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LundUniversity SVT004 DepartmentofPoliticalScience Autumn2004 Supervisor:MatsSjölin DefiningintheEuropeanUnion Assessingtheprocedureandthesubstance JohannaSeverinsson Abstract Theaimofmyessayistolookattheorganizationofdemocracyataninternational level,herewithintheEuropeanUnion.Bylookingatthedemocraticorganisationof the European Constitutional draft and the relation between procedural and substantive directives of democracy therein I am able to see what political behaviour the Constitution expresses in turns of creating a “ for the people” or a “government by the people”. By using historical, empirical and internationalinstitutionalismasatheoreticalframeworkIalsosetouttoanalysethe impact democratic conditions have had on the relation between substantive and proceduraldirectivesintheEuropeanConstitutionaldraft.Myfindingswherethat theproceduraldirectivesareflexibleandthesubstantivedirectivesnotspecifiedbut left for interpretation and adjustments to conditions and traditions inthe member states.Ialsofoundthattheconstitutionsetouttomeetsereraldemocraticproblems describedwithincontemporarydemocraticthinkingi.e.“thepowertoact”.Inorder tosalvecontemporarydemocraticproblemsthereisaneedtolookattherelation betweensubstantiveandproceduralapproachestodemocracy. Keywords:EuropeanUnion,Proceduraldemocracy,Substantivedemocracy, Democraticconditions,NewInstitutionslism.

1 TableofContent

1.INTRODUCTION ______4

1.2MotiveforChoiceofSubject ______5

1.2ThePurposeandaPresentationoftheResearchQuestions ______5

1.3DefinitionofKeyConcepts ______6

1.4Theoreticalapproach ______6

1.5Earlierresearch ______9

1.6MethodologyandMaterial ______10

1.7Delimitation ______12

1.8Disposition ______12

2.DEFININGDEMOCRACY ______13

2.1AproceduralapproachtoDemocracy______13

2.2AsubstantiveapproachtoDemocracy ______14

2.3TheRelationbetweenSubstantiveandProceduralapproachestoDemocracy ____16

3.DEMOCRATICCONDITIONSWITHINCONTEMPORARYPOLITICAL ORGANIZATIONINTHEEUROPEANUNION ______18

3.1TheProcedureofDemocracyisnoLongerConsideredtobeStable ______18

3.2GlobalProcesseshaveDislocatedthePoliticalSubstance______20

4.THEEUROPEANCONSTITUTIONALDRAFT ______21

4.1TheOriginandDevelopmentoftheConstitutionDraft ______21

4.2TheDemocraticBasesoftheUnion ______22 4.2.1ProceduralapproachestoDemocracyintheConstitutionDraft ______22 4.2.1.1ThegeneralprinciplesofEUlaw ______22 4.2.1.2Whogoverns?Andtheirproceduraldirectives ______24 4.2.1.3Howarethendecisionsmade? ______25 4.2.2SubstantiveapproachestoDemocracyinTheConstitutionaldraft ______27

2 4.3DiscussionaboutContemporaryDemocraticConditionsinfluenceontheEuropean ConstitutionsDemocraticOrganization ______29

5.CONCLUSIONS ______31 REFERENCES

3 1.Introduction Thetheoryandideaofdemocracychangesconstantly.Whatdemocracyisandhow it should be organised varies with different outlooks of life and in different democratictheories.(Dahl2003p.13pp)Thetheoryandideaofdemocracyare seen as products of different societies in a historical context responding to conditions, problems and possibilities. A review and renewal of democracy take place constantly. (Olsson 1999 p. 20pp) Today key assumptions of democratic thinkingandpracticearebeingquestioned.Arethinkingaboutthenature,formand content of democratic is taken place and the nation state as the suitable democraticarenaischallenged.(Held1995:ixpp) HansAgne(2002)writesthatoneofthegreatpoliticalchallengestodayisto develop forms [to be read as arrangements ] for democratic decision-making that will work on an international level, to develop democratic forms [to be read as arrangements ]thatformulatesaccordingtospecificpoliticalcontexts.Forinstance, representativedemocracywasdevelopedwithinthepoliticalcontextofthenation stateandreferredtothedemocraticpossibilitiesandlimitationsofthenationstate. Hefindsthattodaythereisaneedtounderstanddemocracyinaninternationalised world.(Agne ISOU2002:82,p.59)TheEuropeanUnion(EU)isan exampleof democracy spread to an international level and it is seen as the most internationalised organisation in history. Its development has transformed the nationalistic democratic form [to be read as arrangements ] as the citizens of the Union can, and do invoke EU law against other individuals and their national .(March,Olsen1998p.967p)TodayEUismovingtowardsapplying aEuropeanconstitution,inpurposetomakeEUmoredemocratic,transparentand effective. (Presentation to citizens 2004 p.5) A problem that arises here is: what kindofdemocracyistheconstitutionstrivingfor? Whilestudyingtheorganisationofdemocraticdecision-making,oneendupin oneoftheoldestdemocraticdebatewheretoputtheemphasis;onsubstantiveor procedural aspects of democracy. Is it enough that democracy is defined as a procedure(i.e.thatthedecision-makingprocessisdesignedinaspecialway,for examplethatdecisionsaremadeaftertheprincipleofmajority)ordoesitneedto amplify a substance, a result (i.e. indicate what a democratic decision should contain)?(Lundquist1991p.64)Thisconflictconcernsthestatusoftheprinciples of democracy: should they be procedural or substantive? Between these two aspectsofdemocracythereisaconflict.Forexample:Procedures(suchasmajority rule) can produce unjust outcomes (such as discrimination against minorities). Substance principles in a democracy on the other hand can limit the democratic decision-making process (by implying a certain result that must be sustained). (Janda(ed)1995p.39p)Differentdemocraticforms [tobereadasarrangements ] put the emphasis differently on the dimension between procedure andsubstance.

4 Where does EU end up between the two democratic extremes in the capacity of beinganinternationaldemocracy? 1.2MotiveforChoiceofSubject

Ifeelthatthestudyofpolicyhasalargerelevancefortheunderstandingoftoday’s policy making and, therefore, the limits and possibilities of democracy. By studying the European Constitutional draft and, the decision-making process and the content within I can reach an understanding of the future of democracy in Europe. I find the relation between substantive and procedural aspects of democracy to be intriguing, because it will give an indicator on if we will have “governmentforthepeople”or“governmentbythepeople”. In the essay I will be looking at what defines a procedural and substantive approachtodemocracyandlooknotonlyhowtheycanbeinterrelatedbutalsohow theycanconflict.Bybreakingdowntheinherentdemocraticstructureasdescribed intheconstitutionaldraftIwillbeabletoseewheretheemphasisisputbetween substantive and procedural aspects of democracy. By relating this emphasis to democratictermsandcircumstancesforpoliticalorganizationinEuropeIcanget an understanding of the influence of the democratic limits and possibilities in contemporarydemocraticorganization. 1.2 The Purpose and a Presentation of the Research Questions Themainpurposeofmy essayistolookattheorganizationofdemocracyatan internationallevel,herewithintheEuropeanUnion.Thiswillgivemeanindicator for how democracy can be organized on an international level. As a subsequent purpose I would like to see if contemporary democratic conditions have had an influenceontheorganizationofdemocracyattheEuropeanlevel. InordertoachievemypurposeIwillexaminefollowingresearchquestions: - HowisdemocracyorganizedwithintheEuropeanConstitutionaldraftinterms ofputtingtheemphasisonsubstantiveandproceduraldirectives? - Canweseeaconnectionbetweencontemporarydemocraticconditionspresent withintheEuropeanUnionandwhattherelationlookslikeintheconstitutional draft and between democracy’s emphases on procedural or substantive directive? InordertoclarifymypurposeandresearchquestionsIwillbelowdefinesomekey concepts. Thereafter I will describe the theoretical approach I will be having throughouttheresearch.Afterthatcomesadescriptionofearlierresearchthathas

5 beenconductedwithintheareasIamstudying.Thiswillthereafterbefollowedby adiscussionofthemethodologyandthematerialIcametouse. 1.3DefinitionofKeyConcepts

AconstitutionisatextthatcontainsthefundamentalrulesofaStateoragroupof States. The rules answer several questions. How is the division of powers arranged? How do the institutions work?Whatmeans can be used to implement policies?Whatvaluesareupheld?Whatarethe citizen’sfundamental rights?(A constitutionforEurope2004p.3) The European Union is a supranational organization of 25 European states (sinceMay2004),holdingapproximately453millioncitizens.Thememberstates co-operate on certain political and economical issues giving away parts of their sovereigntytotheUnion.Ithasbeendescribedasaninternationalorganizationand asaconfederationbutshouldratherbeseenasauniquecharacter.Thepurposeof theUnion,asitwascreatedbysixmemberstatesin1952,wastorebuildEurope after the Second World War and to eliminate the possibility for another war to occur.ItstartedasaEuropeanCoalandSteelCommunityin1952followedbya commonmarketwithfeemobilityconcerningproducts,capital,servicesandpeople in1958.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EU) Togiveadefinitionoftheconceptdemocracywouldbetoexpressanormative andideologicalstandpointanditwouldunderminethepurposeoftheessay.The word democracy originates from the Greek word demos meaning people and the word kratos meaningpower,rule.(Held1999p.13)Whoarethepeople?Whatis rule? Who rule? And how should they rule?, These are questions that will be answereddifferently,dependingonwhichtheoryofdemocracyonechoosestolook from. Withindemocratictheoriestherearesubstantiveandproceduralpositions,some theories emphasize a procedural approach over a substantive approach to democracy.Thesetwoapproachestodemocracywillbepresentedanddiscussedin chaptertwo.Belowisashortrundownofwhattheyarereferredtoas,inorderto giveadirection. Substantive democracy looks at the substance in democracy. It is concerned withthecontent,resultandoutcomeofdemocracy. Proceduraldemocracylooksatthedemocraticprocedure,theformandshape ofthedemocraticdecision-makingprocess. 1.4Theoreticalapproach Tochooseatheoreticalapproachaccordingtoarelativisticviewpointisaquestion ofwhatframeworkonefindsgivesthebestpictureoftheworldinordertobeable to explain an occurrence. It has nothing to do with finding the truth. (Alvesson, Deetz2000p.50)Itisratheraboutgivingapictureofanoccurrence.Atheoryisin thiswayasystemofajointofconceptsthatdemonstratehowconceptsarerelated

6 toeachotherinordertohelponeunderstand,predictandexplainthemeaningof the occurrence. (Patel, Davidson 1994 p. 20) The opposite of this relativistic viewpointisobjectivism,meaninghowtoseekthetruth.(Lundquist1993p.151)I findmyselftobesomewhatofa criticalrelativist,when Ithinkthetruthcan,in some aspects, be sought and proved, like the fact that the earth is round. My theoreticalframewillbethatIwillusenewinstitutionalismasmyapproach.The approachwillhelpmeillustratehowinstitutionsaffectthedemocraticsocietyand visa versa. This approach agrees in many aspects with my own mind-set and corresponds with the purpose of my paper. In many aspects a structureagent relation. Theanalysisofthewayinstitutionsinteractandhowtheyaffectoursocietyareas old as the greek philosophers.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_institutionalism) Upuntilthe1950saninstitutionalapproachdominatedthefieldofpoliticalscience research, however at this time a behaviouralistic revolution came to change the institutional approaches dominans by critizising its lack of explanatory tools for how the way humanbeings act. (Marsh, Stoker 2002 p. 90) In the 1980s a new institutionalistic approach came to break out within disciplines like political science,internationalrelationsandeconomics.Thisnewinstitutionalisticapproach, viewed as a social theory, focuses on instititions 1, the way they interact and the effecttheyhaveonsociety.Thetheorylooksathowinstitutionsinfluencehuman behaviourthroughnorms,rules,andnormativeandcultural-cognitiveframeworks. Aninstitutionishoweveritselfseenasanactorthathasbeensociallyconstructed andisabletofeelpressurefromthebroaderenvironment.Institutionsarealsoseen as persistent across time and difficult to change. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_institutionalism) The approach looks at how politicallifeisorganisedandrecognizesthatindividualchoicesareinfluencedbya social context. Politics is in this way subordinated to exogenous forces, such as contextualism where factors such as ideology, culture, geography, economic conditions, technology and class affect politics. These factors are themself not significantlyaffectedbypolitics.Politicalsystemsareaffectedbyhumanbehavior at the local level, which makes micro behavior have macro consequences. (http://hypatia.ss.uci.edu) A dilemma for new institutionalism is that the definition of an institution is runningtheriskofsocalledconceptualstretching,includingeverythingthatguides political behaviour, and to many aspects of political life. There is then no clear distinction between norms and institutions. (March, Stoker 2002 p.100pp) New institutionalism demand a critical stance towards theory when no theory is ever true, but the approach emphasise that you can learn from comparing several theories.(Marsh,Stoker2002p.108)Institutionscanformsocialvalues.Political democracydependsonthearrangementofpoliticalinstitutions,andoneconomic andsocialconditions.Institutions,humanactionandthesocialcontextallinfluence each other and work upon each other in complex ways. (March, Olsen 1984 p. 741p)

1Aninstitutionisagrouporanorganisationcreatedbyagroupofhumans.Aninstitutioncanbereal or/andabstract.From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institutions .15october2004.

7 Newinstitutionalismisfarfromcoherentorconsistentandhasmanydifferent frameworks in itself like a rational choice, normative, historical, empirical, international,sociologicalandnetworkstrains.Someofthestrainsintervenewith each other. (Marsh, Stoker 2002 p. 95pp) The normative framework in new institutionalism is looking at how the individual is acting on norms, values and obligationundernormativesystems,setoutbypoliticalinstitution.Institutionsare seenastoconstrainindividualchoice.Individualsareexpectedtoactoutofdutyor an awareness of what one is “supposed” to do. (Scott 2001 p. 57. Wikipedia encyclopediaandLowndesinMarch,Stokerp.100pp)Normativeanalysesarerare in international relations much due to conflicting rules and power relations. (Krasner in Jönsson, Tallberg p.6). A rational choice framework of new institutionalismdisagreeswiththisnormativefameworksayingthatinstitutionsare humanconstructionswhereagents(orstatesataninternationallevel [likeEU ]) useinstitutionsto‘structurechoices’.(BlythinMarsh,Stoker2002p.300)This stance finds that institutions emerge and survive, because they fulfil significant functions for the individual actor who is affected by these institutions. (Jönsson, Tallbergp.4)EUasademocraticlevelaccordingtothisstancecouldbearesponse to functional requirements responding to collective problems. Historical and international frameworks of new institutionalism both develop the strain of normative and rational choice by having both value-based (from the normative stance) and game-theoretical (from the rational choice stance) approaches. (Jönsson, Tallberg p.5) Historical institutionalism looks at how institutions ‘structurechoices’thatinstitutionsgivecontenttoagents’preferencesandthereby constrain their action, but the agents also use institutions to ‘structure choices’. (BlythinMarsh,Stoker2002p.300,309)Anempiricalframeworkalsobuildson normativeandrational-choiceandanalysetheinstitutionsimpactupongovernment performance.Anetworkframeworkarguesthatcommonvaluesaretheonesthat certifynetworkstabilitybutthatconsensusistheproductofaconstitutingprocess of re-negotiations.(Marsh, Stoker 2002 p. 97) Using this stance I can look at patternsofinformalinteractionbetweenCommissionersintheUnionandhowthey shape political behaviour. Sociological institutionalism on its hand argues that politicalinstitutionscanbedesignedinorderto cultivatedesirablevalueswithin societyatlarge.Astudywithinthisstancecouldlookatwhatkindofsignificancea EU Constitutional draft could have on the citizens. An international framework look at how the behaviour of states is steered by structural constrains of international political life. These structural constraints can be both formal and informal. (Marsh, Stoker 2002 p.96p) I will be using a mixture of the historical, empiricalandinternationalstanceofinstitutionalism,lookingathowthechoices that was made regarding the institutional design in the European Constitutional draftwillhaveaninfluenceonthefuturedecision-makingmadebyindividuals;I will be analysing the institutional designs practical impact upon government performanceandshowhowstructuralconstrainsofinternationallifehavesteered thebehaviourofstates.

8 1.5Earlierresearch

Earlier research literature about democracy in the EU has been focusing on the perspective of democracy (Andersen & Eliassen, The European union: How DemocraticIsIt? ),theconceptoflegitimacy(Beetham& Loyd, Legitimacyand theEuropeanunion )andcitizenship(Rosas&Antola, AcitizensEuropé: insearch of a New Order ). Many of the researchers have carried out a modern policy research with focus on the actor’s political influence and the unity of the policy networks and their maneuvers. The study of policy has a large relevance for the understandingoftoday’spolicymakingand,therefore,thelimitsandpossibilities ofdemocracy.Therehasonlybeenafewempiricalresearchesconducted,andthey havebeenfieldstudiesoverspecificpolicyareas.(Olsson,Jan,1999:10pp) Bengt-Ove Boström (1988) reviews influential democratic theoreticians (Joseph A Schumpeter, Alf Ross, V B Macperson, Robert A Dahl, Herbert Tingsten, Jörgen Westerståhl and Leif Lewin), looking at their discussion of whether the concept of democracy should be concerned both with the form of decision-makingandthecontentofthedecisions.Boströmfindsthattheemphasis variesaccordingtoideologicalperspectivesandthatthereisaneedtolookatthe ideastructurethatlaysbehindthedebateofaproceduralorsubstantivedemocratic approach.(Boström1988p.2,11p) Researchabouttheproceduralandsubstantiveaspectsofdemocracyhasbeen carried out by scholars studying democracy and . (Bell, Staeheli 2001 p.175pp) Lincoln Allison talks about the difference between theories of democracy and theories of democratization, how studies about democracy have been performed in a normative manner through empirical studies, pushing for a certain concept of democracy, like liberal or pluralist democracy. Studies of democratizationhaveontheotherhandlookedattheconditionsofdemocracysuch asthesocialinputsandpoliticaloutputs,tofindoutwhatkindofdemocracypeople innewlydemocraticcountrieswantandwhatmightbeappropriateorworkablefor them,makingthempoliticalscientists.(Lincoln1994p.8-27) Looking at the discourse of substantive and procedural aspects of democracy through a historical perspective, democracy seems throughout the 1950s to the early1970stohavestructuralconstraints,requiringthepresenceofkeysocialand economicfactors,therewheretherebyasomewhatsubstantivesideofdemocracy present. In the final two decades of the 20 th century this came to change when liberal models of a political and economical organisation prevailed over other ideological models. Fukuyama talked about “the end of history”, where western liberaldemocracyhadbecomethefinalformofhumangovernment.Democracyas a discourse treated formal institutions and procedures as the foundation for democratic society. The role of substantive outcomes and emerging political identities in shaping the processes of democratization was virtually ignored. The adaptation of institutions to specific geographical–historical contexts was also ignored and the procedures of liberal democratic governance where seen as universally applicable. Many researchers offer a procedural definition of democracy. Huntington, as an example, views this definition as being the only

9 definition that is uncontroversial, clear and common sense. (Bell, Staeheli, 2001 p.175pp) Today there is critique towards procedurally focused concepts of democracy, claiming they are ill-suited to bring out and explain the changing connections between the legitimacy of formal institutions, the social equity of political outcomes,andtheemergingshapeofcivicidentity.Todayamongacademicsand policy-makers there is an increasing importance to measure more encompassing definitionsofdemocracy.(Bell,Staeheli,2001p.175pp ) DavidHeldalsoraisethis question and suggests that we need to broaden and deepen our concept of democracybeyondtherealmofsurfaceprocedures,bylookingatcontext-specific factorsandhowthey contributetothedemocratizationofformalinstitutionsand civilsociety.(Heldin Bell,Staeheli,2001p.175pp )RobertDahl(2003)alsolooks atthecontextualismofdemocracy,thatjusticeandthecommongoodareculturally dependent,toaspecificgroupofpeopleandtheirhistoricalexperiences.Hefinds thatthesubstanceofdemocracyintheshapeofvaluesandinterestsaredifferentat different places and at different times. (Dahl 2003 p.467pp) He feels that the democratic process needs to be adjusted to the values specific for the political culture and the political institutions of the specific country. (Dahl 2003 p.299) They indicate an increasing interest in substantial factors in the concept of democracy.Anexplanationforthelackofresearchregardingsubstantivefactorsof democracyisthatitisdifficulttoanalyticallyevaluatethe“democratic-ness”ofthe outcomessetoutbysubstantivetheoriesofdemocracy.Evaluatingproceduresand institutions is seen as more reliable. (Bell, Staeheli 2001 p. 180pp) The characteristic of studies of substantive democracy is that they focus on defining substantive democracy and rights and they do not look much at the process of selectingrightsinpractice.(Zucker2004p.74) Inrelationtothisonecanseethat researchabouthowlegitimacyshouldbereachedwithintheUnion,lackthestudy ofsociallegitimacyandofsubstantivedemocraticfactorsandlegalcommentators are mostly stunned and analytically silent about the importance of substantial democraticfactors.(Haltern2002p.4pp) 1.6Methodologyandmaterial

When it comes to the design of the research you should carefully consider what method you are going to use, this since different methods generate different data.(Momsen,Kinnaird1993p.40)Iwillbeconductingaqualitativemethodby carryingoutadescription.Withadescriptiononedescribesomething;thisrequires a well worked out purpose to be able to stick to knowledge that is relevant. (Ejvegård 1996 p.30p) Qualitative research on the other hand is associated with interpretive epistemology. This will highlight the constructed, dynamic and evolving nature of social reality by saying that science cannot be objective, it cannot establish universal truths or exist independently of values, beliefs or by conceptscreatedtounderstandtheworld.Theresearchercollectingthedatainthis light colours the study with his personal views and experiences.(Marsh Stoker, 2002:201pp)Mydescriptivestudycontainsofdescribingtheemphasislaiddown

10 on the procedural and substantive approaches of democracy in the European Constitutionaldraft.Andthereaftergiveanexplanationforwhytheemphasisisput where it is. In one aspect my study is besides descriptive the also explanatory, tryingtoexplainwhytheemphasisisputwhereitisinthedraftconstitution.By examiningthedemocraticconditionsasavariableItrytofindanexplanation.The resultwilldependontherepresentationofthematerial. Tocollectmaterialappearedtoberatherdemanding.Thereisplentyofmaterial aboutdemocracyandtheEUbutitwasdifficulttofindmaterial,whichdiscussed democracyintheEUfromaproceduralandsubstantiveapproach,oreventofind material, which discussed democracy from either a substantive or a procedural standpoint.Iseemedtohaveusedthe“backdoor”somewhatfrequently,lookingfor the expressed relation between substantive and procedural approaches to democracy in between the lines in text books discussing in general terms the discourseofdemocracy.Ilookedthroughseveraldatabasesandskimmedthrough articles.ThedatabasesIusedwherelinksfromdifferentUniversities.Preparation of search words took place continuously. Many times it turned out to bea quite frustratingprocess.YetthemoreIfoundoutaboutthesubjectanditsproblematic, the more I found material and better search words. To help me better grasp the contentoftheEuropeanConstitutionaldraftIlookedatboththeoriginaldraftthat wasformedandhandedoutinJune2004anddifferentsummarizedversions,likea summary performed by EU officials of the articles that relate to the decision- making process. I choose this to be able to compare and structure the decision- making process and content of the Constitution better. I used the summarised versionsasameasurementofvalidity. Thequestionofvalidityisimportantinallresearch;youneedtoaskyourselfif youarestudyingwhatyouareintendedtostudy.(Patel,Davidsson1991p.85p)I chosetolookatthedemocraticdesignintheEUwiththehelpofusingtwotheory- basedapproachestodemocracy:asubstantiveandaprocedural.Bylookingatthe relationbetweenthesetwoaspectsofthedemocraticidealasitisexpressedinthe European constitutional draft I can reach an understanding of how political organisationischangingandbeingshapedinaninternationalcontext. Throughout the research I ran into several problems. Problems like; is this studyaboutdemocracyordemocratization?AsIseeit,itisastudyofbothasthey intervene. Democracy is a condition developed by democratization. (Karvonen 1997 p.11) This can be viewed in the below described definition of democratization. Democratizationreferstothetransitiontodemocracyfromotherformsofrule,aswellas to the processes within democratic societies that extend political participation to new arenasandnewcommunities. (CraigCalhoun. DictionaryoftheSocialSciences .) TheEuropeanUnionisverymuchanewarenaforpoliticalparticipationandanew community developed by democratic societies.(Diamond 1999 p. 275) Their interrelation can also be seen as researchers have studied the conception of democracy in the European Union by conducting studies of democracy and democratizationaswillbeviewedintheresearchsectionoftheessay.

11 1.7Delimitation The question on how we should understand the relation between the democratic formsofthedecision-makingandthesubstanceofthedecisioniscontroversial.I will not give an account for how different ideologies view this problematic. Shortly, I will just mention that within theories like for example deliberalism, theorists favour different emphases on substantive and procedural conceptions of democracy. AsdelimitationIhavechosentoleaveouttheEuropeaninstitutions:theCourt ofAuditorsandtheEuropeanCentralBank.ImotivatethisbyreferringtotheEU institutions; the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of Ministers,theEuropeanCommission,theCourtofJustice,astheonesthatmakeup theinstitutionalframeworkforallareasofcooperationandtheonesthatshallact within the limits of the Constitution. They are the institutions that promote the union’s values, advance its objectives, serve the interests of the citizens and the member states and the ones that ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuityofitspoliciesandactions.(ArticleI-18) As another delimitation I have chosen not to touch on the subject of the democratic organization in the EU as it was organised before the prepared Constitutional draft, consequently to put a focus on the future development of democracy in the EU. I have only shortly described where the democracy originatesfromtogiveanentryintothesubjectmatter. 1.8Disposition

In the next chapter I will be looking at how democracy can be defined using a procedural and substantive approach to democracy. I will also be looking at the relationbetweenthem.Thiswillbefollowedbyadescriptionofthecontemporary conditionsthatfacesdemocracywithinaEUandhowtheprocedureofdemocracy and substance no longer is considered stable. Thereafter I will describe the democraticorganizationoftheEuropeanConstitutionaldraftintermsoflookingat procedural and substantive directives. In a followed discussion I try to find an explanationforwhytherelationbetweensubstanceandprocedurelookslikeitdoes intheEuropeanConstitutiondraft.InthefinalsectionIgiveoutmyconclusions followedbyideasforfurtherresearch.

12 2.Definingdemocracy Democracy is both as an idea and as a political reality disputed.Throughout the history of democracy old and new approaches have mixed leading to unclear interpretations and internal conflicts. Democracy as a term originates from the Greekword demokratia ,meaningpeopleandrule,power.Theruleofthepeopleis not a clear-cut concept. There is a problem of defining what rule is? Rule of? People? How one chooses to define democracy differs. This is apparent in democratic theories, how give out different ideological persuasions about what democracyisandthereby howpoliticallifeshouldbeorganized.(Held1999:13) Theresearchersstudyingdifferenttheoriesofdemocracyhavebeenanalysingthe rulesorcomponentsexpressedinthetheories’definitionaboutwhatdemocracyis. The rules express what form the democratic government shall take as well as if democracyshouldstrivetoattainacertainsubstance.Therelationshipbetweenthe formandsubstanceofdemocracygivesexpressionforanolddemocraticdebate, theoreticallyaswellaspractically.(Dahl2003p.18,Boström1988p.11f)Theyare seen as two aspects of the democratic ideal and make out two theory based approachestodemocracy:procedural(orformal)andsubstantive.(Bell(ed)2001 p.175pp )Whethertheemphasisisputontheproceduralapproachofdemocracyor thesubstantiveapproachofdemocracywillhaveconsequencesforhowweshape ourdemocracyboththeoreticallyandpractically.Whetherweobtain“government by the people” or “government for the people” is decisive in where we lay the emphasis.(Karvonen1997p.14) Iwillnowdiscussproceduraldemocracyandsubstantivedemocracyinterms ofhowtheyworkand whattheyassume. Iwillmakereferencestothestrengths andweaknessesofbothconceptionsofdemocracyandgiveanexplanationforhow theycanconflictwitheachotherandhowtheycanbeaconditionforeachother. 2.1Aproceduralapproachtodemocracy

Aproceduralapproachtodemocracyevaluatesdemocracyintermsofinstitutions, rules,practicesofgovernanceandparticipation.Itbelievesdemocracyisaformof government and is concerned with how decisions are made by looking at the proceduresthatenablethepeopletogovern,votein,runningforpublic officeandmeettodiscussissues.(Janda(ed)2003p.33 )Inthisapproach,astate andthecommunityitgovernsareheldtobedemocraticifithasfirmlyestablished democratic procedures. (Bell (ed) 2001 p.175pp ) The rules and procedures by which decisions are reached are of greater importance than the outcome of the actualdecisionitself.(Berry,2002www.law.howard.edu/).

13 A procedural view of democracy sets out three principles that describe how the government should make decisions. The principles in its turn derive from three questions. - Who should participate? All adults within the boundaries of the political community should participate in governmental decision-making, and be allowedtovote.A universalparticipationprinciple . - How much should each participants vote count? All votes should be counted equallyaccordingtothe principleof politicalequality. -Howmanyvotes areneededtoreachadecision?Goingbymajorityrule,the groupshoulddecidewhatthemajorityofitsparticipantswanttodo.Majority principle. However, these principles can only be applied to governments in a direct democracy. In an indirect democracy citizens choose representatives, to make decisionsforthem,whichleadsustoaforthprinciple: -Theelectedrepresentativesshouldrespondtopublicopinionanddowhatthe majority of the citizens’ want, regardless what, and are responsible to them. Responsivenessprinciple .(Janda(ed)2003p.33pp) Kenneth Janda (2003) finds that the term “government by the people” is closely related to the procedural approach to democracy. (Janda (ed) 2003 p.39) The strengthswithaproceduralapproachtodemocracyarethatthedemocraticprocess can equip citizens when it is a distributive justice of resources (knowledge, influence, power, education). (Dahl 2003 p.252, 272, 258p) Robert Dahl (2003) quotes Rawls with saying it is impossible to reach a perfect and just procedure whentherearenoperfectandformaljustice,leadingtothatallinterestscannotbe considered.(Dahl2003p.153pp) Aweaknessisthatthedemocraticprocesscanleadtoanunwantedresultand injusticeswhenitgivesprioritytocertaingroupsandtheirinterests.Themajority can also be wrong and act according to own interests. Another negative Dahl express is that some citizens are less; articulated, effective and organised which makes them less visible and heard in the democratic process. (Dahl 2003 p.252, 272, 258p) This critique opens up for a look outside a procedural approach to democracy,toasubstantiveapproachtodemocracy. 2.2Asubstantiveapproachtodemocracy

A substantive approach to democracy evaluates democracy in terms of fairness, equalityandjustice.Thefocusisontheoutcomes ofdemocraticgovernanceand practice.Thereisaconcernoverwhatthegovernmentdoes.Democracyliesinthe substance of government policies. (Janda (ed) 2003 p. 33) The approach argues that structural inequalities and forces of exclusion limit the extent to which individualscanparticipateequally,ifatall,intheformationofacivicandsocial collective identity. Democratic procedures alone cannot overcome these inequalities and exclusions. Certain democratic principles and results must, therefore, be incorporated in government policies. (Bell 2001 p.175pp) Many, in

14 fact, argue that the operation of procedures that presuppose social equality may actuallyworktoheighteninequality,aspoliticalagentshavedifferentialabilitiesto mobilizepoliticalresourcestotheirbenefit.Advocatesforasubstantivetheoryof democracy do not advocate the abandoning of the formal procedures and institutionsofpublicgovernance,theymoreemphasisaneedforsupplement.(Bell 2001 p. 175pp) Substantive democracy addresses many of the concerns raised underproceduraldemocracy,especiallywhenrelatedtoequality,participationand majorityrule.(Nelson.1997www.civilnet.org)Substantivetheoriesofdemocracy give out normative concerns about outcomes. The substantive approach to democracy looks to contextualism, how values and interests are different dependingonwhere youareanddependingonwhatsocialgroup youbelongto. True democratic institutions must adapt and respond to their geographical– historicalcontextsandinstitutionsandpracticesmustbedesignedtoallowvarious socialgroupstoachievepolitical,economic,andsocialequality.(Bell(ed)2001p. 175pp) The core of substantive principles is embedded in the amendments of the constitution like the Bill of Rights. Other examples of substantive policies are: freedomofreligion,freedomofexpression,therightofminoritiesandprotection against discrimination. Among substantive theorists there is disagreements on whetherthegovernmentmustpromotesocialrights(adequatehealthcare,decent housing, quality education) and economic rights (steady employment, private property)inordertobecalleddemocratic. (Janda(ed)2003p.33pp) Strengthinthesubstantiveapproachtodemocracyisthattheresultemphasis has a tendency to reduce complex social and economic issues by addressing the underlyingsocialissuesthateffectsociety.(Box(ed)2001p.11)Argumentsforthe strength of substantive democracy can be find in the view that a persons will is complex(andoftencollidewithseveralmodesofwilling)andnotalwaysdirect, whenaperson’spreferencesusuallydonot expressallofthe conditionsthatare needed for her or his freedom. Theoretical investigation of willing can thus be unavoidableinattemptingtodefinefreedom.(Zucker2004p.69) Thecritiquetowardsthesubstantivedemocratictheoryisthatitdoesnotgive outclearcriteriaofwhatmakesagovernmentdemocratic.(Janda(ed)2003p.38) A procedural democrat finds that substantive democracy gives out undemocratic implicationsbyassumingthatthereisaway,independentofdemocraticprocedure, todeterminewhatoutcomesare genuinelydemocratic. Itissaidtobenological waytofindtheappropriatemetricofsocialjustice.Onlyademocraticprocess,not theoreticalanalysiscandefinerights.(Zucher2004p.67pp)Theplacetolookfor fairnessandjusticeisintheproceduresinstalledtosalvetheseconflicts.Another weaknesswithsubstantivedemocracyisthatpeopledisagreeandalwayswillabout substantiveprinciplesofsocialjustice.(Zucher2004p.74)Substantiverightsare also said to lack consensus, something procedural democrats say the democratic processprovide.(Zucher2004p.67pp)Alistoverwhatareimportantdemocratic conditionscanturnintoarestriction,thiswhenyouaretotakeapositiontowards political conditions that you are not familiar with since before. (SOU 2002:82 p.65pp) To put result politics in front of the formal process, could lead to a guardianship.(Dahl2003p.252)Aguardianshipisnegativeinthesenseofthebig

15 demandthatitputsontheknowledgeoftheguardiansandinthesenseofthatthis supervision counteract with our skill to develop moralistic capacity. (Dahl 2003 p.125) 2.3 The Relation between Substantive and Procedural approachestoDemocracy Dahlfindsthatthedebateandconflictabouttherelationbetween thedemocratic process and substance has been exaggerated and characterized by misunderstandingsandobscurity.Hechoosestolookattheir connections ,likehow certainmoralisticandjuridicalrightslikefreedomofspeechandfreedomtomeet areessentialforthedemocraticprocessandhowthedemocraticprocessinitsturn equip the citizens with rights, freedoms, possibilities and resources in the lifeof politics.Thereforetheoppositionbetweentheprocessandsubstanceisnotthere. (Dahl 2003 p.153pp, 160, 272, 467pp) Dahl also finds that equal distribution of resourcesbetweencitizensisanecessaryconditionforthedemocraticprocessto work.(Dahl.2003p.153ppseealso Verhoeven2002p.4pp)Thatwithoutmoralor constitutionallimitsthedemocraticprocesswillbecomecontradictivesincethereis aneedforinstitutionalguaranteesforcertainvaluesandrights,andnotonlyformal procedures.Thesevaluesandrightsshouldalsobereflectingthecountriesvalues andhabits.(Dahl2003p.266pp) UlrichHaltern(2002)alsofindsthatinorderfor participationtobemeaningful,ifevenpossibleatall,substantiveconditionsmust be met like respect for human right, the rule of law and communication in the public arena. (Haltern 2002 p.4pp) Procedural principles are also said to have substantivecontent.Forexample,majorityruleispracticedaboveminorityruleit mustbeformoralreasonsandthisgivesexpressionforavaluesuchasfreeand equal“personhood”,whichisthesamevaluethatmaintainssubstantiveprinciples. (http://www.pupress.princeton.edu)Zucker(2004)findsthatdemocracyconsistsof “rulebythepeople”and“ruleforthepeople”.Ruleforthepeopleincludesrules that maintain economic justice, dealing with the fundamental substance of democracy(includingthenecessaryconditionsforeconomicjustice).Rulebythe peopledealswiththeproceduresofdecision-making.(Zucker2004p.73p) Lundquist (1991) talks about how there is a problem of legitimacy in the relationshipbetweensubstanceandprocedure,whenoneslegitimacyisseentobe inadequate.Citizensdonottolerateanykindofprocedurejustbecauseitleadstoa wantedsubstanceandviceversa.(Lundquist1991p.68)Toreachlegitimacyyou thereforeneedbothprocessandsubstance.ThisissomethingHabermaslooksat, how formal and social legitimacy presuppose and reinforce one another, where sociallegitimacyreferstoabroad,empiricalsocietalacceptanceof,orloyaltytoa systemandformallegitimacygivesvalidityinajuridicalsensetoagivensystem. Andinpoliticalparticipationtheactivecitizensalsocomposeapoliticalidentity, which is vital to reach legitimacy for a political system. In this sense social legitimacy joins requirement with formal legitimacy. (Habermas in Verhoeven, 2002p,8pp)

16 After looking at the relation between substantive and procedural democracy and howtheycanbeseenasaconditionforeachotherwesetouttolookatthetimes theycancomein conflict witheachother.Theconflictconcernsthestatusofthe principlesinademocracy:shouldtheybeproceduralorsubstantive?Indicationsof conflicts may have been made in the explanation of the weaknesses of the both approachesbutbelowcomesamoreverboseexplanation. Drawing an appropriate line between issues that ought to be subject to proceduraldemocracyandthosethatoughttofallundersubstantivedemocracyis notalwayseasy.Peopleoftendisagree.Thereisaconflictifdemocraticprinciples shouldprescribethesubstanceoflaworiftheyshouldonlyprescribeprocedures thatmakeslaws.(Janda(ed)2003p.39). Thereisaconflictinthedemandtoprotectthecitizen’srightsandthedemand thatamajorityshouldbeabletoreachanydecisionitwants.Thisisaconflictof legalsecurity,whenthelegalstatedemandthatcitizen’srightsaretobeprotected (substance)andabouttheauthorityofthepeople,thatthemajorityshouldbeable toreachanydecisionitwants(procedure).Butthereisalsoaninherentconflictof equality(substance)andfreedom(process).Botharenecessaryinademocracybut theycancomeinconflictwitheachother.(Lundquist.1991p.67p)Italsoraisesthe questionifweshoulddevelopasystemofstability(substance)orifwearetogive the individual the possibility to grow and to reach self-realization (procedure). (Macperson1973p.51inLundquist1991p.69)Asociety-orientedperspectiveon society Lundquist argues does assume that people have a collective identity, whereasanindividualorientedperspectiveonsocietyassumesthattheautonomous individual should not be submitted to collective needs. Minority protection is a significantinstitutionintheindividualorientedperspective.(Olsen1990p.28ppin Lundquist1991p.70) Thereisaconflictinthatprocedures(suchasmajorityrule)canproduceunjust outcomes(suchasdiscriminationagainstminorities).(Janda(ed)2003p.39)Ifwe wheretolimitthemajorityruletoincludeatwo-thirdsmajorityitcouldhelp,butit canalsoturnintothattheminorityrulesinstead.(Janda(ed)2003p,33pp) Substantiveprinciplescouldconstrainthedemocraticdecision-makingbutalso make a democratic decision-making possible. This when substantive principles couldgivethecitizensrecoursesthatmakesthemabletoparticipate.Thereisalsoa conflict in making the process structurally available to the citizens without compromisingtheeffectivenessandintegrityoftheprocessofgovernance.(Ndulo p.105) Thereisalsoaconflictinpoliticalagentshavingdifferentabilitiestomobilize politicalresourcestotheirbenefit,whichmayleadtothatproceduresthatassume socialequalitymayactuallyworktoheighteninequality.(Bell2001p.175pp) Thereisaconflictraisedifracistexpressionsinpublicshouldhavelegalcurbs (substancedirective)oriffreedomofspeechshouldprevail.Isitmoredemocratic toassignrestrainstolaw-courtsorshoulditbelefttoorgansofrepresentativesto decide what constitutional democracy requires to bee democratic. (Michelman. www.bostonreview.net)

17 3.DemocraticConditionswithin ContemporaryPoliticalOrganization intheEuropeanUnion According to the new institutionalistic approach, institutions are socially constructedandfeelpressurefromitssurroundings.Inthislightitisofinterestto look at the contemporary democratic conditions that are inherent within the Europeansocietyandtoseehowtheyhaveaffectedtheproceduralandsubstantive approachtodemocracyandtherelationbetweenthem. Since the view on democracy is seen as a product of historical societies and theirspecificconditions,problemsandpossibilitiesweneedtoreviewthechanges that occur within our society. In this essay I put the emphasis on the European society and on the democratic procedure and substance. As Jan Olsson (1999) affirms,thetraditionaldemocraticorganisationischangingwithinoursocietyand withitthedistinctionbetweenthedemocraticprocedureandsubstance.Todaynot onlythesubstancefordemocracyischangingbutalsotheprocedureofdemocracy isseenasunstableandvariable.(Olsson1999p.177) Ihavechosentoseparatethechangestoatfirstdescribehowtheprocedureof democracyisnolongerconsideredtobestableto,thereafter,describehowglobal processeshavedislocatedthepoliticalsubstance. 3.1 The Procedure of Democracy is no Longer ConsideredtobeStable National democracy and state sovereignty, two concepts that constituted the underlying conception of democracy in the 1900-century are being challenged. (Olsson 1999 p.20pp) Held finds that the conception about sovereignty as non- divided,exclusive,unlimitedandasaneternalformofpublicpower,shapedinan individualstateisdead.(Held1987p.421pp)Thissincethehierarchicalstateno longer describes power relations in the society. The state is said today to be to smalltosalvebigproblemsandtolargetosalvesmallproblems.(DellaSala2001 p.1pp)Todaythereisalsoagreatinterdependencebetweennationswhenweare highlyaffectedbydemocraticdecisionsmadeinothernations.Thishasleadtothat thenationdecision-makingbody’sabilitytobeconsequent,responsibleandrobust is being questioned. (Held 1997 p. 411p) Political questions demand problem salvingonaninternationallevel,whichleadstodemocracybeinginternationalised. The future prospectus of states is no longer based on there own, internal experiences.Thishasopenedaneedforanewpoliticalsystemwithnewroutines tomakeitpossibletograsppoliticalexperience.(Stenelo1999p.242)

18 ThechancingconditionsindemocracyareespeciallyevidentinEuropewherethe EUmemberstatesnolongeraretheonlypowercentrewithinitsboarders.(Held 1987 p.421pp) The member states in the EU are transferring parts of their legislative authority to the EU . (Olsson 1999 p.53pp) Making the legislative authority complex and it difficult to find out how is responsible for political decisionsandthereforetodemandpoliticalresponsibility.(Schmitter1999p.933) Therefore, the criteria for the democratic process need to be questioned and reevaluated.(Elofsson,Rindefjäll1998p.12p) Democratic systems are moving from government towards governance. In 2000 the EU Commission stated that the debate about institutional reform in the EUwasintrinsicallylinkedtothatofgovernance.EUrepresentsaquantumleapin democraticgovernanceonaninternationalscale.(DellaSalap.13pp)Governance itselfisaquestionedconceptwithmanyversions;thisishowUNdefinesitandthe versionEUuses: Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverseinterestsmaybeaccommodatedandco-operativeactionmaybetaken.Itincludes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangementsthatpeopleandinstitutionseitherhaveagreedtoorperceivetobeintheir interest.(DellaSala2001p.1p) Onecanseethattherelationshipbetweenthestateandthecommunityhaschanged, whenotheractorsthanthestateisnowresponsibleforarrangingsocialserviceand to achieve legitimacy. As an effect civil society and market forces are given a gainedroleinpolitics.(DellaSala2001p.1pp) Jan Olsson (1999) expresses that politicians today mostly deals with the comprehensive issues of politics. Civil servants have top responsibility for specifyingandcarryingoutpolicy,forthepoliticalinputandoutputarena.Hefinds that the EU gives expression for elitism and the authority of bureaucracy. The EuropeanCommission,whoisabureaucratic organization,hastheformalpower when it comes to taking initiatives. Another example of the authority of bureaucracyistheEuropeanCourt,whoresolvesinterpretationtwists.Government by citizens, as a value in democracy is therefore put to challenge. (Olsson 1999 p.56ff) The democratic process is in some extents out of the hand from the politicians,aswellasitiscontrolledbyelitesandrunbybureaucrats. Yetthechangesinthedemocraticproceduretohavegrowntobecontrolledby otheractorsthanthepoliticiansarenotonlyduetoatransformationofauthorityto theEU.Democracyhavealsoincreasinglybeencolouredbymarketconceptswith elements of shrinking the government’s service. This has led to that the civil servantisincreasinglyresponsibleforpoliticalinputandoutputattheexpenseof the government’s influence. Another consequence is that citizens are treated as customers and rational self-maximizers that compete with each other. (Box, Marshall p.6pp) Box finds that citizens have a politically and morally week position when decisions already have been made. Public managers who are workinginnarrowerfieldsareseenaslessconcernedwithface-to-faceinteraction withcitizensandmore focusedonperformance. Asa consequencepeoplearein

19 lesser extent looking to models of democratic practice to salve public problems. (Box(ed)2001p.10pp)Democracyisalsolookeduponinthetermsofefficiency. A decision-making process should now be effective. (Elofsson, Rindefjäll 1998 p.16p) Hans Agne finds that within international politics, within the EU there is a problem of representation when every country receives only one vote, a vote administrated by the country’s government. In this way, only one interest from everycountryisrepresentedininternationalassemblys.Theminoritygroupsand oppositionsfromacountryarenotrepresented.(Agne2002p.23,59pp)Thelack of representations for minority interests leads us into the debate whether substantivedirectiveshavegainedemphasisintoday’spolitics,ornot. 3.2 Global Processes have Dislocated the Political Substance Isthereagainingemphasisonsubstance?Olssonseemstothinksowhenhetalks about how the emphasis on substance in democracy has increased, something he says can be seen when the political “authority to act” has been drawn towards specific political areas and become a larger component in the debate about what democracyis.Olssonthinkstheincreaseonsubstantivedemocracyhasoccurredat theexpenseofhavingagovernmentbythecitizens.(Olsson:63pp)Hethinksthat the substance of politics is in focus in the EU while the rules of the game for democracy is being adjusted after the continually changing circumstances of European politics, that the substance of politics works as the steering wheel for democracy. He points out that legitimacy is increasingly given when democratic results are showed just as much, if not more than if a decision was following certain democratic procedures. (Olsson) Ulrich Haltern (2002) finds that the EU fails when it comes to store social meaning and archiving social legitimacy. (Haltern 2002 p.4pp) He finds an explanation for this problem in that EU is a pluralistic society where values and social positions are of puzzling variety and fluidity.(Haltern, 2002p.29) Box(2001)ontheotherhandfindsthattheintroductionofmarketconceptsin many ways hinders a return to substantive democracy and also meaningful ways fortheindividualtoaffectpolicy.(Box(ed)p.6pp)Thatthemanagerialstatedoes not address the underlying social issues that affect society. Racism, poverty etc. thataresubstantiveissues,havebecomeindividualproblemsinsteadofcollective problems.Healsofindsthatsocietyitselfisbeingreconstructedandthatthesocial order is based more on rationality and exchange rather then reason, learning, obligationandhistory.(Box(ed)2001p.10pp) Itseemslikeitcouldbedebatedwhethertheconceptsofsubstantivedemocracy haveincreasedornot.Karlsson(2002)writesabouthowtheprecisesubstanceof democracywithintheEUiscontroversial.(Karlsson2002p.10pp)

20 4.TheEuropeanConstitutionalDraft 4.1 The Origin and Development of the Constitution Draft The route to the constitution is paved by The Treaty of Rome1957, The single European Act 1986, The Treaty of Maastricht 1992, The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997,TheTreatyofNice2001andTheDraftConstitution2003.(Aconstitution forEurope2004p.1)Forthepast15 yearstheEuropeantreatieshaveregularly beenmodifiedafterbeingreviewedatintergovernmentalconferences.Themethod forreviewingthetreatiesbehindcloseddoorsaswellasonlybytheleadersofthe government of the member states has heavily been criticized. The criticism was meetin2001attheEuropeanCouncilmeetinginLaeken,wheretheycametoform aconventioninpurposetomaketheEuropeanUnionmoredemocratic,transparent andeffective.Theconventionbroughttogetherrepresentativesofthegovernment of the 15 member states and 13 representatives from the 13 candidate countries, representatives of the European parliament and of the European Commission, representativesofthenationalparliaments,13observersfromtheCommitteeofthe RegionsandtheEconomicandSocialcommittee.Therewerealsorepresentatives oftheEuropeansocialpartnersandtheEuropeanOmbudsman.Themandateofthe conventionwastoprovidearesponsetovariousquestionsonthefutureofEurope, like how to provide better guarantees of democracy, transparency and effectiveness .ToorganizetheworkoftheconventionaPraesidium,composedof twelveleadingcharacterswassetuptohelpguidethework.Plenarysessionsand workinggroupsweresetupoveraperiodoffifteenmonths.Alloftheconventions’ sessions were open to the public via an Internet site where all documents were published. The Internet site also had a forum open for organizations to post on. (Presentation to citizens 2004 p.4p) Extensive consultations were organized with organizationsrepresentingthecivilsociety(tradeunions,employers’organizations, academic circles, NGOs etc). (A constitution for Europe 2004 p.2) Jens-Peter Bonde(2004)hasquestionedthepoliticalanddemocraticprocessoftheConvention whenapplicantcountrieshadnoinfluenceovertheprocessandwhenEuroscepticals wasnotallowedtoobserveorparticipateintheworkinthePraesidium.(Bonde,2004 p.280pp) The European Constitution consists of four parts: Part I describes the Constitutions fundamental provisions that defines its values, its powers, its objectives,itsinstitutionsanditsdecision-makingprocedures.PartIIcontainsthe Charter of Fundamental Rights. Part III deals with the Union’s policies and describes the functions and policies of the European Union. Part IV presents the final clauses. (A constitution for Europe 2004 p.4) The constitution gives a presentation of the distribution of competences and a simplified set of legal instrumentsandprocedures.Todaytheconstitutionremainsatreatysinceithasnot yet been ratified by the Member States. In some states popular consultation is

21 goingtobeneeded.Amodificationoftheconstitutionwillrequiretheunanimous agreementofalltheMemberStatesand,inprinciple,ratificationbyall. The purpose of the European Constitution is to deepen the democratic and transparentnatureofitspubliclife,andtostriveforpeace,justiceandsolidarity throughouttheworld.Intheforewordoftheconstitutionwecanread: Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities,byestablishingthecitizenshipoftheUnionandbycreatinganareaoffreedom, securityandjustice.(Theforewordoftheconstitution) 4.2TheDemocraticBasesoftheUnion

Howisthendemocracy organizedwithintheEuropeanConstitutionaldraft?The twoconceptualframeworksdescribedinchaptertwoareinherentinConstitutions and by looking at the emphasis laid out between the two democratic concepts withintheEuropeanConstitutionaldraftweareabletogetanindicationofifthe EUismovingtowards“rulebythepeople”or“ruleforthepeople”. Bylookingathowdecisionsaremade,whoarelefttogovern,voteinelections, running for public office and meet to discuss we are looking at procedural directives in the European Constitutional draft. The procedural approaches to democracy as expressed in the Constitution are described below. After this description comes a presentation of the substantive approaches to democracy expressedintheConstitution,whereIlookatcontentdrivingdirectivesoutlininga certaindemocraticresultsthatneedstobeobtainedinthedecision-makingprocess. Atsomepointsremarksaremadetowheresubstantiveandproceduraldirectives seemtocollideintheconstitutionaltext.Toclarify,Iwillbeusingmytheoretical democraticapproaches;proceduralandsubstantivedemocracy,whenIlookatthe empiricalcontentoftheEuropeanConstitutionaldraft. 4.2.1ProceduralapproachestoDemocracyintheConstitution Draft 4.2.1.1ThegeneralprinciplesofEUlaw ThegeneralprinciplesofEUlawexpresseswhatrulesaretoapplyinthedecision makingprocessoftheUnionandtherebyhowandwhentheunionshouldact.The generalprinciplesofEUlawintheConstitutionexpressesruleslike;Unionlawhas primacyovernationallaw,memberstatesmustassistoneanother,thedemocratic process is to be based on representative and participatory democracy. Another generalprincipleofEUlawisthattheUnion’sCompetencesaretobedividedinto threeareas. (ArticlesI-10to13,I-5(2))Theseprinciplesallexpressesprocedural directivesbystatinghowandwhenthedemocraticprocessintheEUshouldwork.

22 These democratic principles have within them several procedural directives for example;accordingtoarticleI-51onparticipatorydemocracytheInstitutionshave an obligation to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and the civil society. Article I-51 as well as I-50 on representativedemocracyshould alsobereadincombinationwithArticle I-8on Europeancitizenship.Thisarticleincludesseveralproceduraldirectivesbystating who has the right to vote, to stand as candidate in elections to the European Parliamentandinmunicipalelections;therighttopetitiontheParliamentandto applytotheEuropeanOmbudsmanetc.ArticleI-46alsoarelatingarticleinitiatea citizens initiative, making it possible for European citizens to participate in the decision making process if they gather one million signatures from a number of memberstates.Bygatheringonemillionsignaturestheycansubmitaproposalon matters where they believes that a legal act of the Union is necessary for the purpose of implementing articles in the Constitution. The Commission can howeverdecidewhethertorespondtotherequesttopresentaproposalornot. The Constitution divides the Union’s competence into three categories; exclusivecompetence,sharedcompetence,andareasofsupportiveaction.(Article III-11)Exclusivecompetence referstothattheunionactsaloneonbehalfofallthe member states, areas includes; competitions rules for the internal market, commercialpolicy,andmonetarypolicy.Sharedcompetence meansthattheunion actswhenitsactionbringsaddedvaluetoactionstakenbythememberstates,areas include;socialpolicy,internalmarketandenvironment.Areasofsupportiveaction iswhentheunionactsonlytosupportactionstakenbythememberstatesandithas no responsibility for management, which lays at the member state in question. (Presentationtocitizens2004p.10andArticleIII-12,13)ThelimitsoftheUnions competences are in its turn governed by the principle of conferral. The principle saysthatCompetencesnotpresentedupontheUnionintheConstitutionisgoingto remainwithinthememberstates’jurisdiction.TheuseoftheUnionscompetences is also governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Subsidiary refers to that decision-making shall be performed at state level if it can be sufficiently achieved; excluding areas in the constitution that gives the union exclusive competence. Proportionality means that the content and form of the Union action shall not exceed what is necessary in the stride of achieving the objectives of the Constitution. The constitution can also confer to a shared competencethattheunionandthememberstatesmaybothlegislate,butUnionlaw suppressesnationalcompetencetolegislate. (Article1-11,12,17) Aproposalmade bythecommissionmustexplainthewayinwhichithastakentheprinciplesinto account.Ifanationalparliamentfindsthatsohasnotbeenthecase,theycanissue a reasoned opinion. If the parliament thereafter holds the same opinion, the commissionmustreviewitsproposal.ThereisalsotherightofreferraltotheCourt ofJustice.(Presentationtocitizens2004p.11)Thereisthoughaflexibilityclause thatsays: IfactionbytheUnionshouldprovenecessarywithintheframeworkofthepoliciesdefinedinPart IIItoattainoneoftheobjectivessetbytheConstitution,andtheConstitutionhasnotprovidedthe necessarypowers,theCouncil,actingunanimouslyonaproposalfromtheEuropeanCommission

23 andafterobtainingtheconsentoftheEuropeanParliament,shalladopttheappropriatemeasures. (ArticleI-18) Theprincipleofconferral,subsidiarityandproportionalitylimitthecompetenceof theunion’sinstitutionsinthedemocraticprocessandsetsoutrulesthattheprocess needstofollowandcanthereforeberegardedasproceduraldirectives.Itcouldbe argued that they are substantive directivesbut they are hardly rules that imply a result,substanceand,therefore,Idonotfindthemsubstantivebutprocedural. 4.2.1.2Whogoverns?Andtheirproceduraldirectives Tobeabletolookathowdecisionsaremadeweneedtolookattheprocedural directiveofhowgoverns.Firstwelookattheactorsinthelegislativeprocessthat are the EU institutions; European Parliament (EP), the European Council, the Council of Ministers (hereinafter “Council”), the European Commission (hereinafter“Commission”)andtheCourtofJustice.Withintheseinstitutionsthere is authority given to the European Parliament President, the European Council President, the Commission President and the Vice president of the Commission also referred to as the Foreign Minister. (Article I-18 to 28) Other actors in the legislative process are the institutions advisory bodies; the Committee of the Regions,theEconomicandSocialCommittee.(ArticleI-31) Within the institutions and bodies that govern there are several procedural directives that needs to be followed, for example procedures and compositionrulesregardingtheactors.Downbelowisashortintroductionofthe actor’sdifferentrolesanddifferentproceduraldirectiveswithintheirorganization. The EP how is considered the voice of the people with its directly elected representatives from the member states, co-legislate with the Council, exercise politicalcontrolandconsultation,electstheEPPresidentaswellasapprovesofthe Commission President. (ArticleI-19) There are several procedural directives laid outintheConstitutionregardingtheinstitutionsprovisions.ArticleIII-232to243 addressestheprovisionoftheEP. TheEuropeanCouncil,whoconsistsoftheHeadsofStateorgovernmentofthe member states, the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission, define the general political directions and priorities for the Unions development.TheConstitutionstatesproceduraldirectivesonhowtheyaretomeet and where they are to meet. The Constitution states that decisions within the EuropeanCouncilaretobemadebyconsensus;someexceptionsarethoughstated intheConstitution.Ifrequiredbytheagendaotherministersofthememberstate mayassist.(ArticleI-21)ThepresidentoftheEuropeanCouncilistorepresentthe EU abroad, to drive forward its work. (Article I-21) Procedural directives addressingtheprovisionoftheEuropeanCouncilaresetoutinArticleIII-244. The Council, who consists of representatives of each member state at ministerial level, co-ordinates the Unions functions. The constitution gives out proceduraldirectivesthattheyaretomeetanddiscussinpublicwhendeliberating onadraftlegislativeact.OtherproceduraldirectivesgivenintheConstitutionare thattheformationoftheCouncilcanchangeifaqualifiedmajorityoftheCouncils

24 membersfindsitappropriate.(ArticleI-22)Otherproceduraldirectivesconcerning theprovisionoftheCouncilaresetoutinarticlesIII-245to249. The European Commission who consists of one to be independent representativefromeachmemberstate,proposelegislativeactsandpromotesthe generalinterestsoftheUnion.Theconstitutionstatesthatupuntil2014therewill beonecommissionerpermemberstate,afterthattherewillbecommissionersfrom 2/3ofthememberstates,arepresentationthatwillrotateonequalbasisamongst thememberstates.Theconstitutionstatesthateachmemberstatewillproposetheir commissionerbutthattheyneedtobeapprovedjointlybytheEuropeanCouncil President and the President of the Commission as well as the EP who needs to reachasimplemajority.Theseandmanymoreproceduraldirectivecanbefoundin articleIII-250to257.TheCommissionPresidentdecidesguidelines,todevelopan internalorganization,toappointaVice-Presidentanddischargememberslikethe Unions Foreign Affairs Minister. In the Constitution procedural directives limits the authority of the Commission President by stating that the President cannot discharge its commissioner without the consent of the European Council. The Foreign Minister, elected by the European Council and by agreement of the PresidentoftheCommission,isresponsibleforhandlingand coordinateexternal relationsandaction.(ArticleI-25) The Court of Justice who includes the Court of Justice, the High Court and specialized courts, consisting of at least one judge per member state ensures the rightofappealtoUnionlaw.(ArticleI-28)Thereareseveralproceduraldirectives beingexpressedfortheCourtofJusticeinarticleIII-258to289,statingfromhow theycanincreasethenumbersofassistantstowhohasthejurisdictiontodetermine proceedings. The Committee of the Regions consists of representatives of local and regionalbodieswhoeitherholdsalocalorregionalauthority,electoralmandateor is politically accountable to an elected assembly. The Economic and Social Committee consist of representatives of organizations of the employed and the employers,andofothersthatarerepresentativeofthecivilsociety.(ArticlesIII- 292toIII-298)Otherproceduraldirectivesregardingtheinstitutionalprovisionsof thecommitteesaresetoutinarticleIII-292to298. In order to reach a high level of transparency the Constitution sets out proceduraldirectivesregardingtheaccesstotheinstitutionsdocuments.ArticleI- 49 underlines the rule of transparency when it comes to the institutions proceedings. 4.2.1.3Howarethendecisionsmade? The actors that govern, what procedural directives do they have to go by in a decisionmakingprocess?Thelegislativeprocessconsistsofthethreelaw-making procedures; co-decision, assent and consultation. The Constitution employ that decisions are to be made primary by co-decision by the EP and the Council. (htttp://www.euabc.com) In a co-decision process the EP cannot adopt laws withouttheapprovaloftheCouncilandviceversa.ThedifferenceisthattheEP

25 needs absolute majority 2 among its members and the council needs qualified majority 3initsassembly.(ArticleIII-302.7,8)Thedecision-makinginvolvesthe European Commission as an executive independent of the member states, the Council of Ministers to represent the governments of the member states and the European Parliament as the directly elected representative of the citizens. Down belowisanexplanationfortheproceduralpracticeinaco-decisionprocess.(III- 308)Inaco-decisionprocedure: 1) The Commission submits a proposal to the EP and the Council. The proposal madebytheCommissionistheresultofawideconsultationprocess,whichmay have been conducted by reports from experts, consultation of national experts, internationalorganisationsand/ornon-governmentalorganisations,consultationvia Green and White Papers, etc. A consultation can also have been conducted internallyamongthedifferentCommissiondepartments.(http://www.europa.eu) 2) ThereaftertheEPadoptsitspositionatafirstreadingandsendsittotheCouncil. Thepositionhasthenbeendiscussedwithintherelevantparliamentarycommittee and debated in a plenary session, where it is adopted by reaching a simple 4 majority.(http://www.europa.eu) 3) IfTheCouncila)approvestheproposalitisadopted.IftheCouncilb)doesnot approve,itmakesapositionoftheirown,explainingwhytheydidnotadopt,and aftersendsittotheEP. 4) Subsequently the EP approves or rejects the Councils proposal by absolute majoritywithinthreemonths.IfEPa)approves,theproposalisadopted.IftheEP b)rejects theproposedactitshallbedeemednottohavebeenadoptedand issent back to the Council. EP can also c) propose amendments to the position of the CouncilandforwardittotheCouncilandtheCommissionaskingthemtogivean opinionontheproposedamendments. 5) If4)c)ispracticed,thentheCouncilneedstoactontheamendmentbyreaching aqualifiedmajoritywithintreemonths.Ifita)approves,theproposalisconsidered adopted.Ifitb)rejectstheamendments,thePresidentsoftheCouncilandtheEP conveneameetingoftheConciliationCommittee. 6) If5b)ispracticed,theConciliationCommittee,whoiscomposedbymembersof the Council or their representatives and representatives of the EP, reaches an

2Initspresentconfiguration367votesfromthe732membersisneededtoreachabsolutemajority. 3Absolutemajorityalsoknownasqualifiedmajorityisdefinedbyreachingatleast55percentofthevotesof themembersoftheCouncil,andbyrepresentingatleast15MemberStatesand65percentofthepopulationof theUnion.Toblockadecisionthereneedstobeatleastfourmemberstatesbehindtheblock.ASuperqualified majorityconsistsof72percentofMemberStatesand65percentoftheUnion’spopulation.(Article1-24,25)In caseswhereaqualifiedmajorityhasbeenverynarrowlyachieved,inotherwordswherethedecisionhasbeen controversialaspecialclausewillapply.(http://www.europaworld.org) 4Majorityofthememberstakingpartinthevote. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/codecision/stepbystep/glossary_en.htm)

26 agreement,byhavingaqualifiedmajorityamongstthemembersoftheCouncilor theirrepresentativesandbyhavingamajorityamongsttherepresentativesofthe EP. The time limit is six weeks. The Commission also participates in the conciliationmeeting takinginitiativestoreconcilethepositionsoftheEPandthe Council. If, the ConciliationCommittee a) approves, the proposal is adopted. If theyb)reject,theproposedactshallnotbeadopted.Thedeadlinescanbeextended andconsultationcanbeaskedfor. To be able to reach ahigh level of transparency in the Union theConstitutional draftstatesthat;theEPandtheCouncilshallmeetinpublicwhenconsideringand votingonadraftlegislativeact.(ArticleI-50) InthesituationswhenassentappliestheCouncilmustobtaintheEPsassent beforecertaindecisionsaremade.IftheEPcannotgiveitsassenttheproposalwill not be adopted. In some cases the Council cannot decide/legislate without the consentoftheEPlikeforexample;theuseoftheflexibilityclause(ArticleI-17), the adoption of laws against discrimination (Article I-53), the suspension of membershiprights(I-58),thedeterminationoftheUnionsresources(I-53). Ifnoneoftheproceduresco-decisionorassentismentioned,theEPonlyneeds tobeconsulted.InaconsultationtheCouncilmustconsulttheEPbeforevotingon aproposalfromtheCommission.ThecouncilisnotboundbyEPsposition.But consultation will still be practiced in cases that are particularly sensitive for the memberstates.(http://www.euabc.com) TheCouncilcanonitsownadoptlawsandframeworklawsinareassuchas; ownresources,multi-annualfinancialframeworkandelectionstotheEP.TheEP canonitsownadoptlawsandframeworklawsinareassuchas;thestatusofits members, the status of the Ombudsman and law on provisions governing the exerciseoftherightofinquiry.Alotoftimesthereisaneedforinvolvementby the other branch, and this involvement can range from simple consultation to approval.(htttp://www.euabc.com) Theresultsmadefromthedecisionmakingprocessarelaws,frameworklaws, regulation,decision,recommendationandopinion.(Presentationstocitizens2004 p.19)Legislativeactslikelawsandframeworklawsarelegallybindingacts.Non- legislative acts like recommendations and opinions are non-legally binding acts which member states cannot be fined for not following. (Article I-24) As been shownthedecisionmakingprocessitselfcontainsmanyproceduraldirectivesbutit isalsolimitedbysubstantivedirectivesaswillbeexplainedbelow. 4.2.2SubstantiveapproachestodemocracyinThe Constitutionaldraft A substantive approach to democracy focuses on the outcomes of democratic governanceandpractice.Substantivedirectivesgiveoutanormativeconcernover aresultthattheUnionshoulduphold.Substantiveprinciplesareimbeddedinthe charter of fundamental rights, but they are being expressed in many parts of the EuropeanConstitution.

27 AsearlyasintheexplainedpurposeoftheEuropeanConstitutionwecanreadof substantivedirectiveswhensubstantivevalueslikepeace,justiceandsolidarityare statedasbeingvaluestostrivedfor. The Unions Values and Objectives expressed in articles I-2 and I-3, they emphasesaresultsthatthedemocraticdecision-makingshouldobtain.The values oftheunionare;dignity,liberty,democracy,equality,ruleoflaw,humanrights, rightsofminorities,pluralism,non-discrimination,tolerance,justice,solidarityand equalityofwomenandmen.(ArticleI-2)The objectives oftheunionare;tooffer itscitizensanareaofpeace,freedom,securityandjusticewithoutinternalfrontiers andtoofferaninternalmarketwithfreecompetition.(ArticleI-3) In the constitution draft one can also read that the Union shall work for sustainable development, balanced economic growth, price stability, full employment, social progress, environmental protection and for scientific and technologicaladvances.Itistocombatsocialexclusion,topromotesocialjustice andequalitybetweenmenandwomen,toprotecttherightsofthechild,solidarity between generations. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion between member states but respect the cultural and linguistic diversity. Free movement of persons, goods, services and establishments shall be guaranteed within and by the Union, capital as well as freedom of establishment shall be guaranteed within and by the Union. Equality between the Member States shall comebeforetheConstitutionandtheirnationalidentities.(Presentationstocitizens 2004p.19).Theprincipleofequalitybetweenmemberstatesshallbeobservedby the Union in all of its activity. (Article I-44) These all make out substantive directivesandnormativepositionswithinademocracy. The constitution doesn’t allow any differentiation of religious, philosophical andnon-confessionalassociationsandorganizationinthememberstates.Thesame article also states that respect should be shown to the status of churches under national law. (Article I-51) These directives will limit the result the democratic procedureisallowedtoreachandaretobeconsideredassubstantivedirectives. An attempt to balance two substantive values is taken in Article III-103. The article states the importance of promoting employment, improving living and workingconditionsbutthatthisshouldbepracticedinconsiderationwiththeneed tomaintainthecompetitivenessoftheUnionseconomy.TheConstitutionfindsthat suchadevelopmentwillensuethefunctioningoftheinternalmarket,whichinturn willfavortheharmonisationofsocialsystems. ArticleIII-104dealingwithsocialpolicystatesseveralsubstantivedirectivesto be uphold like the combating of social exclusion. The constitution expresses the needtolookatthecircumstancesforthememberstate.ForexamplearticleIII-104 statesthatEuropeanframeworklawsshallavoidimposingadministrative,financial and legal constraints that could hold back the creation and development ofsmall and medium sized undertakings. Framework laws in it self give the national authoritiesthefreedomtochooseformandmeansbuttheyarebindingtotheresult givenbythelaw. TheactualruleoflawIfindtobeasubstantivedirectiveaswell,thiswhena democraticprocedurecanchoosetogiveawaytheruleoflawandmaybegivemore powerforthepresidenttoruleabovethelaw.Thiscanthoughbequestioned;giving

28 an indicator for how substantive and procedural democracy collides when they becomeaconditionforeachother. Lookingatcontentdrivingdirectivesthatoutlinesacertaindemocraticresults, thatneedstobeobtainedinthedecision-makingprocessiscomplex.Thiswhena procedural directive like the principle of subsidiarity as expressed in article I-9 statingthat;theUnionshallactonlyifandinsofarastheobjectivesoftheintended actioncannotbesufficientlyachievedbythememberstates,eitheratcentrallevel oratregionalandlocallevel.Thisexpressanindirectresultoutlinedthatdecisions shouldbemadeasclosetothecitizensaspossible.Thesamegoesfortheruleof transparency.(ArticleI-50)Butwheredoyouthendrawtheline? My stance is that neither the rule of transparency or subsidiarity gives out a substantiveresultinthesenseofavalueorobjectivethatneedstobeupheldorbe the result of a democratic process. A substantive directive referees to result in someone’sinterests,agroupofpeopleoravalueandobjective. . 4.3 Discussion about Contemporary Democratic Conditions Influence on the European ConstitutionsDemocraticOrganization AfterlookingattheinherentcontentoftheConstitutionaldraftandthedemocratic proceduresandsubstantialdirectivesitgivesexpressionforitisofinteresttoseeif onecanrelatethisdemocraticorganizationtothedemocraticconditionsthatare inherentintheEuropeansocietywherethememberstatesoftheUnionaresituated. ContemporarydemocraticconditionsasHeldarguedexpressesanurgetoact,to act collectively over national boarders. Since the power to act is viewed as a substantialapproachtodemocracytheConstitutionishavingasubstantialapproach to democracy since it put strong emphasis on the power to act within certain political areas. EU itself is also a way to increase and strengthened the political powertoact. Alsoofincreasinglyimportanceinthecontemporarydemocraticdebateisthata decision-making process should be effective. The Constution trys to make the decision-makingmoreeffectivebyhavingtheCouncilandtheEPco-legislateon most issues. But the Constitution also prioritice using qualified majority which couldhavetheoppositeeffectleadingtoablockingminority. In the contemporary democratic society the nation state no longer describes powerrelationinthesocietywhenithasobtainedcompetitionfromotheractors.To meetthedifferentcentresofpowerinsociety;otheractorswithinthesocietyarein theConstitutioninvitedtoparticipateandgivetheirinputinthedecision-making process.Asaresultthedecisionmakingprocesshasmoreactorsanddecisionsare madeonahigherlevel.Democracyhas,therefore,becomeinternationalisedandthe ConstitutionphrasestermssuchastheEuropeancitizenanddrawoutpossibilities fortheEuropeancitizenstomakecitizensinitiative. Acontemporarydemocraticproblemistofindouthowisresponsibleforpolitical decisions. The constitution meets this democratic problem by emphasising transparencyinthedecision-makingprocessandtogiveEuropeancitizen’saccess

29 to the institutions documents. In the contemporary democratic society the bureaucratshasalarge amountofpower.ThisisalsoevidentintheConstitution whentheEuropeancommissionhasthesinglepowertotakelegislative initiative and has the power to disregard proposals from elected representatives and the citizens. Theconstitutioncontainsseveralexceptions;therulesofthegameandthereby proceduraldemocraticdirectivesarebeingadjustedafterthecontinuallychanging circumstancesofEUpolitics. In The Charter of Fundamental Rights the Constitution expresses the importanceofstrengtheningtheprotectionoffundamentalrights,thisinthelightof changesinsociety,socialprogressandscientificandtechnologicaldevelopments. This give a strong indicator for how the Constitution is trying to adjust to contemporarydemocraticconditions. TheConstitutionphrasesmanynormativeprinciplesbyexpressingvaluesand objectives that needs to be upheld like equality between member states. These substantial values increase the procedural democratic process. Many procedural rulesarealsoadjustedtothelikesorsettingsofthememberstatewhichcanbeseen inthemanyframeworklawstheconstitutionexpresseswherethememberstatesare bounded to the result but not to procedures. Procedural directives changes along withcircumstancesandnewconditionssomethingtheconstitutionleaveroomforin theformofflexibleclauses.Thesubstantivedirectivesarethoughvagueleadingto thepossibilityofinterpretationsandadjustmenttotraditionsandcircumstancesin thememberstates.AsHalternaddressed,EUasapluralisticsocietyhasapuzzling varietyofvalueswithinitsboarders.TheConstitutionsvaguenessaboutitsvalues couldbeawaytoaddressthepuzzlingvarietyofvaluesandtomakethesubstance ofdemocracyinEUlesscontroversial. Overall the distinction between the democratic procedure and substance is sometimes difficult to find in the Constitution. This problem can bee viewed in relation to Olsson’s thoughts that the traditional democratic organization is changing within our society and with it the distinction between the democratic procedureandsubstance.Theprocedureandsubstanceofdemocracyistodayseen asunstableandvariable.

30 5.Conclusions Themainpurposeofmyessaywastolookattheorganizationofdemocracyatan international level, within the European Union. This to give me an indicator for how democracy can be organized on an international level. As a subsequent purposeIsawifcontemporarydemocraticconditionshavehadaninfluenceonthe organizationofdemocracyattheEuropeanlevel.Inordertoachievemypurpose myresearchquestionswas:a)HowisdemocracyorganizedwithintheEuropean Constitutionaldraftintermsofputtingtheemphasisonsubstantiveandprocedural directives? b) Can we see a connection between contemporary democratic conditionspresentwithintheEuropeanUnionandwhattherelationlookslikein the constitutional draft and between democracy’s emphases on procedural or substantivedirective? EUcarriesoutdemocraticgovernanceonaninternationallevelwithallofits varietiesofactors.Byconductingcooperativeaction,anetworkofactor’smostly civil servants performs “government for the people”. Union law prevails over nationallaw.Therulesofthedecision-makingprocesscanbeconsideredcomplex horizontally; between the institutions and vertically; between the Union and the memberstates.Thedemocraticorganizationasexpressedintheconstitutiondraft focusesontheproceduralapproachtodemocracywithallitsrulesforwhetherthe institutions can act, to what end they can act, who should be involved in the decision-making process, and how. The procedural directives in the constitution sometimes become quite complex as several procedural rules interfere with each otherandtherearealsomanyexceptionsfromtherule. Butthedemocraticprocessitselfisrestrainedbyvaluesexpressingasubstantive approach to democracy. There are several indicators for both procedural and substantivedirectivesintheconstitution.Butoveralltheproceduraldirectivesgive expressionforpoliticalbehaviourof“governmentforthepeople”.Butitisnotthe politicians who are governing but civil servants. The constitution promote social and economic rights like full employment, social progress, price stability. This indicates that the EU needs to uphold substantive values in order to be called democratic. The vagueness of some of the substantive values like i.e. “social justice” can be counted, as an indicator for how substantive values needs to be adjustabletotheconditionsofsocietyandespeciallythedifferentconditionswithin thememberstates. Theconstitutionsetouttomeetsereraldemocraticproblemsdescribedwithin contemporarydemocraticthinkinglike“thepowertoact”,whoisresponsiblefor decisions being taken and democratic effectivity. Contemporary democratic thought gives expression for how both the democratic procedure and the democratic substance are considered not to be fixed but to change accordning to conditionsandpossibilitiseexpressedwithindemocracy.Maybeasconsequenceof

31 democracymovingawayfromthehandsofrepresentativeelectedpoliticians,there has been an enhancement of substantive directives in contemporary democratic thinking.Toreachlegitimacythereseemstobeanincreasingneedfornotjustfair procedures but democratic results. Within contemporary democratic thinking concepts of substantive democracy are though considered controversial. The distinctionbetweenthedemocraticprocedureandsubstanceisalsoseenasmore difficulttomakeout.Complexityariseswhenthe“ruleoflaw”and“thepowerto act” are considered substantive democratic rules whereas the rule of subsidiarity and transparency are considered procedural democratic rules. If directives concerning efficiency are procedural or substantive I also find complex. The relationbetweensubstantiveandproceduralapproachtodemocracyseemtohave come closer and intervene more. The procedure and substance of democracy is seenasunstableandvariable. Thedemocraticproblemsareofbothsubstantiveandproceduralcharacterandin ordertosalvecontemporarydemocraticproblemsthereseemstobeaneedtolook attherelationbetweensubstantiveandproceduralapproachestodemocracy. Forfurtherresearchitwouldbeofinteresttoconductresearchaboutwhyvalues and interests differ within the European context. Indicators to include would be historicalexperiencesandculturethissincevaluesandinterestsseemtodependon these.Thesubstanceofdemocracyintheshapeofvaluesandinterestsaresaidto bedifferentatdifferentplacesandindifferenttimes.

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