This paper should (after many revisions) become a part of a book manuscript entitled Democracy Beyond Elections: Government Accountability in the Media Age.

There are actually three mini chapters included here: Democracy: Crisis or Transformation? (p.2) The Crisis of Democracy, Elitism and Diversity (p. 20) The Transformation of Democracy and Connectivity (p.40)

I would be most grateful for any advice you can give me about any part that you might have read.

Thank you again,

Gergana Jeremy Haworth Research Fellow in Political Science University of Cambridge Email: [email protected]

1 Democracy: Crisis or Transformation?

Is democracy today in crisis or not? The growing body of literature on the state of democracy testifies to the renewed urgency of that question. In this chapter only, I extrapolate more than 100 references to the most recent manifestations of democracy (see table 1 in the appendix). The majority of these studies are published in the last five years and almost all of them are published after 1997. The advances in conceptual innovation, however, sometimes mask the wealth of new insights into the nature of modern democracy. It is not entirely clear what the major dividing lines between the different conceptions of democracy are and where their commonalities, if any, lie.

The conceptual ambiguities exceed the confines of conceptual clarity. Do we live in a “post-democracy” (Crouch 2004) or a “counter-democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008)?; “Audience” (Manin 1997), “spectator” (Lippman 1922) or “ocular” (Green 2011) democracy? Unrepresentative (Lewis 2001) or post-representative democracy Green 2011) democracy?; “Rancierean” (Hazan 2012), “Madisonian” (Bergman & Strom 2013) or “Machiavellian” (McCormick 2011) democracy?; A “shareholder” (Dasgupta 2010) or “stakeholder” y (Macdonald 2012) democracy? “Demoicrcay” (Nicolaïdis 2012), “technocracy” (Stie 2012), “mediocracy” (Tassano 2006) or “juristocracy” (Hirschl 2004)?; Is there a “confidence gap” (Lipset 1987), a “confidence trap” (Runciman 2013) or an “expectations gap” (Flinders &Dommett 2013); Are we living in an “electronic republic” (Grossman 1996), a “digital democracy” (Hindman 2008) or an “e-democrcay” (Della Porta 2013)? Are we witnessing the “great degeneration of democracy” (Ferguson 2012) or the “great transformation of democracy” (Warren 2006)?; Is there a “global resurgence of democracy” (Diamond & Plattner 1996) or “global divergence of democracy” (Diamond & Plattner 2010)? Is democracy in a “terminal decline” (Burn-Murdoch 2012) or in the midst of a “democratic revolution” (Schmitter)?

The chapters suggest that there are two interrelated principles for distinguishing the models of the crisis of democracy from those of the transformation of democracy. 1. How elitist is the model and in what way? 2. What is the place of the concept of “diversity” in the model?

The first and more obvious principal difference is the elitist character of democracy. Critical accounts of democracy tend to see the present state of democracy as being elitist. Elitism here is defined as being either caused by elites, resolved by elites or maintained by elites. The elites are the key driving force behind those models. The second point of differentiation between conflicting conceptions of democracy- the conception of the diversity of the public will. Both the models of the crisis and the transformation of democracy emphasize the fragmentation of the public. There is one crucial difference, however. The critics of democracy see the fragmentation of the public as the final and deplorable state of democratic development, whereas the transformationists believe that fragmentation is a precondition for the regrouping of public opinion. The newly configured public opinion, according to the transformationists, is more autonomous.

2 Ultimately, these two criteria- elitism and diversity - yield two very different concepts of society and governance: a polycentric and a monocentric model reflecting the conceptions of crisis and a transformation of democracy respectively.

Figure 1: Monocentric vs. Polycentric Models of Democracy in Crisis and Transformation Respectively

Transformation of Democracy: Crisis of Democracy: Polycentric Model Monocentric Model Elites Elites

Public Public

These two criteria-elitism and diversity- give rise to three additional questions: first, what is the connection between elitism and diversity; second, what are the causal mechanisms which explain why models of the crisis and transformation of democracy reach such different conclusions, based on the principles of diversity and elitism; and three, what are the implications for choosing diversity as a principle for defining the transformation or crisis of democracy? I briefly address each question below.

What are the Main Differences between Contemporary Models of Democracy? This chapter seeks to breathe new life into the most recent insights about the nature of democracy by putting the new concepts in dialogue with each other and by separating them into distinct analytical categories. This is an effort to simultaneously differentiate and integrate the new advances in understanding democracy. I argue that it is possible to reduce the great variety of conceptual innovation into two big but meaningful categories: the sceptics of democracy versus the transformationists, who believe that democracy is transformed, not undermined. Kenneth Newton (2011) distinguishes between a “citizen-centred input theory of democratic malaise” and a “top down output approach to democratic malaise.” I develop this analytical separation further

I introduce seven main points of differentiation between models of the crisis of democracy and models of the transformation of democracy. To facilitate the comparison between the models, I use a simple depiction of democracy as the

3 crossover point between public demand for representation and institutional supply of representation. The following criteria differentiate more from less optimistic accounts of present day democracy: 1) emphasis: who drives the model- the elites or the public; 2) approach: is the determining force bottom-up or top-down?; 3) view of the public: is the public homogenous or heterogeneous?; 4) view of the elites: are the elites divided or united; 5) relationship between supply and demand: is there a democratic deficit or democratic surplus?; 6) mechanisms: are the mechanisms that determine the model centripetal or centrifugal; 7) determinants of public demand: are they endogenous or exogenous?; single or multiple?

The sceptics believe that democracy is in crisis. The single most common critique of the democracy is that it elitist and oligarchic. According to the sceptics of democracy, a powerful and unified group of political elites dominates over a passive public. The will of the public is dependent and endogenously determined. An endogenous public will is largely created by the elites or by instruments or groups that the elites control, such as (civic) education, the media moguls or by intellectuals. The sceptics’ perception of the public is that it is mostly homogenous. It is not splintered into groups, factions and autonomous centres of power. The crisis of democracy is a top- down phenomenon devised and executed by the elites. Whereas the degrees of totality within the sceptics’ camp vary, the model of the crisis of democracy in its most extreme version propounds that the totality of the elites rules over the totality of public will. The crisis of democracy arises because of a democratic deficit.

The transformationists tend to view democracy as being in a state of a progress, reinvention and an opportunity for improvement. It presents a bottom-up conception of democracy, because public will, not elites, are at the centre of activism. Transformationists perceive the public will as created by exogenous factors which are beyond the control of political elites. Part of the reason why the determinants of the public will are exogenous is that they are multiple: globalization, the financial crisis, the rise of the media, technological revolution, the demise of the political parties, the New Public Management and depoliticisation. The result of these multiple exogenous forces is to fragment the public will. Fragmentation, according to the transformationists, creates new opportunities for association, reconfiguration and re- creation of the public will. The public becomes more particularistic but also more autonomous. The multiple and exogenous factors have split up the monolithic elites. There is no immediate and ostensible connection between media moguls, political leaders, globalization firms, educational institutions and intellectuals. While the level and the reasons for diversity vary, the transformationist model can be summarized as portraying diverse elites as being challenged by a diverse public will. The transformation of democracy is activated by a democratic surplus.

4 Figure2: Principle Differences between the Sceptics and the Transformationalists’ View of the Present State of Democracy Criteria Sceptics Transformationists State of democracy Crisis Transformation Emphasis Elites Public Approach Top-down Bottom-up View of the Public Homogenous or Heterogeneous Over- Heterogeneous View of the Elites Homogenous Heterogeneous Relationship between Democratic deficit Democratic Surplus Supply and Demand Mechanisms Centrifugal Centripetal Determinants of public Endogenous: intellectuals, Exogenous: globalization, demand civic education, elites, media, associations, media financial crises Determinants of public Single Multiple demand Determinants of public Hegemonic, strategic, Economic, social, political, demand manipulative historical

Problem One: What is the Connection between Elitism and the Diversity of Public Opinion? The evaluation of the current state of democracy is plagued by ambivalence. The critics apply the principle of elitism to pass damning judgement on the state of democracy whereas the transformationists use the principle of diversity to describe a more positive view of democracy. But how can we compare the cogency of these two sets of models if they use seemingly different criteria? The logical question arises, then, to what extent elitism and the diversity of the public will are connected.

To some, the connection between elitism and the diversity of public opinion might seem obvious. Most of the other criteria listed above, whether the mechanisms guiding democracy are centripetal or centrifugal, whether this is a top-down or bottom up approach and whether this is a democratic deficit or democratic surplus, seem epiphenomenal to the issue of the diversity of society and the diversity of political elites. The intuitive answer would be that a more diverse public opinion constrains the elites and so the connection should be exponential. A review of the literature shows that this is not the case.

Models of the crisis of democracy are anchored at a very high level of elitism and models of the transformation of democracy are anchored at a very low degree of elitism. The crucial point is, given these levels of elitism, to what extent the public will is fragmented. This point arises because within the camp of the critics and transformationists there are very different opinions about the degree to which the public will is fragmented. Some critics of democracy, such as Wolin and Urbinati, tend to see the public will as intrinsically holistic. They see the unification of the public will as the primary factor which allows the elites to control the public. They draw a connection between an overly unified public will and too much elite domination. Conversely, other critics of democracy, such as Huntigton, view the public will as overly fragmented to the point where the public “overloads” the government with demands. He draws a connection between an overly fragmented

5 public will and not enough government autonomy. In between Huntington, there are the conceptions of Downs and Flinders, who believe that the primary problem is not whether the public is passive or active but whether it wants too much or too little from the government. Without elaborating where the will is fragmented or not, they argue that the elites can increase or decrease the public expectations.

What defines the levels of elitism in the models of the crisis and transformation of democracy is the possibility that the fragmentation of the will can be followed by a re- connection, which then leads to a more autonomous public.

Figure 3: Relationship between Elitism and Diversity of the Public Will

Schumpeter Downs Lipset Huntington Manin Flinders Pharr, Urbinati Norris Putnam Wolin Crisis of democracy

Re-connection of the public will m s i t i l E Transformation of democracy

Fragmentation of the public will

Problem Two: What are Causal Mechanisms Explaining the Different Interpretations of the Crisis and Transformation of Democracy?

Ironically, the critics and the transformationists list the same reasons for two diametrically opposed conceptions of the latest developments- crisis versus transformation. For example, Pharr and Putnam and Merkel list exactly the same factors for the crisis of democracy that are brought up by the transformationists as reasons explaining the transformation of democracy. These causal factors include globalization, the rise of media and digital technology, the demise of the parties and economic crisis.1

1 Pharr and Putnam believe that democracy have become “disaffected” because of the “deterioration of the performance of representative institutions, which is connected with the limited capacity of political agents to act, because of internationalisation and the “growing incongruence between the scope of territorial units and the issues raised by interdependence,” the greater availability of information about

6 Another difficulty in proving a causal connection between various factors and the transformation of democracy is that many of the causal factors are interconnected, or have interconnected effects, without the factors themselves being caused by the same reasons. Thus for example, the decline of the mass base of political parties and the rise of media technologies are thought to simultaneously make the public more apathetic and passive. The problem is that these are every different causal factors with the same effects. Yet another difficulty arises from the fact that scholars who have completely different visions of the state of democracy, such as Goodin and Urbinati and Manin, offer the same solutions.

The burden of proof, ultimately, falls on demonstrating empirically the causal mechanisms that link the purported factors with the current state of democracy. The task is made harder because the regions are quite varied and the causal factors, such as globalization and the media revolution, affect them in different stages of democratic development. So it is difficult to make an argument whether the media connect or fragment the public will, if the media revolution reaches such varied societies as the Western, post-communist and Middle Eastern publics at the same time. Very often area scholars of different areas, scholars with different specialisations, and political theorists talk past each other just because they explore isolated phenomena. That is why it is important to have not only comprehensive and representative data but also an integrated theoretical approach.

The greatest difference then in the causal mechanisms is whether the evaluations of the processes of the public will are characterise in terms of totalisation, fragmentation or re-connection.

democratic performance; “the heterogeneity of public desires increases, either by polarisation along a single dimension or by divergence across multiple dimensions,” the deterioration of the performance of representative institutions, which is connected with the limited capacity of political agents to act, because of internationalisation and the “growing incongruence between the scope of territorial units and the issues raised by interdependence” (Pharr & Putnam 2000, p.25). Somewhat similarly, Merkel summarises that “crisis theories yield five sets of challenges to democracy: 1. (Financial) capitalism as a challenge to democracy; 2. Supranationalism (globalization, EU) as a challenge to the national democratic State; 3. Socio-economic inequality as a challenge to the democratic principle of equality; 4. Democratic procedures and too much participation lead to overly demands and therefore to an overload of the state; 5. Cultural diversity as a challenge to the political community” (Merkel 2014, p.24).

7 Figure 4: Causal Mechanisms

Media

Globalization Fragmentation of Reconnection of the public will the public will Transformation (Archibugi, of democracy Technological change Kostovica)

Parties

Economy

Intellectual paradigms Totalisation of the public will (Wolin, Urbinati, Flinders, Norris) Urbanization Crisis of democracy Fragmentation of the public will (Huntington, Streeck, Holmes.)

Problem Three: Implications of Selecting Diversity as a Criterion for Assessing Democracy

The emphasis on diversity has important implications for the way the argument about the nature of democracy is conducted. By introducing the centrality of diversity, the discourse shifts in one meaningful way- it goes away from the centrality of summum malum. Dunn reminds us that Hobbes and Locke “both agreed that the sole possible basis for establishing a stable shape and a clear structure of priorities for himan practical reason lay in the identification of a human summum malum…Today, the potential extermination of the species itself does at last offer a compelling candidate for a summum malum… No one could be optimistic enough to expect its mere identification to clarify and simplify political rationality as dramatically as Hobbes proposed. But what it can and should do is establish one single dominant value as the ultimate standard if political evaluation.” (Dunn 1990, p.197).

Zakaria echoes Dunn’s hypothesis that contemporary societies are based on certain conceptions of the benevolence, or lack of benevolence, of human nature: “The American system is based on an avowedly pessimistic conception of human nature, assuming that people cannot be trusted with power. "If men were angels," Madison famously wrote, "no government would be necessary." The other model for democratic governance in Western history is based on the French Revolution. The French model places its faith in the goodness of human beings.” In a statement, which seems to be the archytype of Madison’s popular quote, Rousseau suggests that “if there were a nation of gods, they would be governed democratically. So perfect a government is unsuited to men” (Rousseau1998, p.68).

8 Sieyes also connects human nature and political order: “It would be a grave misjudgement to entrust the destiny of societies to the endeavours of vitue” (Sieyes 1791, p.xxvii). The concept of the goodness of human nature continues to be one of the principle assumptions of contemporary works of human society. One of the latest examples is Nancy Rosenblum’s (2010) book in defense of political parties, called “On the Side of the Angels.”

The Italian philosopher Bobbio challenged the organizing principle of summum malum already in 1987. He noticed that when the number of active citizens increased, thanks to universal suffrage, and the influence of the labour unions and mass parties increased, the result was a regression away from the triumphal match towards the supra-individual collective state, uniform and unifying.” According to Bobbio, this anxiety about this particularilistic tendencies found expression in the “withering critiques of democracy” formulated by Pareto and Carl Schmitt (Bobbio, p.122). Schmitt’s concern with democracy was exactly what Bobbio pointed out. Schmitt was worried that the conception of democracy was based on a homogenous public and the public was actually heterogenous: “The various notions of social and economic groups who organize themselves “democratically” have the sane subject, “the people”, only in the abstract. In concreto the masses are sociologically and psychologically heterogenous… Rousseau’s frequently cited arguments in the Contract Social …ultimately conform to an ancient tradition. It [this argument] is to be found only literally in Locke” (Schmitt 1988, p.25).

Bobbio denies the assumption of summum malum: “the social and political reality which confronts us every day is so multifarious and multifaceted, and hence so impossible to fit into models based on public law inherited from the doctrine of state of the last few centuries from Bodin to Weber and right up to Kelsen.” (Bobbio, p.123). Even more presciently, Bobbio outlines a watershed moment in the history of understanding democracy. He says that the there is a trade-off between admitting the diversity of society and preserving the old doctrine of the unitary nation state. Te resulting danger is to “throw away the baby of democracy with the bath water of particularism, a baby which still has to grow up with pluralism or to die.”

The proliferation of the contemporary models of the transformation of democracy, discussed at length in the following chapter, can be conceived as a response to the exact same problem that Bobbio outlined more than 40 years ago. To take just one example of the numerous models supplied in chapter two, Kuper unites his idea of “responsive democracy” with a distinctly non-unitary version of the public will. “Responsive democracy constitutes a fundamental break from the neo-Hobbesian paradigm that still dominates both liberal and communitarian theories of citizenship and patriotism. Citizenship is no longer treated as a unitary2 phenomenon that resolves all motivational complexity and conflicts of allegiance by a reference to an ultimate moment of primary attachment to one state or community” (Kuper 2004, p.132). The discourse on the transformation of democracy needs to continue on both new and old turf. It needs to develop the trade-off between democracy and a fragmented society, as Bobbio suggested, and at the same time it needs to inquire to what extent the conditions for the proliferation of societal fragmentation and association have changed in the last decade.

2 Italics mine.

9 The shift of discourse from the kindness of human nature to the variety of human nature implies several changes, which I will simply list here. The first implication is that fear stops being the single motivational force behind human autonomy, consent and volition. Second, the question of the governability of society emerges with a new force. The capacity for societal independence and autonomy is put in a different context with renewed possibilities. Third, this shift challenges the utility of the social contract and similar contractual concepts of societal bonds. The shift evokes a search for alternative forms of interaction between the elites and society.

Fourth, the idea of the reconnection the public outside out the boundaries of the nation state undermines the idea that security justifies oppression. Albrow argues suggests exactly that: “In this volume with its emphasis on globalization from below, on bottom up agency, we are effectively doing a respite of the Hobbesian question: how is civil order possible in a world of competing passions and scarce resources? But neither the conditions of our time, nor our bitter experience of the nadir of the nation state, allow us to repeat his answer: the centralised state controlling the means of violence.” (Albrow 2011, p.244)

In the following part, I list several further implications of diversity and trace the difference in the interpretation between the proponents and the opponents of the crisis of democracy. These implications include: visibility, representation, pluralist forms of sovereignty, trust, human and historical perfectibility.

3.1.Diversity and Visibility The diversity of public opinion is decried by the critics of democracy for two interrelated reasons. On the one hand, greater diversity of demands increases the overall complexity of the world and it becomes less comprehensible to members of the public. At the same time, diversity decreases the visibility of demands made by the public and the demand become less visible to the elites. In both cases, the decrease in visibility of public demands hinders the communication between the public and the elites. Dunn mentions that “human beings need to learn to respond to the complexity of an extravagantly complicated world… It is increasingly difficult to believe that anyone at all…is actually equipped to understand what is being decided about” (Dunn, 209).

The complexity of public opinion and visibility of public opinion are connected. Crouch thinks that this complexity and obscurity of political demands leaves only one choice to the political elites- to resort to manipulation: “unable to discern easily what demands are coming to it from the population, it has recourse to the well-known techniques of contemporary political manipulation, which give it all the advantages of discovering the public’s views without the latter being able to take control of the process itself” (Crouch 2004, p.21). This perception of diversity and visibility is in line with Crouch’s top-down, elitist concept of “post-democracy”.3

3 In her book on the “disfigurement of democracy,” Urbinati also underscores the importance of visibility: “democracy entails a permanent struggle to make visible the issues that citizens deem central to their lives. Opinion is thus a form of action as important as the mechanisms that organize votes and mobilize decisions.”

10 In his quite optimistic model of “counter-democracy,” Rosanvallon presents a more balanced vision of the implications of the increased complexity of the public will. Rosanvallon agrees with the sceptics that one “consequence of counter-democracy is to make what is going on more difficult to perceive and still harder to interpret… visibility and legibility are two essential properties of the political.” Rosanvallon says that the development of counter-democracy is “complex and problematic. It is problematic “because the evolution toward civil society leads to fragmentation and dissemination where coherence and comprehensiveness are needed…It was my awareness of the phenomenon that led me to coin what might at first sight seem like a rather shocking neologism: counter-democracy.”

In contrast to the critics of democracy, Rosanvallon believes that diversity is a double- sided coin, i.e. it also has positive effects: “Counter-democracy can reinforce democracy, but it can also contradict it.” From the point of view of the transformationists, diversity is not conceived as necessarily a negative precondition for democracy either in terms of visibility or in terms of complexity. Instead, transformationalists tend to perceive diversity as a multiplicity of interests, which generates opportunities to create more constellations.

3.2. Diversity and Representation The diversity of the public entails different conceptions of representation.4 Some critics of post-representational forms of democracy are more likely to view representation as an arena for resolving conflicts between pluralistic public views. In contrast, some transformationalists believe that representation is oligarchic and it does not incorporate but marginalizes and obscures the pluralism of public views.

Under the rubric of diversity, defined as “discordant space and time,” Bensaid jusxaposes two visions of representation. One vision is presented by Lefort for whom representation “provides a designated space for controversy so that the common interest can prevail over corporatism.” Representation, according to Lefort, gives “full recognition of social conflict, and of the differentiation of the political, economic, juridical, and aesthetic spheres, of the heterogeneity of society.” Representation is seen as the consequence not just of society’s irreducible heterogeneity but also of the unharmonized plurality of social spaces and times that grounds plurality” (Bensaid in Amagben, p.35).

Ranciere expresses the opposite view of representation: “representation is fully and overtly an oligarchic form” (Bensaid, p.35). Bensaid further underscores the connection between diversity, representation and democracy by saying that “the phobia about mixture and motleyness is revealing of a dream of a sociologically pure workers’ revolution without hegemonic intent. Its paradoxical outcome was the single party, the incarnation of a single, unified class.” He cites Bourdieu who “rejected the democratic faith in the correctness of the mathematical sum of individual opinions.” Representation is plunging into alienation through delegation and representation

4Representation and visibility of public will are connect. “Lefort sees representative democracy as a system that imparts “relative visibility” at the price of quite severe distortions.”

11 Perhaps this connection between diversity, representation and democracy dates back to Hobbes. Ubrinati says that “we should disassociate representation from that tradition, which was a way of getting the sovereign state an absolute power, not creating a government that enjoys people’s consent and is authorized by the electors. Hobbes used the strategy of representation… in order to create the sovereign state. Representation was in his system a way for giving legitimacy to the absolute sovereign while disempowering the people, who were only subjects. It was an interesting way of giving legitimacy by taking away power from the people; representation as a fiction to create the absolute sovereign.”5

3.2.Diversity and Sovereignty

Diversity and sovereignty are also connected. A positive attitude to diversity is connected to a pluralistic vision of sovereignty and more positive view of the transformation of democracy. A more critical attitude to diversity denies alternative forms of sovereignty and is more critical of new conceptions of democracy. Some models of the crisis of democracy, such as “unpolitical democracy” by Urbinati and “technocracy” by Hirschl, tend to have a monocratic vision of the public will.

On the other hand, Rosanvallon’s transformationist idea of counter-democracy “involves pluralistic forms of sovereignty in which elections are not the sole source of legitimacy” (Rosanvallon, p.303). Rosanvallon argues that “judgement does not spring immediately from a supposedly unified reason” or “will,” and the growing social demand for judgement reflects a pragmatic and pluralistic vision of the general interest” (Rosanvallon, p.240). “Public will is an idealized, abstract and generalised vision, an “imagined social unity” (Rosanvallon, p.267) whereas the practical experience of the general will is quite different.”

3.4. Diversity and Public Opinion

Diversity affects the perceptions of the autonomy of public opinion. Proponents of the transformation of democracy attribute a more autonomous role to public opinion. The critics of democracy view public opinion as constructed by the elites. Chomsky and Herman’s “manufacturing consent” and Schumpeter’s idea of the “manufactured public will” are cases in point.

It is important to point out how the idea of the manufactured public opinion features in the latest accounts of the crisis of democracy. The modern techniques for polling public opinion are a crucial instrument for manufacturing public opinion. In his critique of “audience democracy,” Manin notes that “opinions in polls, demonstrations and petitions…are solicited rather than spontaneous.” Whether it takes the form of demonstrations, petitions, or polls, expressions of public opinion is usually partial and initiated by small groups (Manin, p.173). Manin brings up Pierre Bourdieu’s idea that “opinion polls are no more than a way to manipulate opinion, precisely because questions that might be quite foreign to people’s concerns and to

5 Manin’s and Urbinati’s interview with Landermore

12 which people respond in order to please the interviewer or to avoid appearing ignorant (Manin, p.173).

In his account of “unrepresentative democracy,” Lewis argues that survey technology and media technology present the interests of the power-holders as the interests of the public. According to him, the military industrial context and media owners conspire to delude the public.; “media representations limit the meaning of public opinion polls, so that the range of public opinions appears to be in tune with pro-business, centre-right spectre of political elites.” (Lewis 2001, p.xi). Public opinion is endogenous.

In his damning idea of “hyperdemocrcay,” Heclo notes that “alongside innovations in communications technology, there have also been remarkable developments in “political technology”-sophisticated techniques for studying, developing, manufacturing, and manipulating public opinion to produce political support for candidates and causes… In fact, scientific polling…proved to be the midwife of hyperdemocrcay” (Heclo 1999, p.62). The book with the telling title “Constructing Public Opinion” also suggests that political elites help to promote the military industrial complex and how the media sustains belief in an electoral system with a built-in bias against the interests of ordinary people.

Not everybody is so certain of the constructed nature of public opinion and its malleability. In more positive accounts of democracy, the public opinion is more autonomous. For example, Manza et al (2003) suggest that politicians do listen to public opinion and that the latest advances in survey-based experiments, probabilistic polling methods, non-survey-based measures of public opinion, Internet polls and surveys have contributed to greater policy responsiveness to public mood.

3.5. Diversity and Distrust Diversity is also connected to different notions of distrust. Critics of democracy decry distrust and apathy. Conversely, proponents of the new developments of democracy are more inclined to view the positive side of distrust. The difference in the attitudes to diversity and distrust can be attributed to different models of compartamentalisation of trust.

In his critical account of post-democracy, Couch differentiates between positive and negative citizenship and argues that negative citizenship, which is his word for public anger and distrust, makes democracy elitist: “On the one hand is positive citizenship, where groups and organizations of people together develop collective identities…On the other hand is the negative activism of blame and complaint. Democracy needs both of these approaches to citizenship, but at the present the negative is receiving considerably more attention. This is worrying, because it is obviously the positive citizenship that represents democracy’s creative energies. The negative model… is essentially an affair of the elites, who are then subject to blaming and shaming by an angry populace of spectators.” (Crouch, pp.13-14)

In a direct contradiction to Crouch, Stokes contends that “distrust is good for democracy.” (Stokes & Cleary 2006, p.3). Stokes (2006) outlines two views of trust: On the first view, the political culture of democracy is a culture of trust and activism

13 and trust; on the other, it is one of delegation and scepticism.” She argues that “a well-functioning democracy requires sceptical citizens rather than trusting ones.” Pettit (2001) also views depoliticisation, or the withdrawal of people from politics, in positive terms. According to Petitt deliberative democracy requires depoliticisation. “The democratic society which leaves the exercise of power to popular majorities and political elites may easily become the worst of despotisms. “67

Lipset expresses a more neutral view of distrust. According to him, the main characteristic of distrust is not that it is harmful but it is disposable and transient. Consequently, distrust does not overload democracy. Lipset reaches this conclusion by going back to Euston’s classification of three types of distrust in the incumbent political authorities, distrust in the “regime,” and distrust in the overall political community. Lipset says that the Americans do not approve of the politicians but that distrust does not translate into distrust of democracy as a whole because “democratic procedures tend to direct discontent at the incumbent authorities, who may be thrown out and replaced, while insulating the system from opposition.” This compartmentalisation of trust keeps distrust from undermining democracy (Lipset 1983, p.159).

Finley argues that Lipset actually makes a case for the positive effects of apathy in democracy. According to Finley, in both Plato’s and Lipset’s accounts, apathy is “transformed into a public good, a virtue, one which in some mysterious way overcomes itself in those occasional moments when people are invited to choose among competing groups of experts.” (Finley 1973, p.7)

3.6. Diversity and Human Perfectibility The idea of diversity is linked to the tolerance to perfectibility. Transformationists are more likely to take a long term view of democracy because they believe in its intrinsic perfectibility. Critics of democracy perceive its present decline as a finite state. One of the reasons for this short-sightedness is that critics do not espouse the notion of perfectibility. Diversity is connected to perfectibility because diversity allows for flexibility which, if given time, will perfect itself by taking various forms and constellations.

Transformationalists are more inclined to view the decline in democracy as a temporary step along the natural progression and evolution of human perfectibility. Archibugi connects the idea of cosmopolitan democracy with the issue of perfectibility: “The cosmopolitan project is based implicitly on the Enlightenment project, i.e. on the idea that humankind is able to progress. (Archibugi, p.273) Bilaskovosc, in his idea of “democracy without politics,” seeks the resolution of the crisis in the idea of “democratic openness” and in Tocqueville’s idea of “indefinite perfectibility” (Bilaskovisc, p.11). On the surface, Bilakovics’ model looks very similar to Downs’ “marketplace democracy,” Flinders’ “bad-faith democracy” and Norris’s “democratic deficit.” Bilakovics conceives the gap as the “often-remarked- upon simultaneous triumph of democratic principles and absence of democratic

6 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/58.html#Heading125 7 Check montesqiue, cited in Rosanv, p.14 ability to act and ability to prevent, also Locke???

14 political practice.”8 Democracy is “everywhere preached but nowhere practiced.” And to a certain extent, these models overlap. Bilakovics sees a growing cynicism which arises from the gap between the individualised, self-interested logic of the market and the community-conscious, more altruistic logic of the family. But this is where the similarity ends.

The true democratic gap, according to Bilakovics, is the gap between this cynicism and the idealised version of democracy, which can never be achieved. Bilakovics’ revolutionary vision lies in conceiving cynicism as the chief driving force of democracy. To him, cynicism and idealism are the only forces that can demolish existing hierarchical structures and build new ones. Whereas Flinders is concerned that bad faith, apathy and cynicism spoil democracy, Bilakovics believes that it is exactly this cynicism that propels democracy. Cynicism is the most certain sign that the ideal of democracy is not forgotten. These different views arise because critics of democracy view it a single static equilibrium with only one predetermined realistic crossover point, whereas for Bilakovics democracy is not a point, it is a movement. Ultimately, Bilakovics’ model of “democracy without politics” is grounded in the assumption that human beings are perfectible and they change and diversify on their way of approaching the ideal democracy.

Figure: Bilakovics: Democracy without Politics

Idealism

Gap Cynicism 2

Solution Cynisism 1 Family Market

3.7. Diversity and Historical Perfectibility Transformationalists view democracy in the long duree. Sceptics of democracy are more focused on the present decline of democracy. Similar to Bilakovics, Runciman also relies heavily on Tocqueville’s idea of the indefinite perfectibility, but he takes a

8 Bilakovics, p.13

15 more historical rather than individualistic approach to perfectibility. The mechanism of perfectibility that Runciman presents is very ingenuous one. When not in crisis, democracy breeds complacency. The role of the crisis is to shake democracy out of its “complacency,” (p.294)“torpor” and “fatalistic tendencies” (pp.20-21). Lots of little failures combine to produce a lasting success (p301). The key strength of democracy is its self-corrective power. It is bad at short term failure and good at long term success.

Keane also views the newest reincarnations of democracy, monitory democracy, as a logical consequence of the development of democracy. Even Dunn, who is a self- professed critic of monitory democracy, asserts that “the greatest strength of Keane’s book is the zest with which he recognizes the global scope and historical depth of the story he tries to tell. On this point at least, he is surely correct.” Despite the emphasis that Keane lays on the role of the media, he thinks that the media is just a supporting device to history. One such historical force that gave the initial push to monitory democracy is the Second World War. The war, according to Keane, proved that “the rulers cannot be trusted” and that “mobocracy had its true source in thuggish leaders” (Keane 2013, p.98).9

In another historical example, Keane shows that India “proved that democracy could thrive within a society that lacked a homogenous demos, a civil society shackled by poverty and illiteracy and crowded with all sorts of cultural, religious and historical distinctions.” (Keane 2009, p.629). Keane comes with the idea of “banyan democracy” named after the famous banyan tree that symbolizes “the vibrant unity that comes from complex diversity.”10

Rosanvallon views the emergence of “counter-democracy” not as a sign of a democratic decline due to the fragmented public will, but as a logical continuation of a historic trend. He opposes looking at the history of democracy in a linear fashion. “Many of the facets of counter-democracy have carried out from pre-democratic past to democratic present.” History reflects different historical reflections of sovereignty. He outlines three stages of the history of liberty and collective sovereignty. In the first stage, a limited set of oversight powers existed; in the second stage, these powers were institutionalized and in the third stage, which began in the 1970s, parliamentarism was in decline and new more “socialized” forms of oversight developed (pp.76-83).

Conclusion: Elites versus the Public

Most of the discussion about public diversity and its implications ultimately boil down to one question: to what extent does diversity affects the elites’ control over the public? Transformationists are more inclined to believe that a more fragmented public will gives the less elites have opportunities to shape it. Gerring (2012), for

9 Keane took a diametrically opposed view on the role of war on the lessons of human and historical perfectibility to the effect that Schumpeter attributed it to have. Schumpeter’s lesson from the war was to limit the power of the public in a minimalist model of democracy and to give more power to the rulers.

10 http://johnkeane.net/52/topics-of-interest/banyan-democracy

16 example, argues that a larger and more diverse “population places a series of constraints on the ability of leaders to monopolize power.”11 In his version of Machiavellian democracy, McCormick suggests that homogenous public are more likely to control the elites than heterogenous states: “The modern, socially homogenous notion of the “sovereign people”…reinforce(s) the people’s general disposition not to want to know, or do anything, about their subordinate position…Consequently, the constitutions of post-eighteen’s century republics give wealthy citizens and public magistrates … free rein to oppress others (McCormick 2011, pp.16-17). Abramovotz suggest that public fragmentation indices elite fragmentation, which should decrease the ability of the elites to control the public: “Polarization at the elite level is largely a reflection of polarization among the politically active segment of the American public” (Abramovitz 2011).

Finally, the question arises whether there is any need to couch the problem as a choice between an elitist and public centred model, or a homogenous versus heterogeneous model of the public will. Is such an approach is unnecessary antagonistic. Of course, the reality is, most probably, that the people are semi-sovereign (Schattenschneider 1962), neither entirely homogenous nor completely heterogeneous. The point is to outline the critical junctures at which a democracy can go one way or the other. The crisis of democracy is surely a matter of degree.

Appendix 1: References to the crisis versus the transformation of democrcay Crisis of Development of Democracy Democracy Crisis of Counter-democracy (Rosanvallon 2008) democracy Monitory democracy (Keane 2013, Taagapera 2013) (Trilateral Quantum democracy (Keane 2014) Commission 1973) Banyan democracy (Keane 2009) Anomic democracy Between-election democracy (Narud & Esaiasson 2013) (Huntington et al Democracy without politics (Bilakovics 2012) 1973, p.158) Ocular democracy (Green 2011) Disfigurement of Post-representative democracy (Green 2011) democracy Post-national democracy (Habermas 2001; (Urbinati 2014) Eriksenhttp://www.amazon.co.uk/Rethinking-Democracy- Managed European-Routledge- democracy (Wolin Democratising/dp/0415690722/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&qid=139 2010) 4806144&sr=8- Audience 5&keywords=Dahl+Robert+Size+and+Democracy & Fossum democracy (Manin 2011) 1997) Post-party democracy (Mair 2013) Post-democracy Knowledge democracy (Stoker 2014) (Crouch 2004) Plurinational democracy (Keating 2004) Disaffected Cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi 2008) democracy (Pharr Stakeholder democracy (Macdonald 2012) 2000) Global democracy (Archibugi 2012) Bad-faith Transnational democracy (Held 1999) democracy Responsive democracy (Kuper 2004)

11 http://people.bu.edu/jgerring/documents/SizeDemocracyRevisited.pdf

17 (Flinders 2012) Associative democracy (Traegardh 2013) Unrepresentative Agonitistic democracy (Wenman 2013) democracy (Lewis International democracy (Wendt 1999 in edges p.9) 2001) Regional democracy (Gould 2012) Illiberal democracy Substantive democracy(Cox 1997 in McGrew p.69) (Zakaria 1997, Madisonian democracy (Bergman & Strom 2013) Hamid 2014) Machiavellian democracy (McCormick 2011) Marketplace Electronic republic (Grossman 2000) democracy (Downs E-democracy (Della Porta 2013) 1953) Demoicracy (Nicolaïdis 2012; Cheneval & Schimmelfennig, Façade democracy 2013) (Streeck 2013) Digital democracy (Alvarez 2010) Shareholder Altered states (Sperling 2009) democracy The transformation of democracy (McGrew 1997) (Dasgupta 2010) Global resurgence of democracy (Diamond & Plattner 1996) Post-broadcast Global divergence of democracy (Diamond & Plattner 2010) democracy (Prior Renewal of democracy (Ginsborg 2008) 2007) Democracy transformed? (Cain, Hollowing out Daltonhttp://www.amazon.co.uk/Democracy-Transformed- crisis of democracy Opportunities-Democracies- (Streeck 2013) Comparative/dp/0199291640/ref=sr_1_sc_2?ie=UTF8&qid=13 “Point and click” 95692851&sr=8-2- democracy spell&keywords=second+transformation+of+democrcay, Scarr (Krastev 2012) ow 2006) Rancierean Supplementary Democracy (Lang &Warren 2008) democracy (Hazan Fourth wave of democracy (Howard & Hussein 2013) 2012, p.78) Advocacy democracy (Dalton, Cain, Scarrow 2003, p.254) The great Fiscal democracy (Genschel and Schwartz 2013) degeneration of Multilateral democracy (Cheneval 2011) democracy Innovating democracy (Goodin 2008) (Ferguson 2012) Deliberative democracy (Elster 1998) Democracy in peril Empowered participatory democracy (Fung 2003) (Stiglitz 2013) Democracy across borders (Bohman 2007) Democracy in Technocracy (Stie 2012, Reck 2003) decline (James Reinvigorating democracy (Vibert 2007) 2014) Confidence trap (Runciman 2013) Democratic drift The future of representative democracy (Merkel 2011) (Flinders 2010) Democratic revolution (Schmitter) Democratic deficit Diffusion of democracy (Wejnert 2014) (Norris 2011) Democracy on trial (Elshtain 2005) Confidence gap The future of democracy (Bobbio 1987) (Lipset 1987) Changes for democracy (Morlino 2011) The captive state After the crisis (Bauman and Bordoni 2014) (Monbiot 2001) Muslim democracy (Cesari 2014) The crisis of Imagined democracies (Ezrahi 2012) democracy? Confucian democracy (Kim 2014) (Papadopoulos Democratic renewal (Marsh & Miller 2012) 2013) Consumer democracy (Scammell 2014) New democracies in crisis? (Blokker

18 2013) Democracy in decline? (Touraine 2000) Democracy in crisis (Preiss & Brunner 2013) The crisis of capitalist democracy (Posner 2013) Executive Unbound (Posner & Vermeule 2011) The Myth of Digital Democracy (Hindman 2008) Democracy at the crossroads (Ginsborg 2008) Democracy in Retreat (Kurlantzick 2013) Democratic malaise (Newton 2011) The Promise and Failure of Democracy (Williamson 2012) The death of democracy (Hertz 2002) The decline of representative democracy (Rosenthal 1998) The decadence of industrial democracies (Stiegler 2011) The crisis of parliamentary democracy (Schmitt 1988) Juristocracy (Hirschl 2004) Mediocracy (Tassano 2006) Hyperdemocracy (Heclo 1999)

19 Democracy’s drift (Rahe 2009) The trouble with democracy (Gaidner 2001) Beyond democracy (Karsten & Beckman 2012) Decline and fall of the American Empire (Greer 2014) The decline and fall of the American Republic (Ackerman 2010) Contesting democracy (Mueller 2013) “Terminal decline” of democracy (Burn-Murdoch 2012) Unpolitical democracy, populist democracy, and plebiscitarian demo cracy (Urbinati 2014) Carbon democracy (Mitchell 2013)

20 The Crisis of Democracy, Elitism and Diversity

There are multiple summaries of various models of democracy, but there are fewer comparative explorations of the models of the crisis of democracy. The models of the crisis of democracy look different but they are similar insofar as they all assume that the crisis is created, sustained or resolved by the elites. The models leave very little space for the autonomy to the public. One difference between these models is the degree to which they think that the elites control the public. The other more substantial difference lies in the realm and the method within which the elites create the crisis of democracy.

This chapter reviews four older models depicting various aspects of the crisis of democracy. These are Huntington’s model of “democratic excess,” Downs “marketplace democracy,” Lipset’s “confidence gap” and Schumpeter’s elitist model. While Schumpeter’s and Down’s models are not explicitly proper models of the crisis of democracy, they still provide valuable guiding questions for assessing more recent models of the crisis of democracy. From the discussion of all four models, I extrapolate six such questions: 1) what counts as institutional supply; 2) what counts as democratic demand; 3) what constitutes the crisis of democracy; 4) how does the

21 crisis arise?; 5) how is the crisis resolved; 6) who resolves the crisis? I then apply these questions to analyse five of the most prominent recent models of the crisis of democracy: Flinders’s bad-faith democracy, Manin’s audience democracy, Norris’s democratic deficit, Wolin’s managed democracy, Urbinati’s democracy disfigured. These six models serve as the centre around which I order other competing contemporary accounts of the crisis of democracy.

Figure 1: Outline of the Analysis of the Models of the Crisis of Democracy

Older Accounts of the Criteria: Recent Accounts of the Crisis of Democracy: What is supply? Crisis of Democracy: Flinders: Bad-Faith Huntington: Democratic democracy excess What is demand? What constitutes the Manin: Audience Downs: Marketplace crisis? democrcay democracy How does the crisis Norris: Democratic deficit Lipset: Confidence gap arise? How is the crisis Wolin: Managed Schumpeter: Elitist resolved? democracy democracy Who resolves the crisis? Urbinati: Democracy disfigured

It is much harder to prove that a model of democracy is elitist than it seems. As Dahl rightly points out in his “Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” it is much easier to accuse a model of being elitist than to prove that it actually is. According to Dahl, criticism of elitism is easy and appealing because for “individuals with a strong sense of frustrated idealism, it has just the right touch of hard-boiled cynicism.” But the biggest advantage of elitist critics is that “it can be cast in such a form as it is virtually impossible to disprove.” (Dahl 1958, p.463).

Dahl believes that all models which accuse democracy of being elitist should pass a test. The hypothesis of the existence of a ruling elite can be strictly tested only if: (1) The hypothetical ruling elite group is a well-defined group; (2) There is a fair number of cases in which the preferences of the ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group and (3) In such cases, the preferences of the ruling elite regularly prevail (Dahl 1958, p.466).

I take a slightly different route, which builds upon Dahl’s criteria for elitism. I review four models of the crisis of democracy and extrapolate from them additional criteria for determining whether a model is elitist and in what way a model is elitist. The four models include Huntington’s model of democratic overload, Downs’ model of marketplace democracy, Lipset’s confidence gap and Schumpeter’s minimalist democracy. Schumpeter’s model is not a proper model of a crisis of democracy, but a minimalist conception of democracy. I still include it as a reference point because of

22 the telling conceptual boundaries it poses for delineating later models of the crisis of democracy.

I believe that these models suggest six guiding questions to understanding whether democracy us elitist or not. These questions are summarized in figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Criteria for Assessing the Crisis of Democracy Criteria Huntington Downs Lipset Schumpeter What is 1. Politicians’ 1. Politicians’ Politicians’ Politicians’ supply? performance performance performance virtue 2. Politicians’ promises What is What people What people How people Demand is demand? want from the expect from perceive the manufactured government the government’s by supply. government performance What Public demand Public Present Politicians’ constitutes the is bigger than expectations performance is morale crisis? healthy are raised worse than past deteriorates institutional above possible performance supply institutional supply How does the Public demand Politicians External events Politicians crisis arise? rises up cause the crisis because of its because they concentration are self- interested How is the Politicians Politicians unclear unclear crisis ignore the make less resolved? public unrealistic promises Who resolves Politicians Politicians Neither the unclear the crisis? politicians nor the public

One of the problems of differentiating between various models of democracy is that they do not use the same terminology or, alternatively, they use the same terminology but impute different meaning in it. That is why, in an effort to position the models on a common ground, I sustain Dahl’s terminology of supply and demand of representation in politics. Some of the newest models of the crisis of democracy, such as Flinders’ and Dommett (2013), also use the supply and demand terminology successfully.

The difference between these four archetypes of the crisis of democracy lie in the way they perceive what constitutes the public demand for representation and the public supply for representation and the way they perceive how the interaction between supply and demand give rise the democratic crisis.

23 I suggest that the most recent depictions of the crisis of democracy are mostly related to Schumpeter’s or Downs’s models, but not so much to Lipset’s or Huntington’s. In the neo-Downs model of the crisis of democracy, politicians unnecessary inflate the public demands. Demands are here understood as expectations. In a neo- Schumpeterian model of democracy, politicians reduce the supply of representation, where supply is understood as virtue. Demand has very little place in this model. In Lipset’s model of the confidence gap, politicians change the supply of representation, but here supply is understood as performance, not as virtue as in the Schumpeterian model. Finally, in Huntington’s model of “democratic overload,” the public piles up too many expectations on the government. Huntington’s and Lipset’s models find less common ground with the latest conceptualizations of democracy than those of Schumpeter and Downs. I will review these models briefly and then I will turn to the current models of crisis of democracy.

But there is another important difference that these models suggest four different visions between the diversity of public will and elitism.

Figure 3: Relationship between Diversity and Public demand

Passive vs. Active Demands (Lipset)

Greater vs. Smaller Demands (Downs)

Diversity Diverse vs Homogenous Demands (Huntington)

Demands are irrelevant (Schumpeter)

Part I: Four Older Models of the Crisis of Democracy: What are the Main Criteria for a Crisis?

Archetype 1 of Crisis of Democracy: “Democratic Overload” by Huntington (1973)

In the seminal “Report of the Trilateral Commission,” Huntington and his colleagues diagnose “an excess of democracy,” not “a deficit of democracy” (Norris 2011). Guiding in the report is the idea that there is a “democratic overload.” The overload stems from the better organization and higher concentration of groups in society which find it easier to press their demands on the government. Concentration of public demands leads to lack of governability of society. The weakening of

24 governability of society and the resulting weakening of social control constitute the two major pillars of the “democratic distemper.”

The “overload” on the government is detrimental because it leads the government to expand its role in the economy and society, which in term leads to negative consequences. Huntington says, for example, that “inflation is the economic disease of democracies.” He says that because of competitive elections, the government cannot curtail spending because of the pressures from lobby groups, labour unions and beneficiaries of government largess. For the authors of the Trilateral Report, the chief problem is that the democratic overload makes it hard for the politicians not to adhere to public demands. “This expansion is attributed not so much to the strength of the government as to its weakness and the inability and unwillingness of central political leaders to reject the demands made upon them by numerically and functionally important groups in their society” (Huntington et al 1973, p.164).

Huntington suggests two solutions to the crisis of democratic overload. Both of these solutions can be considered elitist. They are elitist in form because they involve the active role of the elites and they are elitist in substance as they cut down democratic control. The first scenario is when “claims of expertise, experience and special talents may overcome the claims of democracy as a way of constituting authority. Second, the effective operation of a democratic political system requires some degree of apathy and non-involvement on the part of some groups” (Hind 2010, p.82).12

Archetype 2 of the Crisis of Democracy: “Marketplace Democracy” by Downs (1957)

Anthony Downs is probably the earliest predecessor of applying the economic theory of supply and demand to politics. According to Downs, the politicians are suppliers of ideologies in the electoral market of voters. Voters “shop” for policy preferences. As politicians want to win more voters, the politicians are embroiled in a bidding war. Politicians make increasingly more generous promises to the public. Thus the politicians increase artificially the voters’ expectations only for the elected party to renege upon them or to fail to fulfil them. Thus economic theory explains the “discrepancy” between pre-election political rhetoric and subsequent post-election performance.13

The elitist character of this model is debateable. On the one hand, the preferences of the elites may be constructed by the public as the elites try to win more votes. On the other hand, the expectations of the public are set by the elites. For the purposes of assessing the elitism of Downs’s “marketplace democracy,” it is important to understand the motives of the politicians. The purported gap between the inflated promises and their post-election performance is driven by the self-interest of the elites. Downs notes that self-interestedness is the key to understanding economic models of politics: “Every agent is motivated to carry out his social function

12 The Return of the Public: Democracy, Power and the Case for Media Reform By Dan Hind 13 Downs summarized by Flinders, p.57; See also Anthony Downs.1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy. Vol.65, No.2, pp.135-150.

25 motivated by his desire to earn income, not by any desire to serve others…any attempt to construct a theory without regarding the motives of those who run the government must be regarded as inconsistent with the main body of economic analysis” (Downs 1957, p.136). If we accept that “marketplace democracy” allows he elites to use the public as a way of asserting their self-interest, then this is an elitist model.14

Figure 4: Downs: Marketplace Democracy

S2 D2 s e s i m o r Deficit P

=

D

D1 S1

S = Performance

Archetype 3 of Crisis of Democracy: Confidence Gap (Lipset 1987)

Lipset describes the “confidence gap” as a decline in the public perception of government performance in comparison to the public perception of previous government performance. The key point here is that this decline in the public perception is not caused by any changes to the social structure, as in Huntington’s model of “democratic overload.” Neither is the gap driven by the manipulation of the elites of the public’s expectations as in Downs’s model. The gap is beyond the elites’ or the public’s reach: “A striking characteristic of the decline of confidence is that it is almost entirely related to events beyond people’s own personal experience: conflicts, scandals, protests, and failures that affect their own lives indirectly at all” (Lipset, p.8).

Accoridng to Lipset, the decline in faith occurred most rapidly between 1964 and 1975. It is connected to President Johnson’s decisive escalation of the Vietnam War in February 1965, the first racial disorder in Watts, California in July 1965, the Gulf of Tonkin crisis in August 1965 and specially the Watergate revelations between 1972

14 There are many possible objections to this approach, though.

26 and 1974. The influence of class and age is diminishing overall. The gap is the difference in the people’s evaluations about the performance of the government before and after these events.

Figure 5: Lipset: Confidence Gap n o i t a t

n D e s e r p e R

r o f

d

n S1 a m e D

c i t

a S2 r c o m e D Institutional Supply of Representation

Archetype 6 of Crisis of Democracy: Elitist Democracy by Schumpeter (1976) In the most supply-centred model of democracy, Schumpeter suggests that democracy is not the crossover point between supply and demand but just a competition for voters between the politicians, whom he calls “entrepreneurs.” Schumpeter does not present a model democracy rather than a model of the crisis of democracy. 15

Nevertheless, I incorporate his model of minimalist or leadership democracy as a prototypical archetype of democracy, which can be useful for assessing contemporary critiques of democracy. In Schumpeter’s elitist version of democracy, the electorate makes very limited decisions about policies. Schumpeter’s model is different from those of Downs, Lipset or Huntington because it attributes no significant place for the demand side of representation. The public will is absent, expect during elections. The quality of democracy depends on the supply of democracy. The supply of democracy decreases when the politicians degenerate in moral character. Supply is maintained when “the human material of politics-the people who man the party

15 Michels, Pareto

27 machines, are elected to serve in parliament, rise to cabinet office- should be of sufficiently high quality,” “there should be a well-trained bureaucracy of good standing and tradition endowed with a good sense of duty and a no less strong esprit de corps”, and thirdly, “electorates and parliaments must be on an intellectual and moral level high enough.”16

Figure 6: Schumpeter: Minimalist Democracy

S1 S2

Solution

D

For Schumpeter, the will of the people is unimportant. The public will is manufactured by the elites. This is quite different from Huntington’s overload thesis, which attributes a great negative role to public demand. In this aspect, Schumpeter differs from Downs as Schumpeter does not believe that the politicians spend a great effort at shaping the public’s expectations. Finally, Schumpeter’s vision is also different from Lipset’s, because Lipset thinks that government performance is shaped by extraneous factors, whereas Schumpeter is concerned with their moral virtue of the politicians and their sense of public calling.

According to Schumpeter, people are irrational, ignorant, undiscerning, “infantile” and “primitive again” when they need to decide on public matters (Schumpeter, p.234-235). This state of human nature allows interested groups and politicians “to fashion and, within very wide limits, even to create the will of the people” (Schumpeter, p.235). Schumpeter argues that the old doctrine of the general will has been preserved for four reasons. First, it fits well with Christian doctrine of equality. Second, it accidentally coincided with historical developments that have received the approval of big majorities, such as in the United State. Third, the doctrine of the general will fits well with the social patterns of small peasants societies, such as Switzerland. Fourth, it allows the politicians to flatter the masses, for evading responsibility and crushing the opponents in the name of the people” (Schumpeter, p.237-240). If we have to speculate, Schumpeter’s model of the crisis of democracy would entail a scenario where the politicians’ virtue degenerates.

16 Schumpeter, pp.257-260

28 Part II: Contemporary Models of the Crisis of Democracy

Flinders (2012): Bad-Faith Democracy Flinders’s model of “bad-faith democracy” or “democratic drift” (2009) derives from Down’s model of marketplace democracy. Flinders suggests the following: “Imagine for a moment two horizontal bars placed one above the other with a significant gap between them. The upper bar relates to demand17 and specifically to the promises that politicians may have made in order to be elected (in addition to the public’s expectations of what politics and the state could and should deliver). The bottom line relates to supply in terms of what the political system can realistically deliver given the complexity of the challenges, the contradictory nature of many requests and the resources with which it can seek to satisfy demand. The distance between the two bars is the expectations gap.’18 Whereas Downs argues that electoral competition is the reason why political parties inflate the public’s expectations, it is not exactly clear why the public has such high expectations in the “performance gap” and the “expectations gap” models.

Flinders’ model, which seeks the root cause of the democratic deficit in the inflated expectations of the citizens is in sharp contrast to the notion of “disaffected democracies” advanced by Pharr and Putnam. The latter contend that “some commentators may tell their fellow citizens that the problem is “just in your head”- a function of unrealistic expectations rather than deteriorating performance- but we are inclined to think that our political systems are not, in fact, performing well.” (Pharr & Putnam 2000, p.27). Flinders’ model is demand-centred. Pharr’s and Putnam’s model is supply-centred.

Flinders offers to reduce the expectations gap by more civic education and by more community conscious journalism. More recently, Flinders and Dommett suggest that deliberative forums may be another avenue for reducing what they call “performance gap."19

17 Italics for both “supply” and “demand” in the original. 18 Flinders 2012. Defending Politics. Oxford University Press., p.57 19 Dommett and Flinders 2013, Gap Analysis

29 Figure 6: Flinders: Bad-Faith Democracy

D1 Solution

Gap D2

S

Kurlantzick also says that part of the problem is that young democracies have very high expectations that democracy will bring prosperity and equality. In many cases these expectations have not been met. Whereas for Downs the difference in expectations comes from the time before and after the elections, and for Flinders the difference in expectations probably lies in civic education, Kurlantzick suggests that the difference in expectations springs from what people hear about democracy abroad and the democracy they perceive to have at home. But Kurlantzick is equally emphatic about the central role of expectations: “As in a political campaign, then, managing the public’s expectations in an emerging democracy is critical to maintaining public’s support and preventing “authoritarian nostalgia” (Kurlantzick, .211). Again, Kurlantzick offers a solution to this problem that is driven by elites. The country’s rulers as well as international power-holders should tone down expectations in your democracies. He thinks, for example, that the Obama administration and the Bush administration should have worked with developing nation’s leaders to manage and moderate their citizens’ expectations (Kurlantzick 2013, p.182).

Colin Hay believes that the real trouble with democracy is that people do not have an appreciation for what politicians do.20 On the surface Hay’s model may seem like a far cry from Flinder’s, Dommett’s and Downs’ models, but in fact they present the two sides of the same coin. Lack of appreciation of what the government does and unrealistic expectation of what the government should do are probably related.

Hay thinks that people do not appreciate politicians because of the intellectual ideas that inform contemporary public discourse. This is a very different conception of the rise of the expectation gap from the electoral dynamics outlined by Downs. Hay traces public disenchantment to the role of public choice theory in political life. Public choice theory demonized politics and the political in narrating the crisis of the 1970s, and at the same time, coupled with neoliberalism, helped portray politicians as

20 This argument is developed by Flinders in his book “Defending Politics”

30 instrumental, rational and self-serving (Hay 2007, pp. 95-100). Hay’s conception of the determinants of the public will is endogenous because what drives the gap is the influence of a group of scholars.

Hay is not the only one to attribute such importance to political ideas in shaping the demands of the public. In the “Report of the Trilateral Commission on The Crisis of Democracy”, the authors complain of the destructive influence of intellectuals because intellectuals “assert their disgust with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy and with the subservience of democratic government to “monopoly capitalism” (Duthel, p.52)21. Intellectuals constitute “a challenge to democratic government which is, potentially at least, as serious as those posed in the past by aristocratic cliques, fascist movements and communist parties.” (Hind 2010, p.80)

In his book “Contesting Democracy,” Mueller reminds us that the destructive role of intellectuals was often brought up by proponents of the “systems theory.” Helmut Shelsky, for example, “derided intellectuals as a “new class of high priests” trying to gain power while “others are actually doing the work” (Mueller, p.205).

Norris (2011): Democratic Deficit

Norris presents a model of the democratic deficit. The democratic deficit is the difference between the actual performance of the representative system and the people’s principled support for the ideal type of representative system. Democratic deficit is defined as the mean difference between (i) and (ii), where (i) measures democratic aspirations and (ii) measures democratic satisfaction.

(i) Democratic aspirations: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? (ii) Democratic satisfaction: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today?

Figure 7: Norris: Democratic deficit

21 The trilateral commission and the new world order By Heinz Duthel

31 D1

D2

S2 Gap Solution

S1

Both Flinders and Norris believe that supply falls short of the expectations, and they both seek the solutions in reducing the democratic deficit in education and the media. But there are two important differences in regard to the effects of mediatisation and education. Flinders uses them to reduce demand, whereas Norris uses them to simultaneously reduce demand and increase supply. Contrary to Flinders, Norris is a strong believer in the salacious effects of media information. She is a proponent of the virtuous circle of news, where media exposure makes citizens more informed members of the electorate. Thus media exposure affects both the supply and demand. Norris argues that “regular exposure to television and radio news strengthened democratic aspirations and (italics mine) satisfaction with democracy, thereby reducing the democratic deficit.”22 By contrast, Flinders believes that the media corrupt the electorate. So whereas Flinders wants to reduce negative media exposure to reduce the level of unrealistic expectations, Norris accentuates media exposure to make citizens more informed in electing their rulers.

Flinders and Norris retain the same difference in regard to education. Flinders uses education to make voters more realistic and reduce demand. Norris uses education to enlighten voters. Her research implies that education will not only make people’s expectations more realistic but it will also feed into a more quality supply of representation. Ironically, Huntington also wants to resolve the democratic overload through education but not by increasing education, as in the case of Flinders and Norris, but by reducing it. Huntington believes that educated people unnecessarily overload the government. Education could be considered an elitist way to reduce demand because education could, under certain conditions, be engineered by the elites. As Rosenthal points out, “it may appear elitist, politically incorrect and practically foolish to even think about educating the public in politics.” (Rosenthal 1998, p.340). If we take Rosenthal’s statement at face value, we can argue that these three models of the crisis of democracy, the “expectations gap,” the “democratic deficit” and the “democratic overload,” are elitist in terms of the solutions they offer for resolving the crisis. This applies to a smaller extent to Flinders and Dommett who also suggest the deliberative forums as a a much elitist alternative solution.

22 Norris, chapter 8, p.1

32 Manin (1997): Audience Democracy

In his model of “audience democracy,” Manin argues that citizens can only watch how the ruling elites are governing. Media experts have replaced the party democrats at the helm of the nation-state but this has not shortened the distance between the rulers and ruled, which Manin defines as the major gap in audience democracy. Media are more central in Manin’s perception of the origins of the crisis than in the previous models reviewed here. Manin says that there is no “sign that those elites are in a position to inspire feelings of identification on the side if voters. More than the substitution of one elite with another, it is the persistence, possibly even the aggravation, of the gap between the governed and the governing elite that has provoked a sense if crisis.”23

Figure 8: Manin: Audience Democracy

Solution S

D2 D1

Manin suggests that demand mostly derives from supply. In contrast to the previous authors who apply Downs’ economic theory to democracy, Manin argues that “in politics, there is no such thing as a demand independent of supply. “When a citizen enters what may be called the political market, his preferences are usually not already formed; they develop through listening to public debates. In politics, demand is not

23 Manin, p.233

33 exogenous; in general, preferences do not exist prior to the action of the politicians.”24 For Manin, this elitist model of democracy is inevitable but still oligarchic.

Manin’s concept of the public demand is similar to Schumpeter’s idea of the manufactured will. However, unlike Manin who believes that the democratic gap can be reduced by refining the will through deliberation, Schumpeter has no faith in refining it. Schumpeter thinks that “the general citizen drops down to a lower level of performance as long as he enters the political field.”25 This is so because people tend to displace ignorance and lack of judgement about things that do not directly concern them like family, neighbours and local matters. Various people with selfish agendas take advantage of this weakness of human nature and manufacture the will by staging shows, political advertising, selecting and defining the issues for public choice. Again unlike Manin, Schumpeter does not think that deliberation or greater initiative on the side of the people can rescue the will. It is beyond rescue. Finally, unlike Manin, Schumpeter does not believe that people choose leaders for their overall programs.26 To him, politics is exclusively image-based.

Although Manin is the most recent and popular thinker who uses the notion of audience democracy, the roots of “audience democracy” can be traced to the concept of “spectator democracy” coined by Lippman in 1922. Contrary to Manin, Lippman is really supportive of the idea of the people as mere spectators: “People have to be atomized and segregated and alone. They're not supposed to organize, because then they might be something beyond spectators of action. They might actually be participants if many people with limited resources could get together to enter the political arena. That's really threatening” (Chomsky paraphrasing Lippman 2002, p.26).

Lippman thinks that “there are two "functions" in a democracy: The specialized class, the responsible men, carry out the executive function, which means they do the thinking and planning and understand the common interests. Then, there is the bewildered herd, and they have a function in democracy too. Their function in a democracy, [Lippmann] said, is to be "spectators," not participants in action. But they have more of a function than that, because it's a democracy. Occasionally they are allowed to lend their weight to one or another member of the specialized class. In other words, they're allowed to say, "We want you to be our leader" or "We want you to be our leader." That's because it's a democracy and not a totalitarian state. That's called an election. But once they've lent their weight to one or another member of the specialized class they're supposed to sink back and become spectators of action, but not participants. That's in a properly functioning democracy. (Lippman in Chomsky 2002, p.23).

Ranciere disagrees that spectators are passive. He puts forth the idea of the “emancipated spectator.” Ranciere argues that “the spectator also acts…She observes, selects, compares, interprets. She links what she sees to a host of other things that she has seen on other stages, in other kinds of places.” (Ranciere 2011, p.13). Greene, in a more positive version of “ocular democracy” than that of Manin’s

24 Manin, p.225 25 Schumpeter, p.235 26 Manin 1987, p.358

34 “audience democracy,” argues that the distance between the rulers and the spectators should not be cancelled, neutralised or reduced, because such a goal is unrealistic. Instead, it should be accepted that the power-holders should recompensate the spectators by exposing themselves to the public in the so-called candour moments of unmanaged surveillance (Greene 2010, p.20-22). In a similar vein, Zumbrunnen (2008) attributes a more active role to non-vocal citizens by distinguishes the "silence of contending voices" from the "collective silence of the demos."

According to Manin, to counteract these oligarchic forces in “audience democracy,” demand should be made more independent of supply. “One way of making the demand is more independent is by allowing the people to have more say in constructing the party’s programs and in allowing the possibility that in a media democracy based on images of the politicians, the images still carry information about the candidates overall platforms” (Manin 1987, p.358.) But the other major way of refining and enforcing the demand is deliberation. Constructing the demand through the process of deliberation by the electorate imparts legitimacy to the democracy that it would not have, had it been only a mere competition by the politicians.

Wolin (2010): Managed democracy

In Wolin’s “managed democracy,” the corporate elite, lobbyists and the high degree of media concentration subjugate the public. “Managed democracy” is created by elites but this subjugation is veiled. Wolin says that the United States democracy is managed without appearing to be suppressed because the elite classes have not directly imposed their will and eliminated the opposition. Instead, the elite’s oppression has arisen due to less visible processes and phenomena, such as concentrated wealth, private education and !a regime ideology of capitalism which is just as undisputed as a Nazi doctrine.” In fact, the origins of “managed democracy” may be so well concealed as to point to be classified as exogenous independent factors in manipulating the public will.

But the elite have a more direct and endogenous role in managed democracy than it seems. Wolin believes that “the genius of the Republican Party is to perceive the possibilities present in these systematizing and dynamic institutions” and to exploit them. Therefore, the role of the political party in manipulating these instruments is decisive. Wolin also says the elite’s deliberate use of the rhetoric of terror in the aftermath of the September 11 events de-politicised the public, made it exclusively interested in its security only and made it obedient, “willing collaborators and conscious accomplices” (Wolin 2010, p.76).

Wolin’s vision of the public demand or the public will is very peculiar. Wolin thinks that the public is disconnected and fragmented in an exactly the opposite way in which it is totalised in totalitarianism. “Instead of collectivism, inverted totalitarianism thrives on disaggregation... Classical totalitarianism mobilized its subjects; inverted totalitarianism fragments them.” Wolin contends that “the Nazis were primarily interested in a “mass” opinion, a monolithic expression of the citizens…In contrast, the American method is to prepare for elections by first splintering the electorate into distinct categories, such as “between 20 and 35 years

35 old,” or “white male over 40”… The effect is to accentuate what separates citizens, to plant suspicions and thereby further promote demobilization” (Wolin 2010, p.196).

As a result of this fragmentation, the public becomes apolitical, passive, estranged and concerned with its own pursuits. In this way, the despot does not actively destroy the citizens, but it “enervates and dazes them.” As a result, the citizen chooses to relinquish participatory politics. The ruling elite uses the vast space and distance between the citizens as a way to make majorities “disaggregated and incoherent”(p.234). Wolin goes back to Madison’s view that “geographical expanse, ideological differences, and socioeconomic complexity will… splinter the demos… and thereby prevent it permanently27 from gaining unity of purpose.”

Urbinati (2014): Disfigurement of Democracy Wolin’s view of the reasons why the public is passive are diametrically opposed to those of Urbinati’s which she lays out in her account of the “disfigurement of democracy.” Urbinati believes that the passivity of the public springs not from its fragmentation but from its unification. Unpolitical democracy, which is one of the three forms of disfigurement of democracy, “dislodges the doxa from democratic politics and makes it a diarchy of will and reason, populism takes advantage of the doxa as an active strategy of hegemonic unification of the people…; and plebiscitarianism…makes doxa the name of crafted images unfurled by video technicians” (Urbinati, p.8). Urbinati is especially emphatic about how populism converts the people as a “unified body” (137) and a “homogenous” actor. To her, unification of the people is the first step to simplification that “narrows the possibility of a space of communication” and increases polarization (132) and subjugation (p.137).

Huntington’s vision of the public differs from those of Wolin and Urbinati. Whereas Wolin believes that the passivity of the public comes from fragmentation, Huntington thinks that it comes from “concentration.” Whereas Urbinati thinks that the passivity of the electorate comes from unification, Huntington thinks that unification strengthens, rather than enervates the public, thus making it unnecessarily demanding. Contrary to Urbinati, Huntington believes that concentration requires more rather than less control: “dispersion, fragmentation and simple ranking have been replaced by concentration, interdependence and a complex texture… Because of the basic importance of the contemporary complex social structure, its management has a crucial importance, which raises the problem of social control over the individual” (Huntington et al, p.21).

Several accounts of the crisis of democracy fit the models suggested by Wolin and Urbinati. In “The Promise and Failure of Democracy,” Williamson suggests that one of the chief problems with democracy is that the public is homogenous: “The Western publics are nearly identical with each other, skin colour excepted, largely homogenous. They are what the classless society looks like… In the short run, this is a good thing for liberalism, but it is disastrous for democracy” (Williamson 2012, p.128).

27 Italics in the original.

36 Ginsborg (2008) adds one more culprit for the total subjugation of the public will. He says that the transnational firms are “juggernauts in economic performance but dinosaurs in terms of democracy…In their shadow, the individual citizen feels powerless and dependent at the same time” (Ginsborg 2008, p.42). Ginsborg points to another causal mechanism for making the public passive- providing economic incentives for making individuals close off in their private lives. According to Ginsborg, consumer capitalism, which is a compensation for the powerlessness inflicted by globalization, made citizens “overwhelmingly privatised in their habits, thoughts and daily practices” (Ginsborg 2008, p.42).

Similarly to Wolin, Crouch defines “post-democracy” as a regime where “the political elites have learned to manage and manipulate popular demands; where people have to be persuaded to vote by top-down publicity campaigns.” (Crouch, p.19-20). In his book “Democracy in Decline,” James Allan (2013) says that democracy has been diluted in the world's oldest democracies and that lawyers, judges, and international bureaucrats use special tactics to deny that any decline has occurred. Rhetoric, disinformation and hypocrisy are the main tools that elites use to conceal the reality of declining democracy from the public. In “The Rise and Fall of the American Republic,” Ackerman similarly suggests that the American presidency dominates the political scene with formidable powers of mass manipulation (Ackerman 2010, p. 67).

Wolin’s and Urbinati’s camp is also joined by the critics of technocracy and unpolitical democracy. Those sceptics believe that the rise of technocratic government is engendered by self-serving elites. For example, Hirschl is very critical of juristocracy, because he believes that judicial empowerment through constitutionalization is a process that is meant to insulate the policy preferences of hegemonic elites from the vicissitudes of democratic politics (Hirschl, p.16). In decrying juristocry, Hirschl advances a very elitist version of the ascendance of judiciary, in which there is very little space for public opinion. He discards conventional evolutionary theories, functionalist explanations and institutional economics models and favours instead the strategic approach and the hegemonic preservation thesis. Both theses are elitist, where the power-holders favour increased judicial intervention in politics only that will serve their interests (Hirschl, p.39). By another “thick” strategic explanation posits that judicial empowerment is a by-product of a strategic interplay between various elites (Hirschl, p.43). Similarly to Hirschl, Blokker (2013) argues that the democratic promise of 1989 largely lost out to a technocratic and top-down view of judicial control of politics and that this state of affairs was reinforced by EU accession.

Urbinati’s critique of unpoltiical democracy would probably be quite compatible with the Maravall and Przeworski’s thesis that in a “pluralistic society” which presses its demands via legal and extra-legal means and a government that tries to be responsive to “such a cacophony of complaints and aspirations, for one thing, risks collapsing into incoherence” (Maravall & Przeworski 2003, p.23). The authors propound that members of politically influential and well-organized groups will always receive much better legal protection than less-well organized and less wealthy groups. In short, judicialisation of politics always serves the dominant groups. It reinstates rather than challenges the status quo. This scenario is bound to unravel because “a few well-organized social networks monopolize political access and turn law into an instrument increasingly useful to themselves but decreasingly useful to fellow citizens

37 who belong to poorly organized and politically voiceless strata” (Maravall & Przeworski 2003, p.23).28

This damning critique of the rising power of the non-political and judicial organs in democracy is prevalent but not uncontested. The alternative view argues that “the rise of the unelected is not a danger to democracy. On the contrary, their rise has the potential to make democratic systems of government more robust” (Vibert 2007, p.2).

Part IV: Implications of the Models of the Crisis of Democracy

The above five depictions of democratic crisis differ along several important dimensions that predetermine their responses to the solutions of the democratic crisis. Despite these differences, however, there are two very deep and consequential similarities. The first similarity is that the concept of the institutional supply of representation is a given, and is static. Except for Schumpeter and Norris in very limited ways, none of the theories envisions shortening the gap by changing the supply. The second similarity is that the concept of demand for representation is assumed to be endogenous to the system. This means that public demand can be educated, enlightened, denigrated, molested, in short- demand is malleable. All of the models above envision curtailing the deficit either by boosting or suppressing the demand.

We can probably say that models of the crisis of democracy share two basic assumptions: Assumption 1: The demand for representation is endogenously determined by the elites. Assumption 2: The supply of representation is homogenous and static.

Assumption One: The Demands of the Public are Endogenously Determined by Elites In the majority of the models discussed above, public demand is endogenous to the model. This means that demand can be educated, enlightened, marginalised, in short it is something that can be constructed. All of the models of democracy seek to reduce the democratic deficit by changing the demand. Norris wants to make the public more informed and more active in politics through the “virtual circle” of the news. For Flinders, the problem is that the public has unrealistically high expectations of the supply. Flinders wants to decrease the public demand by educating the public in civic values and by fostering more community oriented journalism.

Huntington, similarly to Flinders, wants to make people less educated so that they do not overburden the procedures of the democratic process. Manin seeks to refine the public demand through deliberation. For example Manin, basing his argument on Herber Simon, argues that demand is endogenous because the public lacks complete

28 Maravall and Przeworski implicitly evoke the Hobbsian rationale for the unifying role of the sovereign in conditions of fear for one’s physical life. They contend that the incentives of the ruling elites do not depend on the organization capacities of the excluded groups, unless there is a hostile international power and the elites depend on physical control of a piece of territory.

38 information; its set of preferences is incomplete and incoherent.29 Norris defines the demand as the general appreciation of the public for living in a democracy but the source of that appreciation remains unclear. The implication is that the initial set of preferences of the citizens at the moment when they enter the representative democracy is far less important than what happens after they enter the moment of election.30

Assumption Two: The Supply of representation is homogenous and static.

All of the models described above envision a static supply. Lipset is the only one who implicitly envisions a resolution of the confidence gap by a better performance of the government. Flinders defines three options for reducing the perception gap: “option 1: increasing supply”, “option 2: reducing demand”, and “option three: a combination of option 1 and option 2” Flinders goes on to say that “the essential point… is that although Option 1 (i.e. increasing supply) may have provided the default position for politicians throughout the twentieth century, it is no longer feasible.”

To Flinders, there are three ways for increasing supply. The first option is through increasing the public goods provided by the government to the public. Flinders says that this is not an option because economic resources have been exhausted, “the global financial crisis, population growth, the emergence of a new world order, and the demands of addressing climate change conspire to ensure that politics in the future must focus on reducing demand rather than increasing the supply of public goods.” In addition, he says that “option 1 is simply not viable because the public’s demands are insatiable, the problems facing society are too complex, the available resources are insufficient, and although managerial reforms within the public sector may deliver marginal efficiency savings, they will never close the gap.”31

Flinders says that the second option for increasing supply is through delegation and electoral accountability, which is imperfect but satisfactory: “it is possible to argue that the democratic promise provides a fairly direct and responsive chain of delegation…we live in a democracy where it is possible to elect our rulers, to hold them to account (albeit imperfectly) and ultimately “kick the rascals out.” That is why his solution for closing the expectations’ gap is through reducing the public’s expectations.

Challenges to Assumption One: “The supply of representation homogenous.”

There is one very central question that seems to be overlooked amid the diversity of accounts of the decline of democracy- who are the elites that subjugate and dominate the public will? To Manin, the elites are the charismatic media people. To Wolin and Crouch, the elites are the corporate class. To the critics of global democracy, the elites are the supranational bodies. To Urbinati, the media, the technocrats and the demagogues are three additional distinct types of elites. In reality, all of these elites coexist. That is why the newest accounts of the crisis of democracy need to give an account of how the rise of new elites changes the nature of democratic politics.

29 Manin 1987, pp.348-350 30 Only Easton’s model allows for a more exogenous vision of public demand. 31 Flinders, p.59

39 One of the reasons why current accounts of democracy tend to talk about a single elite rather than multiple elites is that they make the assumption that the economic and political elites overlap. Parry notes that the distribution of political resources is not equally distributed and that political resources in kind, such as wealth, race, education. Parry’s chide point is that “whereas elitist see the control of such resources as always cumulative, Dahl does not believe this to be true of polyarchies. Wealth does not necessarily give rise to political power nor does social status to economic power” (Parry 1969, p.112). The determining issue here is to what extent the elites overlap and how they interact.

For the purposes of this chapter, it is interesting to explore how the very fact of the multiplicity of elites makes it possible for the public to make its own demands, rather than the elites to construct the public demand. There are four ways in which this can be done.

First, different types of elites increase the likelihood that the conflicts would come before the public. According to the Manin/Przeworksi model, sparring elites took their grievances to the courts when they could not settle their disputes in the political arena. But if the conflict is not between two contending political elites but between a political elite and a media elite, or between a technocratic elite or a supranational body, then the likelihood that their difference will flare up in public is even greater. This is so that different types of elites do not have a priori one single arena for resolving their differences.

Second, the public benefits from the multiplicity of elites because it is likely to create a greater “clarity of visibility.” Whitten and Powell (1993) contend that institutional ambiguity camouflages responsibility for policymaking decisions and outcomes and thus hampers citizens’ ability to express their discontent by voting politicians out of office. An independently elected Congress and an independently elected presidency will each have their own institutional incentives to hold the other branch accountable and to defend their its turf. The multiplicity of elites may follow a similar logic.

Third, the multiplicity of elites might open up a bigger opportunity for greater monitoring by the public because no single elite can monopolize the public discourse. Greene contends that during most of the time the elites control their image in the public space. This is Manin’s worry as well. However, according to Greene, the constant presence of elites in the media space makes them more prone to being caught off-guard. He calls these moments of truth “candid moments.” It seems that the multiplicity of elites may even further increase the chance for a candid moment as they will constantly pry on each other.

Fourth, one of the defining features of elitist theories of democracy is that the elites are “conspirational” (Parry 1969, p.118). One could suggest that the existence of many elites makes it harder for them to collude against the public. If before elites which master “wealth”, “class” and “education” could collude, today elites which master the media, international institutions, technocratic knowledge, corporate wealth and mass support will be hard pressed to reach a consensus.

40 The Transformation of Democracy and Connectivity

Accounts of the transformation of democracy abound. The latest models of the transformation of democracy can be grouped in four general categories. The first and probably most salient category attributes prior importance to globalization. It includes conceptions of “cosmopolitan,” “global” (Archibugi et al 2012), “transnational” (Held 1999), “stakeholders” (Macdonald 2012), “plurinational democracy,” (Keating 2004), “international democracy” (Wendt 1999) and “associative democracy” (Traegardh 2013). The second category attributes great importance to the media and technological innovation. It comprises of conceptions, such as “e-democracy” (Della Porta 2013) and “the electronic republic” (Grossman 2000). The third category attributes the transformation of democracy not so much to new causes as to the demise of the old factors that sustained representative democracy. These are conceptions of “post-representative” democracy (Greene 2012), “post-broadcast” democracy (Prior 2007), “post-party” democracy (Mair 2004) and “post-national” democracy (Habermas 2001). The fourth category boldly looks forward to a totally new stage in democratic development. This is the category of “counter-democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008) and “monitory democracy” (Keane 2013).

The scholars who tend to perceive the transformation rather than the crisis of democracy are united in the idea that the newest manifestation of democracy is driven by the people rather than the elites. The transformation of democracy carves out a very limited space for manipulation by the political elites. Transformation is a bottom-up process. It begins with the fragmentation of the public will. The crucial point is that transformationists do not see the fragmentation of the public as a final

41 and regrettable state, as the critics do. Instead, fragmentation provides new opportunities for reconfiguration of the public will. The public will gains its autonomy precisely because smaller fragments can coordinate and rise up easier. A fragmented public will provides greater opportunities for new constellations. Old cleavages could have served the political elites better but a fragmented society does not let itself to similar manipulation. The fragmented public will is intractable. It is good news for transformationists and bad news for the political elites. Connectivity is the most defining aspect of the transformation of democracy.

Therefore, good theories of the transformation of democracy must show that fragmentation leads to connectivity that is meaningful and makes the public more autonomous. Therefore, such theories come in two stages: they show that the old cleavages have dissipated and then they show that the new configuration of the public will lends itself to more sanguine accounts of democracy.

Good theories of the transformation of democracy also show that the changes that they describe actually amount to a transformation, not to a mere change of democracy. They demonstrate that the developments are indeed transformative, i.e. they make a qualitative difference. Dunn (2005) speaks of democracy’s first and second coming. Can we really speak of democracy’s third coming? Warren talks about democracy’s second transformation. Is today’s democracy experiencing a third transformation? Huntington names three waves of democratization. Is this really the fourth such wave (Howard & Hussein 2013)? Schmitter lays out the stage for a democratic revolution, but is today’s transformation really on the scale of the Dahlian or post-Dahlian revolution? Do the Arab world revolutions, the Orange Revolution and the many protests throughout Eastern and Western Europe ultimately add up to a democratic revolution on the scale of the American and the French Revolutions? Or are they merely political revolutions that do not change the fabric of society and do not challenge the place of the state? Do these revolutions point to a democratic deficit (Elbadawi & Makdisi 2010), not to a democratic transformation?

This chapter begins to lay out the agenda for a research which seeks to uncover the causal factors, the linkages and the magnitude of democratic transformation. It outlines several points that connect accounts of the transformation of democracy, such as multiple and exogenous causes, fragmentation and re-connection of the political will, heterogeneous and relatively autonomous public, and a suppressed function for political elites.

Part I: Causes of the Transformation of Democracy

The question of the diversity of the public will takes centre stage in the analysis of the transformation of democracy. The issue of diversity is raised frequently in most of models but it is mentioned in passing and the mentions are scattered. There is definitely an insufficient attempt of the literature to reflect on the significance of the notion of diversity, and most of all, to establish its origins and its consequences.

Albeit unsystematized, the issue of diversity is present and the rise of diversity is problematised. As Dunn suggests, “the attempt to understand the present state of development of democracy is inherently connected to “re-conceiving modern political

42 community” (Dunn, p.193). Rosanvallon lists a number of factors that dissolve the solidarity of the collective will: the large size of the country (p.292), social cleavages and differences (p.313), the decline of trade unions (p.170), the media (p.303), and political parties (p.267), the fact that the third industrial revolution has blurred the lines of class conflict and collective identities have simultaneously been transformed (p.170). Rosanvallon says that “if class struggle persists, it has become fragmented and passive…Both forms of sovereignty- the social critical and the positive political have collapsed (p.170).

Schmitter believes that we are in the midst of a democratic revolution and points out that “changes in living contexts, working conditions and personal mobility” have contributed to a “more fragmented and personalised conceptions of self-interest and collective passion” (Schmitter, p.203). He also lists the following causes of the present democratic revolutions: globalisation, European integration, intercultural migration and cohabitation, demographic trends, economic performance, technological change, state capacity, mediatisation and sense of insecurity (Schmitter, p. 198-205). Christiano (1996) also argues that it is the collision of this demand for equality with the fact of pluralism of interests that determines how democratic institutions ought to be designed.

In the following sections, I try to analyze the new concepts of the transformation of democracy through the prism of diversity. This attempt involves two stages. First, I explore the linkages between the origins of the democratic transformation and the diversification of the public will as well as the possibilities for re-connecting the newly fragmented public will. In the second part, I explore the implications of positioning the notion of diversity at the centre of analysis.

1. 1. Globalization and Diversity

In the transformationist camp, globalization features as the most salient reason for public fragmentation. Globalization scholars believe that the fragmentation of the public will is a result of both economic and political globalization, both of which strengthen civil society.

This view of the positively transformative nature of globalization is far from uncontested. Amy Chua conceives of globalization as an essentially elitist process that sets great wealth in a handful of elites. Far from strengthening civil society, globalization triggers disastrous consequences, which she describes as a “world on fire.” Globalization triggers the crisis of democracy in two ways. First, when elites expand their power in international territories, they use policies of tolerance to assimilate the conquered population, but the resulting state of multiculturalism becomes rife with new tensions which threaten to pull the empire apart from within (Chua 2009). The second consequence of globalization is that democracy empowers the impoverished majority, unleashing ethnic demagoguery, confiscation, and sometimes genocidal revenge (Chua 2004). Similarly to Chua, Stiglitz (2003) perceives globalization as an insidious process that allows the wealthy nations to use

43 international organizations, such as the IMF and WTO, to advance their own interests. Given these pessimistic views of globalization, how do the transformationists manage to make an argument that globalization invigorates democratic public will?

Let’s examine the effects of economic globalization on the fragmentation of the public will first.32 Cox argues that economic globalization began in the 1970s when large scale mass production could no longer satisfy the more differentiated and changeable demand. As a result, a three-part hierarchy of labourers appeared (Cox in McGrew, pp.57-61). At the top are the highly skilled workers who are integrated closely into the global economy. The second level in the hierarchy includes those who serve in more precarious employment. The bottom level includes those who are excluded from the global economy. According to Cox, economic globalization causes fragmentation and re-connection of the public will by re-drawing the boundaries of the classes on an international level.

Economic globalization has also contributed to the fragmentation of civil society on a national level. It has undermined the authority of conventional political structures, such as trade unions and industrial associations, and has “accentuated the fragmentation of societies.” (Cox, p.66). Cox says that some new movements have sprung up, such as the greens and the feminists, but even in those cases there is the problem of “coherence” as feminists in rich countries and poor countries define the gender problem in different ways.

Political globalization has fragmented the public by undermining the foundations of the nation state. Whereas economic globalization severed the traditional links between the people within the nation, political globalization, by the opening up borders, allowing immigration and fostering technological change, linked people across borders. The public will has historically been linked to the unit of the state. The Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648 “fostered a worldview in which discrete, quasi-autonomous territorial units were seen as the primary building blocks for social and political life” (Murphy cited in McGrew, p.3). During the 19th century, the territorial nation state proved the most stable and natural incubator for the nourishment of sovereignty. Sovereignty was implicitly understood to be national. As globalization undermined the institutional form of the nation state, which contained sovereignty, the coherence of sovereignty became to be questioned.33 “A world society” (Thompson in Archibuhi, p.179) has triumphed in a post-Westphalian nation-state.34

Interestingly enough, some of the critics of democracy also believe that globalization undermines the nation state. Bauman and Bordoni (2014), for example, suggest that

32 One way to look at the combined effects of economic and political globalization is to look at Rodrik’s “trillema,” the idea that that we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national self- determination, and economic globalization (Rodrik 2012).

33 McGraw points out that, within the globalization camp, realists actually think that globalization enhances the power of the nation-state, whereas scholars in the liberal- p.20 +11

34 Linklater points out that a further blow to national territorial sovereignty came not only from globalization but from sub-national groups and process (Linklater in Archibugi, p.114). Linklauter, along with Gould (2012), coined the term “regional democracy” to address the fragmentation of the social fabric on a sub-national basis (Gould in Archibugi, p.115).

44 globalization undermines the nation-state and by doing so it also undermines the citizens’ trust in the state’s capacity to deal with the crisis. As a result, citizens’ apathy grows. Hence the current crisis is at once a crisis of agency, a crisis of representative democracy and a crisis of the sovereignty of the state. The difference between the transformationists and the sceptics is that the first see the demise of the nation state as an opportunity for re-configuration of the public will, while the latter believe that the demise of the nation state ends up in citizens’ apathy.

The transformationalists view the de-territorialization and fragmentation of sovereignty as an opportunity to craft new types of democracy, such as “stakeholder democracy” (Macdonald 2012), “associative democracy” (Traegardh 2013), “transnational democracy” (Held 1999) and “international democracy” (Wendt 1999). Linklater points out that “the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and citizenship and cosmopolitan idea of citizenship are necessarily at odds. Westphalia democracy is built upon a unitarian conception of sovereignty, which includes only one sovereign, extreme homogeneity of citizens who have the same status and rights and excludes aliens. Cosmopolitan democracy, on the other hand, involves the dispersal of sovereign powers among several supranational and sub-national actors. Cosmo- political democracy also embraces claims for diversity, which makes for an uneven and heterogeneous citizenship fabric” (Linklauter, p.129). Linklauter argues that “by diversifying the sources of sovereign authority and the loci of public will, globalization has made “the idea of an undifferentiated public which is subordinate to one sovereign power untenable.” (p.130).

To Traegard, “associative democracy” in Sweden is achieved through pre-configuring the public will through a “set of institutions where free associations negotiate with each other under the helpful and neutral guise of state representatives” (Traegardh 2013, p.257). Held and Morrison suggest that the public will is pre-configured through a variety of organizational forms ranging from international professional associations to broad activist associations, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International. Transnational democracy has a definite component “from below” (Morrison 2003, p. 38).

Keating sees the fragmentation of national sovereignty as an opportunity for the creation of other types of sovereignty. In his concept of “plurinational democracy,” Keating argues that transnational integration has severed the automatic link between the state and the nation. But the fragmentation of the public will provides opportunities for citizens in various nations to “embrace multiple identities” (Keating, p.iix).

Warren also suggests that globalization has reconfigured the public will in a promising way. He believes that there is “an emerging political system that is pluralized, multi-venued and de-centred.” The image of the political system, in his mind, “suggests quite clearly that the representative model of democracy lacks the conceptual tools necessary to judge the contributions of these emerging political spaces to democracy.” Warren sees this diversity and the inadequacy of the representative model as an opportunity to put forward the idea of a “second transformation of democracy” which presents a “qualitative break with representative democracy” (Warren 2003, p.228).

45 Wenman believes that diversity has given rise to “agonistic democracy.” “Agonisic democracy” is premised on the idea of “politics of diversity arising from the great social mobility and the radical change of values in post-industrialised societies, the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and Russia, the crisis of the welfare state across Western Europe, the systematic economic crises (Wenman 2013, pp.xi-xiii).

Goodin says that the scale of the diversity of the public will calls for various ways to “innovate democracy.” When diversity is moderate, deliberation and representation are compatible solutions for democracy. Moderate diversity presupposes relatively few distinct groups, internal homogeneity within the groups and the condition that the dimensions of the difference must be relatively uncomplicated. However, Goodin insists that in most cases diversity is far from moderate and it is precisely for this reason that he seeks to “innovate democracy” “beyond the deliberative turn.” (Goodin, pp.237-238).

Touraine suggests another way to reconnect citizens in a global world. At first it seems that Touraine thinks that such reconfiguration is impossible because he says that there is a twin movement between globalization which unifies the public will and fragmentation which results from the public retreating ever more into their own communities to protect their identities from the encroachment of global power. According to Touraine, one way out of this double and mutually reinforcing movement is to first allow the citizens to pick and concentrate on a project which is interesting and meaningful to an individual. Such a project, which Touraine calls the “Subject” create a stable point of reference in a world of permanent change. The second step of re-connection is to forma connection between citizens on the basis that they all share the personal freedom to choose and enjoy a “Subject.” This concept entails a replacement of the old idea of democracy, defined as participation in the general will, with the new idea of institutions that safeguard the freedom of the subject and permit communication between subjects. Archibugi (2008) suggests that a “global commonwealth of citizens” may not be such a fantasy. His suggestion is to incorporate the citizens through a World Parliamentary Assembly and perhaps a search for a common language.

O’Byrne suggests that the modern notions of citizenship are connected to an extension of the idea of the nation-state just as participatory citizenship is defined in the Aristotelian sense. He thinks that the “contractarian tradition, which… emphasizes the role of the citizen as a bearer of rights and duties in relation to a political state, is not a helpful tradition within which to understand global citizenship, because, clearly, globalization decentres the nation-state” (O’Byrne 2003, p.118). O’Byrne sides with a notion of the “performative citizenship,” “which “reconstructs citizenship as a social practice.” “The performative citizen is not acting out some duty imposed by a social body but acts out of conscience and free commitment” (Arrow cited in O’Byrne 2003, p.119).

The most important take-away from this review of the link between public diversity and new forms of democracy is that fragmentation is the precondition for re- connection and reconfiguration of the public will. But there are three additional and important conclusions. First, one bonus effect of fragmentation is that the elites have less leeway to prevail over the fragmented public. Dalton argues that what he calls “advocacy democracy” “gives citizens greater control of the political agenda…in part

46 by increasing their opportunity to press political interests outside of the institutionalized time and format of fixed election cycles.” Dalton believes that advocacy democracy is grounded in “the realization that societies are more complex in their social and economic structures. This complexity and specialization leads to the fragmentation of political interests and identities” (Dalton et al, p.250). One of the staunchest proponents of global democracy, Archibugi underscores the fact that “democracy is achieved in a bottom-up manner. (Archibugi, Re-Imaginingp.200-201).

Second, there is a link between the fragmentation of the public and causes of globalization. Those scholars who see globalization as caused by a single, endogenous force fail to acknowledge the fragmentation of the will. Conversely, those who see globalization as caused by a multiple, exogenous forces are more likely to acknowledge the fragmentation of the public will. Similarly, people who think that the nation state is preserved see the causes of globalization as caused by monocratic and endogenous political elites. Those who see the diversification of the public will are more likely to perceive globalization as caused by multiple and exogenous causes (McGrew, p.20).

It is not by accident that Colin Hay, for example, disputes the positive effects of globalization and takes an endogenous approach to democracy at the same time. In Hay’s own account, his book “Why we hate politics” does “some considerable damage to the prevailing orthodoxy that has come to surround the term “globalization.” Despite proliferation of the language of globalization, …definitive evidence of a single and ever more closely integrated economy is remarkable elusive.” In fact, Hay believes that the idea of globalization, rather than globalization itself, is more influential. Because governments are led to believe that they have less autonomy than others, they tend to behave in a less autonomous way and as a result lose the confidence of the voters. The impotence of the state becomes the self- fulfilling prophecy of the tale on the omnipotence of globalization. In this indirect way, Hay relates globalization to a more elitist perspective than the transformationalists, who emphasize the fragmentation and the autonomy of public will.

The third implication of the discussion is that the nation state is no longer considered the primary pillar of world peace. Archibugi emphasizes that the implication of the idea of global citizenship is that it debunks the “peace among democracy” hypothesis that many critics of contemporary democracy share. Archibugi states that while the “peace among democracy” hypothesis stresses the link between state democracy and international peace, cosmopolitan democracy stresses an equally important link from international peace and democracy to internal democracy (Archibugi 2012, p.11).

1. 2. Demise of the Political Party and Diversity

47 The decline of political parties is another major development that led to the fragmentation of the public will. Peter Mair declares that the “age of party democracy has passed” (Mair 2013, p.1). Still, Mair can be classified as a transformationist rather than a sceptic of democracy because he sees democracy adapting to the decline of parties and is interested in “a theory of democratic renewal” (p.15). Mair’s concept of post-party democracy connects the adaptation of party democracy in the environment of severed homogeneity, loss of collective identity and particularisation: “Homogeneity of political preferences within the remaining political cohorts has been lost.”; “voters have become more particularised,” “there has been a decline in collective identity” (pp.56-57); “The left right divide loses its interpretative power as a schema for making overall sense of mainstream politics… Demands become particularised and fragmented. (p.72)”

Mair cites numerous studies which connect the decline of party democracy with the fragmentation of the public will. The two main reasons that “hollow out” the meaning of political parties as unifying organizations are that politics have become very complicated and that the governments’ ability to deliver public goods has been curtailed. Typically for the transformationists’ models of democracy, Mair’s concept of post-party democracy is centred on the demand rather than the supply of representation: “But it is not just the supply of partisan policy making that determines whether the parties make a difference; It is also a matter of what is demanded at the electoral level (p.55).35 It is noteworthy that transformationalists’ views of democracy are consistently demand centred.

Bergman and Strom also emphasize that societies have become more “diverse and fragmented” (Bergman and Strom 2013, p.22-24). According to them, rising levels of education, the technological and information revolutions have made the electorate more demanding and diverse. As a result of that diversity, the constituents’ interests are becoming more difficult to aggregate, and elites have less opportunity to do so. The authors conceive this development as an opportunity rather than a set-back. They argue that we live in a “Madisonian democracy” in which popular disengagement with politics, the judicialisation of politics, the European integration and the advent of cartel parties have shifted the model of democracy from parliamentary to a system with a greater emphasis of checks and balances.

In an original line of argument, Abramowitz (2011) argues that American society has indeed been polarized not along the traditional left-right dimension, but along the citizens who vote and those who do not vote. Contrary to the sceptics of democracy who decry passivity and apathy, however, Abramovitz argues that polarization is not detrimental to democracy. Polarization is a sign of the elite’s responsiveness to the more engaged parts of the electorate. Polarization, or the fragmentation of the public will, is a positive development for democracy as it presents the voters with clear choices, increases the public’s interest in politics and strengthens electoral accountability.

Crouch’s interpretation of the diversity of public will is in direct opposition to those of Mair, Bergman and Strom and Abramovitz. Crouch also acknowledges the “incoherence” of class structure. He says that the majority of the population consists

35 Italics in the original.

48 of “diverse and heterogeneous groups.” Contrary to the transformationists, however, Crouch’s critical version of “post-democracy” views diversity as a factor which gives the elites more control over the public, not the other way around. Crouch says that many of these diverse groups “have failed to generate much autonomous profile at all” (Crouch p.57). The result of this heterogeneity is that the public does not have “a clear agenda of political demands” (Crouch, p.58).

1. 3. Media, Technological Innovation and Diversity

A more balanced view of the role of the media suggests that the media serve both to express the elites’ views (a process called ecological symbiosis) and at the same media news is increasingly co-generated by ordinary people (Shapiro & Jacobs 2013). But such balanced views are rare. Opinions are split diametrically between the sceptics and the transformationists. The first tend to acknowledge the polarizing effect of the media on the community, whereas the latter emphasize the connecting role of the media.

Manin’s idea of “audience democracy” is probably one of the most articulate and damning versions of how the politicians use the media to gain control over the electorate which has been rendered passive. Manin is not alone. Gingsborg actually says that the high concentration of media ownership prevents the public from becoming more autonomous and pluralistic. Gingsborg argues that there may be more media outlets, but the important point is who controls them: “given the oligarchic structure and conformist culture of global television-Rupert Murdoch’s media empire is the classic example of the enormously powerful transnational media accompany- there is little hope for a solid transmission of plural, democratic and participative values” (Ginsborg 2008, p.43). From the point of view of the totalising power of the media, Ginsborg’s vision of “democracy at the crossroads” is very similar to Wolin’s “managed democracy.” Hindman (2008), however, argues that the idea of “digital democracy” is a myth simply because digital technology has not undermined the monopolistic influence of corporate television neither has it given greater voice to ordinary citizens.

Prior takes a different route to proving that the media fragment the public and this fragmentation brings democracy down. Prior acknowledges the greater availability of media sources and media content but says that the greater variety simply deepens the dividing line between the people who participate in politics and those who do not, and between the news junkies and entertainment fans (Prior 2007). In contradiction to Abramovitz’s positive evaluation of polarization, Prior argues that polarization by the media does not improve democracy. Instead, polarization simply makes politicians use more entertainment in their campaigns to recruit the entertainment fans.

In his critical version of “point and click” democracy,” Krastev argues that the media create connectivity but not commonality. He highlights the “segregation” effect of the Internet. Krastev argues that the Internet is not a powerful enough tool to bridge more fundamental differences: “Increased ethnic diversity within nation states, fragmentation of the public space, and our fashionable obsessions with individual rights have in fact eroded the foundations of national solidarity… we lose what we have in common, yet we are more connected than ever before.” (Kratsev 2012, p.8). The “point and click” democracy is a sign that “the voice of the citizenry has been

49 rendered mere noise” (p.14). Krastev argues further that the media technology has not rendered the citizen more autonomous. Instead, “the crisis of democracy is just another name for the decline of citizens’ driven political reformism” (p.17).

Huntington, in his description of “democratic overload,” argues that “the media play a most decisive role in the present drift of Western societies. They are a very important source of disintegration of the old forms of social control inasmuch as they contribute to the breakdown of the old forms of communication. Television…has made it impossible to maintain the old forms of social fragmentation and hierarchy that was necessary to enforce traditional forms of social control (Huntington et al, p.35).

In a damning critique of democracy, Stiegler contends that marketing techniques and technological advances in capitalism inure the consumers to short-term gratification. These practices of ‘libidinal economics’ have rendered the consumers stupid and content in their voluntary subjugation to control. Stiegler argues that such situation is not sustainable and controlled societies will become uncontrollable as they surrender to the lowest instincts of war, terrorism and social tensions (Stiegler 2012, p.11). Stiegler’s concept of the otium of the people is connected to the idea of fragmentation and the individualisation of society. In his account of the “decadence of industrial democracies,” Stiegler argues that decadence is a decomposition of the forces of individuation and of all the individualities that compose it…this proliferous decomposition prevents the affirmation of their lack of unity (and the lack of identity, of calculability and the determination of the individuation that results from it.” (Stiegler 2012, p.94). The result of fragmentation through technology is an explosion of social, geo-political, ethnic conflicts.

Contrary to the critics of democracy who view the media primarily as a disconnecting force, the transformationists emphasize the ability of the media to connect people and make them more autonomous. Below are only a few references to scholars whose judgment of the media is a far cry from the segregation and polarization effect decried by the critics of democracy. Sperling suggests that information technology consolidates the multiplicity of heterogeneous wills, thus creating a multiplicity of issue-based public wills. Sperling believes that the media create “globalized conscience,” “global identity” and “a community of sympathy” (Sperling, p.327). Her positive assessment of the role of the media is reflected in her vision of the transformation of democracy into “altered states.”

Similar to Sperling, Howard and Hussein suggest that digital media was important in the Arab revolts. The social media enabled revolts to spread across countries in three ways: the media nourished the sharing of grievances, the media allowed the sharing of strategies to fight dictators and the media allowed the people to act collectively (Howard & Hussein 2013). Howard and Hussein describe the resulting state as the “fourth wave of democracy.”

Gallager points out that the media connect people and overcome fragmentation by reducing the costs of access and affiliation: “One crucial technological change underpinning growing popular participation in various types of less conventional social movements has been the explosive growth and penetration of the Internet and the World Wide Web, email, Twitter, Facebook which reduce the costs of access and

50 affiliation. These social movements have a fluid membership and cut across traditional ideological lines” (Gallagher et al, 2011, p.474). Della Porta joins in by saying that all new forms of social movements from the Indignados, and Occupy Wall Street to the Arab uprisings were “interwoven inextricably with the creation of autonomous communication networks supported by the Internet and wireless communication” (Della Porta 2013).

Keane suggests that “communicative abundance on balance has positive consequences. ..the new media galaxy nudges and broadens people’s horizons. It tutors their sense of pluralism; reminds them that “truth” depends on context and perspective” (Keane 2013, p.47). Grossman creates an optimistic picture of the “electronic republic” as a democratic system that is vastly increasing the people’s day-to-day influence on the decisions of the state.” (Grossman 1995, p. 3). Important in this respect is the instant public opinion polling, interactive telecommunications devoices, which make the government instantly and constantly aware of “popular will.” Grossman talks about the “remarkable convergence of television, telephone, satellites and personal computers. This is the first generation o citizens who can see, hear and judge their leaders simultaneously and instantaneously.” Grossman in facts coins a new form of connectivity that merges hearing, listening and judging. This new form of connectivity in fact presents is a new form of transparency that is more inclusive and more instantaneous.

Castells again emphasises connectivity. He agrees with Grossman that communication networks change minds, create meaning and contest power. Castells provides another causal link between media and connectivity. He suggests that the characteristics of the communication technology are inevitably reflected in the characteristics of the social movement: “the more interactive and self-configurable communication is, the less hierarchical is the organization and the more participatory is the movement.” (Castells 2012, p.15). He goes on to suggest that these new developments will lead to a new form of democracy, which reflects a “revolutionary dream” and will be more responsive to all “demands and projects.” (Castells, p. 245).

Whereas the transformationists argue that the media technology induce fragmentation which gives new opportunities for re-configuration and connectivity, the critics of democracy believe that fragmentation is generally the end result of the increased role of the media.

1. 4. Economic Well-Being and Diversity There are two additional factors which affect the transformation of representative democracy- the state of the economy and urbanization. Contrary to the treatment of the connecting effects of the media, globalization and party decline, the treatment of the connecting effects of the economy and the increased scale of states is not so thorough. I will sketch them here briefly.

In his account of “façade democracy,” Streeck (2013) points out that the increase in economic well-being has fragmented the public by differentiating the consumers’ demands. The state, however, could not accommodate this fragmentation because it is meant to provide justice and social services, irrespective of colour, gender, and class differences. The public’s greater differentiation is at odds with a government which is created to unify the people and to minimize in its services the differences

51 between them, not to differentiate between them. “The financial crisis of 2008 is just the latest reminder that the government is for uniformity, not for diversity” (Streeck cited in Krastev 2013). Consequently, “façade democracy” is an account of the crisis of democracy, not the transformation of democracy. In a somewhat similar line of argument, Genschel & Schwartz 2013 suggest that we live in an age of “fiscal democracy” where the power of the government to change fiscal policy in light of voter preferences (Genschel & Schwartz 2013) is sometimes constrained by tax competition.36 What Steeck’s and Genschel’s accounts of the effects of the economy have in common is that they see he srisis of democracy arising from the disjunction between the differentiated public demands and the monolithic government supply of goods and services.

Stephen Holmes (2012) also argues that economic well-being has differentiation of the public. His account of the crisis, however, does not arise from the governing elite’s ability but from its lack of motivation to respond to the differentiated public demands. Holmes argues that in the days of the national democracies, a citizen- soldier was citizen-worker and citizen-consumer. In other words, all possible areas of interest to the elite, security, economy and prosperity, depended on the citizen. Because of specialisation and economic growth, the three identities of the citizen dissolved and disappeared and the elites were left without motivation to respond to the public. Low-cost labor immigrants replaced the citizen-worker. Professional armies replaced the citizen-soldier. The stock market replaced the citizen-consumer. The differentiation undermined the elites’ vested interest in the well-being of the citizens. This differentiation and fragmentation left the elites to rule freely.37 This is a totally different line of argument from the one that transformationists usually make, namely that fragmentation decreases the scope of elite’s manipulation. I am not aware of any studies that bring up the issue of connectivity in regard to economic well-being and the financial crisis.

1.5. The Size of the State and Diversity The ever expanding geographical scope of the state is also linked to the fragmentation of the public will. Rousseau famously noted that bigger territories cut off the communication between people and in this way prevent the consolidation of their collective efforts: “The greater the surface occupied by the same number of inhabitants, the more difficult rebellions become, because measures cannot be concerted promptly and secretly, and because it is always easy for the government to discover the plans and cut off communications. But the more closely packed a numerous population is, the less power has a government to usurp the sovereignty (Rousseau, p.83).

Rousseau’s train of thought has been picked up by a line of thinkers, such as Montesquieu, the Founding fathers and Mill, which Dahl retraced in “Size and Democracy.” Dahl notes that larger democracies are more likely to exhibit “diversity in beliefs, values, goals, social and economic characteristics, occupations, etc.” Dahl proceeds by saying that larger democracies create more opportunities for the emergence of multiple loyalties and interests and less opportunities for conformity (Dahl, p. 14-15).

36 http://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/0745661696/ref=rdr_ext_tmb 37 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-11-21-holmes-en.html

52 The idea that bigger states create conditions for fragmentation is brought up with renewed vigour recently. Nancy suggests that “something essential is at stake. Society exists inasmuch as there exists exteriority in relationships. From this perspective, “society” only starts where interiority stops… The dissolution of rural community life is organically linked to the rise of the cities…To cross from the rural community into the polis or into the modern megacity is already a step from interiority to exteriority. Exteriority was the problem… that democracy was called to resolve” (Nancy 2009, p.67). In his account of “plurinational democracy,” Kuper points out that “in pluralist societies of great scale, people could never generate and validate public decisions in this implausibly demanding way” (Kuper 2004, 121). Dunn also points out that “the widening gap of the stage in which human life is now lived, socially, politically, and economically has certainly not by itself engineered an accompanying rise in collective moral capabilities” (Dunn, 1990, p.206)

Not everybody agrees that size is related to heterogeneity. Tufte, for example, shows that in terms of attitudinal diversity, smaller units are indeed more homogeneous. In terms of ethnic and religious diversity, however, no significant differences emerge between small states and large states. 38 Therefore, size is not a good predictor of homogeneity or heterogeneity.

From the transformationists’ point of view, the connection between connectivity and the increased size of the states is still to be explored.

Figure 1: Globalization, Proponents of Democracy and the Reconfiguration of the Political Will

Archibugi Cosmopolitan Public will pre-configured through democracy World Parliament and a common lingua Linklauter Regional democracy Public will pre-configured through sub-

n regional networks o i t

a Macdonald Stakeholder Public will pre-configured through z i

l democracy shared interests in a given issue a

b Associative Public will pre-configured through a set o l

G democracy of institutions where free associations

h negotiate wit each other under state g u

o supervision. r h

t Held International Public will pre-configured through

n

o democracy international professional associations i t

c to broad activist associations e

n (Greenpeace, Amnesty International) n o

c Keating Plurinational Public will pre-configured through the e

R democracy public will embracing multiple identities. Warren Second Public will pre-configured by becoming transformation of pluralized, multi-venued and de-

38 https://tidsskrift.dk/index.php/scandinavian_political_studies/article/view/13371/25487

53 democracy centred. Wenman Agonistic Public will pre-configured by giving democracy voice to politics of diversity. Goodin Innovating Public will pre-configured by democracy deliberative and non-deliberative techniques Touraine A new paradigm for Public will pre-configured by choosing understanding private Subjects and connecting them. today’s O’Byrne Performative Public will pre-configured through citizenship conscience and free commitment. Dalton Advocacy Public will pre-configured through a democracy greater control of the political agenda.

Figure 2: Parties, Media, Proponents of Democracy and the Reconfiguration of the Political Will

Reconfiguration Bergman & Madisonian Public will pre- through the Strom democracy configured through a demise of the greater differentiation of political parties political elites. Abramowitz The Disappearing Public will pre- centre configured through more responsive elites and clearer options for the electorate.

Sperling Altered states Public will pre- d

n configured through a

a

i globalized conscience d . e

e and community of g m

n sympathy. h a g h c

u Howard and Fourth wave of Public will pre-

l o r a Hussein democratization configured through h c t i

g sharing of common n o o l i t o grievances. a n r

h Gallager Public will pre- u c g e i t

f configured through a n

o decrease of cost of c

e affiliation and access. R Della Porta E-democracy Public will pre-

54 configured through autonomous communication networks Keane Monitory Public will pre- democracy configured through broader horizons and a sense of subjectivity. Grossman Electronic republic Public will pre- configured through making itself known instantaneously Castells Revolutionary Public will pre- dream configured through interactive and self- configurable communication. Shapiro & Ecological Public will pre- Jacobs symbiosis configured through ordinary people co- generating the news.

Figure 2: Critics of Democracy and the Fragmentation of the Political Will

l

l Chua Public will fragmented through ethnic hatred and i

w multicultural tensions.

c i n l Cox Public will fragmented through highly skilled, o b i t u medium skilled and unskilled workers on a a p

z i e

l global scale. h a t

b

f Bauman and Public will fragmented through diminished state o o l

g Bordoni capacity resulting in apathy. n

o h i g t Stiglitz Public will fragmented through elite using IMF a u t o

n and WTO to advance their interests. r e h t

m Hay Public will fragmented through voters losing g

a confidence in the state due to the self-fulfilling r

F idea of globalization. Fragmentation Crouch Public will fragmented through no clear agenda of the public of demands. will through demise of

55 political parties Fragmentation Ginsborg Public will fragmented through high degree of of the public concentration of media ownership. will through Hindman Public will fragmented through the lack of real technological ideological choice and freedom in the media and media outlets. revolution. Prior Public will fragmented through greater increase of entertainment. Krastev Public will fragmented through erosion of national sovereignty. Huntington Public will fragmented through demise of hierarchical structures. Fragmentation Stiegler Public will fragmented through short term of the public gratification of citizens. will through Streeck Public will fragmented through disjunction the economy between the differentiated demands of the citizens and the unified services of the state. Holmes Public will fragmented through disjunction between the citizen-soldier, citizen-worker and citizen-consumer. Fragmentation Rousseau, Dunn, Public will fragmented through increased scale of the public Dahl, Nancy of states. will through urbanization

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