Aufsätze Holger H. Herwig and David F. Trask Naval
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Aufsätze Holger H. Herwig and David F. Trask Naval Operations Plans between Germany and the United States of America 1898-1913 A Study of Strategic Planning in the Age of Imperialism* In recent years historians on both sides of the Atlantic have been most eager to analyse the effect, both on internal and external affairs, of the creation of a large German battle fleet by the Imperial Naval Office (»Reidismarineamt«)1. A num- ber of scholars has gone one step further and investigated the actual tasks assigned to this force by the Admiralty Staff (»Admiralstab«)2. However, the existence of both German and American naval plans against eadi other has received little or no attention from historians of German-American relations. When sudi plans are mentioned, confusion, lack of precise data, and heated sentiments all too often preclude sober discussion. After World War I, William II denied to his blood relative George Sylvester Viereck the existence of any plans against the United States. »Never was any plan for military or naval action against the United States prepared or even contemplated8.« The Kaiser's memory had obviously faded. The first discussion of sudi German naval plans appeared in two articles by the German-American scholar Alfred Vagts in the »Political Science Quarterly« (1939 and 1940). In the 1930's, during a visit to the Foreign Office in the Wilhelmstraße, Vagts examined copies of reports by the German naval attaché in Washington, Kapitänleutnant Hubert v. Rebeur-Pasdiwitz, to the State Secretary of the Naval Office, Kontreadmiral Alfred v. Tirpitz4. In 1958 Walther Hubatsch revealed an »Immediatvortrag« of February 26, 1900, by the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Vizeadmiral Otto v. Diederidis, that recommended an attack on the coast of New England in the event of war between Germany and the United States. Hubatsdi dismissed the plan as emblematic of »der in alien Admi- ralstäben üblichen routinemäßigen Überlegungen ... Sie [the study] ist niemals zu einem Operationsplan ausgereift, sondern lediglich im März 1899 als Denkschrift aufgesetzt, die in ihrer Art ein Unikum geblieben sein dürfte5.« The American plan likewise has received little mention. It is best discussed in an unpublished Yale University dissertation of 1954 written by Warner Roller Sdiilling. Schil- ling's work was limited because he lacked information concerning the German * This project vas supported through the Klaus-Epstein-Gedächtnis-Stipendium of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. 1 See, for example, J. Steinberg: Yesterday's Deterrent, London 1965; W. Hubatsdi: Die Ara Tir- pitz, Göttingen 1955; and A. J. Marder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Vol. 1, London 1961. 1 See especially G. Ritter: Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Vol. 2: Die Hauptmächte Europas und das wilhelminische Reich (1890-1914), München 1968 (cit. Ritter); R. Stadelmann: Die Epoche der deutsch-englischen Flottenrivalität, in: Deutschland und Westeuropa. Drei Aufsätze, Sdilofi Laupheim 1948 (cit. Stadelmann); L. Dehio: Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert, München 1955 (cit. Dehio); V. R. Berghahn: Zu den Zielen des deutschen Flottenbaus unter Wil- helm II., in: Historische Zeitschrift 210 (1970), S. 34 ff. (cit. Berghahn). * Cit. in A. Vagts: Hopes and Fears of an American-German War, 1870-1915, in: Political Science Quarterly 55 (Mardi 1940), Part II, 74, fn. 93 (cit. Vagts). 4 Ibid., II, 59, fn. 62. These copies carried the notation »Original an S. M.« on the cover. Since the Foreign Office almost never made copies of the reports of military and naval attachés, Vagts at once realized the importance attributed to this topic. 5 W. Hubatsch: Der Admiralstab und die Obersten Marinebehörden in Deutschland 1848-1945, 5 Frankfurt/M. 1958, 92 (cit. Hubatsch). plans; in a footnote he drew attention to a plan from 1901 by »a Lieutenant on the German General Staff«®. A later study of American diplomacy and war plans by J. A. S. Grenville proved inadequate in its discussion of the Black War Plan7. The following article is based primarily on document collections deposited at the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg/Brsg., and at the U. S. Naval History Division, Washington, D. CA Its purpose is to revise earlier treatments of these plans and to clear away some of the myths and misapprehensions still surrounding this topic. I The German naval documents do point up one »Unikum«, to use Hubatsdi's term. There exists a study dated Mardi 13, 1889, which first dealt with the possibility of a German-American war. It is certainly conceivable that the dispute between these two countries over possession of the Samoan Islands in that same year lead the Admiralty (»Admiralität«) to turn its attention to the possibility of a future German-American naval encounter9. On February 23, 1889, the Acting Chief of the Admiralty, Vizeadmiral Freiherr v. d. Goltz, requested »Promemo- ria« on the subject »Wie ist der Krieg mit Nordamerika zu führen und was ist dazu in die Wege zu leiten.« Kontreadmiral Guido Karcher, Chief of Staff of the Admiralty, replied to the request on Mardi 13, recommending: »die feindliche Kriegsflotte zu vernichten, die Handelsflotte durdi Verniditung und Vertreibung von den Meeren zu zerstören und endlidi durch Bombardement... das Land zu schädigen und einen Druck auf die Bevölkerung auszuüben«. Kardier recognized that the German fleet was still too small effectively to carry out an invasion of American territory, and therefore concluded that the fleet would have to limit itself to »Bekämpfung der Kriegsflotte und Störung des Handels durdi Kreuzer- krieg«. The plan allowed for isolated cruiser raids, in order to interrupt maritime trade on the east coast of the United States, but stated quite clearly: »Der Krieg wird sich hauptsächlich als ein Kreuzerkrieg abspielen10.« Germany's naval impotence against the United States in the Samoa question did not go unnoticed • W. R. Schilling: Admirals and Foreign Policy 1913-1919, unpublished Yale Univ. diss. 1954 (cit. Schilling). University Microfilm (Ann Arbor, Michigan) No. 64-11, 383, 17, fn. 32. Schilling is probably referring to the plan drawn up by Leutnant zur See Eberhard v. Mantey in the winter of 1898, or perhaps the second plan in the spring of 1899. 7 J. A. S. Grenville: Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890-1917 (cit. Grenville), in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 11 (1961), 1-21. It is curious that Grenville, a resident scholar at Yale 1958-59, did not make use of Schilling's excellent research on this subject. In contrast to Germany, which numbered its plans, the United States used colors to denote its operational plans: black for the German (1913) and orange for the Japanese Plan (1914). 8 The main German source is: Bundesarchiv-Militärardiiv, Marinearchiv, Fasz. 5174b: Acta betr. Vorbereitung der Operationspläne gegen Nord-Amerika, 4 vols., with one vol. »Neben-Akten« (cit. BA-MA, F 5174 b). Three further collections used are: Admiralstab der Marine, Fasz. 2015 (PG 65 956), vol. I. 3. No. 8: Acta betr. Immediatvorträge; Nachlaß Büchsei (Ν 168); Nadilaß v. Levetzow (N 239) ; as well as other less relevant collections which will be cited in the footnotes. The American plan is in: U. S. Department of the Navy, Naval History Division, Records of the General Board of the Navy, Operational Archives, Box 10, War Portfolios. ' In the early spring of 1889 German and American business interests clashed over the Samoan Islands, almost leading to open hostilities. A conference in Berlin (April 17 to June 14, 1889) resulted in joint German, American and British rule over the islands. See H.-U.Wehler: Bismarck und der Imperialismus, Köln, Berlin 1969, 398 fï. F. Fischer: Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914, Düsseldorf 1969, 90 f. (cit. Fischer) attributes the joint rule decision to the clever negotiations of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Herbert v. Bismarck, who forged a united German-British front against American interests. 10BA-MA, F 5174 b, I, 2-13, 19 a. by her political leaders. A decade later, when German and American business interests once again clashed over the Samoan Islands, Bernhard v. Biilow, State Secretary of the Foreign Office, commented: »Der Vorfall auf Samoa ist ein neuer Beweis dafür, daß sich überseeische Politik nur mit einer ausreichenden Flotten- macht führen läßt11.« On April 10, 1898, Germany took the first step towards creating just sudi a »Flottenmacht« by passing the First Naval Law calling for 17 ships of the line, 8 »Küstenpanzer«, 9 large and 26 small cruisers, to be backed by a material reserve of 2 ships of the line and 7 cruisers. The passage of the bill was facilitated by a most clever naval propaganda directed by Tirpitz's Naval Office12. No stone was left unturned, no path untried, in this masterful manipulation of public opinion. The most prominent academicians in Germany joined the Tirpitz band- wagon18, providing a scaffold of cultural, economic, political, military, and vulgar Darwinistic timber for the new structure14. This nava' propaganda became »ein höchst wirksames Kampfinstrument... Sie wurde Funktion eines nicht nominell, aber faktisch bestehenden Propagandaministeriums18.« Few both- ered to examine more closely the likely repercussions that sudi a measure would ultimately exert on Germany's relations with her European neighbours. It is perhaps profitable at this stage briefly to discuss past interpretations of Ger- many's naval policy under Admiral v. Tirpitz. For Tirpitz and, to a lesser extent,