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Award Concerning the Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation PCA Case No. 2017-06 IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION - before - AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED UNDER ANNEX VII TO THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA - between - UKRAINE - and - THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION - in respect of - Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– AWARD CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 21 February 2020 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL: Judge Jin-Hyun Paik (President) Judge Boualem Bouguetaia Judge Alonso Gómez-Robledo Judge Vladimir Golitsyn Professor Vaughan Lowe QC REGISTRY: Permanent Court of Arbitration TABLE OF CONTENTS I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................................................... 1 A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1 B. INSTITUTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................................ 2 C. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL AND INITIAL PROCEDURAL DECISIONS .................. 4 D. SUBMISSION OF UKRAINE’S MEMORIAL .......................................................................................... 5 E. SUBMISSION OF THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND WRITTEN PLEADINGS RELATED THERETO....................................................................................................... 7 F. HEARING CONCERNING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS ...................... 8 II. THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS ON JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY ............................... 12 A. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................................................................. 12 B. SUBMISSIONS OF UKRAINE ............................................................................................................. 13 III. BASIS OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL’S JURISDICTION ............................................................. 13 IV. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S OBJECTION THAT THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER UKRAINE’S SOVEREIGNTY CLAIM ....................................................... 15 A. CHARACTERISATION OF THE DISPUTE BEFORE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL .................................. 15 1. Position of the Russian Federation ......................................................................................... 15 2. Position of Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 20 B. SCOPE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNDER ARTICLES 286 AND 288 OF THE CONVENTION ........................................................................................................................... 21 1. Position of the Russian Federation ......................................................................................... 21 2. Position of Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 23 C. EXISTENCE VEL NON OF A SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE OVER CRIMEA ............................................... 25 1. General Argument ................................................................................................................... 25 (a) Position of the Russian Federation ................................................................................... 25 (b) Position of Ukraine ............................................................................................................. 26 2. Inadmissibility .......................................................................................................................... 27 (a) Position of the Russian Federation ................................................................................... 27 (b) Position of Ukraine ............................................................................................................. 31 3. Implausibility ........................................................................................................................... 34 (a) Position of the Russian Federation ................................................................................... 34 (b) Position of Ukraine ............................................................................................................. 36 4. The Relative Weight of the Dispute ........................................................................................ 39 (a) Position of the Russian Federation ................................................................................... 39 (b) Position of Ukraine ............................................................................................................. 42 D. REPLY TO THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL’S QUESTIONS ....................................................................... 45 1. Reply of the Russian Federation ............................................................................................. 45 2. Reply of Ukraine ...................................................................................................................... 46 PCA 300354 i E. ANALYSIS OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL ........................................................................................ 47 1. Nature or Characterisation of the Dispute before the Arbitral Tribunal ............................ 47 2. Scope of the Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Article 288(1) of the Convention ................................................................................................................................ 48 3. Existence vel non of a Sovereignty Dispute over Crimea ...................................................... 50 (a) General Considerations ..................................................................................................... 50 (b) Inadmissibility .................................................................................................................... 51 (c) Implausibility ...................................................................................................................... 56 (d) Relative Weight of the Dispute .......................................................................................... 58 4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 59 V. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S OBJECTION THAT THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS CONCERNING ACTIVITIES IN THE SEA OF AZOV AND IN THE KERCH STRAIT ............................................................................................................................ 59 A. STATUS OF THE SEA OF AZOV AND THE KERCH STRAIT BEFORE 1991 AND DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE USSR .............................................................................. 60 1. Position of the Russian Federation ......................................................................................... 60 2. Position of Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 64 B. POSITIONS AND PRACTICE OF THE PARTIES REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE SEA OF AZOV AND THE KERCH STRAIT ........................................................................................................................ 66 1. Position of the Russian Federation ......................................................................................... 66 2. Position of Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 69 C. RIGHTS OF THIRD STATES .............................................................................................................. 74 1. Position of the Russian Federation ......................................................................................... 74 2. Position of Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 74 D. RELEVANCE OF THE SIZE OF THE SEA OF AZOV ............................................................................. 76 1. Position of the Russian Federation ......................................................................................... 76 2. Position of Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 77 E. HISTORIC TITLE ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 79 1. Position of the Russian Federation ......................................................................................... 79 2. Position of Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 80 F. APPLICABILITY OF UNCLOS TO THE WATERS OF THE SEA OF AZOV AND THE KERCH STRAIT . 80 1. Position of the Russian Federation ......................................................................................... 80 2. Position of Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 81 G. EXCLUSIVELY PRELIMINARY CHARACTER OF THE OBJECTION ................................................... 82 1. Position of the Russian Federation ........................................................................................
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