southeastern europe 43 (2019) 75-87
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Book Reviews
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James Lyon, Serbia and the Balkan Front, 1914: The Outbreak of the Great War (Bloomsbury Academic, 2015) 328 pp., isbn 9781472580030 (paperback).
The recent wave of commemorative activities revolving around the First World War centenary reinvigorated the scholarly interest for this historical period. Re- surging academic attention was coupled with vehement public debates regard- ing the causes of the war, often erupting into emotionally charged arguments with nationalist undertones. Curiously, the exception of the Sarajevo assassi- nation notwithstanding, the Great War events in the Balkans and the pertain- ing historiography have remained largely off the Anglophone academia’s radar. American historian James Lyon draws attention to this neglected theater of operations in the form of a detailed diplomatic and military history of the first year of the war as seen through the prism of Serbian involvement, for which the author won the Norman B. Tomlinson Prize in 2015. Lyon wrote this book in an effort to introduce English-speaking readers to historical findings on the beginnings of the Great War that can be found in the existing historiography in the region. Another aim was to provide his own interpretation of the Serbian role in the outbreak of the war and the rea- sons for the Austro-Hungarian military’s failures in the first year of combat. Accordingly, Lyon mostly relies on documents of Serbian state institutions, memoirs and diaries of distinguished politicians and soldiers, as well as on Austro-Hungarian military documentation. Whereas these sources had been well-known in Serbian and Yugoslav historiography, they have mostly been overlooked by Western researchers of the First World War. However, apart from the already-known archival materials, Lyon brings to the table some never- before-seen sources, such as the documents of Serbian Orthodox community in Sarajevo. The use of such varied materials, aided by the extensive English- language bibliography on the Great War, combines the micro-perspective of Serbia with the broader historical context in a compelling way.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/18763332-04301004
In the opening chapter, the author weaves a novelesque backdrop for the assassination that sparked the most destructive conflict of the time, through minute lyrical descriptions of Sarajevo’s architecture, society, and everyday life in the summer of 1914. The narration of the circumstances of the archduke’s murder is followed by an analysis of the purported involvement of the Serbian government. Lyon concludes that the Serbian authorities were unaware of the conspirators’ plans, albeit increasingly susceptible to the nationalist agenda of the putschist “Black Hand” organization. Through a convincing scrutiny of Ser- bian diplomatic correspondence, he shows that not only was the Serbian gov- ernment aware of the country’s ill state in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, but that it was seeking rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire in order to prevent the escalation of the new war in the region. The book’s delving into the diplomatic history genre is at its best in Lyon’s discussion of factors that influenced the military alliances of each of Serbia’s neighbors upon the decla- ration of war in July 1914. Furthermore, the author counters the “myth” created by Austrian postwar apologists that the K.u.K. Army was unprepared for the war by providing a detailed catalogue of weaponry, manpower, and materiel reserves of both countries. A shift in the book’s genre towards military history occurs with description of the battles on the Mount Cer, Mačkov Kamen, and Kolubara. Lyon presents these military operations in a very detailed manner, offering a blow-by-blow reconstruction of the actions of Serbian and Austro-Hungarian units. Such a factographically intensive narrative, however, becomes difficult to follow at certain points, and these chapters would have benefited from a more generous use of maps and other illustrations, especially since the author himself (quite rightfully) emphasizes the importance of topography in both armies’ military planning. Apart from dense battle descriptions, the critical situation of the Ser- bian state in the autumn of 1914 is vividly depicted through presentation of the problem of widespread desertion, as well as lukewarm help from the Entente. In his closing analysis of the reasons for the eventual failure of the Austro- Hungarian invasions of Serbia in 1914, Lyon points out incompetent officers, whose mistakes in strategic and tactical planning overwhelmed the monar- chy’s materiel and manpower advantage over the Serbian army. Whereas Oskar Potiorek’s vanity-motivated decision to forcefully advance into Serbia through mountainous western Serbia (instead of the more logical Morava valley route) led to an overextension of Austro-Hungarian supply lines, the disconcerted usage of artillery wasted the initially ample technological resources without inflicting significant damage on the enemy. The factors that contributed to Serbian victory are found precisely in contrary actions: strategy and tactics
southeastern europe 43 (2019) 75-87