The “Маnchurian Blitzkrieg” of 1945 and Japanese Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union
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The “Маnchurian Blitzkrieg” of 1945 and Japanese Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union Alekseĭ A. Кirichenko and Sergey V. Grishachev The USSR and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1925, yet the ties between them remained tense for the next two decades, at times leading to armed conflicts such as the battles at Lake Khasan (1938) and Khalkhin Gol River (1939). The powers would ultimately sign the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941, which came into force for five years after its ratification on April 25. From 1941 to 1945 both parties observed neutrality, which each interpret- ed in accordance with the international situation dictated by the events of World War II. The Japanese command abandoned their initial plans to attack the USSR after the defeats in the battles of Midway (1942) and Guadalcanal (1942–1943) but the Soviet Union, as an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, began its own war preparations. The Kremlin made its final political decision regarding the war with Japan on August 16, 1944, at a private meet- ing that was attended by the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav M. Molotov; chief of the political department of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA), Aleksandr S. Shcherbakov; chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, Andreĭ A. Zhdanov; and USSR ambassa- dor to Japan, Yakov A. Malik. Joseph Stalin, it should be noted, also participated in the meeting. The probability of war with the USSR may have already been evident to the Japanese government following Stalin’s speech at the solemn commemora- tion of the 27th anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1944, when he referred to Japan as an “aggressor” (агрессор). Such suspicions sig- naled the real possibility of war with the Soviet Union after the unilateral denouncement by Moscow of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact on April 5, 1945. Although Molotov assured the Japanese ambassador Satō Naotake that the Soviet Union would faithfully comply with the terms of the treaty before its termination on April 25, 1946, Japan remained unconvinced, and it freneti- cally began to strengthen its Kwantung Army. In actual fact, the Soviets ad- opted several decrees in the first half of 1945 dealing with the preparation of war with Japan, and in the summer vast military forces were relocated to the Far East. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_017 The “Маnchurian Blitzkrieg” of 1945 AND Japanese pows 335 1 The Entry into War with Japan, a “Manchurian Blitzkrieg” The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, outlines the terms of Japan’s uncon- ditional surrender; however, there were still segments of the Japanese com- mand that refused to accept the terms of surrender and claimed that they would fight to the last soldier. This unsound decision provoked the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, respectively, as well as the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan. At 5 p.m. on August 8, 1945,1 Molotov conveyed to Ambassador Satō the news that the Soviet Union would go to war with Japan the following day. Although Soviet leaders had formally given Japan advance notice about the beginning of war, it was only on August 9 that the Soviet chief diplomat re- ceived the Japanese envoy in the Far East. The Soviet army invaded Manchuria (Manchukuo), taking the Japanese troops by surprise in what could be de- scribed as a “Manchurian Blitzkrieg.” Russian historians have demonstrated that the Soviet action complied with international law, proving that Japan was not the subject of aggression in World War II (Kuz’minkov 2010, 121). The Japanese historian Yokote Shinji has challenged its legality, claiming that the USSR ignored the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact that should have remained in force until April 25, 1946 (Yokote 2003, 193). The well-mobilized, well-trained Soviet troops were already experienced from fighting the forces of Nazi Germany and were equipped with state-of- the-art weapons. They also greatly outnumbered the Japanese, and the Soviet units invading Manchuria encountered almost no resistance. Seventy percent of the Soviet’s infantry troops and ninety percent of the tanks and artillery were concentrated along the main axis of advance at the Transbaikal front. In the first three days of the campaign, for example, the 6th Guards Tank Army under command of Colonel General Andreĭ G. Kravchenko advanced by 450 km with no opposition and halted only because the transport aircraft had not been able to supply the necessary fuel (Vnotchenko 1971, 187). Their ammuni- tion reserve remained intact due to the absence of the enemy. The swift advance of the Soviet troops was also facilitated by the command of the Kwantung Army, which ordered its troops to retreat and not to engage in 1 It must be remembered that with the seven-hour time difference, 5 p.m. on August 8, Moscow time, was already midnight in the Far East; this was precisely the moment when Soviet troops crossed the border into Manchuria. Formally, Molotov presented the document the day be- fore entering the war, but in actual fact he presented the document at the same time as the beginning of the invasion..