilityturn questions the primacy of elections and democratic proceduralism. It propounds that the implosion of the electoral paradigm and the concomitant explosion of the accountability revolution, both of which are discussed at length above, put democracy on a qualitatively different path, or at least created another path, that is worth exploring. The second major difference is that the accountabilityturn does not try to change public demand. The deliberative, participatory and aesthetic turns all seek to refne, aggregate and represent public demand in various ways (Chapter 11). For example, the deliberative turn suggests that people become more enlightened in the process of participating in deliberative forums (Sass and Dryzek 2014). The participatory turn conjectures that individuals may change their minds in the course of participatory initiatives (Della Porta 2013; Fung 2009). The international turn also argues that by bringing people together in cross-border forums, their demands change (Macdonald 2008; Held 2004). By contrast, the accountabilityturn treats citizens’ preferences as given and exogenously determined. Thus, the accountability turn stands out because it provides opportunities for supply to interact with public demand, but supply does not change demand. Furthermore, unlike many other turns, the accountabilityturn is not monogenic. It is highly decentralised because there are many opportunities to hold the government to account, and these opportunities come at different normative trade-offs and practical costs. The implication is that the accountabilityturn does not seek to aggregate all preferences into one majority preference. It rejects the homogeneity of the public will. Instead, it recognises the incompatibility and diversity of preferences, just as the agonistic turn (Mouffe 2005) does. The accountabilityturn, 72 G. DIMOVA as described here, is most akin to some elements of supply in “monitory democracy” (Keane 2009), “counter-democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008) “social accountability mechanism” (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2000), “Machiavellian democracy” (McCormick 2011), “Madisonian turn” (Bergman and Strøm 2013) and the “rise of the unelected” (Vibert 2007).

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The Demand for Accountability and Public Fragmentation

Public Fragmentation: Does It Enhance or Undermine Public Demand for Accountability? After accusations levelled at the government appear in the media, two conditions must be fulflled in order for the government to be held accountable: there must be enough opportunities for the public and the elites to do so and the public must demand accountability from the incumbents. Simply put, if there are not enough interested individuals or associations to take up media claims at the government and pursue them in the courts, the EU institutions, parliament, through protests and other accountability venues, there will be very little accountability. This chapter turns to public demand for government accountability and particularly to the conditions that could make society more or less demanding in the aftermath of media allegations. A recent slew of studies has put the notion of public fragmentation at the epicentre of the concept of public demand. There is a lot of specu- lation that the public has been fragmented, i.e. that the bonds that have glued various sections of society together have come apart. People are more individualised and less tolerant. Globalisation, the shrinking of the state, the process of de-politicisation, the demise of the political party and the power of the markets are all to blame for the undoing of societal bonds and the increased heterogeneity of the populace. It is considered that this fragmentation of society has had two profoundly different

© The Author(s) 2020 79 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6_4 80 G. DIMOVA effects on the public demand for accountability. The activism, attentiveness and fexibility of the public have increased as the expense of their stability and legitimacy. Thus, public fragmentation has placed public demand for accountability in a limbo. On the negative side, a more disconnected public is less demanding because: (1) small fragments of society are more likely to be co-opted by special interests; (2) its demands are less legitimate and less representative; (3) its demands are more transient; (4) it is unpredictable and ungovernable; (5) it presents a fertile ground for populism; (5) it threatens national identity. Papadopoulos (2013, 217) argues that “social fragmentation” has lead to “heterogeneous and volatile electorate” and “amorphous networks of actors of different nature”. In this context, Stiegler (2011, 94) talks about “uncontrollable societies of disaffected individuals”. Crouch is concerned about the “loss of collective organizational capacity in society” (Crouch 2004, 22) and “a growing complexity of issues” (Crouch 2004, 9). The coalitions of a fragmented public are less stable and less predictable because issue- based groups are more transient. The groups will dissolve as soon as the issue gets off the agenda. Krastev (2013) and Kohli (1991) talk about a “crisis of governability”. When it comes to holding the government to account in the courts, one of the main arguments why a fragmented public cannot hold the government to account is that state transgressions have unequal distributional effects on various groups of citizens. This means that groups that do not perceive themselves as losers from state transgressions will not cooperate with those who perceive themselves as the losers of state transgressions. As a result, no coordinated action against government transgressions will be undertaken. Therefore, there will be no imposition of costs on the rulers and no accountability (Weingast 1997). Thus, the lack of coordination in imposing accountability is a vital deterrent. In a similar vein, Urbinati (2014, 131) believes that the extreme fragmentation of society is dangerous as it could be a fertile ground for populism: “populism treats pluralism of conficting interests as a show of litigious claims to be overcome by creating a polarized scenario that simplifes social forces… Simplifcation and polarization produce vericalisation of political consent, which inaugurates a deeper unifcation of the masses under an organic narrative and a charismatic and Caesarist leader person- ating it”. Huntington (2004, xvi) is also very disturbed by heterogeneity and fragmentation. He suggests that the Anglo-Protestant culture, with 4 THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC FRAGMENTATION 81 its emphasis on the English language, Christianity, Protestant values of individualism and work ethic, constitutes the backbone of national identity. However, that commonality has been challenged by a new wave of immigrants from Latin America and Asia, the popularity of the doctrines of multiculturalism and diversity in intellectual circles, the impact of dias- poras and the elite’s commitment to cosmopolitan and transnational values. This depiction of the fragmented national identity is in line with Huntington’s earlier writings on fragmented demand, which endangers the solid organisation of various groups in society. A fragmented demand is at the core of Huntington’s theory of democratic overload. Some scholars believe that these new constellations impede public demand for accountability. In particular, Krastev (2017) suggests that the “vexing question is… how political identities built around shared conspiracy theories — rather than shared ideologies — are changing the internal logic of democracy and the ability of citizens to hold their leaders accountable”. His hypothesis is that such new constellations of paranoid citizens undermine public demand for accountability because they lack the need for self-criticism. There exists, however, a far more optimistic, albeit far less popular, view of the impact of public fragmentation on demand for accountability. A more disconnected public is considered to be more demanding because: (1) smaller groups are easier to organise and are more fexible; (2) smaller groups are likely to pay more attention to specifc issues about the government; (3) fragmented publics are a viable new alternative to the stagnation of established representative politics. Rosanvallon’s notion of “complex sovereignty” highlights the positive effects of public fragmentation. Instead of seeing the disconnect between the public as a conduit of special interests and instability, Rosanvallon perceives it as a liberation. According to him, complex sovereignty means that “the demos and the unifed people disappear” (Rosanvallon 2008, 263). Complex sovereignty works because it is a practical compromise between preserving the established order and an all-out rebellion. It is the “middle ground between politics as usual and politics as insurrec- tion”, a “middle ground between submission to an established order and rebellion” (Rosanvallon 2008, 140–141), a “pragmatic and pluralistic vision of the general interest” (Rosanvallon 2008, 240). Instead of seeing its dooming power as Papadopoulos, Weingast, Huntington, Crouch and Stiegler do, Rosanvallon conceives the emergence of complex sovereignty as an evolution not only in practical but also in philosophical 82 G. DIMOVA terms. Rosanvallon argues that “it has always been diffcult for French public law to admit anything but a single sovereign power; any attempt to decompose or sub-divide sovereignty is seen as a source of weakness”. This tradition was broken by the writings of Condorcet and Francois Robert who imagined “a more complex notion of sovereignty that would have integrated some forms of preventive power into the nature of government itself” (Rosanvallon 2008, 140). One of the reasons why complex sovereignty works is that it allows for various forms of preventative power to exist within any given homogenous majority. The power of preventative coalitions is that they overcome their heterogeneity very easily and are less costly to organise: “Reactive coalitions are easier to organize because their heterogeneity can be ignored. They do not need to be coherent in order to play their political role. They derive power from the intensity of the reactions to which they give voice” (Rosanvallon 2008, 183). It is easier to organise negative coalitions than positive coalitions. “Rejection is the simplest thing to aggregate. Indeed, all rejections are identical, regardless of what may have motivated them. In a world no longer organized around ideological confrontation, it has become easier and easier to put together reactive political majorities” (Rosanvallon 2008, 183). Bennett (2003, 148) agrees that “it is easier to assemble publics through common threats and fears than through positive appeals”. Similar to Rosanvallon, Tormey (2015) sees the transforming potential of fragmented publics. He agrees that that contemporary society is “disjunctural” (192) as it consists of a “heterogeneous mass of individuals” (76). However, social heterogeneity does not make the public less political. Instead, it just withdraws the societal matrix from traditional electoral and party-based channels of participation and moves to more “subterranean” politics, which are more “‘horizontal’…fexible, participatory, collaborative, spontaneous, non-representative and far less ideological. Instead, they are mostly created around a shared sense of inequality” (Dadgar 2015). In a direct rebuke of Weingast, Smulovitz argues that an uncoordinated public is much better positioned to use the courts to its advantage than a coordinated public. An uncoordinated public possesses several advantages. Its constituents are loosely and less well organised but they are more intensely attentive and interested in the topic of government discussed in the courts. Secondly, an uncoordinated public is less predictable, and in doing so, it makes the elites uncertain whether it would not criticise them on the topic where it hurts most. Third, this type of 4 THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC FRAGMENTATION 83 what she calls “molecular control” is best suited to the uncoordinated nature of the government’s transgressions. Because the “number, places and opportunities for the rulers’ transgressions of the rule of law are enormous, subjects face a technical and physical problem in controlling the rulers’ transgressions” (Smulovitz 2003, 182). Fragmented coalitions have the advantage of being very fexible and proactive, while still requiring a critical mass of trust, which legitimises the importance of the issues. Prodanov’s (2014, 413) idea of the formation of “ad-hock elites” is a good example how smalls sections of society can get together, popularise the issue, while still engaging in a process of public vetting. Finally, because of the uncertainty, attentiveness and feasibility of random interest groups, they are more likely to control-specifc acts of the government. Proponents of the positive effects of public fragmentation of public demand for accountability point out that many of the recent protest movements are apolitical, such as Occupy Wall Street and the Indignados. Krasteva (2014, 474) says that protests have been diversifed according to two criteria: political claims versus syndicate claims and values versus interests. Dinev (2013) distinguishes between positive and negative protests. The movements consist of diverse groups, which orig- inate in diverse contexts. They are leaderless, i.e. the public is not united around a common fgure (Castells 2012, 222; Shigetomi 2009, 91). The rise of protest movements lends credence to the idea that the costs of association and the pursuit of issues are more affordable by an increasingly growing number of constituencies. A great deal of the debate whether pubic fragmentation improves public demand for accountability revolves around the perception of advocacy coalitions. Advocacy coalitions fragment the public in the sense that the public is divided according to the claims it makes and the causes it pursues, instead of being a homogenous body of a territorially defned demoi; functionally defned stakeholders (Kriesi 2013, 8) or “advocacy coalitions” (Baumgartner et al. 2009 cited in Kriesi 2013, 64). On the positive side, Dalton et al. (2003, 254) suggest that such advocacy coalitions empower individual citizens or citizen groups to participate in advisory hearings and attend open government meetings. They argue that this fragmentation into advocacy groups is a sign that new routes to political access have been provided to societal sections, which are not included in the formal electoral channel. Greater access and transparency allow citizens to uncover and punish government malfeasance (Dalton 84 G. DIMOVA et al. 2003, 271). Kriesi (2013, 63) concurs with Dalton that advocacy groups improve electoral accountability in two respects. They allow citizens to take the initiative by putting certain issues on the political agenda and they allow citizens to evaluate single issues rather than a bundle of policies as in elections. In other words, public fragmentation under the guise of advocacy democracy could be perceived as a worthy supple- ment to representative democracy. However, the authors also warn of the opposite view. They (Kriesi et al. 2013, 208) suggest that such advocacy groups do not address the democratic defcit because they remain at the elite level and rarely extend to the citizens at large. Furthermore, Kriesi (2005, 111) argues that when the majority demobilises, it becomes prey to the so-called intensive minorities, which represent small minorities of highly motivated people and stand for “by and far extreme voices in the context of democratic politics”. Papadopoulos levels some of the most compelling criticism of public fragmentation. He believes that “a high degree of organization may be necessary to become a credible spokesman for the interests of ‘clients,’ so not all those affected have the same opportunity to make their voice heard” (Papadopoulos 2013, 15). In the end, Papadopoulos (2013, 220) criticises the fragmentation of the public and the related advocacy democracy as curtailing the representative channel through substitut- ing the individual vote by the organised vote of narrow populations. In a similar vein, Schmitter (2011, 193) argues that public fragmentation leaves some groups more privileged than others because they have unequal access to resources. Some might argue that the idea of public fragmentation is not a new phenomenon. For example, Madison suggests that “geographical expanse, ideological differences, and socioeconomic complexity will… splinter the demos… and thereby prevent it permanently from gaining unity of purpose” (Madison interpreted by Wolin 2017, 234). There are, however, several developments, which are considered to have pulled people within a nation irretrievably apart. The extent of the fragmentation that they have induced goes beyond the natural differences in geogra- phy, ideology and socio-economic status that Madison envisioned. These developments include the loss of trust in the political party, the process of de-politicisation, modernisation, marketisation and the emergence of protest movements. Globalisation and the advancement of the EU are thought to have two opposing effects of simultaneously fragmenting and reconnecting the public. 4 THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC FRAGMENTATION 85

Keane, Rosanvallon and the Fragmentation of Demand Under diversifcation of demand, Keane and Rosanvallon mean that societies have become both big and complex (Keane 2011, 214; Rosanvallon 2006, 80). Keane argues that monitory democracy clearly exposes and undermines the myth of the unifed sovereign:

Monitory democracy demonstrates that the world is made of many demoi, and that particular societies are made of fesh-and-blood people who have different interests and who, therefore, do not necessarily see eye to eye. It could be said that monitory democracy democratizes- publicly exposes- the whole principle of “the sovereign people” as a pompous fction; at best, it turns it into a handy reference device that most people know to be just that, a useful political fction. (Keane 2013, 89–90)

Rosanvallon develops the notion of the diversifcation of demand further. According to him, when the general will was born during the French Revolution, it was amorphous, “unrepresentable” and ambiguous, but it was unifed. The unity of the general will during the French Revolution stemmed mainly from the fact that it stood in a united opposition against a common enemy—the monarchy. Today, the general will continues to be just as amorphous, “unrepresentable” and ambiguous as during its infancy, but it has diversifed:

The point is that a number of forces, not so clearly specifed, combined, the growth of the self- organizing capacity of civil society stands out as the truly remarkable phenomenon. A complex system of interests and wills has substituted for the former ideal type of the political will, a model that pre- supposed a unifed agent. What results is a much more disseminated and differentiated type of economic and social regulation. The regulation has not disappeared, but it has lost its comprehensive scope and, above all, its legibility. (Rosanvallon 2006, 226)

It should be noted, however, that the fragmentation of demand is not absolute. Both Rosanvallon and Keane allow for the possibility that people do come together. According to Rosanvallon (2008, 223), globalisation reconnects the fragmented public through the rise of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism indicates that generality, which is necessary for a unifed sovereignty, can no longer derive from a unifed view of society. 86 G. DIMOVA

Instead, generality is intelligible only as an aggregation of the overlap- ping of particularities. Rosanvallon argues that multiculturalism eased the links between formally separate groups, based on national identity, and this made the process of reconnection less costly. Keane believes that people come together through acquiring broader horizons and a sense of subjectivity. Keane (2009, 839) argues that the rise of monitory democracy was caused by “multiple pressures”, such as the contempt for parties, nationalism, anti-American sentiment, market failures and social inequality, but he also has an eye on more individual level factors, such as personal ambition as well. Nevertheless, the most important initial trigger of monitory democracy was war. The two World Wars “shattered old structures of security… and unleashed angry popular energies that fed major revolutionary upheavals, usually in the name of ‘people’ against representative democracy…Western democracy was denounced as parliamentary dithering and muddling, as liberal perplexity, bourgeois hypocrisy and military cowardice” (Keane 2013, 97). The aftermath of wars was theorised by an intellectual group, which toyed with “the possible self-extinction of electoral democracy” (Keane 2013, 99). Following the wars, three realisations were made that undermined representative democracy: frst, “the ‘natural home’ of democracy in representative form is not the sovereign territorial state”; second, “the language and practice of majority-rule democracy could be utterly corrupted” and third, the unifed notion of “the People” and their sovereignty is false (Keane 2013, 99–100). Rosanvallon takes a slightly different, historical, route to the diversifcation of demand. He charts a three-stage process of the growth of the powers of surveillance and prevention into complex sovereignty. In the frst stage, there were primitive and fragile forms of oversight, such as the insistence of guilds that town accounts were subject to scrutiny by independent auditors in medieval European towns. In the second stage, Parliament monopolised and incorporated all powers of surveillance. The third stage began in the 1970s, when parliamentarianism was in decline and “new powers of oversight developed, and old ones were reorganized and refocused” (Rosanvallon 2008, 83). According to Rosanvallon, the earliest powers of surveillance were practised in classical Greece by the overseers (euthynoi). The Roman tribunes of the people exercised powers of prevention. The idea of the people as overseers, the ideal of the vig- ilant citizen, was embraced by Rousseau and Montesquieu. During the French Constitutional Debates in 1791, the possibility of establishing a 4 THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC FRAGMENTATION 87

“tribunal of the conscience of the people” was discussed but was aban- doned, but it remained a constant feature of French political thought for the frst half of the nineteenth century. Rosanvallon surveys medieval theories of resistance and consent, the right of resistance during the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolutionary experience to state that the idea of the modern ephorate culminates in the writings of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Presumably, modern complex sovereignty takes its roots from this long history.

Causes of the Fragmentation of Demand: Weak Cleavages, De-Politicisation, Globalisation, Marketisation, Modernisation The starting point of any discussion of the fragmentation of the public is the weakening of cleavages in society, and consequently, the decline of political parties. Fragmentation of the public occurs mostly because the social cleavages of class, religion and language (Lijphart’s 1979) no longer divide and structure the demand in a neat and predictable way as they used to. In the 1960s, social cleavages explained about 30% of electoral choice; in the 1980s, social cleavages explained only 10% of electoral choice (Lobo and Curtis 2014, 3). The decline of social cleavages has put an end to mass parties, catch-all parties and class politics. Party politicians become leaders without followers, a political class without a social base (Evans 1999). Party memberships and membership in trade unions and religious organisations have collapsed (Biezen and Poguntke 2014). Catch-all parties have been displaced by cartel parties, far-right parties (Sikk 2009), anti-establishment reform parties (Hanley and Sikk 2016), personalistic parties and the so-called newness parties, which appear not because they adopt a new ideology but just because they are new (Hanley and Sikk 2011). The dissolution of cleavages has infuenced the fragmentation of demand in several ways. The importance and irreplaceability of majorities begins to disappear. The costs for association of smaller groups decrease. Second, alternative forms of formation of the public began to appear: “When parties fail, alternative communitarian, environmental, supplementary and anti-authoritarian organizations emerge” (Lawson and Merkl 2014). Third, issues take centre stage and replace ideology. “Voters increasingly pick policies rather than signing up for 88 G. DIMOVA comprehensive world views. Single issue groups have thrived” (The Economist, 21 October 2010). As the profle of issues increases, the costs of organising groups around issues decrease. Fourth, an organisation of society that is not exclusively based on parties leads to a less predictable way of making politics. De-politicisation has further bolstered fragmentation. De-politicisation refers to a process where society becomes more fragmented and the discourse becomes more issue-based. As Rancière (2007) argues, politics is a major way to organise dissent. When politics is out, societal organisation acquires a dispersed and decentralised quality. The world has become disordered (Mouffe 2005). It is precisely this disorderliness of a de-politicised society that points to the fact that the public man- ages its partial coalitions and the pursuit of issues in a non-structured, a-political way. It also demonstrates that society has managed to tackle the costs of such partial coalitions and that their importance has increased. Globalisation and Europeanisation diversifed the public, and contributed to its fragmentation, by stripping it of its territorial identity. The nation and the state have been historically bound to a certain territory. The advent of supranational states dissolves the territorial boundaries and thus erodes national identity. Multiculturalism, immigration and greater cross-border mobility enhance this process of diversifying the public by challenging national unity. As Olsen (2013, 462) points out, “the EU illustrates that there is no unitary and stable ‘people’ to be served and there are competing claims regarding what citizens want and what their interests and needs are”. The idea of national sovereignty, bound to a territory, is a symbolic way to unite great masses of people. As that notion withered away, the costs for unifcation have gone up. At the same time, in a fragmented public that no longer feels the pressure to organise in a majority to be infuential, the costs of association seem more manageable. Rosanvallon (2006) offers a less standard line of the effect of globalisation on public fragmentation. According to him, globalisation diversifed sovereignty because it increased the distance between state regulation and the institution of the nation state. Whereas market, judicial and other types of regulation have largely overfown the feld of the nation state, the democratic social institution has been weakened by the crisis in the welfare state. The institution weakened but regulation 4 THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC FRAGMENTATION 89 increased. This incongruity necessitates the spread of new types of political forms to express the new social and economic realities. Thus, alongside the conventional form of procedural, i.e. electoral representation, other forms of representation appeared, such as moral and functional (based on expertise) representation (Rosanvallon 2006, 223). Modernisation diversifed demand in two main ways. The rise in the living standards allowed the public to acquire postmodern values (Inglehart 1997, 237). Postmodern values, in turn, were harder to aggregate along one of the three cleavages of economic class. Also, postmodern values increase the salience of issues, and consequently, make it less costly to organise groups around issues. Modernisation also decreased the public’s unity in respecting authority (Warren 1999, 8). The combined effects of modernisation, the decreasing trust in authority and the salience of issues, made the formation of non-majoritarian groups less costly. Consequently, fragmentation ensued. The advent of the market further fragmented the public by obviating the need for centralised power. The doctrine of the market “dispenses with all forms of authority” (Rosanvallon 2006, 150). The New Public Management doctrine is another source of diversifying public demand. The New Public Management created alternative centres for passing judgements on government policies through the processes of “agencifcation” and fragmentation (Egeberg 2008), where the government becomes subordinate and accountable to many quasi-independent governmental agencies, such as guanos and ombudsmen. In this sense, it increased the number of principals holding the government to account.

Implication of Public Fragmentation: Challenge the Principle of the Aggregation of Demand The fragmentation of the public has one important implication: it challenges the principle of aggregation of preferences. If people have become so different and their differences so substantial, then it is harder to do justice to their demands by simply putting them together. Thinking about the public as an aggregation of demands has undergone two stages, and I suggest that we fnd ourselves in a qualitatively different third stage. The frst two stages, the introduction of representation and the expansion of suffrage, tried to resolve the problem of many votes, one representative. The diversity of the public poses a very 90 G. DIMOVA different challenge because the votes are too fragmented to be aggregated (Fig. 4.1). In the frst stage, which marked the transition from direct to representative democracy with very limited suffrage, the idea of the general will (or aggregate demand) emerged. Representation was a mechanism, which resolved the impossibility of a growing population to deliberate and take decisions. The rise of representative democracy was mostly driven by the increased size of the city states: “Since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate in any but some very minor portions of public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative” (Mill 1991 [1861], 80). The great facilitating factor in this frst stage was that people’s demands were very similar. Hobbes (2008 [1651], 82) suggests that “nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and the mind…the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable”. It is only because public demand was homogenous that the principle of aggregation and representation was a suitable mechanism. Wolin (1996, 41) also argues that the assumption of homogeneity of demand was instrumental at this stage: “When Locke’s individuals place themselves under an obligation to observe the law of nature and to treat others as free and equal beings, they create homogeneity not as a description but as a norm”.

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Fig. 4.1 Demand changes: Problem of the multitude becomes the problem of the diversity 4 THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC FRAGMENTATION 91

In its second stage, which was marked by the extension of suffrage, public demand increased because many workers felt excluded and demanded more rights and freedoms. The enfranchisement was a crucial mechanism that integrated the new segments of the population into the old system because it created the illusion that all electors are equal. It bound the population to representative democracy; it made them more invested in it. Enfranchisement was meant to “bind a large class of people to the institutions of the country, teaching them to look to the House of Commons as the tribunal where their grievances could be discussed and remedied” (Ford, 495). The fragmentation of the public demand marks the beginning of a new, third, stage of thinking about demand. It challenges the applica- bility of the “aggregative model” because the assumptions that under- lined the frst and second stage no longer apply to a fragmented public. Schmitt expresses his concern with a conception of democracy based on a homogenous public, when the public is actually heterogeneous: “The various notions of social and economic groups who organize themselves ‘democratically’ have the same subject, ‘the people,’ only in the abstract. In concreto the masses are sociologically and psychologically heterogeneous… Rousseau’s frequently cited arguments in the Social Contract… ultimately conform to an ancient tradition. It [this argument] is to be found only literally in Locke” (Schmitt 1988, 25). In a similar vein, Kuper (2006, 132) unites his idea of “responsive democracy” with a dis- tinctly non-unitary version of the public will: “Responsive democracy constitutes a fundamental break from the neo-Hobbesian paradigm that still dominates both liberal and communitarian theories of citizenship and patriotism. Citizenship is no longer treated as a unitary phenomenon that resolves all motivational complexity and conficts of allegiance by a reference to an ultimate moment of primary attachment to one state or community”. The concept of diversity shows that in reality, the public consists of islands of positive and negative citizenship, of trustful and scepti- cal individuals, and that the confguration of these islands is fuid and interchangeable. The expectation that there will be neat majorities and minorities becomes untenable. A fragmented public puts into question the assumption that preferences are fxed and homogenous. In a fragmented public, demands are changing and diverse. Up until this stage, “the idea of democracy has been simplifed: number alone determines what is law and what is right. All politics is reduced to a question 92 G. DIMOVA of arithmetic” (Tocqueville 2004 cited by Rosanvallon 2011, 12). However, as Rosanvallon argues, “today one would say exactly the opposite” (Rosanvallon 2011, 12). A single government could not respond to the variety of preferences, and the preferences are not likely to be reconciled. All these considerations lay the ground for analysing the fragmented public demands for government accountability and media accusations that follows in the subsequent chapters.

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Shigetomi, Shinichi (ed.). 2009. Protest and Social Movements in the Developing World. Edward Elgar. Schmitter, Philippe. 2011. Diagnosing and Designing Democracy. Available at http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profles/Schmitter/ DiagnosingAndDesigningDemocracy.pdf. Accessed February 2015. Sikk, Allan. 2009. Parties and Populism. CEPSI Working Paper. Available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/docs/research-publications-documents/cepsi-working-papers/parties-and-populism.pdf. Accessed March 11, 2017. Smulovitz, Catalina. 2003. How Can the Rule of Law Rule? Cost Imposition Through Decentralized Mechanisms. In Democracy and the Rule of Law, ed. José María Maravall and Adam Pzeworksi. Cambridge University Press. Stiegler, Bernard. 2011. The Decadence of Industrial Democracies. Polity Press. Tormey, Simon. 2015. The End of Representative Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Urbinati, Nadia. 2014. Democracy Disfgured. Harvard University Press. Warren, Mark. (ed.). 1999. Democracy and Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weingast, Barry R. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law. American Political Science Review 91 (2): 245–263. Wolin, Shledon. 1996. Fugitive Democracy. In Democracy and Difference, ed. Sheila Benhabib. Princeton University Press. Wolin, Sheldon. 2017. Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism-New Edition. Princeton University Press. Проданов, Георги. 2014. „Качество на Демокрацията и Качество на Елитите”. в В: Канев, Добрин., Тодоров, Антоний (съст.) Качество на Демокрацията в България. Изток-Запад, София. Kръстева, Анна. 2014. „Граждански протести, Е-демокрация, Нови Мобилизации”. в В: Канев, Добрин., Тодоров, Антоний (съст.) Качество на Демокрацията в България. Изток-Запад, София. Динев, Ивайло. 2013. Между Негативня и Позитивния Протест. Култура. Available at http://www.kultura.bg/bg/article/view/20734. Accessed June 2017. PART II

Evaluating Government Accountability: Methodological Considerations and Empirical Results CHAPTER 5

Accountability and Democracy: An Assessment

Accountability and Democracy: A Complicated Relationship The fundamental problem with assessing whether the process of accountability that follows media allegations is democratic or not is this: there is no independent way to verify whether the allegations are real or fabricated. Another problem is that accountability in itself is hard to measure because it denotes a relation rather than a fxed quantity. A further complicating factor is that accountability is conceptualised either as a virtue or as an instrument (Bovens 2010) but it is usually both. Current assessments of accountability take one of the four approaches. Some scholars measure accountability in terms of democracy, which is counterproductive because it is impossible to gain new insights about either accountability or democracy, if they are equalised. In another instance, accountability is gauged in terms of elections, but this is a very partial measure of accountability, which misses other ways to hold the incumbents to account. A third approach gauges accountability based on the outcomes it produces, rather than on the process it triggers or the norms it imposes. Finally, scholars assess accountability based on the investigations, sanctions and government explanations. I follow and advance this fourth line of reasoning. I suggest that an improved understanding of the democratic creden- tials of accountability should include a novel measure of the sanctioning capacity of accountability forums. This measure shows how effectively

© The Author(s) 2020 97 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6_5 98 G. DIMOVA the public, parliament, the judiciary, the prosecutor or the EU can sanction incumbents. Currently, such an estimate is missing in the literature. I obtain such a measure by imputing the cases of investigations as independent variables and the sanctions as dependent variables to gain coeffcients, which show the sanctioning effectiveness of various forums, such as the courts, the prosecutor and the president. Then I arrange the coeffcients in an “accountability pyramid”, which is a visual way to order these indicators of sanctioning effectiveness. The top of the pyramid shows the most effective investigations and the base of the pyramid shows the least effective investigations. The height of the pyramid shows the difference between the most and least effective forums. The width of the base of the pyramid shows how many accountability forums overall have some sanctioning powers. The goal is to gain an idea of the relative places of elected, non-elected, specialised and other institutions in the accountability process. More generally, the accountability pyramids are a novel way to acquire an insight into who dominates this process. The other methodological improvement that I suggest is that assessments of accountability need to be comprehensive and dynamic. Viewed in isolation, the accountability pyramids are imprecise indicators of the democratic credential of accountability arrangements. The reason is that the accountability process has many stages, which contain hidden back- doors through which the elites or the public can undermine the accountability process. These aspects are often ignored in assessing accountability but, as I demonstrate below, they are crucial in crafting a more precise assessment of the impact of the accountability process on democracy. In addition to the accountability pyramids specifed above, there are fve other aspects of the accountability process that can provide insights into the democratic nature of the accountability process: (1) the investigation: Which accountability forum conducts the investigation of the government in relation to media allegations; (2) identity of the accuser: Who makes the accusations in the media; (3) the type of the accusation: What type of accusation is levelled at the government in the media; (4) type of sanctions: How the incumbents are punished in relation to media allegations; and (5) government responses: How the government deals with the public accusations. Overall, these indicators should offer the empirical basis to approach the theoretical debates, which then determine the impact of accountability on democracy. Third, good assessments of government accountability should not be too technical or too narrow. Instead, they should serve as the foundation 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 99

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Fig. 5.1 A roadmap to connecting empirical measures of post-media government accountability to democracy for considering the main questions that frame understandings of democracy, namely: Are accountability arrangements a bottom-up phenomenon (Kostovicova and Glasius 2011) or are they a reassertion of the elitist strategies (Chomsky 2012)? Are current forms of accountability suffcient to give voice to “the people”? Who leads in democracy (Ercan and Gagnon 2014)? In other words, the assessment of accountability needs to spell out whether the people or the elites are the net winners of the accountability process. I approach these questions through in-depth theoretical discussions of the roles of parliament, the public, the EU, the judiciary in controlling the accountability process in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. In turn, these theoretical discussions serve as a gateway into assessing the development of democracy more generally in Chapter 9 (Fig. 5.1).

Existing Measures of Accountability: Theoretical Overview Existing concepts of estimating accountability can be classifed into four types: those who evaluate accountability in terms of electoral effectiveness, those that equalise accountability with democracy, those that assess accountability in terms of the internal phases and sanctions and those that gauge accountability in terms of the outcomes it produces 100 G. DIMOVA

(Table 5.1). These four approaches fall into two larger categories— accountability as a virtue and accountability as an instrument. The approaches that assess accountability in terms of democracy and good outcomes perceive accountability as a virtue. Their method implies that accountability is so virtuous that it is intrinsically connected with democracy. The approaches that assess accountability in terms of the electoral process or the specifc aspects of the accountability process perceive accountability as an instrument. To them, accountability is a mechanism for achieving certain outcomes. Each of these perspectives offers insights into the accountability process but also has some limitations. Ideally, such methods should perceive accountability both as a virtue and as a mechanism. The most common way to link accountability and democracy is to equalise them. According to this approach, various aspects of the democratic process and elections become proxies for accountability. Corruption levels (Adsera et al. 2000), political and civil rights (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), trust in legislatures and in parties (Schmitter 2004) and public perceptions of accountability (Kaufmann et al. 2008) should supposedly indicate greater accountability. According to this explanation, accountable governments inevitably emerge in democratic countries, where civil and political rights are respected, the media are free, trade unions do not boycott important government decisions, etc. The shortcoming of this conceptualisation is that there is no necessarily a linear relation between various dimensions of democracy and government accountability. In fact, some scholars believe that one can have accountability without democracy (Tsai 2007; Schedler 2015). All good things do not necessarily go together. Furthermore, this approach confuses the dependent with the independent variable. It measures accountability with democracy, when in fact democracy can cause accountability. Accountability arrangements can produce a spectrum of outcomes of various degrees of democratic credential and so it is important to evaluate each democratic outcome separately. Thus, I use a wide variety of indicators to estimate how the positive and negative sides of the Europeanisation, judicialisation, presidentialistaion and de-parliamentarisation of the accountability process play out for democracy. The second existing approach evaluates accountability from the perspective of its effect on various aspects of politics. This perspective also perceives accountability as a virtue rather than as a mechanism. It judges accountability not in terms of the actual process of sanctions 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 101 (continued) There have been no frequent incidents where important boycotted the implementation organizations of government decisions Public perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government The national legislature over the past fve years approved the annual government budget within the prescribed time limit There been not major incidents in which signifcant parties, or associations, refused to discuss important legislation • Executive decision makers invite spokespersons from competing parties to discuss the drafting of major laws • Classifcation of executive accountability Types of arguments supplied by the accountability holders: on their actions, intentions, results of arguments Types Re-directory; informatory; explanatory; amendatory; sacrifcial explain their actions enforceability: punishing poor or criminal Answerability: making power-holders performance Investigatory; punitive Accountability cube: information phase, debating sanctions phase The government provides suffcient, reliable and timely information There is a proper debate where both sides are heard. The forum of judgment is independent and unbi - ased. The standards of judgment are clear The facts warrant the judgment The consequences are proportionate The ability of constituents to punish their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes of the representativeThe responsiveness to the constituents Extent to which governments keep their campaign promises Ability of the voters to sanction government for retrospective performance Durability and overall quality of democracy: civil rights political as rated by Freedom House Level of government corruption and effciency • • Public perceptions of freedom of expression, freedom of association, free media • Increase in turnout over the past three elections for the national legislature • Individuals increasingly support parties focusing particularly on a given issue • The country has improved its economic competitiveness over the past fve years • • Citizens reported that they believe their leaders pay more attention to persons such as themselves • Author Goodin ( 2003 ) ( 1994 , 26) Turpin Goetz and Jenkins ( 2004 ) Flinders ( 2001 , 12) Brandsma and Schillemans ( 2012 ) Bovens ( 2007 ) Pitkin ( 2004 ) Greene et al. ( 2014 ) Hellwig and Samuels ( 2007 ) Mainwaring and Shugart ( 1997 , 29) Adsera et al. ( 2000 , 14) Kaufmann et al. ( 2008 , 7) Schmitter ( 2004 , 2007 6) Theoretical criteria for evaluating accountability Criteria Sanctions and explanations Elections Democracy 5.1 Table 102 G. DIMOVA Classifcation of executive accountability The extent to which an accountability arrangement or regime enables democratically legitimized bodies to monitor and evaluate executive behaviour induce actors modify that in accordance with their preferences The extent to which an accountability arrangement curtails the abuse of executive power and privilege The extent to which an accountability arrangement stimulates public executives and bodies to focus consistently on achieving desirable societal outcomes Author Bovens ( 2007 ): democratic perspective Bovens ( 2007 ): constitutional perspective Bovens ( 2007 ): learning perspective (continued) Criteria External 5.1 Table 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 103 and investigations but in terms of the outcomes that it stimulates. For example, it judges the process of accountability positively if “it induces executive actors to modify their behaviour in accordance with their preferences” or when “it stimulates public executives to focus consistently on achieving desirable societal outcomes” (Bovens et al. 2010, 231). Furthermore, Bovens (2007) argues that “new forms of accountability enhance policy learning and provide a series of formal and informal checks and balances but they are no alternative to traditional forms of popular control”. Another common perspective in assessing accountability arrangements is to link them to elections. This perspective perceives accountability as a mechanism rather than as a virtue. According to it, accountability is present when governments keep their electoral promises or if people can sanction the power holders through the ballot (Green 2009; Hellwig and Samuels 2007). This exclusive focus on electoral accountability is too restrictive. It is problematic from the point of view of the literature, which acknowledges the multitude of accountability mechanisms (O’Donnell 2003; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006, 27; Flinders 2001, 20; Keohane 2003, 1130–1135). Grant and Keohane (2005, 42) claim, “we should resist the temptation to narrow the issue of accountability to that of democratic control”. Mulgan (2014, 552) restates the need to go beyond electoral accountability, “to be useful, the concept [of accountability] should be widened beyond political control to include possible defcits in any type of accountability”. Furthermore, such an emphasis on electoral accountability conficts with the realisation that the practices of government wrongdoing have diversifed (Schillemans 2011) and de-politicised (Flinders and Wood 2013). In addition, a narrow focus on elections is uni-centred and does not compound well with the acknowledgement that contemporary democracy does not have one single centre of conferring judgement. Democracies are decentralised and multiple centred (Navarria 2010; Kane and Patapan 2009), and some of these centres have non-electoral means of legitimation (Vibert 2007; Rosanvallon 2011). Finally, such a preoccupation with accountability through elections is not compatible with the considerations of the limitations of elections, which are outlined in Chapter 3. Another strain of accountability research, etched mainly in the public administration literature, gauges accountability as a process with multiple stages and multiple aspects. In its incipient stages, it is visible in Pitkin’s 104 G. DIMOVA writings on accountability as a sanctioning mechanism (Pitkin 2004). This perspective conceives accountability as a mechanism rather than as a virtue. Its primary focus falls on the issues of account-giving and investigations (Goodin 2003; Turpin 1994; Brandsma and Schillemans 2012). According to this view, government accountability is democratic when the incumbents routinely give information and explanations about their plans, actions and policies, when there is a proper debate about the policies. The accountability process is also considered democratic, when the forum of judgement is independent and unbiased, the standards of judgement are clear, the facts warrant the judgement and the consequences are proportionate (Bovens 2007). This approach has several advantages over the other three perspectives that link accountability to elections, democracy or to the outcomes it produces. Its main advantage is that it is inclusive and considers multiple aspects of the accountability process, such as the investigations and account-giving. My research is frmly anchored in this method but it aims to refne and expand it in several ways. One important conceptual and methodological expansion of the tools for assessing accountability is the introduction of the notion of the accountability pyramid, which compares the sanctioning effectiveness of various investigative forums. Another improvement is to apply existing measures of government responses to media inquiries, the type of accusation and the various types of sanctions in a more consistent and integrated way. This contribution would be impossible without the collection of an original database containing about 6000 articles alleging incumbents of misconduct or incompetence. It also has the advantage that it compares the post-media accountability process across countries, covering a democracy (Germany), a transitional democracy (Bulgaria) and a managed democracy (Russia). Finally, my evaluation of the accountability process does not end with these measures. The measures serve as the foundation for approaching the theoretical debates, which yield the corresponding judgements on the crisis or transformation of democracy.

Contribution 1: Introduce the Notion of the “Accountability Pyramid” as a Measure of the Sanctioning Effectiveness of Investigative Forums I introduce a new measure of accountability, which gauges the relative sanction power of various accountability forums. Consideration of this measure indicates that it is important not only whether certain media 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 105 allegations are investigated by parliament and other institutions, but whether the investigations actually produce sanctions. I obtain estimates of this measure from the coeffcients of a regression analysis where the input variables are the investigations conducted by the prosecutor, the courts, parliament, president, the audit chamber and various government investigations, and the output variables are the resulting sanctions. The regression controls for public opinion, unemployment, infation and includes a measure of the identity of the accuser. The coeffcients show to what extent one sanctioning forum is likely to impose sanctions on the government. The equation below shows how this study gauges the impact that various investigative mechanisms exert on the probability that the government will be sanctioned for media accusations. I take the capacity of each investigative body to impose sanctions on the government as an indicator of how much the government is accountable to that body. Higher coeffcients indicate that the government is more accountable to that particular mechanism. Constant + α(Legislative investigation) + β(Legal investigation) + c(Internal government investigation) + d(Public opinion) + e(International investigation) + Control Variables + Error term “Sanctioning of the accused government minister” = For example, if a parliamentary committee is involved in investigating a media accusation of government incompetence, the equation translates the likelihood of a sanction by the coeffcient α. If an accusation is taken to the Supreme Administrative Court, then the type of accountability mechanism is legal, and the coeffcient β gauges its impact on the probability of sanctioning the government. The coeffcient d signifes how a decrease in the public approval ratings of the government increases the chances that the government minister will be sanctioned or a policy would be reversed. The same goes for the effect of internal governmental and international accountability. Three estimation methods are used to gauge the effectiveness with which various investigations produce sanctions—frst differences, odds ratios and probit analysis. The results I get from all three estimation techniques are consistent.1

1 The only exception is that the impact of the presidential approval ratings in Russia differs slightly between the frst differences model and the odds ratio model. In the chapter on Russia, I explain why this might be the case. 106 G. DIMOVA

In model 1, I present the estimations of First Differences. The coeffcients present the change in the simulated probability of the dependent variable, “sanctioning the government”, when a particular independent variable, “investigation by a particular accountability mechanism”, increases from its minimum to its maximum value. All other independent variables are kept at their means. For example, if the coeffcient for a prosecutorial investigation is (.34), and the dependent variable is dichotomous, this means that the presence of a prosecutorial investigation of the government increases the probability that the government will be sanctioned by 34%. If the dependent variable is gauged in degrees, for example, demoting a minister versus dismissing a minister, then a coeffcient of (.34) means that a prosecutorial investigation increases the probability that the government minister will be dismissed versus him being demoted by 34%. In model 2, I present the fndings of Odd Ratios. According to this model, a coeffcient of 34 means that a prosecutorial investigation increases the odds of the government being sanctioned versus not being sanctioned by 34 times. In model 3, I present the fndings of Probit estimations. A positive coeffcient means a one-unit increase in the independent variable has the effect of increasing the odds of being in a higher category for the dependent variable. In other words, we estimate the effects of an independent variable in raising or lowering the odds of a response in a given category of the dependent variable or below. A coeffcient of 34 in a probit model means that the presence of a prosecutorial investigation increases the likelihood of imposing sanctions on the government. The precise magnitude of that increase, however, is not known as in odd ratio and frst differences models. All of the independent variables, except public opinion, are coded as dichotomous variables, where 0 designates the absence of an investigatory mechanism, and 1 designates the presence of an investigation.

• Legislative investigations are coded as 1 if there is a vote of no-confdence, select investigative committees or parliamentary questions relating to public accusations against the government. They are coded as 0s otherwise. • Judicial investigations are coded as 1 if there are investigations conducted by the independent counsel or the prosecutor general, review of a lawsuit against the government by the Supreme Court, 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 107

Cassation Court, Administrative, Constitutional Court or lower courts. They are coded as 0s otherwise. • Internal government investigations are coded as 1 if there are investigations conducted by the president, the prime minister, government experts, emergency Cabinet meetings or emergency meetings of the governing party. They are coded as 0 otherwise. • International investigations are coded as 1 if there are investigations conducted by foreign prosecutors or international investigations. They are coded as 0 otherwise. • Public opinion is taken at the frst available number after the publication of the frst article containing accusations against the government. The frst differences model estimates the effect of moving public opinion from its minimum value in the dataset to its maximum value in the dataset. Probit models estimate the effects of a change in public opinion by 1%. 0 in this category indicates that the public approval rating of the government is 0%.

Accountability pyramids measure three important aspects of the relative sanctioning of accountability forums. First, they measure which is the most infuential sanctioning body. This body occupies the top of the pyramid. It gives the name of the accountability arrangements, such as judicialisation, if the courts are most effective, presidentialisation, if the president is most effective, etc. However, this generalisation is just a short cut; it should not be assumed to describe the whole accountability process, which is multidimensional. The second aspect of the accountability pyramid is its height. The height measures how many stages of sanctioning power accountability forums exert. The most effective sanctioning forums are placed at the top and are frst-order sanctioning mechanisms. The less effective forums are placed below and are second-order sanctioning mechanisms. The third most effective forums come on the third level, etc. Taller pyramids mean that the sanctioning power of the pyramids is more distributed among the most effective and least effective sanctioning forums. Shorter pyramids indicate that there are either forums, which are very effective, or such that are not very effective, but not a lot of forums in between. The base of the accountability pyramid is very important. It shows how many accountability forums scan sanction the government. 108 G. DIMOVA

• Pyramid Top: Who is at the top of the pyramid? • Pyramid Height: How tall is the pyramid? • Pyramid Base: How many functioning accountability forums are there?

The accountability pyramids contribute distinct analytical and explanatory advantages. First, they provide useful indicators of the degree of de-parliamentarisation, technocratisation and about the place of informal sanctioning mechanisms. They are the only measuring devices that put the sanctioning power of the legislatures and non-elected bodies in a relative perspective. Another advantage of the accountability pyramids is that they are multidimensional, i.e. they compensate for the limitations of existing measures of accountability, which are predominantly focused on electoral accountability or on democracy more generally. They take a full picture of the de-centralisation of accountability mechanisms. At the same time, they reintegrate, relativise and centralise the cacophony of arrangements. Many studies have underscored the multidimensionality of accountability but none has overcome it. This failure has resulted in a lack of knowledge who ultimately holds the government to account in between elections. Third, accountability pyramids are a good indicator of the elitism of democratic arrangements. If there are a few accountability forums and only one trumps the others, and if the most effective accountability forum is elitist, then democracy suffers. Conversely, many and equally effective extra-electoral accountability mechanisms make it impossible for any particular elite to dominate the others. In this way, accountability pyramids are suitable measures to consider when drawing conclusions about the crisis of democracy. Finally, accountability pyramids do not pretend that accountability forums exist independent of each other. Especially for media accusations, which reach all accountability forums, accountability forums compete or coordinate, and their interaction is important. Let’s look at one illustration of the accountability pyramids. In the graph below, there are two types of accountability pyramids. In the pyramid to the left, the EU is at the top, which means that EU mechanisms are most likely to impose sanctions on the government, when an accusation surfaces in the media. In the pyramid to the right, the president is most effective accountability forum. Pyramid 1 is taller than pyramid 2, which means that there are many levels of sanctioning power, such 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 109

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Fig. 5.2 Examples of two accountability pyramids as the prosecutor (second-order), intergovernmental investigations, public opinion (third-order) and parliamentary questions (fourth-order). By contrast, pyramid 2 presents either a presidential or prosecutorial degrees of sanctioning power. The base of pyramid 1 is wider than the base of pyramid 1, which indicates that accountability seekers in the frst case have a larger number of effective accountability forums at their disposal. The choice of accountability forums for accountability seekers in the second case is extremely limited. Overall, pyramid 2 demonstrates an undermining of the accountability process. It is overtaken and monopolised by non-elected, single-person institutions, such as the president or the prosecutor. Pyramid 2 indicates an extreme case of elitism in accountability. It is a telling sign of the crisis of democracy. In short, the accountability pyramid is a unique way of assessing both empirically and methodologically the “rebalancing” of the powers in horizontal accountability and it is also a unique way to compare the balance of power between old mechanisms of horizontal accountability and new ones (Fig. 5.2).

Contribution 2: Refine Five Criteria for Assessing Democracy Through the Lens of Accountability Building upon the strain of accountability research, which examines investigations, sanctions and government explanations, I single out additional assessment criteria and view all of them in conjunction with each other. I propose measures of the identity of the accuser, the type of issue that constitutes the allegation (corruption or incompetence), a 110 G. DIMOVA comparison of the frequency of investigations across all possible accountability forums, an examination of government responses not only in parliament but in the whole public space and a note of the type of the sanctions, which includes several different types, not only dismissals. These measures come in addition to the measure of the sanctioning power of various accountability forums, discussed above. This comprehensive and dynamic approach allows me to approach questions of the parliamentarisation, judicialisation and presidentialisation of the post-media accountability process (Table 5.2). The introduction of multiple criteria for evaluating accountability might be confusing. As Dunn (2010) argues, “monitory democracy, on Keane’s reading… offers no coherent basis on which to assign entitle- ment or competence to judge, no way of rendering its judges or judgments accountable, and no systematic means to align judgment with the control of consequences in the world. This cannot be how to link sound judgment to effective authority”. Dunn is right. The lack of predictabil- ity may render democracy beyond elections a useless concept. We would never be able to agree whether the executive accountability is de-parliamentarised, judicialialised, presidentialised or EU-nised. Ultimately, if no ranking of criteria is installed, we would never be able to reach a conclusion whether democracy is in crisis or not. This book suggests that the accountability pyramids should be the most important guide in assessing accountability beyond elections. Who imposes the sanctions is probably more important than who makes the accusations, how the government responds to the allegations or what the sanctions are.

Assessment Criterion 1: Who Investigates the Government for Media Allegations? This aspect of the accountability process fashes out the trade-off between sanctions and values. It is in line with the perspective that the accountability process has many phases (Flinders 2001; Brandsma and Schillemans 2012). It is important which forums investigate the wrongdoing, not only which forum sanctions it. Just as the forums leave their imprint on the nature of the sanctions, their logic and specifcity are evident in the investigative process, i.e. in the process through which various forums reach their conclusions about the culpability of the government. Furthermore, it is important to what extent the forums open up the issue of government culpability for public discussion. Vibert (2007, 101) 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 111 Personnel- ori - ented sanctions Mainly policy and oriented sanctions Policy- oriented sanctions Sanctions Government strategies Assault media accuser Denial of media charges Defend and explain govern - ment policies : Courts Base : : prosecutor, EU, : prosecutor, Main one: forums (accountability pyramid) President Base: Top: Little choice of forums Height : 3 sanctioning levels Top Many choices of forums Height : 4 sanctioning levelstop, base and height should be on separate lines as in the other cells Top government Base : Many choices of forums Height : A few sanction - ing levels - - Investigations Mostly presidential investigations Mostly par liamentary questions Mostly par liamentary questions Issue Mainly politicised issues Mainly policy issues, but also politicisable issues Mainly policy issues The multiple criteria for evaluating executive accountability beyond elections Accuser Media Media and opposition Opposition Criteria countries Russia Bulgaria Germany 5.2 Table 112 G. DIMOVA argues that accountability forums have two functions: to solve problems and to serve as arenas for discussing values and principles. This is probably also refected in Boven’s (2010) idea that accountability is not only an instrument (for imposing sanctions) but also embodies certain values. These values come alive during the investigation process. Vibert (2007, 109–113) suggests that there is a functional differentiation between unelected and elected forums responding to judgemental processes based on knowledge and discursive processes based on values, respectively. Therefore, the accountability forums, if they serve as a forum for opening up the public dialogue, can enhance public contestability of certain alleged wrongdoings. This public debate is a value in itself. The fndings in the empirical chapters in this book demonstrate how considerations of accountability based on the investigations often modify the conclusions reached through assessing other criteria. For example, the conclusion that the courts are very effective in sanctioning the government in Bulgaria is partially mitigated by the observation that the courts only rarely investigate the government. In other words, the courts may be an effective but rare instrument. Similarly, although the German parliament is weak in sanctioning the government, it is strong in investigating it. In Russia, the glimpse into the investigative process enforces rather than undermines the conclusion that the president has monopolised the accountability process as most sanctions and most investigations are performed by presidential committees, not by the Duma.

Assessment Criterion 2: Who Constructs the Accountability Agenda in the Media? The identity of the accuser is an important but neglected aspect of the accountability chain. The importance of the accountability-holder is threefold. First, accountability-holders defne the accountability agenda by initiating the accountability process. They frame and prime the accountability debate. The government is put in the back seat as the incumbents are given no choice but to react to the accusations surfac- ing in the media. When the public takes the initiative to level allegations at the government in the media, the public reverses the central tenet of audience democracy, where the “terms of electoral choice belong to politicians and not to the electorate” (Manin 1997, 223). Manin’s main concern with audience democracy is that the public does not participate in constructing electoral programmes, etc. In audience democracy, voters 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 113 are mere spectators of the performance put on stage by the politicians who are the initiators (Mancini 2011, 18). The second reason why the identity of the accuser is important is that account-holders usually trigger the accountability chain, when they think that they are most likely to beneft from it. Therefore, the identity of the accuser is one indicator for assessing who benefts mostly from the accountability process. Third, the ability to ask questions is very important even if the questions are not answered. The unanswered questions show which issues the government refuses to respond to or ignores. They “catch” the government in an unguarded moment. Usually, the identity of the group, which makes allegations at the government, is considered to be dichotomous. Critics of democracy believe that public demand is made by sectional, corporatist and elite’s interests (Papadopolous 2013). Alternatively, proponents of democracy argue that public demand has been reconfgured to express the demands of a more active civil society and groups, which are increasingly capable to organise around issues (Prodanov 2014), civil society invigoration (Kriesi 2013), protest movements (Castells 2012; Della Porta 2012), more demanding public opinion, or investigative journalists (Thompson 2000) or NGOs Slaughter (2004). In reality, the distribution of the accusers is not dichotomous but a matter of degrees. The reason for this is that the construction of demand is a result of multiple, sometimes mutually opposing, processes, such as mediatisation, globalisation, weakening of party cleavages, technological progress and modernisation, which rarely come together to produce a single winner of the confguration (Chapter 4). That is why it is essential to consider inquiries, such as: Which group benefts mostly from the decreased costs for association? Who are the new ad hoc majorities and the vocal minorities that have taken the place of the purported disappearance of the majority?

Assessment Criterion 3: What Kind of Issues Make up the Accountability Agenda? This criterion harks back to Vibert’s claim that the emergence of new forums is connected to the fact that there are new issues, which need to be reviewed by more specialised bodies (Vibert 2007, 103). Given this line of argument, it is surprising that there has been disproportionate attention paid to the logic of the forums and relatively less attention 114 G. DIMOVA whatsoever to the issues which are reviewed by the forums. There has been a large body of scholarship dealing with the way that allegations levelled at the government are liable to politicisation (Brändström and Kuipers 2003; Edelman 1988; Bovens et al. 1999, 145; Boin et al. 2009, 100; McConnell 2003). However, this differentiation does not get to the heart of the problem, namely whether the issues require a specifc forum of investigation. If we go by this conventional differentiation of allegations, there is no way to establish that the spread of accountability forums have provided a better ft for new types of issues, if the issues themselves are not studied and well known. I divide the media allegations into allegations of misconduct and allegations of incompetence. Misconduct charges include accusations of corruption, matters of private life, such as infdelity and sexual orientation, information-related and electoral allegations. Incompetence charges relate to delayed handling of emergencies and bad policy decisions. For example, in Russia incompetence charges related to foreign policy and to the handling of emergency situations. Their prevalence is dictated by the ongoing wars in Chechnya and the terrorist acts throughout Russia. There were fourteen allegations for mishandling emergency situations, including, the handling of the Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis in 1995, the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in 2002, the Beslan school hostage crisis in 2004 and the rescue of the submarine Kursk in 2000. In this sense, the issue-orientation of the accountability agenda in Russia is slightly overesti- mated by the number of overall instances of incompetence.

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 Corruption Incompetence

Germany Bulgaria Russia

Fig. 5.3 Distribution of issues on the accountability agenda (N 1314) = 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 115

The data reveal that incompetence charges comprise the biggest category of issues in all three countries. Charges of misconduct are the second biggest category. However, the relative frequency of incompetence and misconduct charges varies across countries. In Russia, the difference between misconduct and incompetence charges is the small- est. In Bulgaria, the disparity between the misconduct and incompetence charges is the biggest. By contrast, in Germany, the most common charges are related to policies, not to corruption (Fig. 5.3).

Assessment Criterion 4: How Does the Government Respond to Media Accusations? There is an agreement in the literature that government account-giving constitutes a crucial step towards overall accountability but there have been insuffcient attempts to integrate this aspect into empirical assessments of accountability. In theory, accountability is often defned as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens 2007, 450). Aucoin and Neintzman (2000, 49–52) argue that “the processes of public accountability in which administrators are given the opportunity to explain and justify their intentions, and in which citizens and interest groups can pose questions and offer their opinion, can promote acceptance of government authority and the citizens’ confdence in the government’s administration”. In a similar vein, March and Olsen (1995, 141–181) suggest that “account giving by political executives to political forums, such as elected representatives, political parties, voters, and media, is crucial as a feedback mechanism to establish popular control of government”. Account-giving is so important because it levels the inherent information asymmetries that defne the relationship between the electors and their representatives. There are many categorizations of government responses, centring on two main lines: whether the government recognizes the problem and whether it accepts blame (Hood et al. 2009; McGraw 1990, 1991; Weaver 1986; Bovens et al. 1999; Coombs 1998). Hood (2014, 609) argues that “the abundance of blame avoidance strategies obscures the main inquiry, namely how the government strategies affect accountability, namely whether they improve answerability and the fow of information”. Building upon existing categorisations, this article reduces existing 116 G. DIMOVA typologies of responses to one main differentiation: do the responses contain some element of information or not? These two categories are labelled as explanatory and evasive responses respectively. Explanatory strategies include “defend position” and “confess, apologize”. They provide additional information to the public, which levels the information asymmetries inherent in the representative chain. Explanatory responses enhance accountability. Evasive (also referred as aggressive) strategies include “deny charges”, “attack accuser verbally”, “fle libel suit” and “attack accuser non-verbally”. They restrict the fow of information, as their main purpose is to defect attention from the issue in the allegation. As Fig. 5.4 shows, in Germany, the biggest category of government responses is defensive. That means that German government offcials are most prepared to give explanations and to present the rationale for their decisions. In Russia, assaulting the accusers in the media comprises the biggest category of government responses. This category is most perni- cious for accountability because it does not centre on the wrongdoing

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Fig. 5.4 How do governments respond to media allegations? (N 1314) = 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 117 or on those responsible for the wrongdoing. Instead, it simply jeopard- ises the position of the accuser. Assaulting the accuser sends a signal that the true wrongdoing is raising issues with the government. I use it in the Russia chapter to confrm my conclusion of presidentialisation of accountability in Russia. In Bulgaria, government denial of media accusations constitutes the biggest category of responses. Government denials are less informative than government defensive responses because they shift the debate from the question who bears responsibility for the wrongdoing to whether there is a wrongdoing in the frst place. At the same time, government denials are still a more constructive type of responses because they allow the incumbents to engage with the public in a process of account-giving. The hope is that at some point this process will reveal an “ocular moment” (Green 2009), when the public will catch the incumbents off guard and will learn about their true intentions. Of course, persistent denials are not conducive to account-giving as they merely show that the incumbents are not ready to accept responsibility.

Assessment Criterion 5: What Kind of Sanctions Are Imposed? The nature of the sanctions is the ffth indicator of the democratic nature of the accountability process. Sanctions are often ignored but they are important because they can lessen the sanctioning effects of a given accountability forum. Imagine, for example, that a jury fnds a person guilty of a second-degree murder and the judge orders the death penalty. In another state, the jury gives the same guilty verdict of a frst-degree murder and the judge sentences the culprit to 25 years of confnement with the possibility of parole. The point is that the actual sanctions may incur various degrees on harm on the incumbents, even when the same type of wrongdoing is established. For example, if an incumbent is found guilty of grave incompetence in one country, the president can demote that person, or appoint him to another, equally attractive position of power, whereas the president in another country may reverse that policy. In the second scenario, the sanctions will incur much more harm than in the frst case. The dependent variable, or the variation that I aim to explain in this study, is the difference in the degree of government accountability. I propose three models for gauging the dependent variable “sanctioning of the government minister” (Fig. 5.5). The models differ in the way they gauge the severity of the sanctions. In the frst model, the dependent 118 G. DIMOVA

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Fig. 5.5 Three coding schemes of the dependent variable “Punitive Accountability” variable “sanctions imposed on the government as a result of investigations of media accusations” has the following eleven degrees enumerated in an ascending order: no sanction, exonerate an offcial or retain government policy, policy compromise, reversal of a policy, creation of legislation pertinent to the alleged offense, verbal reprimand or fnes imposed on an incumbent, demotion of a lower-ranking offcial, dismissal of a lower-ranking offcial, demotion or appointment to another position of a high-ranking offcial, dismissal of a high-ranking offcial, arrest and imprisonment. The second coding assumes that personnel changes in the government amount to more accountability than changing separate policies. The logic is that ministers can generate many policies while policies cannot generate ministers. Dismissing a minister means dismissing a whole range of policies that he could have potentially suggested. A minister is a less exhaustible resource than policies. I apply this second type of coding to Bulgaria and Russia, because there are many personnel-related sanctions in these two countries. In the second model, the dependent variable “sanctions” has the following degrees: 0—no sanction; 1—the imposition of a government policy; 2—compromise with the government policy; 3—all 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 119 sanctions from reversal of policies to dismissals of high-ranking offcials. This type of coding assumes that reversing a policy indicates the same degree of punishment for the government as personnel changes, such as dismissing or demoting incumbents. The substantive difference is whether the policy is imposed, compromised or totally reversed. I use this coding for Germany, where policy disputes comprise the biggest part of accusations of government malfeasance. In the third model, the dependent variable “sanctions” is coded as dichotomous, where 0 indicates no sanctions and 1 indicates the presence of sanction. This coding assumes that the government accepts equal responsibility, regardless whether it secedes on a policy question, completely abandons a policy action, demotes a low-ranking offcial or dismisses very highly positioned incumbent. This measure is applied to all countries in this study. It is important to pay attention to a special category of the dependent variable—exoneration of a government minister or the imposition of the original government policy. This category can be interpreted in two ways. In one case, the government clearly does not make any conces- sions, and it does not suffer any punishment. According to this logic, exoneration should be coded as 0, i.e. the government suffers no sanctions. This is the rationale implicit in coding schemes 1 and 2. On the other hand, exoneration is not a sanction but it is defnitely a verdict. The presence of some sort of a decision indicates that the investigation was willing or able to produce a result, which is a form of accountability. According to this logic, exoneration should be coded as 1. This rationale is implicit in coding scheme 3. For all practical purposes, this category is so small relative to the others that I use it interchangeably. There are three ways to subvert the accountability process through sanctions. First, imposing primarily sanctions that centre on the people rather than on policies allows the government to preserve a given course of action by simply disposing of the faces attached to it. Second, reap- pointing guilty incumbents to infuential positions, instead of dismissing them, is another way to subvert the accountability process through sanctions. Third, delegating the blame to low-ranking offcials is a classic way to dissolve high-ranking offcials of blame (Fig. 5.6). The fndings suggest that the Bulgarian government faces the most punitive sanctions. They are related to policies and they relate to total reversal of those policies. In Germany, reversal of policies is also the most common category, but the difference between the number of sanctions where policies are reversed and the number of sanctions where a 120 G. DIMOVA

Patterns of Sanctioning the Government

All 60 50 40 30 20

Sanctions 10 0

Percentage of

New gher gher Policy Lower Hi Hi Official Official Official Demote Reverse Ranking Ranking Ranking Dismiss Dismiss Laws eate Policy Cr Exoneration Compromis Imprisonment Categories of Sanctions

Bulgaria Russia Germany

Fig. 5.6 Incidence of sanctions imposed on the governments in Germany, Russia and Bulgaria (N 1314) = compromised is reached and the policies are not reversed is smaller than that in Bulgaria. The German government faces less strict consequences from its actions because in many cases it is exonerated. In other words, both the German and Bulgarian incumbents are punished through policy-related instead of personnel-related sanctions; however, the German incumbents suffer a more partial displacement of policies than their Bulgarian counterparts. In Russia, the sanctions are most elusive and least conducive to an actual punishment of the incumbents. The sanctions do not relate to policy, which means that they affect just the people who committed the wrongdoing. But even these personnel-related sanctions are evasive. The biggest category is to demote high-ranking offcials, which means that guilty incumbents are not dismissed, but just moved from one position to the other. The incriminated offcials remain in power and can con- veniently resume a high position when the media storm dies away. The second biggest category of sanctions in Russia is the dismissal of lower-ranking offcials. This strategy allows the government to preserve the infuential favourites and dispose of people who have little say anyway.

Methodological Appendix 1: Data Collection, Unit of Analysis, Case Study Selection

Data Collection It is impossible to obtain consistent and comparable estimates of the accountability process without collecting the necessary data. I compiled 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 121 an original database of more than 1314 media charges and 5980 articles involving the governments in Russia, Bulgaria and Germany. I collected 2904 articles and 467 scandals in Germany, 2583 articles and 942 accusations in Bulgaria, 493 articles and 205 accusations in Russia. I noted down the nature of each allegation, the position of the alleged minister, the title and date of each article related to the accusation, the name and the position of the accuser, the name and the position of the alleged minister, citations of any verbal response of the alleged minister. Then I examined judicial and parliamentary records, as well as public opinion trends, to check for the corresponding sanctions and the punishment for the accused incumbent. The allegations are initially classifed in 23 types, including nepo- tism, bribery, illegal party fnancing, private use of government vehicles, etc. They fall into two major types of incompetence and misconduct, as explained above. The identity of the maker of the allegation consists of nine categories: government member, opposition, journalist, individual person, businessperson, international organisation, judicial representative, NGO and trade unions. It is important to underscore that the identity of the accuser is not the media, but various groups who make allegations in the media. As detailed above, the responses that the incumbents gave to the public allegations are classifed in eight subtypes, which fall into three broader categories of “no comment”, “evasive response” and “explanatory response”. The German accusations were sampled from the newspaper Die Welt for the period between 1995 and 2005. Although Die Welt occupies the conservative end of the political spectrum, it is a suitable source because it expresses the views of the opposition for the better part of the period studied in the article. Arguably, the most numerous accusations can be found in oppositional newspapers. Die Welt’s archive is also available online. The information was double-checked with the contents of the TV news programme Die Tagesschau. The Russian allegations were extrapolated from reading the daily press digests of Radio Free Europe Liberty (RFEL) for the period between 1995 and 2005. RFEL was a suitable source of information because it sampled all available media sources. Single media sources in Russia do not produce enough criticisms. Additional sources were the Open Media Research Institute: Daily Digest and the Jamestown Foundation Daily Monitor. Taken together, these three sources reach an expansive and representative sample of news outlets in Russia, the most important of which ate: NTV, ITAR TASS, the newspapers Moskovsky Komsomolets, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Izvestya 122 G. DIMOVA the magazine Ogonek and radio Ekho Moskvy. For Bulgaria, I read the biggest national daily 24 Hours in the period from 1990 to 2005. I double-checked the information with the media accusations collected by the Centre for the Study of Democracy. Inter-coder reliability is .85. This coeffcient refers to the average pairwise per cent agreement between the two coders of the same news source. All articles of each daily issue (not just the titles of the articles) for every day for all 10 years presented on the websites of Die Welt and on RFLE were read.

Unit of Analysis: Public Accusation Levelled at the Government The main methodological challenge in gauging how much the government accounts to one principal in comparison with another principal is fnding the right unit of analysis. There are no readily available real-life situations, let alone datasets, where all potential accounting agents have an equal opportunity to investigate and sanction the government. One cannot compare the effectiveness of judicial, international, governmental, legislative and public principals, when they do not have equal access to information about potential government malfeasance. If the potential account-holders are not equally informed of the allegations, then it is unclear whether they did not punish the government because they were unable or unwilling or because they simply were unaware of its faults. Government accountability should gauge the capacity and willingness of accountability mechanisms rather than their unawareness. I introduce “a media accusation of government malfeasance” as the unit of analysis, because a public accusation overcomes the problem of informational asymmetries between bodies controlling the government. Accusation is defned as every instance of public critique levelled at the government as a whole or at a particular minister. The situation of a media allegation presents an invaluable analytical advantage because it alleviates the principal–agent problems that commonly plague accountability chains (Stiglitz 2004). Scholars agree that the lack of complete information is the biggest impediment to accountability (Djankov et al. 2001, 1; Besley and Prat 2006). Oliver (1991, 25) concurs that “the effectiveness of accountability to the public depends on the availability of information. An ill-informed public cannot hold the government to account for its care of the public interest”. Information is crucial because “the details of the political process are often so complex and behind the scenes that voters do not have an informed opinion on many issues” 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 123

(Persson et al. 1997, 1163–1202). Media accusations of executive wrongdoing can be perceived as an instance of a short-lived resolution of the information asymmetry between the executive, on the one hand, and the fve principals—the judiciary, the international community, the public, the legislature and the government on the other hand. Once the news comes out, the prime minister, the public, the legislature and the judiciary become exposed to the same information automatically, equally and simultaneously. Another advantage of using “media scandals” as a unit of analysis is that they establish a yardstick for comparing the effectiveness of multiple accountability forums. Admittedly, institutional reactions to media allegations comprise only a small part of overall institutional accountability. For example, members of parliament regularly question incumbents in parliament. Only a small percentage of these questions are asked as a follow-up to media allegations. Concentrating on media scandals limits the study to this select sample of questions that follow up on a public charge and omits the rest. I believe that this “omission” is regrettable but it is necessary and quite advantageous because scandals establish a basis from which the researcher can compare the responses of accountability forums. Knowledge that, for example, parliament in one country created a total of three committees to investigate the government and another parliament created four committees, provides little basis for comparison between the effectiveness of parliamentary committees, because we do not know how many accusations were made in the frst place. However, if we know that these committees were established in relation to a certain number of media charges, then it is easier to compare their effectiveness. There is a third advantage of using “media accusations” as a unit of analysis. By opening up the information fow simultaneously to all possible accounting principals, a “media scandal” is best suited to cap- turing the relative and simultaneous reactions of institutions and the public. All other models of accountability either deal with institutional or with public mechanisms of control. A media scandal presents a situation, which preserves the multidimensionality of the proposed accountability model. It is important to underscore that the analysis focuses on all allegations publicised by the media, not on allegations made by the media. In fact, the results reveal that less than 7% of all accusations result from journalistic investigations. I have selected allegations made in the media by all possible agents—the prosecutor general, private citizens, opposition leaders, government members, MPs, etc. The crucial point 124 G. DIMOVA is “informational”, i.e. that everybody is aware of the allegations at the same time.

Addressing Potential Biases in the Data One potential drawback of using “media accusations” as a unit of analysis is that the media are not independent. Free media are vital because “freedom of the press reduces the informational problem in the political system and increases accountability” (Lederman et al. 2005, 33). The Russian press, in particular, stands out as the least free in this sample. I respond to this challenge in several ways. First, I use the news broadcast from Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, whose main mission is to provide uncensored news and information to countries where a free press is not fully established. Second, media bias does not affect the measure of investigative accountability, because all accusations need to be investigated, whereas not all investigations must produce sanctions. Third, even counterfeit information is crucial for public opinion. The public judges the government based on the information it receives. As long as the public does not have enough information to distinguish between false and fabricated charges, it is equally likely to be affected by both. Finally, some scholars may argue that public accusations pose an endogeneity problem as it is unclear whether scandals arise as a response to institutional and public reactions to accusations, or whether institutions and the public react to these public accusations (Barker 1994; Newell and Garrard 2006). To circumvent this potential setback, I defne scandal as any accusation against the government that appears in the media. Similar to Dewana and Dowding (2005) and Lowi (1988), I see the defning feature of a scandal in the revelation of the crime as opposed to the moral gravity of the offense (King 1984; Funk 1993), the longevity of the scandal (Bytzek 2007) or the vigour of the reaction (Schudson 2003; Thompson 1997).

Case Study Selection: Bulgaria, Germany and Russia The selection of cases is made on the independent variables (Geddes 1990) because, arguably, Bulgaria, Russia and Germany exhibit different degrees of the independent variables “supply of accountability forums” and “public demand for accountability”. 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 125

Russia: A Case of a Low Fragmentation of Supply and Demand The supply of accountability forums in Russia is monolithic because the accountability revolution which supposedly diversifes the unitary chain of electoral delegation by creating multiple principals, multiple agents, multiple accountability forums and multiple accountability criteria, did not transpire in Russia. In fact, the opposite of de-centralisation, re-centralisation, took place. Putin used the term “power vertical” to explain the re-centralisation of the power of the presidency and the federal centre. The “power vertical” is the exact opposite of the accountability revolution. The “power vertical” is defned as “governing from the top”, where power is held by the elites and wielded in their interests (Sakwa 2008, 2010, 2014). The presidential administration, the security services, the state media, the Duma and the upper echelons of the judiciary are used to support Putin and undermine his opponents (Gorham et al. 2014, 46). The 2004 Putin’s law which entitled the president to elect the deputies to the upper legislative chamber, the Federation Council, reversed decentralisation (Goode 2011). The pre-history of building the power vertical includes: weak economic autonomy of the regions (McMann 2012), merger of the post-Soviet bourgeoisie and state (Gill 2008), the self-serving interests of powerful and wealthy local elites (Stoner-Weiss 2006), Russia’s highly politicised and negotiated form of asymmetrical federalism (Ross 2008) and the disconnectedness of the Russian terrain (Lynch 2005, 26–27). Public demand for accountability in Russia could be considered monolithic because of the failure of modernisation and of the ideological alignment to produce well-differentiated group identities. Instead of individualisation and fragmentation, de-industrialisation and de-modernisation took place (Ryabov 2012, 4). Colton suggests a personal factor: the fact that Medvedev could not defne himself against Putin failed to rekindle Russian modernisation (Colton 2008, 115). Ledeneva (2013) argues that Russia has fallen into the “modernization trap of informality”. The failure of public fragmentation can be attributed to the crash- ing of anti-Putin protests and protests in support of Navalny “after which people lost hope” (Bennetts 2014). People could be differentiated in respect of the EU because entry into the EU was never a practical political ambition (Ryabov 2012, 149). Marketisation failed to fragment society as the transfer to a market economy did not produce strong and suffcient individuals but “spawned many feudal elements in society” (Shlapentokh and Arutunyan 2013, 5) and “crony capitalism 126 G. DIMOVA in which informal elite groups dominate policy making… took over” (Sharafutdinova 2011, 2). Public demand in Russia is unifed in the so-called parties of power, such as Our Home is Russia in 1993, Unity in 1999 or Fatherland- All-Russia in 2003 (Oates 2006). These “parties of power” are created by powerful players around the Kremlin and look like “a full-fedged political party but its political marketing makes it clear that the party exist to further the government interests that funded it and staffed it” (Oates 2006, 72). “The absence of successful political party ideologies” (Hanson 2010, xv), the “prolonged failure of ideological indoctrination” (Colton and McFaul 2003, 185) and the failure of the Communists, Yablako and the Liberal Democrats to put up a solid opposition, enabled the rise of “parties substitutes” which have largely squeezed Russia’s real parties out of the “electoral market” (Hale 2005).

Bulgaria: A Case of Medium Fragmentation of the Supply and Demand In terms of demand for and supply of accountability, Bulgaria occupies a middle position between Germany and Russia in the study. This mid-range position is confrmed by large N empirical assessments of Bulgaria’s media and democratic development by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the Freedom House Democracy Index, the EIU Democracy Index and the Polity Project. Scholars of Bulgarian history and anthropology agree with the large N assessments of the modernity project in Bulgaria. The most recent history of Bulgaria since the fall of communism is described as a wavering between “two political and cultural worlds, between two philosophical views about human nature and society” (Dajnov 639 cited in Lavern 2010, 35). These theoretical views are torn between the past and the present, the communist system and liberal capitalism, the East and the West, state and society, between individualism and collectivism (Lavern 2010, 34). Fotev (2010, 36) argues that the “transition from the traditional forms of life to modern society and state is a long protracted crisis of the societal integrity and underde- veloped individualism”. Genov suggests that Bulgarians occupy a place somewhere midway through collective thinking and individualistic thinking: “in its whole new history, Bulgaria…has always wavered between the European civilisation, created by the industrial society, on the one hand, and collective and etatist theories” (Genov 2004, 228). In Bulgaria, the degree of fragmentation of demand is assessed as medium-range, which means that people are relatively unlikely to pay 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 127 attention to issues and to organise in smaller groups to pursue these issues. On the one hand, the public in Bulgaria is highly unifed. The collectivist values and passivity date back to the long Ottoman yoke that Bulgaria endured. Stambolov, a renowned historical statesman in Bulgaria, has said that “the disagreements, hate, envy, intrigues, and all other bad personal qualities, which are particularly well developed in a slave nation, are rooted deeply in between us and paralyse many good deeds of our nation” (Stambolov cited by Fotev 2010, 22–23). In addition, Bulgaria is often cited as the poorest country in the EU, and this low standard of economic well-being could also explain low openness to others, multiculturalism and rationality: “Why doesn’t our nation accept and appreciate the other-ness? For the same reason that it does not like to read- poverty” (Hadjiiski 2002, 115). In general, the post-commuist public discourse did not manage to rise above narrow materialist issues (Dawson 2016). The emigrants from Bulgaria failed to form long-lasting constellation abroad (Jileva 2002). The advent of personalistic parties, such as National Movement Simeon Saks Coburg led by Simeon Saks Coburg, did not enable the process of fragmentation either. The trend continued by the rise of Bulgaria without Censorship led by Barekov, the party GERB led by Boiko Borisov and Attaka by Volen Siderov, all of which were less successful in attracting attention to political issues and instead shifted it to political personalities. Given this weak tendency to follow up on issues and the weak self-organisational capacity of civil society, why do we classify the demand of fragmentation as fragmented, not as totalised as in Russia? There are good reasons to suggest that the equilibrium of melancholy and non-cooperation has been punctuated by a few counter-tendencies. Prodanov (2014, 414–415) argues that there is a rise of ad hoc elites, which are “non-professional elites, spontaneously elected and legitimized as repre- senting the interests of certain dynamic public groups”. Another reason to upgrade the state of fragmentation of demand to a “medium” is that Bulgarian civic culture is more vibrant than it is commonly acknowledged (Krasteva 2014, 451). The public exhibited a relatively strong capacity to self-organise and pursue the issue of the appointment of the media mogul Peevski as the head of the Secret Services on 14 June 2013 (Dimova 2019). On the morning of the appointment, a Facebook group appeared protesting his appointment. Within an hour, the group numbered 6–7000. It grew to up to over 80,000 in the next days 128 G. DIMOVA

(Todorov 2014, 12). This was known as the year of “civic anger”. This protest has been classifed as a call for accountability (Ganev 2014). The fragmentation of the supply of accountability forums refers to the availability of avenues through which interested parties can advance their claims for accountability. In Bulgaria, this availability is at a medium level. The accountability revolution has not taken place. The New Public Management is a relatively unknown platform. Decentralisation, however, has taken shape as more and more towns, such as Plovdiv and Varna acquire their own autonomy. In the period under research, Bulgaria was not a member of the European Union membership; however, the expectation of meeting the criteria for EU entry has created some avenues for expressing public grievances.

Germany: A Case of High Fragmentation of Supply and Demand Without any claim to being exhaustive, the analysis classifes the degree of fragmentation of public demand in Germany as higher than that in Russia and Bulgaria. Some of the factors that such an analysis should consider are: the greater reliance of the Germans on market mechanisms as testifed by the relative advancement of capitalism in the period under study, the greater cultural appreciation for expressing one’s individual- ity, the more vigorous protest sphere (Koopmans 1993, 1995), the more dynamic work of the German trade unions (Pickles and Smith 2005), as well as the inherently more mature process of decentralisation resulting on greater self-reliance of the federal provinces. However, the German public should be considered to have achieved an even higher stage of fragmentation—a phase where separate factions come together. This process of reconnection is engendered by the two factors: the party system that pre-existed in West Germany, which provided a framework for political parties in East Germany to come together after the Fall of the Berlin Wall (Waller 1995) and the more available opportunities for international travel, which allowed families, friends and colleagues to come together. On the supply side, Germany presents a case of high fragmentation in this study. Considerations of the accessibility, independence and availability of various accountability channels that the public can use to pursue media allegations of the government should relate to several factors. First, parliament remains a solid and relatively trusted instrument for channelling public discontent through political delegates. Neither the electoral not the democratisation paradigm have imploded in Germany and therefore the appeal and effectiveness of the electoral sphere is still 5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ASSESSMENT 129 considerable. Second, the media is relatively free, which means that there are potentially additional levers for exerting infuence (Randall 1998; Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2008). Third, Germany is the only case in this study which is a member of the European Union (Bulgaria is not a member until 2007). This means that the European court of justice and all bodies of the EU were not an option for channelling accountability.

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De-parliamentarisation of Government Accountability in Germany: Crisis or Transformation of Democracy?

Did Parliament Lose the Battle to Hold the Government to Account? This chapter seeks to answer the question whether parliaments are an important and effective instrument for holding the government to account for various allegations raised in the German media. The empirical evidence that I have collected and analysed indicates that parliaments frequently investigate the government in relation to media criticism but that these investigations are unlikely to produce sanctions for the incumbents. The sanctioning capacity of parliamentary questions and parliamentary committees is surpassed by that of the EU, the prosecutor and internal governmental meetings. At frst glance, these fndings support the argument that parliaments are weak accountability forums because the parliamentary majority party simply lacks the motivation to sanction the government it has elected (Strøm et al. 2003). It seems that parliaments have lost the battle for holding the government to account, at least as far as media allegations are concerned. The fndings, however, reveal a novel and robust trend of accountability arrangements: political parties continue to be very important in holding the government to account, but their control is not asserted in the conventional venues of parliament, elections or the courts. Instead, my analysis indicates that political parties affect government accountability in four ways: (1) opposition parties are an important accountability

© The Author(s) 2020 137 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6_6 138 G. DIMOVA player because they raise more than half of all allegations that are levelled at the incumbents in the media; (2) opposition parties are an important accountability player because the popularity of the opposition party is a decisive factor determining whether the government would reverse policy or dismiss an incumbent implicated in corruption; (3) governing parties are an important accountability player because internal party meetings are an important forum producing sanctions for incumbents implicated in incompetence; and (4) governing parties are an important accountability player because government meetings between coalitional parties are effective in imposing sanctions related to media allegations.

Parliamentary Questions in the Accountability Process: The Theoretical Debate Parliaments, along with elections, are considered the chief instruments for imposing government accountability. Parliamentary questions, in addition to parliamentary committees and votes of no-confdence, are one of the three means that parliaments have at their disposal to control the government in between elections. The practice of parliamentary questioning has been evaluated in antagonistic terms. On the one hand, public questioning of ministers is viewed as “the most direct and effective mechanism or holding the governments to account” (Mulgan 2014, 549). On the other hand, it has been viewed as ineffective: “Ministerial accountability, though tightly championed as a cornerstone of accountability in parliamentary democracies, has also proved inadequate in guaranteeing the accountability of both ministers and departmental public servants” (Mulgan 2014, 552). The chief reason why political scrutiny of parliament is ineffective is that the majority party has the power but lacks the incentive to embarrass its government in public, whereas the opposition has the incentive but lacks the numerical majority to impose sanctions (Strøm et al. 2003). In short, the majority party is unwilling, and the opposition party is unable to sanction the government in parliament. “We can hardly expect the majority party or parties to engage regularly in such political scrutiny publicly, in particular if it involves criticizing the government’s actions. In parliamentary systems of government, the function of political scrutiny in terms of assessing and criticising the government’s actions is mainly the responsibility of the parliamentary opposition, exercised through instruments such as parliamentary questions and public debate either in a 6 DE-PARLIAMENTARISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 139 committee or on the foor of the House” (Auel 2007, 500). Cole (1999) suggests that the House of Commons in the UK is ineffective because of its partisan political atmosphere and the apathy of many MPs. Given the lack of motivation of the majority party, it is generally agreed that the political opposition is the main driver of political scrutiny. The opposition functions as a “police patrol” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). The opposition’s motivation to pose questions to the government is to keep the executive’s weakness in the public eye (Finer 1957, 143). In this way, the opposition hopes to reap electoral benefts (Mezey 1998, 784; Saalfeld 2005, 343). Because of the role of electoral incentives, the opposition chooses to ask questions that are of concern to the socio-demographic composition of their constituencies (Saalfeld 2011). Others think that electoral incentives are less important, and political scrutiny in parliament is performed by less experienced and more ambitious MPs who seek to gather information rather than represent the citizens’ concerns (Bailer 2011). A great deal of the capacity of the opposition to ask questions depends on its internal party discipline (Dandoy 2011). The resolution of the dilemma of an unmotivated majority and a powerless minority in parliament is to think of parliamentary questioning as a process rather than in terms of the outcomes it achieves. For example, Norton (1998, 1) suggests that electors build trust in the system by seeing their electors voice their concerns in parliament. Vibert (2007, 112) argues that “the key role of representative assemblies is not mounting old fashioned debates between old-fashioned parties in old-fashioned chambers. Equally, it is not about trying to compete with the world of media celebrities or reality TV or the passing headline or the internet fash. It is about inquiry”. Such a view of the role of parliamentary questioning is challenged as it assumes that the demos is attentive, well informed and has a good memory. This chapter puts these various notions of the effectiveness of parliamentary questioning to the empirical test.

Empirical Findings: Did the German Parliament Lose the Battle for Government Accountability? It seems that parliaments are relatively ineffective accountability forums for imposing accountability on the government for media allegations in Germany. The shape, height and direction of the accountability pyramid, which is a measure of the sanctioning capacity of various accountability 140 G. DIMOVA bodies, points to a relatively insignifcant role of parliament. The shape of the accountability pyramid in Fig. 6.1 demonstrates that parliamentary committees are ineffective sanctioning devices and parliamentary questions come only fourth in sanctioning capacity. It seems that the sanctioning role of parliament has been taken over by the prosecutor, the European Union and internal governmental investigations. The least effcient way to produce sanctions for public accusations is to pose a question to the government in parliament. The height of the pyramid, which measures the difference between the most effective and least effective forums, is relatively big. This means that parliamentary questions are relatively ineffective sanctioning devices in comparison with prosecutorial, EU and intra-governmental instruments. Furthermore, the accountability pyramid is inverted. This means that there are many sanctioning instruments that are very effective and just one mechanism, parliamentary questioning, that is less effective. The involvement of the prosecutor in investigating media allegations increases the likelihood of sanctions by 49%, whereas if a parliamentary question is asked in relation to a media charge, the government is only 18% more likely to face consequences. The results above measured the capacity of various investigations to produce sanctions or not. However, the severity of the sanctions also differs. Figure 6.2 indicates which investigation is most effcient in producing various degrees of severity of the sanctions. The dependent variable “sanctions” has three degrees; the coeffcients are calculated based

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Fig. 6.2 Impact of investigations on the severity of sanctions imposed on the government (N 467) = on a frst differences estimation. It turns out that all investigations are equally effcient in all categories—imposing a policy, compromising on a policy or reversing a policy. All of them are most effcient in producing the most severe type of sanctions—“reversal of policies and dismissals of low and high ranking offcials”. Within this category, the most effcient investigation is conducted by an international investigation. Government investigation and prosecutorial investigations are roughly equally infuential in imposing this type of sanction. The least effcient mechanism in this category is the questioning of the government in parliament. The fndings suggest a trend of exporting government accountability for media allegations from parliament to non-parliamentary forums, such as the EU, the prosecutor and internal investigations. There is a tendency of de-parliamentarisation of government accountability. However, parliamentary questions may not impose sanctions but they could extract information from the government. They enable the public to witness the exchange between the opposition and the government. The public questioning of one of the most popular Germany politicians, Joschka Fischer, is a case in point. Fischer was accused in the media to have signed a decree, which led to the admission of millions of illegal immigrants into 142 G. DIMOVA

Germany. In April, 2005, Fischer faced the visa investigative committee and his questioning was shown live on TV. Around 6 Million viewers tuned in to watch the daylong proceedings. Phoenix TV which transmitted the live event achieved the highest share of viewers, around 790,000. Its market share skyrocketed from 0.6 to 4% (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 May 2010). Because of the public interrogation, for the frst time in many years, Fischer failed to top a poll by the broadcaster ZDF to fnd Germany’s most popular politician. The public interrogation was an act of shaming the government with the most serious repercussions. Admittedly, Fischer did not resign. Only Volmer, who was Fischer’s junior foreign minister, resigned. Nevertheless, the bone of contention was not Fischer’s dismissal; it was that of Chancellor Schröder himself (Rhetorik, 25 April 2005). The questioning shattered Fischer’s reputation. The public disapproval of Fischer was partially responsible for the bad performance of the governing party at the local elections. The bad performance at the local elections in turn was the reason why Schröder suggested a vote of confdence, which he lost. Ultimately, questioning is not about the information per se. It shattered Fischer’s reputation and thus triggered a serious of events, which culminated in the ultimate downfall of the government. Parliamentary questions serve yet another function: they augment the likelihood that the politicians can be caught in the so-called candid moments (Green 2009), when they can show their true self in an unscripted scenario. In this respect, parliamentary questions enhance monitory and ocular democracy. They show that the audience does not need to be passive spectators. The German journal Der Spiegel suggests that the “unexpected questions in parliament led to the lies” of Helmut Kohl’s most likely successor, Wolfgang Schäuble. When questioned in parliament in 1999 about whether he had accepted a donation during a meeting with a person of questionable reputation called Schreiber, Schäuble disputed the question. However, in a radio interview later, he admitted he had met Schreiber at least once more than he had initially admitted. This inconsistency created suspicion that a second donation had been made. The indignation within the ranks of the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) towards Schäuble grew so much that he was forced to resign (Der Spiegel, 7 August 2009). If it were not for the unexpected question in parliament, Schäuble would 6 DE-PARLIAMENTARISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 143 have thought out his position better, he would not have lied, and his credibility would not have been undermined. The parliamentary question constituted a “candid moment” which allowed the truth to come out. At the same time, it opened an opportunity for the rise of Angela Merkel. “So how exactly did Merkel proft from the Schreiber incident? The former party secretary became aware that, in the face of an unexpected question in parliament, Schäuble had lied about taking cash from Schreiber. Merkel realized at the time that this secret would eventually come out and would inevitably lead to Schäuble’s downfall. She also knew that, if she wasn’t careful, she could go down with him” (Der Spiegel, 7 August 2009). So she seized the opportunity. Merkel wrote an open letter to Kohl in the FAZ newspaper on 22 December 1999. It was described as a “Dear John” divorce letter to her mentor. In the letter, Merkel distanced herself from Kohl, saying that the new generation of politicians in the CDU needed to distance themselves from him, in the same way that teenagers must distance themselves from their parents, if they are to become adults. Thus, the parliamentary question asked of Schäuble was indirectly responsible for the rise of chancellor Merkel.

Parliamentary Investigations: The Accountability Role of the Party Within Parliament There is another trend that shows that government accountability for media allegations is not completely de-parliamentarised in Germany: the fndings show unequivocally that parliamentary questions and parliamentary committees are the most common devices for investigating the government. More than 68% of all investigations are legislative. There are about 28% judicial investigations, 4% are investigations by the political parties, internal investigations that the government appoints amount to about 8%. International investigations are merely 4%. Parliamentary questions and parliamentary committees are the specifc instruments that drive the parliamentarisation of investigative accountability. Germany is the only country in this study, where parliamentary questions and committees are so frequently utilised in response to media allegations. The prominence of parliamentary questions and parliamentary committees beckons two questions. First, why is there such a great discord between punitive and sanctioning accountability? Why does the impact 144 G. DIMOVA of government accountability to the legislature decrease dramatically when the process moves from the investigative to the sanctioning phase? Despite being the most common investigative mechanism, legislative control is only the fourth most effective sanctioning mechanism. The second inquiry is why parliamentary committees in Germany are less effective than parliamentary questions. Parliamentary questions are as widespread as parliamentary committees, yet parliamentary questions are more effective than parliamentary committees. Parliamentary questions are asked following 30.66% of all media allegations, while parliamentary committees are created in response to 27.01% of all public accusations (Fig. 6.3). Despite their prominence, parliamentary committees have no statistically signifcant infuence on sanctions. This fnding speaks to the low organisational costs of asking a question on the foor in comparison to the high costs associated with passing a decision in committees. The big difference is that it takes only one person to articulate a question, whereas decisions in committees require a majority vote. Committee membership refects the distribution of seats in parliament and members of the majority party will not use the committees to incriminate the government they elected. Still, parliamentary committees can be an effectual accountability mechanism for sanctioning former incumbents. The German “fraud” scandal is a case in point. Three months after re-electing the German

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Fig. 6.3 Incidence of investigations of media accusations levelled at the government in Germany in 1995–2005 (N 467) = 6 DE-PARLIAMENTARISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 145 government in 2000, the political opposition accused the fnance minister Eichel that he had lied about the budget defcit before the elections. Eichel was alleged to have misinformed the German public by deliber- ately painting an unrealistically positive picture of the state’s fnances. The accusations against him were that “he beat about the bush”, and “committed an election fraud”. The new parliament created a special committee on election fraud to investigate the case, and he was sanctioned. This scandal shows that in a true democracy political accountability is maintained even when elections end, at least insofar as former incumbents are alleged. Surprisingly, parliamentary committees are less important sanctioning devices than committees in Bulgaria. The explanation is perhaps related to the fact that there are more parties in the Bulgarian parliament, which are less disciplined. This multiplicity of unpredictable parties’ behaviour increases the likelihood that committees will produce sanctions. Because of the fuidity of the number and type of the relationship between parties, it is more likely that committees in an unconsolidated democracy with a multi-party system are more infuential than committees in a consolidated democracy with a two-party system. The fndings further suggest that the vote of no-confdence is not an infuential legislative tool for controlling the government in Germany. Its absence in a consolidated parliamentary democracy speaks volumes. It brings us back to Strøm et al. (2003, 155, 175) statement that the no-confdence threat is a blunt and unwieldy instrument. Germany is a special case in this regard. Article 67 of the Basic Law states that “The Bundestag can pass a vote of no-confdence only when it chooses with the majority of its members a successor”. This rule, called constructive vote of no-confdence, is a left-over from the Weimar Republic, where the no-confdence procedure was abused by parties of both political extremes in order to oppose chancellors and undermine the democratic process. The constructive no-confdence vote makes it harder to remove a chancellor because opponents of the chancellor must agree on a replacement. There have been only two such votes so far. In April 1972, an unsuccessful vote failed to unseat chancellor Rainer Barzel, and in October 1982, a successful vote unseated Helmut Schmidt and appointed Helmut Kohl as a successor. In the most recent history, in 2005 chancellor Schröder failed a vote of confdence suggested by himself. 146 G. DIMOVA

Can Political Parties Play a Role in the Accountability Process Outside Parliament? The empirical fndings reveal a highly curious phenomenon: political parties can play an active role in the accountability process through their role outside, not inside, parliament. Of course, political parties and the opposition in particular are the main drivers of parliamentary questions in parliament. However, it is their role outside parliament that is most intriguing. One trend in support of the party’s role outside parliament has already been revealed: political parties constitute the main accuser of the government in the public. The opposition drives the accountability agenda. There are two other trends, however, that also suggest that political parties perpetuate the accountability process outside of parliament: party meetings are important sanctioning forums for issues of incompetence and party popularity is the most important determinant of imposing sanctions following corruption allegations.

Party Accusations and Party Meetings: The Accountability Role of the Party Outside Parliament The frst evidence of the importance of political parties in the accountability process, despite their relative sanctioning impotence in parliament, is that they are the most active accusers of the government in the media. The opposition makes 39% of the accusations and the members of the government party criticise the government in 17% of the cases (Dimova 2012). That means that as a total political parties prime the accountability agenda in 56% of the cases. That means that even though the parties cannot hold the government effectively to account in parliament, they still are the single most important account-holder in the public space. The second trend is that party meetings convened outside of the legislature are an important factor in affecting the sanctions for allegations of incompetence (Table 6.1). Party meetings are the second most important mechanisms for sanctioning charges of incompetence. They are the third most common investigative mechanism for investigating media allegations levelled at the government. They are closely followed by international investigations. The third most effcient type of investigation is an extraordinary party meeting convened to discuss the alleged problem. Parliamentary questions addressing a public accusation are the fourth most effcient way to affect a sanction of the government. 6 DE-PARLIAMENTARISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 147

Table 6.1 Impact of the type of investigation on the incidence of government sanctions for incompetence charges (N 364) = Who conducts the Dependent variable is: 0 No Sanctions vs. 1 Sanctions = = investigation? Model 1: First differences Model 2: Odds ratios Model 3: Probit analysis (R2 0.34) (R2 0.43) (R2 0.50) = = = Government .54 (.21)** 18.67 (23.78)** 18.67 (23.78)** investigation Party meetings .53 (.22)** 1.68 (.79)** 1.68 (.79)** International .39 (.19)** 10.69 (11.03)** 10.69 (11.03)** investigation Parliamentary .28 (.12)** 1.07 (.36)** 1.07 (.36)** questions

**signifcant at 5% level

The term “party meetings” denotes instances when the governing party convenes a party conference to address critical media allegations. Just like extraordinary Cabinet meetings, convened to address a prominent media issue, party meetings are convened outside the regular schedule of party meetings. Unlike Cabinet meetings, which address disagreements between coalitional partners, party meetings usually address disagreements between members of the same party. In one instance of such a party meeting, in July 2004, the interior minister Schily from the SPD party suggested that the government build asylum bureaus for ref- ugees in Africa. The minister for development Heidemarie Wieczorek- Zeul, also from the SPD, spoke against the idea. The leader of the SPD party, Franz Müntefering, saw that these disagreements could damage the image of the party and organised a party meeting to clarify the contentious issue (Die Welt, 23 September 2004).

The Popularity of the Opposition Party: The Accountability Role of the Party Outside Parliament The third fnding indicating a trend where parties are important outside parliament is that the likelihood that ministers are sanctioned for media accusations of misconduct increases mainly if the opposition popularity is high (Table 6.2). The second most infuential factor is a government investigation of the charges. The involvement of the prosecutor in investigating misconduct charges is the third most infuential factor. 148 G. DIMOVA

Table 6.2 Impact of the type of investigation on the incidence of government sanctions for misconduct charges (N 103) (Party meetings are important only = in model 2, where sanctions are gradual)

Who conducts the Dependent variable is: 0 No Sanctions vs. 1 Sanctions = = investigation? Model 2: First differences Model 3: Odds ratios Model 1: Probit analysis (R2 0.55) (R2 0.47) (R2 0.64) = = = Opposition .92 (.14)** 3485.38 (11796.73)** 4.06 (1.64)** popularity Government .71 (.21)** 1305.57 (4445.08)** 3.51 (1.57)** investigation Prosecutorial .68 (.23)** 33.57 (97.03) 1.61 (1.44) investigation

**signifcant at 5% level

Political parties affect accountability through their popularity. Opposition popularity is the most important determinant of sanctions for corruption accusations. When the opposition’s popularity increases, the government is more likely to face sanctions and vice versa. The discovery stands in contrast to the importance of public approval in Bulgaria and Russia. In Bulgaria, it is the popularity of the government that is a signif- icant determinant of executive accountability. In Russia, it is the popularity of the president that determines the likelihood of sanctions. It is also noteworthy that public opinion matters for accusations of government misconduct in Russia and in Bulgaria, while public opinion matters for accusations of incompetence in Germany. Why is the opposition’s popularity in Germany more important for sanctions than the government’s popularity? Perhaps the importance of the opposition’s popularity is rooted in the German bipolar party system. The German party landscape could be conceived as a two-party system, not because there are only two parties, but because the two big parties, the SPD and the CDU, rule sometimes in a coalition with the smaller parties—the Greens, Bündnis 90 or the FDP. None of the smaller parties can win a governing mandate. Either SPD or the CDU are in power at any point in time. In this sense, the German system, although not a purely two-party system, is closer to a two-party model than to a multi-party model. The two-polar model of the German party system makes the power distribution between the parties more visible in parliament. This argument is in line with Whitten and Powell’s concept of clarity of 6 DE-PARLIAMENTARISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 149 responsibility (Whitten and Powell 1993). It is easier to gauge the overall power of the opposition in a semi-two-party system than in a multi-party system. The existence of only one big opposition party means that the increase in its popularity is a good predictor of the overall opposition popularity. In addition, the small number of opposition parties makes alliances between the big party and the smaller opposition parties more predictable. In a two-party system, the inverse relation between the popularity and the government is more obvious. As the empirical trend shows, the popularity of the opposition and the government are negatively correlated (Fig. 6.4). They constitute a zero-sum game. Rises in the opposition popularity roughly mirror the downfalls in the government’s popularity. In terms of sequence, it seems that high oppositional ratings narrowly precede, and possibly cause, low government’s ratings. This is especially clear in the two spike movements in the middle of 1998 and in the middle of 2004. There is one caveat, however. The inverse relationship between the parties holds only as long as the government ratings are lower than those of the opposition. The only time when the government’s approval ratings were higher than the approval ratings of the opposition is the period between the end of 1999 and the end of 2002. This episode is marked by the CDU fnancial affair. During the scandal, the leadership of the CDU was alleged to have accepted illegal party donations. The affair became public at the very end of the Kohl government and gained full exposure during the governance of the SPD. The scandal had disastrous consequences both for the leadership of the CDU, and for its ratings. For the frst time, the approval ratings of the opposition became lower than those of the government. The party chief Wolfgang Schäuble and the treasurer

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Brigitte Baumeister were forced to step down. On 5 November 1999, the Augsburg prosecutor’s offce arrested the former CDU treasurer Walther Leisler Kiep. On 18 January 2000, Kohl resigned from his post as an honorary chairperson of the CDU. This was the only time when there were many articles critical of the government but government ratings remained high, and the reason is that the opposition’s ratings were very low. The negative correlation between the government’s and opposition’s approval ratings explains why the government is more likely to punish allegedly corrupt government offcials, when the opposition popularity rises. The increase in the approval ratings of the opposition automatically indicates to the government that its own standing is in peril. The polls serve as a warning sign that increases the incumbents’ inclination to agree on compromises, reverse policies and dismiss offcials.

Internal Governmental Investigations: The Accountability Role of the Party Outside Parliament Government meetings are an important, but often neglected, self-sanctioning mechanism for media allegations. Government meetings come up frst in sanctioning capacity in relation to charges of misconduct (Table 6.2) and frst in sanctioning capacity in relation to charges of incompetence (Table 6.1). The sanctioning prowess of government meetings may suggest a trend of de-parliamentarisation of government accountability as governments are increasingly sanctioned by themselves, or they take the investigation process in their own hands. My point is that we can view ministerial meetings in a coalitional government as a continuation of the confict between parties. The difference is that the confict is not fought out in parliament between all parties, but is fought behind the closed Cabinet doors among ruling parties. In the German case, internal governmental investigations could be viewed as substitutes of party meetings. German governments are sometimes coalitional, and coalitional governments need extra Cabinet meetings to negotiate their positions. Such a need for coordination does not arise when the government consists of just one party. In the examined period between 1995 and 2005, there were four governments, and all of them were coalitional. The ffth cabinet of chancellor Kohl, which lasted from 17 November 1994 to 26 October 1998, consisted of a coalition between the CDU and FD. The frst cabinet of chancellor Schröder, 6 DE-PARLIAMENTARISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 151 which ruled from 27 October 1998 till 22 October 2002, was a coalition between SPD and Bündnis 90/the Greens. The second Schröder cabinet, that governed in the period from 22 October 2002 to 18 October 2005, was a coalition between SPD and the Greens. The cabinet of Angela Merkel is a “Big Coalition” between the two major contending parties SPD and the CDU. The coalitional character of the government necessitates more frequent meetings between the coalitional partners. My fndings show that half of the allegations, which were discussed at an internal governmental meeting, were made by a coalitional partner. Internal government investigations, most of which refer to emergency meetings of the coalitional parties, are the natural response mechanisms to disagreements within the government coalitions. Governmental investigations in Germany differ signifcantly from presidential investigations in Russia. In Russia, almost all executive investigations are conducted by the president. In Germany, governmental investigations encompass cases when the government convenes a special meeting. Here is one example of an internal governmental handling of a crisis: in February 2001, a four-hour long emergency meeting was convened to discuss the fght between the minister of the economy Werner Müller and the minister of labour Walter Riester about the law for enter- prises (Die Welt, 6 February 2001). Müller was an independent, but had the backing of the labour unions. Riester was a member of the governing SPD party. This emergency meeting was one step towards the policy compromise, which the two ministers eventually reached. Thus, it would be reasonable to conjecture that internal meetings in coalitional governments function as de facto inter-party meetings. This means that the party aspect fnds just another reincarnation in ministerial meetings, which investigate accountability arrangements.

Parties Without Parliament: The New Trend in Accountability for Media Accusations? When it comes to government accountability for allegations that appear in the media, the role of parliament is weak. Parliaments are the most reliable mechanism for investigating the government, but their investigations do not result in sanctions. This discrepancy between the investigative and sanctioning capacity of parliament is probably due to the lack of motivation on the part of the majority party to sanction the government it has 152 G. DIMOVA elected. Nevertheless, it seems that political parties can be effective in imposing sanctions outside of the realm of parliaments. Party meetings, the popularity of the opposition party, the role of parties in criticising the government in the media and inter-party negotiations at Cabinet meetings present infuential channels for asserting the role of the party into the accountability process. Further studies are needed to establish whether parliaments have lost the battle for all allegations or just media allegations and whether this extra-parliamentary role of political parties endures.

References Auel, Katrin. 2007. Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefning the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs. European Law Journal 13 (4): 487–504. Bailer, Stefanie. 2011. People’s Voice or Information Pool? The Role of, and Reasons for, Parliamentary Questions in the Swiss Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (3): 302–314. Cole, Michael. 1999. Accountability and Quasi-Government: The Role of Parliamentary Questions. Journal of Legislative Studies 5 (1): 77–101. Dandoy, Regis. 2011. Parliamentary Questions in Belgium: Testing for Party Discipline. Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (3): 315–326. Der Spiegel. 2009. Germany’s Schreiber Affair: The Scandal That Helped Merkel Become Chancellor, August 7. Die Welt. 2001. Machtprobe zwischen Müller und Riester, February 6. Die Welt. 2004. Koalitionstreffen soll Streit um Minister Schily schlichten, September 23. Dimova, Gergana. 2012. Who Criticizes the Government in the Media? The Symbolic Power Model. Observatorio (OBS*) 6 (1): 63–85. Financial Times. 2005. The Trial of Joschka Fischer, April 25. Finer, A. 1957. Primer of Public Administration. Frederick: Muller. Frankurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 2005. Volmer live im Visa-TV: Mutmaßlich hätte er sich geäußert, April 22. Green, Jeffrey. 2009. The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship. New York: Oxford University Press. McCubbins, Matthew, and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 165–179. Mezey, Michael. 1998. Executive–Legislative Relations. In World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures, ed. G.T. Kurian, vol. II, 780–786. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. 6 DE-PARLIAMENTARISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY … 153

Mulgan, Richard. 2014. Accountability Defcits. In The Oxford Handbook Public Accountability, ed. Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norton, Philip. 1998. Introduction: The Institution of Parliaments. In Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe, ed. Philip Norton. Abingdon: Routledge. Powell, G. Bingham, and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context. American Journal of Political Science 37 (2): 391–414. Rhetorik. Ch. 2005. Joschka Fischers Rhetorik im Visa-TV Auftritt, April 25. Available at http://www.rhetorik.ch/Aktuell/05/04_25.html. Accessed April 14, 2015. Saalfeld, Thomas. 2005. Delegation or Abdication? Government Backbenchers, Ministers and European Integration. Journal of Legislative Studies 11 (3–4): 343–371. Saalfeld, Thomas. 2011. Parliamentary Questions as Instruments of Substantive Representation: Visible Minorities in the UK House of Commons, 2005–10. The Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (3): 271–289. Strøm, Kaare, Torbjorn Bergman, and Wolfgang C. Müller. 2003. Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross-National Patterns. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Süddeutsche Zeitung. 2010. TV-Sender über Interesse an Live-Übertragung Erfreut, May 17. Vibert, Frank. 2007. The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CHAPTER 7

The Presidentialisation of Government Accountability in Russia: Crisis or Transformation of Democracy?

Russian Democracy and the Presidentialisation of Government Accountability Perhaps it seems like a foregone conclusion to argue, as this chapter does, that the president in Russia is the most important fgure in steer- ing the accountability process after the incumbents have been criticised in the media. The devil, however, is in the details. It is not so much the conclusion that accountability channels are monopolised by the president that is new, but the fndings how the president monopolises accountability and exactly at what point in the accountability process the concentration of the president’s power becomes dangerous for democracy, and to explain why. In other words, how can we measure and establish at what point does the president’s domination become a president’s monopoly over the accountability arrangements? In addition, this approach to Russian democracy is unique as it gauges democracy through the lens of accountability, not through the lens of representation. The chapter advances thinking about the role of the president beyond the two theoretical debates about the ramifcations of presidentialisation in general and about the presidentialisation of power in Russia in particular. Where does the presidentialisation of politics as manifested in Western democracy end and the presidentialisation of politics in Russia begin? How is the presidentialisation in Russia that I describe different

© The Author(s) 2020 155 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6_7 156 G. DIMOVA from the global trend of presidentialisation, which includes expanding presidential bureaucracy, making more political appointments and playing the media in the president’s favour? When does presidentialisation cross over the boundary between innocuous centralisation of executive authority and transforms into the hurtful monopolising of executive authority? Ultimately, we would inquire when presidentialisation serves the elites and when it serves the public. The chapter suggests that the presidentialisation of government accountability in Russia is extreme in six ways. The frst major indicator is that the president possesses the highest sanctioning capacity in the country. This means that when incumbents are criticised in the media, presidential investigations are most likely to produce sanctions. Other alarming effects of presidentialisation of accountability include: (2) a presidentialised response to public opinion. This means that the importance of public opinion is consequential only insofar as it affects the standing of the president. The image of the president is more important for effecting sanctions than the image of parliament, the government, the judiciary and other elected and non-elected institutions; (3) presidentialisation of investigative accountability and the de-parliamentarisation of investigative accountability. This means that parliament is by-passed as a forum of accountability not only because political opposition is weak. In the Russian case, parliament is by-passed also because ministers can afford to refuse to appear on the foor and to answer for their deeds without any consequences. In view of such legislative impotence, presidential infuence rises by default; (4) personalization of sanctions. The majority of the sanctions are related to people, not to policies. This means that the whole accountability process is premised on personal relationships, usually relationships to the president, rather than on principles, ideology, competence and notions of the common good; (5) personalization of accusations: the government response to media accusations is related to the person raising the allegation, not to the essence of the allegation. This personalisation allows the president to spin the accountability process in the direction of the accuser’s personal relation to him or other incumbents, rather than to debate the merits of the allegations; (6) personalisation of the judiciary: the prosecutorial investigations of the government are de-legitimised by discrediting the prosecutor, not by arguing the case in point. On the basis of these six observations, the chapter concludes that the Russian president has monopolised the post-media accountability process and that this presidential monopoly has undermined Russian democracy. 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 157

This perspective offers a novel take on Russian democracy because it is unique in assessing democracy through the lens of accountability. It taps into a sizeable literature seeking to gauge Russian democracy through other means and describe it as a “failing democracy” (Politkovskaya 2007), “democracy derailed” (Fish 2005), “managed democracy” (Colton and McFaul 2003), a “mirage of democracy” (Steele 1995), a “fragile empire” (Judah 2013), “democracy without foundation” (Smyth 2006), a “democracy of despots” (Murray 1996), “democracy unclaimed” (Golosov 2003), “stillborn democracy” (Gill and Markwick 2000), “imperial democracy” (Nakamura 2010), “imitation democracy” (Furman 2007), “sovereign democracy” (Okara 2007) and “fake democracy” (Wilson 2005).

Presidentialisation of Politics: Existing Conceptions The presidentialisation of politics in Russia could be viewed in relation to the presidentialisation of politics in the West. Presidentialisation is defned as “the movement over time away from collective to personal- ized government, movement away from a pattern of governmental and electoral politics dominated by the political party towards one where the party leader becomes a more autonomous political force” (Mughan 2000, 7). Prime ministers and presidents presidentialise politics by using the budget to assert their decisions, by controlling the media, making more political appointees, increasing the size of their bureaucracies (Bergman and Strom 2011). One aspect of personalisation is the personalisation of the electoral process, which includes a growing emphasis on leadership appeals in election campaigning, leadership focus in media coverage of politics, and the growing signifcance of leader effects in voting behaviour (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 8–11; Mughan 2000). The literature outlines several causes of presidentialisation (Lobo and Curtis 2014; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Poguntke and Webb 2005, 16): modernisation, individualisation, mediatisation, globalisation and party fragmentation. There has been a trend of presidentialisation of politics even in parliamentary systems, where “prime ministers have gained control of much of the decision-making apparatus in cabinet and parliament and also have control over their political parties” (Peters 2011, 610). Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair came to be seen as the pro- totypical example of a prime minister who has presidentialised his offce (Norton 2003; Foley 2000). Presidentialisation has been conceived 158 G. DIMOVA in Japan (Krauss and Nyblade 2005, 368) and Italy under Berlusconi (Calise 2005, 90), although this characterisation has been disputed by some scholars (King 2002; Bevir and Rhodes 2006). The challenge is to understand how the idea of presidentialisation of politics in the West could be extended to presidentialisation of Russian politics and to the presidentialisation of government accountability in particular. What would presidentialised accountability arrangements look like? What role would the president take in holding the government to account? Presidentialisation had different paths and different origins under Putin and Yeltsin. The origins of presidentialism (and centralisation) in Yeltsin’s Russia could perhaps be traced to the March 1991 ref- erendum which Yeltsin organised to ask the Russian citizens whether they wanted a directly elected president. In June of that year, Yeltsin became the frst democratically elected president and he derived much of his power from the fact that he was elected. His position gave him enough legitimacy to thwart the plotters of the August 1991 coup and to demand from Gorbachev the dismantling of the Soviet Union (Walker 2003, 96). His position was also important for pressing for radical economic reforms (White 2000, 80). The 1993 constitution further boosted presidential power. It was written by anonymous Yeltsin loyalists behind closed doors. Its intent was to provide maximum authority to the president with limited possibilities for interference from the new parliament (Satarov 2007, 42). In terms of the increase of formal powers, Putin took the presidentialisation of politics to a new level. Although the appeal of his personality might have been less strong than that of Yeltsin, Putin built up his formal powers to the utmost degree. The clearest trend of presidentialisation of politics was the introduction of the “power vertical” under Putin. This vertical was perhaps the most important detour from the presidentialisation of politics as understood in established democracies. “The Vertical”, usually understood as the “vertical of power”, refers to the top-down command structure established by Putin during his presidency (Monaghan 2011, 3). Putin recentralised political power in a steep vertical authoritarian structure. Allegedly, the need for a power vertical was highlighted by the Kursk tragedy in August 2000, when Putin realised that he was “systematically misled” by the military authorities. The power vertical was further justifed by the acute need to combat terrorism as demonstrated in the Beslan school attack in 2004. It led to the abolition of gubernatorial elections and replacing directly elected governors with presidential appointees (Monaghan 2011, 8). 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 159

Zaznaev (2008, 29) applies and expands the framework of the presidentialisation by looking at the degree of the leader’s autonomy and detachedness from political institutions and the degree of control by and responsibility to the executive power. Zaznaev (2008, 34–36) makes the following list of the manifestations of presidentialisation in Russia: (1) the creation of seven districts and the appointment of presidential envoys to these districts; (2) eliminating the automatic representation of governors in the Federation Council; (3) changing the budget to the beneft of the centre and at the expense of the provinces; (4) the Russian president receives the right to dismiss regional legislatures; (5) cancellation of popular elections of governors and the involvement of the president in their appointment; (6) after 2003 elections, the president secured a constitutional majority in the Duma; (7) changes in the electoral law to secure future wins for the party of power; (8) the courts have become more attentive to the arguments of the Kremlin. In general, the presidentialisation of Russian politics is thought to have a deleterious effect on democracy (Colton and Skach 2005). According to Fish (2005, 224–230), the effects of super-presidentialism in Russia are damning because super-presidentialism has compromised the legitimacy of the post-Soviet regime by equalising democracy with a single person. It had a “chilling effect on party development” as parliament was weak and parties in a weak parliament failed to create identities and reputations. Furthermore, super-presidentialism reduced the quality of the party class. The president, by occupying so much power, stifed the entrance of other people of ability. Sakwa (2011) makes a compelling argument about the connection between presidentialisation and the worsening of democracy. He argues that the formal centralisation of authority around the president has given rise to the informal resolution of a myriad of conficts. He calls this phenomenon the rise of the dual state. The dual state refers to the constant struggle between two pillars: the formal constitutional order and the para-constitutional political process (Sakwa 2011, xi). This para-constitutional order is grounded in shadowy arbitrary arrangements, populated by various conficting factions (Sakwa 2011, iix). The practices of para-constitutionalism and para-democracy were accentuated by the establishment of several institutions, which could be roughly related to presidentialisation. The frst was the establishment of seven federal districts in 2000, which were subordinated to the president. The second was the establishment of the State Council in September 2000, a body comprised of the 160 G. DIMOVA heads of the Russian regions with running in parallel with the Federation Council. The third para-constitutional body was the “Presidential Council for the Implementation of National Projects” in August 2005. The fourth para- constitutional institution was the Public Chamber, which monitors draft legislation and the work of parliament. All of these institutions denied the supremacy of the normative state (Sakwa 2011, 48–49).

Presidentialisation of Government Accountability in Russia: New Findings The empirical fndings reveal several aspects of the infuence of the Russian president in the post-media accountability process that enrich our understanding of the role of the president in Russian democracy. The fndings demonstrate that the president is the single most important person for both investigating and sanctioning the government for media allegations. This means that if the media criticise an incumbent, there is a very high likelihood that the case will be reviewed by the president and that, if sanctions are imposed, it will be the president who imposes them. This view of the increase in the informal powers of the president shows that the president unoffcially controls the accountability process through personalising several aspects of it, which are different to those outlined by the literature above. These novel aspects are: (1) sanctions are imposed depending on the likeability of incumbents; (2) presidential ratings determine whether the government is sanctioned; (3) the president puts pressure on the judiciary by attacking the persona of the prosecutor; (4) the government attacks its critics personally. Based on these new fndings, the chapter argues that the presidentialisation of accountability arrangements in Russia has thoroughly undermined democracy. Presidentialisation has annulled any feasible ways of resolving the ultimate confict between account-givers and account-holders. Account- holders, with the exception of several groups which make allegation in the media, are exclusively narrowed down to just one—the president. This means that presidentialisation has altered the concept of centralising the resolution of conficts into monopolising the resolution of conficts. This effectually means that the president appropriates the accountability agenda, investigations and sanctions. In the light of these trends, the presidentialisation of politics in Russia acquires even more formidable implications. It shows that the line between presidentialistaion and super-presidentialism has been crossed. 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 161

The President Has Monopoly Over Sanctioning the Government The increase in formal powers of the president has two dimensions, which go beyond the conventional storyline of centralisation of authority and the power vertical. The presidentialisation of accountability arrangements means that the president is the most common investigator of media criticism of the incumbents and the most effective factor in sanctioning the incumbents. To comprehend the comparison and distribution of sanctioning power, it is useful to refer to the accountability pyramids, and more specifcally their height, base and shape. The pyramid in Fig. 7.1 shows that the president has monopolised the accountability process. The top of the pyramid illustrates that the most important determinant of sanctions in the light of media accusations is the approval rating of the president. If the president’s rating decreases from its minimum to its maximum, the likelihood of sanctions of the government increases by 57%. It is notable that it is the president’s, rather than the government’s ratings, that affect the likelihood of government sanctions for media accusations. Another powerful

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Fig. 7.1 The accountability pyramid in Russia: relative sanctioning effectiveness of forums 162 G. DIMOVA indicator of the presidentialisation of accountability is that presidential investigations of media allegations rank second in importance (after the effect of the approval ratings), which means that the president is the most powerful imposer of sanctions on the government. The involvement of the president in the investigation of media accusations of government misconduct or government incompetence increases the chances of sanctions by 43%. All the descriptions of the fndings refer to the results from the First Differences Model, unless otherwise specifed. The second-order sanctioning mechanisms that occupy the second level of the pyramid are judicial. When a media allegation is viewed in the Supreme Court, the probability for sanctions increases by 29%. Courts are the third most effective accountability device (after presidential ratings and presidential investigations). The prosecutor, in turn, is the least effective accountability forum. Whenever the prosecutor gets involved in investigating a media accusation, the likelihood that the government would be sanctioned increases by 19%. The odds ratios results show that the impact of the prosecutor is roughly fve times less than the impact of the president in prosecuting media charges levelled at the government. The presidentialisation of politics is also manifested in the fact that there are not many forums, which can contest the presidential power. The base of the pyramid is very narrow. The base of the pyramid shows that there is no great variety of effective tools that compete to impose their logic on the accountability process. It consists of just the prosecutor. The Russian Duma, which is the lower house of the legislature, has an extremely limited impact on the outcome of investigations. Forming a parliamentary committee or putting forward a parliamentary inquiry makes no difference for the likelihood of sanctions. Likewise, international investigations and the involvement of the audit chamber make no difference for the probability of punishing alleged government offcials. The height of the accountability pyramid, which measures the difference between the most effective sanctioning forum (presidential ratings) and the least effective sanctioning forum (prosecutorial investigation), is relatively big, which further supports the thesis of the supremacy of the president. 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 163

The President Has Monopoly Over Investigating the Government The second aspect of the increase in formal power related to presidentialisation is evident in the investigative pattern of executive accountability. Only in Russia does the president come before the legislature in terms of the number of investigative activity. This is a precedent. The fndings reveal that, whatever the sanctioning capacity of parliament, the latter always is the prime investigative organ of media allegations in Germany and in Bulgaria. The prosecutor is involved in a roughly equal number of investigations as the president. The most widely used legislative tool for imposing investigative accountability is legislative questions. This feature is very similar to the trend in Germany, where parliamentary questions are the most widespread tool for investigative the government. The difference is that in Germany, parliamentary questions are not only the most widespread legislative tool for investigation but also the most widespread tool overall. In contrast to Russia, the German legislature also regularly employs legislative committees, which are the second most widely used legislative measure after parliamentary questions. A unique feature of investigative accountability in Russia is that the Security Forces are involved in investigating the government, which is unusual for either Bulgaria or Germany (Fig. 7.2).

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Fig. 7.2 Incidence of investigations of all media accusations levelled at the government in Russia during 1995–2005 (N 205) = 164 G. DIMOVA

The presidentialisation of government accountability necessarily entails the de-parliamentarisation of government accountability. This means that as the president usurps power and resources to investigate and sanction the government, the legislature loses a grip on the process. De-parliamentarisation naturally means that parliament is less willing and able to ask the government for clarifcation, explanation and justifcation. It also suggests that parliament would punish the government less. In Russia, however, the process of de-parliamentarisation has been taken to a completely new level. As stated above, Russia’s Duma mechanisms for control, such as public questioning and investigatory committees, do not have a statistically signifcant impact on the likelihood of sanctioning the government. In fact, in cases when the Duma forms a committee or (threatens) a vote of no-confdence for incompetence allegations, the probability of sanctions strangely decreases. Parliament’s investigations fail mainly because the government does not cooperate. Incumbents simply refuse to respond to Duma inquiries. Oftentimes the ministers ignore Duma requests or delay answering them until the case is forgotten or more opportune political circumstances arise. One example is the reaction of the frst Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets. He was summoned by the Duma to account for allegations that he abuses his offce to beneft the presidential campaign. Instead of showing up on the Duma foor, Soskovets sent a letter saying that he thought it is “pointless” for the Duma to examine the issue (RFE/RL, 26 February 1996). Another dimension of the parliament’s weakness is that it cannot oblige the government to explain its actions. Offce-holders avoid divulg- ing information under the pretext of a state secret. In the February 2003 edition of Novaya Gazeta, the journalist and MP Yuri Schechchokin points to yet another failure of the Russian government to rise to the standard of accountability. As a member of the Duma Committee on Public Safety, Schechchokin investigated the 2002 hostage crisis, when Chechen terrorists took 850 people hostage in a Moscow theatre. The Russian special forces raided the building using an unidentifed gas. The media widely discussed suspicions that more than 89 hostages died from that gas. Schechchokin wanted to fnd out whether the authorities used a poisonous substance. His investigation was once again averted by the unresponsiveness of the government, which stated that the Federal Security Bureau could not give information about the gas because it was a “state secret” (Schechchokin, 27 January 2001). 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 165

The executive recourse to the pretext of “national security” is not a unique Russian phenomenon. Noble (1992, 539) points out that in the USA “control of classifed information is a tool that can potentially be used to circumvent the entire Independent Counsel process, as it puts the Executive Branch in a position of judging whether or not one of its own is prosecuted”. However, in Russia, this form of non-cooperation with the Duma is taken to an extreme. Because of several non-appear- ances of government members, the Duma deputies were so discouraged that they wanted to introduce monetary fnes for incumbents who do not attend the required plenary sessions. In another testament to the legislature’s impotence, after parliament refused to pass a resolution to investigate the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings, several deputies formed an independent public committee outside of the Duma (RFE/RL, 6 September 2002). Another extreme form of parliamentary control is the MPs’ hunger strike. Five delegates from the Motherland party faction went on a hunger strike on 24 January 2004 to protest the government’s social benefts reform. This extreme de-parliamentarisation can be explained with the weakness of the political opposition and the short-term time horizons of the Russian deputies who see more benefts from non-cooperating at the present time than in cooperating for the sake of future benefts (Popova 2012). Russian incumbents know that, as long as they are subservient to the president, no other accountability forum can take them to account.

The Personalisation of Sanctions Of all the countries examined in this study, the proportion of personnel-related vs. policy-related sanctions in Russia is the biggest (Fig. 7.3). The presidentialisation of accountability in Russia is particularly illumi- nating in regard to the informal ways in which the president infuences the process of holding the government to account. This increase in informal powers is less related to the president’s charisma, as the theory would predict, and more related to the way important aspects of accountability relate to people. Such aspects of the personalisation of accountability include the fndings that (1) sanctions are imposed depending on the likeability of incumbents; (2) the government attacks its critics personally; (3) the president puts pressure on the judiciary by attacking the persona of the prosecutor. In addition, another indicator that the president has personalised the accountability process is that presidential ratings are a very important determinant whether the government is sanctioned or not. 166 G. DIMOVA

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The presidentialisation of politics is refected in the pattern of sanctions imposed on the government. If we look at the types of sanctions that the incumbents face for various media allegations, it is clear that the president is more infuential across all categories. As Fig. 7.4 shows, presidential investigations are by far more infuential than prosecutorial or court investigations in cases resulting in demoting or reappoint- ing high-ranking government offcials. The president’s investigation is also very decisive in cases resulting in the dismissal of high-ranking and low-ranking incumbents. The involvement of the president is the most important factor determining whether the incumbent would go to prison or not. By comparison, court investigations and prosecutorial investigations are less important across all categories of sanctions. The dependent variable “sanctions” in Fig. 7.4 has 10 degrees. The coeffcients are calculated based on frst differences estimation. The fndings about presidential infuence across the various categories of sanctions are informative in several ways. It is edifying to note that the president is most likely to impose personnel-related sanctions as opposed to policy-related sanctions. In contrast to Germany, where the majority of sanctions relate to the reversal of policies, in Russia, the sanctions 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 167

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Fig. 7.4 Impact of the type of investigations on the likelihood of various types of sanctions being imposed on the government in Russia (N 205) = include mostly dismissal or demotion of incumbents. This trend constitutes one aspect of the personalisation of sanctions. Another aspect of the personal element in the sanctioning process is the remarkably big category of demotion of incumbents, which also include the reappointment of incumbents. It seems that there is a certain trend of recycling of cadres in the political elite. This recycling of incumbents undermines the spirit of accountability. It creates a double reality. It gives the impression that an offcial is punished for the alleged wrongdoing when in fact he has simply been moved to another position, which is usually just as attractive. Why does the reappointment of incumbents indicate that the sanctions are biased? In principle, the dismissal of government offcials means that the government is aware of the incumbents’ guilt or that it admits their blame to some extent. The reappointment of such offcials, on the other hand, means that the government wants to retain these, admittedly guilty, offcials within positions of power, despite their past record. In this indirect way, allegedly corrupt or incompetent offcials are rewarded, rather than punished, for their bad record. This trend indicates that high-ranking offcials are virtually untouchable, which in turn suggests that political connections transcend notions of good and bad. This is one indicator that accountability is personalised. People who are dear to the president will retain power, regardless of their transgressions, which have been publicised in the media. 168 G. DIMOVA

Examples of the Kremlin’s revolving door personnel policy are plenty. Sergey Stepashin had been dismissed as an FSB chief in 1995 because of the unsuccessful handling of the Budyonnovsk hostage crisis, yet he later became justice minister, interior minister and briefy a prime minister (NUPI 2002a). Stepashin’s reappointment is not nearly as telling as Borodin’s. Pavel Borodin, Yeltsin’s property chief, came under investigation in 1999 by Swiss authorities for receiving kickbacks and laundering $22.4 million. Borodin was imprisoned by the FBI on 8 January 2001 and sen- tenced by a Swiss court in 2002 (NUPI, 6 March 2002b). Although he lost his position as a Kremlin property chief, Borodin was appointed a state secretary of the Union of Russia and Belarus. Other cases of reappointments of admittedly corrupt or incompetent offcials include the Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov and the Governor Nazdratenko. The Prosecutor General Ustinov was dismissed in June 2006 because of his improper handling of the corruption case “The Three Whales”. Many critics hailed the move as a sign of purging corruption. Several days later this illusion was lifted as Ustinov was appointed justice minister. The former Justice Minister Yuri Chaika, whose place the former Prosecutor Ustinov took, became the new prosecutor general. A telling example of a person who stays in power despite huge mistakes and low public approval is Anatolii Chubais. Although Chubais was dismissed three times for misconduct or incompetence, he continued to be reappointed to lucrative positions. The frst time Chubais was dismissed from the post of chief of the presidential staff for failing to deal with wage arrears. The wage arrears were deemed to have contributed to the poor showing of the pro-government Our Home is Russia party in the December 1995 election. However, Yeltsin reinstated Chubais in the same position only one year later. Chubais’s reappointment was met with negative reaction. State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev described the appointment as a mistake. Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov compared the appointment to “spitting in the face of society”. Zyuganov claimed that Chubais was almost as hated in Russia as Hitler. Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky said that a narrow clique of politicians was being reshuffed “like a greasy old pack of cards” (RFE/RL, 10 March 1997). Yeltsin ignored the parliamentarians’ anger only to dismiss Chubais later from the post of fnance minister because of the “book scandal”. Allegedly, Chubais received $100,000 for a book on privatisation he had 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 169 never written. Although Chubais’s public approval rating was only 9.8% in 1998, Yeltsin appointed him to be a presidential envoy to international fnancial institutions. Chubais lost this job in August 1998, when the Russian currency collapsed and plunged the country into a fnancial crisis. Despite being fred three times—for failure to manage wage arrears, for a big corruption scandal and for the fnancial crisis, Chubais moved on to assume one of the most coveted positions in the country—head of the United Energy Systems. On 16 May 2002, angry parliamentarians protested and questioned Prime Minister Kasyanov about Chubais’s $350,000 salary. Although Kasyanov promised the deputies to look into the matter, nothing was done. Chubais continued to reign on the same terms until he failed one more time on 26 May 2005, when blackout struck Moscow. The State Duma declined to consider a “Motherland”-drafted resolution calling for an emergency shareholders’ meeting to discuss Chubais’s resignation. Communist Party leader Zyuganov told the radio station Ekho Moskvy that “Chubais should be fred…the Duma has voted 10 times to sack him, but the party of power [Unifed Russia] and [President Vladimir] Putin have always backed him” (RFE/RL, 30 May 2005). These examples indicate that people who are favoured by the president are not punished, regardless of what they might have done wrong. Accountability is not based on evidence, merit and rules but on personal connections and likeability. This personalisation of sanctions is indicative of enhanced accountability.

The Presidentialisation of the Judiciary The fndings reveal that prosecutorial involvement in investigating the government is the third most important determinant of the likelihood of sanctions. What does prosecutorial infuence in the accountability process tell us about the infuence of the president? Are prosecutorial investigations an alternative investigatory channel to the presidential one, or are they simply reinforcing presidential investigations? The relationship between the presidency and the prosecutor is important because it changes the perception of whom the government is ultimately accountable to. The answer to that question turns largely on the impact that the president has on the prosecutorial offce. This infuence in turn depends on the mode of election of the prosecutor and the democratic culture 170 G. DIMOVA of accountability. The Russian prosecutor general is elected in a roughly similar mode as the German prosecutor general. According to the “Federal Law about the Offce of the Prosecutor General of Russian Federation”, the prosecutor is nominated by the president, he is elected by the upper house of parliament and reports to both of them (Offcial Website, Russian Prosecutor). The election of the German prosecutor should also be approved by the upper house of the legislature at the suggestion of the minister of justice and is confrmed by the president. In Bulgaria, for example, the routine is reversed—a judicial council nominates the prosecutor, and the president appoints him. The fragile democratic tradition in Russia enables the president to bypass the legislature in appointing, and ultimately, controlling the prosecutor. The president has also found an institutional loophole that helps him usurp the accountability channels. Article 12 of the law does not specify what happens if the Federation Council rejects the president’s nomination for a prosecutor twice. Thanks to that loophole, Alexey Ilyushenko served as a prosecutor for two years without ever having been approved by the Federation Council. The personalisation of accountability in Russia arises less due to the formal mode of his appointment and more due to the fact that the president has found informal ways to personalise his relationship with the prosecutor. A brief look at the behaviour of the three Russian prosecutors under Yeltsin testifes to the dependency of the prosecutor on the president. A pattern emerges. First, the prosecutor shows disloyalty to the president, then some compromising material unexpectedly appears in the media, and subsequently the prosecutor is dismissed. Here is the frst example of the personalisation of the presidential-prosecutorial connection: Valentine Stepankov, prosecutor general between 1991 and 1993, was dismissed by Yeltsin shortly after Stepankov appeared on national TV to condemn Yeltsin’s decree to disband the parliament in March 1993 as unconstitutional. In August of the same year, the Russian entrepreneur Dmitriy Yakubovskiy showed a tape containing a conversation in which Stepankov asked him to organise the assassination of the Deputy Prosecutor Makarov. Stepankov was dismissed two months later. Here is a second example of the personalisation of the presidential-prosecutorial connection: Aleksey Kazannik was prosecutor general from 1993 to 1994. He disagreed with Yelstin’s order to suspend the amnesty of the people imprisoned for the October 1993 rebellion. 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 171

There was no need for compromising material this time since Kazannik resigned voluntarily shortly thereafter, while defending his judgement (NUPI, 26 February 1994). In another instance, Alexey Ilyushenko was prosecutor general from 1994 to 1996. Before Yeltsin nominated him to the prosecutorial position, he was the president’s aide. Ilyushenko was dismissed only days after closing the investigation into the bloody events of October 1993, in which he pinned the blame equally on executive authorities and on the supporters of the Supreme Soviet. Around this time, the media published reports that Ilyushenko was involved in a small car dealership that mysteriously had won a lucrative contract to export oil. It was this news that Yeltsin used as a pretext for his dismissal. “Of course Ilyushenko denies everything but after all the blemish, I can hardly recommend him again for prosecutor general”, said Yeltsin (Stanley, 9 October 1995). Another example of the personalisation of the presidential-prosecutorial connection relates to Yuri Skuratov, the prosecutor general from 1997 to 1999. Skuratov was dismissed when he refused to quit his investigation of the Mabetex scandal, in which Yeltsin and his property advisor Borodin were accused to have accepted bribes from the Swiss company Mabetex. When the Federation council refused to approve the dismissal, a tape surfaced in the media in which a man resembling Skuratov was flmed in bed with two prostitutes. The Council still refused to acquiesce. Skuratov was fnally dismissed shortly after Putin assumed the presidency. After Putin’s reforms, the president appoints the members of the Federation Council, so it will not be a problem anymore for a president to get prosecutors dismissed.

Presidential Ratings: Important Factor for Sanctioning the Government One aspect of presidentialisation is that a big part of the political process hangs on the president’s ratings. The question is whether in a managed democracy, such as Russia, the president is as attentive to public opinion as in established democracies. The common supposition is that public opinion is less important in a regime that is isolated from popular infuences. However, this might be a misconception. Treisman (2010, 2) argues that Russian politics has been far more dependent on public opinion than is commonly understood. 172 G. DIMOVA

Table 7.1 Impact of the type of investigation on the incidence of government sanctions for both incompetence and misconduct charges (N 205) = Who conducts the Dependent variable is: 0 no sanctions vs. 1 sanctions = = investigation? Model 1: frst Model 2: odds ratios Model 3: probit differences (R2 0.56) analysis = (R2 0.60) (R2 0.51) = = President .43 (.08)** 16.9 (13.92)** 1.40 (.38)** President’s ratings .57 (.18)** .96 (.01)** .02 (.007)** − − Supreme Court .29 (.11)** 5.08 (3.8)** .96 (.44)** Prosecutor .19 (.8)** 3.39 (2.13)* .64 (.36)*

*signifcant at 10% level **signifcant at 5% level

My fndings also reveal that, despite its authoritarian tendencies, the president is fxated on his public approval, and that he would be willing to chastise the government for media allegations, if his approval ratings fall. Thus, another aspect of the presidentialisation of politics in Russia was explicated in the fnding that the president’s approval ratings are an important determinant of sanctions for the government (Table 7.1). When the approval ratings of the president drop, sanctions of the government are more likely to ensue, and vice versa. The element of presidentialisation is obvious in the fact that public opinion matters in the accountability process only insofar it refects the public attitude to the president. Surprisingly, government approval ratings are inconsequential for government sanctions. By contrast, in Germany, it is the public approval of the opposition parties that matters for imposing sanctions, and in Bulgaria, it is public approval of the government.

Presidentialisation of Post-media Accountability: Crisis or Transformation of Democracy? The presidentialisation of the accountability process in Russia yields new insights into the presidentialisation of politics in general and in Russia in particular. The general take away from the presidentialisation in politics 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 173 is that it can be twofold. The positive effect is that a centralised authority enhances democracy through greater effciency and coordination of the executive. The downside is that presidentialisation puts a greater focus on the image of the offce-holder at the expense of his or her competence and policy decisions. When applied to Russia, the negative impact of presidentialisation is thought to relate to the rise of the dual state (Sakwa 2011), shadowy arbitrary arrangements between conficting factions, loss of legitimacy of the system, a worse quality of the party class (Fish 2005). Analysing democracy through the lens of accountability adds to these perspectives by demonstrating how accountability has become a one-man’s game. With small exceptions, the public has almost no voice in the accountability arrangements. This could hardly bode well for accountability and democracy. The chapter seeks to complement the awareness of the damning effects of presidentialisation. It provides new evidence to show that the government is not accountable to the public. In this sense, it supple- ments existing understandings of presidentialisation related to the power vertical, the presidential appointment of governors, the 1991 referen- dum, the 1993 constitution, the centralised Federation, the subservient Duma and the obedient courts. Presidentialisation relates both to informal and formal powers of the president in the accountability process. In terms of formal powers, the president controls the most infuential forum for sanctioning the government for media accusations. He has almost no competitors in this regard. The president is the single most important forum for investigating the government for media allegations. Russia is the only country in the subset where post-scandals legislative investigations are less common than presidential investigations. The informal powers of the president are another aspect of the presidentialisation of accountability. The pattern of government responses to media accusations signifes a personalisation of the accountability process because incumbents are less inclined to give explanations and information. Instead, they attack their critics. Sanctions are personal, which means that presidential favourites are often reappointed instead of being dismissed. Moreover, sanctions are imposed as a response to a decrease in public approval of the president, which is yet another way in which the president has monopolised accountability (Table 7.2). 174 G. DIMOVA (continued) Presidentialisation in Russia Presidentialisation Dimova 2012 Limited supply: Media Age, Europeanisation, the New Public Management, de-centralisation, the elections, democratisation paradigm Limited demand: Media Age, moderni - sation, marketisation, Europeanisation, protest movements, parties 1. Sanctions are imposed depending likeability of incumbents; 2. Presidential ratings determine when the government is sanctioned; 3. The president puts pressure on the judiciary by attacking the persona of prosecutor; 4. The government attacks its critics personally Presidentialisation in Russia Presidentialisation Zaznaev ( 2008 ), Colton and Skach ( 2005 ), Sakwa 2011 Fish Steele ( 1995 ), Golosov 2003 Nakamura ( 2010 ), Smyth 2006 Judah ( 2013 ), Gill and Markwick ( 2000 ), and Colton McFaul 2003 Yeltsin’s frst presidential election, Yeltsin’s the 1993 constitution, Kursk tragedy in August 2000, the need to combat terrorism as seen by the Beslan school attack in 2004 Yeltsin’s charismatic personality, charismatic personality, Yeltsin’s the importance of the Family in presidential administration, Putin’s use of KGB cadres to concentrate power around himself - Presidentialisation in Presidentialisation the West Peters ( 2011 ), and StrømBergman ( 2011 ), Poguntke and ( 2005 ), and Webb Mughan 2000 Televised debates; glo - Televised balisation, downsizing of the state ance, lifestyle of leaders are more important in elections than policies The image, appear How the presidentialisation of accountability in Russia advances theoretical debates Presidentialisation References Causes of presidentialisation - Manifestation of presi in dentialisation: increase informal powers 7.2 Table 7 THE PRESIDENTIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT … 175 - Presidentialisation in Russia Presidentialisation 1. The president has monopoly over sanctioning the government; 2. The president has monopoly over investigating the Government Negative: the accountability process is entirely subverted as it serves the inter ests of the president and his allies Presidentialisation in Russia Presidentialisation “Power vertical”: (1) the creation of seven districts and the appoint - ment of presidential envoys to these districts; (2) eliminating the automatic representation of governors in the Federation Council; (3) changing the budget to the beneft of centre; (4) the president can dismiss regional legislatures; (5) cancellation of popular elections of governors; (6) a consti - tutional majority in the Duma; (7) changes in the electoral law; (8) more subservient courts Negative: rise of the dual state, shad - owy arbitrary arrangements between conficting factions, loss of legitimacy, worse quality of the party class Presidentialisation in Presidentialisation the West Prime ministers gain more resources and the power in the party, executive, and parlia - ment to make decisions about the budget and appointees Positive: greater eff - ciency and coordina - tion Negative: image is more important than competence and policy (continued) Presidentialisation - Manifestation of presi in dentialisation: increase formal powers How presidentialisation How presidentialisation affects democracy 7.2 Table 176 G. DIMOVA

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Judicialisation of Government Accountability in Bulgaria: Crisis or Transformation of Democracy?

Introduction: Bulgarian Democracy and the Judicialisation of Government Accountability This chapter seeks to gauge the state of Bulgarian democracy through the lens of accountability that government offcials face after they have been criticised in the media. The fndings of the study suggest that the post-media accountability process in Bulgaria has been heavily judicialised. The judicialisation of government accountability means that the prosecutor general and the courts have a strong infuence in investigating and sanctioning the government in the aftermath of media accusations. This trend is illustrated by the fnding that government policies are sometimes reversed in the courts and that the prosecutor is the second most common forum for investigating the government after the legislature. The principal question that the study seeks to answer is whether this judicialisation of accountability improves democracy in Bulgaria or not. The judicialisation of accountability in Bulgaria taps into a contested argument about the democratic potential of judicialisation in general. On the one hand, judicialisation of politics is thought to have a negative effect on democracy as it gives disproportionate voice to the elites

(Maravall and Przeworski 2003; Papadopoulos 2013; Blokker 2013), helps the elites to insulate unpopular decisions from democratic contestation (Hirschl 2004; Shetreet 1984; Ginsborg 2008) and enables the elites to legitimise unpopular decisions (Solomon 2008) and to threaten the opposition (Popova 2012). On the other hand, judicialisation is thought to have a positive effect on democracy as it provides marginalised populations with a chance to have their grievances heard (Guarnieri et al. 2002). Judicialisation is credited for consolidating the myriad of previously discarded voices into a more visible stream of demands (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). Rather than closing the contentious issue to the limited judgment of non-elected judges, judicialisation is considered to open up a new public space for contestation (Warren 2003, 242). It is advantageous for democracy because it requires concrete action and pins responsibility on specifc people (Rosanvallon 2008). My fndings about judicialisation of accountability in Bulgaria provide support for both sides of the theoretical argument. Judicialisation benefts the public, when issues are discussed in the courts, but it benefts the elites, when media allegations are investigated by the prosecutor. It is interesting that the involvement of the prosecutor is always associated with some sort of sanctions or reversals of policy but the prosecutor never directly imposes those sanctions. It seems that the infuence of the prosecutor is mostly informal as his position is used by the government to delay sanctions, legitimise government decisions and threaten political opponents. The more salient fallout of judicialisation is that court investigations seem to open up a certain space for public discussion of incumbents’ transgressions and they also appear to produce speeder and more defnitive judgements for public grievances with the government. Overall, the judicial logic can play successfully both in the hands of the elites and the public. Thus, the chapter concludes that judicialisation has both negative and positive effects in Bulgaria. The negative effects concern the elite’s use of the prosecutor to (1) threaten elite’s opponents; (2) legitimise elite’s claims; and (3) delay opponents’ claims. The positive effects of judicialisation refer to the ability of the courts to provide the public with (1) greater and less costly access to holding the government to account; (2) a more facts-based public discourse; and (3) a better ft between their specifc claims and the judicial accountability forms. 8 JUDICIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN BULGARIA … 181

The Judicialisation of Government Accountability in Bulgaria: The Findings The proposition that the post-media accountability process in Bulgaria is judicialised means that when the incumbents are criticised in the media, the prosecutor and the courts play a prominent role in holding the incumbents to account. This process relates to both the investigative and the sanctioning power of the judiciary. On the investigative side, the judicialisation of accountability is evident in the fact that the second most common way to investigate media allegations is to assign the investigation to the prosecutor general. When an allegation levelled at the government appears in the media, the accusations are most often investigated by parliamentary questions. Prosecutorial investigations come up second in importance. Supreme Court investigations and lower court investigations also fgure prominently (Fig. 8.1). On the sanctioning side, the judicialisation of accountability is most obvious in fact that Supreme Court investigations and lower court investigations of alleged incumbents are most likely to produce sanctions. This trend is refected in the accountability pyramid in Fig. 8.2, which is a measure of the relative sanctioning power of various forums. The accountability pyramid shows that the judiciary occupies the top of the accountability pyramid. The second most effective forums are

120 s 100

60 of Investigation 40

Incidence 0 t y Audit Court chamber Supreme President Internal Prosecutor Vote of No- Confidence Questions Lower Cour Government International Investigation Investigation Committee Parliamentar Parliamentray

Fig. 8.1 Incidence of investigations of media accusations levelled at the government in Bulgaria (N 942) = 182 G. DIMOVA

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Fig. 8.2 The accountability pyramid in Bulgaria: relative sanctioning effectiveness of forums parliamentary committees. If the Supreme Court or a lower court reviews media allegations, the likelihood of sanctions increases by 54% and 46%, respectively. The sanctioning power of the legislature, in the form of parliamentary committees, comes up as only third in importance with 39%. The base of the pyramid is constructed by three less infuential sanctioning mechanisms: investigations from within the government, the public approval ratings of the government and the investigations of the audit chamber. This is a relatively broad base in comparison with the accountability pyramid in Russia, for example, where the base contains prosecutorial investigations only.

Does the Judicialisation of Politics Enhance Democracy? The Theoretical Debate It is diffcult to assess whether the disproportionate infuence of the judicial organs in the accountability process bodes well for democracy or not. The literature presents two opposing views about the consequences of the judicialisation of politics. The dominant line is that judicialisation benefts the elites because they turn to the judicial arena when their powers are even and they cannot agree who prevails in parliament (Maravall and Przeworski 2003). On the opposite side, the judicialisation of politics is considered a positive, bottom-up process, which gives unrepresented minorities a chance to participate in politics (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). The debate has many nuances, which I have captured in six concepts: (1) accessibility; (2) aggregation; (3) legitimation; (4) intimidation; (5) contestability; (6) uncertainty (Table 8.1). 8 JUDICIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN BULGARIA … 183 Uncertainty Judicialisation is an instrument the elites use to delay the reso - lution of issues until they are forgotten Judicialisation helps minorities to get faster sanctions on the incumbents than in an uncertain political process Contestability Judicialisation is an instrument the elites use to insulate unpopu - lar decisions from public debate Judicialisation opens up an additional space for public debate Intimidation Judicialisation is an instrument the elites use to intimidate their opponents and safeguard them - selves against attacks Judicialisation is an instrument the minorities use to intimidate the elites and safeguard them - selves against attacks Legitimation Judicialisation allows the elites to make their claims appear more legitimate Judicialisation allows minorities to make their claims appear more legitimate Aggregation Judicialisation makes accounta - bility a discordant process because it gives to an unmanageable number of voices Judicialisation aggregates the myriad of unrep - resented demands into a more coherent and visible demand Accessibility Judicialisation is a prerogative of the elites because access to courts or the prosecutor involves high costs Judicialisation is a prerogative of the non - repre - sented minorities because access to courts or the prosecutor is less costly than that to parliament Assessment of judiciary mechanisms and accountability Criteria Positive sides of judicialisation Negative sides of judicialisation 8.1 Table 184 G. DIMOVA

The frst criterion whether judicialisation enhances democracy is related to the accessibility of the courts. The contention is that, on the one hand, the courts serve the elites because the elites are the only ones who can afford the organisational and the material costs, as well the expertise to take the government to court (Maravall and Przeworski 2003, 23; Papadopoulos 2013, 18). According to this vein of research, judicialisation reinstates rather than challenges the status quo because “a few well-organized social networks monopolize political access and turn law into an instrument increasingly useful to themselves but decreasingly useful to fellow citizens who belong to poorly organized and politically voiceless strata” (Maravall and Przeworski 2003, 23). The opposite perspective states that the courts are far more accessible by the public than was previously believed. They are deemed accessible because they are geographically dispersed and provide an alternative forum of accountability to those who have not voted for the majority party in parliament (Guarnieri 2003). To Guarnieri (2003, 12), the judicialisation of politics refects an increased public demand: “individuals and groups increasingly seek out the judicial system in the hope of obtaining an authoritative decision in their favour”. Similarly, McCormick (2011, 17) believes that people’s tribunes and political trials enable “disadvantaged, marginalized, or exploited citizens [to] bring socio-economic and political elites more directly to account”. According to Warren, courts expand individual rights in three aspects. First, awareness of the rule of law enables citizens to protest and organise outside of the realm of government without fear that their actions will be punished. Second, “individuals or classes of individuals who have interest in political decisions can appeal for inclusion” in the courts (Warren 2003, 243). Third, class-action suits expand democracy as segments of the population demand responsibility from corporations. Warren (2003, 242) suggests that “court decisions that equalize and expand individual rights tend to expand democracy”. The second criterion whether judicialisation enhances democracy is related to the aggregation of demands. On the one hand, judicialisation can express a cacophony of popular demands because it can give voice to disparate and smaller voices. On the other hand, judicialisation is credited for streamlining and aggregating popular demands in a more cogent and visible way. Critics of the judicialisation of politics argue that judicialisation is a discordant process. Maravall and Przeworski (2003, 23) 8 JUDICIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN BULGARIA … 185 propose that a “‘pluralistic society’ which presses its demands via legal and extra-legal means and a government that tries to be responsive to such a cacophony of complaints and aspirations, for one thing, risks col- lapsing into incoherence.” By contrast, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006, 20) sees judicialisation as a way to make petitions more legitimate and to force the state to take a stand on the advanced claims. Judicialisation is most effective in conjunction with mediatisation and social mobilisation. The third criterion whether judicialisation enhances democracy is related to legitimation, i.e. whether the elites use the courts to legitimise their decisions. According to Ginsborg (2008, 6), “authoritarian regimes switch to the rule of law as a legitimizing narrative” if they cannot gain popular support in any other way. Similarly, Solomon (2008, 263) argues that elites empower the courts in an effort to gain legitimacy “that comes from democratic practices like elections and constitutionalism but do not want to face the risk of leaving offce”. The fourth criterion whether judicialisation enhances democracy is related to intimidation, i.e. whether the elites use the prosecutor and the courts to threaten the opposition or whether the opposition uses them as an alternative forum to seek accountability from the elites. Popova (2012, 40) purports that the courts can be used as instruments for the political elites to threaten and manipulate the opposition. She argues that politicians in emerging democracies use the courts to weaken their competitors. Furthermore, weak incumbents can use subservient courts as campaign instruments to maximise their re-election odds by securing favourable rulings in politically salient issue areas (Popova 2012, 38). The ffth criterion whether judicialisation enhances democracy is related to contestation, i.e. whether the elites use the courts to insulate unpopular decisions from the public or whether court trials open up a wide public space to discuss elite’s decisions. Hirschl (2004, 16) is very critical of juristocracy, because he believes that judicial empowerment through constitutionalisation is a process that is meant to insulate the policy preferences of hegemonic elites from the vicissitudes of democratic politics. Politicians can use the courts to unload politically contestable issues, which can damage the politicians’ reputation (Shetreet 1984). Blokker (2013) argue that judicial control of politics has stifed the democratic engagement of citizens in the new democracies of the third wave. The sixth criterion whether judicialisation enhances democracy is related to uncertainty. On the one hand, judicialisation could speed up the accountability process and fx it within more institutionalised rules. On 186 G. DIMOVA the other hand, it can just lock up and delay certain investigations until they become irrelevant. Rosanvallon argues that judicial decisions are also more defnitive in attributing responsibility and ending uncertainty. By contrast, a political decision could be an instrument for delaying the resolution of conficts (233). Having outlined these six ways to judge whether judicialisation enhances democracy in principle, we can use the empirical fndings for Bulgaria to determine whether judicialisation has improved and transformed democracy in Bulgaria. In the following section, the fndings show that the judicialisation of accountability is just as antagonistic as prescribed by the theorists. On the one hand, there are many prosecutorial investigations, which the elites use mainly to delay decisions and threaten opponents. On the other hand, there are a few cases when the media allegations were brought to court by the public and there were signifcant sanctions for the government.

Negative Aspects of the Judicialisation of Government Accountability: The Prosecutor as an Instrument of the Elites One dimension of judicialisation in Bulgaria is that the prosecutor is often involved in investigating incumbents embroiled in media allegations. This fact is both notable and confounding because it is unclear why people refer such cases to the prosecutor if he has never actually imposed sanctions on the government. The existing sanctions do not result from law- suits; instead, they are a by-product of informal mechanisms. Below, I outline three mechanisms which explain the frequent prosecutorial investigations: the prosecutor is used as an instrument to threaten opponents, as a legitimising instrument and as an instrument for delaying sanctions for the government (Fig. 8.3). The informal infuence of the prosecutor in Bulgaria is often rumoured but has never been estimated. A joke in Bulgaria goes like that: “Question: What is the difference between two Bulgarian oligarchs? Answer: One has a lawyer and the other one has a prosecutor” (Smilov 2015). Numerous doubts have crept about prosecutorial motivations and affliations. As one journalist noted, “what is the procuracy used for? If you ask the ‘new politician’ before retirement, he would tell you that the procuracy is a way to accrue dividends before the media and to speak 8 JUDICIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN BULGARIA … 187

ϳϬ ϲϬ ϱϬ ϰϬ ϯϬ ϮϬ ϭϬ Ϭ ŽƵƌƚďĞĨŽƌĞ WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ dŚƌĞĂƚŽĨĂ dĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ >ŽǁĞƌŽƵƌƚ ƐƵŝƚ ƐƵŝƚ ŽƵƌƚ EƵŵďĞƌŽĨŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨĨŽƌƵŵǁĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ >ŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨĨŽƌƵŵǁŽƵůĚŝŵƉŽƐĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĐƟŽŶƐ

Fig. 8.3 Incidence of investigations and the likelihood of sanctions (N 942) = nonsense with a weapon against your political opponents” (Dimitrova 2014). The prosecutor Tsatsarov himself admitted that “the procuracy is a universal soap with which everybody wants to clean his/her hands” (Dnes.bg, 25 June 2014).

The Prosecutor Is Used by the Elites to Threaten Opponents and Legitimate Threats One conjecture why politicians choose to refer media accusations to the prosecutor general is that they seek to increase the level of threat contained in the allegations. Critics of the government hope that by taking an allegation to the prosecutor, they will create the impression that they are serious about pursuing it. A media threat, which is taken to the prosecutor, is a more ominous threat than a media threat, which is not taken to the prosecutor. The worthlessness of scandals in the Media Age arises from the saturation of the public discourse. Accusations have come to stir little emotions. This means that political actors need an additional source of institutional support to show that they are credible and 188 G. DIMOVA trustworthy. We live in a post-scandal age where media logic needs to unite with judicial logic to be successful. Another reason to take up media claims to the prosecutor is to create the impression that the allegations are legitimate. The account seekers hope that by taking the media allegation to the prosecutor they will trick the public into concluding that the accusation contains enough evidence to win the case in court. Even if the criticism does not win in the court of justice, it may win in the court of public opinion. The hope is that the public would believe that a media accusation, which is lodged in the prosecutorial offce, has substance. This situation of potential credibility will last in the long period before the prosecutor abandons the case, which is all that matters for PR purposes. The timing of such media claims and the concomitant prosecutorial reaction is more important than the outcome of the investigation. The Affair Kostinbrod is a case in point. On the day before the 2013 parliamentary elections, an anonymous signal sent to the majority media outlets made the accusation that 350,000 ballots were found in a mys- terious storehouse. Later on, it turned out that the “anonymous” signal was lodged at the prosecutorial offce by Mrs Maya Manolova, a prominent member of the Socialist Party. The signal insinuated that the ballots would be used to rig the election in favour of the political party GERB, which was poised to win the elections. The prosecutor general, Tsatsarov, and his staff held a huge press conference. They had a PowerPoint presentation showing pictures of the storehouse with the ballots. They had brought in the hall several boxes flled with ballots. The high point of the media spectacle was when they opened one of the envelopes containing a ballot and solemnly asked whether one of the present journalists would approach the podium and witness the opening of the envelope as the latter was supposed to serve as a piece of evidence in the ensuing trial. One of the journalists volun- teered. A member of the prosecutorial staff took his passport and noted down his details. The prosecutorial press conference was ceremonial and mystical. It was both a courtroom drama and a reality show charged with the highest political stakes. The audiences were pleased. The investigation was barren. Nevertheless, the publicity of the investigation decided the electoral outcome and the destiny of the country for the next year or so. This episode shows that, when it comes to the instrumental use of the media and the prosecutor, their timing is sometimes more important than their outcome. 8 JUDICIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN BULGARIA … 189

The Prosecutor Is Used by the Elites to Gain Time Prosecutorial investigations are an effective way to “buy” time for the politicians embroiled in the media confict. Once the investigation is in the hands of the procuracy, both the government and its critics are absolved of the responsibility to act, defend or defy the allegations. They gain “public time”. “Public time” is the time that takes place in the media domain. It differs from ordinary time in that “public time” is the period when everybody is watching the parties in the course of the media scandal. In real time, there is a more acute need for a public reaction than in a “public time”. Figuratively speaking, prosecutorial investigations “stop” that “public time”. The parties involved can use it to settle disputes behind the scenes or broker a deal. They hope that in the course of the prosecutorial investigation people will forget about the allegations. It is unclear whether the procuracy is a victim or a willing accom- plice in the elites’ game of gaining time. It is certain, however, that the procuracy is an easy target for two reasons. First, there is no punishment for raising an unfounded allegation at the government at the prosecutorial offce. The second reason is that despite the bad reputation of the prosecutorial offce, its political biasness remains unproved (Smilova 2011). Therefore, its credibility, albeit shrouded in doubt, is still possible, although not very probable. Overall, taking media charges to the prosecutor is a politically affordbale tool for creating a favourable public impression and intimidating opponents.

The Positive Side of Judicialisation of Government Accountability: Court Investigations Serve the Public

The Courts Improve Public Accessibility As the theoretical overview suggested, it is not clear whether the courts are more accessible to the elites (Maravall and Przeworski 2003; Papadopoulos 2013) or to the public (Guarnieri et al. 2002; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006; Rosanvallon 2006). The fndings here reveal that the trade unions, private people and businessmen raise about 25% of all allegations (Fig. 8.4). The elites, which comprise the government and the opposition, make up around 33%. There is one caveat. In established democracies, the reason why political parties take their battles out of parliament and into the courts is 190 G. DIMOVA

0 Opposition From Below: people Government Media and business

Fig. 8.4 Who makes the media accusations which end up in the judiciary? (N 942) = that their balance of power is unclear (Maravall and Przeworski 2003). Another reason is that legislative and electoral representation in established democracies has waned (McCormick 2011). The publics are fragmented (Rosanvallon 2008); the cleavages are post-ideological (Mair 2013). Therefore, people look for alternative, non-legislative ways to settle their disputes. In transitional countries, the problem is not so much that the political players do not feel represented enough in the legislature. The problem is that many political players are not represented in parliament at all. These unrepresented political players include new movements that have not participated in elections, small parties that did not succeed in elections, or movements, which do not want to become political parties. For such entities, selecting extra-parliamentary means of infuencing the government is not simply an alternative. It is the only option. One example of seeking government accountability through the prosecutor, and publicising it, is the confict between the movement Protest Network, the party Bulgaria without Censorship and the party GERB. By July 2014, all three of them had recently lodged complaints against each other at the prosecutor general’s offce, and not in parliament. Protest Network lodged complaints to the prosecutor that the party Bulgaria without Censorship is sponsored by the notorious Corporate Commercial Bank. This allegation was highly publicised in the media by Protest Network. Just a month later, Barekov, the leader of Bulgaria 8 JUDICIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN BULGARIA … 191 without Censorship, proclaimed enthusiastically on nearly all the media channels that intelligence reports allege that GERB’s leader, Borisov, used to control a channel for drug traffcking. Barekov issued a media invitation to Protest Network to come to his meeting with the prosecutor, when he delivered the secret documents. Protest Network, equally publicly, refused. Barekov accused Protest Network that they are a part of the mafa as is Borisov. At the same time, Borisov fled at the prosecutorial offce yet another libel suit against Barekov. This was also publicised. The reason why these actors took the political drama to the prosecutor and not to parliament is obvious—Protest Network and Bulgaria without Censorship did not have representatives in the national parliament. Protest Network is an extra-parliamentary movement that sprung from a year-long civil protest against the current government. It proclaims to be a horizontal structure and is not offcially a political party. It has no formal access to parliament. At the time of wriitng, the political party Bulgaria without Censorship had been in existence for several months only. It has MPs at the European parliament, but it has not participated in local elections and therefore does not have any MPs in the national parliament. For them, the prosecutorial offce was the only available institutional channel to pursue accountability.

The Courts Offer More Specifc Expertise for Reviewing Some Accusations Taking media accusations to the courts provides one potential advantage that has not been widely acknowledged in the literature: the courts can pronounce themselves on certain aspects of a media allegation that does not fall within the political domain. Sometimes, some accusations have aspects that cannot be addressed in parliament. This was the case with the appointment of the contentious fgure of media oligarch Delyan Peevski as a head of Secret Services, an appointment that became a pivotal moment in the recent Bulgarian history. Mr Peevski had a reputation for being a politically biased media mogul and had no experience in the Secret Services. His appointment triggered widespread public protests against the new government and the oligarchic model of governance as a whole. The government quickly reversed its decision. The Constitutional Court was summoned to decide whether Mr Peevski could resume his parliamentary seat after he gave it up to take up his new post (from which he was dismissed one day later). The court 192 G. DIMOVA asserted the right of Mr Peevski to remain in parliament and the public protested with renewed vigour. The point is that some problems contain many aspects. In this particular case, the public distrust of Mr Peevski was one aspect of his appointment that lent itself to political logic. However, Mr Peevski’s right to remain in parliament, despite the fact that he was openly mocked and clearly hated, was a constitutional and more technical matter. The involvement of the court in this case addressed the technical issues of the problem. Thus, judicialisation can facilitate accountability on the constitutional aspects of the case, even when the issue is highly politicised or personalised, as was the case of Mr Peevski’s appointment.

The Courts Facilitate a More Facts-Based Public Discourse As the theoretical overview suggested, the debate about the value added of judicialisation to public discourse mainly centres on the contestability of the claim. The predominant view is that judicialisation is an instrument the elites use to reduce contestability by taking unpopular decisions to the court, thus shielding them from public debate. This argument works only when the court cases are not discussed in the media. When they are discussed in the media, however, judicialisation fulfls a very important function: it steers public discourse to more evidence-based turfs. Examples abound. Recently, Mr Barekov, the leader of the newly formed party Bulgaria without Censorship, accused Mr Borisov, the leader of the party GERB, that the latter had in the past directed the traffc of amphetamines. To support his position, he produced a document. The discussion focused on the authenticity of the document, which he submitted to the prosecutor. The positive side of judicialisation was that the media discussed the credibility of the claim through examining the credibility of the evidence. Experts debated where the stamp in the document was located, how the document was numbered and how it was worded. Members of the Ministry of the Interior were immediately summoned to speak on TV to testify about the validity of the documents. In another example of a more evidence-based public discussion of media accusations, the procuracy made public the notebook of Mr Zlatanov, who was a member of the Committee for Regulating the Confict of Interest. The notebook showed Mr Zlatanov’s notes explicating which politicians should be “hit”, whom to dismiss, whom to bribe 8 JUDICIALISATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN BULGARIA … 193 and how to exert pressure on various political opponents (Legal World, 17 July 2013). Once again, the public discussion focused on interpreting the notes, who the people mentioned in the notes were, what these actions meant. Experts found out that all of the scenarios in the notebook were implemented (Alarma News, 16 January 2014). Usually, the specifcity and contestability of the claims are perceived as mutually opposing. The reasoning is that as the claim gets more specifc, people fnd it more diffcult to follow. Specifcity alienates the public. But there is another side of the issue, which is that as the claims made by the participants in the judicial process are made public, they do not only increase the technicality of the discourse, but they also expose the claims to the public so it can make its own mind. Thus, the combination of judicialisation and mediatisation facilitates a more rational and facts- based discourse.

Conclusion: The New Synergy of Judicial, the Media and Political Logic The discussion above suggested that judicialisation of post-media accountability, i.e. the fact that the government is investigated and sanctioned mostly by judicial organs, has brought both positives and nega- tives for democracy in Bulgaria. On the negative side, judicialisation of accountability has played into the hands of the elites. The elites have used the offce of the prosecutor general to legitimise their decisions, delay sanctions and threaten the opposition. On the positive side, judicialisation has benefted democracy by allowing isolated groups to gain entry into the political arena. This is especially helpful for the many new political players and the many non-political players who are not integrated in the political process. They get a forum to participate and to have their grievances heard. In addition, judicialisation is benefcial for democracy because it is suitable for tackling the technical sides of complicated political issues. This is especially helpful in cases where some issues transcend ideological and political divides. Finally, another positive aspect of judicialisation is that it opens up a certain leeway for discussing political issues in a more facts-oriented fashion. This double-sidedness of judicialisation, which is manifested in the frequent and ineffective prosecutorial investigations and the rare but effective court trials, testifes yet again that democracy beyond elections is a multi-centred process with many winners and many losers. In this 194 G. DIMOVA sense, the fndings lend credence to the two mutually opposing theoretical arguments connected to the judicialisation of representation. On the one hand, it supports Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) view of judicialisation as a “social accountability mechanism”, which helps the public to control the government. On the other hand, it supports the more critical view that judicialisation is used by the elites to settle disputes in a non- elected arena of courts (Maravall and Przeworski 2003). The analysis of the empirical fndings leaves the impression that judicial logic is the new actor on the political scene. Judicial logic has joined media and political logic and has taken centre stage in the public political show. The entrance of judicial logic has changed the calculus. The dilemma is no longer whether the media intrude on politics in order to accrue dividends or whether politicians instrumentalise the media in order to attract more voters. The question is how media allegations, which reach the courts, change politics. The answer is perhaps that we no longer live in a post-ideological age but in a post-scandalous age. A kompromat (blackmail) in and of itself is not as powerful as it used to be. Media frenzy (Sabato 2000) has become the norm not the exception. We live in a state of a permanent campaign (Elmer et al. 2012). The public is not so impressionable any more. The public appetite for sensation is sati- ated. This is why kompromats need to be attached to judicial investigations. This combination of the media, politics and the judiciary signifes a new stage of political warfare. Making claims at the government in the media brings publicity without credibility. Taking allegations levelled at the government without media attention brings credibility without publicity. Mediatisation and judicialisation give the perfect formula for credible publicity or public credibility.

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Elmer, Greg, Ganaele Langlois, and Fenwick McKelvey. 2012. The Permanent Campaign: New Media, New Politics. Peter Lang. Ginsborg, Paul. 2008. Democracy: Crisis and Renewal. Profle Books. Guarnieri, Carlo. 2003. Courts as an Instrument of Horizontal Accountability: The Case of Latin Europe. In Democracy and the Rule of Law, ed. J. Maravall and A. Przeworski, 223–241. Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guarnieri, Carlo, P. Pederzoli, and C.A. Thomas. 2002. The Power of Judges. New York: Oxford University Press. Hirschl, Ran. 2004. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Harvard University Press. Legal World. 2013, May 15. Available at http://www.legalworld.bg/30835.dos- tojnite-prokurori-ne-sa-anonimni-ili-pone-sa-pogramotni.html. Accessed April 17, 2015. Mair, Peter. 2013. Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. Verso. Maravall, José María, and Adam Przeworski. 2003. Democracy and the Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press. McCormick, John. 2011. Machiavellian Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Papadopoulos, Yannis. 2013. Democracy in Crisis?: Politics, Governance and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan. Popova, Maria. 2012. Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies. Cambridge University Press Peruzzotti, Enrique, and Catalina Smulovitz. 2006. Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American Democracies. University of Pittsburgh Press. Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2006. Democracy Past and Future. Columbia University Press. Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2008. Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge University Press. Sabato, Larry. 2000. Feeding Frenzy: Attack Journalism and American Politics. Lanahan Publishers. Shetreet, Shimon. 1984. Judicial Independence and Accountability in Israel. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 33 (4): 979–1012. Smilova, Ruzha. 2011. The Duty to Obey the Law and Social Trust: The Experience of Post-Comunist Bulgaria. CAS Sofa Working Paper Series 4, 1–39. Smilov, Daniel. 2015. Статус на деня: Разликата между Василев и Пеевски: Единият има адвокат, а другият – прокурор, March 31. Available at http://danismilov.blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/blog-post_31.html. Accessed April 17, 2015. Solomon, P.H. 2008. Assessing the Courts in Russia: Parameters of Progress Under Putin. International Journal for Court Administration 1 (2): 1–7. Warren, Mark. 2003. The Second Transformation of Democracy. In Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, ed. B.E. Cain, R.J. Dalton, S.E. Scarrow, B. Cain, and S.E. Scarrow. Oxford University Press. PART III

Democracy Analyzed Through the Lens of Accountability: Crisis or Transformation? CHAPTER 9

Democracy Through the Prism of Accountability: Comparison with Models of the Crisis and Transformation of Democracy

The Demand and Supply Analytical Framework: Utility for Studying the Crisis and Transformation of Democracy There has been lately a surge in the scholarship on the crisis and transformation of democracy. Gagnon et al. (2014) list 507 models of democracy, most of them appearing in the past decade. My own research has uncovered about 150 models of democracy published since 1997, which I have split roughly into those critical and those optimistic about democracy. A closer inspection of this list indicates that current models of the crisis and transformation of democracy do not communicate suffciently well. There is little awareness about their differences in regard to their reasoning, assumptions and causal mechanisms. Even within the individual camps of the crisis and transformation of democracy, there has been a limited effort to compare and contrast them. They lack a common framework, this lack of criteria for comparison constitute an omission, which Chapters 9, 10 and 11 seek to address. The review of the models of democracy might seem tangential to the book’s argument but it is in fact a necessary step in advancing it. Scholarship on democracy has been prolifc but fragmented. This fragmentation has hollowed out the meaning of the crisis of democracy. It was impossible to justify and demonstrate the value added of the novel perspective on democracy, presented in this book, without frst catego- rising and analysing existing insights. Thus, one of the contributions of

© The Author(s) 2020 199 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6_9 200 G. DIMOVA this book is to create and apply an analytical framework of supply and demand that integrates current models of democracy. The book proposes a demand and supply analytical framework to decipher the controversy and facilitate the dialogue between the models of the crisis and transformation of democracy. The value added of this framework is that it complements and modifes existing models in the following respects: the conclusions it reaches about democracy, the normative approach to assessing democracy, the methodological approach in assessing democracy, the perception of supply and the perception of supply. I argue that the supply and demand framework is a ftting model for analysing models of the transformation and crisis of democracy because it man- ages to (1) differentiate between the causes and effects of the crisis; (2) integrate the opposing effects of identical causes; (3) differentiate between the different causes of the same phenomenon; (4) transcend interdisciplinary divides; and (5) relate to a long tradition of democratic dichotomy. First, a supply and demand analytical framework puts apart the causes from the consequences of the crisis and transformation of democracy. For example, it is not immediately clear in the literature how the decreased support for political parties is linked to the crisis of democracy. Some scholars believe that they are the causes of the crisis (Mair 2011), while others argue that they are the result and manifestation of the crisis (Habermas et al. 1974). In the same vein, it is unclear whether the decreased legitimacy of representative institutions, corruption, low electoral turnouts is a cause or a consequence of the crisis. Second, the supply and demand framework makes it easy to confate divergent processes. It presents the analysis as a matter of degrees rather than as a matter of prioritising one phenomenon over another. Furthermore, it allows the analysis to integrate causes of various natures. For example, supply can be determined by both structural factors, such as economic growth, by personal factors, such as political charisma, and by random factors, such as the Watergate, the Vietnam War, and the Lewinsky Affair (Dalton 2004, 2). In the suggested framework, there is no need to select explanatory variables according to their sphere or domain. They can be integrated. Third, the supply and demand framework integrates models of democracy, which have hitherto existed in a relative isolation. Because of the “exceptional diversity” (Schmitter 2011, 8) of the causes of the crisis, many unproductive interdisciplinary boundaries have sprung up. As Papadopoulos (2013, 6) argues, “the discipline of political science today is too fragmented along school, and above all, subsidiary lines (for 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 201 example, political sociology, policy analysis, European studies, international relations) to be able to offer an encompassing view of the changes affecting contemporary democracies”. The result is that researchers working in their own subfelds “reach contradictory conclusions about the fate of democracies”, “fail to capture the full range of phenomena that illustrate major transformations of democracies, and thus offer only a partial view of them” (Papadopoulos 2013, 6–7). This disparity in the democratic literature is refected in the fact that, for instance, notions of monitory democracy (Keane 2009), cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi 2008) and counter-democracy (Rosanvallon 2008), which are relatively optimistic about the prospects for democracy exist side by side with far more critical accounts of democracy, such as the “expectations gap” (Flinders 2012), democratic overload (Crozier et al. 1975) and democratic defcit (Norris 2011). Such models exist relatively independently of each other, without building upon each others’ formidable explanatory potential. As will be demonstrated below, the supply and demand framework is well placed to integrate these models. Fourth, the supply and demand framework makes it possible to account for the divergent consequences of the same phenomenon. For example, globalisation is viewed as a double-sided process, where supranational bodies exercise infuence from the top (Crouch 2004) and, at the same time, bottom-up politics, which rise up from below (Kostovicova et al. 2012). Furthermore, globalisation is thought to both segment and reconnect the public (Macdonald 2008). Similarly, mediatisation is a contradictory process as it simultaneously empowers the citizen (Norris 2011), while making it more passive (Manin 1997). Without a framework, which can keep score of the complicated analytical landscape, scholars tend to choose just one aspect of a phenomenon. The supply and demand model integrates various practices, such as mediatisation, globalisation, agencifcation and technocratisation. It sheds much- needed light on these intertwined processes. Finally, the supply and demand framework is used because it has a long, although not immediately visible, lineage in the literature. It frst appears in the economic theory of “marketplace democracy” by Downs in the 1960s. Some models, such as Flinders’ “expectations gap” (2012), Norris’s “democratic defcit” (2011) and Rosenau’s (2004) idea of a “strong demand and huge supply” use it explicitly. Schedler (2002) suggests that some of the conditions for free and fair elections are “freedom of supply” and “freedom of demand”. Harden (2015) invokes a 202 G. DIMOVA supply and demand theory of political representation in the American legislatures. Onians (2004) talks about a “supply and demand democracy” in Egypt. Fowler (2015) presents a model of “supply and demand of democracy”. Maravall (2016) gauges the “demands on democracy”. Kubik (2017) mentions a “demand side” explanation of the rise of populists advanced by Inglehart and Norris (2016) only to conclude that “while these theories explain much, particularly about the ‘demand side’ of politics, there is additional work to be done on the ‘supply side’”. Furthermore, the idea that democracy is diarchic and consists of antagonistic currents enjoys a long and venerable tradition. This democratic dichotomy is refected in the antagonism between democratic thought and political reality (Schmitt 1976), equality and liberty (Mouffe 2005), oligarchic dimension and democratic dimension (Manin 1997), doxa and episteme (Urbinati 2014), promise and reality (Rosanvallon 2008). Thus, the supply and demand framework is uniquely ftted to introduce the following three clear and fruitful lines of inquiry:

1. Which is higher: supply or demand? Models of the crisis of democracy believe that demand and supply simply do not add up. The supply-centred models of the crisis purport that democracy is undergoing a legitimation crisis because the government cannot deliver enough economic growth, welfare benefts and stability (Habermas et al. 1974; Lipset 1987). The demand-centred models of the crisis believe that democratic decline is caused by democratic overload, which means that the public is expecting too much from the government (Crozier et al. 1975, Flinders 2012). By contrast, models of the transformation of democracy propound that demand and supply have both diversifed and they constantly interact. Instead of focusing on the gap between supply and demand, the models of transformation emphasise the ways in which they inter- relate (Rosanvallon 2008, Keane 2009). 2. Is supply too low or too high? Can supply be extended? The chief difference in the perception of supply is that models of the crisis of democracy propound that supply is fxed or exhausted, whereas models of the transformation of democracy suggest that supply can be extended. The most common reason for the limitation of supply is the crisis of capitalism (Gamble 2014; Streeck 2014). More recently, the limitations of supply have been defned in institutional terms in the sense that parliaments have lost their representative 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 203

power (Fukuyama 2014; Mair 2011; Crouch 2004; Papadopoulos 2013; Kriesi et al. 2013). In contrast to this fxity of the supply channel, proponents of the transformation of democracy seek to expand supply through the representative turn (Näsström 2011; Saward 2010; Urbinati 2014). Deliberation and participatory budgeting constitute alternative ways to extend supply. The most recent way to expand supply is through accountability forums (Rosanvallon 2008; Keane 2009; Vibert 2007, McCormick 2011). 3. Is the public an active participant in crafting democracy? Critics of democracy argue that the public is too passive, while proponents of democracy argue that the public is suffciently active. Models of the crisis of democracy purport that demand is too high or too low for four (sometimes contradictory) reasons: (1) demand is too high because people expect too much from the government (Flinders 2012); (2) demand is too high because people are too fragmented (Wolin 2010); (3) demand is too low because people are totalised (Urbinati 2014); (4) demand is too low because people are too passive (Manin 1997). By contrast, models of the transformation of democracy believe that public demand is active enough because people want to be represented and to seek accountability. These models believe that demand is reconnected across borders (Acrhibugi 2008), or that people can be active participants in democracy, even when they are spectators (Green 2009).

Democracy Through the Lens of Accountability: Contributions to Democratic Theory Analysing democracy through the lens of accountability (on the heels of media allegations) contributes two new insights to democratic theory: frst, it reconsiders the assumptions that we make about what people expect from the government and what mechanisms are available to hold the incumbents accountable; second, it uses a large original database and a new methodological framework to test empirically how various accountability arrangements work in practice. The empirical results enrich common understandings of the models of the transformation and crisis of democracy. Furthermore, the book proposes and opera- tionalises a novel measure of accountability, the accountability pyramid (Chapter 5). The accountability pyramid measures the sanctioning power 204 G. DIMOVA of various accountability forums, i.e. the likelihood that an investigation would produce a sanction of the government. Thus, we acquire an idea not only which accountability forums investigate the incumbents but also who sanctions them. This is a very useful measure as it gets right into the heart of the controversy between democratic legitimacy and specialised knowledge. Table 9.1 summarises some of the analytical and methodological contributions. One of the most obvious differences in these models is the way they approach the notion of supply. Models of the crisis of democracy defne supply in terms of outcomes, whereas my model of democracy through the lens of accountability and the models of the transformation of democracy defne it in terms of opportunities. For example, critics of democracy gauge supply as state policies, such as welfare benefts and monitory policy, economic crisis or economic growth, the responsiveness or the lack of responsiveness of representative institutions. By contrast, more sanguine approaches choose to emphasise democratic innovations, such as deliberative forums and participatory initiatives. It is no surprise then that this emphasis on outcomes versus opportunities produces two diagonally opposed visions of supply: critics believe that supply is limited or exhausted and transformationalists conjecture that supply can be extended. My model is different from the models of transformation in that it suggests to expand supply through the “accountability turn” whereas other models of the transformation of democracy expand supply through the representative, affective, deliberative, participatory and other turns. The views of demand adopted by various approaches of democracy also differ. While critics believe that democracy is in crisis either because people are not appreciative enough of the government or because they are too apathetic to take part in politics, the more optimistic views surmise that the public can be enlightened. In my model, the public fts neither of those descriptions. The public demands are neither too low nor too high just because the emphasis falls on the way demands are fragmented, aggregated and expressed. Assuming that demand is too high or too low assumes that demand is monogenic and that demands can be aggregated into neat majorities and minorities, which I believe is less tenable because of globalisation, mediatisation and party de-alignment. In line with several other theorists, I propose that demands are grouped around specifc issues and these alliances are quick to form and quick to dissolve as soon as the issue is addressed. Of course, there is the 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 205 - View of demand View Demand is diverse Demand can be both active or passive Demand is monogenic Demand is either too active or passive Demand is diverse Demand can be either active or passive - View of supply View Supply is diverse. Supply increases through the “accountability turn” Supply is monogenic Supply is static or decreases ative, representative and “other turns” should be on the same line other “turns” Supply is diverse. Supply increases through the deliber Methodological approach Supply and demand interact at many points Supply and demand are divergent Supply moulds demand Normative approach Accountability Economic Well-being Representative institutions The State Representation Deliberation Participation Protests Conclusions about democracy Democracy is mostly in crisis but the pub - lic benefts as well Democracy is in decline Democracy is trans - forming into new forms The model of democracy through the lens of accountability compared to models of the crisis and transfor Model of democracy Democracy through the lens of accountability Crisis of democracy Transformation of Transformation democracy mation of democracy 9.1 Table 206 G. DIMOVA real danger that oligarchic elites co-opt these alliances, which is a point that needs additional empirical examination. This version of demand is drastically different from that inherent in deliberative and participatory democracy because it assumes that the public demand is made up by external factors rather than by the deliberative and participatory forums. There is also a very big difference in the way demand and supply relate to each other in the models. The crisis of democracy, according to pundits, is the gap or the difference between supply and demand. In the transformation of democracy, demand is moulded and shaped by supply, i.e. people change their views while they participate in various forums. In my model, demand and supply are diverse and exogenous and they interact on various levels, such as sanctions, explanations and investigations. This interaction makes the accountability process a multi-stage procedure, which harbours great uncertainty. Another contribution of the book is to provide empirical assessments of post-media accountability arrangements in three countries with different degrees of democratic potential: Germany, Russia and Bulgaria. The value added of this approach is to present another way in which democracy has failed, which is different from established ideas of the expectations gap, the confdence gap, the performance gap, the opportunity gap, etc. (Table 10.1). I suggest that one way in which democracy has failed is through the judicialisation of accountability, which allows the prosecutor to be used by the elites to threaten opponents and to create the impression that media criticisms are legitimate (Chapter 8). An alternative manifestation of the failure of democracy is the impotency of parliaments not only to investigate but to punish incumbents (Chapter 6). Finally, democracy has failed in Russia, partly because the president monopolises the accountability forums and decides on various sanctions of the government (Chapter 7). Despite the indicators demonstrating how accountability arrangements advance the elites, the results presented in this book still give some grounds for hope. The courts seemed to be able to process well public grievances with the government. The involvement of the courts produces a more fact-based public and media discourse. Another positive fnding is that the public took an active role in criticising the incumbents in the media, thus leaving an imprint on formulating the public accountability agenda. An encouraging sign of the post-media accountability process is that even the power of the almighty president in Russia is constrained by considerations of his popularity ratings. Overall, the mixed nature 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 207 of these fndings suggests that democracy viewed through the lens of accountability is in a rather uncertain state.

Comparing the Models of Democracy in Terms of Their Views of Supply There is a considerable difference in the way various models of democracy conceptualise supply. The book argues that supply is theoretically expandable. People in certain advanced democracies have acquired greater opportunities to participate in politics through holding the government to account, reversing its policies, making it give explanations and dismissing ministers. I call these greater opportunities an “accountability turn”. The “accountability turn” introduced in Chapter 3 means that the mechanisms for holding the government to account have expanded or have become more visible and more accessible to the public, and that the accountability forums have specifcity which responds to the various demands of the public. Some of these specialised bodies include arms-length organisations, the EU court of human rights, ombudsmen but also more established accountability channels, such as parliamentary committees, votes of no-confdence, audit chambers, public opinion, protests and party meetings. The contention that there has been an accountability turn challenges both the notions of the expansion of supply, purported by models of the transformation of democracy, and the notions of the insuffciency of supply, advanced by models of the crisis of democracy. The critics of democracy conceive supply as the tangible goods or policies that the government delivers to the public. These goods could be economic growth, welfare benefts, intergenerational debt as well as non-material delivera- bles, such as representative policies and educational opportunities. Thus failure of democratic government manifests itself in its failure to deliver public goods (Streeck 2014; Gamble 2014), to ensure economic growth (Wallerstein 2011), to manage its welfare state effciently (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2015; Wallerstein 2011), to manage the aftermath of fnancial crises (Posner 2010), to tolerate the monopoly of global frms (Crouch 2004; Ginsborg 2008), or when the political parties (Mair 2013) and representative institutions have lost public trust (Fukuyama 2014; Papadopoulos 2013; Kriesi 2013). Perhaps because supply is defned in mostly material terms, it is no surprise that it is thought of as a fnite and exhaustible resource. 208 G. DIMOVA

In fact, in many of the models of the crisis of democracy, supply has already been exhausted. Flinders is fully aware of the limitations of supply and illustrates well the perception of supply espoused by the critics of democracy. Flinders lists three options for reducing the “perception gap”, which measures the difference between supply and demand: “option 1: increasing supply”, “option 2: reducing demand”, and “option 3: a combination of option 1 and option 2”. Flinders (2012, 58) goes on to say that “the essential point… is that although Option 1 (i.e. increasing supply) may have provided the default position for politicians throughout the twentieth century, it is no longer feasible”. According to Flinders (2012, 59), “option 1 is simply not viable because the public’s demands are insatiable, the problems facing society are too complex, the available resources are insuffcient, and although managerial reforms within the public sector may deliver marginal effciency sav- ings, they will never close the gap”. Another way to increase supply is to increase the public goods provided by the government to the public. Flinders says that this is not an option because economic resources have been depleted, “the global fnancial crisis, population growth, the emergence of a new world order, and the demands of addressing climate change conspire to ensure that politics in the future must focus on reducing demand rather than increasing the supply of public goods” (Flinders 2012, 59). Compared to the limitations of the supply of goods and policies inherent in the models of the crisis of democracy, the concept of supply of opportunities inherent in the accountability turn that I propose is by far more extendable. The concept of the accountability turn proposed in this book also challenges the perceptions of supply propounded by some models of the transformation of democracy, which seek to increase supply through various other “turns”. Models of the transformation of democracy seek to expand supply through the representative turn (Näsström 2011; Saward 2010; Urbinati 2014), the “deliberative turn” (Dryzek 2002; Habermas 2001), the “international turn” (Archibugi 2008; Held 2004) and the “participatory turn” (Fung 2009). Less popular are the attempts to expand supply through the “aesthetic turn” (Ankersmit 1996), the “agonistic turn” (Mouffe 2005). The accountability turn that I advocate is closest to the notion of expanding supply through the “monitory turn” (Rosanvallon 2008; Keane 2009; Vibert 2007; McCormick 2011) and the “Madisonian turn” (Bergman and Strøm 2011). 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 209

By juxtaposing the accountability turn with the other turns, I seek to make one important point. We need to recognise that the representative channel and elections per se have a very substantial but ultimately limited utility in providing opportunities to improve supply. The representative turn strives to salvage elections by extending the defnition of elections beyond just the mere act of casting a ballot and by gauging elections as a constitutive moment which refnes people’s judgements (Näsström 2011, 506). The representative turn thus adds value by increasing the supply of representation by highlighting the importance of democratic proceduralism (Urbinati 2014, 8) and by pointing out how the “representative claim” is refned in the course of elections (Saward 2010). By contrast, the accountability turn implies the limited utility of the representative turn. Elections, however scholars redefne them, have let us down (Norris 2015). The disappointment with elections stems from the realisation that even in Western countries manipulative (but entirely legal) electoral campaigning enables incumbents who have not performed well in offce to create the impression that they have performed well in offce, and be re-elected (Maravall and Przeworski 2003). This element of electoral campaigning undermines the strength of elections as a retrospective accountability mechanism (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006; Holmes 2012). At the same time, the limitations of elections became apparent in the transitional democracies of 1989 as they did not manage to guarantee democracy as they were expected to (Carothers 2002). The disappointment with elections is also related to the recent acknowledgement that elections are a crude mechanism, because they occur rather infrequently and people vote on an incredibly big bundle of policies, outcomes and people (Peruzzotti 2014). Finally, I argue that the representative turn has a limited utility because the accountability revolution, as argued in Chapter 3, has revealed a galaxy of accountability mechanisms, which are not related to elections. Two opposing tendencies, the decentralisation of the state and multi-level governance, are responsible for the increase in accountability forums, accountability standards and accountability agents. Ignoring these developments by focusing on representation and elections alone would be unwise. It is precisely this emphasis on the limitation of elections and the representative turn that draws my attention to accountability. Of course, accountability and representation do not need to be at odds and are not mutually exclusive. By all means, representation has been the dominant view in democratic theory (Vieira and Runciman 2008). However, as 210 G. DIMOVA

Castiglione and Warren (2005, 6) argue, “‘formalistic’ theories, as Pitkin notes, may emphasize either authorization or accountability, almost to the complete exclusion of the other… Each of these accounts of what the relationship of political representation implies may give rise to different political conceptions. Democratic theories tend to combine the two accounts, but the way in which they combine them is not always obvious, nor, for that matter, need to be fxed once and for all. Indeed, our point is that democratic societies and institutions often propose different equilibria between these two accounts”. Representation and accountability seem to be “communication tubes” (Lord and Pollak 2010).

Comparing the Models of Democracy in Terms of Their Views of Demand The model of democracy through the prism of accountability introduces a new way of defning what the public wants and expects from the government. Most models of democracy defne demand in terms of representation, i.e. what people expect from their representatives. In contrast to those models, I argue that it is important to consider to what extent people want to hold the government to account. This means that we should seek to understand why and to what extent people are willing and able to act upon media allegations of executive malfeasance or misconduct. Public demand for accountability includes three aspects: to what extent groups have the capacity to organise to seek accountability from the government, to what extent issues are salient and important for the public and to what extent the public has the inclination to form independent judgements. These two different approaches to demand, accountability and representation, respectively, yield two different views of the shape and size of demand. Most models of democracy argue that demand is largely homogenous while my model, presented in Chapter 4, sides with those suggesting that public demand is largely fragmented. I conjecture that the public’s desires cannot be classifed as too high or too low because the public is too fragmented to produce these homogenous perceptions. I reach this conclusion by approaching public demand through the prism of public fragmentation, which has been increasingly popular in a disparate strands of literatures, such as international relations (Slaughter 2004; 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 211

Pavel 2014), public administration (Papadopoulos 2013), sociology (Bauman 2000) and democratic theory (Rosanvallon 2008). Another difference in our perceptions of public demand is that most models of democracy believe that people’s demands are fxed or endogenous while I believe that they are exogenous. The term “endogeneity of public demand” simply means that the public changes its mind in the process of participation in various forums. For example, the representative turn argues that the representative claim is refned in the process of elections (Saward 2010). The deliberative turn suggests that people are enlightened in the process of participating in various deliberative forums (Dryzek 2002). The participatory turn suggests that people refne their demands while taking part in various initiatives, such as participatory budgeting. The international turn propounds that people change their minds when they join international forums, such as an international parliament. In the accountability turn, no such change of public demand occurs. People come to the accountability forums, such as the ombudsman, audit chambers and the courts with their mind set on an issue. Their expectations are not determined by the forums in which they participate but by outside factors, such as party de-alignment and globalisation. For example, the dissipation of party cleavages has largely decreased the demand for representation as it has deprived politics of political ideology as a central device of aggregating preferences and organising confict (Mair 2005). Europeanisation fragmented the public will by de-territo- rialising it (Olson 2013). Globalisation served to re-confgure the public will (Archibugi 2008). The demise of the parties, globalisation and mediatisation diversifed the public by transforming a unifed demand into a greater variety of demands. In this regard, the notion of public demand as exogenously determined and diverse most closely resembles the notions of demand in the models of “counter-democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008), monitory democracy (Keane 2009) and “Madisonian democracy” (Bergman and Strøm 2013). There is at least one important implication of arguing that we should perceive demand (1) in terms of accountability, rather than representation; (2) as diverse rather than homogenous; and (3) as exogenous rather than endogenous. This implication is that public demands cannot be easily aggregated and consequently we cannot argue that demand is too high or too low, as some models of the crisis of democracy do. They 212 G. DIMOVA suggest that when public expectations are unreasonably high there is an expectations gap (Flinders and Dommett 2013) or a democratic overload (Crozier et al. 1975), and when people are too passive, there is an audience democracy (Manin 1997). In contrast to these arguments, I conjecture that public demand varies depending on the issue and the constellation of the actors. Public fragmentation could work both ways. On the one hand, the fragmentation of demand allows actors to convene more quickly in smaller groups to seek accountability and they are also more likely to pay more attention to the issues that interest them. On the other hand, a fragmented public is more likely to produce permanent alliances between actors and it is more likely to be co-opted by oligarchic interests. Therefore, the outcome of the accountability process is not predetermined but depends on the type of issue, the constellation of actors and their interaction with the accountability forums.

Comparing the Models of Democracy in Terms of the Outcomes They Produce The model of democracy through the prism of accountability that I propose concludes that democracy is both in crisis and is transforming, but the manifestations of the crisis and transformation are quite different from those advanced by existing models. For example, current studies measure democratic downfall as the gap between what the government delivers and what the people expect from the incumbents. There is an “expectations gap” (Flinders 2012), “opportunity gap” (Putnam 2015), “dual control gap” (Offe 2012), “confdence gap” (Lipset 1987), “performance gap” (Flinders 2009). In contrast to these conceptualisations of the crisis, the book gauges the demise of democracy through the bias and ineffciency of its post-media accountability arrangements. Far from having to do with fscal defcits, government performance or state capacity, the sense of crisis is born out of the realisation that the elites abuse the accountability process in the aftermath of media allegations. One of the major indicators of a crisis of democracy though accountability is the sense that parliament has become embattled. With the exception of Germany, where parliamentary questions are very important in producing punishment for the government, parliaments rarely have a big say in the post-media accountability process. This sense of the reced- ing role of parliaments is partially ameliorated by the fnding that parliaments, in general, are very active in investigating the government, 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 213 even though they are powerless to sanction it. The perspective about the diminished role of parliaments in holding the government to account is similar to the idea that democracy is in crisis because representative institutions are failing (Fukuyama 2014; Mair 2011; Crouch 2004; Papadopoulos 2013; Kriesi et al. 2013). The reasons for the failure of legislatures are different, however. In this case, it is not the irresponsive- ness of the legislature that underpins the crisis, but its inability to dismiss alleged ministers and reverse contentious policies, as far as public scandals is concerned. Again, in contrast to current models which view the crisis in terms of public expectations and government performance, another manifestation of the crisis of accountability is manifested in the way the elites use prosecutorial investigations of media allegations to threaten their political opponents, delay investigations and legitimate unpopular policies. The ascendance of the prosecutor in helping the elites beneft from the post-scandals accountability process, or what I call judicialisation of accountability in Chapter 8, should raise a red fag. As the empirical fndings revealed, the prosecutor consistently comes up as an infuential forum, either in terms of sanctioning power (Germany and Russia) or in terms of investigative power (Bulgaria). The Bulgarian case is especially instructive in this regard as it demonstrates that the prosecutor can be used effectively by the political elites to threaten political opponents, despite the fact that the prosecutor lacks institutional levers to affect sanctions. Thus, one take away from this study is that it is important to fnd ways to hold the prosecutor accountable and independent. Perhaps one of the main dilemmas that would defne the crisis of democracy is whether prosecutorial accountability builds upon electoral accountability or whether prosecutorial systems rely on internal bureaucratic accountability (Wright and Miller 2010). Another dimension of the crisis of democracy is unravelled in Russia, where the president has monopolised the accountability arrangements in almost all possible respects: investigations, sanctions, verbal responses (Chapter 7). Perhaps this is not a surprising discovery for students of Russia, who have long ago established that the Russian president over- extends his powers (Colton 1995; Colton and Skach 2005). However, it is the frst study which approaches the notion of the power vertical from the perspective of accountability, not representation, and which demonstrates empirically to what extent the president abuses his power to investigate and sanction. 214 G. DIMOVA

Because of the broader trends of judicialisation, presidentialisation and de-parliamentarisation of accountability, the model of democracy gauged through accountability is more pessimistic than optimistic about democratic progress. Yet, there are fndings which create hope for the increased role of the public and make it compatible with models of the transformation of democracy. The manifestations of progress advanced here, however, are slightly different than those in established models. In general, scholars who advocate the transformation of democracy believe that there are more opportunities for the public to take part in government and that the public uses these opportunities to the citizens’ advantage. For example, models of deliberative, participatory or cosmopolitan democracy believe that deliberative chambers, participatory budgeting or world parliaments foster democratic progress because they create opportunities for public participation. In the present analysis, the transformation of democracy is explicated in different ways. To begin with, there are several upsides to the judicialisation of post-media accountability. First, the courts give relatively more access to the people to pursue their grievances with the government. Second, the courts increase the speed and defnitiveness of the accountability process. Third, the courts could facilitate a public debate where the accusations of the government are discussed in terms of evidence and facts. Another sign of democratic transformation is the functional differentiation between the accountability forums, which allows certain claims to be heard in settings which are best suited for them. According to this line of argument, democracy progresses because of the greater synergy between the account-holder, the issue and the accountability forum. This is evident in the way the prosecutor takes up mainly cases of government corruption, the EU investigates mainly cases of government incompetence and internal governmental investigations deal equally with media allegations of incompetence and misconduct.

Comparing the Models of Democracy in Terms of Their Methodological Approach Models of democracy take three distinct approaches to gauging democracy. The crisis of democracy is measured mainly as the difference between supply and demand. The progress of democracy is measured as the transformation of public demand through supply. The model 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 215 of democracy presented here bases its conclusion on the interaction between supply and demand (Fig. 9.1). As mentioned above, the crisis of democracy is gauged as the difference between supply and demand. In this case, either supply or demand is insuffcient. If the government does not manage state fnances or the welfare system well or if representative institutions are ineffective, that means that supply has fallen short. This default on the side of supply triggers a legitimation crisis (Lipset 1987). If the public is too passive and does not actively monitor the government, this means that demand is not on a par with supply (Manin 1997; Urbinati 2014; Wolin 2010; Ginsborg 2008; Crouch 2004; Huntington 2004). If the public has unrealistic expectations of the government, then demand is too high for what the government could be realistically expected to supply (Flinders 2012; Hay 2007; Kurlantzick 2013). In either case, the crisis of democracy designates the difference between supply and demand. In the models of the transformation of democracy, supply moulds demand. This happens in many different ways. In the so-called aesthetic democracy, public demand changes in the course of discussing the distance between the electors and the elector (Ankersmit 1996; Kompridis 2014; Csigo 2009). In participatory democracy, attitudinal changes in

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Fig. 9.1 Relation between supply and demand 216 G. DIMOVA demand occur in the process of participation and protests (Fung 2009; Della Porta 2012). In international democracy, the World parliament, demand is reconfgured through a common lingua; shareholder communities reconnect according to issues rather than territory (Archibugi 2008; Macdonald 2008; Held 2004). And, of course, in deliberative democracy, deliberative forums enlighten the public, thus changing demand (Dryzek 2002; Habermas 2001). In representative democracy, electoral and semi-electoral means help citizens refne the representative claim (Näsström 2011; Saward 2010; Urbinati 2014). All these examples show how the various opportunities for participation, deliberation, etc. change what people expect of the government. In the model of democracy conceived through the view of accountability, supply and demand are in constant interaction. Demand does not change demand or vice versa. Neither does demand fall short of supply or vice versa. Simply speaking, the public has some demand to hold the government to account for media allegations and it uses the accountability forums such as courts and audit chambers to pursue these demands. The interaction depends on the particular constellation of demands and on the availability, responsiveness and specifcity of accountability forums. The interaction between supply and demand is of utmost importance. As Halachmi (2014, 568) argues, the “mere existence” and the “mere creation of administrative units within an agency to enhance accountability is not enough to assure it”. Flinders (2009, 2) also underscores that the relationship between supply and demand be more dialogical: “A gap has emerged, and has been emerging for some time, between the governors and the governed in terms of levels of trust and engagement. Yet, the existence of a gap should not be confused with a public decline in interest in politics”. The gap exists in relation to the public’s belief in the utility of those processes and mechanisms associated with traditional representative politics. As Hay (2007 cited in Flinders 2009, 1–2) has shown, “explanations for this phenomenon have tended to focus on either supply-side (political-institutional-behavioural variables) or demand-side dimensions (sociological-cultural-demographic variables). Yet both dimensions are quite obviously inter-related: they are two sides of the same coin, rather than separate issues. The relationship is both iterative and dialectical”. Bovens et al. (2010, 6) also argue that the forums in and of themselves cannot be a causal variable: “the extent to which the relevant accountability forums actually use the oversight mechanisms offered to them varies markedly. Some forums lack the 9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ACCOUNTABILITY … 217 institutional resources, others the willingness, yet other appear to possess both”. Similarly, Cornwal and Gaventa (2001, 32) argue that emphasis on just the citizens or just the state misses the point. There is another difference in the methodology for gauging the development of democracy. The methods of current models of democracy are one-shot, one stage and one-dimensional. As stated, there is either a divergence between supply and demand, in which case there is a crisis of democracy, or supply moulds demand, in which case there is a transformation of democracy. In contrast to this approach, the model proposed here treats the accountability pyramids, which relate to the interaction between supply and demand, as just one of the many additional indicators, which should be considered. The type of sanctions, the identity of the accusers who criticise the government in the media, and the response that the government gives to media allegations all constitute additional data that can modify the fndings gleaned from the accountability pyramids. I then use all these multiple indicators to assess rigorous theoretical debates about the dominance of the courts, the prosecutor, the EU and legislature in the accountability process. Only after the various indicators are factored in, does a more nuanced picture of the crisis or transformation of democracy emerge.

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Contemporary Models of the Crisis of Democracy: Critical Overview Through a Demand and Supply Framework

Models of the Crisis of Democracy: Three Guiding Questions It has become common to suggest that democracy is in crisis. Naturally, the supposed crisis of democracy has revived scholarship on democratic decline but as theories proliferate exponentially, it becomes increasingly less clear how they differ, how they enhance each other and what their individual value added is. We have been offered so many reasons for the demise of democracy that it is hard to keep track. Confusingly, the explanations are often contradictory, fnding faults with either populist leaders or technocratic leaders, unresponsive governments or overreaching governments, a structural crisis of capitalism or a normal boom and bust cycle, passive and distrusting public or an overly demanding public, with people being too homogenous or too fragmented. More than 100 defni- tions, explanations or manifestations of democratic decline are reviewed in the book, such as the “disfgurement of democracy” (Urbinati 2014), managed democracy (Wolin 2010), audience democracy (Manin 1997), “bad-faith democracy” (Flinders 2012), “hollowing out of democracy” (Mair 2011/2012) and post-democracy (Crouch 2004). One unfortunate development in the democratic literature is that the avalanche of such models has rendered the very notion of the crisis of democracy hollow. The so-called crisis has turned into a

“cliché” (Flinders and Wood 2014) and “its usage is just as loose as ever” Wallerstein (2010, 133). Agreeing with the adverse direction that the scholarship on democratic decline has taken, Merkel (2013, 2) points out that the “there is no other concept in political and social sciences that has acquired as much notoriety as the word ‘crisis’ [of democracy]”. Gamble (2014, 28) points out that “crisis has become such a ubiquitous term in modern politics that it often seems to have lost any precise meaning”. Dahrendorf (2000, 311) agrees that “it appears that democracy is always in crisis… the topic [of the crisis of democracy] is of classical parentage”. It seems that the disconnect in the democratic scholarship is a detrimental but not an insurmountable obstacle. The main reason why recent theories of the crisis of democracy are not in a dialogue with each other is that there have been an insuffcient number of studies that seek to compare and integrate them. This chapter sets out to map out current scholarship on the crisis of democracy by using a supply and demand approach. I suggest that most recent models of the crisis of democracy can be differentiated by asking three questions: Is the crisis of democracy caused by the elites or the public, which I term the supply and demand respectively? What is it about government supply that has come up short? What is it about public demand that has facilitated the crisis of democracy? On the surface, these three questions may seem to be about the public expectations and the elites’ shenanigans only but they actually come down to essential differences in perceiving the importance of institutions, individual people and the economy in spurring the crisis of democracy. They relate to the proper scope of the state and the democratic fundamentals that rely on economic growth. The advantage of the supply and demand framework is that it can bind all these narratives of democratic decline into a model that makes it easier to compare and assess them. As stated, the frst inquiry is whether the crisis of democracy is caused by the elites or by the public, or what I term supply or demand, respectively. The supply and demand frameworks are quite different in pinpoint- ing the source of the crisis. Demand-side theories argue that democratic troubles start from below in that people are unreasonable, passive, apathetic or too discordant. The problem is that the government ends up with too many demands that it cannot possibly meet. By contrast, supply-sided theories suggest that the crisis is spurred from above because it is the failure on the part of the government or the elites that has caused public discontent that in turn has provoked a legitimation crisis. Thus, demand-sided theories conceive the crisis mainly as a democratic overload whereas supply-sided theories argue for a legitimation crisis. 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 225

If we go along with supply-sided explanations, the second question is in what way have the elites failed the public? This inquiry pits the models that perceive the crisis in terms of institutional decline against the more popular version that perceives the failure of supply in economic terms. Probing even deeper, it raises questions whether institutional decline is spurred by individual actors (Fukuyama 2014) or whether institutions do not function for structural reasons, such as faws in the representative system (Mair 2011/2012; Crouch 2004; Papadopoulos 2013; Kriesi et al. 2013). Between those who advance an economic cause of democratic decline, there is a disagreement as to whether politicians should be blamed for not managing the economy well (Ferguson 2012; Wooldridge and Micklethwait 2014; Posner 2010) or whether the economy is beyond rescue in the face of some inherent faws of capitalism (Wallerstein 2011; Streeck 2014; Gamble 2014; Offe 2012). Ultimately, the question about the inadequacy of supply turns into a question of the right scope of state intervention in the economy (Putnam 2015). Finally, I see a lot of disagreement in the democratic literature as to why public demand is inadequate. Is public demand inadequate because the public is too demanding? Alternatively, is public demand inadequate because the public is too passive? According to the frst scenario, the crisis arises because the public’s expectations of the government are infated and unrealistic. Flinders’ and Dommett’s (2013) “expectations’ gap” and Huntington and Crozier (1975) “democratic overload” form this camp. According to the second scenario, it is the public passivity that is the root of the crisis of democracy. Manin’s (1997) model of “audience democracy” and Urbinati’s “disfgured democracy” (2014) are cases in point. Ultimately, a lot of this antagonism comes down to the question whether the public is too fragmented or too homogenous (Fig. 10.1).

Supply-Side Models: The Crisis of Democracy as a Shortage of Economic or Institutional Supply The pessimism that pervades the models of the crisis of democracy often states that democracy has failed because of democracy’s failure to deliver: “some commentators may tell their fellow citizens that the problem is ‘just in your head’- a function of unrealistic expectations rather than deteri- orating performance- but we are inclined to think that our political systems are not, in fact, performing well” (Pharr and Putnam 2000, 27). In the jargon of this study, this means that democracy has failed because supply has come up short. Obviously, this view fies in the face of the 226 G. DIMOVA

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Fig. 10.1 The supply and demand framework applied to the models of the crisis of democracy 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 227 demand-centred theories reviewed below, which propound that democracy is in crisis because there is a faw with the people, their expectations and their activeness. It is essential to underscore that supply-side theories are premised on the erosion of trust in the performance of democracy. Habermas’s (1973) notion of the “legitimation crisis of democracy” and Lipset’s (1987) “confdence gap” could be viewed as the archetypical concepts of a supply-based theory. Habermas’s (1973) model of the legitimation crisis of democracy is important because it reveals the mechanism that links the economic shortage with democratic failure. According to Habermas, the legitimation crisis unfolds in four stages: (1) economic crisis, resulting from slow economic growth and the downturns of business cycles; (2) rationality crisis, where the political-administrative system fails to protect the losers of the economic crisis; (3) legitimation crisis, during which individuals withdraw mass support from formal democracy; and (4) motivational crisis, during which support of the normative order of democracy declines sharply. There is certainly a demand element in these supply-oriented theories insofar as the very high expectations of the people play an important role in perpetrating the crisis. Nevertheless, Habermas’s model of “legitimation crisis” is mostly a supply-centred model, because it is the shortage of economic prosperity that triggers the crisis. The idea that the bad performance of democracy or the shortage of supply (as opposed to people’s expectations) is responsible for democratic decline has been embraced and enlarged by a group of scholars who have added an international dimension to it. According to them, the failure of supply does not trigger only a domestic legitimacy crisis but also a global disappointment with democracy. Plattner (2015, 7) suggests that democracy is in decline because it has lost international legitimacy as “the best system for achieving the kind of prosperity and effective governance that almost all countries seek”. The supply side of these models starts from “the growing sense that the advanced democracies are in trouble in terms of their economic and political performance” (7). This realisation then converts into a global crisis of legitimacy of democracy because of two facilitating circumstances: “the new self-confdence and 228 G. DIMOVA seeming vitality of some authoritarian countries” and “the shifting geo- political balance between the democracies and their rivals” (Plattner 2015, 7). China is the most cogent alternative model to Western democracy, because it shows that economic progress is possible without sweep- ing democratic reforms (Gyimah-Boadi 2015). USA’s withdrawal from the international arena (Kagan 2015), the failure to democratise the Middle East after the Arab Spring and the ascendance of ISIS have also contributed to the crumbling legitimacy of the democratic ideal. The failure to deliver of Western democracies coupled with the convincing alternative of non-democratic models and a fuid international order could be detrimental for countries which are recent transitioners or are caught in the geographical periphery of Western democracy (Carothers 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). If the main problem with supply-side models of the crisis of democracy is the failure to deliver, the logical question that comes up is in what ways did democracy fail to deliver? What is actually supply and how is it defned? In my view, existing models defne the failure of supply in two main ways: shortage of economic supply and unsatisfactory quality representative institutions. Each of these shortages then can be divided into shortages caused by individual actors and those caused by more systematic factors. Table 10.1 lists all the possible ways in which supply fails and how this failure has been defned in the democratic literature.

Why Is Supply Insufficient? The Representative Institutions Fail (Kriesi 2013; Papadopoulos 2013; Fukuyama 2014) Let me begin with reviewing the theories, which conceive “supply” in institutional terms, although they are less numerous than the theories which conceive “supply” in economic terms. According to this vein of research, democracy is in crisis not because the state or the economy is declining but because parliaments and representative institutions have become dysfunctional. I would differentiate between actor-based and structural explanations for the decline of institutional supply. Fukuyama (2014) is perhaps the only one who adopts an actor-centred view of the “political decay” of representative institutions. Fukuyama attributes institutional decay to the inertia of the human behaviour, which leads people 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 229 Authors Habermas ( 1973 ) Lipset ( 1987 ) Offe ( 2012 ) Ferguson ( 2012 ) Ferguson Putnam ( 2015 ) Wooldridge and Wooldridge Micklethwait 2014 Posner ( 2010 ) Streeck ( 2014 ) Gamble ( 2014 ) Wallerstein ( 2011 ) Wallerstein Fukuyama ( 2014 ) Papadopoulos ( 2013 ) Kriesi et al. ( 2013 ) Mair ( 2011 / 2012 ) Crouch ( 2004 ) Manifestations of insuffcient supply Economic crisis, rationality legitimation crisis, motivational crisis “Confdence gap” “Dual control gap” “Intergenerational gap” “Intergenerational “Opportunity gap” “Bloated” welfare state Lack of governability Emaciated state capacity “Crisis of liberal capitalism” Structural crisis, Chaos Political decay of modern political institutions Shrinkage of the representative channel Shrinkage of the representative channel Shrinkage of the representative channel Shrinkage of the representative channel Erosion of state authority Various perceptions of supply-based accounts the crisis democracy Various Why is supply insuffcient? Slow economic growth, business cycles Economic performance, political scandals, Vietnam War Tension between rights of the people and property Tension owners The state has overextended itself in society and economy Structural shift towards a class-based society Extreme state responsiveness to public demands Failure of monetary policy, regulatory policy, and intellec - regulatoryFailure of monetary policy, policy, tual rigour Inherent and endemic confict of capitalism (e.g. between market justice and social justice) Governance conundrum; growth conundrum; fscal conundrum 1970s decline of economic growth 1968 revolutions Elite capture cognitive rigidity Mediatisation multi-level governance Europeanization Globalisation mediatisation Political parties do not represent preferences Failure of the concentric model party recruitment monopoly of the global frm 10.1 Table 230 G. DIMOVA to follow norms, even when these norms do not beneft them. Political decay also arises from elite or inside capture. The elites who control the institutions capture them from the inside by deterring entrance to outsiders. Similar to Fukuyama, Mansbridge (2014) suggests that the failure of representative institutions should be attributed to the inability of individual politicians and political parties to produce successful negotiations: “In a system like the U.S., characterized by a strong separation of powers and thus an institutionalized requirement for negotiation, the breakdown of negotiation produces deadlock and the incapacity to solve collective action problems. Failures of negotiation at the global level produce a comparable incapacity to solve collective action problems such as global warming. Faced with these problems, we need to revise current popular and academic concepts of democracy to take into consideration the conditions for successful negotiation”. McCarty (2014) also adopts an actor-based perspective as he states that the “emergence of excessive partisanship and deep ideological divisions among political elites and offceholders. In short, ‘polarization’ is to blame”. The majority of the scholars who defne supply in institutional terms adopt a structural rather than actor-specifc approach. They point out external causes, such as globalisation and mediatisation. Papadopoulos (2013) believes that the supply of representative institutions has been cur- tailed in the sense that the importance of parliaments has diminished. Mair (2011/2012, 2) is also convinced that “the parliamentary chain of delegation faces increasing diffculty in functioning in the ideal-typical way”. Unlike Fukuyama, who faults elite capture and human foolishness for the institutional decline, Papadopoulos faults the processes of mediatisation and internationalisation. Mediatisation contributes to the presidentialisation of parties as their leaders seek to attract more attention and devote more resources to communication with the voters (Papadopoulos 2013, 216). Internationalisation empowers weakly accountable supranational bodies. The resulting shrinking of the representative channel constitutes the crisis of democracy because it marginalises parliamentary institutions and technocratises political decisions (Papadopoulos 2013, 19). Similar to Papadopoulos, Kriesi et al. (2013, 212–213) put forward structural explanations for institutional decline. The authors argue that mediatisation and globalisation have undermined the representative channel. Globalisation weakens governments because it leaves just a handful of decisions to them. Elected offcials have been further trumped and eclipsed by the multiple levels of governance and the ascendance of 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 231 the administrative channel. Mediatisation, in turn, cuts back the supply of representation by fostering the depoliticisation of the party base and by making politicians devote more attention and resources to their public image rather than to substantive policies. As opposed to emphasising demand-oriented factors, such as civil society, Kapur and Mehta (2017) focus on supply-oriented factors, responsiveness and integrity of the Indian state and institutions, such as parliament, the judiciary and civil services, which are also touted as important determinants of Indian democracy.

Why Is Supply Insufficient? Economic Prosperity Is Insufficient or Badly Distributed Apart from defning supply in institutional terms, supply can be also gauged in economic terms. The recent surge of economic explanations of the crisis of democracy comes down to the inquiry: In what way is economic supply insuffcient and how does that shortage of supply affect democracy? I suggest differentiating the variety of theories, which defne the shortage of supply in economic terms, into two groups. The frst group comprises of structural explanations for the government’s failure to provide economic prosperity. These explanations boil down to the inherent contradictions within capitalism (Streeck 2014; Posner 2010; Wallerstein 2011; Offe 2012). The second group of explanations for economic shortage is actor-based. According to them, economic prosperity is in short supply because governments’ fawed policy. The mistakes that governments make vary: either they do not distribute wealth well across the generations by overindulging the present generation with welfare benefts (Ferguson 2012; Wooldridge and Micklethwait 2014), or they do not distribute wealth well across classes by privileging the upper classes (Putnam 2015) or they fail to devise effective monetary and regulatory policies (Posner 2010). In all cases, economic prosperity suffers, and economic supply diminishes. Sometimes, the nature of the decrease in supply does not fall strictly into the institutional or economic spheres or within the actor-based or system-based explanations. For example, Lipset’s (1987) idea of a “confdence gap” emphasises both economic and non-economic reasons, such as President Johnson’s decisive escalation of the Vietnam War in February 1965, the frst racial disorder in Watts, California, in July 1965, the Gulf 232 G. DIMOVA of Tonkin crisis in August 1965 and especially with the Watergate revelations between 1972 and 1974. The confdence gap designates the gap between the people’s trust in government prior to and after these events. The gap is not demand-centred; i.e., it is not caused by public expectations, because it arises out of factors beyond the public’s reach. As Lipset (1987, 8) points out, “a striking characteristic of the decline of confdence is that it is almost entirely related to events beyond people’s own personal experience: conficts, scandals, protests, and failures that affect their own lives indirectly at all”. Yet, the confdence gap is a supply-oriented model insofar as it argues that public distrust increases and government performance declines. However, while the “legitimation crisis” focuses exclusively on the economic causes of government performance, the “confdence gap” envisions other non-economic factors as well.

Why Is Economic Supply Insufficient? Structural Explanations

Streeck 2014: Crisis of Democratic Capitalism Streeck (2014) argues that the crisis of democracy is better construed as a crisis of democratic capitalism. The problem with capitalism, according to Streeck, is that it harbours an inherent contradiction between democratic-political claims for social justice and economic claims for proftability, a tension between labour and capital, and a strain between market justice and social justice. This tension has been staved off for the period of economic growth, but the fnancial crisis reinvigorated it. In this sense, the fnancial crisis and economic growth just trigger rather than cause the democratic crisis. The real cause of the crisis is set within the system of capitalism, which harbours this endemic and inherent confict. Streeck’s analysis is also supply-centred because he believes that another cause of the crisis is that state autonomy is so constricted that the state cannot manage distributional conficts effectively. One reason for the retreat of the state is that distributional conficts have become ever more remote from popular politics. The state is completely subjugated to market logic: “‘the markets’ have begun to dictate in unprecedented ways what presumably sovereign and democratic states may still do for their citizens and what they must refuse them” (Streeck 2011). The other reason for the retreat of the state is that the contradictions 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 233 inherent in the system are so complex that it is very hard for the state to fgure out which policies defend whose interests. The third reason for the retreat of the state is that the globalisation of the economy undermines the decision-making autonomy of the governments (Streeck 2011).

Gamble (2014): “Crisis Without End” Similar to Streeck, Gamble (2014) conceives the crisis of democracy as a crisis of liberal capitalism. Streeck and Gamble, however, frame the tensions within capitalism differently. As was pointed above, Streeck singles out the three tensions between social justice and proftability, labour and capital, and market justice and social justice. Gamble, in turn, identifes the tensions as the governance conundrum, the growth conundrum and the fscal conundrum. The governance conundrum refects the strain between a single unifed market and a multi-polar and fragmented state system. This multi-polarity of the state system is manifested both in the growth of informal networks outside of the government, such as drug traffcking, and in the rise of experts and international institutions. This fragmentation of the international system has arisen after US dominance has waned and has left a vacuum. In a way, the fscal conundrum is the mirror image of the governance conundrum. While the governance conundrum fashes out the discrepancy between a unifed market and a fragmented state, the fscal conundrum underscores the mismatch between a global market and national democracy. Gamble believes that the ramifcations of these two conundrums are different. The tension between a single market and a fragmented state refects a democratic disconnect. The growth of a multi-polar world is also problematic because it is directionless, there is no one in control, or control is being exercised by external forces (Gamble 2014, 118). The problem with the fscal conundrum is that it manifests itself through exacerbated income inequality and falling living standards, which, in turn, undermine the legitimacy of the state (Gamble 2014, 8). The growth conundrum is the third tension within capitalism. Perhaps it points to the most inherent faw within capitalism as it posits that capitalism undermines the very forces of its existence. It works by “privatising gains and socialising losses” (Gamble 2014, 8). According to Gamble, this scenario is tenable only under conditions of economic 234 G. DIMOVA growth because growth ensures that everybody can be made better off without making anybody worse off. However, the decline in growth sharpens the tension because the gains are smaller and the losses are bigger. Gamble conjectures that this tension is not going away because the growth is bound to decline due to rising population, technological innovation, immigration and exhausted natural resources.

Offe (2012): “Dual Control Gap” Offe (2012) conceives of the crisis of democracy as a “dual control gap”. The duality of the gap consists in a two-stage loss of control. In the frst place, “governments lose control over taxation and the fnancial sector, and in response citizens lose their confdence that the idea of democratic control over government policies is a credible one”. To him, this inherent tension manifests itself in the dichotomy between the urgency of the austerity imperative and the diffculty to comply with it. Offe is worried that “this confguration of constraints leaves little space for the processes and institutions that supposedly make up the core decision-making site of democracy, namely party competition, elections, and parliamentary representation and legislation” (Offe 2012). Offe’s concerns completely resonate with those of Gamble and Streeck, who point out that market forces undermine the power of democratic self-determination and the autonomy of the state.

Wallerstein (2011): “Structural Crisis” Just like Streeck and Gamble, Wallerstein (2011) is prone to seek a “structural crisis of capitalism”. He argues that “the primary characteristic of a structural crisis is chaos” and that this chaos was wrought by the rapid and constant fuctuations that began in 1970s. The 1970s were a water- shed point because they ended the period of great economic expansion that started after the Second World War and US hegemony declined. In addition, the revolutions of 1966–1968, which took place in the pan-Eu- ropean world (the “West”), the Socialist bloc (the “East”), and the third world (the “South”) ended the dominance of centrist Liberalism. It is notable that Wallerstein’s primary unit of analysis is the world, whereas the state and national democracies are often used as units of analysis in other supply-based models of the crisis. Wallerstein conceives two solutions to the structural crisis: Porto Alegre and Davos. The Davos alternative seeks to create a “non-capitalist” system, which retains three essential features of the 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 235 present system: hierarchy, exploitation and polarisation. The Porto Alegre option is “relatively democratic and relatively egalitarian” (Wallerstein 2017, 192).

Putnam (2015): “Opportunity Gap” Putnam (2015) defnes the crisis of democracy as the death of the American dream or as a gap of opportunities. According to Putnam, American democracy is in decline because the values and opportunities that defne it have become a myth. He argues that ability and effort alone no longer matter; it is the social environment in the family, school and the community that predetermines opportunities. Putnam’s model of the crisis appears to defne supply in terms of social opportunities, but it could be perceived in terms of economic inequality as well. Putnam’s account of supply is structural insofar as he defnes supply as class inequality, which serves as a barrier to greater opportunities, which in turn leads to a crisis of democracy. The lurking explanatory variable underlying the opportunity gap is the structural shift towards a class-based society (Reeves 2017). Alternatively, supply could potentially be interpreted as actor-based insofar as it relates to the inability of the government to distribute wealth equally among classes.

Why Is Economic Supply Insufficient? Actor-Based Explanations

Wooldridge’s (2014) “Bloated” Welfare State, Ferguson’s (2012) “Intergenerational Gap”; Schmitter’s (2015) “Gap Between Promise and Reality” Contrary to the previous theorists, who argue that democracy is in crisis due to external factors which limit the role of the state, another vein of research suggests that democracy is in crisis because the state actors are not playing their part correctly. In fact, while Gamble and Streeck are worried that the role of the state is circumscribed, Wooldridge and Micklethwait (2014) and Ferguson (2012) adopt the exact opposite perspective, namely that the state has been too lavish in spending on welfare. Wooldridge and Micklethwait (2014) argues that the fnancial crisis of 2008 brought to prominence the high demands of the public and the corresponding inability of a “bloated state” to deal with them. 236 G. DIMOVA

Wooldridge and Micklethwait (2014, 22–23) suggests that a smaller state is a solution to the limited supply of governance and that “listening to the people is one reason why the West has become so overloaded… Leviathan has to be tamed”. Wooldridge and Micklethwait (2014, 6–8, 268) most generally defne this epistemic shift in democracy as a new type of state. They extrapo- late three and a half revolutions and suggest that we are in the middle of a fourth revolution. The frst revolution, which took place in the sev- enteenth century, created the centralised state. The second revolution, which took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, replaced old patronage systems with more meritocratic and accountable government. The third revolution was the invention of the modern welfare state. The authors suggest that politicians should embark on the fourth revolution. The fourth revolution is about reviving the power of two liberal ideas: prioritising individual rights over social rights and about lightening the burden on the state. Ferguson (2012, 43) construes the current crisis of democracy as an intergenerational inequality which is caused by the over-extension of the state. He believes that the true tension is not between the sovereign and the public will, but between the present generation and future generations. The crisis explicates itself in the fact that the present generation makes enormous expenditures by borrowing loans at the expense of the future generation. According to him, the cause of this generational inequality is institutional. Ferguson’s account is supply-centred in the sense that it relegates an important causal role to the state. The state has spread itself too wide and too deep into civil society and the economy. The state has overextended itself into civil society by controlling the spread of civil society groups, and by not allowing enough vouchers and support for pupils in private schools. Furthermore, the state has hampered the economy by creating overcomplicated regulation. The state seceded only in one way—by delegating power to lawyers.

Posner (2010): “Lack of Governability” Among the supply-oriented models of democracy, Posner’s (2010) account most explicitly points the fnger to the political actors. He faults lax banking regulation for the fscal crisis and attributes to the state the main blame for dealing with it: “I continue to be perplexed by how government (except 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 237 for its promotion of home ownership, a secondary cause of the crisis) has managed to escape most of the blame for our current economic state” (Posner 2010, 260). However, contrary to the accounts of Woodbridge and Ferguson, who contend that the state was doing too much in over- spending the national budget, Posner believes that the state has done too little in regulating the banks. According to Posner, banks used to be safe in response to the banking crisis during the Great Depression. The 1999 banking deregulation, which was instituted to the repeal of the 1930s banking reform, resulted in “lax regulation, regulatory complacency, regulatory inattention, and regulatory ineptitude” (Posner 2010, 13). Overall, Posner adopts an overtly actor-centred explanation of the shortage of economic supply. He believes that the root cause of the latest depression is a failure of the monetary and regulatory policy of the Federal Reserve, which kept its short-term interest rate too low between 2001 and 2004. He also holds the economists responsible for falsely believing that the enlightened self-interest of bankers and shareholders would suffce to prevent the crisis. The result of the intellectual failure of government offcials, bankers and academics is that the system is imbued with uncertainty. This uncertainty translates into a lack of governability of society, which in turn causes the crisis of democracy.

Demand-Side Models: The Crisis of Democracy as a Failure of the Public In this part of the chapter, I shift the focus from the supply to the demand side of the crisis of democracy. Demand-sided explanations trace the causes of the crisis to the expectations of the electors, rather than to the state, the government, the elites, the institutions, the nature of capitalism or the economic crisis. In general, I could detect one major source of disagreement within these models. On the one hand, some demand-centred models believe that public demand is too high as people have overly infated expectations of what the government can do for them. On the other hand, demand-centred models argue that the public is too passive and uncritical. The secondary, but not minor, disagreement concerns the reasons why the public expectations are so high. Here are the four alternatives: public expectations are infated by the very nature of organisation of society (Huntington and Crozier 1975), by the electoral promises of the politicians (Flinders 2012), by a certain intellectual 238 G. DIMOVA paradigm, which devalues politicians’ achievements (Hay 2007) or by the unrealistic standards set by established democracies to newly minted democracies (Kurlantzick 2013). The studies who purport that the crisis of democracy is caused by the passivity of the public believe that the public does not have enough input in selecting representatives, setting the public agenda and formulating policies. The public simply observes what the government does. Its opinion is “manufactured” through polling techniques and electoral campaigns by corporate elites, lobbyists and the biased media. Although all these theories agree that the passivity of the public triggers a crisis of democracy, they disagree what that crisis will look like. They talk about unpolitical, populist, plebiscitarian democracy (Urbinati 2014), audience democracy (Manin 1997), managed democracy (Wolin 2010), hyperdemocracy (Heclo 1999), unrepresentative democracy (Lewis 2001), democracy in decline (Allan 2014) and the “rise and fall of the American Republic” (Ackerman 2010).

Why Is Demand Inappropriate? Public Expectations Are Too High

“Democratic Overload” (Huntington 1975, 2004): Public Expectations Are Infated by Better Organisation and Concentration in Society In the seminal “Report of the Trilateral Commission”, Huntington and Crozier (1975) and his colleagues diagnose “an excess of democracy” in contrast to the “defcit of democracy” diagnosed by Norris (2011). The report argues that the crisis of democracy is caused by a “democratic overload”. The overload stems from the better organisation and higher concentration of groups in society, which fnd it easier to press their demands on the government. The concentration of public demands leads to a lack of governability of society. The weakening of governability of society and the resulting weakening of social control constitute the two major pillars of the “democratic distemper” (Huntington and Crozier 1975). Huntington (2004) later linked the idea of the diversity of demands to the erosion of national identity, resulting from assimi- lating massive numbers of primarily Hispanic immigrants, bilingualism, multiculturalism and the devaluation of citizenship. 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 239

This “overload” of demands is detrimental because it makes the government expand its role in the economy and society, which in term leads to negative consequences. For the authors of the Trilateral Report, the chief problem is that the democratic overload makes it hard for the politicians not to adhere to public demands. “This expansion is attributed not so much to the strength of the government as to its weakness and the inability and unwillingness of central political leaders to reject the demands made upon them by numerically and functionally important groups in their society” (Huntington and Crozier 1975, 164). Huntington believes that the government cannot curtail spending because of the pressures from lobby groups, labour unions and ben- efciaries of government largess. The unfortunate result is “infation [which] is the economic disease of democracies”.

Flinders (2012): “Bad-Faith Democracy” and “Expectations Gap”: Public Expectations Are Infated by Pre-election Promises Flinders’ (2012) account of the crisis of democracy is demand-centred because he blames the overly high expectations of the public for the “expectations gap”, the “bad- faith democracy” and the “democratic drift” (Flinders 2009). Flinders suggests the following: “Imagine for a moment two horizontal bars placed one above the other with a signifcant gap between them. The upper bar relates to demand and specifcally to the promises that politicians may have made in order to be elected (in addition to the public’s expectations of what politics and the state could and should deliver). The bottom line relates to supply in terms of what the political system can realistically deliver given the complexity of the challenges, the contradictory nature of many requests and the resources with which it can seek to satisfy demand. The distance between the two bars is the expectations gap” (Flinders 2012, 57). Flinders proposes that his model of “bad-faith democracy” or “democratic drift” (2009) derives from Down’s model of marketplace democracy. According to Flinders’ (2012, 57) interpretation of Downs’ theory, the politicians are suppliers of ideologies in the electoral market of voters. Voters “shop” for policy preferences. As politicians want to win more voters, the politicians are embroiled in a bidding war. Politicians make increasingly more generous promises to the public. Thus, the politicians increase artifcially the voters’ expectations only for the elected 240 G. DIMOVA party to renege upon them or to fail to fulfl them. Economic theory explains the “discrepancy” between pre-election political rhetoric and subsequent post-election performance. The “expectations gap” is the gap between expectations fuelled by pre-election promises and government performance in the post-election. Schmitter (2015, 40) also agrees that the crisis of democracy arises from infated electoral promises: “The gap between what is promised and what is delivered has been an omnipres- ent feature of those long- established regimes that I have called ‘really existing democracies’, and it has been reproduced in newly established democracies as well… A widening of this gap between the real and the ideal characterises the present crisis”. In a similar vein, Krugman (1990) argues in the book with the telling title “The Age of Diminished Expectations” that the key is for people to accept less than the expected economic results. According to Krugman, it is important to understand that “expectations have arisen from the failures to meet the exaggerated hopes in real national income gains held by some in the late 1960’s”.

Hay (2007): Public Expectations Are Infated by Intellectual Paradigms In another demand-centred model of the crisis of democracy, Colin Hay (2007) propounds that the real trouble with democracy is that people do not have an appreciation for what politicians do. Hay propunds that people do not appreciate politicians because of the intellectual ideas that inform contemporary public discourse. This is a very different conception of the rise of the expectation gap from the electoral dynamics outlined by Downs and Flinders above. Hay traces public disenchantment to the role of public choice theory in political life. Public choice theory demonised politics and the political in narrating the crisis of the 1970s, and at the same time, coupled with neoliberalism, helped portray politicians as instrumental, rational and self-serving (Hay 2007, 95–100). Hay is not the only scholar attributing such importance to intellectual ideas in shaping the demands of the public. In the “Report of the Trilateral Commission”, the authors complain of the destructive infuence of intellectuals because intellectuals “assert their disgust with the corruption, materialism, and ineffciency of democracy and with the sub- servience of democratic government to “monopoly capitalism” (Duthel 2011, 52). “Value-intellectuals” constitute “a challenge to democratic government which is, potentially at least, as serious as those posed in the 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 241 past by aristocratic cliques, fascist movements and communist parties” (Huntington and Crozier 1975). In a similar vein, Chomsky (2011) reminds us that intellectuals have a “responsibility” to use their power to challenge the state. In his book “Contesting Democracy”, Müller (2013, 205) proposes that the destructive role of intellectuals was often brought up by proponents of the “systems theory”. Helmut Schelsky (1975) “derided intellectuals as a ‘new class of high priests’ trying to gain power while “others are actually doing the work”.

Kurlantzick (2013): Public Expectations Are Infated by Perceptions of Established Democracies Kurlantzick (2013) suggests that one cause of the problem is that young democracies have very high expectations that democracy will bring the prosperity and equality that they associate with established democracies. In many cases, these expectations have not been met. Whereas for Downs the difference in expectations comes from the time before and after the elections, and for Flinders the difference in expectations probably lies in civic education, Kurlantzick suggests that the difference in expectations springs from what people hear about democracy abroad and the democracy they perceive to have at home. Nevertheless, Kurlantzick is equally emphatic about the central role of expectations: “As in a political campaign, then, managing the public’s expectations in an emerging democracy is critical to maintaining public’s support and preventing “authoritarian nostalgia” (Kurlantzick 2013, 211). Kurlantzick believes that expectations should be toned down by the elites. More concretely, he suggests that the Obama administration and the Bush administration should have worked with leaders of developing nations to manage and moderate their citizens’ expectations (Kurlantzick 2013, 182).

Why Is Demand Inappropriate? The Public Is Too Passive The passivity of the public is a central source of grievance with democracy and underlines demand-centred models of the crisis. The source of passivity, however, is largely contested. On the one hand, the public has been withdrawn due to economic and institutional factors. On the other hand, public passivity is due to the strategies and manipulations of the elites. 242 G. DIMOVA

The Public Is Passive Because of Structural Factors: Taylor (2014), Putnam (2002), Offe (2002), Brennan (2016) The idea that democracy is in decline because the public is withdraw- ing from politics for reasons that are the public’s fault is not new. One of the main strands of this demand-centred view turns on the various forms of capital and associative life (Putnam 2002; Skocpol 2002). The underlying notion is that people are less demanding and interested in politics because they have a less rich social life. As people participate less in churches, unions, leisure and neighbourhood initiatives, they become marginalised and democracy fades away. Alternatively, citizens’ passivity is attributed to the human nature, which is mean, irrational and has little desire to process information (Brennan 2016). Taylor (2017) posits that citizen effcacy, or the lack of it, is the key to understanding why democracy is “slipping away”. To him, people withdraw from politics because the issues are more complex, they are not neatly ordered into party ideologies, and people do not have a structured way to understand them: “The complexifcation of contemporary government, along with a host of other factors, has contributed to a greater opacity surrounding democratic rule, and this in turn has led to a drop in felt citizen effcacy”. This complexity of issues triggers “seven spirals of declines”: a drop in voter participation, a rise in inequality, taking the action outside of representative institutions, inability of Social Democratic parties to channel voters’ frustration, a “dumbing down” of electorates, where they do not understand issues, surrendering mainstream political debate to neoliberalism, and a biased and irresponsible media (Taylor 2017). Further factors that facilitate the passivity of the public are the heterogeneity of electoral districts, which enable “voter self-sorting into inter- nally homogeneous districts that elect representatives who refect narrow and strongly held preferences over policies” (Rosenbluth 2014). The lowest classes are the net losers of this passivity because “low participation rates give political candidates in search of the median voter diminished incentives to cater to the interests of the poor” (Shapiro 2014, 3).

The Public Is Passive Because of Elite’s Strategies: Manin (1997), Allan (2014), Lewis (2001), Heclo (1999), Ackerman (2010), Berger (2012) Manin’s model of “audience democracy” is demand-centred because it purports that the origin of the crisis is rooted in people’s passivity. This 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 243 passivity translates into a very low public demand. To Manin, audience democracy constitutes a crisis of democracy because it relegates the citizens to a mere audience witnessing the elites’ doings. According to him, media experts have replaced the party democrats at the helm of the nation state, but this development has not shortened the distance between the rulers and ruled, which Manin (1997, 233) defnes as the major gap in audience democracy. The gap is evident in the fact that the “elites are in [no] position to inspire feelings of identifcation on the side of voters… it is the persistence, possibly even the aggravation, of the gap between the governed and the governing elite that has provoked a sense if crisis”. However, there is a catch. Audience democracy may be a demand-centred model because it focuses on public passivity, but Manin (1997, 225) argues that demand mostly derives from supply: “In politics, there is no such thing as a demand independent of supply…When a citizen enters what may be called the political market, his preferences are usually not already formed; they develop through listening to public debates. In politics, demand is not exogenous; in general, preferences do not exist prior to the action of the politicians”. In Downs’ economic theory of marketplace democracy, demand is made by elites through electoral campaigning, and in Manin’s “audience democracy”, demand is made by the elites through the media. The media are more central in “fxing” the preferences of the voters than in any of the previous models of the crisis reviewed here, except for Norris’s “democratic defcit”. Manin’s concept of the public demand is similar to Schumpeter’s (1943) idea of the “manufactured will”. According to Schumpeter (2003 [1943], 236), the voter’s will “is largely not a genuine but a manufactured will”. It is a creation or product of the political process—not its impetus. While Manin and Schumpeter agree that the public is inac- tive, they disagree how to repair it. According to Manin, one solution to the crisis of democracy is to make demand more independent of supply. “One way of making the demand more independent is by allowing the people to have more say in constructing the party’s programs and in allowing the possibility that in a media democracy based on images of the politicians, the images still carry information about the candidates’ overall platforms” (Manin 1987, 358). Manin also believes that the democratic gap can be reduced by refning the will through deliberation. In contrast to Manin, Schumpeter has no faith in refning human capabilities or understanding. He does not think that deliberation or greater 244 G. DIMOVA initiative on the side of the people can rescue the public will. It is beyond rescue. Schumpeter (1943, 235) thinks that “the general citizen drops down to a lower level of performance as long as he enters the political feld”. This is so because people tend to display ignorance and lack of judgement about things that do not directly concern them like family, neighbours and local matters. Various people with selfsh agendas take advantage of this weakness of human nature and manufacture the will by staging shows, political advertising, selecting and defning the issues for public choice. That is why instead of propagating greater participation for the public, Schumpeter envisions limiting the role of the public to selecting elites only. The idea of elites’ manufacturing the public will comes up in at least two further renditions of the crisis of democracy. In his book “Democracy in Decline”, James Allan (2014) claims that democracy has been diluted in the world’s oldest democracies and that lawyers, judges and international bureaucrats use special tactics to deny that any decline has occurred. Rhetoric, disinformation and hypocrisy are the main tools that elites use to conceal the reality of declining democracy from the public. In “The Rise and Fall of the American Republic”, Ackerman similarly suggests that the American presidency dominates the political scene with formidable powers of mass manipulation (Ackerman 2010, 67). According to these views of the crisis of democracy, the notion of the manufactured public opinion has a lot to do with the modern techniques for public opinion polling. Manin (1997) notes that “opinions in polls, demonstrations and petitions…are solicited rather than spontaneous”. Whether they take the form of demonstrations, petitions or polls, expressions of public opinion are usually partial and initiated by small groups (Manin 1997, 173). Manin brings up Pierre Bourdieu’s idea that “opinion polls are no more than a way to manipulate opinion, precisely because questions that might be quite foreign to people’s concerns and to which people respond in order to please the interviewer or to avoid appearing ignorant” (Manin 1997, 173). In his account of “unrepresentative democracy”, Lewis argues that survey technology and media technology present the interests of the power-holders as the interests of the public. According to him, the military industrial context and media owners conspire to delude the public: “media representations limit the meaning of public opinion polls, so that the range of public opinions appears to be in tune with pro-business, centre- right spectre of political elites” (Lewis 2001, xi). Public opinion is an elite’s doing. In his damning idea of “hyperdemocracy”, Heclo notes that “alongside innovations in communications technology, there have also been remarkable developments in 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 245

‘political technology’-sophisticated techniques for studying, developing, manufacturing, and manipulating public opinion to produce political support for candidates and causes… In fact, scientifc polling… proved to be the midwife of hyperdemocracy” (Heclo 1999, 62).

Urbinati (2014): The Epistemic, Plebiscitarian and Populist Disfgurement of Democracy Broadly perceived, Urbinati’s three models of the “disfgurement of democracy” represent exactly the same problem that Manin’s model of an “audience democracy” represents: it is unclear whether democracy is in crisis because of low demand from the people or because of the elite’s supply of rhetoric, personalities or strategies that create a certain perception of the will of the people. According to Urbinati(2014), the passivity of the public is refected in three types of disfgurement of democracy. In an epistemic (or unpolitical) democracy, the public is bypassed in favour of the judgement of experts. Epistemic democracy is problematic because it does not require the participation of the public as a “commitment to truth in politics makes consent redundant” (Urbinati 2014, 10). Unpolitical democracy takes away the voice and the initiative of the people. It substitutes their voice with impartial decisions made by courts, committees of experts and deliberative groups. In the second disfgurement of democracy, plebiscitarian democracy, the public is lulled into passivity by charismatic leaders. Society is only present in politics through sight and hearing. It has no voice. It is the third disfgurement of democracy, populism, that most closely resembles audience democracy. In a joint interview with Manin, Urbinati says, “In my view, this new form of Caesarism or populism [audience democracy] is a violation of representative democracy. An acritical identifcation of the masses with a leader elected out of a campaign he manipulated through a media system is still a violation of the principles of representative democracy. The rise of audience democracy is truly problematic in my view” (Urbinati interviewed by Landemore 2007, 12). Very important for the rise of populist leaders is the idea of the homogenisation of the public. The main dilemma, however, is to what extent people become homogenised due to the tactics of manipulation of the elites and to what extent there are other external factors for this homogenisation. Urbinati seems to think, just like Manin, that the elites have a major role to play in crafting an image of reality when there is a lack of alternatives. Populist rhetoric simplifes political ideas into broad 246 G. DIMOVA and extreme political choices. As the public has little choice, it rallies behind one of the alternatives, which turns the public into a “unifed body” (137) and a “homogenous” actor. To Urbinati, this unifcation of the people is detrimental for democracy because it “narrows the possibility of a space of communication” (132). Furthermore, populism priv- ileges the homogenous voice of the people over that of the minorities, thus stifing the voice of the minorities. In this way, populism de-activates the minority segments of the public by undermining the principle of party pluralism and political competition. The importance of the elites in introducing and crafting the necessary rhetoric that can unify the masses is underscored by Taylor (2016). Müller’s take on populism could also be interpreted to suggest that populist rhetoric is a distinct kind and has a unifying and homogenising infuence. He propounds that populists not only criticise the elites (as all political talk does) but also make a moral claim to be the only representative of the people and that whoever does not support them is not part of the proper or real people: “The populist logic also implies that whoever does not really support populist parties might not be part of the proper people at all: there are American citizens, and then there are what George C Wallace, an arch-populist of the 1960s often viewed as a precursor of Trump, always called ‘real Americans’ (white, God-fearing, hard-working, gun-owning and so on). Thus, populists do not just claim: we are the 99%. According to their own logic, they actually have to say: we are the 100%” (Müller 2016, 593). One essential element of this argument is that publics are not inherently homogenous; they are made to look homogenous by the elite’s representation of them. This portrayal of elite-induced homogenisation is different from other accounts of homogenisation, which purport that “the Western publics are nearly identical with each other, skin colour excepted, largely homogenous. They are what the class- less society looks like… In the short run, this is a good thing for liberalism, but it is disastrous for democracy” (Williamson 2012, 128). What is key here is that while the models of disfgurement of democracy presented by Urbinati seem to be focused on public passivity, they still retain a considerable focus on the intervention of the elites. Using the terms “supply” and “demand”, this logic implies that supply determines demand because the elite’s rhetoric helps the public imagine itself in a certain way. This type of relationship is very different from other accounts of the crisis of democracy reviewed above, which purport that the crisis is the result of the difference between supply and demand, 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 247 rather than the infuence of supply over demand. Urbinati’s and Manin’s version of the crisis of democracy is also different from accounts which emphasise non-elite-related factors for the rise of populism, such as immigration, terrorist threats, the rise of ISIS and economic stagnation.

Wolin (2010): Managed Democracy, Inverted Totalitarianism Wolin’s critical account of “managed democracy” is demand-centred as he argues that the public is too passive and fragmented and the elites secretly take advantage of it. The public has been subjugated by the corporations, lobbyists and media empires of highly concentrated ownership. Wolin says that democracy in the USA is managed without appearing to be suppressed because the elite classes have not directly imposed their will and have eliminated the opposition. Instead, the elite’s oppression has arisen due to less visible processes and phenomena, such as concentrated wealth, private education and “a regime ideology of capitalism which is just as undisputed as a Nazi doctrine” (Wolin 2010, 47). Wolin (2010, 76) also suggests that the elite’s deliberate use of the rhetoric of terror in the aftermath of 9/11 de-politicised the public, made it exclusively interested in its security only and made people “willing col- laborators and conscious accomplices”. In contrast to Urbinati who argues that the public is passive because it is too unifed, Wolin suggests that the public is too passive because it is too fragmented. Wolin argues that public is so vulnerable to elite’s manipulation because it is disconnected. The public is fragmented in a “managed democracy” in exactly the opposite way in which it is totalised in totalitarianism. “Instead of collectivism, inverted totalitarianism thrives on disaggregation… Classical totalitarianism mobilized its subjects; inverted totalitarianism fragments them” (Wolin 2010, 196). Because of this fragmentation, the public becomes apolitical, passive, estranged and concerned with its own pursuits. In this way, the despot does not actively destroy the citizens, but it “enervates and dazes them”.

The “In-Between” Models: Are Demand-Centred and Supply-Centred Explanations Irreconcilable? Not all models of the crisis choose to focus exclusively or mainly on the supply or the demand side only. In fact, most large N, longitudinal studies of the crisis of democracy include both the dimensions of supply 248 G. DIMOVA and demand (Levitsky and Way 2014; Diamond 2015). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Freedom House World Index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the Polity project and the Varieties of Democracy project all contain many measures about the demand side and a few measures of the supply side. The demand side is not focused on public expectations (Flinders 2012) or on the public homogenisation or fragmentation (Wolin 2010, Urbinati 2014). Instead, demand is defned in terms of political rights, such as free and fair elections and political participation, and civil rights, such as freedom of expression and association rights. It is noteworthy that these models decidedly do not espouse an economic interpretation of supply (Streeck 2014, Gamble 2014). To them, supply is strictly institutional and boils down to corruption, independent judiciary, separation of powers, rule of law, performance of democratic institutions (Diamond 2015, 65). Apart from these large-N studies, a few distinct models of the crisis of democracy incorporate both supply and demand. For example, Hall (2014) perceives one aspect of the crisis of democracy to be a paradox where governments, which are less trusted by the public (demand), need to solve problems that are more acute than before (supply). For the emergence of that paradox, Hall sees at least one demand-centred cause, namely that “the electoral voice of the poor may be more muted today than it was some decades ago” and (at least one) supply-side factor, namely the complexity of multi-level governance. Similarly, Roberts sees a demand-centred compo- nent in the “crisis of discipline”, which refers to the unreasonable demands placed on the government. At the same time, he keeps in sight three supply-centred crises of democracy, namely the crisis of representation, the crisis of mastery and the crisis of anticipation, all of which focus on the administrative capacity of the government and its ability to deliver (Roberts 2017). In a similar vein, Merkel et al. (2011, 13) conceives of the crisis of democracy as the “the widening gap between the poor substantive performance of the representative democracy and the growing expectations har- boured by most people, experts and general publics alike”. His defnition is demand-centred insofar as public expectations play a role, and it is supply-centred insofar as elite’s manipulation of party fnances and corruption is concerned. In the supply and demand models reviewed below, Norris (2011) measures the democratic defcits as the difference between the democratic aspirations of the public, which is a measure of demand, and the 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 249 satisfaction of the public with democracy, which could be conceived as a subjective measure of supply. Mair (2013) also presents an interactive model, where the hollowing out of democracy depends on both the policy-making of the political parties and the preferences of the electorate. Crouch (2004) presents a double-sided model, where “post-democracy” is the result of non-representative parties (supply) and manipulative public demands. Similarly, Ginsborg (2008) conceives the crisis as the consequence of both the defciencies of the parties (supply) and the passivity of consumerist public.

Mair (2013): “Hollowing Out of Democracy” Mair (2013, 55) explicitly states that both the failure of supply and demand contributed to the hollowing out of party democracy: “it is not just the supply of partisan policy-making that determines whether parties make a difference; it is also a matter of what is demanded at the electoral level”. The demand is refected in the trend where social constituencies have clear preferences and feed these preferences into the process of policy formation. The policy preferences of the electorate can no longer be constrained by the single ideological division between left and right. This is so because the tension between the planning versus markets has been at least temporarily settled in favour of markets, and second because issues have become too complex to be grasped by the voters. Mair suggests that supply is diminished by the passing of the traditional mass party. Parties no longer represent; they just govern. The articulation and aggregation of popular interests occurs not within the electoral process but after elections. It fact, interest representation occurs through de-politicised channels, such as judges and regulatory agencies. The representative functions of the party are being slowly replaced by other agencies, while the procedural functions of the parties have become more relevant. One major procedural function of the parties is to recruit candidates and to grant political patronage to elites who seek offce. This procedural function is failing because candidates are recruited not through parties but through the media as the candidate’s capacity to appeal to the media is more important than his appeal to the party. In short, Mair (2013, 92) offers a demand and supply account of the hollowing out of democracy, where “the interests being articulated are more particularised and the channels of representation become more specialised and narrow-cast”. 250 G. DIMOVA

Crouch (2004): “Post-democracy” Crouch’s (2004, 19–20) concept of “post-democracy”, which is based on a model created by Rancière (2011), also considers both supply and demand factors. Crouch defnes it as a regime where “the political elites have learned to manage and manipulate popular demands; where people have to be persuaded to vote by top-down publicity campaigns”. On one level, the model of “post-democracy” could be conceived as supply-centred. The supply of representation is hampered because the concentric model of the party no longer works. In an ideal version of supply, party leaders are drawn from party activists, who refect the party base, which in turn represents the electorate. This democratic model of concentric circles is sabotaged by a far more potent circle of campaign strategies, advisers and lobbyists. The frms, which offer the party elites money to fnance their television campaigns, have largely replaced local activities for vote gathering (Crouch 2004, 74). The global frm is another factor that limits the supply of representation by eroding government authority and power. The global frm possesses a combination of mobility and wealth, which puts national governments in a position of dependence. The other way in which supply has been hampered is by allowing the market to annihi- late the social state and social citizenship. Crouch (2004, 79) argues that citizenship has been commercialised and privatised by allowing frms to intrude and control the provision of social services. The egalitarian demands of democracy have been trumped by the inequalities that allow capitalism to thrive. This line of reasoning is decidedly supply-centred and is very much in harmony with Chomsky’s idea that “control of the government is concentrated at the peak of the income scale, while the large majority in the lower portions are virtually disen- franchised” (Chomsky 2014, 159). However, Crouch’s model is also demand-centred because Crouch stipulates that demand is a central precondition for the usurpation of governments by privileged elites. Demand is failing because the working class is declining. The erosion of collective organisations of the lower classes and of workers’ interests and the fact that the underprivileged miss a collective identity and a capacity for concerted action are key factors in diminishing demand (Crouch 2004, 62). 10 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY … 251

Ginsborg (2008): “Crisis and Renewal of Democracy” Ginsborg’s account of the “crisis and renewal of democracy” also retains elements of both demand and supply. Ginsborg points to a novel factor that explains the passivity of the public: providing economic incentives that make individuals close off in their private lives. According to Ginsborg, consumer capitalism, which is a compensation for the power- lessness inficted by globalisation, made citizens “overwhelmingly privatised in their habits, thoughts and daily practices” (Ginsborg 2008, 42). Ginsborg singles out the oligarchic structure and the conformist culture of global television as the most important determinants of a heavily privatised society. The supply side of the equation enters the model in the guise of the democratic defcit in the EU and transnational corporations. Ginsborg points out that the 100 largest corporations control 20% of foreign assets (2008, 41). He says that transnational corporations are “juggernauts in economic performance but dinosaurs in democratic terms” (Ginsborg 2008, 41).

Norris (2011): Democratic Defcit The notion of the democratic defcit is quite popular (Bekkers et al. 2016; Psygkas 2017). Norris presents a model of the democratic defcit, which also straddles demand- and supply-centred explanations. The democratic defcit is the difference between the actual performance of the representative system and the people’s principled support for the ideal type of representative system. Democratic defcit is defned as the mean difference between (i) and (ii), where (i) measures democratic aspirations and (ii) measures democratic satisfaction. Both Flinders and Norris believe that supply falls short of the expectations, and they both seek the solutions in reducing the democratic defcit through education and the media. Nevertheless, there are two important differences in regard to the effects of mediatisation and education. Flinders uses them to reduce demand, whereas Norris uses them to simultaneously reduce demand and increase supply. Contrary to Flinders, Norris is a strong believer in the salacious effects of media information. She is a proponent of the virtuous circle of news, where media exposure makes citizens more informed members of the electorate. Norris (2011, 1) 252 G. DIMOVA argues that “regular exposure to television and radio news strengthened democratic aspirations and (italics mine) satisfaction with democracy, thereby reducing the democratic defcit”. Thus, media exposure affects both supply and demand. By contrast, Flinders believes that the media corrupt the electorate. In sum, whereas Flinders wants to reduce negative media exposure to reduce the level of unrealistic expectations, Norris accentuates media exposure to make citizens more informed in electing their rulers. Flinders and Norris retain the same difference in regard to the role of education in refning demand. Flinders uses education to make voters more realistic and reduce demand. Norris uses education to enlighten voters. Her research implies that education will not only make people’s expectations more realistic but it will also feed into a better quality of supply of representation. Ironically, Huntington and Crozier also seek to resolve the democratic overload through education but not by increasing education, as in the case of Flinders and Norris, but by reducing it. Huntington and Crozier (1975) believe that educated people unnecessarily overload the government. This line of thinking about education as reducing or increasing the public demand is challenged by Rosenthal (1998, 340) who points out that “it may appear elitist, politically incorrect and practically foolish to even think about educating the public in politics”.

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Models of the Transformation of Democracy: Critical Overview Through a Demand and Supply Framework

What Is the Difference Between the Models of the Transformation of Democracy? Three Guiding Questions Perhaps the optimism about democracy seems misplaced in the face of rising populism, fnancial crises, low electoral turnouts, civic apathy, the threat of terrorism and an avalanche of research professing the crisis of democracy (Urbinati 2014; Wolin 2010, for example). Yet, a rising tide of recent studies seeks to gauge democracy as a constantly evolving and transforming form of government. This chapter compares and contrasts the most recent models of the transformation of democracy. It aims to bring these more optimistic views of democracy together as they have existed side by side but rarely in a conversation with each other. Thus, it is unclear what these models have in common and where their most serious disagreements lie. For example, there is little understanding how to differentiate between the conceptualisations of the transformations of democracy, such as “monitory democracy” (Keane 2009), “counterdemocracy” (Rosanvallon 2008), “international democracy” (Archibugi 2008), “shareholder democracy” (Dasgupta 2010), “stakeholder democracy” (Macdonald 2008), “unrepresentative democracy” (Lewis 2001), “post-representative democracy” (Green 2010), “ocular democracy” (Green 2009), “Rancièrean democracy” (Rancière 2011b, 77), “Madisonian democracy” (Bergman and Strøm 2013), “Machiavellian democracy” (McCormick 2011), “interactive

© The Author(s) 2020 257 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6_11 258 G. DIMOVA democracy” (Gould 2014), “deliberative democracy” (Dryzek 2011) and “participatory democracy” (Fung 2006). This paper uses a supply and demand framework to highlight the differences and similarities between the models. It proposes that there are three questions that set these views apart:

1. In what way have the opportunities for the public to shape politics expanded? In other words, how has “supply” expanded? 2. Why is the public so active? In other words, how has public demand evolved? 3. What is the relationship between supply and demand? These differences are summarised in Table 11.1.

The frst differentiation between the models of democracy bears on the question “what opportunities are there for the public to shape politics?” This question essentially frames the issue not in terms of the demand side, i.e. what people expect of the government, but in terms of the supply side, i.e. how institutional arrangements or the informal sphere accommodate the public demands. I use the term “supply” here to des- ignate a range of opportunities for the public to express and pursue its demands. The common thread that ties all models of transformation of democracy together is that supply has expanded. This view challenges the pessimism of the critics of democracy who believe that supply has diminished because institutions have crumbled and the economy has shrunk. Thus, the second big question that underpins the models of transformation is why supply has expanded and what forms this expansion of supply has taken. There are eleven possible mechanisms that the literature proposes to increase supply. These mechanisms have been called “turns” by their authors. They include the “representative turn” (Näsström 2011; Saward 2010; Urbinati 2014), the “deliberative turn” (Dryzek 2002; Habermas 2001), the “participatory turn” (Fung 2009; Della Porta 2013), the “monitory turn” (Rosanvallon 2008; Keane 2009), the “Madisonian turn” (Bergman and Strøm 2013), the “aesthetic turn” (Ankersmit 1996), the “cultural turn” (Jahanbegloo 2014), the “local turn” (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013), the “democratic turn” (Bevir 2014), the “agonistic turn” (Mouffe 2005), the “cosmopolitan turn” (Beck and Grande 2010) and the “materialist turn” (Peterson et al. 2015). My goal below is to systematise and explore the linkages between the “turns” and the assumptions that underline them. 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 259 - (continued) Changes in public demand Electoral and semi-electoral institutions help citizens refne the representative claim Public demand changes in the course of discussing the distance between electors and elector Participation incurs attitudinal changes in demand Deliberation enlightens the public and makes it more tolerant Public demand is re-confgured by deliberative and non-deliberative techniques Public demand is re-confgured through sub- regional networks Public demand is re-confgured through shared inter ests in a given issue Public demand is re-confgured through a set of institutions where free associations negotiate with each other under state supervision Public demand is re-confgured through international professional associations to broad activist associations Public demand is re-confgured through the public will embracing multiple identities The plurality of modern publics undergoes cosmopolitization Changes in supply of representation or accountability Changes in supply of representation turn: Electoral and semi-electoral Representative means Aesthetic turn : Descriptive representation Participatory turn : Participatory budgeting: referenda Deliberative turn : Deliberative forums Beyond the deliberative turn : Innovating democracy International turn : Regional democracy International turn : Stakeholder democracy International turn : Associative democracy International turn : International democracy International turn : Plurinational democracy : World families: long-distance Cosmopolitan turn : World relationships Changes in supply and demand models of the transformation of democracy Author Näsström ( 2011 ) Saward ( 2010 ) Urbinati ( 2014 ) Thomassen ( 2007 ) Ankersmit ( 1996 ) Kompridis ( 2014 ) Csigo ( 2009 ) Fung ( 2009 ) Della Porta ( 2013 ) Dryzek ( 2011 ) Habermas ( 2001 ) Goodin ( 2008 ) Linklauter ( 1998 ) Macdonald ( 2008 ) Macdonald ( 2008 ) Held ( 2004 ) Keating ( 2004 ) Beck and Grande ( 2010 ) 11.1 Table 260 G. DIMOVA Changes in public demand Public demand is re-confgured as democratic self- awareness (democratic passion) arises during the protests Not clarifed Not clarifed None . Demand is fxed and exogenous. It interacts with supply None . Demand is fxed and exogenous. It interacts with supply None . Demand is fxed and exogenous. It interacts with supply Public demand is reconfgured as participants in the communication gain a better understanding of the common structural origins of their plight None . Demand is exogenous. It interacts with supply Changes in supply of representation or accountability Changes in supply of representation Cultural turn : Protesters carve out a space for discontent in non-democratic regimes Democratic turn : People, local managers acquire a greater say in what the state does Materialist turn : People protest against inequality and austerity Local turn : Non-institutional local actors acquire greater say in peace-building efforts Agonistic turn : Conficts are represented not extricated Madisonian turn : Courts: Independent agencies The Pragmatic turn : Deliberations reveal rather than conceal confict Monitory turn: Accountability forums (continued) Author Jahanbegloo ( 2014 ) Bevir ( 2014 ) Peterson et al. ( 2015 ) Karyotis and Rüdig ( 2016 ), Bailey 2014 ) Mac Ginty and Richmond ( 2013 ) Mouffe 2005 (2013) Wenman Bergman and StrømBergman ( 2013 ) Azmanova ( 2013 , 2014 ) Keane ( 2009 ) Rosanvallon ( 2008 ) McCormick ( 2011 ) Peruzzotti and Smulovitz ( 2006 ) Vibert ( 2007 ) 11.1 Table 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 261

One of the biggest epistemological challenges to the various “turns” is issued by the monitory turn, propounded by Rosanvallon, Keane, Bergman and Strøm, Vibert and Peruzzotti. What sets the monitory turn apart is that it seeks to expand supply through providing more opportunities for government accountability. By contrast, all other turns seek to expand supply through greater opportunities for representation. Apart from the dilemma between representation and accountability, the monitory turn espouses a very different perspective of public demand. It propounds that the public preferences are too diverse to be united, hard to change and exogenously determined, whereas all other “turns” believe that public demands are malleable, reconcilable and endoge- nously determined. Furthermore, the monitory turn is the only one which propounds that supply is decentred around various accountability mechanisms (courts, public opinion, NGOs), whereas the representative, deliberative, participatory and other turns suggest that the tools to infuence the government centre around one particular mechanism (election, deliberation, participatory budgets, etc.) Finally, the former believes in the idea of “one person, many votes” whereas the latter espouses the notion of “many people, one vote”. Within the camp of scholars who want to advance non-accountability based, representative ways to expand supply, there are two main disagreements, (1) to what extent should the expansion of supply let go of elections; and (2) what is the degree of informality that this expansion of supply takes? On the frst point of contention, letting go of elections, the representative turn (Näsström 2011) is the only one, which sticks to the electoral method, albeit it changes the notion of elections to do so. All other turns seek to complement or replace elections. At frst, it might seem that the representative turn is a turn away from elections, because it seeks to revamp and enlarge the notion of elections. In essence, however, the representative turn is a covered up attempt to salvage the place of elections in democratic theory. It does so by bringing forth the notion of the representative claim (Saward 2010) and the constitutive power of elections. With its faith in the electoral method, the representative turn stands in a direct opposition to a number of other “turns” which seek to increase supply through means unrelated to elections. The difference between these models is to what extent the expansion of opportunities for representation is institutional and to what extent it is informal. This level of informality is refected in the status of the actors (elected 262 G. DIMOVA actors, such as members of local government, versus non-elected actors, such as NGOs and protesters), the arena for fghting (institutionalised forums, such as participatory budgeting, versus non-institutionalised forums, such as deliberative forums and protests) and the representativity of their claims (claims of big majorities versus claims of minorities). Within this spectrum, the most informal are the local turn (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015), which seeks to include local actors, the cultural turn (Jahanbegloo 2014), which seeks to open a space for meaningful understanding of democracy in the course of cultural protests, and the democratic turn (Bevir 2014), which seeks to open a space for managers and local residents in the administration of state. The more formal extra-electoral forms are the deliberative turn (deliberative forums), participatory turn (participatory budgeting) and the international turn (European parliament). The key to the second question that differentiates models of democracy, namely “why are people so active”, relates to the so-called notion of public demand. “Public demand” in this chapter is used as a general concept referring to the interest of the public in politics, to the public’s involvement in public life, to societal expectations of their government, to their views of how they should be represented and how the incumbents should be held accountable. It is notable that the notion of public demand is decisively positive, as the transformationists believe that the public is very demanding of politics and politicians. This view is in great contrast to that of the critics of democracy, who suggest that the public is apathetic and disengaged. However, the transformationists’ models disagree as to what factors make public demand active. This substantial disagreement is examined below. This chapter argues that there are three types of views on the genesis of higher or more active public demand. The frst one argues that due to a large number of external factors, the public has become so diverse that each new segment of society has developed a different type of demand (Keane 2009; Rosanvallon 2008). It is notable that this diversity of public preferences is determined by the factors that are beyond the infuence of particular actors and public demand cannot be changed. In the second case, the public is more active for precisely the opposite reason, namely that it is more connected, and not more disaggregated. According to this view, the various parts of society on a global scale have acquired the means to come together in settings, such as an international parliament or deliberative forums (Archibugi 2008; Macdonald 2008). Demand in this case is malleable and changes in the course of cultural exchanges, deliberation, protests, 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 263 etc. The third view on the genesis of the activeness of public demand posits that the public has remained mere spectators but that spectators can still exert a disciplining effect even by just observing (Green 2009; Rancière 2011a). This line of thinking challenges the wisdom of a passive public demand advanced in notions of audience democracy (Manin 1997).

Question One: What Factors Cause the Expansion of Supply? The frst major view that the models of transformation of democracy share is that there are plenty of innovative ways to provide opportunities for the public to participate in politics. In this chapter, I refer to these additional avenues for expressing one’s opinion as the expansion of supply. The argument about the expansion of supply is in stark contrast to models of the crisis of democracy, which purport that supply is insuffcient, fnite and cannot be expanded (e.g. Fukuyama 2014; Mair 2011/2012; Crouch 2004). While they agree that people get more opportunities to infuence politics, the models of the transformation of democracy largely disagree about the different types of opportunities. They call these expansions of supply “turns”. In the section below, I list and compare the various “turns”, which have never been discussed in a group. I propose that the chief difference between these ways of expansion of supply refers to three main characteristics: (1) the dilemma of representation versus accountability; (2) the place of elections in representation; and (3) the signifcance of informality in extra-electoral representation.

Supply Expands Through Accountability: The Monitory Turn, Madisonian Turn and Agonistic Turn The monitory turn is perhaps the most recent view of the expansion of supply. At the same time, the monitory turn presents one of the most novel and provocative trends in thinking about the reincarnations of supply. As a notion, the monitory turn is most characteristic (although never stated explicitly as a term) in the notions of “counter-democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008) and “monitory democracy” (Keane 2009), but it also comes up in the writings of McCormick (2011), Peruzzotti and 264 G. DIMOVA

Smulovitz (2006) and Vibert (2007). It has four main elements: (1) it believes that public demand is immutable, exogenously determined and irreconcilable; (2) it argues that supply extends through accountability rather than through representation; (3) it challenges the monopoly of electoral mode of supply of representation; (4) it presents the accountability channel as decentralised; i.e., there are many ways to hold the government to account. I will discuss the frst proposition about the notions of demand in detail in the next section. Apart from its particular idea of public demand, the monitory turn is unique because it expands supply through accountability, not by representation. They both herald the advent of non-elected representation (Keane 2011, 14–16). The very essence of counter-democracy is that it is “a durable democracy of distrust that complements the episodic democracy of the usual representative system” (Rosanvallon 2006, 8). Keane’s project on monitory democracy is equally accountability-centred. Keane (2009, xxvii) defnes “monitory democracy” as a “post-Westminster’ form of democracy in which power-monitoring, power-controlling devices have begun to extend sideways and downwards through the whole political order”. According to him, “there is a “sea change in favour of extra-parliamentary monitors” (2013, 92). The monitory turn challenges the monopoly of the elections. Rosanvallon and Keane share a very strong sense of the approaching end of the representative era: monitory democracy is “a brand new historical type of democracy that operates in radically different ways from the textbook accounts of ‘representative’, ‘parliamentary’ or ‘liberal’ democracy…The whole architecture of democracy has begun to change funda- mentally” (Keane 2013, 91). According to Keane, the electoral channel is not working because electors lack information and are “constantly liable to be misled” (Keane interpreted by Kampfner 2009). Similarly, Rosanvallon disputes the centrality of the electoral mode of supply by arguing that elections are “desacralised”; i.e., elections have lost their status as the modus operandi of representation:

In the classical theory of representative government, as well as in practice, the function of voters was to legitimate those whom they chose to govern them; the governors were in turn granted a considerable measure of autonomy. This is no longer the case… Indeed, it is fair to say that elections are now little more than a way of choosing governors. (Rosanvallon 2008, 115) 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 265

The failure, or the desacralisation of elections, is attributed by Rosanvallon to their inability to embody both legitimacy and trust. Elections have failed to link the procedure of selection with a qualitative public reaction. According to Rosanvallon (2006), elections continue to imbue legitimacy, but they no longer confer trust. Legitimacy is a jurid- ical quality of a strictly procedural order. However, trust is of a complex nature. There is a need to improve the quality of legitimacy by adding to its procedural character a moral dimension, to temporalise legitimacy by extending its continuity over time and to serve as an institutional short cut to a whole series of mechanisms of verifcation and ratifcation (Rosanvallon 2006, 235–236). However, as trust is no longer cotermi- nous with legitimacy, elections are no longer the alpha and omega of democracy. Another reason for the decreased salience of elections is that they no longer present the unity of functional and procedural representativity. Functional representativity is recognised by the laws and the constitutions and guarantees that the representatives will not abuse their mandate. Procedural representativity is derived from the electoral body. Elections are in decline, according to Rosanvallon, because they embody procedural but not functional representativity. Fourth, the monitory turn presents the accountability channel as decentralised. This means that there is no single or most important centre of accountability (Navarra cited by Keane 2013, 88). Accountability has many centres, layers and forms. Keane should also be credited for decentralising the notion of accountability. According to Keane (2008, 21), “the mechanisms of monitory democracy resemble self-assertive units in a multi-nested complex of power-monitoring bodies that extend deep inside and well beyond the boundaries of many territorial states. These ‘latticed’ patterns fudge the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ and between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’”. Keane (2013, 45) espouses Navarria’s concept of the evolution of networks from “central- ized” through “decentralized” to “distributed”. Today, accountability is driven by a fully pluralised and decentralised network of communication. Several other models of the transformation of democracy could be broadly interpreted as making the monitory turn. In his book “The Rise of the Unelected”, Vibert (2007) perceives the expansion of supply through the empowerment of unelected bodies, such as independent central banks, economic regulators, risk managers and auditors. Drawing on Machiavelli, McCormick (2011, 106) propounds increasing the supply of representation through accountability forums, such 266 G. DIMOVA as the Tribune Assembly. In the Tribune Assembly, ffty-one private citizens are selected by lottery for one year for non-renewable, non-re- peatable terms. In another version of the monitory turn, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006, 56) seek to increase the supply of representation through more “social accountability”. According to them, “social accountability has great potential for controlling government actions in representative democracies”. This monitory turn is driven by civic groups, NGOs and the media, which exert control via two ways—judicialisation and mediatisation. Judicialisation, the process where social groups or individuals submit claims to courts, contributes to social accountability because it (1) provides a legitimacy seal for the petitions; and (2) it forces the state to take a stand on the advanced claims. Mediatisation bolsters social accountability because it increases visibility and thus increases the reputation costs of elite’s wrongdoing. Social accountability, as gauged by Smulovitz and Peruzzottim is most effective when judicialisation and mediatisation work in conjunction with social mobilisation. The Madisonian turn is also very similar to the monitory turn. According to Bergman and Strøm (2013, 382), the Madisonian turn entails a turn away from holding the government to account by parties and parliament and towards holding the government to account by courts, the EU, central banks and other independent auditors. In its essence, it is “a turn away from the classical model of Westminster democracy”. In the Westminster model, control of the government relies on the ex ante controls for political accountability. Strong and cohesive political parties with deep social roots make it possible to do extensive screening to fnd suitable candidates for offce. In the Madisonian model, the control logic is external to parliament and ex post rather than parliamentary and ex ante. The Madisonian turn is close to the monitory turn because it recognises that “citizen preferences are becoming increasingly diffcult to aggregate” (Bergman and Strøm 2013, 23) and that various accountability mechanisms are suitable for the expression of various demands. The agonistic turn, coined by Mouffe (2005), is similar to the monitory and the Madisonian turns because it proposes multiple centres for the expansion of supply and because it believes that people’s demands are too diverse and exogenously determined to be united. Mouffe argues that the existing “turns”, especially the deliberative one, are deeply fawed as they assume that preferences are malleable rather than fxed. 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 267

Mouffe contends that this is a sort of escapism. According to her, the models which manufacture the public will are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible (Mouffe 2005, 93). She believes that the public will is more immediate than deliberative and representative theorists are ready to admit. She advocates an agonistic democracy, which centres on the recognition of conficts rather than on the resolution of conficts in society. In this respect, Mouffe is closer to the accountability turn than to the representative, participatory and the deliberative turns. Medearis’s notion of “oppositional democracy” might also be considered to contain some of the features of the monitory or agonistic turns because it recasts democracy as a struggle between various public segments, not as a forum where these segments reach a consensus: “My approach entails criticisms of assumptions and concepts embedded in leading scholarly approaches to democracy, especially the models with the most present adherents, elite theory and deliberative theory… I think that participatory democracy, agonistic democracy and fugitive democracy have oppositional elements” (Medearis 2015, 5). Medearis (9) further notes: “my conceptual critique of these dominant models of democracy points towards a need for another approach that would foreground democracy as a form of active engagement with the many undemocratic tendencies at work in society-not a retreat behind wall or a special form of interaction between ideally situation actors”.

Supply Expands Through Electoral Means: The Representative Turn and the Aesthetic Turn Apart from the monitory turn, all other turns seek to expand supply through representation. They disagree, however, about the place of elections in those representative arrangements. The representative turn is least willing to give up on elections. All remaining turns, such as the deliberative or participatory, seek to complement or replace elections. According to Näsström (2011, 506), the three main assumptions underlying the notion of the “representative turn” are: (1) “representation is a constitutive act, interests are not themselves prior to representative politics but they are made through them”; (2) elections consist not only of electoral but of non-electoral means as well; (3) voting is not only a decisional moment but a movement of judgment. 268 G. DIMOVA

At frst glance, the second assumption that “elections consist not only of electoral but of non-electoral means as well” might seem to indicate that the representative turn is moving away from elections. This impression is deceiving. In reality, the representative turn changes and enlarges the spectrum of elections not to renege on them but to rehabilitate the importance of elections in representation. Despite its modifed version of elections, the representative turn is still centred on voting. This is obvious in the third assumption, namely that “voting is not only a decisional moment but a movement of judgment”. The difference between the representative turn and models of electoral democracy is that the former presents voting as an end of a long journey, whereas the latter conceive voting as a single point. How exactly does the representative turn proceed to rescue elections? In addition to postulating that elections are more than the act of voting but a process of deliberation that precedes the voting, it also postulates that public demand changes in the course of that deliberation. This means that people do not come to the ballot box with a predetermined set of preferences, but that these preferences are made in the course of discussing candidates who seek offce. This perspective challenges the idea that voting is a mere act of delegation that results from the aggregation of preferences. In the representative turn, preferences are made rather than simply added up. “The chief purpose of representative government is not to represent the popular will but to ‘provoke debate about precisely what the popular will is’” (Garsten 2010, 91). The public will is not immediate, it is constructed. Saward’s (2010) notion of the representative claim is a good illustration of the way demand changes during elections. He believes that the exchange between the elector and the elected constitutes a crucial and rigorous process of defning the representative claim, or in the par- lance of this study, a process of defning demand. Thus, Saward could be viewed as one of the scholars supporting the representative turn. In essence, Saward’s notion of the making of the representative claim disputes the presumption “that the represented has a given, transpar- ent and largely stable set of interests” (Schaap 2012, 109). Ultimately, the representative turn draws renewed attention to the normative value of democratic proceduralism (Urbinati 2014, 8) and, more specifcally, to elections. It is the procedure of elections, the act of casting the ballot and the whole process surrounding it that drives the representative turn. 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 269

Warren’s idea of the second transformation of democracy could also be interpreted to be as a part of the “representative turn” because of its emphasis on elections and representation (Warren 2003, 228). According to him, the frst transformation of democracy involved the development of institutions of representation, such as elections and legislatures. It has been unfolding gradually with enfranchisement. The second democratic transformation included the deepening of representative institutions with the increasing membership of parties, a greater number of elected offces, new types of activities and life of associations outside of the representative channel. However, Warren’s model makes a small break with the representative turn as he argues that there is a “striking change in what democracy looks like and how it operates” and that “democracies now function in ways that represent a qualitative break with the representative model” (Warren 2003, 224). Although the similarity is rarely acknowledged, I would draw a parallel between the representative turn and the aesthetic turn. The two turns are very similar in their acknowledgement that true representation arises out of the discussion between the electors and the elected. With its emphasis on dialogue and discourse, it bears similarity to the idea of the representative claim (Saward 2010). The aesthetic turn in democratic theory expands the supply of representation through a sphere of “in- betweeness” between the represented and the representatives (Ankersmit 1996). Instead of trying to ignore or downplay the gap arising from delegation, Ankersmit believes that this gap is of great importance for democratic politics. He believes that “‘mimetic’, i.e. one-to-one representation, is illusory” (Ankersmit 1996, 123). Proponents of the aesthetic turn believe that the interaction between the citizens and the elites is of paramount importance because it engenders creative representation (Kompridis 2014). According to them, the distance between the elected and the electors is replicable to the distance between the painter and the model, because the painter has to respect the identity of the model but still has to see the model through the lens of his art (Csigo 2009). The aesthetic turn should not be confused with descriptive representation, which means that the demands of the electors should be represented by electors who have the same race, geographic area of birth and socio-economic status, neither is it akin to substantive representation, which means that the demands of the electors should be represented by electors who advance the demands of their political party. In aesthetic representation, neither the demands of the elected nor the demands of the electors 270 G. DIMOVA are decisive. It is the interchange between them that is of paramount importance. One of the most direct and systematised criticisms of the representative claim has been mounted by Tormey (2015), who argues that we need to move beyond representation instead of trying to salvage it in one form or another. His anti-representational stance has been challenged by Thomassen (2007). In my view, the main point of contention between Tormey and Thomassen comes down to the question whether public demands could be crafted outside or only inside of the representative process. In other words, can identities be made outside of representative institutions? Thomassen (2007, 111) argues that “representation is constitutive, by which I mean that there is no politics or experience outside representation, which can, then, not be opposed to some true or authentic presence. As such, there is no way ‘beyond representation’, and representation is not a second best”. Robinson and Tormey (2007, 128), in return, suggest that it is very possible to have interests expressed beyond representation mainly through spontaneous horizontal networks: “there are all manner of horizontal movements in which identities are negotiated within the movement and without necessitating leadership in some overt or even tacit manner”. One of Thomassen’s key arguments is that the horizontal networks that Tormey puts forth need space to unfold and take shape and that the only way to secure that space from intruders is to institute some form of a horizontal authority. In other words, Thomassen (2007, 115) suggests that there is no possibility of horizontal networks without some sort of vertical representation: “Tormey argues that …one must create the spaces for the creation of new worlds…What he does not consider is how these spaces are created and, subsequently, defended… Creating horizontal spaces involves exclusion of those who threaten those very spaces. We can say that the spaces of horizontality are only possible as spaces of horizontality through a relation of verticality, where someone takes it upon themselves to secure and defend these spaces”. Robinson and Tormey (2007, 3) retorts that Thomassen provides a very restraining binary choice between representation, on the one hand, and a “state-like” violence and exclusion, on the other. Interestingly, the debate between Thomassen and Tormey/Robinson about the limits of representation took place four years before the representative turn took a defnite shape in the writings of Näsström (2011), Saward 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 271

(2010) and Urbinati (2014). It seems that the representative turn has contributed one important nuance to this earlier debate. The theorists of the representative turn have enlarged the notion of representation by going away from the more literal notion of representation advanced by Thomassen. The space for creating identities is no longer so strictly confned to the representative institutions and the electoral process per se, but involves the discussions and processes preceding and surrounding them. Thus, the new development is that the informal processes came to play just as an important role in the representative turn as the formal representative institutions. Tormey’s idea of the end of representation, on the other hand, should be seen as paving the way for the monitory turn, but defnitely not making the monitory turn. What Tormey has in common with Rosanvallon and Keane is the suggestion that representation is old fashioned and passé and that spontaneous horizontal networks have a right of their own. Unlike these monitory theorists, however, he stops short of arguing that these networks will use these accountability mechanisms to pursue their claims. Tormey is also different from the scholars of the monitory turn because he believes that singularities are made in the process of forming networks, whereas Rosanvallon and Keane are more likely to argue that these public preferences are a given, or at least that they are a result of many external forces.

Supply Expands Through Organised Initiatives: The Deliberative Turn, the Participatory Turn and the Pragmatic Turn The deliberative and participatory turns are perhaps hardest to categorise in terms of their proximity to elections and to informality. The deliberative turn increases the supply of representative forums by the creation of deliberative polls, citizen juries, consensus conferences and mini-publics (Habermas 2001; Dryzek 2011; Goodin 2008). The participatory turn increases supply through participatory budgeting (Fung 2009), secto- rial consultation councils (Della Porta 2013, 5), and, possibly, referenda and protests. Landemore (2017) expands “supply” through bolstering the attractiveness of the deliberative turn and through modifying central principles of representative democracy. The deliberative and participatory turns can be classifed with slightly greater certainty towards their proximity to informality. They both need 272 G. DIMOVA some sort of top-down structure and organisation as deliberative polls, deliberative juries and participatory budgeting, and referenda are mostly organised by a leader, the state or local governments or another vertical authority. In this respect, they are less bottom-up, individual-based processes than the democratic, cultural, materialist and the local turns discussed below. However, if protests count towards the participatory turn, then the latter has more place for informality than is otherwise acknowledged. Della Porta (2012, 33) argues that “protest movements conceptu- alize and practice … democratic models that emphasize participation over delegation and deliberation over majority voting. In doing this, they present a potential for reconstructing social and political trust from below”. There is one principal similarity between the representative, participatory and deliberative turns: they all argue that in the process of deliberation, election or participation, preferences change. Scholars advocating these turns implicitly oppose the immediacy of the public will. The deliberative space exists mainly for the purposes of forming the public will, not only of expressing the public will. The difference is that deliberative democrats seek to reinvigorate the public will through deliberation, whereas scholars of the representative turn seek to enlighten the public through electoral and semi-electoral means. Similarly, in the course of participatory practices, “attitudinal changes occur” (Della Porta 2013, 197). This means that while taking part in participatory initiatives, people change their preferences and demands. In this sense, the participatory turn is closer to the representative and deliberative turn as it is to the monitory turn. Most deliberative scholars agree that deliberation creates and refnes the demand for representation. Dryzek (2002, 1) states that “the refec- tive process is critical because preferences can be transformed in the process of deliberation… deliberators are amenable to changing their judgments, preferences and views during the course of their interaction”. Testifying to the formative character of deliberation, Thompson (1995, 255) argues that “a deliberative conception does not assume that each individual possesses an already predetermined will or set of preferences nor does it defne legitimacy as merely the arithmetic summation of individual preferences. Rather, the process of deliberation is crucial, because it is through this process… that individuals come to form their wills”. Manin (1987, 359) further concurs, “It is the process [of deliberation] by which everyone’s will is formed that confrms its legitimacy on the outcome, rather than the sum of already 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 273 formed wills”. Habermas (2001, 76) also presents deliberation as an act of will formation, “In complex societies, it is the deliberative opinion-and will- formation of citizens… that forms the ultimate medium for a form of abstract, legally constructed solidarity that reproduces itself through political participation”. Offe (2011, 6) agrees that “the opportunity to participate in the collective affairs of the political community will actually have a virtuous formative impact upon citizen. It is clear that deliberative turn is just as demand-based as is the representative turn”. Perhaps Goodin’s (2008) idea of “beyond the deliberative turn” brings the deliberative turns closer to the cultural turns in terms of its degree of informality. According to Goodin (2008), the deliberative turn actually encompasses three turns, a systematic turn, which suggests that deliberation should not be linked to the deliberative forum alone, but should be interlinked to many forums and to the informal public sphere as well, and a practical turn and an empirical turn, both of which seek to apply deliberative practices. Furthermore, Gould’s later idea of “interactive democracy” moves the deliberative turn even closer to the international turn by “the cultivation of solidarities across borders” (Gould 2014, 2). Interestingly, Dryzek (2011, 111) defnes the deliberative turn as similar to the monitory turn. He contends that the methodological approach is the only difference that sets apart the deliberative turn from the monitory turn. He suggests that deliberative democracy is a normative project whereas monitory democracy is an “interpretative frame”. Beyond that difference, Dryzek argues that the deliberative and monitory turns overlap insofar as some accountability mechanisms are both deliberative and monitory in nature. Rosanvallon (2014, 130) is somewhat ready to agree with Dryzek’s claim but only if deliberative democracy is seen as one of the modalities of democracy of watchfulness. In my mind, the difference between the monitory and the deliberative turn goes well beyond the methodological approach. It comes down to the two very different goals of the “turns”. The deliberative turn seeks to change the public demand, whereas the monitory turn treats demand as a given. The pragmatic turn advanced by Azmanova (2013) constitutes an ingenious theoretical vision of the expansion of supply. In two very important respects, the pragmatic turn she articulates is similar to the deliberative turn: it focuses on the communicative situation as a way to increase the opportunities that people have to achieve democratic 274 G. DIMOVA outcomes and it posits that people’s demands alter in the course of these communicative situations (Azmanova 2012, 201–222). In another also very important respect, however, the pragmatic turn is similar to the agonistic turn because it places a very high premium on the emancipatory work done by conficts among actors. With this combination between a communicative-pragmatic and agonistic turns, her model provides an account of the way the conficting claims of injustice the deliberators exchange engender a better understanding of their respective positions and bridge the divides between them within an emergent shared perception of injustice. On this basis, the pragmatic turn seeks to trace the common origin of seemingly conficting claims to justice. One assumption underlying this model is that grievances, especially when voiced from opposite sides of the spectrum of experienced injustice, have common structural roots lying in the socio-economic system. In other words, the power asymmetries which rattle and anger people are the symptom and epiphenomenon of structural/systemic dynamics of injustice (Azmanova 2014). The communicative-pragmatic procedure of unconstrained deliberations allows participants to gain cognizance of these deeper dynamics. This allows claims against the asymmetrical distribution of power (be it material inequality or cultural mis-recognition) to transform into claims against the very system of social relations, thereby opening a perspective for radical politics. Thus, the revelation, rather than the suppression, of conficts is necessary for tracing these structural roots of injustice. Otherwise, communicative situations, which espouse the very unrealistic and idealistic terms of the deliberative turn and communicative turn, are bound to just redefne justice or achieve it “in the abstract terms of moral universalism” instead of addressing it effectively” (Azmanova 2013, 32).

Supply Expands Through Informal Channels: The Democratic Turn, the Local Turn, the Cultural Turn and the Materialist Turn What the democratic, local and cultural turns have in common is that they all carve out a space for offciating identities and that space is informal, bottom-up and individual-centred. They are all turns towards the informal sphere, where individuals are increasingly more important in relation to institutions. They also contain a greater degree of con- tingency about the way these identities are shaped and they are more 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 275 involved with the everyday aspects of politics. However, the “turns” are different insofar as they pose turns away from various starting points. The democratic turn is a turn away from a monolithic concept of the state. The local turn is a turn away from institutional solutions to peace-building that take only the prerogatives of governments and international bodies into account. The cultural turn is a turn away from perceiving democracy as suitable to the Western culture only. The materialist turn is a turn away from treating protests as a reaction and expression of post-materialist values only. The democratic turn is a phrase coined by Bevir (2014) which is a turn away from concepts of the state as network governance or metagov- ernance and towards a concept of the decentred state. The concept of the decentred state is key for the democratic turn because it allows for a more “pluralist” and “dialogic” approach to the state (Bevir 2014, 26). The democratic element in the democratic turn is manifested in two main guises: frst, managers, even at the lowest level, have a say in interpreting directives, and secondly, managers consult with local people to form rationales for their work. The democratic element also kicks in as it allows for these various managers, employees and local people to formulate policy directives in informal settings, such as over coffee and lunch conversations, in the street and not necessarily in the boardrooms. The beliefs of the individual actors about the traditions have more agency than the traditions that reign in the institutions. According to Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 194), dominant theories of the state “postulate the state as an institution or structure that determines practices and explains outcomes. Our emphasis on situated agency precludes such reifcation. The state is merely an aggregate descriptive term for a vast array of meaningful actions that coalesce into contingent, shifting, and contested practices”. The local turn bears many of the characteristics of the democratic turn, but it is set within the literature on peace-building as opposed to theories of the state. Unlike the democratic turn, which is a term used mostly incidentally, the notion of the local turn has gained a lot of currency in the last two decades or so. It arose as a backlash against unsuccessful peace-building efforts around the globe, such as “unsta- ble political settlements in Bosnia, violent resistance in Cambodia and Afghanistan, mounting legitimacy crises of international administra- tions, and the recurrence of violence or increasing volatility of the ‘negative peace’ in places like Kosovo and Iraq” (Randazzo 2016, 2). The local turn is a turn away from imposing peace-building initiatives by 276 G. DIMOVA international institutions and a turn towards including the local agency more extensively. The meaning of the local agency extends from sub- national governments, informal institutions, local community committees, non-state actors and NGOs to local political elites (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015, 4). The local turn seeks to fll in the gap between local expectations and international targets (Randazzo 2016, 2). One of the chief problems of the local turn is how to tell apart local actors who do not have representation or are not willing to have representation, how to interact with them and to what extent they are legitimate participants in the peace-building effort. The cultural turn, which as a term coined by Jahanbegloo (2014), bears all the main characteristics of the democratic and local turns; namely, it is informal, bottom-up, individual-centred, contingent and situated in everyday politics. Nevertheless, its focus is somewhat different. The cultural turn seeks to emphasise the importance of democratic passion. According to Jahanbegloo, elections and representative institutions become meaningless without democratic passion. The author believes that Western society has become apathetic, indifferent and cynical and has lost its democratic passion. At the same time, he believes that civil uprisings in the Middle East, and especially the Green Movement of 2009 in Iran, have rekindled that democratic passion. The cultural turn diversifes supply by instigating non-violent, anti-regime demonstrations. Protests are instrumental for democratic passion for two reasons; they institute a sense of “explicit commonality” and “self-institution” (Jahanbegloo 2014, 68). “Explicit commonality” implies the realisation that “democracy is not a Western experience, it is a universal one. There is no such thing as a democratic DNA” (Jahanbegloo 2014, 68). The notion of “self- institution” means that participants in demonstrations talk with each other, make sense of their democratic experience, realise that the democratic experience is meaningful and, consequently, claim responsibility for their part of building democracy. Although they are rarely discussed together, the local turn and the cultural turn share one explicit realisation. This is the apprehension that democracy cannot be instituted in a foreign country unless local actors cooperate. Both “turns” in their own way arise out of the Western confusion and frustration trying to spot legitimate local actors, especially when there are internal fractions in the country and when these actors are new or emerge from the informal sphere. However, the cultural turn places far greater emphasis on the constitutive power of 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 277 demonstrations. In addition, the cultural turn represents the viewpoint of local actors whereas the local turn is conceptualised with the international peace-building institutions in mind. Finally, the cultural turn is similar to the participatory turn with its emphasis on participation, but it is more limited as to the forms of this participation (mainly protests) and more emphatic about the cross-cultural aspects of democracy. Finally, the “materialist turn” is a notion coined to describe the economic causes behind the protests aimed against austerity measures, economic inequality, the rise of economic crises and the badly management of fscal crises: “Political protest…since 2010 with the current wave of anti-austerity protests, has taken a decidedly materialistic turn… contention in Europe never turned away from issues of economic inequality and social justice, rather research on social movements turned more or less a blind eye towards the ‘old’ social movements of class to a one-sided preoccupation with the post-materialist concerns of the so-called ‘new’ social movements—environmental, feminist, peace, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender movements, etc. Whatever is the case, we can no longer neglect the materialist focus of contemporary protest” (Peterson et al. 2015, 294). Some authors are more cautious about the exclusivity of the materialist incentives to protest. They pinpoint that relative depravation is an important factor, but other factors, such as previous participation in protests, are also determinative (Karyotis and Rüdig 2015). Similar to the local, cultural and democratic turn, the materialist turn is openly non-institutionalist in nature as scholars underscore the “extra-parliamentary” essence of the protests (Bailey 2014). They have a different focus, however. The materialist turn is more about the causes of the protests. By contrast, the local turn and the democratic turn are more about emphasising the legitimacy and the status of informal actors, while the cultural turn focuses on the informal process of developing a democratic passion.

Supply Expands Internationally: The International Turn and the Cosmopolitan Turn There is a sizeable difference as to whether democracy is taking a “turn” on a local or international level. The notions of democracy, which propagate an international turn of supply, include regional democracy (Linklauter 1998), stakeholder democracy (Macdonald 2008), 278 G. DIMOVA associative democracy (Macdonald 2008), international democracy (Held 2004), plurinational democracy (Keating 2004) and the idea of the cosmopolitan turn (Beck and Grande 2010). What they have in common is the notion that the opportunities for people to engage in politics have expanded beyond the nation state. Dahl also gauges the expansion of supply in terms of the expansion of the representative democracy on an international scale. He outlines three great transformations of democracy. The frst transformation gave birth of the assembly democracy in the city state. The second transformation enables the rise of representative democracy in the nation state. The third revolution replicates the second revolution on an international scale. It is a sort of a “transnational polyarchy” (Dahl 1994, 32). It adopts the democratic idea to a new change in scale. Held concurs with viewing democratic transformations in terms of a change in scale, and emphasises the international turn in democratic theory. He (2014: 73) states: “I think there have been three basic revolutions in thinking about democracy: the frst links the idea of democracy to the city-state; the second, of course, to the nation-state; and the third, which is prominent in my own work, thinks about democracy beyond borders”. Schmitter (2011) argues that multi-level governance has simultaneously diversifed supply upwards onto a European level, and it has devolved downwards into sub-national provinces and federal districts. Thus, multi-level governance is a search for the right level of aggregation of the supply channel. Schmitter holds a negative view of the international expansion of supply as he argues that multi-level governance has diluted the supply as it has muddled the clarity of responsibility. It has turned into an excuse for governments to “pass the buck”.

Question Two: Why Is Demand Active? The second question that sets models of the crisis and transformation of democracy apart is whether demand is active or passive. Models of the crisis of democracy perceive public demand as too passive or as overly demanding. By contrast, models of the transformation of democracy are united in their perception that public demand is active. They all agree that the public takes an active part in voicing its concerns and in seeking their resolution. They disagree, however, as to what causes the public to be so active. There are three scenarios: (1) the public is active, although it is merely a spectator; (2) the public is active because it is too diverse and fragmented; (3) the public is active because the various societal 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 279 segments have reconnected through various forums. Each rationale is reviewed below.

Demand Is Active, Even Though People Are Spectators: Green (2009), Rancière (2011a) The passivity of the public is generally condemned by critics of democracy, who believe that a passive public gives the elites a free reign to rule (Manin 1997). In great contrast to this view, a few scholars propound that observation does not necessarily have to be a passive activity. Instead, the public can monitor and discipline the incumbents by observing them. This more optimistic view of public demand includes Lippman’s 1997 (1992) model of “spectators’ democracy”, Rancière’s model of the “citizen-spectator” (2011a) and Green’s model of “ocular democracy” (2009). Lippman’s notion of (1992) “spectator democracy” suggests that the passivity of the people does not cause the crisis of democracy. In fact, people should be mere spectators to avoid a crisis of democracy: “People have to be atomized and segregated and alone. They are not supposed to organize, because then they might be something beyond spectators of action. They might actually be participants if many people with limited resources could get together to enter the political arena. That’s really threatening” (Lippman in Chomsky 2002, 26). Lippman believes that “there are two ‘functions’ in a democracy, the specialized class, the responsible men, carry out the executive function, which means they do the thinking and planning and understand the common interests. Then, there is the bewildered herd, and they have a function in democracy too. Their function in a democracy, [Lippmann] said, is to be ‘spectators’, not participants in action” (Lippman cited in Chomsky 2002, 17). Rancière disagrees with the critics of democracy (e.g. Manin 1999) who postulate that citizen spectators are passive. He puts forth the idea of the “emancipated spectator”. Rancière argues that “the spectator also acts…She observes, selects, compares, interprets. She links what she sees to a host of other things that she has seen on other stages, in other kinds of places” (Rancière 2011a, 13). Green (2009) agrees that the public needs not be passive just because it is observing. He comes up with a version of “ocular democracy” that is much more positive than Manin’s concept of “audience democracy”. Green argues that the 280 G. DIMOVA distance between the rulers and the spectators should not be cancelled, neutralised or reduced, because such a goal is unrealistic. Instead, it should be accepted that the power-holders should compensate the spectators by exposing themselves to the public in the so-called candour moments of unmanaged surveillance (Green 2009, 20–22). In a similar vein, Zumbrunnen (2008, 7) attributes a more active role to non-vocal citizens by distinguishing the “silence of contending voices” from the “collective silence of the demos”.

Demand Is Active Because the Public Reconnects Across Borders: Archibugi (2008), Macdonald (2008), Linklauter (1998) A large body of scholars, working mainly in the feld of international democracy, believes that the public has become more active and vocal because it has acquired new venues to come together. In these venues, reconnection means that communities are created which are based not on a territorial identity but on issue identities that transcend territories. The rationale behind this line of argument is that when people from various ends of the world meet to defend an issue that is of interest to them, their demand increases. The reconnection of demand through the international turn is achieved through the mechanisms specifed in Table 11.1. For example, one way of reconnected the fragmented publics in a “cosmopolitan democracy” is to constitute a World parliament and a common lingua (Archibugi 2008). In the version of “stakeholder democracy” (Macdonald 2008), fragmented publics reconnect through associations that share interests over particular issues. In Held’s (2004) account of “international democracy”, the fragmented public is reconnected through a range of international professional associations and broad activist associations, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International. In Keating’s (2004) model of “plurinational democracy”, the public reconnects by sharing multiple identities. All these versions of democracy related to globalisation see the fragmentation of the public not as an demise of the public will but as a process that leads towards the reconstituting of the public will and transforming democracy in another direction. International democracy, more than any other type of transformation of democracy, is engaged in a process of demos building and identity. The stakes behind this 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 281 project are high because it implies that there can be democracy at the EU level (Sternberg 2013, 145). Global civil society is supposed to be a potent, if partial, answer to accountability defcits (Scholte 2011, 145). This “reconnecting” effect of the international turn is in contrast to the effects of the deliberative turn and the representative turn. The representative turn and deliberative turn seek to enlighten the public, while the international turn reconnects it. The process of building a common demos is also quite characteristic of the cosmopolitan turn (Beck and Grande 2010, 418). Similar to the international turn, the cosmopolitan turn claims to build upon the concepts of “entanglement” (Friedman and Randeria 2004) and “intercon- nectedness” (Held et al. 1999) by creating the concepts of “dialogical imagination” and “internationalization of the other”. These imagined cosmopolitan communities establish themselves in the awareness that risks are no longer socially delimited in space and time (Beck and Grande 2010, 418). This process of cosmopolitisation can be a result of deliberative, refexive opening of individuals, or of passive submission of individuals who are unwillingly and unwittingly caught up in certain patterns. One example of a demos building exercise is the Eurovision debate about a European Commission presidency conducted on 15 May 2014. The debate brought people together by being televised live in all European Union countries. The EU peoples had the opportunity to ask questions on social media, new media and radio and TV. The fve presidential candidates were brought in front of a live audience in the Plenary Chamber of the European Parliament. The project brought the people of Europe together also by stimulating an international debate around key issues on a real-time basis during the TV debate. According to the organis- ers, the offcial hashtag #TellEUROPE was a trending topic on Twitter in Belgium, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy and Spain (EBU, 15 May 2014). Although the idea that people have re-established new bonds is most prevalent in the concepts of transformation of international democracy and globalisation, other models also embrace it. For example, when Warren (2009) discusses the second transformation of democracy, he argues that society is re-confgured as it has become more pluralised, multi-venued and decentred. As people move around, they meet other people at different venues and new bonds appear. Consequently, the newly minted groups forge new demands of the government. Howard and Hussein (2013) suggest that the protesters in the fourth wave of democratisation came together through the sharing of common 282 G. DIMOVA grievances. Similar to them, Sperling (2009) fnds new avenues for com- ing together through globalised conscience and community of sympa- thy. The demos building exercise can also transpire through the bonds of love and family (Giddens 1991). World families are another example of building a common demos. World families comprise of long-distance relationships, marriages and families that stretch across countries, conti- nents and cultures (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2013). Common demos is also built through the countless individuals who frequently change their countries of living and have no permanent bonds but constantly forge new temporary connections (Bauman 2003).

Demand Is Active Because It Is Fragmented: Rosanvallon (2006) and Keane (2011) The third view why people have become more active and demanding is that they have splintered into different groups. The concepts of monitory and counter-democracy are the most salient proponents of this perspective. Both counter-democracy and monitory democracy view the diversity of demand as a positive characteristic. In most models of the crisis of democracy, diversity is considered a condition that debilitates democracy. Wolin (2010), for example, believes that the public is too passive because it is fragmented and Huntington et al. (1975) argue that public fragmentation makes some groups overly demanding of the state. This is not the case for Keane and Rosanvallon for whom diversifcation is a positive characteristic. Fragmentation in the models of the crisis of democracy is diametrically opposed to diversifcation in models of the transformation of democracy. For example, Keane (2013, 46) suggests that the diversity of networks of communication prevents the manipulation and bullying of the powerless “because the powerless readily fnd the networked communicative means to take their revenge on the powerful”. This is so because such decentralised networks function according to the logic of packet switching. If the information is blocked at any point within the latticed system, then it is diverted and rerouted automatically to its intended destination (Keane 2013, 45). Rosanvallon denotes the term public fragmentation with the notion “complex sovereignty”. He suggests that complex sovereignty has two advantages: it is more realistic because its nature corresponds to recent real-life development, and it is harder to be abused because it is unfath- omable. According to him, complex sovereignty allows for a more trustworthy expression of the political will, because it expands the political 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 283 will both functionally and materially. “Because of its ‘unlocalizable’ character, the people remains a power that no one can possess or pretend to incarnate by oneself” (Rosanvallon 2008, 203). The point is that a complex sovereignty cannot exist side by side with a monogenic version of the political. Therefore, the political has diversifed to accommodate the diverse interests of the public. According to Rosanvallon, the political is pluralised in three ways, powers of oversight or “surveillance”, forms of prevention and the testing of judgements (Rosanvallon 2008). This is exactly how demand drives supply in the monitory turn rather than the other way around.

Question Three: What Is the Relationship Between Supply and Demand? The third pivotal inquiry underlying models of democracy is whether the changes in democracy are driven by the people or by the opportunities that the people have to express their demand. In the framework of the present study, the question is framed in the following way: Are the changes in democracy caused by supply or demand? The models of the crisis of democracy resolve this dilemma in a different way than the models of the transformation of democracy. In the models of the crisis of democracy, the relationship between supply and demand plays out as a zero-sum game. The crisis of democracy is perceived either as caused by insuffcient supply or by a passive or an overly demanding public demand (Flinders and Dommett 2013). By contrast, in models of the transformation of democracy, demand and supply have a more amica- ble relationship. The dilemma is not so much whether demand or supply causes the transformation of democracy but whether the connection between supply and demand is one of correlation or causation. In some models, the expansion of supply activates demand, and in other models, the expansion of supply occurs concomitantly with the rise of active public demand. In other words, the chief contention is whether demand is determined by supply or whether demand is independent of supply. The majority of the models of the transformation of democracy purport that the expansion of supply infuences demand. The correlation between supply and demand is one of causation. For example, expanding supply through the deliberative turn leads to the creation of deliberative forums, which enlighten the public and make it more cognizant of the different points of view (Dryzek 2002). The causal relationship between demand and supply is especially pronounced in the models of 284 G. DIMOVA cosmopolitan and international democracy. The expansion of supply through the international turn leads to the creation of a world parliament, common language, common media, which in turn reconfgure and reconnect territorially dispersed groups (Archibugi 2008). Similarly, some specialists suggest that the expansion of supply through the participatory turn also activates and enlightens the public because it becomes more educated and conscious of social issues in the process of participation (Della Porta 2013). The type of argument where supply enhances demand is tantamount to making the education argument, i.e. the suggestion that participation in political life through various sorts of deliberation or other initiatives would make people more informed and more sympathetic. This argument has been challenged by Brennan (2016, 55) who suggests that “while it is of course possible in principle to structure civic and political activity in ways that tend to educate and enlighten people, we don’t seem to know how to do so, and most of the activities that my colleagues advocate tend to fail”. In big contrast to the models of the international, representative, deliberative and participatory democracy, the models of counter-democracy, monitory democracy, agonistic democracy and Madisonian democracy do not present the relationship between supply and demand as causal. The expansion of supply through the monitory turn, i.e. the creation of additional accountability forums, does not bring about a change in demand. Public demand is constructed and activated by the factors unrelated to supply, such as war, modernisation and mediatisation. At the same time, demand in monitory and counter-democracy is very different from demand in models of the crisis of democracy. Demand is not manufactured by media-savvy and charismatic leaders (Manin 1997, Urbinati 2014) or wealthy corporations (Crouch 2004). It is determined by factors beyond the scope of the elites. In fact, insofar as there is some causation effect between supply and demand, it would be in the opposite direction, where the diversifcation of public demand necessitates new forms of supply, not the other way around. Rosanvallon and Keane reverse the logic underlying models of transformation and crisis of democracy. For the proponents of the monitory turn, the central dilemma is that the sovereign has become more complex, less representable and more individualised, but the political has remained monist. They see the growing number of accountability arrangements as the solution to this imparity. The means of expression grow to accommodate the complexity of the people (Rosanvallon 2006, 11 MODELS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY … 285

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A accountability turn, 7–10, 54–56, Accountability 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 70, 71, accountability costs, 34, 36, 53, 65, 204, 205, 207–209, 211, 267 68–71, 80, 266 account-givers, 9, 60, 62, 160 accountability forums, 2, 6–9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 30, 31, 35, 36, 46–48, 53, 54, 59–62, 64, 65, C 68–70, 97, 98, 104, 107–110, Courts, 7, 13–15, 18, 45–47, 53, 54, 112, 114, 117, 124, 125, 128, 57, 58, 61, 66, 69, 70, 79, 80, 137, 139, 162, 165, 203, 204, 82, 98, 105, 107, 111, 112, 129, 206, 207, 209, 211, 212, 214, 137, 159, 162, 166, 168, 172, 216, 260, 265, 284 173, 179–182, 184–186, 188, accountability issues, 4, 14, 17, 40, 189, 191–194, 206, 207, 211, 46, 59, 64–66, 69, 84, 103, 214, 216, 217, 245, 260, 261, 109, 110, 113, 114, 117, 146, 266 180, 192, 210, 212, 214 accountability pyramid, 13, 14, 98, 104, 107–110, 139, 140, 161, D 162, 181, 182, 203, 217 Demand, 15, 16, 20, 21, 53, 66, 90, accountability revolution, 9, 54, 59– 158, 180, 200, 202, 205, 207, 61, 63, 64, 71, 125, 128, 209 208, 215–217, 227, 235, 240, accountability standards, 9, 64, 104, 241, 245–247, 249–251, 266, 209 281, 282, 285

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), 337 under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2020 G. Dimova, Democracy Beyond Elections, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25294-6 338 Index

fragmentation of demand, 11, 85, confdence gap, 17, 206, 212, 227, 87, 126, 127, 212 231, 232 public demand, 6, 7, 10, 11, 17, opportunity gap, 17, 206, 212, 30, 31, 37–43, 48, 49, 71, 235 79–81, 83, 89–91, 113, 124–126, 128, 184, 203, 204, 206, 210–212, 214, 215, 224, K 225, 237–239, 243, 249, 252, Keane, John, 3, 8, 10, 18, 20, 258–264, 268, 270, 273, 278, 33–35, 44, 62, 72, 85, 86, 110, 279, 283, 284 201–203, 208, 211, 257, 258, Democracy 260–265, 271, 282, 284 crisis of democracy, 3, 16, 17, 21, 53, 65, 108, 109, 199, 200, 202–208, 211–215, 217, M 223–225, 227, 228, 230–240, Media, 14–16, 18–20, 31, 38, 39, 42– 243, 244, 246–248, 257, 263, 47, 53, 62, 65, 69, 99, 101, 110, 278, 279, 282–284 111, 116, 120, 121, 126–129, managed democracy, 2, 104, 157, 137, 138, 150, 160, 164, 166, 171, 223, 238, 247 167, 170, 171, 188, 189, 194, “overload” democracy, 201, 202, 203, 210, 212, 214, 216, 217, 212, 225, 238 238, 242–245, 247, 249, 251, transformation of democracy, 9, 252, 266, 281, 284 16–18, 21, 104, 199, 200, media accusations, 1, 2, 4–7, 11–13, 202–208, 214, 215, 217, 257, 21, 31, 79, 98, 105, 112, 114, 258, 263, 265, 269, 278, 115, 117, 122–124, 140, 144, 280–283, 285 146, 147, 151, 156, 161, 162, 173, 181, 187, 191, 192, 214 E media age, 5–7, 29–37, 40, 42, 48, Elections 49, 187 demise of elections, 57 elections in transitional countries, 56, 190 P electoral paradigm, 54, 56, 57, 71 Parliaments, 13–15, 19, 45, 46, 54, 66, 151, 152, 202, 228, 230 demise of parliaments, 212 G parliament in germany, 4, 137, 139, Gaps, 44, 46, 54, 201, 202, 208, 216, 206, 212 225, 239, 240, 243, 248, 269, Party, 10, 14, 15, 35, 55, 58, 62, 276 66, 67, 69, 79, 84, 87, 107, Index 339

113, 121, 126–128, 137–139, S 142–144, 146–152, 157, 159, Sovereignty, 85, 88 165, 168, 169, 173, 184, 188, advocacy coalitions, 83 190–192, 204, 207, 211, 231, complex sovereignty, 10, 81, 82, 86, 234, 240, 242, 243, 246, 87, 282, 283 248–250, 269 Supply, 8, 16, 17, 20, 21, 71, 72, President 126, 128, 200–209, 214–217, presidentialisation, 4, 15, 18, 107, 224, 225, 227, 228, 230, 231, 155–166, 171–173 235–237, 239, 243, 245–252, Putin, Vladimir, 125, 158, 169, 171 258–261, 263–267, 269, 271, Yeltsin, Boris, 158, 168–171 273, 276–278, 283–285 Prosecutor, 4, 11, 13, 18, 19, 21, supply of accountability, 6, 7, 11, 47, 53, 54, 57, 61, 67, 69, 70, 30, 31, 36, 37, 44, 46, 47, 49, 98, 105–107, 109, 111, 123, 53, 64, 65, 70, 124 137, 140, 141, 147, 150, 156, 160, 162, 163, 165, 168–172, 179–181, 185–193, 206, 213, T 214, 217 Turns accountability turn, 7–10, 54–56, 58–61, 63, 64, 70, 71, 80, 204, R 205, 207–209, 211, 267 Representation agonistic turn, 71, 208, 258, 266, representative channel, 71, 209, 274 230, 269 deliberative turn, 9, 208, 258, 267, representative democracy, 46, 90, 271–273 248 epistemic turn, 261 representative institutions, 46, 205, international turn, 9, 71, 208, 273 270, 271 participatory turn, 10, 70, 71, 208, representative turn, 9, 60, 70, 71, 258, 271, 272, 277 209, 259, 261, 267–271 representative turn, 9, 60, 63, 70, Rosanvallon, Pierre, 3, 8, 10, 18, 71, 203, 208, 209, 211, 258, 20, 72, 81, 82, 85–89, 92, 103, 259, 261, 267–271, 273, 281 180, 186, 189, 201–203, 208, 211, 257, 258, 260–265, 271, 282–284