State Repression and Human Security in

A Dissertation Submitted To Sikkim University

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy

By Dipika Kaushik Department of International Relations School of Social Sciences

February 2017 Gangtok 737102

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A note of gratitude to a number of people, whose genuine support and encouragements made this dissertation a successful work. The dissertation began and ended with the dedicated guidance and enormous help of my supervisor Dr. Manish Srivastava, without whose support it would be almost impossible for the completion of the same. I would like to express my heartiest thankfulness and acknowledge him for helping me to get an access to Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis library. I also express my sincere thanks to the faculty members of my Department (International Relations/Politics), Dr. Sebastian and Ph Newton Singh for their valuable suggestions.

The major resources throughout the dissertation writing has been the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis library in New and Central Library of Sikkim Therefore, I am thankful to all the concerned authorities of these libraries who provided me access to the library and procured relevant materials during the course of my research. It was indeed their constant support, encouragement and patience which contributed at large in the process of this research.

Dipika Kaushik Glossary of Acronyms Used

AD After the death of Christ

ADB Asian Development Bank

AHRC Asian Human Rights Commission

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

BC Before Christ

BLUF Baloch Liberation United Front

BNM Baloch Nationalist Movement

BNV Baloch National Voice

BPLF Balochistan People s Liberation Front

BRP

BRP Baloch Republican Party

BSMA Baloch Social Media Activists

BSO Baloch Students Organisation

BSU Balochistan States Union (BSU

BUJ Balochistan Union of Journalists

CPEC China- Economic Corridor

EU European Union

FC Frontier Corps

FIR First information report GPI Gender Parity Index

GPIA Port Implementation Authority

HRCP Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

HRD Human Development Report

HRW Human Rights Watch

HSR Human Security Report

ICHS Independent Commission on Human Security

ICJ International Commission of Jurists

IFJ International Federation of Journalists

ISA Ideological State apparatus

ISI Inter Service Intelligence

IVBMP International Voice for Baloch Missing Person

JUI Jamiat Ulema-e-

JWP Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP)

KSNP Kalat State National Party KSNP

MI Military Intelligence

MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal

NAP National Awami Party (NAP)

NGO Nongovernmental organization

NWFP North west Frontier Province

PCPO Press Council of Pakistan Ordinance PFUJ Pakistan Federal Union of Journalist

PIPS Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies

PML Pakistan

PNP Pakistan National Party (PNP)

PONM Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement

PPL Pakistan Petroleum Limited

PPO The Press and Publication Ordinance

PPP Pakistan People’s Party

PSDP Public Sector Development Program

PSDP Public Sector Development Programme

RPPO Revised Press and Publication Ordinance

RSA Repressive State apparatus

SATP South Asian Terrorism Portal

SHARP Society for Human Rights and Prisoners

TF-88 Task Force-88

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Program’s

US The United States of America

WGEID Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances Table of Contents Page Nos. Declaration Certificate Plagiarism Check Certificate Acknowledgements Glossary of Acronyms Used

CHAPTER-I: State Repression and Human Security: A Conceptual Study 1-20 1.1. Introduction 1.2. Framework of Analysis 1.3. State Apparatuses 1.3. a. Repression as a State Measure 1.3. b. Regimes and Repression 1.3. c. Instruments of State Repression 1.4 The Concept of Human Security 1.4. a. The UNDP Approach to Human Security 1.5 Literature Survey 1.6. Rational and Scope of Study 1.7. Objectives 1.8. Research Question 1.9. Methodology 1.10 Chapterization

CHAPTER-II: Origins and 21-52 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Section I: Early History 2.2.a. British Invasion 2.3 Section II: Rise of 2.4 Section III: Partition and the British withdrawal 1947 2.5 Section IV: Pakistan accession over State of Kalat in 1948 2.6 Section V: Post 1950’s Era 2.7 Section VI: The State of Baloch Insurgency 2.8 Conclusion

CHAPTER –III: Patterns of State Repression in Balochistan 53-73 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Section I: Background 3.3 Section II: Forms and Patterns of State Repression 3.3.a. Extrajudicial Killing 3.3.b. Target Killings 3.3.c. Disappearance 3.3.d. Torture, Kill and Dump 3.3.e. Political Imprisonment 3.4 Conclusion

CHAPTER- IV: State Repression as a threat to Human Security 74-93 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Section I: State of Human Security in Balochistan. 4.2.a. Economic Security 4.2.b . Educational System 4.3 Sections II: State Repression as a threat to Human Security 4.3.a. Attacks and Threats on Schools 4.3.b. Planning and Development 4.3.c. Civil Society and Development Agencies 4.3.d. Threat on Media 4.4 Conclusion

CHAPTER-V: Conclusion 94-99

Bibliography 100-110

Annexure List of Maps, Tables and Figures

List of Maps

Sl. No. Name of Maps Pg.no Map : 1 Map of Balochistan post 1948 Map : 2 District- wise Map of Balochistan. Map : 3 Balochistan under British Domination (1800’s-1947) 25

List of Tables

Sl. No. Name of Tables Pg.no Table :1 Fatalities in Balochistan 2011-2016 55 Table: 2 Bomb Blasts in Balochistan 2001-2016 56 Table : 3 Number of Extrajudicial Killing 61 Table : 4 Number of Baloch Missing 64 Table : 5 Attacks on schools (2010,2009,2008) 84

List of Figures

Sl. No. Name of Figures Pg.no Figure: 1 Fatalities in Balochistan 2011-2016 55 Figure: 2 Bomb Blasts in Balochistan 2001-2016 56 Figure: 3 Number of Extrajudicial Killing 61 Figure: 4 Number of Baloch Missing 64 Figure: 5 Multidimensional Poverty Number of Baloch Missing 77 Figure: 6 Multidimensional Poverty Number of Baloch Missing 78 Headcount

Dedicated to the encapsulating beauty of Balochistan.

Map 1: Map of Balochistan Post 1948

Source: http://www.lodhran.pk/balochistan-map.aspx

Map 2: District-Wise Map of Balochistan

Source : http://www.lodhran.pk/balochistan-map.aspx

CHAPTER I

State Repression and Human Security: A Conceptual Study.

1.1 Introduction

This study attempts to examine state repression as a threat to human security by taking the case of Balochistan province of Pakistan. Balochistan was an independent State of Kalat until 1947.After the British forces decided to withdraw from the Indian subcontinent; Lord Mountbatten held a meeting and declared State of Kalat as independent. However, on 27 March 1948, the then Pakistani government mobilised armed forces against the State of Kalat and forced an , thereby renaming the State of Kalat as Balochistan and declared it as a part of Pakistan. The Baloch nationalists, however, rejected the accession, and by 1950s, mooted the idea of a separate Balochistan through „self-determination‟.

In 1951, a Balochistan States Union was created including Lasbela, , and Kalat. It was administered by of Kalat as its president and a civil servant as its prime minister. However, the Khan of Kalat was suspected by the federal government for carrying out a secessionist policy. This led to the dissolution of Balochistan State Union assembly. In 1955, policy was adopted by Pakistan. This led to the demand for provincial autonomy. Finally, in 1970 Balochistan was granted as a fully-fledged province of Pakistan. However, there was political instability, and subsequently the first democratically elected government was dismissed by . Thus, the Baloch citizens lost faith in democratic means within the framework of Pakistan and its constitutional process which led to Baloch students taking up arms to prevent marginalisation of community. This has been the starting point for series of insurgencies and rebel attacks. Pakistan started imposing its state apparatus to repress all by upsurge of activities against the government.

Conceptually, a state repression involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organisation within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as the deterring specific

1 activities and beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel practise or institution.

To curb the Baloch rebellion, the Pakistani state subsequently adopted methods of abduction, target killing, extra judicial detainment and so on. Since then, Pakistan has been channelizing all its forces to assert its control over this area. Balochistan has witnessed a major demographic, social, political and economic change, ever since it became part of Pakistan. There has been increase in death toll and constant violence. Repressive measures such as abduction, extra judicial killing, target killing, media censorship, and above all militarization of the state are some of the major ongoing issues in the state.

Today, Baloch leaders are agitating vociferously in Pakistani Parliament and outside against the setting up of new cantonments in the province at Sui, Kohlu and Gwadar. Besides the four existing cantonment at , Sibi, Loralai and ; the province also has three naval base, four missile testing sites, two nuclear development sites and 59 paramilitary facilities . These cantonments have over the years become centres of parallel authority beyond the provincial and local government. Baloch perceive these cantonments as nothing but grabbing and forceful occupation of their traditional land by the army (Bansal, 2010).To further complicate the problem, the state has been witnessing abductions and extra-judicial killings. This has led to issues related to underdevelopment of the state and protection and welfare of its citizenry, leading to a demand for autonomy and secession of Balochistan from Pakistan.

In its classical formulation, security means the protection and welfare of the state. However, what remains the cardinal focus of human security is the protection and welfare of individual citizen or human being. The „individual‟ is the key referent than the state in the conceptualisation of human security. Issues like poverty, economic deprivation, loss of faith in institutions, unemployment and hunger and soon have to be secure if individuals are secure. However the parameters of human security in Balochistan have been affected by state repression.

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As we see, the Baloch problem has so far been seen from the lens of the classic realist angle of national security. The pathologies identified and the remedies suggested for resolution of the crisis also, therefore, bear a strong imprimatur of a security-centred approach.

The de jure reality of Balochistan features an electoral process and the representative institutions that promise inclusiveness and plurality but the reality is different. The low voter turnout in the Makran belt and the captive voters paying obeisance to entrenched tribal hierarchy elsewhere reflect the defacto reality where the tyranny of geography combines with the apathy of the leadership at the expense of the hapless populace.

Why Baloch issues have not been addressed as per a human-centric paradigm should be an interesting question to begin a debate on the causes, consequences and remedies of the conflict. There has little focus on human security while framing the parameters of the security debate on the Baloch conflict in the past. The human security concept that espouses the safety of humans from myriad threats like hunger, disease, violence, poverty and joblessness runs against the grain of our accumulated security wisdom weaned on the classic security precepts defined by scholars like Barry Buzan, who amongst their trinity of security referents – individuals, state and the international system – privilege the state over all others.

If we analyze the history of Baloch discontent that found violent expression in 1948, 1962-63 1973-77, and 2003 onwards, a clear pattern of socio-economic deprivation coupled with a strong narrative of resource exploitation is discernible; this was capitalized upon with varying success by different armed uprisings (The News, Janjua, January 17, 2016)

With income per capita as low as $400, 52 percent of households living below the poverty line, unresolved feelings of provincial resource exploitation and ethno-linguistic fragmentations like Baloch-Punjabi, and Pakhtun-Baloch, the province‟s which brew of grievances presents propitious conditions for an intractable conflict (The News, Janjua, January 17, 2016)

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The answer to the above questions lies in the seven elements of human security – physical, food, health, community, political, environment, and economic security. Economic security‟s most important dimension is job creation which is directly linked with poverty. According to a World Bank sponsored Balochistan Economic Report the province needs 158,000 jobs and a growth rate of 6.5 percent annually to lift a significant percentage of the poverty-affected population above the poverty line (The News, Janjua, January 17, 2016).

People-centred equitable development and inclusive polity is therefore the scarlet thread that would bind state and human security into a symbiotic relationship for the survival and prosperity of the federation as well as Balochistan.

As a result of economic deprivation, lack of representation and political marginalisation, the Baloch have inculcated the feeling of alienation and domination under Pakistan. The repressive measures adopted by Pakistani government raises question on the condition of human security in Balochistan. This study, therefore will examine the state of human security under a repressive Pakistani state.

1.2 Framework of Analysis

Nation-State has become the main subject of focus while studying the interrelationship between threats and repression. Generally when a State gets susceptible to any sort of threat, the State adopts repressive policies. A threat as a concept can be considered only under certain criteria. Firstly, an entity must exit whose very existence can be threatened in some manner. Second, this entity must survey its environment for phenomena that threaten or can assure its continuity/survival.

Therefore, we can see that State is such an entity which maintains its territorial domain and fulfils the criteria as an entity by which threats can be identified. State also takes the responsibility of adhering to those standards through application of repressive measures. The Marxist school of thinking views State as a repressive apparatus. According to this tradition, the State is a „machine‟ of repression, which enables the ruling classes, to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion that is to capitalist exploitation. This can

4 be seen in the Communist Manifesto and the Eighteenth Brumaire and in all the later classical texts, above all in Marx‟s writings on the Paris Commune and Lenin‟s on State and Revolution.

The State Apparatus includes the specialized apparatus which is considered as a necessity in relation to the requirements of legal practice that is the Army, police, the courts and the prisons.

1.3 State Apparatuses

Louis Althusser has separated the State apparatus into two type‟s namely Repressive State apparatus (RSA) and Ideological State apparatus (ISA). In Marxist theory, the State Apparatus (SA) contains: the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc., which Louis Althusser calls it the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA). By using the word Repressive Althusser suggests that the State Apparatus in question „functions by violence‟ at least ultimately.

The other State apparatus according to Althusser is the Ideological State Apparatus. Ideological State Apparatuses are certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions. Althusser proposes an empirical list of these which has to be examined in detail, tested, corrected and re-organized. The following institutions are considered as Ideological State Apparatuses, they are the religious ideological state apparatus which includes the system of the different churches, the educational ideological state apparatus that is the system of the different public and private „schools‟, the family, the legal, the political ideological state apparatus which includes the political system also the different political parties, the trade-union, the communications which includes all press, radio and television, the cultural ideological state apparatus which includes literature, the arts, sports, etc.

What constitutes the difference between ideological state apparatus and repressive state apparatus are can be understood from the public and private domain perspective, that while there is one (Repressive) State Apparatus, there is a plurality of Ideological State Apparatuses. Even presupposing that it exists, the unity that constitutes this plurality of ideological state apparatus as a body is not immediately visible. As a second moment, it

5 is clear that whereas the unified – (Repressive) State Apparatus belongs entirely to the public domain, much the larger part of the Ideological State Apparatuses (in their apparent dispersion) are part, on the contrary, of the private domain. Churches, Parties, Trade Unions, families, some schools, most newspapers, cultural ventures, etc., are private.

What distinguishes the ideological state apparatus from the Repressive State Apparatus is the following basic difference: the Repressive State Apparatus functions „by violence‟, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function „by ideology‟. State Apparatus, whether Repressive or Ideological, „functions‟ both by violence and by ideology, but with one very important distinction which makes it imperative not to confuse the Ideological State Apparatuses with the Repressive State Apparatus.

This is the fact that the Repressive State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression including physical repression, while functioning secondarily by ideology. There is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus. For example, the Army and the Police also function by ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the „values‟ they propound externally.

In the same way, but inversely, it is essential to say that for their part the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. (There is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus.)

1.3. a Repression as a State Measure

States frequently resort to various repressive measures, often justified as „act of deterrence‟, or retaliatory measures. States may direct these measures towards perpetrators of terrorist acts (as in the case of targeted assassinations, although even non combatants sometimes get hurt), towards the groups of people accused of supporting their goals, or towards the general civil population of a country.

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Common forms of state repression are, killing and wounding terrorists or civilians, widespread arrest, often without due process and internment without trial, state kidnapping of those involved in any sort of threat to the state, extra judicial killings, disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, collective punishments, such as closures, destruction of homes or property and most importantly curtailment of civil liberties such as the freedom of movement, speech, or assembly.

1.3. b Regimes and Repression

As for repression and human rights violations, although generally seen as a homogeneous type of state behaviour, Davenport claims that it has two basic components: a) Violent repression in the form of violations of personal integrity. The violent repression is strongly related to the concessions for obtaining support. Violent repression entails target measures including physical abuses, torture, imprisonment, extra judicial killings, and disappearances. Restrictions on civil and political rights serve to mould citizen, ban certain challenging behaviours, and prevent contentious collective action. b) Less (or non) violent activities consisting of the restriction of individuals civil and political rights. Repression is one among several different strategies that could be used by governments to influence or control those within their territorial domain.

Charles Tilly did not believe that all governments responded to the same challenges in comparable ways. Rather, he believed that different types of regimes responded in different ways. For example, Repressive governments view the largest number of groups/actions as unacceptable across both dimensions. Consequently, these governments repress the largest number, tolerate a decent amount and facilitate few.

Totalitarian governments also repress a large amount of challengers but less than repressive governments, they tolerate a small number of challengers but facilitate more. Tolerant governments, unsurprisingly, tolerate the widest range of challengers, they represent a smaller range of challengers and they facilitate a larger number of challengers. Finally, Weak governments focus their repression on the weakest groups, facilitate the smallest number of challengers and tolerate the most. Tilly generally argued

7 that the government‟s response to dissent would roughly correspond to distinct types of government. For example, tolerant governments would be associated with democracies as tolerance is one of the defining characteristics of this regime type, totalitarian governments would be identified by the same name.

Finally, repressive governments would likely be categorised as authoritarian in nature and weak governments would likely be those either being built (i.e. undergoing state formation) or collapsing (i.e. failing). It is found that when threats are confronted political authorities frequently use repression as a means to control/ eliminate them and to establish/extend their tenure.

1.3. c Instruments of State Repression

This method increasingly used for State Repression is as follows: a) Extrajudicial Killings – killings by government officials without due process of law, including murders by private groups if instigated by the government. b) Disappearances – cases in which people disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims were been found. c) Torture – purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. d) Political Imprisonment – the incarceration of people by government officials because of their speech, their non-violent religious practices, or their membership in a group.

1.4 The Concept of Human Security

The concept of human security has gained momentum over years and has been the key element for formulation of any policy of a nation. The concept of human security has evolved and reshaped into a very wide and cardinal concept over time. To understand the concept of security perspicuously David Baldwin, the political scientist argued that it is important to evaluate it more closely. This requires, at the least, two things: agreement on the root meaning of security; and greater specification of the term, with reference to a

8 series of questions: Security for whom, security for which values, how much security, security from what threats and security by what means?

The traditional concept of human security was to protect the territorial integrity of a nation and protect its citizen from external threat. The main focus in traditional concept security was State. It was perceived if a state if is secured its citizens are automatically secured. This concept of security where guns and arms were seen as a protector and guard to install the feeling of security in people led to two major world wars and a cold war. All that was achieved after series of war was citizen still fearing about their life security. Thus there was a demand for looking viewing security from a different dimension. From this perspective, implicit in the classical formulation of security is the protection and welfare of the state, whereas what is central- or should be central-is the protection and welfare of individual citizen or human being.

The club of Rome in 1970 produced volumes on the “world problematique” which acknowledged that there were other significant problems that were troubling men. Issues like poverty, economic deprivation, loss of faith in institutions, unemployment and hunger etc were looked into. The group suggested that there is a need of alternative global system whose influence would be positive on global development and provide global security to individual‟s life.

1.4. a The UNDP Approach to Human Security.

In 1980 the Independent Commission on International Development Issue, issued a reported called „North-South Report‟ which said that it is a moral obligation on mankind to survive and thus it answered how world hunger, mass misery and alarming disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor can overcome. Second, the Independent commission on Disarmament and security issue gave a new way to look at the concept of peace and security and the importance of common security. It also covered how the economic instability has created a divide between the poor and rich nation and the way third world countries are suffering from poverty and deprivation.

Realist approaches to security have traditionally privileged a narrow conception of security that focuses on issues related to the threat and use of military force. In this view,

9 threats to security are defined as existential threats to the sovereignty, values and territorial integrity of states. Although these ideas enjoyed considerable institutional and discursive power in the context of the nuclear stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union, the historic political changes signalled by the end of the Cold War helped to open up space for „new thinking‟ about global peace and security. Crucially, in the years following the end of the Cold War, the idea of human security provided something of a rallying point for policy-makers and academics who wished to combine calls for a post-Cold War „peace dividend‟ with an alternative, more holistic and people-centred approach to security.

Human security departs from the defining assumptions of traditional realist thinking in two key ways. First, the idea of human security marks a break with the traditional privileging of the state as the primary referent for security (that which is to be secured) and signals a new emphasis on the security concerns of individual men and women. For proponents of human security, the national security priorities of states do not always best reflect the security concerns of their citizens; rather than serving as the ultimate security providers in global politics, states often threaten the security of their own populations.

Since the publication of the United Nations Development Program‟s (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR) 1994, the human security agenda in world politics has been framed as a normative and practical challenge to traditional approaches to security in theory and practice. Most notably, the ideas that underpin the human security agenda represent an important departure from the realist approaches to international politics that, until recently, dominated mainstream thinking about security in academic and, to some extent, policy circles.

The UNDP's HDR 1994, which was written as a contribution to the 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development, can be seen as one of the key agenda-setting initiatives in relation to the introduction of the human security concept. Although the UNDP‟s approach is by no means the only influential approach in the literature, it is commonly regarded as a key departure point in academic and policy debates about human security. As Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong suggest in their comprehensive study, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (2006), in

10 initiating the human security agenda, the HDR 1994 was a key contribution to both reconfiguring the accepted parameters of the concept of security and unsettling orthodox assumptions about the security role of the state.

In the UNDP‟s formulation, human security is defined as safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. On this basis, security is broadened to include seven key dimensions: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Moreover, there are four further defining elements to the UNDP‟s approach: first, human security is a „universal concern relevant to people everywhere‟; second, „its components are interdependent‟, especially in the context of globalization where security problems „are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders‟ but have „consequences that travel the globe‟; third, it is „easier to ensure through early prevention rather than later intervention‟; and finally, in recognition of the ways in which there may be tensions between the security interests of states and those of their citizens, human security is defined as „people-centred‟ (original emphasis).

In particular, repressive political regimes (or State Repression) may generate insecurity for their citizens through the denial of basic human rights, the unequal distribution of resources or the use of armed force as a means of internal repression. Second, many proponents of human security seek to broaden the concept of security beyond the confines of a military-based focus in favour of a broader security agenda that emphasizes the ways in which economic, health and environmental concerns also contribute to diverse forms of „insecurity‟ in the daily lives of many people around the world.

As the UNDP puts it, security should no longer be defined solely in terms of „freedom from fear‟ issues, such as military threats and organised violence, but should also involve the ways in which „freedom from want‟ issues, such as poverty and under-development, undermine the security of human populations. The aim here is not to neglect or ignore the continued importance of military security questions, but is rather to develop a more holistic or broad, development-centred approach that recognises the interconnectedness of military and non-military aspects of security and the extent to which the well-being of

11 human populations is often as much, if not more, at risk from non-military sources of harm.

Implicit in this approach is the notion that recasting security in holistic and people- centred terms opens up space for a new, more „progressive‟ politics of security where the meanings and practices associated with „security‟ are decoupled from their traditional statist and military-focused associations. From this perspective, broadening the concept of security to include economic, health and environmental concerns provides a means to shift political attention and resources away from the high military spending priorities of many states towards development projects centred on the economic and social welfare of populations.

The UNDP approach of human security enlists seven important parameters of human security. Although the people-centred character of human security remains a core element in this approach, there is a troubling tension between the focus on individual human beings as the referent for security and the continued dominance of states or state repression as the primary agents of security in world politics. In this respect, many conceptions of human security revert to a complimentary understanding of the relationship between states and individuals; where individuals are to be protected from harm, the primary agent of rescue is likely to be the state.

The concern here is that the universalist, humanitarian assumptions that underpin the human security agenda, and its implied criticism of non-liberal regimes, have become a justification for the most powerful states in the international system to erode the principles of non-intervention that protect the sovereignty of the weak. Moreover, where liberal universalism becomes a justification for intervention, economic sanctions or military force may, paradoxically, bring harm to the civilian populations that human security purportedly seeks to protect.

Second, the expansive, open-ended character of early formulations of human security - most notably, that of the HDR 1994 - has been subjected to considerable criticism, even among academics and policy actors sympathetic to the idea of human security. Whereas a broad, development centred approach, somewhat similar, though not identical, to that of

12 the UNDP, can be seen in the Japanese government‟s human security foreign policy, some of the other middle power states spearheading the human security agenda have favoured a narrower „freedom from fear‟ approach focused on the safety of people from threats related to organized violence.

The 2003 Human Security document, prepared by the influential Independent Commission on Human Security (ICHS) and supported by the Japanese government, comes closest to the development-centred conception of human security originally promulgated by the UNDP. By contrast, the Human Security Report (HSR) 2005, compiled by the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia and funded partly by the Canadian government, reflects the narrower „freedom from fear‟ approach favoured by Canada and members of the Human Security Network.

Significantly, the conceptual tensions that lie at the heart of the human security agenda resonate well with the academic literature on security where the issues raised by „broadening‟ (that is, the inclusion of non-military concerns on the contemporary security agenda) and „deepening‟ (problematising the role of the state as the primary referent for security) have animated debates among Security Studies scholars over the course of the last two decades. On the one hand, the idea of human security has gained currency among critically minded scholars in Security Studies, and in the discipline of International Relations more broadly, who wish to challenge the dominance of realist accounts of international politics.

In this view, a holistic and people-centred approach to human security elicits an important normative challenge to the military emphases and state-centeredness of orthodox Security Studies. On the other hand, human security has provoked controversy amongst scholars who fear the political consequences of extending security practices into ever increasing numbers of areas of everyday life. From this perspective, the existing meanings and practices associated with security are bound up with deep-rooted structures that are not so easy to change; the cards are stacked against the potential for human security thinking to transform the power relations that characterize the darker elements of contemporary security politics.

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Crucially, although human security can, in many respects, be characterized as a policy- led agenda, this academic literature has an important role to play in deepening our understanding of the political and philosophical issues at stake in „narrow‟ versus „broad‟ conceptions of both human security and security more broadly. Indeed, a more theoretically informed analysis of the implications of human security becomes increasingly important to the extent that human security thinking begins to inform contemporary security and development practices.

The implications of the human security agenda are highly ambiguous. Even though many of the leading powers in the international system continue to eschew explicit use of the term human security, security policies of the North have increasingly begun to reflect the convergence of security and development that human security represents. Central to this is the idea that weak or failing state structures, poverty and under-development, and environmental scarcity or degradation may contribute to insecurity and instability at local/national, regional and even international levels.

Where early formulations of human security emphasised solidarity between poor people in the global North and South, the post-September 11 security environment frames poverty and under-development as threats to rich Northern countries. In this aspect, critics fear that, rather than providing a counterweight to the assumptions of traditional national security thinking, human security risks being incorporated into the very structures it initially sought to oppose.

This brings us to the foremost question: Has the state (or repression) led to economic deprivation, lack of representation and political marginalisation, the feeling of alienation of the Balochis and domination under Pakistan? The repressive measures adopted by Pakistani government raises question on the condition of human security in Balochistan. This study, therefore will examine the state of human security under a repressive Pakistan state.

1.5 Literature Survey

Most of the literature on Balochistan deals with the concept of human security, the historical survey of Balochistan in order to understand the history of Balochistan and the

14 current scenario in Balochistan, which deals with the changes that have been occurring in the social, political and economic demography.

David Baldwin’s article “Concept of Security” studies the concept of security from contemporary dimension. David Baldwin claims that the concept of security has been used to justify wars and massive government spending and most works on security employ the term without any clear analysis of what the security actually means. Baldwin then offers several specifications that would explain the concept of Security such as for whom is the security intended? Security of which values? How much security is needed? From what threats is security invoked? What means is security pursued? At what cost is security pursued? In what time period would the security policy be in effect? Baldwin notes that all types of security such as economic, environmental, identity, social, military, etc follow the same conceptual distinctions.

Human security: Concepts and Measurement by Kanti Bajpai studies the idea of human security and suggests that human security can be clearly delineated in relation to the dominant, neo- realist conception of security and tries to make the concept of human security generally applicable to any society. The author puts together different approaches of human security and studies it in comparison.

The Baloch and Balochistan by Naseer Dasthi describes the history of Balochistan and the role played by Baloch from Aryan invasion to Arab invasion in regions where Baloch had settled. Further it gives a detailed comprehension of formation of State of Kalat and holds British imperialism mainly responsible for the present plight of the . Little has been written on the significant changes in the socio, economic and political changes that took place after its accession by Pakistan.

Unending Violence in Pakistan, IDSA, Pakistan project Report gives a detailed account of violence happening in different provinces of Pakistan. It is a series of report prepared by the project Pakistan at IDSA. It looks at the internal Security in Pakistan during 2013- 2014 and how Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz government has worked in different areas of Pakistan after assuming power. It has categorically listed the entire terrorist and other violence causing death and injuries till year 2014. It also deals with the Security situation

15 in Balochistan such problems of insurgencies, sectarian violence and continued problem of disappearance of Baloch activities in the state and provincial governments approach towards handling the problem.

Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan by Adeel Khan explore the politicization of identity in Pakistan. He builds up the correlation between ethnicity, nationalism and the modern state. The author takes four ethnic movements in Pakistan, that of Mohajir, Baloch, Sindhi and Pakhtun and studies its origin to the contemporary scenario of ethnic conflicts in Pakistan.

Baloch Nationalism Its Origin and Development by Dr.Taj Mohammad Breseeg deals with the concept of nationalism and further he elaborates the growth of nationalism in Balochistan by going back to the historical account of Balochistan. He also puts a focus on the growth of nationalism to its nature in the contemporary Balochistan.

Greed, Creed and Governance in Civil Conflicts: a case study of Balochistan written by Rabia Aslam brings forward the growth of the Baloch nationalists and their involvement in continuous armed struggle against the government. Minorities at risk Project places Baloch population at a high risk for future rebellion. The writer makes a comprehensive study on the growing conflict in Balochistan with tribal greed and grievances erupting from the plunder of Balochistan natural recourses. Further she elaborates poor functioning of the federal government and political and economic marginalisation in Balochistan.

The Tigers of Balochistan by Sylvia A. Matheson highlight the problems faced by the Bugti tribe in Balochistan with the industrialisation that took place in the area after accession by Pakistan. It is a personal experience of the author while her stay in Balochistan and highlights problems faced by the tribal population and difficulty faced because of modernisation and industrialisation.

Balochistan the State versus the Nation by Frederic Grace explores how the Pakistani government has adopted repressive measures to suppress the Baloch nationalist movement, fuelling ethnic and sectarian violence in the provinces but the Pakistani armed forces step have failed to eliminate the insurgency and continuation of bloodshed .The

16 author says that a negotiated solution is politically feasible. The Baloch majority favour more autonomy and on the other hand Pakistani army failed to eliminate the nationalist by force of arms.

Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan by Emma Duncan She has covered absolutely every surface about Pakistan from the birth of the nation to it's tumultuous political situation and also studies the patriarchal, male chauvinist society, all the way up to its 1988 elections. She has an overall account of empirical study of Pakistan from ones personal experience, witnessing heroine trading to interviewing General Zia ul Haq.

1.6 Rational and Scope of Study

Balochistan over generations has seen series of changes in political system; from a tribal confederacy to a democratic province of Pakistan. There has also been change in the demographic composition of Balochistan with influx of Pashtoon from Afghanistan and Sardars from Pakistan. This change has lead to growth of many social, political and economic problems leading.

Baloch citizens have been fighting for Baloch representation in Army and government departments. 45% of armed forces are dominated by Punjabi population. In 1979 of 830 higher civil services posts in Balochistan , only 181 was held by Baloch and the official quota of 15% for solders from Balochistan was not filled.

When the construction of the first phase of the Gwadar project started, of 600 people employed only 100 were Baloch. Of the 3000 people employed at Saindak copper and gold mining project only 500 were from Balochistan. The labour participation rate in Balochistan is 28.38% while the national rate is 32.88%. Baloch citizens feel economically marginalised and continuously take out riots demanding their rights.

Regarding the food security the social policy Development Centre (2005) reports discovered that the percentage of the population living in a high degree of deprivation stands highest in Balochistan as compared to other provinces with 88% in Balochistan. The percentage of people living below the poverty lines is at 63% in Balochistan. Dr Ali

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Nasir Bugti, Provincial Coordinator Nutrition Program Government of Balochistan stated that a total of 785 mother lose their lives during pregnancy in Balochistan out of one lakh. The National Nutrition Survey 2011 indicated chronic malnutrition of 52.2% and maternal anaemia of 47.3%.Balochistan is area rich with natural resources thus there are many multinational projects that are established for extraction of resources like the establishment of sui gas pipeline and Gwadar port.

Sui gas field has five gas walls which supplies 38% of Pakistan domestic and commercial energy but only 6% of Baloch population has gas connection and out of 83% of gas produced in Balochistan only four out of twenty eight Balochistan‟s district has access to it. This had led to displacement of locals from the area surrounding the developmental project are thus effecting their tribal lifestyle.

In 2013 Balochistan was among the most violent prone regions in Pakistan. There were about 487 terrorist attacks in the area. The number of life lost was 727 lives and about 1577 injured. The literacy rate in Balochistan is 40%while the national rate is 47.42%. Balochistan has now become home to more than eight highly active nationalist groups and sectarian groups operating within the territory and are engaged in continuous warfare with the Pakistani army.

The provincial government are blaming the federal government for curbing their rights and not giving the representation. The main fight between the tribes and the federal government is that the local Baloch fear that they are being turned into minority as the developmental projects are attracting more Punjabi settlements and Pashtuns settlement. Baloch have a fear of being the minority in their own land. Baloch identity has come into a big question.

After losing its independence to Pakistan Baloch are in a continuous struggle to make the international community aware about the crisis situation in Balochistan. The Baloch civilians are unhappy with the functioning of the federal government. Many secessionist groups and nationalist parties have adopted violent methods to combat Pakistani security forces. On the other hand Pakistan has been adopting more stringent policies such as kill

18 and dump policy along with increased deployment of security forces. This has lead to many violent attacks and insurgencies.

This study will evaluate the prevailing conditions of human security in Balochistan and supporting the understanding of how the civilians are bearing the brunt of violence caused by tribal politics, rebel movements and repressive measures adopted by Pakistani security forces. Thus developing an understanding of how State repression has become threat to human security in Balochistan.

1.7 Objectives a) To study state repression in Balochistan. b) To examine the state of human security in Balochistan. c) To examine if state repression is a threat to human security.

1.8 Research Question a) What is the intensity of state repression in Balochistan? b) What is the prevailing condition of human security in Balochistan? c) How has state repression become a threat to human security in Balochistan?

1.9 Methodology

This research undertaken will employ qualitative and quantitative method. Primary and Secondary source will be used for the study. Primary sources include reports published by Pakistan government etc. Secondary sources include the available books, articles, journals, research papers, academic papers, online sources like south Asian terrorism portal etc and newspaper reports.

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1.10 Chapterization

The study is organised in around five chapters which are as follows:

I. State Repression and Human Security: A Conceptual Study The introductory chapter deals with the study of the concept of State repression and Human security. It gives a brief introduction to the objective of the study that is to know if state repression becomes a threat to human security in Balochistan. II. Origins and History of Balochistan This chapter deals with the history of history of Balochistan. This chapter deals with Balochistan as an independent State of Kalat and its history after the forceful annexation by Pakistan. This chapter includes the political and social history of Balochistan. III. Patterns of State Repression in Balochistan This chapter deals with various repressive measures used by Pakistani Government since accession in Balochistan. These measures were adopted to curb discontentment against the government. Measures such as abduction, target killing, extra judicial detainment and kill and dump policy are adopted by the government. The chapter includes tables and charts supporting the patterns of state repression in Balochistan. IV. State Repression as a Threat to Human Security The fourth chapter deals with how the repressive measures adopted by the Pakistani Government become threat to human security in Balochistan. The Baloch civilians are unhappy with the functioning of the federal government leading to adoption of violent methods by secessionist group and the nationalist parties to combat Pakistani Security force. On the other hand Pakistan has been adopting more stringent policies and increased deployment of security forces, threatening human security in Balochistan. V. Conclusion The fifth chapter which is the concluding chapter gives an overview of the study. It gives an overview on the intensity of State repression in Balochistan and the prevailing condition of human security in Balochistan. Thus answers that State repression has been a threat to human security in Balochistan.

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CHAPTER II

Origins and History of Balochistan

2.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the origins and history of Balochistan. It gives an outline on the geographical location and phases of political and social development in the region. It is structured in six sections and its sub topics. Section I talks about the geographical location of Balochistan, its history of pastor-nomadic tribe 1200 BC who moved from Central Asia towards Caspian Sea and settled in northwestern Iranian region of Balashakan. Section I has one sub- section which talks about the British invasion of the region. Section II talks about the rise of nationalism in Balochistan in the 19th century and the formation of first Baloch national political party. Section III talks about the partition of British India and the British withdrawal from the region in 1947. Section IV includes Pakistan‟s accession over Sate of Kalat in 1948.Section V talks about the post 1950 era of Balochistan. This section covers the start of grievances of Baloch citizens against the Pakistani government. Section VI talks about the state of Baloch insurgeny, 1990‟s onwards.

2.2 Section I: Early History

The geography of Balochistan has been such that in the West, the Dasht-e-Lut, Dasht-e- Kavir, and Kerman Mountains separate it from the Southeast; Hub River, and Kirther range of Mountains separate it from (Pakistan). In the northeast, the right bank of Indus separates it from Pashtunistan and Punjab. In the North, Balochistan is naturally separated from Afghanistan by the natural boundaries of Helmand and the mountain range north of Quetta. In the South, the Indian Ocean separates Balochistan from the Sultanate of . (Balochwarna.org-124)

It is1200 BC Indo-Iranic tribes moved from Central Asia towards Caspian Sea and settled in northwestern Iranian region of Balashakan around Elborz Mountain. These pastoralist nomadic tribal group, known as Balashicks migrated en masse and after many centuries

21 of wandering and sufferings, these pastoralist nomads ultimately settled in the south and eastern fringes of Iranian plateau. They changed themselves from being the Balashichik to become the Baloch. The region finally came to be known as Balochistan or the country of the Baloch. Balochistan thus historically acted as a borderland between India and the Iranian plateau and the Arabian Peninsula.

The Baloch tribes included pastoralist, sedentary nomadic tribe, who in the fifteenth century came across the feudal social institutions of the territory. Influenced by the feudal system few Baloch population who settled in the village and townships started emerging as feudal class. The Baloch religious identity has been traced as followers of Mazdakin and Manichean sects of Zoroastrian religion and later converted to Islam after the Arab invasion of Balochistan during the seventh century.

Politically, Balochistan was a land of loose tribal confederacy without the concept of state system. However, Balochistan came across different waves of invasion by Persians, Afghans, and Sikhs but all avoided permanent control of the tribe. The Afghan invasion in 707AD under Arab General Mahammod bin Qasim brought Bloch territory under the authority of Abbasid Caliph. With the fall of Caliph Empire by the end of 10th century the political history of Balochistan gained momentum.

The traditional Baloch Empire started with the formation of tribal confederacy of 44 tribes headed by Jalal Khan in 12th century. There were many successive attempts of forming a tribal confederacy made by the Rid- Lashkari in 15th century, the Maliks, the Dodais, the Boleidais, and the Gichkis of Makkoran and the of Kalat in 17th century (Baloch, 1946:89). During the 18th century, the sixth Khan of Kalat, Naseer Khan, established a unified Baloch army and organized the major Baloch tribes under an agreed militarily and administrative system. This system claimed sovereignty over all lands, where the Baloch lived and included and most of western Balochistan.

The state structure created by Naseer Khan, however, had a major lacuna; it did not have an organic bureaucracy that could provide the framework for the state to bind the various tribes together in the region. The tribal chiefs only contributed troops to the Baloch

22 confederation headed by the Khan of fighting the wars and in return for their services they were awarded land grants to maintain troops and made responsible for the establishment of law and order in their region. Despite considerable degree of tension between the Khan and the tribal chiefs, who continued to exercise considerable autonomy, there was some semblance of political unity in their loosely formed confederacy.

2.2. a British Invasion

During the early 19th century British diplomatic policy was to expand its territory towards Central Asia. The British had realized the importance of Sindh and Balochistan for their Afghan and Central Asia policy. For the invasion of southern Afghanistan, safe passage through Balochistan was essential. The logistic importance of the area, especially the coastal area of Balochistan, attracted them for pursuance of their forward policy westward. They wanted to capture a suitable port, that is, Jiwani that was only a few days cruise from their stronghold, Bombay. They had already acquired Karachi port facilities in the 1820‟s from the rulers of Sindh. Thus, they began to send many delegations to Kalat in order to secure from the Khan of Kalat various treaties to help reinforce their position in this area.

The British Government sent Sir Alexander Burnes, and an agreement was arrived at in March 1839, which granted the sovereignty and borders of the and made the Khan of Kalat responsible for the safe passage of the British troops in return for 15000 rupees annually, in addition to the cost of provisions. The fundamental objective of the British to enter into a treaty agreement with the khanate of Kalat was to provide a passage and supplies to the Army of Indus on its way to Kandahar through Shikarpur, Jacobabad (Khangadh), Dhadar, Bolan Pass, Quetta, and Khojak Pass. British imperialist interest in Balochistan was not primarily economic as was the case with other regions of India, rather it was of a military and geopolitical nature as Balochistan was to station garrisons so as to defend to frontiers of British India from any threat coming from and Afghanistan and to make Balochistan a first line of defense in case of rival colonial expansion threat from the French and Russians.

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However this Agreement could not last longer as the Khan of Kalat could not prevent Bugti and Marri tribes, part of the Baloch confederacy from attacking the British. The British claimed that the attack were a breach of the treaty and used this pretext to launch an expedition on Kalat. In the encounter, the Khan of Kalat refused to surrender, and was killed.

Making the breach of agreement a reason the British officiated over the dissolution and dismemberment of Baloch confederacy. The British went ahead and even divided the Baloch areas within the British influence .During the process of demarcation of the frontier, several areas of the Khanate of Balochistan were surrendered by the British authorities to Iran and Afghanistan. The change in the British approach was visible in the way the Khan was treated during the negotiations. In 1896, the Khan was not allowed to participate and the commission called The Anglo-Persian Joint Boundary Commission. The Indo-Afghan Boundary Commission headed by Capt. (later Sir) A. Henry McMahon in 1896. As the Khan was not consulted by the British in the demarcation of the Perso- Baloch Frontier, the validity of the line was seen as doubtful by the Baloch. The Balochis had for all practical purposes lost their independence and autonomy.

The final outcome of the boundary settlements imposed on the Baloch was: a) The Goldsmid line giving away almost one fourth of Baloch territory to Iran in 1871. Seistan and Western Makran, Sarhad, etc. became part of Iran. b) The Durand line assigning a narrow strip to Afghanistan in 1893.Outer Seistan and Registan came under the control of Afghanistan. c) Jacobabad, Derajat and Sibi were included in British India. d) The Khanate of Balochistan was recognized as an independent state with the status of a protectorate.

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Map 3: Balochistan under British Domination, 1800’s-1947

Source: http://www.lodhran.pk/balochistan-map.aspx

Since colonial times the strategic location of Balochistan has made it a target of external manipulation. The British economic policies contributed to the economic deterioration of the province. Within the first decade of the 20th century, the settled population in Balochistan increased from less than five percent to over fifty percent. Heavy taxation imposed by the British resulted in number of peasant selling their land. As a result, in a state where there were few tenants and hardly any agricultural labor, their number of non- Baloch increased considerably.

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The development of commodity money relations converted Balochistan into „an agrarian appendage of the metropolis‟, as the import of factory- made articles coupled with high taxation led to the bankruptcy of the local artisans, whose number dropped sharply. The British also beefed up the authority of the tribal chiefs as they depend on them to ensure safe passage for British troops and trade transiting from Sindh to Afghanistan. As a result, the Baloch society, which was fairly egalitarian, turned feudal and this feudal orientation increased with the passage of time.

2.3 Section II: Rise of Baloch Nationalism

Baloch tribes in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century showed their hatred of the unnatural and unjust partition through their revolts against British and Persian rule. In 1932, the Baloch Conference of Jacobabad voiced itself against the Iranian occupation of Western Balochistan. In 1933, Mir , a prominent national leader of Balochistan, showed his opposition to the partition and division of Balochistan by publishing the first map of Greater Balochistan (Balochwarnaorg, 355). In 1934, Magsi, the head of the , suggested an armed struggle for the liberation and unification of Balochistan. However, it was a difficult task because of its division into several parts, each part with a different constitutional and political status.

As a border area, the British were more interested in keeping the area calm and quiet. Through the principalities and the tribal Sardars, the British had astutely created a system of collaborative administration of the area and its people, which proved effective. The Khanate of Kalat was completely subdued and with the emasculation of the predominant seat of power in Balochistan, the British had ensured perpetuation of their rule in the entire region. The British system had, in fact, developed a curious sense of centripetality about it too.

During the first quarter of the twentieth century some of the Baloch educated personalities began to organize the Baloch resistance by establishing political bodies. The Baloch political activism for national liberation was greatly influenced by Indian national struggle and rise in power of socialist revolutionaries in Russia. A small group of

26 educated Baloch serving in the bureaucracy of the Khanate of Kalat had been politically active clandestinely. This was because open political activities were strictly forbidden, particularly for government employees in the state.

These secret organizations under the name of “Young Baloch” were led by Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd. This underground movement came to the surface when in 1928, Mir Yusuf Magsi, son of the powerful Magsi tribal chief, joined the political struggle for the Baloch national cause. Magsi mobilized opinion against the British in the struggle for national liberation. He put in surface the grievances of the Baloch masses under the despotic rule of Prime Minister of the Khanate Kalat, Mir Shams Shah, and a British- nominated civil servant from the Indian bureaucracy. He was convicted on the charges of inciting the public against the British and the Khanate administration. After his release he formed the first organized party in the name of Anjuman- e - Ithehad-e-Baloch-wa- Balochistan.

Soon the government of the Khanate began a crackdown on the newly established party and in 1931, the leader of the Anjuman was arrested nevertheless they continued their work with the help of Baloch activist who had organized themselves in Karachi in a form of a political organization called the Baloch League. The Baloch league was espousing the case of Baloch nationalism among the Baloch population of Sindh. The formation of the Anjuman as an organised political party marked the beginning of a secular, non-tribal nationalist movement in Balochistan. The major achievements of Anjuman were the convening of the First All India Baloch Conference in Jacobabad in December1932 and All India Baloch and Balochistan Conference in Hyderabad.

These two conferences helped in gathering momentum of the Baloch politics for national liberation not only unnerved the government circles in Kalat but also caused serious concern to British administration in Quetta. As the nature of the movement was progressive and democratic, Sardars as the representatives of the British power in Balochistan, felt uneasy at the emerging new political awakening of the Baloch masses. British administration had clamped a total ban on all kinds of political activities in British Balochistan and the Khanate of Kalat. Under the Government of India Act 1935, the Baloch nationalist seized the opportunity and organized themselves in a formal political

27 party. In a convention held in Sibi on February 5, 1937, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd and his comrades formed the Kalat State National Party. The objectives of the party were on broader front struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and on the internal front against the oppressive hegemony of tribal chief (sardars), the Kalat State National Party was emphatic on the replacement of Sardari system with a democratic alternative.

The working committee of KSNP demanded for employing locals as department heads, ministers, and deputy minister and on all other important posts, including the Prime minister. It called for abolition of Bijjar Tax which was a most coercive tax levied on public. With the support of the masses KSNP could yield to some of its demands, replaced the prime minister and took some of the party activities into important administrative positions in his bureaucracy. With its growing activities and influence on people in 1942 KSNP was fully banned. It was the first Baloch political Party in the history of Balochistan and played a pivotal role in various socio-economic reforms introduced by the last Khan of the Baloch and it was the guiding force in the struggle to regain sovereignty of the Baloch state in the wake of British withdrawal from India.

2.4 Section III: Partition and the British withdrawal 1947

The British had a relationship of paramountacy with the Indian states or principalities. The rulers of these states enjoyed substantial measure of internal autonomy in exchange for their loyalty to the British. The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, emphasized on the special status of the Kalat State and in a memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, in 1946, he had highlighted that the governments succeeding the British could only inherit the states that had treaty relations with the British Indian government and not those states whose treaty relations were with Whitehall. As the Cabinet mission could not find flaws with the legality of the demand, it left the issue unresolved. Ironically, Jinnah, as the legal advisor to the Khan had prepared the case in favor of independence of the Kalat state.

By the time the British began their preparations to leave the Indian subcontinent, the State of Kalat had lost much of its past glory, yet it had a functioning government responsible to a parliament, which comprised of two houses, like the British parliament.

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Its council of ministers included Douglas Fell, a British, who was functioning as the Foreign Minister. In addition it also had Mohammed Ali Jinnah as its legal adviser. According to Baloch nationalists, Jinnah had agreed that the position of the Kalat State was different from that of other Indian princely states.

In addition, at a round table conference held in Delhi on August 4, 1947, and attended by Lord Mountbatten, the Khan of Kalat, chief minister of Kalat and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, in his capacity as the legal advisor of Kalat State, it was decided that Kalat State would become independent on August 5, 1947. Subsequently, the rulers of Kharan and Lasbela were informed by the British that control of their regions had been transferred to Kalat State and the Marri and Bugti tribal regions which were under the British control were also returned into the Kalat fold, thereby bringing the whole of Balochistan under the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat .

Jinnah as the legal advisor of the Kalat state and Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan were two separate characters. Under his leadership as Governor General of Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan the legal heir of the British imperial system followed a policy not too different from the policy adopted by the British in 1839 in Kalat.

The legal status of Kalat was different from that of other princely states in the Indian subcontinent. The 560 odd princely states belonged to Category A under the political department. States like Kalat, together with Bhutan; Sikkim etc. were under the External Affairs Department of the Government of India and were in Category B. The 1876 treaty with the British provided for the independence of Kalat in internal jurisdiction and non- interference in domestic affairs. It was on this basis that the Khan never joined the Chamber of Princes in Delhi and always maintained that they were on a separate footing and not part of Britain s Indian empire. Thus Kalat in 1947 was not really obliged to join either India or Pakistan. When it was decided to partition India, the last ruler of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Khan made it clear that he sought independence.

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In a Memorandum submitted to the British Cabinet Mission in March 1946, the Khan made the following points:

First, the Government or Governments succeeding the Raj would inherit only the treaty relationships of the colonial government in New Delhi and not those of Whitehall. Second, after the British left, Kalat would retain the independence it had enjoyed prior to 1876. Third, the Baloch principalities that had been tributaries of Kalat and which were later leased to the British under duress would revert to Kalat. As a result, the Memorandum stated, the Kalat will become fully sovereign and independent in respect to both internal and external affairs and will be free to conclude treaties with any other government or state. It added, the Khan, his government and his people can never agree to Kalat being included in any form of Indian Union.

The League had, in fact, signed a joint statement with Kalat and repeated the declaration two or three times that the League recognized that Kalat was not an Indian state and constituted an independent entity and the League would recognize and respect this independence. In fact, as late as August 11, 1947 a joint statement was signed in which the League leaders, now as the government of Pakistan, again recognize the independence of Kalat.

As a result of a meeting held between a delegation from Kalat and officials of the Pakistan States Department, presided over by the Crown Representative, and a series of meetings between, the Crown Representative HH the Khan of Kalat, and Mr Jinnah, the following was the situation:

1. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state; in treaty relations with British government, with a status different from that of Indian states.

2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases made between the British government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan government (Dashti,2012:338).

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On August 15, 1947, a day after Pakistan was formally established, the Khan declared Kalat‟s independence; the Khan also formed the lower and upper houses of the Kalat Assembly. A meeting of the Kalat National Assembly (elections for which had been held a few weeks earlier) held on August 15, 1947 as well as subsequent meetings of the Assembly, decided not to join Pakistan and affirmed the position that Kalat was an independent state and would only enter into friendly treaty relations with Pakistan.

Apart from declaring independence the Khan of Kalat offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan in the spheres of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Communications. Pakistani leaders rejected this declaration touching off a 9-month diplomatic tug of war that climaxed in the forcible annexation of Kalat.

Pakistan historians have tried to argue that the Khans stand was not representative of Baloch sentiments and point as evidence to the pro-Pakistan Assembly of Baloch leaders (called Shahi Jirga) held in Quetta on June 29, 1947. However, the participants were those who had been appointed by the British and the Assembly‟s recommendation related only to British Balochistan.

Amongst those who, in these meetings of the Kalat Assembly spoke in clear terms about the justification for an independent Balochistan was , who later became a leader of the National Awami Party and also the Governor of Balochistan for a short period. Bizenjo‟s speech of December 14, 1947, in the Kalat Assembly is noteworthy for the ample warnings that it conveyed to the Pakistani state:

“We have a distinct civilization and a separate culture like that of Iran and Afghanistan. We are but it is not necessary that by virtue of being Muslims we should lose our freedom and merge with others. If the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to join Pakistan then Afghanistan and Iran, both Muslim countries, should also amalgamate with Pakistan. We were never a part of India before the British rule. Pakistan s unpleasant and loathsome desire that our national homeland, Balochistan should merge with it is

31 impossible to consider. We are ready to have friendship with that country on the basis of sovereign equality but by no means ready to merge with Pakistan. We can survive without Pakistan. But the question is what Pakistan would be without us? I do not propose to create hurdles for the newly created Pakistan in the matters of defense and external communication. But we want an honorable relationship not a humiliating one. If Pakistan wants to treat us as a sovereign people, we are ready to extend the hand of friendship and cooperation. If Pakistan does not agree to do so, flying in the face of democratic principles, such an attitude will be totally unacceptable to us, and if we are forced to accept this fate then every Baloch son will sacrifice his life in defense of his national freedom (Malik, 1957: 43).”

On January 4, 1948 the Upper House comprising sardars discussed the question of a merger with Pakistan and declared house is not willing to accept a merger with Pakistan which will endanger the separate existence of the Baloch nation.

2.5 Section IV: Pakistan accession over State of Kalat in 1948

By 1948 there was a situation where Khan of Kalat had declared independence, both houses of the Kalat Assembly had endorsed this decision and rejected accession with Pakistan, the Muslim League had acknowledged the independence of Kalat as late as in August 1947. Mr Muhammed Ali Jinnah, after being appointed as the Governor General of Pakistan, began to pressurize the Khan for the merger of the Baloch state with Pakistan. During a meeting with the Khan of the Baloch in October 1947, he proposed the accession of the Khanate of Kalat to Pakistan. He told the Khan that independent Balochistan in not viable, and it would be better that the khanate should decide for the merger in peaceful way.

Darul Awam and Umarah unanimously rejected the accession proposal, pushed by the Pakistani government; the Khan once again referred the accession issue to both the House

32 for reconsideration which again stood rejected on February 25, 1948. After falling to achieve its objective peacefully, Pakistan resorted to use other options. In order to cripple the Baloch state, the Pakistan government manipulated Kharan and Lasbela- the two subordinate states of Kalat for their “merger” with Pakistan directly. Similarly, Makaran, another province of Khanate, was forced to declare its independence from the Baloch state on March 17, 1948. It was later lamented by Mir Ahmad Yar Khan in his memoirs that the Pakistani Cabinet was working on the scheme to break up hundreds of years old Baloch state. The taking over of Khanate provisions of Makaran, Kharan and Lasbela according to him was tantamount to the political castration and geographical isolation of the Khan of Kalat.

The Government of Kalat issued a press statement declaring Kharan, Lasbela and Makaran inalienable parts of Balochistan. Worried about the defense of the Khanate against the aggressive moves from Mr Ali Jinnah and not fully realizing the real intentions of the British, the Khan instructed the commander in chief of the Khanate forces, Brigadier General Purvez, to recognize the forces, and to arrange for acquiring arms and ammunitions. Brigadier Purvez approached the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Ministry of Supply during his visit to England in December 1947.

However, it was made clear to him that no supplies would be authorized to Khanate without the approval of the Pakistan Government. Despite these measures it was not easy for Pakistani Government to incorporate Kalat into Pakistan and it could only be achieved by the use of Brute force. On March 27, 1948, Pakistan‟s armed forces were mobilized for operation against the state of Kalat. It was under this threat of force that the Khan of Kalat was pressurized to sign the „Instrument of Accession‟. As a result, on March 28th after 225 days of independence, the state of Kalat became a part of Pakistan. A political agent was appointed to look after the administration of the state guide the prime minister in all internal affairs. With this, the legal entity of the khan of Kalat was abolished and most of the members of Balochistan Cabinet were arrested or exiled from Balochistan.

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Despite all this, and despite the close personal relations that Jinnah had with the Khan of Kalat and despite the Khan having made large financial contributions to the Muslim League, on April 1, 1948 the invaded Kalat. The Khan surrendered and accepted the merger by signing the instrument of accession and ended the 225 days independence of the Kalat confederacy formed by Mir Ahmad Khan s ancestors almost 300 years earlier. It was British advice that led to the forcible accession of Kalat to Pakistan in 1948. Initially, the British favored honoring their commitments under the 1876 treaty regarding Kalat s independence based upon the prospects of using an independent Balochistan as a base for their activities in the region.

Maj. Gen. R C Money in charge of strategic planning in India had formulated a report in 1944 on the post-war scenario. According to this report, in case of any eventual transfer of power, Balochistan, since it was not formally a part of India, could serve as a strategic military base for the defense of the Persian Gulf. However, by 1946 when it was decided to partition India, the British felt that instead of locating a base in a weak Balochistan, such a base could be established in Pakistan which was more than willing to accommodate the British. Hence, it was in British interests to ensure that Balochistan was kept within Pakistan and did not become an independent entity.

Therefore, Secretary of State Lord Listowell advised Mountbatten in September 1947 that because of the location of Kalat, it would be too dangerous and risky to allow it to be independent. The British High Commissioner in Pakistan was accordingly asked to do what he can to guide the Pakistan government away from making any agreement with Kalat which would involve recognition of the state as a separate international entity. The British were keen to use Balochistan (which they did from 1949) against the new nationalistic government of Prime Minister Mossadegh that came into being in Iran and which had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It was then that the British bases in Western Balochistan started acting against Eastern Iran.

The forceful occupation of Balochistan by Pakistan led to a short-lived revolt, on 15 April 1948, Agha Abdul Karim, brother of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1933-1948) started an armed movement in the area backed by some nationalist

34 leaders and with the secret approval of the Khan. Agha Abdul Karim was educated in Karachi, and served as the governor of Makkoran province until March 1948. He invited the leading members of the nationalist parties (the Kalat State National Party and the Baloch League), to join him in the struggle against Pakistan. In April 1948, when the Pakistani army ordered its garrison Commander in Balochistan to march on Kalat and arrest the Khan unless he signed a agreement of accession. However, neither the Baloch nationalist parties nor the Darbar (Royal Court) of Kalat were prepared for any armed resistance.

In addition to this, the nationalist leaders were also divided on the future line of action. Mohammad Hossein Anka, a prominent journalist, Malik Saeed Dehwar, the Secretary General of the National Party, Abdul Wahid Kurd, Qadir Bakhsh Nizamani and some other activists, favored armed struggle in the form of guerilla war. (Harrison 1981:25) While Abdul Aziz Kurd, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Gul Khan Nasir along with some other leaders of the Kalat State National Party didn't show any resistance to the idea of a military showdown with Pakistan because of the lack of preparation and internal and external support.

On 16 May 1948, after brief skirmishes with the well-trained and well- equipped army of Pakistan, Agha Abdul Karim and his partisans, the "Baloch " (holy warriors), as they called themselves, about 1000 in number, crossed the border into Afghanistan and erected their camp at Karez Nazar Mohammad Khan situated in no man's land known as Sarlat in search of help. The National Party members, who were still free, along with a few Baloch individuals from Sindh and Derajat, joined the Prince (Marri, 2000:307).

While staying in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen adopted the following measures to achieve their goal: a) The sending of messages to the Baloch chiefs of eastern and western Balochistan, asking them to join in the struggle. b) The running of a propaganda campaign in Balochistan, aimed at the creation of unrest, disturbances, and revolt as well as the enlistment of a national liberation force.

35 c) The search for international support, particularly from Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Baloch, 1987: 193).

The propaganda campaign was to be carried out on two fronts: The national cultural front and the religious front. On the national cultural front, the party distributed a series of pamphlets all over Balochistan, aiming to cause an uprising against the oppressive rule of Pakistan. On the religious front the Baloch nationalist Maulauis, Maulaui Nazeer Hossein, Maulaui Arz Mohammad, Maulaui Mohammad Umar, Maulaui Mohammad Afzal and a few others issued the fatwa (decree by a learned religious figure) and proclaimed Jihad (holy war) against Pakistan and demanded that the Baloch people join the national movement. Addressing the government servants and military personnel of Pakistan the fatwa demanded that the Muslims of Pakistan and particularly the soldiers should engage in Jihad against the non-Islamic Government of Pakistan ( Nizamani, 1980:04).

The Prince, who was also chosen as the supreme commander of the Baloch Mujahideen, issued an appeal to personages to help with the recruitment. A person recruiting 100 men was offered the rank of a major and a person recruiting 50 men was entitled to the rank of captain. The Baloch Mujahideen had a secret agency called Jannisar (devotee), whose duty was to provide information, destroy the communication system, and watch the activities of traitors. In addition to this, there was a secret unit Janbaz (volunteers), to kill all traitors. The headquarters of the agency was known as Bab-i-Aali (secret war-office) and headed by the Prince himself (Nizamani, 1980:04).

The Afghan authorities, however, refused to provide any sort of help and told the Baloch Mujahideen either to reside as political refugees at Kandahar or to leave. The Prince approached the Soviet Embassy in for help. The Soviet embassy was sympathetic, but offered no material assistance, which was to be the pattern for relations between Baloch nationalists and Moscow. Under these circumstances, the Prince returned to Balochistan with his militia.

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The Afghans were not happy hosts, Agha Abdul Karim and his partisans, the Baloch Mujahideen, were soon asked by the Afghan government to leave. Kabul-Karachi relations had been embittered over the Pakhtunistan issue. But, since the rise of Ahmad Shah, the Afghan had treated Balochistan as a vassal state until the Baloch-Afghan war in 1758, when an agreement of "non-interference" was signed between the parties. In the 19th century, Afghan rulers like Shah Shuja and Amir Abdur-Rehman desired to occupy Balochistan. With the ending of Imperial paramountcy, it was only fitting in Kabul's view that its historical claims be fulfilled. Kabul's irredentist claims included what had now become Pakistan's Balochistan province, fact Prince Karim‟s nationalists failed to appreciate (Baloch, 1983:200).

Being disillusioned, Prince Agha Abdul Karim and his party returned to Balochistan on 8 July 1948. After a minor clash near Harboi with the Pakistan army, the Prince along with more than one hundred of his followers was arrested. On 27 November 1948, he was tried by a special Jirga in Mach Jail and sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5000. The other members of his party were given various sentences and fines (Nasir, 1993:526).

The Pakistani army had managed to secure Kalat as well as the rest of Balochistan, even though the sporadic cases of violence continued till 1950. The revolt did not last long but it definitely gave a fillip to the Baloch national movement which resurfaced later. This first encounter between the Baloch and Pakistani forces was crucial in shaping nationalist insecurity and fear of repression at the hand of foreigners.

2.6 Section V: Post 1950’s Era

Since the Partition, a number of imbalances attended the formation of Pakistan. Differences of language and culture, uneven development and unequal levels of interest in the very formation of Pakistan accompanied the making of a nation, Pakistan. Originally comprising two geographically separated Eastern and Western wings, the newly created state came to be dominated from the outset by the Punjabis in alliance with the muhajirs. This domination came to be seen by the other regional groups in ethno-

37 national terms. Thus, the seeds of ethnic conflict and tensions were sown from the beginning in the Pakistani state structure. The large-scale Muslim immigrants from India contributed greatly to aggravating ethnic imbalances. The muhajirs, according to Pakistan's 1951 census constituted some seven million people (Talbot, 1999:101).

As said, the muhajirs and the Punjabis together dominated Pakistan's economy and controlled its civil and military administration as inherited from the British. This was the case in spite of the fact that at the time they were even a minority as compared to the majority East Bengalis let alone other non-Punjabi nationalities. Given their urban base and dominant economic position as well as their control of the state bureaucracy, the ruling Punjabis and their muhajir allies began to shape and define the state identity and structure according to their own perceptions and image.

Initially, the muhajirs were over-represented in the powerful civil service of Pakistan. A prime example of their dominance was the imposition of , spoken only by muhajirs, as the lingua franca of the state to the exclusion of the various other languages used by the indigenous national groups, a decision which led to the 1952 language riots in and the subsequent defeat of the Muslim League at the polls in 1954. It is important to note that Urdu was not the language of all the muhajirs. A lot of them spoke either Punjabi or Gujarati. In the early 1950s only around 7 per cent of the Pakistan's population spoke Urdu as their mother tongue.

Another example was the adoption of the One-Unit plan designed to merge the four ethnically distinct regions of Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh, and NWFP into a single wing of Western Pakistan in 1954. The informal ruling alliance of the Muhajir-dominated Bureaucracy and the big Punjabi landowners during the first decade of Pakistan's existence perceived National Unity as a system securing their own hegemony. Muhajirs provided administrative and economic experience, while the Punjabi elite‟s political power. Anybody, who was not part of this combination or not willing to be co-opted as a junior partner, was perceived as a potential threat to Pakistan. Therefore, ethnic minorities or most provincial governments became marginalized.

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However, some significant changes occurred after partition in the ethnic composition and structure of the oligarchy in the country. Pakistan, as stated by Bjorn Hettne, gradually became more and more a state for Punjabis. On 18 October 1951 Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, the most senior muhqjir leader, was assassinated while addressing a public meeting at in Punjab. In muhqjir perceptions it was the beginning of the decline of their influence in Pakistan. The murder remains a mystery to this day. At any rate, the Punjabi bureaucrats expanding their control over the state followed it immediately.

Balochi nationalists within the Khanate took serious exception to the One Unit scheme and in a meeting with Pakistani president Iskander Mirza in October 1957 they urged Iskander Mirza to exempt Kalat from the One Unit scheme, and to allot more government spending on developmental activities in Kalat. But Ayub Khans ambitions changed the political matrix in Pakistan and when some Baloch sardars started non-cooperating with the Pakistani commissioner, under a flimsy pretext that the Khan had raised a parallel army to attack Pakistani military, Ayub ordered Pakistani army to march into Kalat on 6 October 1958, a day before he imposed martial rule in Pakistan. The army arrested the Khan and his followers and accused them of secretly negotiating with Afghanistan for a full-scale Baloch rebellion. The arrest touched off a chain reaction of violence and counter- violence with the government bombing villages suspected of harboring guerrillas.

In 1958 when general brought the first military coup, he fired many top civil servants of muhqjir background in 1960; he also shifted the capital of Pakistan from Karachi a muhqjir- dominated area, to Islamabad in northern Punjab. Those muhqjirs working for the federal government had to abandon Karachi. After the departure of the British, Pakistan adopted the same imperial tactic of divide and rule, of false promises and deception and made it an inalienable part of Pakistan.By 1952; the princely states were united to form the Balochistan States Union (BSU). Later the BSU became part of the then as the Kalat Division in 1955. Under the one unit scheme started in 1955, in the face of rising assertion of Bengalis in , the British

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Balochistan along with the tribal agencies became part of West Pakistan as the in the same year.

Pakistan military campaigns in Danshera and Wad were resisted by the Jhalawan Sardars loyal to the Khan. The octogenarian Chief of the Zehri tribe in Jhalawan, put up a stiff resistance in the Mir Ghat Mountains, but the Pakistani military swore an oath by the Quran and urged Nauroz to give up arms and prepare for negotiations. Nauroz surrendered in anticipation of safe conduct and amnesty but the army put Nauroz and his sons behind the bars as soon as they laid down their arms. Nauroz s sons were hanged soon afterwards, in Hyderabad and Sukur, in July 1960. A shocked and surprised Nauroz died soon afterwards in Kohlu prison in 1962. Aruba Khans message to the Balochis of Kalat who were the first to challenge the might of the Pakistani state, was clear. He reportedly threatened the total extinction of Balochs if they did not mend their ways.

The Pakistan Army set up new garrisons at key points in the interior of Balochistan. This in turn provoked the Baloch to plan for more armed guerrilla movements capable of defending Balochi interests. The movement was led by Sher Mohammed Marri who was far-sighted enough to realise that the disorganised random struggle adopted so far would have to be transformed into classic guerrilla warfare. For this purpose, he set up a network of base camps spread from the Mengal tribal areas of Jhalawan in the South to the Marri and Bugti areas in the North. The Pararis, as the guerrillas were called, ambushed convoys, bombed trains and so on. In retaliation, the army staged savage reprisals. For example, the Army bulldozed 13,000 acres of almond tress owned by Sher Mohammed and his relatives in the Marri area.

The fighting continued sporadically until 1969 when the withdrew the One Unit plan and got the Baloch to agree to a ceasefire. Despite the ceasefire, the Pararis assumed that the renewal of the hostilities with Islamabad would be unavoidable sooner or later. As such, the organizational infrastructure was kept intact and cadres continued to be trained. The nationalist Balochis took to rudimentary politics during Ayub s practice of Basic Democracy in Pakistan. They struck a chord of unity with the Pakhtuns in

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NWFP and formed a National Awami Party (NAP) upon the dissolution of the One Unit scheme in 1970.

With the abolition of the One Unit plan on 1 July 1970, the combined divisions of Quetta and Kalat came together as the separate province of Balochistan. The one unit plan sought to subsume all ethno- national aspirations in West Pakistan, but in reality, strengthened the ethno-nationalist sentiments further. In the elections of 1971, while Bhutto s PPP swept the polls in West Pakistan, the NAP won in Balochistan and NWFP. The attacks on Punjabi settlers in Quetta and Mastung in early 1973, the perceived defiance of the -led government in Balochistan and the discovery of a large consignment of weapons in the Iraqi embassy were woven together to be served as conclusive evidence of the Balochis militant intentions and General was sent to Balochistan to lead the second military attack on Baloch nationalists. Pakistan, smarting under the shock of vivisection in 1971, certainly over-reacted to the Balochi nationalist assertion.

The immediate provocation for the Baloch resistance was Bhutto s dismissal of the Baloch provincial government in February 1973 in which Ghaus Bux Bizenjo was Governor and Attaullah Mengal Chief Minister. Bhutto alleged that the government had repeatedly exceeded its constitutional authority and alleged that this had been done in collusion with Iraq and the Soviet Union as part of a plot to dismember both Pakistan and Iran. The dismissal was timed with the disclosure of a cache of 300 Soviet sub-machine guns and 48,000 rounds of ammunition allegedly consigned to Baloch leaders that were found in the house of the Iraqi Defense Attaché in Islamabad. It was, however, subsequently revealed that the arms had actually been found in Karachi and were meant for Iranian Baloch in retaliation against Iran s support to Iraqi Kurds and that the Iraqi Defense Attaché had collaborated with Iranian and Pakistani intelligence agents in staging the arms exposure to put pressure on the Iranians.

Following the dismissal of their government, Baloch guerrillas began to ambush army convoys from April 1973. Bhutto retaliated by sending in the army to Balochistan and by putting three veteran nationalist leaders of Balochistan Ghous Bux Bizenjo, Ataullah

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Khan Mengal and Khair Bux Marri, behind the bars. The armed struggle continued over the next four years with varying degrees of severity. At the height of the war there were over 80,000 Pakistani troops in the province. The fighting was more wide-spread than it had been in 1950s and 1960s. The guerrillas succeeded by July 1974 to cut off most of the main roads linking Balochistan with surrounding provinces and to periodically disrupt the Sibi-Harnai rail link thereby blocking coal shipments from the Baloch areas to the Punjab. Additionally, attacks on drilling and survey operations stymied oil exploration activities. The then Shah of Iran, apprehending trouble in Iranian Balochistan, supported the Pakistan forces in decimating the Baloch resistance. The Shah sent in 30 US Cobra Helicopters manned by Iranian pilots who pounded the Baloch pockets of resistance.

The turning point came during the 6-day battle at Chamalang in the Marri area in September 1974. In line with the Pakistan army s scorched earth policy, an army ground and air offensive in the winter of 1974 on the Baloch tribes, largely Marris, along with their families, who had gathered in an annual pilgrimage to the Chamalang plains to graze their flocks, inflicted heavy human and livestock casualties. While casualties on both sides were heavy, the Baloch were unable to regain the military initiative in the ensuing years. Most of the Balochi leaders left Pakistan and went into exile in Afghanistan, the UK and other places outside Pakistan. Several Baloch groups migrated to Afghanistan where they were permitted to set up camps by Mohd Daud. Even if Bhutto claimed to have wiped out Baloch resistance, he played a big role in the transformation of dispersed Pararis into the Balochistan People s Liberation Front (BPLF) in 1976, led by Mir Hazar Khan Marri, who broke away from Baloch Students Organisation (BSO) led by Sher Muhammad Marri.

Against this backdrop, one needs to take into account the success of the coercive methods applied by the Pakistani state since 1970s which perhaps forced the tribal sardars to adopt a changed perspective vis-à- vis their fond dream of raising a movement of resistance in Balochistan. Zia-ul-Haq declared a general amnesty for the Balochis taken up as prisoners during the insurgency and sent a serving lieutenant general and the corps commander of Quetta, , as the Administrator and Governor of Balochistan.

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For the first time in the , a provincial military regime was established in Balochistan and it was given phenomenal powers. Gen. Rahimuddin Khan wielded enormous powers and isolated areas which acted as pockets of Balochi resistance. He subdued rag-tag Baloch rebels with an iron fist and was credited with stabilising Balochistan during his reign as the longest serving governor until he was promoted to the rank of full General in 1984. While Zia offered the carrot of amnesty, Rahimuddin was given enough freedom to wield the stick in any way he liked.

It was strange to observe that no Balochi leader raised his voice against Rahimuddin s high-handedness and his authoritarian policies. Marri and Megal chose to stay out and Nawab Bugti who had collaborated with Bhutto in his attack on Balochistan was isolated. Rahimuddin adopted a policy of keeping Balochi sardars out of the pale of politics and functioned as a dictator. It is hard to believe that Baloch nationalists tended to ignore his rule. However, it has to be remembered that during this phase the Baloch People s Liberation Front (BPLF) consolidated its position and prepared itself for future action.

The anti-Bhutto sentiments of the Baloch nationalists were well manipulated by Zia ul Haq after he seized power in 1977 and his show of clemency was received well by many Baloch leaders including the Baloch triumvirate: Ghaus Bux Bizenzo, Ataullah Mengal and Akbar Khan Bugti. However, a rebel faction of the Marris continued defying the Pakistani administration. And, as a proof of the irreconcilability of Balochi nationalism with the Pakistani state-nationalism, the most aggressive and fiercely independent of all Baloch factions, the Baloch Students Union (BSO), reorganised and reasserted itself in the early 1990s.

The post-Bhutto politics of the Balochis, in spite of the strategic show of sympathy from the Zia-ul-Haq administration, has been one of reconciliation and refashioning of their demands in un-aggressive terms. Even if leading Baloch poets like Mir Gul Khan Naseer, Gul Rasool Mullah, Sayad Zahoor Shah continued to urge the Balochis to fight the injustice inflicted on them, the political leadership who stayed back practised caution in projecting their nationalist agendas.

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The willingness to accept Balochi nationalism as a sub-national strain of wider Pakistani nationalism, conceived in whichever way, Islamic or otherwise, featured prominently in Balochi nationalist discourse. Those in either forced-exile or self-exile like Ataullah Mengal in London and Khair Bux Marri in Afghanistan continued to pitch their demands high. But most of the other Baloch leaders showed greater moderation, partly because of Zia s ability to co-opt and defuse them. The former BSO president and guerrilla militant Khair Jan Baloch, for instance, gave up the fight and former Governor Bizenjo created the Pakistan National Party (PNP) in order to put pressure on the regime from inside, for promoting a better functioning of the federal structure enshrined in the Constitution of 1973. Many of the Sardars preferred to collaborate with the centre, which was most willing to co-opt them.

From 1988 onwards, the democratization process gave even more room for maneuver to the Baloch notables in the political arena, and the more they took part competitive elections, the more they became divided. In November 1988, Sardar formed the Balochistan National Movement which played a pivotal role in the new governmental coalition, the Balochistan National Alliance of Nawab . However, factional conflicts became more acute when the 1990 interim elections approached. Bugti broke away from the BNA and launched the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) which made an alliance with the Pakistan Muslim League of . That was a clear indication of an interesting change in the strategy of the Baloch politicians: factional rivalries within Balochi groups led them to make alliances with national parties which could help them in getting access to power. Similarly, in 1996 Zulfikar Ali Khan Magsi formed a government with the support of the PPP, of the PML (N) and the JUI.

In December 1991, the factions of Mengal and Bizenjo formed a new party, the Balochistan National Party (BNP). But none of the contenders won a majority of the seats to the provincial assembly in the February 1997 elections. With 10 seats of 43, the BNP was the largest single party and Sardar Ataullah Mengal therefore formed a coalition government with the support of the PPP. Simultaneously, the BNP supported the PML (N) in the National Assembly, another indication of the increasingly pragmatic relationship between the Baloch leaders and the national, mainstream parties.

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Mengal resigned in 1998 in protest against the conduct of the nuclear tests in Balochistan because, he claimed, they had been decided without consulting him and the honour of the Balochis was at stake. After he resigned, Mengal reverted back to his traditional Baloch nationalist discourse. In an interview in The Muslim he declared: We are forced to look for our identity. However, the main bones of contention between his government and Nawaz Sharif were not related to the identity question alone. Mengal resented the way the centre kept for itself an unwarranted share of the royalties from gas exploited in Balochistan. He was also very critical of the decisions of the National Finance Commission which, according to him were highly detrimental to Balochistan.

A fresh wave of insurgency started building up in Balochistan in the year 2004.The rebels among the older generation of Balochis might have given up after the uprising in the early 1970s and its brutal suppression by the Pakistani army. It has even warranted army action since July 2004 and the encounters between the army and insurgents have resulted in quite a few casualties. An underground armed rebel group which calls itself the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) was seen to be operating from early 2000. It has no leadership but has been gathering strength gradually. It is useful to analyze the phenomenon from a strategic perspective.

2.7 Section VI: The State of Baloch Insurgency

The current Balochi resistance has been building up for quite some time, especially since federal authorities in Pakistan started developing Gwadar port and road and rail links to it as part of an ambitious project to provide a surface (trade) link with central Asia through Chaman, Kandahar across Afghanistan into central Asia, akin to the Silk Route. This was a fashionable idea during Nawaz Sharif s time, the late 1990s, which was obsessed with motorways, and had sound economic reasons. The Chinese patronage to this idea gave this idea a further boost and it continued after Musharraf s takeover. The resistance from the Balochi side to such federal efforts was limited to the nationalist fringe that came out with the traditional interpretation that even if it would bring development to Balochistan, it would ultimately favour the Punjabis. But the Balochi resistance was submerged in the Islamist fervor that surfaced in the wake of post-9/11 war on terror in the neighbourhood.

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This was clearly visible from the way the nationalist parties were decimated in the elections in 2002, even if they did not concede the areas where the traditional Sardars held sway, i.e., Khuzdar, Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Kalat, Nushki and Awaran.

But the sense of Balochi disaffection grew up in the aftermath of the attack on Afghanistan, with the establishment of US bases in Pasni, Gwadar, Dalbandin and Jacobabd (in Sind), not so much because of the US army presence but because of the decision of the Musharraf administration to establish some army cantonments in Balochistan, on the pretext of contributing to the anti-terrorist actions. This was part of a larger plan to consolidate the army s position in the border provinces. The army, as well as the MMA led government could not effectively assuage the Balochi nationalist argument, which was put forward through PONM (Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement) platform, that the building up of cantonments will help the Punjabis in strengthening their controls over Balochis and Balochistan. The imperviousness with which the federal administration dealt with the legitimate demands of the Balochis, that they should be considered for recruitment ahead of others in the so-called developmental activities, hardened sentiments further. In a way, Musharraf obliged the Balochi nationalists with a cause they were desperately in need of, to resuscitate Balochi nationalist resistance.

While all this was happening it was interesting to see a younger generation of Balochi leadership taking on the mantle of the resistance movement. This new leadership is removed from the old in terms of its bases of influence, its power of articulation and its ability to look at the Balochi problem in an un-emotional way. The young leaders like , , Amaullah Baloch, who are all associated with the Baloch Students Organisation (BSO, which has become BSO-United), which provided the sparks during the resistance of the 1970s, do not look towards the old traditional Sardari based system of loyalty and privilege for a guaranteed support base and through their appeal and persuasion they have managed to assemble a group, which is modern in its outlook and has the capacity to sustain the Balochi nationalist struggle for a longer period. This is not to deny that the veterans of the resistance movement in 1950s and 1970s, the famous four Ghaus Bux Bizenzo, Khair Bux Marri, Nawab Akbar Bugti and

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Ataullah Mengal have lost their appeal. The second generation Sardari leadership, i.e. Hasil Bizanzo, , and Akhtar Mengal are also less feudalistic in their outlook and have expressed their willingness to work together in the ongoing movement.

It needs further mention here that the spark of the ongoing Balochi upsurge started from the areas still under the control of some of these veteran families. It built up around the terrain rich in gas resources and under the control of the Marris and the Bugtis in the districts of Dera Bugti and Kohlu. Khair Bux Marri and his two sons Balach Khan Mari and Hyrbyahr Marri, along with the sister tribal group, the Bijrani Marris led by the indomitable Sherbaz Marri, have kept the flag of resistance alive in Kohlu, while Nawab Akbar Bugti s successors have jealously guarded their influence in the Bugti region. Since October 2003, the Kohlu and Bugti areas have witnessed sporadic attacks on outposts of the Frontier Constabulary and the Levies. They have also reacted strongly to the idea of building up cantonment in Kohlu. These attacks perhaps encouraged the Balochi nationalists of the south around Kech (Hq. Turbat) and Gwadar and later Khuzdar to resist the idea of stronger and larger army presence in Gwadar. In fact since June 2004 the nationalists even rejected the Mirani dam project close to Turbat and fired several rockets at the project site damaging some parts of it.

The encounters between the army and the Balochi nationalists became regular and more intense since early July 2005 when in response to the rising tide of terrorist attacks in Karachi, Musharraf directed the Gwadar Port Implementation Authority (GPIA) to shift to Gwadar and instructed the army to provide them tight security in view of the earlier attack on the Chinese engineers in April. With the introduction of the regular army into the fight with the Balochi nationalists, the struggle has intensified and with the attacks on the MMA Chief Minister and army men (who were only proceeding on leave) in July- August 2004, the insurgency seemed to be gathering momentum.

Even if the Baloch resistance started in a low key fashion towards the close of 2000, it gathered momentum from 2003-2004. A hitherto unknown organization called the Baloch Liberation Army began staking its claims for planting mines, firing rockets, exploding bombs and even ambushing military convoys from 2003. However, it was in

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2004 that the Pakistani government showed some anxiety and concern over the issue of Baloch resistance. As the work around Gwadar, the construction of the highways and cantonments gathered pace by 2003, the Baloch rebels made their presence felt with equal speed by attacking all the developmental activities. The main argument that the Baloch nationalists advanced was that all this development will flow to outsiders who will flock to their province and take up all the jobs and participate in the trade and business activities. The Balochis, because of large scale illiteracy and poverty can never avail of the opportunity that such developmental projects provide.

The Balochi rebels were seen to be targeting Chinese and critical facilities aimed at discouraging external participation in the projects on the one hand and discouraging internal efforts by disrupting critical facilities like power and gas on the other. Attacks on security forces also increased day by day. The more high profile acts by the liberationists were the murder of three Chinese engineers working on the Gwadar Port Project, the attack on the Chief Minister s convoy and the attack on Sui Airport Building, as well as regular disruption of power transmission lines and railway-lines, attacks on military and government installations etc.

During 2004 there were 626 rocket attacks, out of which 379 rockets targeted the Sui gas fields and some of them targeted the railway tracks. There were 122 bomb explosions on the gas pipeline. Initially the government ignored the issue, but as the attacks grew in frequency and intensity, the government sent in forces from outside the province and took control of vital installations and engaged the nationalist insurgents. The alleged rape of a Sindhi female doctor by security forces in early 2005 gave a new force to the Baloch movement.

The BLA launched a massive attack when the government showed its callousness in dealing with the issue. Hundreds of rockets and mortar shells were fired and there was a heavy gun battle, which lasted for 11 hours. Large-scale damage was inflicted on the property of residents as well as Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL); the town of Sui was cut off from the rest of the country. In a clear demonstration of their determination and strength, the rebels made an attempt to capture the gas field at Sui in January 2005.

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According to the Pakistan government sources, the rebels fired 14,000 rounds of small arms, 436 mortar and 60 rockets in four days of fighting. By now Nawab Bugti had completely dedicated himself to the Baloch nationalist struggle and his support gave further boost to the movement.

As per media reports, in the fierce engagement, over two dozen security forces were killed in the incidents in Sui and gas supply to major industrial units in the Punjab and Sindh was disrupted trade and business activities. The Balochis, because of large scale illiteracy and poverty can never avail of the opportunity that such developmental projects provide.

Subsequently, the Pakistan army rushed in thousands of regular army troops to the area. Even helicopter gunships were marshaled to put down the Bugtis and the Marris. The government attributed the attack to Nawab Bugti and the Pakistani media was replete with stories of how a septuagenarian chief of the Bugtis took charge mainly because the Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) refused to finance the lavish lifestyle of Nawab Bugti. It was also reported that the PPL was bankrolling the pay and allowances of Nawab Bugti s personal staff to the tune of Rs 122 million per year.

The situation turned even worse even in March 2005 when a minor exchange of fire between the tribesmen and the FC personnel was used as an excuse by security forces to attack the Hindu ghetto in Dera Bugti, which lied just outside the ancestral house of the Nawab, where he was supposed to be hiding. The day-long shelling claimed 67 lives, including 33 Hindus and 8 FC men. Over 100 people were injured and houses and temples were severely damaged. All this was going on when a senate committee on Balochistan was seeking to iron out the differences and address the genuine demands of the people of the state/province. Chaudhary Shujat Hussain, leader of the ruling PML (Q) was sent to Dera Bugti to broker a ceasefire.

The following nine months were relative peaceful. Both the sides dug into their own positions and planned to resume their offensives at an opportune time. Ayaz Amir, a noted commentator on Pakistani politics wrote that the Pakistani army has to be more

49 circumspect while deciding to take on the Bugtis: Bugtis in particular, are a proud and warlike people with a strong sense of grievance against the perceived injustices of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy Pakistan s permanent ruling party. While there is no comparison between the army and the Bugtis, taking on the Bugtis would be no tea party.

The lull was broken in December 2005. Unknown armed men fired at least eight rockets on a paramilitary camp in Kohlu on December 14, 2005, where the president was to address the tribal elders two hours later. Three of the rockets landed near the Frontier Corps (FC) camp. Subsequently the BLA claimed responsibility for the attack. The President however, went ahead and laid the foundation of the garrison. This was the much needed alibi that the army was waiting in patience to seize upon. On December 17, 2005 the security forces launched attacks against the Marri tribes in Kohlu district.

Over 200 troops supported by helicopter gunships attacked the Marri camps. A number of aerial sorties were used to attack the positions held by Marri tribesman. According to Baloch sources there was large scale collateral damage and a heavy loss of life and property on account of indiscriminate bombings carried out by the security forces. Over 40 civilians were reportedly killed on the very first day of the operation. The operations intensified with each subsequent day and engulfed not only the entire Kohlu district but also the neighboring Dera Bugti district. Dr Abdul Hayee Baloch, President of the National Party, went to the extent of saying that the situation of Balochistan was like that of former East Pakistan in 1970.

With the resistance movement going around in Balochistan since decades has drawn a geo-political map of Balochistans and in terms of their loyalty to the Pakistani State. Balochistan can be divided into four regions. The southern-most is Makran, which has not had a strongly legacy of feudalism and has traditionally been a region of political void. The pro-left Baloch Student Organisation has had strong influence in the region. The region‟s economic significance has gone up manifold on account of Gwadar deep sea port and other development projects being undertaken in the region since the nineties. North and East of Makran are the former states of Kalat and Lasbela respectively; the people in this region have generally towed the government line and have tended to ally

50 themselves with the centers of power within and outside Balochistan. This region has not been in the forefront to oppose the Pakistani establishment.

North of this zone is the tribal land inhabited by the recalcitrant tribes like the Bugtis, the Marris and the , who have fought the British in the past and have led the opposition to the Pakistani state over the years. The fourth region comprises the predominantly Pakhtoon areas North of Quetta, who, apart from occasional forays with Afghan Taliban sponsored Pakhtoon Nationalism, have not troubled the state much. This region has seen growing influence of Taliban and is believed to house the leadership of Afghan Taliban including Mullah Omar.

Baloch nationalists soon responded with their favorite tactics of blowing up gas pipelines, railway lines and communication and electricity towers. They not only challenged the writ of the state across the length and breadth of the province, they also went outside the province and targeted pipelines in other states. The government claimed that it had seized some of the rebel training camps and started attacking with all the might at its command. Opposition parties in parliament have accused the government of carrying out genocide of innocent citizens in Balochistan, using helicopters in bombing sorties and poisonous phosphorus gas against the people. They have also deplored the way in which the air force was being utilized in the operation. Even Asma Jehangir, the chair of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) was prevented from visiting Balochistan.

2.8 Conclusion

These pastoralist nomadic tribal group, known as Balashicks migrated en masse and after many centuries of wandering and sufferings, these pastoralist nomads ultimately settled in the south and eastern fringes of Iranian plateau before the and Pakistan, Balochistan consisted of four princely states under the . These were Kalat, Lasbela, Kharan and Makran. Two of these provinces, Lasbela and Kharan, were fiduciary states placed under Khan of Kalat's rule by the British, as was Makran which was a district of Kalat.

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On March 28th after 225 days of independence, the state of Kalat forcibly became a part of Pakistan. In 1950s Pakistan came up with the first repressive policy that is the One- Unit plan designed to merge the four ethnically distinct regions of Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh, and NWFP into a single wing of Western Pakistan in 1954.One-Unit plan was seen as a system securing their own hegemony by the informal ruling alliance of the Muhajir-dominated Bureaucracy and the big Punjabi landowners during the first decade of Pakistan's existence.

1970, Balochistan got a provincial status under Pakistan government, however the Baloch cry by self determination and resistance kept building up for overtime, especially since federal authorities in Pakistan started developing Gwadar port and road and rail links to it as part of an ambitious project to provide a surface (trade) link with central Asia through Chaman, Kandahar across Afghanistan into central Asia, akin to the Silk Route. Now the developmental projects have been the main target area of the Baloch nationalist to show grievances against the Pakistan government.

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CHAPTER III

Patterns of State Repression in Balochistan

3.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with different patterns of state repressions that have been adopted by Pakistan government in Balochistan. It is structured in two sections with their respective subsections. Section I gives a background on the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, which became the triggering point for the start of violent Baloch resistance in Balochistan. The Section II deals with different forms and patterns of state repression adopted by Pakistan government in Balochistan to curb the Baloch resistance. In this section there are five subsections which deal with five different patterns of state repression, which includes extra judicial killings, target killings, disappearances, torture, kill and dump and political imprisonment.

3.2 Section I: Background

The unwarranted and brutal killing of leader of the Jhmoori Watan Party, Nawab Akbar Bugti, the spokesman and the leader of Balochi aspirations, by Pakistani armed forces on August 26, 2005 in Balochistan’s Bhambore hills, reportedly with the use of cluster bombs and laser guided missiles sent shock waves through political circles across Pakistan.

By killing Nawab Bugti with an inordinate show of force that included helicopter gunships strafing the cave in which he was hiding and firing missiles at it, Pakistan has exemplified the heavy-handedness for which the Baloch people have resented Islamabad all along (Hindu 2006 ,The Balochistan cause gets a martyr).

The assassination of Nawab Bugti has set Balochistan ablaze and gave Baloch nationalism a martyr around whom to build itself and stir up the opposition in Pakistan ( Kukreja 2006:28).

Against this backdrop, the entire landscape of Baloch resistance against the Pakistan government changed. The manner in which Bugti was killed and the subsequent treatment meted out to his heirs for handing over his body sowed seeds of deep-seated mistrust and hatred among the Baloch masses, especially the Bugtis. This in turn not

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only contributed further to separatist fervor but also radicalized the Baloch masses, particularly the youth (Motaher, 2015:9). Balochistan has been wracked by insurgency for more than six decades.

Most of the present-day ethnic turbulence in Balochistan revolves around the local issue with Baloch-nationalists seeking more control over their natural resources, a meaningful role to the Baloch in decision-making regarding the construction of mega projects and abandoning of plans for more cantonments in the province, to check the influx of non- Baloch people in the province and equal representation to Baloch people in various central and provincial services including the suspension of the military operations against the Baloch.

The Baloch people harbor a number of grievances against the policies of the federal government. The feeling of alienation and under representation in the political, economic and military spheres at the federal and provincial levels has filled anger against successive federal government. This has leaded the local to resort on arms leading to nationalist uprising and turmoil in the province. The Pakistani government is well aware of the fact that it is Baloch nationalists who are opposed to the mega development projects and construction of cantonments in Balochistan.

That is why Pakistan has strongly warned the Baloch nationalist of stern actions if they took up arms against the government. In an interview to the local private TV channel Geo Pakistan, President made sharp comments that the Baloch nationalists should behave properly or be prepared for dire consequences. He further said that this is not 70s and we will not climb behind them in the mountains. They will not even come to know what has hit them. To control the uprising Pakistani Government has resorted to over-militarization and other repressive measures.

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Table 1: Fatalities in Balochistan 2011-2016

Year Civilians SF’s Terrorist Total

2011 542 122 47 711

2012 690 178 86 954

2013 718 137 105 960

2014 347 83 223 653

2015 247 90 298 635

2016 (until October 177 77 190 444 2)

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

Figure 1: Fatalities in Balochistan 2011-2016

Civilians SF's Terrorist Total

1250

1000 954 960

750 711 690 718 653 635 542 500 444 347 347 298 223 250 178 177 190 122 137 86 105 83 90 47 77 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

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Figure 2: Bomb Blasts in Balochistan 2001-2016

Number of Blasts Killed Injured 1200

900

600

300

0 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

Table 2: Bomb Blasts in Balochistan 2001-2016

Year Number of Killed Injured Blasts 2001 15 14 45

2002 3 0 0 2003 13 3 20

2004 57 31 172 2005 154 92 199

2006 214 179 426

2007 243 125 332 2008 242 110 429

2009 134 93 378 2010 101 132 544 2011 194 181 494

2012 148 205 680 2013 138 440 1089+

2014 84 132 571 2015 60 80 159+

2016* 36 136 286

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal 56

3.3 Section II: Forms and Patterns of State Repression

Common forms of state repression are, killing and wounding terrorists or civilians, widespread arrest, often without due process and internment without trial, state kidnapping of those involved in any sort of threat to the state, extra judicial killings, disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, collective punishments, such as closures, destruction of homes or property and most importantly curtailment of civil liberties such as the freedom of movement, speech, or assembly.

According to the work on Terrorism and state repression of human rights: A cross- national time-series analysis by Eran Shor, Jason Carmichael, Jose Ignacio Nazif Munoz ,John Shandra ,Michael Schwartz there are certain variables that can measure the interrelationship between state repressive policies and human security. There are dependent variables that can be used to examine the variables of repression. They are as follows: a) Extrajudicial Killings – killings by government officials without due process of law, including murders by private groups if instigated by the government. b) Disappearances – cases in which people disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims were been found. c) Torture – purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Political Imprisonment – the incarceration of people by government officials because of their speech, their non-violent religious practices, or their membership in a group (Shor, Charmichael, Munoz, Shandra, Schwartz, 2014:6).

3.3. a Extrajudicial Killing:

According to the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, the most common forms of police killings occur due to excessive use of force in law enforcement operations, including during attempts to arrest suspected criminals, crowd or riot control, and purported “shoot-outs” with alleged armed criminals (sometimes called “encounter killings”) (EuroAsia MUN,2013:7).

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Some killings are motivated by personal monetary gain: the Special Rapporteur has reported on police killings occurring at police checkpoints, where attempts at extortion can escalate into extrajudicial executions (United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/14/24/Add.8, 2010 :5) .

For example, in the Kharotabad incident in Quetta on 17 May, 2011, the Frontier Corps (FC), a federal law enforcement agency, mistook five Russian citizens including three women, two men and a baby, as a threat and reacted with utterly disproportionate force even when it had become clear that they posed no threat to the lives of the members of FC. The incident was apparently a result of combination of the aforementioned factors.

Some incidents of extrajudicial killings occur in the context of poorly planned and unlawful policing policies and operations, for example, where police engage in heavily militarized operations without adequate safeguards or community support. Police engage in “social cleansing”, intentionally killing suspected criminals or members of poor or marginalized communities. In extreme cases, the police operate as part of a formal death squad ormilitia.

Killings also occur as a result of torture or the denial of life-saving treatment while the victim is in police custody. Other killings by police occur outside the context of any purported official police activity, and result from off-duty police officers acting as vigilantes or hired killers. Little needs to be said that these forms of extrajudicial executions identified by the Special Rapporteur are all too familiar in the Pakistani context. Gathering reliable statistics for incidents of extra-judicial killings is a difficult task as state authorities do not proactively reveal such violations. However, despite the absence of statistics at the state level, media reports and efforts by some rights based organizations are useful and have been utilized.

Extrajudicial executions and other grave human rights abuses by member’s police forces have been described as an issue of concern and basis for communication between the UN Special Rapporteur and the Government of Pakistan. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) recorded 338 executions in police encounters in 2010, an alarming 50% increase from the 226 executions that took place in 2009.

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Investigations were launched only in 25 of the 338 cases, following protests by families of the victims.

One of the most horrific of recent extra-judicial killings also referred to above, is that of Sarfaraz Shah, who was killed by Rangers personnel on 8June 2011 in Karachi. The killing was captured on camera and later on aired on many news channels. A spokesperson for the Sindh Rangers claimed Shahwas a criminal and was killed in an “encounter”, very obviously a lie as the video clearly shows that Shah was unarmed and was begging the accused not17 to shoot him.

After widespread public outcry, an anti-terrorist court in Karachi deliberated on the matter and on 12 August 2011, it convicted the seven accused persons. The Ranger who shot Shah was sentenced to death, while the others were sentenced to life imprisonment. Earlier, the provincial head of the paramilitary Rangers and the Sindh police chief were fired by authority’s incompliance with a Supreme Court order on the incident. However, a closer look at reported news and case law emerging in the high court’s reveals that the convictions in such cases as Sarfraz Shah's are a rarity at best as most cases of extra-legal killings are not properly investigated; not surprisingly, the police resist registration of cases against their fellow policemen even when the legal heirs of the deceased “criminals” press for charges of murder.

3.3. b Target Killings

Currently three parallel trends of target killings are simultaneously under way in Balochistan: politically motivated targeted killings of moderate political leadership; targeting of non-Baloch settlers; and ideologically motivated sectarian killings of members of Shia Hazara community. Target killings in Balochistan are not specific to one ethnic or religious/sectarian group. Almost all ethnic entities in Balochistan including Baloch, Pakhtun, Hazara and Punjabi have been affected. If this trend continues for long it can give impetus to further violence and even to the Baloch insurgency as well as create cracks in the social fabric of Balochistan. The target killing of moderate political leaders by Baloch insurgents is a recent phenomenon.

The Baloch victims, mainly those killed in Khuzdar and Makran, have been accused of spying for and working as agents of the Pakistani state. During first eight months of 2010, there had been 11 attacks on political leaders, compared to nine and 12 attacks 59

in 2008 and 2009, respectively. These target killings can have serious political fallout, further alienating the Baloch and generating antagonism among them against the state.

Yet another new trend is the targeting of teachers and other professionals, which began after the assassinations of Ghulam Muhammad Baloch, president of Baloch Nationalist Movement (BNM), Lala Munir, joint secretary of BNM, and Sher Muhammad, secretary general of Baloch Republican Party (BRP) in Turbat. The three leaders were killed in April 2009 after abducted UNHCR official John Solecki’s release from the custody of Baloch insurgents. Punjabi teachers are being targeted in Quetta, Mastung, Kalat, Khuzdar and Hub as well as some other parts of the province.

It is not clear who is behind the target killings of teachers although at least some of them have been claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). While claiming responsibility for the murder of the vice-principal of Technical Training Centre in Hub Industrial Township, BLA spokesperson Sarbaz Baloch said on May 24, 2010 that they were carrying out target killings of those teachers who were spying for intelligence agencies.

Some of the leading teachers assassinated in target killings in Balochistan include Khalid Mehmood Butt, vice-principal of Balochistan Residential College at Khuzdar; Professor Amanat Ali of Government Commerce College Quetta; Javed Ahmed Lodhi of Government Pilot Secondary School Mastung; Professor Safdar Kiani, acting vice chancellor of University of Balochistan; Professor Khurshid Ansari of Balochistan University; and Professor Fazle Bari. Several non-Baloch teachers have asked the Balochistan Education Department to transfer them from Baloch-majority areas of the province to Quetta or to the Pakhtun-populated areas.

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Figure 3: Number of Extra Judicial Killings

70 64

52.5 43

35 30 25 22 17 17 17.5

3 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year 2014 2015 2016 Source: BYGWAAH International voice for Baloch Missing Person

Table 3: Number of Extra Judicial Killings

Year Number of extrajudicial Killings

2005 3

2006 0

2007 0 2008 0 2009 5

2010 17

2011 43

2012 25 2013 64

2014 3 2015 30

2016 22

Source: BYGWAAH International voice for Baloch Missing Person

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These are the statistics of extrajudicial killings registered in BYGWAAH International voice for Baloch Missing Person however many cases are gone unnoticed and unreported.

Such a state of affairs has in turn created greater difficulties for the Education Department in the placement of teachers. So far 14 college lecturers and 22 school teachers have been transferred from Baloch-majority areas to other parts of the province.They also include senior PhDs, including Dr Masoom Zai, Dr Semi Naghmana Tahir, Dr Mansoor Ahmed Kundi, Dr Nadir Bakht and Dr Shafiq-ur- Rehman. The target killings have compelled many Punjabi families to leave Balochistan.

According to some media reports and field research conducted for this study, approximately 100,000 Punjabis have migrated from the province after selling their properties at throwaway prices on account of a growing sense of insecurity. The sectarian-related target killings have been perpetrated mainly against Shia Hazara community in and around Quetta. The present wave of intensified sectarian killings of Hazaras had begun in 2009. Not a single culprit has been brought to justice so far. Police never seem to complete their investigations (Sial&Basit 2010:39).

3.3. c Disappearances

History of disappearances is as old as the history of colonization of Balochistan. It goes back to illegal occupation of Balochistan by British Empire in 1839. But the worst tragic episode of state enforced disappearances in Balochistan began from 1948 onwards. It was when the newly formed state of Pakistan invaded independent Balochistan and forcefully annexed it to its territory.

The truth is increasing number of disappeared Baloch political and human rights activists is a reflection of Baloch resistance against colonialism and occupation. Only and only for this reason, Pakistan has carried out five major military operations in Balochistan since 1948. In each of these catastrophic operations thousands of Baloch people including women and children have been killed and hundreds of thousands more were forced to flee their native towns and villages. Among these victims are those many thousands who disappeared without any trace. The inhumane act of

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disappearances, target killing and kill and dump of Baloch activists by state functionaries continues even today.

The 30th of August is marked internationally as Enforced Disappearance day but in Balochistan, the blatant violation of human rights, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of Baloch are continuing at the hands of the state agencies.” the statement issued by the VBMP has noted. The state institutions and politicians justify their blatant human rights violations under the pretence of Pakistani patriotism; despite the obvious oppression and extreme deprivation imposed upon the Baloch society by this state.

Balochistan’s home minister (Sarfraz Bugti) admitted that more than 13500 people have been arrested in Balochistan during a period of the first half year; through National Action Plan. But state officials are unable to provide details or whereabouts of the “arrested” people; even the relatives of the victims are unaware of the fate of their forcibly disappeared beloved.

The arrested people are often killed in staged encounters and are falsely declared to be terrorists. On August 13, 2016, the dead bodies of Gazain Baloch and Salman Qambrani were found dumped in Balochistan. The last time they were seen alive was when they were arrested a year earlier on July 7, 2015, at their residence situated on Qambrani Road in Quetta. At that time, their relatives had gone to the area police station to register First Information Report (FIR) regarding their abducted loved ones. Although Gazain Baloch and Salman Qambrani were picked up by state institutes along with Frontier Corps and other forces in broad day light; before the eyes of hundreds of citizens. The police outright refused to file the FIR. Then the aggrieved people contacted the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) and registered details with them for assistance in the safe recovery of the enforced disappeared Gazain Baloch and Salman Qambrani. Sadly such examples exist abundantly in Balochistan.

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Figure 4: Number Baloch Missing

300 262

225 180

150 99 63 75 47 34 14 15 3 1 1 1 1 12 1 3 0 1969 2000 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Year

Source: BYGWAAH http://www.bygwaah.com/

Table 4: Number Baloch Missing

Year Number of people missing

1969 3 1992 1

2000 1 2002 1 2003 1

2004 No information 2005 12 2006 No information

2007 1 2008 3 2009 14

2010 15 2011 34 2012 63

2013 262

2014 47 2015 180 Source: BYGWAAH http://www.bygwaah.com/ 2016 99

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The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons repeatedly received complaints by effected families that torture is routinely used to coerce confessional statements from the detainees. One such example is the confession statements of Abdul Bari Nichari. The relatives of Abdul Bari Nichari communicated that he was arrested by police on October 19, 2015, after a quarrel with his cousins and put in lockup at a police station. Afterwards, the involved parties resolved their conflicts and he was released. Astonishingly, in a video aired by the provincial government, Mr Nichari is seen confessing about a bomb blast in the local bus which occurred on October 19, 2015. It’s absurd to think that a person who was arrested on October 19, 2015, and in the custody of the police could have detonated a bomb blast on a bus the same day.

Such incidents raise serious questions about the transparency and authenticity of confessional statements extracted from detained people by government officials. The organization VBMP already challenged the authenticity of confessional statements from detainees, but now the evidence has validated those concerns. The organization by this time revealed that enforced disappeared people are charged in fraudulent cases, and they are also being killed in fake encounters. Most often their bodies show marks inflicted by extreme acts of torture. Afterwards, the victims are falsely declared as terrorists. But the state institute’s trickeries have been publicly exposed.

Regrettably, no government institute and the judiciary are not intervening in the ongoing inhuman activities in Balochistan, nor has the international community given sufficient attentions to atrocities on Baloch. Here in Balochistan, the media has also failed to fully portray the real picture. Hence all these factors give the state forces full impunity to commit human rights abuses and enforced disappearances.

The organization Voice for Baloch Missing Persons often receives complaints from victim families that they are being harassed by state forces to withdraw from their struggle for safe recovery of enforced disappeared persons. The organization condemns the inhuman acts of government institutes and demands for judicial rights and due legal process for all including Baloch missing persons because the national and international laws guarantee human rights to citizens without any discrimination.

There is a clear national consensus in Pakistan that the issue of enforced or involuntary disappearances is one of the major aspects of the crisis of governance the

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country is facing. It is also one of the most serious forms of human rights abuse in Pakistan. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has been seized with this matter since 2004, and in 2007 it also approached the Supreme Court for the recovery of the involuntarily disappeared people.

In September 2012 the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) visited Pakistan and released its preliminary report and recommendations at the conclusion of its mission. The group’s detailed report was to be discussed at the UN Human Rights Council early on 2013. HRCP had decided to publish the group’s preliminary report and recommendations to persuade the government of Pakistan to create some goodwill at the UN by starting implementation of the working group’s recommendations before the matter is taken up at the UN.

According to the preliminary report collected by WGEID on Balochistan, sources allege that more than 14,000 persons are still missing, while the provincial government only recognizes less than a hundred. Till 2012, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances still has more than 500 cases in its docket concerning the whole country. The number of officially registered allegations, although may not be reflective of the reality of the situation, is itself an indication of the existence of the phenomenon.

As recently in December 2015, six Baloch people’s tortured dead bodies were found in different areas of Mashkay and Hub town; four among them were thrown from flying Pakistan military helicopter. On Nov 8th, 2015 Pakistan army conducted an unwarranted three weeks long military operation in Bolan district of Balochistan and abducted 40 Baloch women with their children, since then entire Baloch civil society has gone on peaceful protests across globe from social media campaign with hashtag #SaveBalochWomen to street protests in London, Germany and other parts of world; but in vain as it seems that the world has abandoned Secular Baloch at the mercy of ruthless Pakistani rogue state.

As far as the nature of the practice is concerned, the authorities at the federal and provincial levels with whom WGEID members met often declared that most of the missing persons were in fact not victims of enforced disappearances. According to those authorities, some of those persons had been under criminal charges and had

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chosen to go in hiding, while some others have fled to another country to join illegal armed groups. Others, according to the same authorities, have been the victims of abductions by non state actors for various reasons.

Cases of enforced disappearances by State actors, in this context, would be the result of misconducts and ultravires behavior by some agents of the State. However, nongovernmental sources allege that there is a pattern of enforced disappearances in Pakistan, imputable to law enforcement agencies in conjunction with intelligence agencies. During our visit families told us their stories and each story, while being different, revealed the same pattern. The abduction, often taking place in front of witnesses, is reported to be perpetrated by law enforcement agencies, like the police or the frontier corps, jointly with members of intelligence agencies in civilian clothing.

When asked whether they had filed a complaint for illegal arrest, families generally say they tried to file a first information report (FIR) with the police, but were turned down or discouraged to do so. Most of them finally filed their cases with the provincial High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan, so that the Court would issue an order to the police to initiate an investigation. In a large number of cases, families reportedly received threats or were intimidated to try to prevent them to file such cases.

3.3. d Torture, Kill and Dump

Although the prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the law has no specific section against torture. It prohibits “hurt” but does not mention punishing perpetrators of torture. There are no legislative provisions specifically prohibiting torture. There were reports security forces, including the intelligence services, tortured and abused individuals in custody.

According to the AHRC, the absence of proper complaint centers and a particular section in the criminal code to define and prohibit torture contributed to such practices. The AHRC maintained the government undertook no serious effort to make torture a crime, and the state provided impunity to the perpetrators, who were mostly police or members of the armed forces. According to the Country Reports on Human

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Rights Practices for 2014, United States Department of State; Physical abuse while in official custody allegedly caused some deaths of persons accused of crimes.

The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Society for Human Rights and Prisoners’ Aid (SHARP) reported more than 400 civilian deaths after encounters with police, compared with 300 in 2013. SHARP researchers claimed most deaths took place in the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan and noted a decrease in killings in Punjab compared with previous years. Lengthy trial delays and failure to discipline and prosecute those responsible for killings contributed to a culture of impunity. SHARP reported police tortured persons in more than 7,800 cases, compared with7,200 cases in 2013.

Torture occasionally resulted in death or serious injury and was often underreported. SHARP and other human rights organizations reported acts they cited as torture included beating with batons and whips, burning with cigarettes, whipping the soles of feet, prolonged isolation, electric shock, denial of food or sleep, hanging upside down, and forced spreading of the legs with bar fetters.

Balochistan is a province where justice has been buried, where thousands of civilians and those who fought against authoritarianism and militarism have been tricked, betrayed, and eliminated. The Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), one of most horrific, strategic, well-managed, and dangerous state intelligence agencies in the world is the prime accused in most of the crimes reported in the area. And, a corrupt government has approved its actions in the name of counter-insurgency.

The government of Pakistan is yet to understand that the insurgency is not the disease but the symptoms of the disease. If the government really needs to cure the crisis in the area, then it must engage in genuine treatment procedure rather than engage in ad hoc solutions that go under the motto: picked up, killed, and dumped. Kidnapping the target and dumping his or her bullet riddled and tortured corpse in a public place to scare the people in the area is a military strategy which aims to provide a lesson to those who still retain seeds of resistance.

According to a devastating report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Pakistani authorities are dealing with the situation with extreme brutality.HRW claims that Pakistani security forces are routinely detaining, torturing and murdering hundreds of 68

political activists in Balochistan in what some observers describe as a dirty war. “Pakistan's security forces are engaging in an abusive free-for-all in Balochistan as Baloch nationalists and suspected militants 'disappear' and in many cases are executed," said HRW’s Asia Director Brad Adams.

Since 2005, Pakistani and international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have recorded numerous serious human rights violations by security forces, including extrajudicial executions, torture, enforced disappearances, and forced displacement of civilians.Dragged, hand-cuffed, blindfolded, beaten and almost never told why they have been seized, dozens of individuals have been hit with sticks or leather belts, hung upside down or deprived of food or sleep. The people doing it to them rarely identify themselves.

Many of the people seized are activists seeking independence or autonomy for the province in the west and south-west of the country. Detailing Mr Azeem’s treatment in a new report based on interviews with more than 100 people, HRW says that while hundreds of people have disappeared since 2005, there have been dozens of cases since the Pakistan People’s Party-led government came to power in 2008. It details a total of 45 cases of alleged disappearances.

In an appeal to United nations human rights commission by Baloch Social Media Activists (BSMA) in 2015 stated that currently under the “kill and dump policy”, which begun in 1999, Pakistan army has so far abducted more than 23000 Baloch activists across Balochistan and of them 2000 unfortunate political activists have been killed in the dark dungeons of military torture cells and their bodies have been dumped in mass graves or thrown on deserted areas. Khuzdar, Totuk mass graves tell the tale of 160 unfortunate Baloch who were found by a shepherd in the area. But no DNA test was allowed to determine the identity of these unfortunate Baloch activists by all-powerful colonial Punjabi army. More than 22000 Baloch have been displaced as a result of constant military operations across Balochistan. So far UNHCR has failed to take cognizant of the situation.

3.3. e Political Imprisonment

Baloch Nationalist Pro-independence Organization the Baloch National Voice (BNV) has released a detailed report of under-custody killings of Baloch political activists in 69

last six months of 2010. Previous year (2010) has been one of the bloodiest years for the abducted Baloch from July 2010 to December 2010 at least 60 Baloch political prisoners have been murdered in cold-blood by Pakistani security forces.

The mutilated/decomposed bodies found from different areas in Balochistan bore sign of extreme torture including electric shocks, pulling their nail out, carving their bodies with sharp objects and throwing acids on the faces of Baloch political activists; majority of them were shot in their heads and eyes. The victims of Pakistan’s Military Intelligence belonged to pro-liberation Baloch political Parties and Student Organization including BSO-Azaad, Baloch National Movement (BNM) and other Parties that have been supporting freedom movement in Balochistan.

Apart from the member of political parties a large number of victims included other innocent civilians such as lawyers, Students, intellectuals, writers, social activists, Human Rights activists, poets and other members of general public. The victims of state atrocities belonged to different tribes in Balochistan i.e. Bangluzai, Marri, Langov, Pirkani, Mengal, Kurd, Somalani, Mullazai, Sarparah, Shahwani, Lehri, Zehri, Khosa, Rodeni and members of other tribes who had been abducted from different areas in Balochistan.

Renowned Baloch lawyers advocate Zaman Khan Marri, Baloch writer and lawyers Ali Sher Kurd, BNM Gwadar zone president Lala Hameed Baloch, BSO-Azaad zone President Asim Baloch, well-known Baloch poet and singer Faqeer Mohammad Ajiz Baloch, 14 year old Majeed Zehri Baloch and 70 year old Shadi Khan Marri were among the most conscience and prominent member of society who have become victims of Pakistani state atrocities and “kill and dump” policy.Pakistani Military and their sponsored Organisation Sepah-e-Shohada-e-Balochistan (The Army of the Martyrs of Balochistan), which has been named as Punjab death squad by the Baloch people, have claimed the responsibility for most of the under-custody killings of Baloch political activists.

Under the 2009 Aghaz-e-Huqooqe Balochistan package, intended to address the province’s political, social, and economic problems, the government announced a general amnesty for all Baloch political prisoners, leaders, and activists in exile, as well as those allegedly involved in “antistate” activities. Despite the amnesty some

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Baloch groups claimed illegal detention of nationalist leaders by state agenciescontinued.

AkhtarMengal, a well-known and respected Baloch nationalist, has not been so lucky.He has been kept in solitary confinement in Karachi since December 2006.Akhtar Mengal has not been tried in an open court. His trial is conducted inside the prison. No one except one person from his family is allowed to witness the court proceedings. Mr Iqbal Haider, secretary-general of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, witnessed the first hearing of his trial in Karachi prison on special request, and this is what he saw Mr Mengal was brought into the courtroom and shoved into an iron cage with bars all around that stood in a corner away from his counsel.

Akhtar Mengal is not the only political prisoner from a smaller province who has been humiliated or treated as a second class citizen. A number of Baloch,Sindhi and Pashtun leaders have been detained and humiliated repeatedly in thelast 60 years.Veteran Baloch nationalist Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Nawab Khair Bux KhanMarri, Khan Abdul Khan, Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo, Sher Mohammed Marriand Mir Gul Khan Naseer have spent years in prison for being insubordinate tothe establishment. Akhtar Mengal, president of the Balochistan National Party (BNP) and former chief minister of Balochistan, has been under detention since Nov 2006, and has been denied justice through delaying tactics. Mengal has not been arrested under corruption charges nor has he been charged with misuse of power.

Due to the gravity of the threats he would personally drop his children to school. On April 5, 2006, some unknown persons followed his car presumably to kidnap his school-going children. He stopped his car and asked them who they were. They refused to give any satisfactory answer. Considering this a security issue, Akhtar Mengal’s security guards picked up the two riders of the motorcycle and took them back to the Mengal residence intending to hand them over to the police. At this stage, the two admitted to being army personnel. Almost immediately, a large party of law- enforcement agency men arrived on the spot and took away their two colleagues who had been picked up, and laid siege to the house and its occupants.

On the intervention of the Sindh chief minister, it was agreed that no case would be filed if Mr Mengal’s guards who were involved in the case were handed over to the

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police for questioning. At a later stage, it was discovered that a havaldar of the Pakistan army had filed an FIR against Akhtar Mengal and his four guards, who were voluntarily handed over to the police. Yet Akhtar Mengal remained free till Nov 28, 2006, when the Balochistan police arrested him, along with senior members of his party.

Since then, all proceedings are being conducted in camera. Repeated humiliation of the Baloch and their political representatives will intensify the animosity felt by the troubled Baloch population. The judiciary’s tilted role and the unproductive hearings have already shattered the credibility of the bench. Finally on 2008 Mengal was released.

The Constitution guarantees that all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. However, the Baloch have not been treated according to national and international laws. Constitutional guarantees and the courts have failed to protect their fundamental rights.

3.4 Conclusion

Balochistan has historically had a tense relationship with Pakistan's national government, in large part due to issues of provincial autonomy, control of mineral resources and exploration, and a consequent sense of deprivation. Under Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler from 1999 until 2008, the situation deteriorated markedly, culminating in a crackdown on Baloch nationalists by the security agencies controlled by the Pakistani military and its lead intelligence agency in the province, Military Intelligence (MI).Since 2005, Pakistani and international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have recorded numerous serious human rights violations by security forces, including extrajudicial executions, torture, enforced disappearances, and forced displacement of civilians.

Militancy in Balochistan has been fuelled by ethnic Baloch anger over the Pakistani government's moves to harness local mineral and fossil fuel resources, maintain large numbers of troops in the province, and construct the Gwadar deep-sea port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf with non-Baloch workers. The Pakistani military claims that Baloch militants receive arms and financial support from India but has provided no evidence to support the claim. However human rights violations through repressive 72

measures adopted by Pakistan to gain economic profit have been an issue of grave concern for the international community and the people of Balochistan.

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CHAPTER IV

State Repression as a threat to Human Security

4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with how state repression is posing a threat to human security in Balochistan. This chapter is divided into two sections. Section I deals with the negative effect of state repression on human security, its effect on economic and educational rights are discussed in the subsections. Section II deals with the treat that has been posed on schools, planning and development projects, functioning of civil society and threat on media. These topics are discussed in the subsections.

The repressive measures adopted by the Pakistani government have become threat to human security in Balochistan. The Baloch Civilians are unhappy with the functioning of the federal government leading to adoption of violent methods by secessionist groups and national parties to combat Pakistani Security Forces. The security scenario of Balochistan is negatively affected by a combination of suppressive policies, nationalist insurgency, sectarian-related militancy, Taliban presence in the northern part of the province (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:14).

The root of the present confrontation in Balochistan is Pakistan‘s refusal to allow provincial authority that is guaranteed by the 1973 Constitution. Pakistan continues to treat Balochistan as a conquered colony, where Baloch can only enjoy those rights which are allowed to them. Baloch reject this and demand the right to rule their province and the ownership of its natural wealth. They also demand the abandonment of the Gwadar project and stoppage of building cantonments in the province.

The security situation in Balochistan can be studied by seven elements of human security – physical, food, health, community, political, environment, and economic security. At the level of human security, acute deprivation, underdevelopment, abject poverty, illiteracy, chronic unemployment and continuous deterioration in the law and order situation have forced the non-Baloch to migrate to the relatively safer Pakhtuns

74 localities. Similarly, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, use of excessive by state agencies against political rallies, illegal detentions, torture of political activists during interrogation and uncalled for house raids and searches have sowed the seeds of deep insecurity among the masses, especially the Baloch (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:14).

According to Amnesty International 2015-16 annual report on Pakistan, ―enforced disappearances continued with impunity‖ in Balochistan and other parts of the country. ―The main victims of this violence are the people of Balochistan who are being systematically targeted by paramilitary groups, allegedly sponsored by the Pakistani authorities. Extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances are the most common practices,‖Marc Tarabella, Vice-chair of the EU Parliament's delegation for relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and ASEAN, wrote last year that the EU cannot ignore the dire human rights situation in Balochistan(Hindu,2016).

It can be argued that even economic projects adopted and anticipated by the government a new and far-reaching social, economic trajectories and determinants for decision making in Pakistan will not bring out a fundamental change in the reactionary die-hard, security-dominated mindset of the country‘s leadership featured by repressive domestic politics and state-sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. This will have serious consequences for the economic project in the long-run, especially since domestic security, stability, and national harmony, as well as constructive relations and cooperation with Pakistan's neighbors, are essential pre-conditions for the investing nations support for the mega infrastructure project.

The repressive policies have negatively affected the Human security scenario of Balochistan. The Baloch problem has so far mostly been seen from the lens of the classic realist angle of national security. The pathologies identified and the remedies suggested for resolution of the crisis also therefore bear a strong imprimatur of a security-centered approach. There has little focus on human security while framing the parameters of the security debate on the Baloch conflict in the past. The human security concept that espouses the safety of humans from myriad threats like hunger, disease, violence, poverty

75 and joblessness runs against the grain of our accumulated security wisdom weaned on the classic security precepts defined by scholars like Barry Buzan, who amongst their trinity of security referents – individuals, state and the international system – privilege the state over all others. The negative effect of repressive policies is studied in parameters further discussed in this chapter.

4.2 Section I: State of Human Security in Balochistan.

This brings to the core question that is, is State repression impacting upon the human security aspect in Balochistan? As we see there have been attacks on educational institutions, development projects, and civil societies and on media. The following subsections explain it further.

4.2. a Economic Security

Economic security‘s most important dimension is job creation which is directly linked with poverty. According to a World Bank sponsored Balochistan Economic Report the province needs 158,000 jobs and a growth rate of 6.5 percent annually to lift a significant percentage of the poverty-affected population above the poverty line.

The demographic realities of a fast increasing, yet young, population present job creation challenges to a government that relies more on politics of patronage than merit or equity. Poor utilization of large disbursements by the federal government for poverty alleviation and development has exacerbated the socio-economic inequalities in the province. With large development funds gobbled up by hungry political and administrative machinery, the people are left at the mercy of fate and a tyrannical geography. Due to large distances and poor communication network the scattered population finds it difficult to integrate with the mainstream of the provincial economy. The uncertain security situation has significantly diminished the prospects of foreign investment and resource exploration of a mineral and energy rich province (The News, Janjua, January 17, 2016).

The inaccessibility and remoteness of location of Balochistan, along with the will to deliver services increases the cost of service delivery in Balochistan. Even though the

76 province has one of largest sanctioned strength of officials compared to all provinces it lacks skilled bureaucracy. The political leaders concerned more with their perks and privileges while letting common people suffer.

Pakistan‘s economic system is widely believed to contain inherent discriminations. Economic development and modernization have also been uneven. As a result, the mounting economic pressures, growing economic inequalities and a sense of deprivation and disempowerment in the least developed region of Balochistan have triggered conflicts at the socio-economic and political levels. The Baloch consider the current revenue collection and allocation mechanisms, as well as economic development and economic opportunities discriminatory in a comparative context. They harbor grievances of not getting their due share in resources. The most heightened form of this concern relates to the ownership of and control over the mineral resources of Balochistan (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:7).

The report on Multidimensional poverty was launched by the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform .The Multidimensional Poverty Index uses a broader concept of poverty than income and wealth alone. It reflects the deprivations people experience with respect to health, education and standard of living, and is thus a more detailed way of understanding and alleviating poverty. A person is multidimensionally poor if he or she is deprived in 33% of the weighted indicators.

Figure 5: Multidimensional Poverty Overtime in Balochistan

Source: Multi dimensional poverty in Pakistan Report, 2016

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According to the report development in Balochistan is the poorest and the least developed of the four federating units of Pakistan. The score of Balochistan in MPI is 0.394 and around 71.2 percent of the province‘s population lives below the poverty line. The report further states that incidence of poverty in Rural Balochistan is 84.6 percent. In Balochistan, 18 out of 30 districts have poverty incidence of 70 percent or more. Four of the five poorest districts of Pakistan are in Balochistan, where poverty level is frighteningly high. The poorest district is Kila Abdullah with 97 percent poor population, followed by Harnai at 94.2 percent, Barkhan 93.6 percent, Sherani 90.6 percent poor population (Report on Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan 2016:16).

Figure 6: Multidimensional Poverty Overtime in Balochistan (Headcount)

Source: Multi dimensional poverty in Pakistan Report, 2016

If poverty is considered an index of human deprivation comprising limited opportunities and social exclusion, a much larger portion of population in Balochistan would fall below the poverty line. In addition to low income, poor households are characterized by low levels of education, lack of drinking water and dearth of health and welfare services. 92 percent of Balochistan‘s districts are classified as high deprivation areas compared to 50 percent in Sindh and 29 percent in Punjab. Less educated and less urbanized than the rest

78 of the country, the province also has far greater dependency ratio. Balochistan has the lowest literacy rate of all the provinces, fewest educational institutions and the lowest ranking in the Gender Parity Index (GPI) across the country (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:8).

The Human Development Index as per UNDP report, Dera Bugti district of Balochistan, a region rich in resource district of Balochistan is the lowest at 0.285. Balochistan and its districts were assessed to be the worst off in Pakistan. Amongst the top 31 districts with the highest HDI, Punjab had by far the largest share at 59 percent, while Balochistan lagged far behind at nine percent (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:10)

Besides the persistent disregard and inconsistent policies by the Pakistan government, the Balochistan‘s political, administrative and a developments crisis was not merely the domination of Pakistan government. Its cause was deep rooted in its political history too. Balochistan was not accustomed to the administrative setup and political privilege that prevailed in other provinces since 1948, until 1970, when they got the provincial status.

Over-centralization of development expenditures, as mentioned earlier, is reflected in the large number of schemes in the Public Sector Development Program (PSDP) that are regional in nature but are orchestrated through federal funds. Control and Distribution of Resources is the question of provincial and fiscal autonomy is directly linked to the problem of control over and distribution of resources. The extraction of natural/mineral resources and allocation of the revenues that the province generates plays a central role in its problematic relationship with the federal government. Balochistan has huge natural reserves of minerals, and its gas fields supply about 45 percent of Pakistan‘s total gas requirements (down from 70 percent about a decade earlier), generating US $1.4 billion in revenues annually. Coal reserves are believed to be sufficient to cover to a great extent the country‘s future energy requirements. Other important mineral reserves in the province include gold, copper, chromites, marble and granite.

The 2008 elections changed the scenario. Issues relating to the control and allocation of resources, and development were addressed by three major plans of the government that

79 are the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package, the 7th NFC Award and the 18th Constitutional Amendment. The Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package presented a set of recommendations for a joint sitting of parliament on November 4, 2009. It recommended transfer of subjects on the concurrent list to the provinces, a lingering issue related to provincial autonomy. The package dealt with issues of job creation, royalties and shares in the development and exploitation of oil and gas resources of Balochistan Also shared power over decision-making in launching new mega development projects in Balochistan province and managing the existing ones.

At the outset, the federal government promised to create 5,000 jobs primarily to employ the educated youth of the province and to provide more funds for poverty alleviation and rehabilitation of internally displaced people (IDPs) from Dera Bugti with a grant of 1 billion rupees. Similarly, issues related to gas revenue arrears and to the share of provinces in the divisible tax pool have been addressed through the 7th NFC Award and the 18th Constitutional Amendment (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:10).

The province is now holding greater importance in Pakistan‘s grand economic and geopolitical strategies. It‘s one of the important locations in the economic corridor China has proposed to build at an investment of $46 billion linking the deepwater port of Gwadar with the city of Kashgar, a trading hub in the western Chinese region of Xinjiang. For Pakistan, CPEC is a dream come true after the US and EU declined to bankroll what was hoped would be a Marshall Plan to resurrect the country‘s economy. They were prepared to finance Pakistan for its dubious uses as an ally against terror. But no country was going to sink money to help a country that was also responsible for spreading terror or being perfidious. So enter China with its ‗Iron Brother‘.

The Chinese have already begun to seek tax exemptions in Pakistan that could mean a loss of revenue of about $2 billion. They have also expressed unhappiness at the manner in which decisions are being delayed. The Baloch fear of being pushed out by an influx of Chinese, Punjabi and Pushtun workers into Balochistan. This would change the social fabric in a country afflicted with several insurgencies. In Gwadar, CPEC is perceived as a scheme that will render their fishermen jobless. Besides, the Chinese would be protected

80 by a 10,000-strong armed force of the army, half of which would be commandos and located mostly in Balochistan.

Balochistan requires significant resource allocation for bringing meaningful changes in living standards due to its vast geography and dispersed population. A disproportionate investment in terms of infrastructural development is required compared to other high- density compact provinces like Punjab and Sindh to make any impact on the socio- economic life of people (The Hindu 2016 Impoverished Balochistan bleeds through a thousand cuts, Stanly John).

4.2. b Educational System

Education system in Balochistan is lagging behind and a recent survey was conducted by the Azat foundation has revealed that the literacy rate in Balochistan is merely 33 per cent. There are hundreds or thousands of ghost schools in the province and no one seems to heed the losses the youth is incurring who are being neglected by the government. The children who are studying in the government schools in rural areas are deprived of fundamental opportunities and basic needs like, building walls, chairs, punctual teachers, toilets, drinking water, electricity, school course books and so on

Primary schools, at least 4 percent do not have buildings, 81 percent lack electricity, 34 percent have no drinking water, 72 percent are without a toilet, and 66 percent are without a boundary wall. These provisions have been shown to increase enrollment rates, keep children in school, and ensure their protection. (HRW Report "Their Future is at Stake‖, 2010www.hrw.org). This has led to the disastrous situation and underdevelopment in the province.

Balochistan‘s Educational System Educational opportunities performance for the vast majority of children and youth in Balochistan are dire. The province has the country‘s lowest net enrollment rates for all stages of schooling:

 Primary school (ages 6 to 10): 58 percent of boys and 42 percent of girls;

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 Middle school (ages 11 to 13): 27 percent of boys and 17 percent of girls; and  Metric level (ages 14 to 15): 15 percent of boys and 8 percent of girls (Human Rights Watch Report "Their Future is at Stake‖, 2010www.hrw.org).

According to HRW report in the year 2010 approximately half of the province‘s 10- to 18-year-olds who have attended school dropped out before completing primary school. According to survey data collected by the Pakistan government, of 10- to 18-year-old girls who have never attended school, 42 percent have not done so because their parents objected, while 21 percent had to help at home. 29 Only 32 percent of Balochistan‘s population over age 10 has completed primary level education, the lowest proportion in the country, compared with a national average of 47 percent. Only 42 percent of the population older than 10 has ever attended school. (Human Rights Watch Report "Their Future is at Stake‖, 2010www.hrw.org).

In rural Balochistan a mere 8 percent of females over age 10 has completed primary school. Overall, only 46 percent of people in Balochistan over age 10 are literate enough to read a newspaper or write a simple letter; only 23 percent of females can do so. This is the lowest literacy rate in the country, and compares to a national average of 56 percent. Balochistan‘s education facilities are also the poorest in the country. The province has the highest percentage of primary school buildings rated as either needing ―major repair‖ (36 percent compared to a national average of 11 percent), or ―dangerous‖ (12 percent compared to a national average of 11 percent).

In 2010 the literacy rate in Balochistan is 29.81 percent, compared to the national average of 39.69 percent. The literacy ratio for males is 18.3 percent and for females in the rural areas of the province it is less than 10 percent. With regard to lowest net primary enrolment, 11 out of the 16 districts, including the four districts with the worst record, in 2004-05 were in Balochistan.

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There are 21 Universities in public sector 4 Universities for boys 5 Universities for girls 1 Primary schools (boys) 7,566 Primary schools (girls) 2,876 Middle schools (boys) 583 Middle schools (girls) 137 High schools (boys) 418 High schools (girls) 122 Intermediate colleges (boys) 32 Intermediate colleges (girls) 21 Degree colleges (boys) 23 Degree colleges (girls) 7 Technical colleges (boys) 1 Technical colleges (girls) 1 Commerce colleges 1 College for physical studies 1 Number of students in boys‘ schools 570,032 Number of students in girls‘ schools 364,887 Number of students in boys‘ colleges 23,139 Number of students in girls‘ colleges 20,991 till the year 2010 (Human Rights Watch Report "Their Future is at Stake‖, 2010www.hrw.org).

Table 5: Attacks on Schools (2010,2009,2008)

September Unidentified men threw a hand grenade at the Government High School in 28 Industrial Town Hub of Lasbela district, injuring three people. August 13 An explosive device was detonated at the Model High School in Khuzdar district. June 1 A bomb exploded outside a school on Munawer Road in Quetta. No one was injured but the school‘s walls were damaged. June 1 Unidentified men threw a grenade at a primary school on Manojan Road in Quetta while 200 children were playing outside during recess. No one was injured. May 10 A bomb attached to the wall of Balochistan University of Engineering and Technology in Khuzdar district was remotely detonated, injuring at least two children who were playing nearby. April 19 An unknown assailant threw a grenade into a group of children at the Syed Educational School in Loralai. A teacher quickly picked up the device and threw it onto the roof where it exploded. Nobody was injured. Nine days later, another grenade was thrown into the school and exploded; no one was injured. April 6 A rocket exploded in the courtyard of a school in Kohlu district, partially damaging the building. March 18 A bomb detonated near a school in Dera Bugti district. Three people nearby were injured. March 3 Unknown attackers hurled three grenades into a Balochi cultural show at the University of Engineering and Technology in Khuzdar. According to press accounts, at least one student was killed and at least nine were wounded.

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2009

November An unidentified assailant hurled a grenade at the Government Girls High School on 7 Manojan Road, Quetta. The grenade blew a hole in the staff room roof and shrapnel wounded two teachers and at least one student. July 18 Unknown attackers hurled a grenade near a private school in Arbab Town area, Quetta, damaging a wall.[102] June 13 Unknown assailants threw a hand grenade at a private school in Shahbaz town in Quetta. The blast damaged the school‘s roof. March 2 A suicide bomber attacked a girls‘ madrassa (Islamic school) in Kali Karbala in Pishin district. Six people were reported killed and 12 others wounded. Capital City police officer for Quetta, Humayun Khan Jogezai, told media the suicide bomber was 14 or 15-years-old, although other news reports stated he was older. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) Islamic political party viewed the attack as an attempt on their leader, Maulana Abdul Wasay, a senior provincial minister who was visiting the school at the time.

2008

October Unknown men threw a bomb at a car parked outside a school in Quetta. The vehicle 19 was damaged but there were no casualties. September A bomb exploded at a madrassa north of Quetta run by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. At least 19 five people died, and another 10 to 14 were wounded. Reports vary as to whether the incident was a suicide bombing, or whether the bomb was thrown or planted. August 3 Alleged militants set furniture, computers, and records ablaze at Babul Islam Model Public Girls School, a private school in a Ghilji colony in Quetta. Four rooms were destroyed. February Unknown persons broke into a textbook warehouse on Sariab Road, Quetta, and set fire to 25 the books. The warehouse supplied free textbooks to students throughout Balochistan. Five percent of the facility‘s books were reportedly destroyed. February During elections alleged militants attacked a number of schools that were intended to be used as polling stations. Several schools were bombing targets in the lead up to the elections, but reports are unclear as to whether they were intended to be used as polling stations: on February 15, a blast inside a school injured five students in Kohlu; on February 16, a bomb exploded near a boys‘ school in Kalat. On February 17, the day before the election, a device exploded near a high school in the Graici area of Kholu; an unknown person threw a hand grenade at a government primary school in Killi Qambarani in Quetta; bombs exploded at the main gates of schools in Ismail Quetta and the Soorab area of Kalat, and at Killi Ismail High School; and rockets fired at government high schools in the Ronjan and Nokjo areas of Awaran district. On polling day, February 18, a bomb exploded at Model High School in Khuzdar, another near the Girls School Kechi Baig, and rockets fired at Killi Tusp Government

Source: Human Rights Watch Report "Their Future is at Stake‖, 2010www.hrw.org.

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The provincial education minister, Rahim Ziaratwal while speaking at the seminar revealed that in Balochistan 60 per cent of children quit education by the time they reach the primary and middle school level, whereas 45per cent of students leave schooling prior to completion of their Matriculation and the increasing dropout rate of children is a major problem for the education department (Shah, Dawn Sep 09, 2016). However on 20th January 2016 a notification issued by the provincial education department which stated that beside boys, the girls would also be allowed to study in all the government-run primary schools across the province The basic reason behind this decision was to improve female literacy rate and ensure enrollment of out of school girls in educational institutions.

At current Balochistan, more than 5,000 government-run primary schools are single-room and single-teacher schools. In Balochistan, the number of government-run primary, middle and high schools is greater than 13,000. The Education department sources say that thousands of ghost teachers and schools remain in the province out of which 100 ghost schools are in Quetta.

The schools in rural areas of Balochistan are in miserable condition, with single room schools across the province which are shelter-less with no basic facilities such as clean drinking water and toilets for the children. In an attempt to improve the literacy rate in the province, the government decided to establish literacy centers. According to statistics provided by the non-formal section of the education department, 4,500 children will be enrolled at literacy centers being established at Ziarat, Sibi, Zhob, Bolan and other parts of Balochistan (Shah, Dawn Sep 09, 2016).

The provincial government has already declared education emergency and has announced implementation of article 25-A of the Constitution, which calls for free and compulsory education for all children. Education was given first priority by previous governments in Balochistan with allocation of around 24 per cent budget for the sector. Much work is still remaining for the education department as around 1.6 million children were still out of schools in Balochistan. However, little progress has been made in improving the

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quality of education and enrolling the out of school children in the province. (Shah, Dawn Jan 23rd, 2016).

4.3 Sections II: State Repression as a threat to Human Security

4.3.a Attacks and Threats on Schools

The educational institutions in Balochistan have been a hotspot of militant violent activities. The militants have carried out attacks on schools, including school buildings filled with students and teachers. The same militant nationalist and sectarian motives that underpin violence against teachers are evident in the attacks on schools. These attacks have endangered the lives of children and a teacher, what remains the crucial point is that it damages the right to access good educational facilities. Attacks have included the use of heavy weaponry and the use of grenades and bombs while teachers and students are present. These attacks will have long term undesirable implications for the Balochistan province.

Killing of Teachers and Other Education Personnel Between January 2008 and April 2010, approximately 160 non-Baloch individuals were killed in what the government believes were ―targeted attacks‖—that is, assailants specifically selected their targets rather than conducting indiscriminate or random attacks. At least 220 or more persons were also injured in such attacks during the same time period, according to the same provincial government statistics. Among those targeted and killed by militants have been at least 22 teachers and other education personnel. The most prominent assassination was that of the provincial minister of education, Shafiq Ahmed, in October 2009, for which the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF) claimed responsibility. University professors and grade school teachers in Quetta and Baloch districts have also been attacked. Bramdagh Bugti, the chief of the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) and guerrilla commander, justified the targeted killings of Punjabi teachers to a Pakistani journalist as a reaction to Pakistani army abuses (Human Rights Watch Report "Their Future is at Stake‖, 2010www.hrw.org).

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The other negative effects of violence triggering the educational institutions are that the teachers do not agree to work in such atmosphere and risk their life. Attacks against education personnel have increased the transfers request from mainly Baloch districts such as Khuzdar, Kalat, Mastung, Nushki, and the Sariab area of Quetta city, to elsewhere in Quetta, other non-Baloch districts in Balochistan, and Pakistan‘s three other provinces. This will have irreversible consequence, as the schools, particularly in rural areas, remain understaffed because the teachers do not want to risk their life working is areas with poor security condition and the teachers assigned do not report to work. This as has resulted severe reduction in the number of days that schools remain open. However this situation should be looked into by both the provincial and Pakistan government as this can worsen the literacy rate and poverty rate in the area.

4.3. b Planning and Development

The Planning Department of Balochistan is now virtually sitting idle. Major international development agencies play little or no role in Balochistan. Volatile security conditions, governance issues and lax government attitudes have resulted in suspension or winding up of major development projects initiated by the World Back, United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and Asian Development Bank (ADB), etc. For example, the World Bank‘s National Trade Corridor Improvement Program, meant to improve the railway and road infrastructure from Gwadar to Quetta and Rattodero in Sindh, and has been hanging in the balance for the last 5 years or so. Meanwhile, another mega development project of the World Bank for regulatory reforms in the mines and mineral sector has been on the backburner for two years due to the prevailing insecurity and governance issues in the province. Similarly, an ADB project regarding agribusiness could not be initiated as the Balochistan government did not fulfill the loan conditionality stipulated by the ADB. The bank had even opened its offices in Quetta a couple of years ago but no further development has happened on that front since. (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:32).

Balochistan Resource Management Programme is difficult to implement for the same reason as mentioned before is the volatile security conditions, governance issues and lax

87 government attitudes. The World Bank‘s Balochistan Education Programme was also never implemented. The UNDP and the World Bank have their own security and transportation arrangements but they are barred by the government from entering the areas where the law and order situation is not satisfactory. Some of their development projects, however, continue at the grassroots, employing the local population but without a successful rate.

While development experts argue that there is little development taking place in Balochistan, the government‘s budget figures show significant amounts flowing into the province‘s Public Sector Development Programme PSDP) from international donors. The component of Foreign Project Assistance in the PSDP of Balochistan increased from a revised estimate of 1,751 million rupees in 2009- 10 to 3,951 million rupees in 2010-11. (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:33).

The uncertain security situation has significantly diminished the prospects of foreign investment and resource exploration of a mineral and energy rich province. The terrine and security issues along with the unwillingness of government officials to get the job done has been a major card that has been playing against Baloch citizens fate, thus withdrawing them from their human rights.

Balochistan requires significant resource allocation for bringing meaningful changes in living standards due to its vast geography and dispersed population. A disproportionate investment in terms of infrastructural development is required compared to other high- density compact provinces like Punjab and Sindh to make any impact on the socio- economic life of people.

4.3. c Civil Society and Development Agencies

The role of civil societies and development agencies in Balochistan has been spineless institution. There are two views which emerged from interviews and field research about the role of civil society, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international development agencies in Balochistan which studies the reason behind it. According to

88 one view, the role and work of civil society organizations and development agencies have no impact on the overall conflict in the province.

Arguments in support of this view assert that civil society organizations operate on non- political basis. They are neither part of the ruling establishment nor can they support the nationalists in achieving their cause. Hence they cannot be part of conflict resolution. Secondly, in the absence of rule of law, and in view of widespread insecurity and a critical role of intelligence agencies in the province, civil society organizations and international development agencies cannot play their role to its full potential. Their role, however, remains that of providing services without having any direct impact on the broader Baloch conflict, particularly the political aspect of the conflict(Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:31).

A major issue with civil society organizations in Pakistan is that they are predominantly dependent on foreign donors. Thus the citizens are suspicions about their agenda. As almost all the civil society organizations have religious and not socio-cultural or political cause their initiative becomes less acceptable. Civil society can contributes to the intellectual discourse by raising awareness of issues, the key to resolving the problem lies with various state actors.

At present, all civil society organizations and development agencies working in Balochistan are operating at a much localized level, mainly running small education, health, and water provision projects. They hire the local people for their projects and avoid upsetting the cultural and political sensitivities of the people. The magnitude of the problems they face can be imagined from the fact that at times movement becomes very difficult even for the local people. For example, it is almost impossible for a person from Turbat to work in a project in Gwadar and vice versa (Sial&Basit, PIPS Report 2010:31).

Though all the welfare projects are thoroughly rejected by the village elders the NGOs still try to make a difference with the help of the government security help.The work of many projects focuses on small villages and outsiders are easily identified and not accepted as NGO or civil society workers. Civil society organizations work with the

89 permission of the government which makes people believe that civil society is towing the government line.

4.3. d Threat on Media

Media in Pakistan has played a very effective role against the suppression of political dissent and military/ civil dictators. On the Other hand all successive governments in Pakistan have tried to cage the media. The Press and Publication Ordinance(PPO) was promulgated in 1962 by En.Zia-ul-Haq, who promulgated the Revised Press and Publication Ordinance(RPPO) in 1980, the media and journalists met with the worst kind of treatment; tortures, jails, public lashes and closer of dailies. Later, General Pervez Musharraf, who is credited with the opening of media, also promulgated the Press Council of Pakistan Ordinance (PCPO) in 2002.

Again 2007, media was suppressed and several private channels were put off the air and some anchors of current affair programs were barred from conducting their talk shows; Once again in August 2010 during the visit of President Zardari to the UK, Geo News and ARY transmitted the alleged ‗shoe throwing‘ on him resulting in the closure of these channels.

More than 80 daily newspapers and weekly journals are printed in Balochistan, mostly in the , with three in , and one in Brahui. Almost all the national newspapers, private television channels and national and international radio services have bureaus in Quetta and in some of Baluchistan‘s other large cities. An estimated 500 to 600 journalists work in the province but of this number only around 140 are full-time journalists. The majority work as journalists part-time, for the government, in the private sector, or running their own businesses.

Of the 95 journalists killed in Pakistan since 2000, 30 were killed in Balochistan. The situation in the province has worsened considerably since 2008, with 20journalists killed and there has been a notable rise in threats to journalists‘ safety. In north-eastern districts threats often relate to reporting on paramilitary (or military) operations against the Bugti

90 and Marri resistance, underground separatist groups, insurgent attacks on military, police and government installations, and human rights violations, such as the Internally Displaced Peoples crises and targeted killings by militant groups or in a few cases even intelligence agencies who target journalists for reporting independently in newspapers and do not follow the line of either party militants and military. (IFJ Report 2013:12)

The districts of Dera Bugti and Kohlu have become virtually no-go areas for any independent media since the insurgency following the military killed the head of the Bugti Tribe and in Naseerabad-Jaffarabad entrenched form of tribalism has resulted in a culture where local media are unwilling to speak out against the tribal chief. Cases of violence against women in these areas are common though go unreported due to tribal authorities rule. Activities of Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the Pashtun belt are the focus of reporting at national and international levels. These districts which fall along the border with Afghanistan, have a less entrenched tribal structure than in other parts of the province. The region is divided between two political elements: the anti militancy (Taliban nationalist groups) and the pro-militancy. In these areas, journalists are mostly threatened when they report on the cross border movements of the militants. (IFJ Report 2013:12)

In the Baloch-dominated coastal belt regions of Gwadar, Panjgur and Avaran, the anti- government sentiment is high among the local population and journalists are faced with pressures and threats from both the government and separatist groups. Local newspapers are open about their support for the nationalist cause of the militant groups. Local journalists are often threatened and targeted, allegedly by the government, for supporting militant groups or for reporting on issues such as extra-judicial killings and missing persons, which have become key concerns across Balochistan.

The highest number of journalists killed in Balochistan is in central Khuzdar. In this area, battles between insurgents and the state are most active in Khuzdar and journalists considered pro-government or unsympathetic to the insurgents are targeted. The threat that has more recently emerged is from militant members of Lashkare-Jhangvi- outlawed organisation from the Jhang district of Punjab province. The groups are mostly engaged

91 in sectarian violence and have established their presence in Balochistan by providing welfare, water facilities and food to the poor.

Another important factor in Balochistan is the significant number of journalists who are affiliated with anti-federation or pro-federation armed groups and nationalists, so any evident bias in their reportage is seen as partisan and can lead to threats and serious safety concerns. In addition, there is political pressure, for example the Chief Justice of the High Court of Balochistan High Court, Justice Faiz Essa Qazi, banned reporting on issues relating to Baloch nationalist and separatist movements stating that the person reporting news related to the armed, militants or nationalists groups in the province will be jailed aleast for 6 months (IFJ Report 2013:15).

Despite a prominent organization Pakistan Federal Union of Journalist (PFUJ) campaign against impunity for the killings of journalists, out of a total of 30 journalists murdered in Balochistan, out of which police have only registered three cases. This shows the lack of justice and security given to the citizens by State controlled police forces.

Up to 90 per cent of correspondents in Balochistan‘s districts are not paid for their reporting work. In some cases correspondents themselves pay ‗security‘ fees to the media houses and news agencies. In light of this, the motives for reporting without salary can be called into question – in some cases the purpose of reporting is to support a particular group (political, militant or business related) while in others the aim is to have influence with governments and public officials.

The Mission‘s findings in Baluchistan The mission met with the leadership of the Balochistan Union of Journalists (BUJ), which is an affiliate of the PFUJ. The track record for journalists‘ safety in this largest province of Pakistan in geographical terms has been dismal, with thirty-two journalists killed in the reference period beginning 2000. What is even more alarming about Balochistan is that the death toll has rapidly risen in recent years to such an extent that it is increasingly being seen as the most hazardous place to be a journalist.

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4.4 Conclusion

Balochistan issue cannot be resolved, or at least mitigated, by addressing just the socioeconomic grievances of its people—that time is long gone. Grievances remain, but the political forces willing to negotiate them within the framework of the Pakistani federation have been marginalized and forced to harden their positions. Pakistani security establishment seems to have decided to eliminate the very idea of Baloch nationalism, even in its most innocuous forms. Moreover, the Baloch leaders and Pakistani security establishment have not tried to find a common ground on forging a political agreement that would end the hostilities. Thus we can see in this chapter that the security scenario of Balochistan is negatively affected by the use of repressive forces and suppressive policies of the province by Pakistani government.

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CHAPTER V

Conclusion

This study has made an attempt to examine threats induced by state repression to human security in Balochistan. The Independent State of Kalat was forcefully occupied by Pakistani governments in 1947. The forceful accession by the Pakistani government was the starting point of demographic change in Balochistan. The Baloch nationalists have rejected the accession and this gave an outburst to Baloch insurgency. This movement is led by the cry of self-determination, equality and justice.

Under the Pakistani government, the Baloch have inculcated the feeling of alienation, domination and insecurity. To keep the Baloch insurgency under control, repressive measures adopted by Pakistani government this raises question on the condition of human security in Balochistan. The central government used range of techniques to suppress the Baloch movement. This ranged from brute force to devious manoeuvring, to conciliatory gestures, all of which were designed to push the central governments political agenda on the Baloch (Jetly 2004:25).

As mentioned in the first chapter the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has called upon the security forces and intelligence agencies to function with constitution and the law. Continuous reports of serious human rights violations which include disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and torture and extra judicial killings are reported in Balochistan.

Generally when a State gets susceptible to any sort of threat, the State adopts repressive policies. The Marxist school of thinking views State as a repressive apparatus. According to this tradition, the State is a ‘machine’ of repression, which enables the ruling classes, to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion that is to capitalist exploitation .In Marxist theory, the State Apparatus (SA) contains the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc. which Louis Althusser calls the Repressive State Apparatus. The state apparatus used by a state to maintain dominance upon its citizens are of two types namely Repressive state apparatus and ideological state apparatus. All the State Apparatuses function both by repression and by ideology, with the difference that the (Repressive) State

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Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology. States frequently resort to various repressive measures, often justified as ‘act of deterrence’, or retaliatory measures.

Common forms of state repression are, killing and wounding terrorists or civilians, widespread arrest, often without due process and internment without trial, state kidnapping of those involved in any sort of threat to the state, extra judicial killings, disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, collective punishments, such as closures, destruction of homes or property and most importantly curtailment of civil liberties such as the freedom of movement, speech, or assembly

The traditional concept of human security was to protect the territorial integrity of a nation and protect its citizen from external threat. The main focus in traditional concept security was State. According to UNDP the protection and welfare of individual citizen is the main subject of focus. The repressive government generates a feeling of insecurity for their citizens through the denial of basic human rights, the unequal distribution of resources or the use of armed force as a means of internal repression.

Although Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province with the lowest population still carries the sacs of past military operations that were carried out in 1958, 1963, and 1973. It is unfortunate that new wounds are being inflicted on the province just when old ones were beginning to heal. Balochistan is an economically and strategically important province of Pakistan and its full potential can only be realised if there is no insurgency. It is a well-known fact the Baloch people in general and the youth in particular have been alienated.

The Baloch Nationalists have over the last few decades been spearheading a movement which has led to a lot of violence and heartache for the Civilian population in the province. Yet such incidents of stray violence have been enough to jolt the Pakistani government into taking concrete measures to end the statusquo. The nationalist movement is not under a unified command and as such it does not seem likely to assume the character of a strong and viable secessionist movement even though there have perhaps been attempts to evolve a common agenda. At the same

95 time there are doubts as to whether the movement has the critical mass for a major upsurge. While the insurgency which is simmering at a level which is enough to cause unease to Pakistani establishment.

The worsening factor in Balochistan is the absence of a middle class because of the province economic and social power in the hands of tribal sardars who represent the Baloch nationalism in today’s context.

The repressive measures used by the army have a tarnished army’s reputation among the ordinary Baloch. Deep anti-military sentiments in Balochistan among the Baloch date back to the misrule of General Musharraf. While Musharraf launched military operation in the province, his successors did not abandon the use of force and continued force to get the job done. Pakistan never provided room for political negotiations. As a result, the intelligence agencies ended up in the abusing official power, engaged in forced disappearances and committed extrajudicial killing of thousands of Baloch activists and young professionals.

Death squads which are created by the intelligence agencies to counter Baloch nationalists, mainly in the District of Khuzdar, seem to have re-emerged in recent past as three mass graves were found in Khuzdar in 2014. Regrettably majority of the unarmed civilian, lawyers, teachers, journalists and innocent children have lost their lives because of perpetual denial and the use of force by the security establishment. The worst case of all is that the elected leaders are also forced to work under the shadow of the army. The excessive use of force worsens the situation instead of fixing it.

With the paramount amount of incidents of violence and use of repressive apparatus by the State, the human security of Balochistan is in a critical situation. According to Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) there were approximately 463 people were forcefully disappeared while 157 mutilated bodies were found from Balochistan in 2015. According to a World Bank sponsored Balochistan Economic Report the province needs 158,000 jobs and a growth rate of 6.5 percent annually to lift a significant percentage of the poverty-affected population above the poverty line. 71.2 percent of the province’s population lives below the poverty line. There are only 49 hospitals with 4146 beds available to the patients. The situation of right to education is such that provincial government has already declared education emergency and has

96 announced implementation of article 25-A of the Constitution. However the students have access to roofless classrooms and schools without basic amenities. Nevertheless the teachers and students get succumbed to violence caused by the militants. With this situation in hand the Baloch Nationalist have been fighting for their rights and self determination. They have lost hopes on the Pakistani government and are using all means and measures to achieve their end. With low literacy rates, absence of an educated middle class and remaining marginalised in terms of their access to economic and political powers makes the Baloch tribe harden their stance against the Pakistan government.

The government’s political responses and initiatives gives an ideal image that the Pakistan government development schemes cover a bulk of demands being put forward by Baloch nationalists. But the reality is that the major demands of the Baloch including an army pullout, release of missing persons and prosecution of the people responsible for murder of Baloch leaders are not meted out. The government had come up with Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package which gives a comprehensive roadmap to reverse the injustices done to the Baloch in the past. It also has made recommendations related to Withdrawal of army and missing persons, etc.

While the Chief Ministers of Balochistan have made the issue of enforced disappearances his first priority, and has urged the security forces to stop such activities and to release the missing persons believed to be held by them but they are constrained by his lack of authority and ability to rein in the Pakistan Army and its intelligence agencies, and as such civilian control over governance in Balochistan continues to be limited.

Successive governments of Pakistan had therefore selectively co-opted Baloch leaders in order to keep the Baloch uprising under control. General Musharraf, in order to win over the Baloch, initially appointed Mir Zafarulla Khan Jamali, a Baloch, as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. His subsequent sacking however, did not win General Musharraf many friends in Balochistan. The circumstances changed drastically under the previous military dispensation led by General Musharraf. He decided to share the power and pelf in Balochistan with the mullahs rather than the nationalists; the nationalists were left in the wilderness to instigate the Baloch youth against the military regime.

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Now the situation is such that the second generation of Baloch students and tribal leaders has readily fallen prey to the call to arms and are targeting mega development projects being executed by the federal government like Gwadar where the Baloch including the provincial government have neither been given a stake in the decision making process nor in the benefits accruing.

This alienation has been fuelled by liberal donations from the Baloch Diasporas living and working in the Persian Gulf and especially in Oman. The type of sophisticated weaponry in the Hands of the BLA suggests that it will not be easily sorted out by military means alone (Bansal :254).

The insurgents have no dearth of weapons and have an easy access to weapons both within Balochistan, across the border in Afghanistan and through sea smuggling routes. They have also reportedly established a strong financial network from London to Qatar, the UAE and then on to Balochistan to fund the insurgency.

Depending on the nature and timeliness of the states response in addressing their legitimate grievance and concerns, the agitation against the Pakistan government may assume a more confrontational and violent. A long drawn insurgency will lead to large scale bloodshed and violence in Balochistan and surrounding regions. If the insurgency spreads the cost of containing it both in terms of manpower and capital employed for the Pakistani state will also skyrocket.

To that extent it can be expected that attempts will be made by the federal government, in tandem with the provincial government, to assuage the hurt feelings of dissidents and control unrest in the province. Baloch resistance was a function of multiple determinants these included their historical insularity, sense of solidarity and growing sense of marginalisation from the Pakistani national mainstream in political and economic spheres. The extreme backwardness and low level s of socio-economic development of Balochistan only compounded the Baloch perception of their deprivation and discrimination, leading to resistance among the Baloch. (Jetly 2004:25).

As Balochistan is rich in natural resources and has of deep sea port, there are development project that has been carried out in Balochistan by Pakistan. These developmental projects are rejected by the local Balochis, as it has lead to influx of

98 non- Balochis in the region and has changed the socio- economic demography of the region. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the corridor stretches from the now Gawadar Port in Pakistan's least developed province Balochistan, to the Karakorum Highway further connecting Pakistan to Western China. This has brought a massive influx of much needed infrastructure aid and investment to Pakistan, a nation that has faced chronic electricity shortages and crumbling infrastructure leading to economic stagnation.

The main issue that has to be resolved by Pakistan is the need to be more mindful in balancing the negative externalities of the project for its population. However the Pakistan Navy has intensified forces in 2016, Pakistan Navy has assembled ‘Task Force-88’ (TF-88) for the seaward security of Gwadar port and protection of associated sea lanes against both conventional and non-traditional threats. TF-88 would comprise ships, Fast Attack Craft, aircraft, drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), and surveillance assets. Additionally, marines would be deployed at sea and around Gwadar for security operations. Since 2014 the militants have disrupted the CPEC and the death toll has increased around 44 deaths. In 2015, Pakistan created an army division, to protect the CPEC; it is believed to number more than 10,000 troops. As Pakistan intensifies it troops in Balochistan the violence level is going to intensify. If insurgency continues unabated, this would marginalise the Baloch people; otherwise, one can expect repeated cycles of rebellion and repression.

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(2005, May 7). The tribes arise. The Economist, pp 25. (April 10, 2009), “HRCP Condemns Killing of Baloch Nationalists”, Dawn. (December 13, 2004 ), “Terrorism in Balochistan”, Editorial, Dawn , Karachi. (January 16, 2005), “Confrontation No Solution to Balochistan Imbroglio”, Editorial, The News, Internet Edition. (January 23, 2006), “HRCP Report Right Abuses in Balochistan”, The News, Internet Edition. (March 3, 2008), “Family Fears Akhtar Mengal may be Killed in Prison: BNP-M chief Suffering from Cardiac Problem”, Dawn, pp. 3. Ahmed, Maqbool(2010, December), “Brain drain”. The Herald, pp. 39-40. Ahmed, Maqbool(2010, December), “Targeting Teachers”. The Herald, pp. 39-40. Ahmed, Maqbool(2010, March), “Crying Foul”. The Herald, pp. 52-53. Ahmed, Maqbool(2010, September), “Naval expedition”. The Herald, pp.20-22. Ahmed, Maqbool(2010, September), “Port of permanent call”, The Herald, pp.24-25. Akbar , S Malik( May 31, 2008), “Bugti‟s Grandson says Armed Struggle only Solution for Baloch”, Daily Times. Alvi, Mumtaz( April 30, 2009), “ Balochistan Schools Abandon National Anthem, Senate told”, The News. Ansari, Massoud(2005, February), “Nightmare at Sui”. Newsline, pp 37. Ansari, Massoud(September,2006), “The Battle of Balochistan” , Newsline. Babar, Farahtullah,( October 21, 2004),“Nibbling Away at Autonomy” , Dawn,Karachi. Bakhitiar, Idrees(2004, August), “Balochistan up in Arms Once Again”, Dawn, Karachi, pp 49.

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Bakhtiaar, Idrees(2004, August), “Megaprojects are a Conspiracy to Turn the Balochis into a Minority in their Homeland”, an Interview with Sardar Ataullah Mengal, The Herald, p 51. Baloch, H.Abdul(December 13, 2004), “Bringing development to Balochistan”, The Dawn, Karachi. Butt, Tariq(August 27 , 2006), “A Defiant Politician”, The News. Fair, C.Christine(2012,March), “Beyond „hearing‟ range”. The Herald, pp.28-30. Husian, Khurram (2012, June), “Running on empty”, The Herald, pp. 22-25. Hussain, Zahid(2005, February), “Gathering Storm”. Newsline, pp. 24. Hussain, Zahid(September 2006),“The End Game”, Newsline, pp.44. Kakakhel, Ijaz(January 31, 2009),“Oil& Gas Exploration: Government Sets Drilling Target at 100 Wells”, Daily Times. Kaleem, Moosa(2009, December),“Revolution out of reach”. The Herald, pp. 36-37. Khan, Aurangzaib(2010, December), “ Schools out”. The Herald, pp. 41-43. Khan, Azizullah(2004, July), “Sui Airport Razed in Terrorist Attack”. The Herald, pp 38. Khan, M. Ilyas (2004, September), “Back to the Hills”. The Herald, pp 51-52. Khan, M. Ilyas(September 2004),“ Money, Money,Money”, The Herald , Karachi, pp. 52. Khan, Sherbaz,( Janruary17, 2008), “Security Plan for Oil exploration Companies”, Dawn.

Mahmood Shafqat (2005, January 21), “Centre does not hold”. The News, Internet Edition.

Malik, Mansoor (2010, December), “The situation on the ground is serious”. The Herald, pp. 42-43.

Malik, Aziz(April 10, 2009), “Sindh Nationalists Condemn Baloch Leaders Murder”, Dawn.

Marri, Shah Muhammad(2000),“Baloch Qaum Aed-e-Qadeem says Asre Hazir Tak”, Takhliqat, Lahore.

Masroor, Aroosa(September 1, 2008), “Immediate Halt to Military Operation in Balochistan Demanded”, The News

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Mazari,Shireen(February 2, 2005),“Balochistan and the „Great Power Games”, The News , Internet Edition.

Munir, Kamal (2010, March), “The never ending story”, The Herald, pp. 48-51. Murtazar, Haider(January 11, 2012), “Resolving Balochistan Grievances”, Dawn News. Nizamani, K B (May 1980), “Kaumi Azadi ki Council ka Qeyam”, People's Front. London. Rahim, Nasir(2010, March), “Canaries in a copper mine”,The Herald, pp. 54-56. Rahman J. Mir. (2005, January 15), “Balochistan in Turmoil”,The News, Internet Edition. Rahman, IA(1997, August), “The rise and fall of Democracy”, Newsline, pp 32. Rashid, Haeoon(Februrary 2005), “At the Moment War is Being Imposed on us”, Interview of NawabBugti, Newsline, pp 34. Salahuddin, Ghazi(2005, January 16), “A Crisis of Governance”, The News, Internet Edition. Saleem, Farrukh,( January 22, 2006), “Balochistan: An Objective Assessment”, The News, Internet Edition. Sethi, Najam (January 21-26, 2005), “FAQs about Balochistan and the State”, Editorial, The Friday Times. Sethi, Najam, (January 14-20, 2005), “Balochistan‟s Volcanic Eruption”, Editorial, The Friday Times, Lahore. Shahid, Saleem(2005, January 11), “Gun Battle Leaves Two Dead in Sui”. Dawn, Karachi. Shahid, Saleem(2005, January 8), “Sui Gas Pipeline Blows up”. Dawn, Karachi. Shahid, Saleem(2012,May), “The great game replay”. The Herald, pp.46-48. Shahzada, Zulfikar(Sep 2006), “Trapped in Balochistan”, The Herald ,Vol. 37(9). Sharif, Arshad & Raza, I.Syed(2005, January 13), “Troops to Protect Sui Plant: Sherapo, Operations in the Offing- ISPR”. Dawn , Karachi. Sinha, Aditya(2006, January 15), “Battlefield Balochistan”, Hindustan Times, pp 16. Wahab, Abdul (2010, August), “The blame game”, Newsline, pp. 50-51. Yasin, Asim(2006, July 27), “Tariq sees foreign hand in Balochistan unrest”, The News, Internet Edition. Zehra, Nasim(2001, August 5), “Balochistan: Stop the political slide”, The News.

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Zulfikar, Shahzada(2004, August), “Land-Mine”. Newsline, pp. 58. Zulfikar, Shahzada(2010, May), “In a tight grip”. The Herald, pp. 31-33. Internet sources Subramanian, Nirupama(2013), The Balochistan cause gets a martyr, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/The-Balochistan-cause-gets-a- martyr/article16912671.ece. United Nations General Assembly Third Committee (2013), Developing a Global Plan of Action Against Extrajudicial Executions.http://webcache.googleusercontent. com/search?q=cache:A- KWY5eV9S0J:muntr.org/guides/2013/GA3.%2520SOCHUM.docx+&cd=1&hl=en& ct=clnk&gl=in. UN Special Rapporteur, Use of force by law enforcement officials. http://www. extrajudicialexecutions.org/application/media/Handbook%20Chapter%202%20use%2 0of%20force%20in%20LE.pdf Human Rights councils report(2014), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add8.pdf Johny, Stanly( 2016), Impoverished Balochistan bleeds through a thousand cuts. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Impoverished-Balochistan-bleeds-through-a- thousand-cuts/article14574380.ece Sial, Safdar and Basit, Abdul(Oct-Dec 2010), Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan: Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security, file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/141%20(1).pdf HRW Report (2010),"Their Future is at Stake:Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan‟s Balochistan Province” https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/12/13/their-future- stake/attacks-teachers-and-schools--balochistan-province#page Multi dimensional poverty in Pakistan(2016), file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/ Multidimensional%20Poverty%20in%20Pakistan.pdfShah, S.S,(2016),“1.8m children still out of school in Balochistan”,http://www.dawn.com/news/1283056Shah, Syed.A(2016), “Education for all: Primary schools in Balochistan to end gender segregation”, http://www.dawn.com/news/1234921 International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), (2013), http://www.ifj.org/uploads/ media/2013_Pakistan_-_English.pdf

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Annexure : 1

Annexure : II

Annexure :III

Annexure: IV