Limited vs. total Brian W Brennan Armor; Sep/Oct 2002; 111, 5; ProQuest Direct Complete pg. 8

Limited vs.

by Captain Brian W. Brennan retain its dominant role in world af­ tie and to break his will to continue the fairs, it will have to look back at past conflict. total war strategies and incorporate is entirely different. At them into future operations. Since 1776, the U.S. Government and, the dawn of the , when the more specifically, the U.S. have entered the nuclear age, The concept of total war is fairly sim­ struggled with how best to fight our na­ the Truman and Johnson administra­ ple. Total war is best defined by the old tion's . tions were concerned that a war of any Soviet definition for a "Total 'Naya kind would risk global nuclear annihi­ Though the terms "total war" and Voyna," or "foreign or total war," lation, so a limited warfare policy was "limited war" are relatively new and which states that a total war is "an all­ developed. were developed to describe the United embracing imperialist war, waged by States' efforts to minimize ca­ all manner of means, not only against The policy's goal was "to exact good sualties, prevent global nuclear annihi­ enemy armed forces, but against the behavior or to oblige discontinuance of lation, and engage the enemy only in entire population of a nation, with a mischief, not to destroy the subject specific, politically driven battlefields, view to its complete destruction."2 It is altogether."3 This type of warfare, how­ their concepts have been debated for in this kind of war that almost every ever, was not at all in accordance with centuries. I It is through the lens of mil­ citizen of that nation is mobilized to what had become America's way of itary successes that we can truly exam­ drive the . Automobile facto­ war. In fact, its citizens and its ine the validity of limited warfare in to­ ries are converted to plants; cruise were appalled by what political scien­ day's low-intensity conflict laden world. ships become troop transports; food tist Robert Osgood called the "galling America's lack of success in campaigns and valuable commodities are rationed; but indispensable restraints" they en­ and on the modem battlefield and average citizens are conscripted countered in limited war.4 has been the direct result of a shift in into the military to become soldiers and of focus from the total war practices sailors. There are no holds barred in Total Victory II and the American Civil total war. Soldiers are killed on the War, to the limited war concepts devel­ battlefield - as in any conflict - but The validity of the limited war politi­ oped by the Truman and Johnson ad­ in a total war, commercial shipping is cal philosophy is best seen when exam­ ministrations during the early days of sunk, factories are reduced to rubble by ining the victories and defeats of the the Cold War, and practiced in the jun­ bombs and rockets, and civilian popula­ U.S. military. Over the past 200 years, gles of Vietnam and the deserts of Ku­ tion centers are targeted to deny the the U.S. Army's war record is testi­ wait and Iraq. If the United States is to enemy the means with which to do bat- mony to the importance of the total war 8 ARMOR - September-October 2002

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "World War II is one of the best examples of the total war philosophy's success. During World War II, the United States mobilized every asset available to meet the demands of the immense military machine it fielded to meet the Japanese-German threat. "

philosophy. Numerous battles and cam­ over 300 miles per hour.? This seem­ When offered the chance to save them­ paigns have been won or lost simply ingly large number of civilian casual­ selves from "the devastations of war because the either were or ties paled in comparison to the 90,000 preparing for [them], only by with­ were not able to completely destroy the killed in Hiroshima when the drawing [their] quota out of the Con­ enemy or render him incapable of United States dropped the first nuclear federate Army, and aiding [General mounting military operations. device, and the 35,000 killed in Na­ Sherman] to expel [the Confederate Ar­ gasaki when they dropped the second my] from the borders of the State," the W orld War II is one of the best exam­ one.s By bombing these , the Unit­ Georgian government remained indig­ ples of the total war philosophy's suc­ ed States and her allies showed the nant. 12 cess. During World War II, the United that they were willing to States mobilized every asset available Sherman then razed Atlanta and pro­ go to any length necessary to achieve to meet the demands of the immense ceeded on his historic march to the complete and total victory. There would military machine it fielded to meet the sea, again, destroying everything in his be no negotiated peace. There would Japanese-German threat. By 1945, the path. As Sherman's march continued, be total, unconditional , or the U.S. Army had 891,663 officers and he slowly eroded the Confederacy's Allies would continue to fight, as was 7,376,295 enlisted personnel, and was ability to wage war, and in April 1865, necessary in the case of 's producing over 2,400 per month General Lee, finding himself and his , where the Soviet Red Army - a far cry from the mere 14,186 offi­ army between two Union , sur­ was forced to fight all the way through cers and 175,353 enlisted personnel it rendered to General Grant at Appomat­ Berlin. had in 1939, while spending a mere 2 tox Court House. The Army of the Con­ percent of the nation's gross national America's can also be used federacy laid down their arms, parked product on defense.s to demonstrate one of the many suc­ their and went home, never cesses the U.S. Army has had using to­ again to take up arms against the Fed­ The total war goal for World War II tal war philosophy. The United States' eral Government. was the of It­ aly, Germany, and Japan. No other op­ transition from limited to total war can be seen by reviewing the Union's loss­ Limited Defeat tions were acceptable. The United States es in the early days of the war when the and its allies could not, and would not, The United States has not always government was, according to General be defeated. The degree to which the adopted the total war philosophy for var­ William T. Sherman's memoirs, "ex­ allies pursued their goals is best sum­ ious reasons. The U.S. military adopted tremely wavering and weak."9 marized in a 1944 British report that a limited war strategy for the Korean states: "In five years of drastic labor American losses at battles, such as War in the early 1950s. The fear of es­ , nearly every man and Ball's Bluff and Bull Run, revealed a calation and global nuclear war between every woman under fifty without young unwilling to go complete­ communist China and Western Allies children has been subject to direction ly to war with the Confederacy. At the caused the U.S., under the leadership of to work ....The hours of work average onset of the war, Congress was unwill­ President Harry S. Truman, to refuse the fifty-three for men and fifty overall; ing to admit that Union forces were use of nuclear against North when work is done, every citizen ... has going to have to adopt a total war strat­ Korea and its Chinese allies, as well as had to do forty-eight hours a month egy to defeat the Confederates and re­ refuse to invade China. After 3 years of duty in the Home Guard or Civil De­ store the Union. This was possibly due fighting, the U.N. forces, under which fense."6 to the fact that at the very beginning of the U.S. fought, were only able to re­ the war, "many of the Southern repre­ establish prewar conditions along the Civilian and economic mobilization, sentatives remained in Congress, shar­ 38th paralle\. however, were not the only aspects of ing in public councils, and influencing the allied campaign that adhered to the Today, this cease-fire agreement re­ legislation." 10 total war philosophy. The strategic mil­ mains fragile, occupying a great deal of itary planning involved in World War Regardless of the causes of this pol­ U.S. military power, and allowing North II also demonstrated total war charac­ icy, such political decisions as the gov­ Korea's government to retain its adver­ teristics. Not only did the Allies bomb ernment's refusal to immediately adopt sarial role in Western politics. For the major German and Japanese industrial Winfield Scott's "Anaconda Plan" that first time, U.S. military leaders were re­ centers to cripple their respective war entailed naval and the sei­ stricted in both the weapons they were machines, they also fire bombed major zure of the Mississippi River, served to permitted to bring to bear against the population centers, such as Hamburg, lengthen the war. 11 The strategy that enemy, and the geographic areas in Dresden, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima, to finally ended the war was that of total which they were permitted to operate. 13 break the population's will. In Ham­ war. As Grant's army held the Confed­ Politicians and multinational organiza­ burg alone, British efforts to "dehouse" eracy at bay in the eastern United tions now dictated strategic and, at the German population resulted in the States, General Sherman's army pene­ times, tactical decisionmaking. War was deaths of 30,000 to 40,000 civilians as trated deep into the southern states, now conducted to meet political goals the reached temperatures in excess destroying every Confederate military and create conditions necessary to ne­ of 1,000 degrees and winds blew at and economic asset along the way. gotiate agreements and attain certain ARMOR - September-October 2002 9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "The U.S. military adopted a limited war strategy for the in the early 1950s. The fear of escalation and global nuclear war between communist China and Western Allies caused the United States, under the leadership of President Harry S. Truman, to refuse the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea and its Chinese allies, as well as refuse to invade China. "

political concessions from the enemy, cess. This, however, is not the case The all-volunteer force is the first is­ not to destroy it and render it incapable when one examines both the political sue that the U.S. military must address. of future operations. restraints placed on the military during Since the end of the draft in the mid the Gulf War, and the current state of 1970s, the U.S. military has relied on The U.S. followed a similar strategy affairs that exist due to certain unreal­ volunteers to fill its ranks. This has during the in the 1960s ized or misplaced goals. Though the caused a rather complicated problem - and early 1970s. So great was the fear Gulf War did resemble the total wars of the military needs to put soldiers in of escalation and nuclear from the past, in that all aspects of the Iraqi harm's way to achieve its goals, but in the Soviet Union during this era, that military machine were attacked during doing so, risks eliminating its recruit­ the United States proceeded with a lim­ the 41-day air war, the fact that a large ment source. In an army in which 41 ited war strategy to suppress the com­ amount of the Iraqi Republican Guard percent of incoming recruits enroll in munist North Vietnamese attacks on 14 and other units were allowed to escape the Army College Fund, it is obvious South Vietnam. The U.S. policy of from Kuwait into Iraq, and Saddam that service to one's country is not the gradual escalation operated under the Hussein was permitted to remain in overwhelming desire of most young assumption that a steady increase in the power, attest to the limiting factors dur­ soldiers. 19 As soon as the military be­ amount of military presence in the re­ ing this operation. 18 gins to show casualty numbers, the Ar­ gion, coupled with an equal increase in Today, Saddam Hussein is still al­ my's image as a relatively safe way to the intensity of the conflict, would even­ pay college tuition becomes flawed, tually convince the enemy to comply lowed to playa role in the world com­ 15 munity. His refusal to allow U.N. in­ causing young people to opt for other with U.S. demands. Against an oppo­ means to finance their educations. In nent that was able to match each U.S. spection teams into Iraq, his continuing attempts to smuggle oil out of his coun­ this situation, not only does the military escalation and stood defiant in the face lose recruits, it then becomes necessary try and into the global economy, and of increased conflict intensity, this stra­ to initiate stop-loss programs to retain tegy was doomed from its inception. '6 his constant efforts to develop weapons soldiers. of mass destruction continue to plague U.S. forces were not permitted to en­ the post-Gulf War world community. With an army of finite size, "if vic­ ter known North Vietnamese refuges The U.S. military may have cured the and attack supply lines in Cambodia symptom of Iraqi aggression, but it has tory, and even a repeated victory do not bring an end to the war, the question and Laos. Hanoi, the North Vietnamese yet to cure the disease, that is, Saddam then arises whether the expense of re­ capital city, was not bombed, and its Hussein and his maniacal foreign and storing an army damaged by its victory harbor not mined. Finally, on 30 April domestic policies. 1975, South Vietnam fell after the Unit­ is not as important as the victory it­ self."20 The most successful way, then, ed States stopped military and financial The Future of Total War support to the region. Henry Kissinger, of maintaining a large, dedicated force in his book Years of Renewal, very Today the United States stands in a with which to fight these types of mod­ adeptly summarizes the United States' relatively complicated position. Though em conflicts would be to reestablish the inability to continue combat operations history has proven that limiting military draft to some degree. The U.S. Govern­ in this environment, "Idealism had pro­ efforts during conflicts rarely provides ment selective service programs have pelled America into Indochina, and ex­ the options necessary to achieve suc­ been shown to be less than adequate. haustion caused us to leave."17 The de­ cess on the battlefield and to achieve all With the problems experienced during feat was not only a major embarrass­ of the desired political goals, the U.S. activation of National Guard units dur­ ment to the U.S. military, but also sig­ military must now deal with issues that ing the Gulf War, the U.S. Army would nified a major step back for the West­ were nonexistent in the 1800s and ear­ be hard-pressed to demand service from ern Allies in their continuing struggle ly to mid-1900s. Today, the military is someone who has no intention of serv­ to combat Soviet communist influence forced to deal with issues such as low­ ing and does not feel contractually ob­ around the globe. intensity conflict, an all-volunteer force, ligated to do so. By maintaining a mod­ and maintaining the moral-ethical high erately sized conscripted force, the mil­ Even the Gulf War was limited in ground in the world community. Either itary would have a constant influx of strategy and success. Many people be­ a decision must be reached regarding new personnel during times that the lieve that due to the relatively dispro­ the management of these pressures, or a idea of serving in the military does not portionate losses dealt the Iraqis by vast overhaul of the U.S. military must seem like a life-enhancing opportunity U.S.-led coalition forces, this conflict occur to maintain a force that is capable to average 18 to 25 year olds. Current­ should be seen as a total war-type suc- of sustaining total war operations. ly, many European countries have man- 10 ARMOR - September-October 2002

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. datory 2- to 3-year service obligations, forces in Bosnia and Kosovo routinely forced unconditional surrender. By lim­ and with the current war on terror. it assist refugees and other people hurt by iting war, one risks fighting the same may be time for the United States to the war. enemy again and again, and in the follow suit. These are all fine examples of doing worst-case scenario, one risks defeat. the right thing, however, when civilians The war on terror is the next problem allow themselves to be pulled into the Notes facing today's military. Globally, the fight, they forfeit their rights as civil­ U.S. military finds itself conducting ians. If there are 1Robert A. Doughty. et a!.. Warfare in the West· numerous and peace-en­ facilities beneath a childcare facility, ern World: Volume II, D.C. Heath and Company, forcement operations, in what have be­ such as there were in Iraq, then the ci­ Lexington, MA. 1996, p. 913. come known as operations other than vilians in that area assume the risk in­ war, support and stability operations, 2John I. Alger, The United States Military His· herent with those conditions. The Unit­ and low-intensity conflicts. Conflicts tory Series: Definitions and Doctrine of the Mili­ ed States needs to realize, as does the tary Art Past and Present, Avery Publishing such as regional wars, ethnic hatred, Group Inc., Wayne, NJ, 1985, p. 1-2. , and , will not be media, that it is the responsibility of the opposing government to safeguard its viewed by the public or the media as 3Doughty, p. 913. war, but these conflicts will still inter­ citizens according to the guidelines set forth in the Geneva and Hague Conven­ 4Ibid. rupt global tranquility and U.S. inter­ ests in the global community.21 Con­ tions. Churches, hospitals, and histori­ 5Ibid., p. 719. cal monuments must be honored as safe ducting total war in this arena becomes areas, and it is the responsibility of both 6Ibid., p. 720. a bit more complicated because there is not a specific nation-state to attack. parties to refrain from targeting civil­ 7Ibid., p. 732. ians to the utmost of their abilities, but RIbid., p. 838. only to the extent that those structures Problems in places such as Afghani­ 'iWilliam T. Sherman, Memoirs of General Wil­ stan, Bosnia, and Kosovo do not read­ and locations do not represent viable military objectives. liam T. Shennan, Da Capo Press, Inc., New York, ily present total war solutions; how­ 1984, p. 382. ever, the total war principles remain In 1945, 95,000 Japanese civilians lOS herman, pp. 382-83. the same. Eliminating the enemy's abil­ were killed to save the lives of hun­ ity to make war and create problems in dreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers dur­ IITimothy H. Donovan, et aI., The West Point his native region and globally, is in ing World War II. This should be the Series: The , keeping with the overall intent of total model for total war of the 21st century. Avery Publishing Group Inc., Wayne, NJ, 1987. war. This does not, however, mean that No longer can the U.S. military be p.l1. the intervening country maintains a placed in a situation like the one in 12Sherman, p. 139. peacekeeping force in the region. By Somalia. It cannot allow the feelings of following total war doctrine, the inter­ the world community to dictate the !3Doughty, p. 873. vening country seeks to militarily elim­ policies involved with its military de­ 14Ibid., p. 913. inate the combat power and political ployments. Had the Rangers in Somalia 15Ibid., p. 914. leadership of the aggressors in these re­ been equipped with the armor support gions. Removing heads of state, such as they so desperately needed, more young 16Ibid., p. 920. Slobodan Milosovic in Yugoslavia, is a men would have come home from Mo­ 17Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, Simon key part in the eventual success or fail­ gadishu, and the U.S. may have even and Schuster, New York, 1999, p. 463. ure of these operations. The United realized its goals. States must aspire to make peace in 18General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: these regions, not simply settle for The u.s. Anny in the Gu/fWar, U.S. Army Com­ Throughout the past 200 years, total mand and General College Press, Fort Leav­ keeping peace if it plans to decrease its war philosophy has shown itself to be a enworth, KS, 1994, p. 315. OPTEMPO and increase its prepared­ highly successful means for conducting ness for large-scale operations in future war. Limiting oneself to specific weap­ 19Ibid., p. 17. global hot spots. ons, regions, and practices has proven 20Hans Delbruck, History of , to be costly in terms of human and col­ Volume IV: The Dawn of , trans. Finally, the military must maintain the lateral loses, and ineffective in ending Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., University of Nebraska moral and ethical high ground in the aggression toward the United States Press, Lincoln, NE, 1990, p. 296. world community. While this stance and its allies. If the United States con­ tinues to pursue limited warfare objec­ 21Donald M. Snow. The Shape of the Future: does require doing away with target­ The Post Cold War World, 2d ed., M.E. Sharpe, ing innocent civilians during times of tives in areas such as Somalia, Af­ Inc., Armonk, New York, 1995, p. 212. conflict, it does not necessarily dictate ghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, it will that soldiers be placed in more danger continue to have only limited success­ to safeguard enemy civilians. One of es. Total war methods not only provide CPT Brian Brennan graduated in this country's founding fathers inti­ a means with which to end conflict and 1998 from the United States Military mated that it was not only the right of eliminate enemies, but also to serve as Academy. After attending Armor Of­ the people to do away with a govern­ a deterrent to others, who would at­ ment that they believed to be criminal tempt to disrupt global tranquility, in­ ficer Basic Course, he served as a or morally and ethically devoid, but it terfere with U.S. interests abroad, or platoon leader and executive was their obligation as citizens of that attempt to attack the sovereignty of the in A Company, 2-70 Armor. A grad­ nation, and as men. During the Civil United States. The United States has uate of the Armor Captains Career War, Sherman's forces evacuated the been truly successful only when it has Course, he is currently attending city of Atlanta prior to razing it. U.S. completely destroyed the enemy and CAS3. ARMOR - September-October 2002 11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.