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Studying Substantive Author(s): Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro Source: PS: Political Science and , Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 9-17 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/420450 Accessed: 08-05-2020 04:54 UTC

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This content downloaded from 122.167.143.233 on Fri, 08 May 2020 04:54:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policy Making

Studying Substantive Democracy

Lawrence R. Jacobs, University of Minnesota Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University

Within the last decade, the vestigate the formulation of pressure from the mass public amount and quality of research on American and British health care rather than from above. the relationship between public policy. He concludes that per- Despite important differences in opinion and policy making has ceived public opinion prompted methodology and definitions, the taken a dramatic step forward. This officials to make criti- general finding-across a number of research contributes to the devel- cal decisions about agenda setting, different policies and time periods- opment of democratic theory and the relative influence of interest is that constituency opinion affects to the (re)organization of political groups, and the specific design of congressional behavior. (These science as a profession. Further new administrative arrangements. studies have differed in terms of development of opinion-policy re- The other approaches to studying their definitions of "representa- search, however, will require ad- the opinion-policy relationship rely tion" or "responsiveness," and dressing several critical limitations. on quantitative analysis and on their various adjustments to correct studying a wide range of policy is- for measurement error, functional sues. What is striking is that these form, and simultaneity bias). Varia- What Has Been Done very different research approaches tions in responsiveness have been traced to the distinct features of Statistical analyses and interpre- have led to very similar findings- tative case studies have reported sizeable statistical relationships be- policy areas and to the representa- tive's own characteristics and be- (both in the United States and tween measures of mass public Western Europe) a systematic rela-preferences and policy making. liefs (see Erikson 1978, 1981; Stone tionship between public opinion The most general approach com- 1982; and Page, Shapiro, Gronke, and decision making on a range pares of public "mood" with policy and Rosenberg 1984; Bartels 1991). issues-from national security tomakers' overall ideological posi- Another body of research has social security (for a review see tions (Stimson 1991; Stimson, examined the relationship between Shapiro and Jacobs 1989 and Sha- MacKuen, and Erikson 1993). A public opinion and the collective piro and Young 1989). These re- more focussed approach, which policy decisions or outputs of gov- sults have emerged from several was pioneered by Miller and Stokes ernmental bodies (e.g., Congress or distinct research designs. (1963), examines the "dyadic" the executive branch). In contrast The first relies on in-depth inves- district-by-district relationship be- to the studies of constituency influ- tigations of public opinion's impact tween a legislator's roll call votes ence on congressional , re- on formulating specific policies. and district opinion (Achen 1978; search on collective representation These case studies rely on closely Erikson 1978; Jackson and King has compared public preferences examining public opinion as gauged 1989; West 1987). A particularly and enacted policies. through polling results and policy interesting illustration of dyadic The general finding of this body decisions. Many of these studies analysis is McDonagh's (1992a, of research has been that the col- offer cross-national studies; they 1992b) comparison of state-level lective decisions of government discuss issues central to interna- referenda results at the district institutions have been strongly re- tional relations, American politics, level with the roll call votes of cor- lated to public opinion. These simi- and comparative politics (Jacobs responding congressional represen- lar results have emerged even 1992a, 1992b, and 1993; Risse- tatives during the Progressive Era. though researchers have used two Kappen 1991; Deese 1994 for es- McDonagh concludes that public quite distinct methodologies. One says by Shapiro and Page, Graham, opinion was a major determinant of approach has examined the consis- and Bennett; Jasper 1990; Eichen- congressional votes on Progressive tency between majority opinion on berg 1989; Russett 1990; Graham Era legislation in such areas as la- large numbers of specific issues and 1989; Kusnitz 1984; Burstein 1985; bor and anti-trust regulation, wom- enacted policy. For instance, Alan Sobel 1993; Mattes 1993). For in- en's suffrage, and prohibition. The Monroe (1979) found that, in more stance, Jacobs (1993) uses inter- implication is that expansion of na- than 60% of the issues he exam- views and archival evidence to in- tional institutions was caused by ined, government policy changes

March 1994 9

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were consistent with majority opin- surface that the foreign policy pref- liberal policies, while states with ion toward proposed policy erences of the public differs in im- conservative political structures changes. (For comparisons with portant respects from those of po- produced more conservative poli- other countries, see Coughlin 1980. litical leaders and elites (Dalton cies (see also their subsequent Brooks (1985, 1987) failed to find a 1988; Rielly 1987). work: Erikson et al., 1989 and majoritarian connection in his stud- The thrust of recent research, 1993). Moreover, Gibson's (1988, ies of Britain, France, Canada, and though, suggests that government 1989) intriguing studies of the Mc- the United States). policy on foreign and defense mat- Carthy period and the Vietnam War An alternative methodology has ters closely mirrors public opinion reveal complex variations in the measured the congruence between (Kusnitz 1984; Hartley and Russet opinion-policy relationship. During changes in opinion and changes in the McCarthy years, public opinion policy (Page and Shapiro 1983; was correlated with repressive leg- Devine 1970; and Weissberg 1976). islation (rather than serving as a Does opinion change and policy As it is, most break on intolerance, elites favored change covary? Page and Shapiro researchers carefully even further infringements on indi- (1983) used this approach to study vidual liberties). In the case of time sequencing and thereby to ex- avoid addressing the Vietnam protesters, though, repres- plore causal connections. Compar- sive state policies contradicted pub- ing changes in public preferences implications of lic wishes. The public's tolerance with changes in policy one year their findings for may have fostered conditions for later for several hundred cases of dissent, but it did not deter repres- opinion change, they found that democratic theory. sive responses by state . shifts in policy more frequently fol- lowed changes in opinion than vice versa. (A number of time series 1992; Eichenberg 1989; Monroe Why All the Fuss? studies have revealed the impact of 1979; Page and Shapiro 1983; opinion on a variety of policy ar- Hinckley 1992; Nincic 1992a; Sobel The study of public opinion's eas: Farkas, Page, Shapiro 1990; 1993). This has led to several im- relationship with policy making can Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Silver portant revisions of conventional be justified on two grounds. and Shapiro 1984; Bartels 1992; wisdom. The State Department, Hartley and Russett 1992; Ostrom which Cohen described as insulated Linking Research with and Marra 1986; Wlezian 1993; from popular pressure, has more Democratic Theory Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, 1993a, recently been found to be respon- 1993b). sive to (though not necessarily First, analysis of the opinion- Research on public opinion's im- more confident in) public opinion policy relationship connects re- pact on collective policy decisions (Powlick 1991). Moreover, analysis search with democratic theory has focussed on a variety of gov- of public opinion per se suggests (Held 1987; Marcus and Hanson ernmental bodies and policy areas. that the preferences of ordinary 1993; Pitkin 1967; Dahl 1989; Gins- Supreme Court decisions have been citizens are a stable and reliable berg 1986; Tulis 1987; Margolis and found to be consistent with major- basis for making foreign policy (see Mauser 1989). As it is, most re- ity opinion. The Court is appar- Russett 1990; Nincic 1992b; Hinck- searchers carefully avoid address- ently not the countermajoritarian ley 1992; Wittkopf 1990; Page and ing the implications of their findings institution that America's constitu- Shapiro 1992; Graham 1989). for democratic theory. The concern tional system expects (Marshall Policy making in American states is that normative considerations 1989; Barnum 1993, 1985). The col- has been the focus of especially must be kept separate from factual lective decisions of Congress have interesting and innovative work in analysis in order to prevent "val- also been congruent with public studying the collective decisions ofues" from contaminating the search opinion (Weissberg 1978; Hurley government institutions. (There is for "facts" (Marcus and Hanson 1982). also research on citizens' prefer- 1993). Evidence that the opinion-policy ences and local politics; see Clark The exploration of normative im- relationship holds up in both for- and Ferguson 1983; Shapiro and plications is also avoided because eign and domestic affairs is espe- Jacobs 1989). Based on clever use of the assumption that democracy cially surprising (for review, see of 48 polls and on a variety of po- exists as long as voters and elites Nincic 1992b). Until recently, the litical and policy indicators, adhere to "the rules of the game." making of foreign and defense pol- Wright, Erikson, and McGiver If the formal rules are followed, the icy was reported to be immune (1987) found that public opinion connection between the public's from public pressure. Thus, Co- exerted substantial influence at the wishes and government action is hen's (1973) report that State De- state level from 1976-1982. Political considered irrelevant. Implicit here partment officials are relatively un- structures facilitated this opinion- is a formal view of democracy. interested in public opinion has policy relationship: states charac- What matters at the most basic been widely accepted for decades. terized by liberal elections, legisla- level is that elected officials regu- Moreover, evidence continues to tures, and executives delivered larly face reelection or removal at

10 PS: Political Science & Politics

This content downloaded from 122.167.143.233 on Fri, 08 May 2020 04:54:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Studying Substantive Democracy the end of their term. The expecta- cal science. The study of politics glected, for example, have been tion is that the fear of removal will has become compartmentalized not questions about the impact of citi- motivate representatives to act re- only into separate, self-contained zens' preferences on their govern- sponsibly and respond to the pub- "fields"-American politics, com- ment, and the tension between ex- lic's desires. parative politics, international rela- panded government and the The problem with this formalistic tions, and political theory-but also operation of . All conception of democracy is that it into "subfields" within each area. too often, political science, espe- discourages research on the demo- In the field of American politics, cially American politics, has tended cratic substance of government ac- for instance, this trend has led to to be characterized by a fascination tivity between elections. As long ascreating separate subfields on the with capillaries rather than arteries. elected officials meet formal re- presidency, Congress, and public In the pursuit of useful descriptive quirements, then their conduct is opinion. detail, researchers have neglected assumed to be democratic and is The beneficial result of this ten- the broader meaning of public pol- not evaluated in terms of its actual dency in political science and in icy and institutions. representativeness (Schumpeter American politics, in particular, has Opinion-policy research chal- 1950). In a sense, democracy be- been specialized empirical investi- lenges the prevailing preoccupation gins and ends with the act of voting. gations. The problem, though, is with uniqueness by addressing gen- Opinion-policy research offers a that professional specialization has eral, enduring questions about the powerful corrective to this formal- been accompanied by fragmenta- substance of democracy between istic treatment of democracy; it tion. An earlier (and less extreme) elections. It offers a corrective to adopts a more substantive theory form of fragmentation prevented the excessive preoccupation with of democracy based on the nature scholars from articulating a com- particularism. Moreover, opinion- or content of actual government prehensive view of the purpose and policy research crosses (out of ne- actions (Pitkin 1967). The investiga- direction of political scholarship as cessity) professional boundaries- tion of whether the substantive ac- a whole. Today, the study of poli- linking the study of mass opinion tivity of government corresponds and behavior with that of institu- with the public's wishes is pre- tions and policy making. mised on a particular normative stance: democracy is expected to Today, the study of be evident between elections (rath- Some Unresolved Issues er than being isolated to the formal politics has reached exercise of casting a ballot). The Opinion-policy research-like a stage of hyper- other areas of research-faces sev- explicit standard for evaluating the content or substance of government fragmentation. It is eral limitations. Three weaknesses, actions is whether they respond to in particular, deserve high priority the public's wishes. When policies difficult to characterize in future research. are habitually at odds with public even the defining theme opinion, this is considered undemo- Specifying Opinion's Impact cratic; it is evidence that represen- of the separate fields. on Policy tatives are acting on their own in pursuit of their desired goals. Of There are significant ambiguities course, occasional conflicts be- tics has reached a stage of hyper- in how to interpret evidence that tween government actions and pub- fragmentation. It is difficult to char- public opinion is correlated sub- lic preferences may well be legiti- acterize even the defining theme of stantially with policy. To begin mate if elected representatives can the separate fields. with, the degree of policy makers' adequately account for their behav- Professional fragmentation and, responsiveness to public opinion is ior in terms of voters' interests. specifically, the separation of pub- not always clear. Should respon- For instance, Cook and Barrett lic opinion research from the study siveness be interpreted as evidence (1992) suggest that members of of politics has produced theoretical that public opinion controls policy Congress have reasonably dis- impoverishment. As each subfield makers to the point of forcing them counted public opinion when deal- has become a type of fiefdom with to flip flop on issues? The problem ing with the complex issues associ- its separate, independent sets of with this strong claim is that public ated with Social Security's concepts and research questions, preferences rarely exist at a high actuarial projections. political scientists have focused on level of specificity; their guide for developing narrow theories that policy makers is broad. emphasize collecting specific at- Alternatively, should evidence of tributes and characteristics. The The Cross-Fertilization of responsiveness be interpreted to Political Science uniqueness of each individual set- mean that policy makers make tac- ting is emphasized over its similari- tical adjustments? This more lim- The second contribution of the ties. ited (but nonetheless important) opinion-policy research is to the What is missing are the enduring interpretation suggests that public professional development of politi- questions central to politics. Ne- opinion exerts a more complicated

March 1994 11

This content downloaded from 122.167.143.233 on Fri, 08 May 2020 04:54:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Symposium range of influences. It might affect, institutions and processes that link to detailed policy making, on the for instance, the strength of politi- opinion and policy-political par- one hand, and, on the other, as- cians' positions (i.e., upgrading the ties, elections, or governmental in- suming that public opinion is sim- explicitness of their statements), stitutions for tracking and influenc- ply ratified in government decisions the time devoted to discussing an ing public opinion (Jacobs 1992b). (Jacobs 1993). issue, and their judgment on letting What are the actual linkages that a policy come up for an authorita- account for statistical associations tive discussion and decision (e.g., between public opinion and poli- whether to allow a bill to be re- cies? Finally, additional research is Making the Opinion-Relationship ported out of a congressional com- also needed regarding the way in Dynamic and Interactive mittee for a vote by the full cham- which public preferences are incor- A second limitation is that most ber). In this interpretation, the porated in policy makers' decisions research has treated the opinion- influence of public opinion coexists concerning the setting of agendas policy relationship as unidirection- with substantial discretion by pol- as well as formulating and enacting al-generally focussing on public icy makers; for instance, they can specific policies. This involves link- opinion's effect on policy makers. duck a vote on a bill or rewrite the ing the analysis of public opinion The problem is that the public's bill before it reaches the point of awith investigations of bargaining impact on policy making is part of roll call vote. networks and the development of a reciprocal or interactive process Opinion-policy research also government capacity (e.g., Katzen- in which politicians and other ac- raises questions about the nature of tors in the political process (like public opinion's impact on govern- the media) lead, persuade, or ma- ment. Clearly, the role of public nipulate the public. Responsive- opinion is different from, say, that Future research will need ness, then, may coexist with at- of pressure groups. Because of the to concentrate on the amorphous or diffuse quality of tempts by politicians or the media public opinion, it cannot influence to lead or direct public opinion. uncharted territory Indeed, there is substantial evi- policy makers through the kind of tangible pressure that an interest between treating public dence now that public opinion is influenced by the messages and in- group exerts-whether it is per- opinion as irrelevant to sonal, organizational, or financial. terpretations communicated To understand the nature of pub- detailed policy making, through the mass media. The me- lic opinion's impact, analysis must dia's impact extends beyond simply be grounded in political and institu- on the one hand, and, on agenda-setting (Page, Shapiro, tional processes. We need more the other, assuming that Dempsey 1987; Iyengar 1991; Bar- explorations of the political calcula- tels 1993; Iyengar and Kinder tions and institutional develop- public opinion is simply 1987). Because politicians and ments associated with public opin- other elites can influence public ion's role in policy making. ratified in government opinion through the media's cover- Opinion-policy research can benefit decisions (Jacobs 1993). age of their speeches and actions, from drawing on existing studies of it is critical to study the opinion- the presidency and Congress, policy relationship as a dynamic which suggest that responsiveness stein 1978; Atkinson and Coleman and interactive one. For instance, should be linked to politicians' at- 1989; Skowronek 1982; Skocpol our analyses (1994, 1993b) of John tempts to maximize scarce political 1992). Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson re- resources. For instance, presiden- In short, what needs to be ana- veal an inverse temporal relation- tial selection of popular issues for ship between their policy state- lyzed is how public opinion is re- advocacy is no doubt motivated by ments and private opinion poll fracted through organizational dy- a concern to strengthen the White results. The relationships changed namics and political calculations. House's influence in Congress. In with the electoral cycle and politi- The point of opinion-policy analysis particular, presidential promotion cal conditions. The effect of opin- of popular issues may be expected should be to assign public opinion ion on presidential position-taking both to boost the president's ap- its proper place in institutional was greatest during election cam- proval rating, which will enhance analysis. The outcome of this re- paigns and declined in subsequent his leeway in Congress, and to at- search, though, should not be to years. In contrast, the impact of tract congressional attention and invert the prevailing approach to Johnson's policy statements on support because members will want policy making, replacing institu- public opinion (leadership) was to avoid opposition to popular pol- tional analysis at one extreme with lowest in 1964 and then increased icy positions (Neustadt 1980; Ed- an apolitical interpretation of public as election pressures eased. The wards 1989; Peterson 1990). opinion's impact at another. Future point, then, is that analysis of the Investigating the nature of public research will need to concentrate public's influence on policy makers opinion's impact on policy making on the uncharted territory between needs to consider reciprocal effects also involves exploring the specific treating public opinion as irrelevant (i.e., influences on public opinion)

12 PS: Political Science & Politics

This content downloaded from 122.167.143.233 on Fri, 08 May 2020 04:54:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Studying Substantive Democracy

and to treat the opinion-policy rela- the way Americans' define their bureaucrats recognized by the tionship as interactive. preferences and interests. For in- 1930s that they had to weigh exist- To focus especially on what in- stance, public opinion toward the ing public attitudes. Efforts to fluences public opinion will require Social Security program can only shape public opinion had a "recoil two adjustments-one methodologi- be understood in the context of effect" that sensitized elites to pub- cal and the other conceptual. Time American institutions and their his- lic opinion in such a way that their series analysis is the best statistical torical development-the 1935 So- actions were informed and driven approach for disentangling recipro- cial Security Act's separation of by existing public preferences and cal relationships and, specifically, Social Insurance from assistance to concerns. By the post-war period, examining the reverse effect-of the poor and the absence of mas- then, policy makers were fully policy on public opinion. This ap- sive working-class social welfare committed to developing institu- proach makes it possible to investi- organizations like Britain's Friendly tional mechanisms linking them gate causal connections by compar- Societies (e.g., Jacobs 1993, ch.3). with the mass public that involved ing the temporal ordering of Political processes and institutions both tracking and shaping public variables-whether a change in do not simply act as transmission opinion (Jacobs 1992b and 1993, public opinion occurs after (leader- belts conveying public preferences. ch. 2). ship) or before (responsiveness) a Rather, they condition public opin- The development and use of such change in policy (see for further ion-structuring the way individu- a public opinion apparatus suggests discussion Page and Shapiro 1983 als define what is rational and what a qualitative change in the nature and Jacobs and Shapiro 1993b). In their preferences should be (Hall of politics. National politicians de- addition to investigating the tempo- 1986). veloped the capacity to build politi- ral ordering of change, time series The implication of understanding cal support for policy battles by analysis is conducive to multivari- the opinion-policy relationship as a mobilizing public opinion (and not ate studies and to modelling of re- reciprocal one is that mass opinion ciprocal relationships. Unfortu- and behavior should not be studied political behavior). As Lowi (1985) has observed, the "president must nately, time series analysis of the in isolation from elite politics. Pub- ... mobilize the electorate in order opinion-policy relationship has lic opinion exists neither apart from been limited because appropriate nor prior to institutions; the public to unify the elite" (p. 165). Presi- data have been unavailable (Sha- does not evaluate or pressure pas- dents mobilize public support for piro and Page 1992) and because sive political entities from some themselves and their policies in or- der to offset the constraints on techniques for piecing together long distant, outside vantage point. opinion series are only now being Rather, political structures help their office and to win policy bat- developed (Stimson 1991, 1993). construct public beliefs, attitudes, tles in Washington. Studying the influences on public and preferences. opinion also requires a conceptual Understanding the opinion-policy adjustment-the recognition that relationship as involving complex Bringing History Back In public opinion does not exist out- interactions offers an important side of, or apart from, institutional perspective on American political Historical research offers ample- and political processes. The state- development. In particular, it helps though still not fully exploited-- ments and actions of political elites to explain the transformation of opportunities for exploring the (and the media's portrayal and in- American politics away from elite opinion-policy relationship. In par- terpretation of them) all help to al- efforts to mobilize the mass public ticular, archival records supply in- ter and direct individual ambiva- in elections and social movements tensive, in-depth evidence to ex- lences. In an extreme case, for (Ginsberg 1986; Ginsberg and plain a politician's intentions and example, Lyndon Johnson's strong Shefter 1990; Rosenstone and calculations and to explore, and extensive statements during Hansen 1993). During the twentieth through a few specific policies, 1965 about events in Vietnam and century, the behavioral politics as- whether and why public opinion American military involvement in sociated with mass mobilization affects decision making. For in- Southeast Asia initially monopo- was replaced by a new kind of atti- stance, in our analysis of Kennedy lized public debate and presented tudinal politics. This transformation and Johnson we used archival distorted information to the public. was reflected in the development of records and interviews to examine The result was that the president a public opinion apparatus. The political strategy and found a deter- raised the salience of this issue and initial aim in building this apparatus mined effort to lead public opinion helped form public attitudes toward at the turn of the century was uni- in 1965 and 1966. We combined the administration's policies (Ja- directional-to develop the capac- this "inside" perspective with sta- cobs and Shapiro 1993; Page and ity to conduct public relations cam- tistical analysis, which verified that Shapiro 1992, ch.6,9). paigns that shaped public the White House's leadership strat- The influence of politics on pub- preferences. But, political struggles egy was evident across a number of lic opinion is not simply limited to and institutional limitations se- policy areas and estimated the ex- short-term leadership efforts; the verely constrained elites' efforts to tent to which the White House was everyday organization of political manipulate public opinion. To influ- able to shape public opinion: it had institutions and processes influence ence public opinion, politicians and a noticeable impact on Americans'

March 1994 13

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FIGURE 1 Democracy and Leadership.

LOW HIGH Bureaucratic Democratic Responsiveness LOW Rule a) opinion - > leader: weak a) opinion - > leader: strong b) opinion <- leader: weak b) opinion <- leader: weak DIRECTION HIGH Charismatic Responsive Leadership Direction a) opinion - > leader: weak a) opinion - > leader: strong b) opinion <- leader: strong b) opinion <- leader: strong

policy goals but fell far short of policy makers' perception of them), role of citizens is restricted to de- White House expectations. her theoretical discussions do not ciding the deciders. Instead of re- Historical records also offer a incorporate public opinion. sponding to the public's policy wealth of data for statistical analy- In short, opinion-policy research preferences and caving into sheer ses. McDonagh's use of state refer- could benefit from methodological "quantity rule," these leaders deci- enda to study constituency influ- pluralism-the mixing of quantita- sively exercise their superior skill ences on members of Congress tive methods with interpretative and knowledge in order to refine during the Progressive Era is a case and historical approaches. Because and enlarge their constituents' in point. In addition, historical statistical analysis cannot directly wishes and to mobilize the public records offer evidence that-while disentangle the processes that pro- behind their policies. Without di- not subject to quantitative analysis-- duce policies, historical records rection, society would be ungov- contribute to opinion-policy re- and research techniques offer a ernable. Anarchy and over-respon- search. For instance, social histori- valuable tool for penetrating the siveness are the unavoidable ans have used a range of sources-- institutional black box of policy products of allowing individuals from public records (including making. and small groups to pursue their prison and death records) to per- particularistic and divergent inter- sonal diaries-to study the attitudes Returning to Democratic Theory ests (Weber 1968; Sartori 1987). and practices of ordinary people. According to democratic respon- This large literature provides a use- Opinion-policy studies depart siveness, the representative serves ful historical context for interpret- from much contemporary research as responsive implementer, who ing polling results (Jacobs 1993, because they adopt a substantive defers to (rather than overrides) the ch. 3; Jacobs and Shapiro 1989). theory of democracy: representa- public's judgments about their own In spite of its potential contribu- tion must be apparent in the nature interests. Strong, sustained public tions, historical research on institu- or content of government action tions and political development has between elections (Pitkin 1967). preferences, then, are expected to not explicitly incorporated public Despite this normative position, be an autonomous force in shaping opinion in its theoretical interpreta- opinion-policy research leaves im- policy-making agendas and deter- tions. For instance, Theda portant questions open, unad- mining government decisions. Skocpol's impressive (and award- dressed, or muddled. This limita- Expectations of charismatic di- winning) new book, Protecting Sol- tion is largely the result of rection and democratic responsive- diers and Mothers (1992), explores insufficient analysis-among a ness, however, are premised on the the role of voluntary women's or- range of political observers-of the assumption that responsiveness and ganizations in building support for role of opinion leadership in a lib- direction are inversely related. The measures aimed at improving the eral democracy. We conclude by problem is that this standard analy- health and living conditions of outlining--quite briefly-in Figure 1 sis fails to specify adequately the women and children. Because several divergent ways in which complex nature of leadership in a women were disenfranchised, leadership and responsiveness liberal democracy. Two additional women's political organizations might be combined in liberal de- (and previously neglected) relation- focussed on rallying public opinion. mocracies. ships suggest that bureaucratic rule Our concern is that while Skocpol's Leaders exercise charismatic di- and responsive leadership can also substantive chapters are full of ref- rection by pursuing their own con- develop. The former suggests the erences to activists' concern with victions and by being responsible coexistence of low direction and influencing public attitudes (and for (rather than to) the public. The low responsiveness, while the latter

14 PS: Political Science & Politics

This content downloaded from 122.167.143.233 on Fri, 08 May 2020 04:54:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Studying Substantive Democracy anticipates a high degree of each Toward Taxes and Spending in Industri- Note (see Figure 1). alized Societies. Berkeley: International Democratic and charismatic tra- Studies, University of California. *We have benefitted from research grants Dahl, Robert. 1989. Democracy and Its Crit- ditions share the assumption that from the University of Minnesota McKnight- ics. New Haven: Yale University Press. administrators in large government Land Grant Professorship and the National Dalton, Russell J. 1988. Citizen Politics in Science Foundation (SES-9122440). We bureaucracies are neutral special- Western . Chatham, NJ: thank Lisa Disch, Sunita Parikh, W. Phillips Chatham House Publishers, Inc. ists who implement the goals estab- Shively, and Scott Spitzer for helpful discus- Deese, David. 1994. The New Politics of lished by their masters-whether sions on related work. The paper's interpre- tations and conclusions are our own. American Foreign Policy New York: St. these are the public or responsible Martin's Press. elected officeholders. In stark con- Devine, Donald J. 1970. The Attentive Pub- trast, Max Weber (1968) warned lic: Polyarchical Democracy. Chicago: that bureaucratic development Rand McNally. References Edwards, George III. 1989. At the Margins: tends to create government in Presidential Leadership of Congress. which rule by (rather than simply Achen, Christopher. 1978. "Measuring Rep- New Haven: Yale University Press. through) administrators predomi- resentation." American Journal of Politi- Eichenberg, Richard C. 1989. Public Opin- nates. Politicians' failure to control cal Science. 22 (August):475-510. ion and National Security in Western Aldrich, John H., John Sullivan, and Eu- Europe. 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"Political Intoler- institutional and personal resource- tion in the Anglo-American Polities: A ance and Political Repression During the Quantification of Inconsistency Between McCarthy Red Scare." American Politi- fulness of top elected officials. This Mass Public Opinion and Public Policy." cal Science Review 82:511-29. form of democratic leadership sug- The Westem Political Science Quarterly Gibson, James L. 1989. "The Policy Conse- gests that responsiveness and direc- 38 (June):250-61. quences of Political Intolerance: Political tion are not mutually exclusive but . 1987. "The Opinion-Policy Nexus in Repression During the Vietnam War France: Do Institutions and Ideology Era." Journal of Politics 51:13-35. coexist in a reinforcing fashion. Make a Difference?" The Journal of Pol- Ginsberg, Benjamin. 1986. The Captive Pub- Representatives use their resources itics 49 (May):465-80. lic: How Mass Opinion Promotes State to formulate a comprehensive and Burstein, Paul. 1985. 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"Public Opinion and the Common De- Strategies of Presidential Leadership. tions in Presidential Elections. Chicago: fense: Who Governs Military Spending in Second edition. Washington, D.C.: Con- University of Chicago Press. the United States?" American Political gressional Quarterly Press. Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. Science Review 86 (December):905-15. Kusnitz, Leonard A. 1984. Public Opinion 1983. "Effects of Public Opinion on Poli- Hinckley, Ronald H. 1992. People, Polls, and Foreign Policy: America's China cy." American Political Science Review and Policymakers: American Public Policy, 1949-1979. Westport, CT: Green- 77 (March): 175-190. Opinion and National Security. New wood Press. . 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty York: Lexington Books. Lowi, Theordore J. 1979. The End of Liber- Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Hurley, Patricia A. 1982. "Collective Repre- alism (2nd Edition). New York: W.W. Preferences. Chicago: University of Chi- sentation Reappraised." 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Cam-

16 PS: Political Science & Politics

This content downloaded from 122.167.143.233 on Fri, 08 May 2020 04:54:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The End of the Cold War

bridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard and Popular Government. Englewood the Midwest Political Science Associa- University Press. Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. tion, Chicago. April 9-11. Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. Building a New --. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic Repre- Wright, Gerald C., Robert S. Erikson, and American State: The Expansion of Na- sentation in Congress." American Politi- John P. McIver. 1987. "Public Opinion tional Administrative Capacities, 1877- cal Science Review 72:535-47. and Policy in the American 1920. New York: Cambridge University West, Darrell M. 1987. Congress and Eco- States." American Journal of Political Press. nomic Policymaking. Pittsburgh: Univer- Science 31:980-1001. Sobel, Richard, ed. 1993. Public Opinion in sity of Pittsburgh Press. U.S. Foreign Policy. Boston: Roman & Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The Welfare Littlefield. State and Equality. Berkeley: University Stimson, James A. 1991. Public Opinion in of California Press. About the Authors America: Moods, Swings, and Cycles. Wilson, Woodrow. 1952. Leaders of Men, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. ed. T. Motter. Princeton: Princeton Uni- Laurence W. Jacobs is assistant professor of Stimson, James, Michael MacKuen, and versity Press. political science at the University of Minne- Robert Erikson. 1993. "Dynamic Repre- . 1925. Congressional Government: A sota and is author of The Health of Nations: sentation." University of Minnesota. Study in American Politics. Boston: Public Opinion and the Making of American Photocopy. Houghton Mifflin Co. and British Health Policy (Cornell 1993). Stone, Walter J. 1982. "Electoral Change 1908. Constitutional Government in Robert Y. Shapiro is associate professor of and Policy Representation in Congress: the United States. New York: Columbia political science at Columbia University, Domestic Welfare Issues from 1956- University Press. coauthor of The Rational Public: Fifty Years 1972." British Journal of Political Sci- Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1990. Faces of Interna- of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences ence 12:95-115. tionalism: Public Opinion and American (Chicago 1992), and coeditor of Research in Tulis, Jeffrey. 1987. The Rhetorical Presi- Foreign Policy. Durham, NC: Duke Uni- Micropolitics: New Directions in Political dency. Princeton: Princeton University versity Press. Psychology, vol. 4 (JAI, 1994). Jacobs and Press. Wlezien, Christopher. 1993. "From Outputs Shapiro are currently working on a book Weber, Max. 1968. Economy and Society. to Inputs: The Feedback of Budgetary about presidents' relationship with public 3 vols. New York: Bedminster Press. Policy on Public Preferences for Spend- opinion since John F. Kennedy's administra- Weissberg, Robert. 1976. Public Opinion ing." Presented at the Annual Meeting of tion.

The End of the Cold War, Attitude Change, and the Politics of Defense Spending

Bruce Russett, Thomas Hartley, and Shoon Murray, Yale University

Throughout the Cold War, United quently were predictable from a Attitude Change and Stability States national security policy, and reasonably coherent set of attitudes The end of the Cold War offers a the public attitudes that supported toward domestic policy. rare opportunity to explore the it, seemed anchored in the great The end of the Cold War brought identity and coherence of the basic ideology and power rivalry with the remarkable changes in both policy organizing principles around which Soviet Union. A basic component and attitudes. The major anchoring people's foreign policy preferences of that policy, the ups and downs point for the rivalry-the Soviet form. For example, we can now of American military spending, was Union itself-has ceased to exist, test whether some beliefs (such as largely predictable by changes in and Russia no longer poses the the level of Soviet military spend- people's images about the nature of same level or kind of military ing and by public preferences, as the Soviet Union) had served to threat. Rationales for U.S. military expressed in opinion surveys, for organize or constrain other beliefs; increases or decreases in American spending, for the use of military investigate the rationality of ordi- force abroad, and for international military spending. Public beliefs nary citizens (by observing whether about the appropriate level of mili- cooperation have likewise changed. people adjusted their policy prefer- tary spending, moreover, appeared But in some respects they have not ences to fit a changed international firmly rooted in a larger set of for- changed so greatly. These historic environment); and explore how eign policy beliefs. Attitudes to- events present us with an extraor- deeply foreign events-even occur- ward the Soviet Union, toward the dinary opportunity to study the rences as dramatic as the demoli- circumstances justifying the use of structure of Americans' foreign pol- tion of the Berlin Wall or the disin- military force internationally, and icy beliefs and the dynamics of atti- tegration of the Soviet Union---can toward cooperating with other tude change. They also provide a affect people's basic postures to- countries were all part of a stable chance to speculate about how ward international affairs. and well-defined system of beliefs. changed and stable attitudes may A few scholars took advantage of In turn, foreign policy attitudes fre- affect national security policy. these research opportunities. For

March 1994 17

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