A Hybrid for the 21st Century

Jennifer M. English Department Soochow University , Outline of the presentation

† --the languages and the colonial histories † --the policies in the 20th century † --problems from a nationalistic model † --changes since the end of the 20th century † --the current scene and possible solution † 1. a de-nationalized and hybridized drawing upon features from both local and global interactions † 2. a concentric and marginalized identity more compatible in multilingual and multicultural contexts. Greater

† [1] (Dazhonghua in Chinese). [1] This term, used generally and in a sense most relevant to the discussion in this book, is a tag appropriate for referring to the rapidly increasing interaction among Chinese societies around the world as technical, political and administrative barriers to their interchanges fall (cf. Harding 1993, p. 660). It is also important to note that some don’t like the concept of “Greater China” on grounds of desirability or feasibility for regional and global eco-political balances or consequences. Whether “Greater China” will ever be realized or is just a phantom is immaterial to the discussions of this book. We are only interested in the increasing interactions among Chinese across the Strait and their consequences, most importantly on language and identity. credits

† The concepts of hybrid Chinese and marginal identity draw strength from the untapped linguistic aspects of Greater China’s various themes.

Harding, Harry 1993. The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations and Reservations. The China Quarterly, No. 136, Special Issue: Greater China. (Dec., 1993), pp. 660-686

A discussion of “The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities” , David Yen-ho 1994. “The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities,” in The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today. Tu Wei-ming (ed.) Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 148-167. an additional discussion, “On the Margins of the Chinese Discourse” Lee, Leo Ou-fan 1994. “On the Margins of the Chinese Discourse: Some Personal Thoughts on the Cultural Meaning of the Periphery,” in The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today. Tu Wei- ming (ed.) Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 221-241

Zhang’s argument for a supra-local or transnational linguistic markets in which a “standard” language (of a nation-state or a territorially-based community) may not be the “standard” against which values of other varieties are compared and established (

Zhang, Qing 2005. A Chinese yuppie in : Phonological variation and the construction of a new professional identity. Language in Society 34:3 431–466. The twice-over nationalistic model on language and identity

† A nationalistic policy on language and identity † --Japanese occupation (1895-1945) † Chinese was banned while local languages were initially tolerated till 1941 when a campaign was launched to transform Taiwanese into imperial subjects † --KMT ruling (1945-2000) † Japanese was banned and local languages such as Hakka, Tai-yu and aboriginal languages were initially tolerated but banned in 1964 when a campaign was launched to emphasize the grace of speaking Mandarin After 2000

† With the KMT losing its political monopoly in Taiwan, the then opposition party, the DPP, chose Tai-yu as “the language for the people” to challenge the legitimacy and authority of Mandarin and its long held China-center social and political policies. In the mist of the fledgling party’s quest for power, contending issues on the subject of correcting past wrongs and the quest for rights, including language rights for minorities as well as mother tongue language education (among other social issues) proved to be one of the DPP’s winning cards in the quest for resources and representation. A well-defined nationalistic model on language and identity soon became problematic as the backlash against the Mandarin only and China-center policy took vengeance for its 55 year of monopoly. A well-defined language

† --replacement of wenyan with baihua at the turn of the 19th century in order to modernize and unify the country † --the southern varieties were at greater disadvantages since the linguistic discrepancy between the north and south was great † --objections were raised to challenge the use of a northern norm. According to (1999), the argument was that since wenyan was dissociated from all of the contemporary , the dialectal background of learners would not make any difference in its acquisition; with baihua, on the other hand, southerners would be at a linguistic disadvantage in comparison with native speakers of Northern Mandarin. This concern, as it turned out, was overridden by the urgent need for a written language that was closer to the vernacular of the majority of population and thus more suitable for a modernizing society (Chen 1999, p. 141) † --Linguistically, the variety () and Min variety (Tai-yu)[1] of Chinese preserve more distinct linguistic traces of ancient Chinese than those of the northern varieties such as Beijing Mandarin. For example, Cantonese and Tai-yu have more elaborate tonal repertoires than their Beijing counterpart. Both preserve many word final from which are absent in the Beijing variety. † [1] There are differences between Min, and Tai-yu, mostly due to circumstances of language contact and the latter’s colonial experience with Japan. However, we are only focusing on the language situation in Taiwan and thus are using Tai-yu throughout this book. † --Yue and Min have been widely used not only by Chinese in the southeast provinces of the mainland, such as and Fujien, but are also associated with the Chinese dating from the end of the 18th century. In North America, Australia, and , one can hear these two varieties along with other practiced daily. Lack of a well-respected written form?

† Authenticity and antiquity aside, speakers of southern varieties also experienced, in the way of written representation, church in the 19th century with missionaries coming to the island and the costal areas on the mainland, among other colonial influences.[1] At best, these representations tended at least until very recently, to be treated with the usual condescension by literates who saw anything other than the Chinese character as unworthy of a great civilization, or by authorities who took the position that they simply didn’t exist. To provide examples: When Tai-oan--sia Kau-hoe-po, the first Taiwanese newspaper in Romanization, was published in 1885, the editor and publisher, the Rev. Thomas Barclay, exhorted readers of the newspaper not to “look down at Peh-oe-ji; do not regard it as a childish writing” (cf. Chiung 2001, p. 508). In the volume on literature in zhongguo da baikequanshu (Encyclopedia Sinica) (Y. Zhou), which represents the most up-to-date and comprehensive scholarship on the study of literature in China, non-Mandarin literature does not even receive a passing mention (Chen 1999, p. 115). At its worst, non-Chinese writing had been treated as threat to and . The New Testament (“Sin-Iok”) was once seized, in 1975, because Peh-oe-ji was regarded as a challenge to the orthodox status of characters (Chiung 2001, p. 509). or language in the Chinese case is more than an objective linguistic question and its full ramifications can’t be understood without probing into history and politics. † [1] Notably, Dutch missionaries in the 17th century first introduced Romanization in order to help aboriginal people convert to Christianity, to read to them and translate for them the Bible, and to write contracts. The current scene and the challenges

--Tai-yu for Taiwanese seen by independence minded radicals --Mandarin based on a single standard is seen by some as the “” --countermovement from Hakka and aboriginal language groups --backlash against language and political monopoly, contention for rights and representations Problems in the family

--Many in Taiwan see a hierarchical model of the Chinese languages as nothing more than a political ploy to subordinate speakers of Tai-yu and Hakka. According to Hsiau (1997), the promoters of the Tai-yu movement reject the official definition of Tai-yu as a “dialect.” For them, bilingual education[1] and the establishment of a Tai-yu pronunciation and are crucial to the rebirth of the language. The movement has posed a threat to the status of Mandarin as the , the symbol of Chinese identity and a vehicle of political dominance by the Nationalist Party. further points out that the Tai-yu language movement shares with the official policy a language ideology which is based on the nation-state idea. The dynamics of the Tai-yu language movement reveal a pressing problem facing Taiwan: how to balance national cohesion with and multiculturalism (cf. p. 302). † [1] For details on the problems for bilingual education posed by Tai-yu and Hakka, please refer to Scott and Tiu (2007), pp. 60-62.

--Others criticize the family metaphor by pointing out that by making such an analogy Chinese authorities evoke a primordial sense in language classification, further compounding the effects on a speaker’s psyche and perception. Tu (1994) states that the potential for language, especially in its incarnation as the mother tongue, to evoke sympathetic responses or great indignation is great. This matter is compounded by the fact that , as a distinct cultural symbol significantly different from an alphabetic system, gives literate Chinese a strong sense of membership in a unique discourse community. These primordial ties—ethnic, territorial, linguistic—are so invested with personal feelings that they almost never present themselves simply as unambiguous conditions of human life (1994, vi). With Tai-yu and Hakka speakers and the aboriginal interest groups becoming more vocal and gaining more influence, distinctive history and writings have been rediscovered and documented. Though their social status might not challenge that of Mandarin in the near future, the very existence and legitimacy of languages different in all forms other than hegemonic ideology is undeniable. The family allusion is complicated by the fact that Beijing, unlike Rome when it was the political center of the western world, has been at war, hot and cold, with its counterparts in Taipei since the 1940s. A hybrid Chinese

-- in Taiwan has taken on many local features and has incorporated foreign influences, mostly from English and Japanese, to meet the demands of sophisticated speakers from Taipei and the other side of the Strait. This hybridized Taiwan Mandarin is no longer based on a single political center; rather it draws its currency and resonance from not only local languages such as Tai-yu, Hakka and aboriginal languages but also phonological and lexical features from , , and . Although systematic research on a linguistic model for Greater China has not yet been established, scholarly works such as those by Zhang (2005) and (2004) have already pointed out possible directions for its development. Scholars of languages in contact have long documented the indigenization of Mandarin in various communities (Cheng 1999; Kubler 1981, 1985).

-- A hybrid Chinese that cuts across geographical boundaries and beyond ethno- linguistic determination might be a way out for the cause of increasing contacts between Beijing and Taipei as well as for a people facing multiple language choices in their daily transactions. In fact, Zhang (2005) advocates a cosmopolitan Mandarin like the one that has been practiced by Beijing professionals, which is to say a hybrid Chinese mixed with features from Hong Kong and Taiwan Mandarin as well as a sprinkling of English expressions. What is the alternative?

† With such linguistic adaptations to a plural and cosmopolitan context there might come additional political gains. A de-colonized, poly-centered hybrid Chinese might discount the prejudice in Taiwan against Mandarin as a “Beijing dialect,” thus unfit for its current default status as an . † Languages might be recognized for what they are, divisive symbols with inherent flaws of arrogance and destructiveness to others. On the other hand, an intrinsic link between an official language, an essentialized identity and a zero-sum mentality might confound such possibilities. † The ultimate result might bring Taiwan to the verge of the biblical scene of the Tower of Babel, where the curse of confusion might prove that none of the above (Tai-yu for the independence minded, Hakka and the aboriginal languages for the splittists, and Mandarin or Japanese for the déjà vu colonials) can survive the tasks of communicating truly and behaving civilly in the 21st century.