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Home , Georgiy Gongadze, Leonid Kuchma, Tuzla Island, Viktor Yanukovych

“As cools ’s relations with the West, Yanukovych faces the prospect of having to deal with Putin and Moscow from a weaker posi- tion.”

Ukraine’s Perilous Balancing Act STEVEN PIFER

ince Ukraine regained its independence in THE OVERBEARING NEIGHBOR 1991, the primary foreign policy challenge has been, is, and will remain a major fac- Sconfronting policy makers in Kiev has been tor in Kiev’s foreign policy calculus—as well as a to strike the proper balance between Ukraine’s re- player affecting that calculus. It could hardly be lations with the West and its relations with Russia. otherwise given Russia’s size and geographic prox- Ukrainian presidents over the past 20 years have imity, the historical and cultural links between the structured this balance with the purpose of fixing two countries, and the economic ties that linger Ukraine’s identity on the European map, ensuring even two decades after the end of the Soviet com- that Ukraine does not end up as a borderland be- mand economy. Still, as those two decades have tween an enlarging Europe and a recalcitrant Rus- shown, Russia can be an overbearing neighbor. sia, and gaining greater freedom of maneuver vis- Most Ukrainian strategists thus have concluded à-vis Moscow. Such a balance has generally served that Kiev requires strong relations with the West Ukraine well, but maintaining it has always been as a counterweight. Moreover, the democratic val- tricky. ues and prosperity enjoyed by the EU have long It is becoming even trickier in 2012. President attracted many . , who took office in 2010, Since the formally disbanded has overseen a democratic regression in Ukraine in December 1991, the Russian government has that complicates his effort to keep a balance be- sought to maintain significant influence in the tween relations with the West and with Russia. post-Soviet space, in part through the Common- His domestic political agenda, driven by tactical wealth of Independent States (CIS). Newly inde- goals and personal animus toward his rival, for- pendent Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Krav- mer Prime Minister , is hinder- chuk, adopted a cautious approach toward the CIS, ing achievement of his professed strategic goal of concerned that Russia would use it to undercut drawing Ukraine closer to the . Ukraine’s sovereignty. He moved quickly in 1992, And this comes at a time when Europe and the for example, to assert control over the armed United States are preoccupied with other ques- forces on Ukrainian territory rather than leaving tions and have less time and patience for Kiev. them under a CIS command structure dominated Yanukovych is playing a geopolitical game in by Moscow. which he appears to assume that the West, and At the same time, Kravchuk strove to fix a the EU in particular, will overlook his democratic Ukrainian identity within Europe and gain free- backsliding and embrace Ukraine. This miscal- dom of maneuver in dealing with the . culation risks throwing Ukraine’s foreign policy He launched an effort to build links to institutions out of balance. It could gravely undermine Kiev’s such as the EU and NATO, as well as strong bilater- bargaining position in dealing with a Russia that al relationships with the United States and key Eu- is prepared to play hardball with its Ukrainian ropean states. In 1994, Ukraine began negotiating neighbor. an EU partnership and cooperation agreement and became the first post-Soviet state to join NATO’s newly announced Partnership for Peace program. STEVEN PIFER, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is a retired foreign service officer and former US ambassador The fate of the former Soviet strategic nuclear to Ukraine. arms in Ukraine ranked as a top problem for Kiev 106 Ukraine’s Perilous Balancing Act • 107 in the early 1990s. Bilateral discussions with Mos- would have increased the EU’s leverage to encour- cow failed to reach agreement on terms for their age democratic and economic reform in Ukraine. removal from Ukraine, and Kiev welcomed US par- Still, Kuchma and other senior Ukrainian officials ticipation in a trilateral dialogue. While Ukrainian persisted in the push for membership. leaders recognized that Washington shared Mos- cow’s goal of removing all nuclear weapons from BALANCING GETS HARDER Ukraine, they also believed that having the United Kuchma’s foreign policy seemed to find a com- States at the table could help secure a more favor- fortable balance for a period from 1997 to 1999, as able agreement with Russia. A January 1994 trilat- links with the West grew while relations with Mos- eral statement accomplished that. cow became less tense. However, events began to , who defeated Kravchuk in the threaten the balance at the end of 1999. A marred July 1994 presidential election, was originally re- presidential election; the disappearance and mur- garded as the “pro-Moscow” candidate. In office, der of an internet journalist, ; however, he had to confront continuing Russian and the revelation of recordings that suggested challenges. The Duma (Russian parliament), Mos- high-level involvement in Gongadze’s death and cow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and Russian nationalists other misdeeds sparked concerns in Washington regularly called into question Ukrainian sovereign- and Europe as well as in Ukraine. ty over and , which had become In subsequent years, Ukraine’s relations with the part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in West worsened due to a dispute with NATO over 1954. The Russian government proposed a basing Ukrainian arms transfers to Macedonia, a flawed agreement for its Fleet that would have 2002 Rada (Ukrainian parliament) election, and given it control of large portions of Sevastopol. the release of another recording in which Kuchma Kuchma redoubled Ukraine’s efforts to deepen seemed to approve the transfer of air defense sys- its engagement with the tems to Iraq. In 2002, Wash- West. In 1996, he concluded ington reviewed its relations a strategic partnership with EU circles increasingly are coming with Ukraine, while NATO the United States and es- downgraded a planned to regard Ukraine as a nuisance tablished a high-level com- NATO-Ukraine summit to a mission to oversee bilateral rather than an asset. foreign ministers’ meeting relations. In 1997, Ukraine to signal its unhappiness negotiated a special relation- with Kuchma. ship with NATO. By solidifying ties with NATO and Some Ukrainians at the time cautioned that Washington, Kuchma aimed in part to strengthen these moves by the West might inadvertently push his bargaining position when dealing with Moscow. Ukraine toward Russia. US officials discounted The Russians paid attention. In May 1997, when those warnings, believing that Kiev understood President made his first official visit the risks of overdependence on Russia and would to Kiev in nearly four years, the result was a treaty take care not to fall too far into Moscow’s orbit. of friendship and cooperation that unambiguously Kuchma himself grasped this point. In 2003, he recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial found a way to arrest the decline in relations with integrity. The sides also settled on the terms of a Washington by supporting the US-led military op- 20-year lease for basing facilities in Crimea for the eration against Iraq. After Baghdad fell, Kiev of- Black Sea Fleet. fered troops to the coalition stabilization force—at Kuchma took to describing his foreign policy one point, they constituted the fourth-largest co- as a “multi-vector” approach. It centered on three alition contingent. strategic directions: Europe, the United States, Kuchma also took care to keep good relations and Russia. Among the three, he increasingly with Russia. He changed foreign ministers in Sep- placed emphasis on Europe. In 1998, even though tember 2000, replacing —disliked Ukraine had just brought its EU partnership and in Moscow for his strong pro-West leanings—with cooperation agreement into force, officials in Kiev the less controversial , and began began pressing for an association agreement that holding regular meetings with Russian President would articulate a path toward EU membership. . The Ukrainians declared 2002 the and a number of union countries balked— “Year of Russia,” and Kuchma showed greater in- unfortunately, since the prospect of membership terest in the CIS. 108 • CURRENT HISTORY • March 2012

In October 2003, the Russians rewarded Kuch- But the Ukrainians had done nothing in advance ma’s gestures with one of the oddest of Russian- to prepare the ground, and their request caught Ukrainian crises. Without consultation with Kiev, NATO members by surprise. Although a majority the Russians began building a levee from the Ka- supported or was prepared to go along with a MAP man Peninsula on the Russian mainland to Tuzla for Ukraine at an April NATO summit in Bucharest, Island in the Strait, which separates Crimea a small number—led by Germany and France— from Russia. By any reasonable reading of the his- firmly opposed the idea. tory of Tuzla Island—and certainly by the read- The push for a MAP, while ultimately fruitless, ing of officials in Kiev—the island belonged to ended any sense of balance in Yushchenko’s for- Ukraine. Kuchma cut short a visit to Brazil to rush eign policy approach. During a February 2008 back and visit Tuzla to underscore Ukraine’s terri- Yushchenko visit to Moscow, Putin threatened to torial claim. The sides later remanded the issue to target missiles at Ukraine. a bilateral working group, and work on the levee Other Yushchenko policies also provoked an- stopped, but not before reminding Ukrainians that ger in Moscow. The Kremlin condemned as anti- Russia could be troublesome. Russian steps to promote the , and objected sharply to a push to have the Ho- WARMING TO THE WEST lodomor—the 1930s man-made that killed When Yanukovych was proclaimed winner of millions of Ukrainians—recognized as . the November 2004 presidential election, hun- Kiev’s support for Georgian President Mikheil Saa- dreds of thousands took to the streets to protest kashvili during the August 2008 -Russia . The , led by conflict drew special ire, particularly when Yush- and Tymoshenko, resulted in a chenko suggested that Ukraine might bar the December rerun of the disputed run-off vote. This Black Sea Fleet from operating out of Sevastopol. time Yushchenko handily defeated Yanukovych Disputes over contracts for Ukraine’s purchases of and became president in January 2005. Yushchen- Russian natural gas led Moscow to impose a three- ko’s vision for Ukraine was one of a “normal,” ful- day cut-off in January 2006 and a longer suspen- ly integrated European state holding membership sion in January 2009. in both NATO and the EU. It was a vision sure to By 2009, relations between Moscow and Kiev alarm the Russians. had fallen to their lowest point since 1991. Polling The Yushchenko government pressed the EU within Ukraine indicated growing discomfort with to replace the partnership and cooperation agree- Yushchenko’s foreign policy. His push to join NATO ment with an association agreement and, like its put him far out in front of both Ukrainian elite predecessor, called for a path to membership. Ne- and public opinion; polls showed only 20 to 30 gotiations on an association agreement began in percent support for NATO membership. Underly- 2007. Kiev also pushed to upgrade its relationship ing this sentiment was broad public unease about with NATO, securing in 2005 an intensified dia- the collapse of relations with Russia. Many did not logue with the alliance, the precursory step to a want such problematic relations with their eastern NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). neighbor, given family, ethnic, cultural, and busi- With Ukraine’s strengthening democratic cre- ness links. dentials and a pro-NATO defense ministry begin- ning to pursue serious reform, talk in 2006 turned RESTORING RUSSIAN TIES to Ukraine’s possible receipt of a MAP. Many saw Yanukovych’s narrow victory over Tymosh- this as a realistic prospect until Yushchenko un- enko in the 2010 presidential election stemmed expectedly appointed Yanukovych instead of Ty- largely from voter unhappiness with the econo- moshenko as prime minister that August. What- my and the chaotic management style of the “Or- ever understanding the two Viktors might have ange” government. Once in office, Yanukovych had regarding the NATO relationship, Yanukovych indicated that his first foreign policy priority used the occasion of his September 2006 visit to would be to repair the badly tattered relation- Brussels to state that he did not favor a MAP, which ship with Moscow. He halted the Ukrainian lan- put the idea on ice. guage and campaigns, and dropped After Yushchenko replaced Yanukovych with the goal of NATO membership. In an April 2010 Tymoshenko as prime minister at the end of 2007, meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medve- Ukraine renewed its MAP bid in January 2008. dev, Yanukovych agreed to a 25-year extension Ukraine’s Perilous Balancing Act • 109 of the lease for facilities for the Black Sea Fleet— leaders chose to overlook the past and quickly ex- which would allow Russian warships to remain tended their congratulations. in Sevastopol until 2042—while Russia agreed to By the second half of 2010, however, doubts a 10-year discount on the price of natural gas it began to grow about Yanukovych’s commitment sold Ukraine. to democracy. The Security Service of Ukraine The rapid pace of the restoration of relations monitored the activities of university students with Russia and questions about the wisdom of who had criticized the government. The Consti- the Black Sea Fleet lease and gas price deal raised tutional Court’s abrupt overturn of constitutional concern about Ukraine’s course. Yanukovych and reforms and strengthening of presidential powers his senior foreign policy officials portrayed their raised more questions. Nationwide local elections quick agreements with Russia as necessary, but in October revealed process flaws and fell short of they also described their overall objective as a the standard set by elections that Ukraine had held balance of good relations with the West and Rus- from December 2004 to February 2010. sia. So, while eschewing a MAP, they also stressed Arrests of officials who had served under Yush- their desire to maintain broad practical coopera- chenko mounted. In early 2011, the international tion with NATO, and continued to pursue an as- monitoring group Freedom House—which had sociation agreement and comprehensive ranked Ukraine as the first “free” post-Soviet state arrangement with the EU. other than the Baltic nations—dropped Ukraine’s One question confronted Kiev with a clear either/ ranking to “partly free.” Concern increased in or choice. Senior Kremlin officials urged Ukraine 2011 as the government brought criminal charg- to join a customs union along with Russia, Belar- es against Tymoshenko for abuse of office for her us, and . Yanukovych repeatedly said signing a gas import contract with Russia in 2009. he would not, as doing so would be inconsistent Her trial in the summer of 2011 came to epitomize with Ukraine’s obligations in Western worries about demo- the World Trade Organization cratic backsliding in Ukraine. and would scuttle the nego- There is little reason to believe US and European officials, tiation of a free trade arrange- who had urged Kiev not to Russia will moderate its ment with the EU. prosecute Tymoshenko, be- In the second half of 2010, approach to Kiev. came more outspoken in their the Ukrainian government criticism following her impris- pushed to accelerate talks on onment in August. Members the EU association agreement and free trade. This of the European Parliament and of EU member- coincided with reports from Kiev of growing frus- state legislative bodies began to question the ap- tration, including among senior presidential ad- propriateness of concluding an association agree- visers, regarding Russia. Ukrainian officials felt ment. Some threatened to block its ratification. that they had addressed virtually all major Russian US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and concerns on the bilateral agenda but that, aside EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and from the gas price discount, Moscow had done Security Policy wrote to Yanu- little to reciprocate and instead pressed for more. kovych to express concern about Tymoshenko’s As it had for Kravchuk and Kuchma, the pol- treatment. icy of balancing relations between the West and Ukrainian officials justified the trial of Tymosh- Russia seemed a sensible course for Yanukovych. enko as a necessary step to bring criminal acts to Ukraine’s foreign policy appeared to be moving justice, asserting that to do otherwise would be to again toward that balance. But Yanukovych’s do- ignore the rule of law. There certainly were ques- mestic policies soon began to undermine it. tions about Tymoshenko, but the government’s handling of her case smacked utterly of manipula- BACKSLIDING ON DEMOCRACY tion of the judicial system for political ends. As of Although Yanukovych had been the beneficiary the start of 2012, no comparable figures from Yan- of the vote fraud that triggered the Orange Revo- ukovych’s government or from his political base in lution in 2004, Western and Ukrainian observers the Rada, the , had been brought regarded his election in 2010 as the result of a to trial, despite numerous reports that corruption free, fair, and competitive process. This gave Ya- in Ukraine has grown even worse during the first nukovych democratic legitimacy. US and European two years of his presidency. 110 • CURRENT HISTORY • March 2012

At a September 2011 conference in Yalta, Swed- would “depend on political circumstances.” He ish Foreign Minister , EU Enlargement specifically cited Tymoshenko. Commissioner Stefan Fule, and European Parlia- By the start of 2012, Yanukovych’s professed de- ment member Elmar Brok publicly criticized the sire to achieve a balance in relations between the Ukrainian government’s handling of the Tymosh- West and Russia lay in serious jeopardy. Foreign enko case. Speaking at the same conference, Ya- policy officials in Ukraine privately expressed dis- nukovych outlined a possible solution: The Rada may that cooling relations with the West would planned to review the criminal code and might leave Kiev in a weaker position facing Moscow. eliminate some provisions. In a private meeting on the margins of the conference, Bildt, Fule, and OFF THE RADAR Brok spent two hours with the Ukrainian presi- A foreign policy that balances relations with the dent. The three left the meeting believing that Ya- West and Russia has served Ukraine well. The cur- nukovych understood EU concerns and intended rent breakdown in the balance should worry Kiev, to resolve the Tymoshenko case. especially as it comes at a time when the West is Amendment of the criminal code to drop paying far less attention to Ukraine than it did in the provision providing the basis for the charge the past. against Tymoshenko appeared to offer an elegant Washington today is preoccupied with the way out. In the Rada, however, the Party of Re- American economy and a presidential election gions declined to support removal of the provi- campaign. US foreign policy now focuses on ques- sion. The trial court then announced a guilty ver- tions such as , , and a strategic dict and sentenced her to seven years in prison. pivot toward Asia. The Orange Revolution provid- The verdict provoked a storm of criticism from ed a good news story that meshed nicely with the Brussels, EU member-state capitals, Washington, George W. Bush administration’s rhetorical promo- and even Moscow. EU officials shortly thereafter tion of democracy; as a result, Ukraine from 2005 postponed a planned mid-November meeting to 2008 occupied a much higher place on the US with Yanukovych. Relations deterioriated further agenda than would otherwise have been the case. after the government on November 11 charged Now, however, Ukraine no longer offers such Tymoshenko with tax evasion and theft in con- positive news, and it barely registers on the US nection with her leadership of a gas trading firm foreign policy radar. Kiev constantly seeks senior- in the 1990s. level engagement, but American officials have little Senior European officials in November spoke incentive to carve out time to see the Ukrainian directly to Yanukovych about the problem. Lithu- president. President may encounter anian President Dalia Grybauskaite, in a message Yanukovych on the margins of a March nuclear se- that the EU had authorized her to convey, warned curity summit in or in May multilateral meet- the Ukrainian president that the Tymoshenko ings in Chicago, but absent a reversal of the demo- case would affect an EU-Ukraine summit planned cratic regression in Ukraine, there is zero chance of for December 19. Polish President Bronislaw Ko- Obama or Vice President Joseph Biden traveling to morowski told him that Tymoshenko’s imprison- Kiev or hosting Yanukovych in Washington. ment showed that Ukraine did not share EU values The EU also finds itself preoccupied with oth- and put the association agreement at risk. er questions. The European debt crisis will take As the summit approached, EU officials consid- months to play out. Moreover, the last wave of ered further steps to indicate their displeasure. Had EU enlargement has proved more difficult to di- it not been for the fact that —Ukraine’s best gest than anticipated. It has left many member friend in the EU—held the union’s rotating presi- states wary of leaning too far forward in the EU’s dency, the summit might well have been cancelled. outreach to its neighbors and doing anything While negotiation of the association and free trade that might suggest further enlargement. For arrangements was complete, there was no con- those member states skeptical of Ukraine, the sensus among EU members on signing the docu- democratic regression offers a handy reason to ments. In the end, President suggest that the EU tamp down its engagement. and European Commission This makes it much harder for countries such President José Manuel Barroso traveled to Kiev to as Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden, which have meet Yanukovych, but they declined to sign. Van in the past advocated for Ukraine within the EU, Rompuy stated after the meeting that signature to make headway with other member states. The Ukraine’s Perilous Balancing Act • 111 drop-off in Western attention should give Kiev First, it suggests that Kiev believes that the reason for concern. West—and the EU in particular—should over- As Ukraine’s relations with the West cool, look the democracy problems of the past two there is little reason to believe Russia will moder- years and warmly embrace Ukraine. But demo- ate its approach to Kiev. Ukrainian officials in the cratic values matter to the EU and United States; autumn of 2011 put at the top of their agenda they will not give Yanukovych a pass on this. with Moscow the goal of securing a lower price Second, it implies a view in Kiev that Ukraine for the natural gas they buy from Russia’s energy somehow should matter more to Europe than monopoly Gazprom. In December, Yanukovych Europe should matter to Ukraine. In fact, given and other officials complained that Ukraine Kiev’s policies, EU circles increasingly are coming would have to pay $400 to $415 per thousand to regard Ukraine as a nuisance rather than an cubic meters of gas in 2012, whereas they consid- asset. Third, the assertion appears to imply that ered a “fair” price to be $230 to $250. They did Ukraine is more an object of the foreign policy of not explain their rationale for this price or what others than a subject that shapes its own destiny. incentives Gazprom and Moscow might have to Yet it is Ukrainian choices, policies, and actions cut the gas charge. that will most directly determine the country’s Also in December 2011, Ukrainian media re- future place. ported that a deal was under discussion that Yanukovych’s geopolitical game is based on would give Gazprom significant control over the miscalculations regarding the depth of the West’s gas pipelines and underground storage facilities interest in Ukraine and its readiness to compro- in Ukraine, the crown jewels of Ukraine’s energy mise on democracy questions. The president’s two infrastructure which Gazprom has long coveted. apparent near-term foreign policy goals are an EU The Russians appear to calculate that time works association agreement and a lower Russian gas to their advantage on the gas question; Ukraine price. But achievement of the former has been sty- should not expect any gifts. mied by his domestic goals of tightening control Kiev also faces Putin’s coming return to the over politics and sidelining Tymoshenko. Whereas Russian presidency. Although Russian public dis- the EU agreement is strategically important for satisfaction with the conduct of the 2011 Duma Ukraine, the energy price goal is tactical, and Ya- elections may cause Putin to adjust his domestic nukovych’s political goals reflect a mix of tactical politics, his expected victory in the March 2012 domestic aims and personal animus toward Ty- election likely will mean no change in the strate- moshenko. The tactical objectives have come to gic course of Russian foreign policy. Putin was fully overshadow the strategic. engaged in foreign policy matters as prime minister Yanukovych and other Ukrainian officials and de facto leader of the “tandem” with Medvedev. overestimate—perhaps dramatically so—their The tone, however, could change. Putin’s an- country’s strategic value to an EU that, for the nouncement of his intention to establish a Eur- foreseeable future, will be preoccupied with in- asian Union—whatever that institution might ternal questions and reluctant to pursue anything mean in practice—confirms that Moscow will con- that hints at further enlargement. As democratic tinue to pursue mechanisms to broaden its influ- backsliding chills Ukraine’s relations with the ence in and over neighboring states. This should West, Yanukovych faces the prospect of having also give Kiev reason for concern. to deal with Putin and Moscow from a weaker position. FEELING IGNORED This is a grim prognosis for Ukraine and its for- When discussing Ukraine’s foreign policy sit- eign policy, but it does not mean that the country uation, senior officials in Kiev acknowledge that will inevitably fall back into Russia’s orbit. Yanu- they face difficult times this year. They complain, kovych may yet reverse course as circumstances however, that the West ignores Ukraine’s strate- bring him to see that the absence of a balance be- gic importance and is allowing it to slip back to- tween the West and Russia undermines his posi- ward a Russian sphere of influence. Ukrainian tion vis-à-vis Moscow. Two questions then would officials have voiced the same complaint in the follow: How difficult will it be for Kiev to rebuild past when relations with the West encountered relationships with the West, and how much dam- problems. This is an interesting assertion for age might be done in the meantime to Ukraine’s three reasons. interests with Russia? I