Caucasus and Moldova
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 72 4.2 Caucasus and Moldova Increased clashes between Azerbaijan the conflict, focusing instead on issues of and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh became press freedom and justice. a growing challenge in 2012, while the stale- As clashes broke out over Nagorno- mate between Georgia and its breakaway terri- Kara bakh in the early 1990s, the former So- tories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia contin- viet republics of Moldova and Georgia suc- ued. In contrast, some positive developments cumbed to secessionist wars. Despite various were observed in the Moldova-Transdniestria cease-fire agreements, the conflicts remain dispute, where actors showed a new willing- unresolved. ness to cooperate on settling the long-standing Despite their inability to politically solve conflict. the conflict, the Russian-led Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC), the OSCE mission, and, since 2005, the EU Bor- Background der Assistance Mission (EUBAM) assisted in At the close of the Cold War, Armenia and Azer- preventing renewed outbreak of violence be- baijan were drawn into a war over Nagorno- tween Moldova and the Transdniestria region Karabakh. Populated by an ethnically Armen- after a cease-fire was reached in 1992. ian majority, this region within Azerbaijan In Georgia, the UN deployed military ob- unilaterally declared independence in 1991. servers to the secessionist region of Abkhazia, Fighting stopped by and large with a cease-fire while the OSCE had a presence in Tbilisi that agreement in 1994, but the territorial dispute engaged with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. has yet to be settled. Since 1992, international Violent conflict was curtailed until 2004, when engagement to settle the conflict has been co- Russia began to strengthen its ties with Ab - ordinated primarily by the Organization for khazia and South Ossetia. Russo-Georgian ten- Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). sions culminated in a 2008 war that ended de- The organization’s efforts to solve the frozen cisively in Russia’s favor. After the war, Russia conflict are guided by the Minsk Process, recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia and jointly co-chaired by France, Russia, and the South Ossetia, amid harsh critiques of the inter- United States. Settlement of the conflict is also national community. Differences between Rus- guided by a Special Envoy based in Georgia— sia and Western powers on the breakaway re- the Personal Representative of the Chairman- gions’ sovereignty status led to the closure of in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the the OSCE and UN missions in Georgia, leaving OSCE Minsk Conference (CiO Personal Rep- the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), estab- resentative)—a position held by Ambassador lished shortly after the war ended in 2008, as Andrzej Kaspryzk since 1996. He is supported the sole peacekeeping presence on the ground. by field office staff in Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, However, despite closing their missions, both and Stepanakert. The OSCE’s offices in Arme- the UN and the OSCE remain involved in po- nia and Azerbaijan are not involved in settling litical efforts to resolve the Georgian conflict. 72 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 73 CAUCASUS AND MOLDOVA • 73 Armenia and Azerbaijan CiO Personal Representative on the Minsk Conference Since 1994, Armenian troops have held Nagorno-Karabakh and a significant part of • Authorization Date 23 March 1995 (Doc. 525/95) southwest Azerbaijan. Though the front line • Start Date 10 August 1995 has always been highly militarized, signifi- • Head of Mission Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland) cant military buildup occurred in 2012, with • Budget $1.5 million (1 January 2012– both sides investing in sophisticated defense 31 December 2012) systems. Armed clashes increased markedly • Strength as of International Staff: 5 and the number of conflict-related casualties 30 September 2012 National Staff: 11 in 2012 was the highest since 1994. These developments notwithstanding, the French, Russian, and US co-chairs of the Minsk Group travel to Baku and Yerevan every EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) two months to meet with the Azeri and Armen- ian presidents. The meetings serve as a forum • Authorization Date 7 October 2005 (Memorandum of to identify basic principles for a comprehensive Understanding) peace settlement. Minsk Group meetings have • Start Date 30 November 2005 also discussed mechanisms to investigate • Head of Mission Udo Burkholder (Germany) cease-fire violations along the front line and • Strength as of International Staff: approx. 100 the development of both military and civilian 30 September 2012 National Staff: approx. 120 confidence-building measures. In May and July Source: EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, 9 January 2012 the co-chairs combined meetings in Baku 2013, http://www.eubam.org/en/about/who_we_are. and Yerevan with travels to Nagorno-Karabakh to discuss matters on the ground with de facto leaders of the breakaway region. The Minsk Group’s efforts in mediating Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC) between Azerbaijan and Armenia were strongly supported by CiO Personal Representative • Authorization Date 21 July 1992 (Agreement on the Kaspryzk, who took part in all the group’s ac- Principles Governing the Peaceful tivities. He also maintained regular contact Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniester Region) with de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities • Start Date July 1992 to discuss developments at the line of contact • Heads of Mission V. Birca (Moldova), V. Bugaev between Karabakhi and Azerbaijani armed (separatist), A. Zverev (Russia), forces. In keeping with his mandated tasks E. Sidorov (Ukraine) and the consent, support, and involvement of • Strength as of Troops: 1,102 all relevant authorities, the CiO Personal Rep- 30 September 2012 Military Observers: 40 resentative further scheduled bimonthly mon- itoring exercises at the line of contact. Increased remilitarization, violent inci- dents at the front line, and hostile rhetoric un- dermined the Minsk Group’s mediation efforts to defuse Azeri-Armenian tensions through- Georgia out 2012. Both countries are scheduled to At the request of the Georgian government, hold presidential elections in 2013 and the EUMM was established in September 2008, conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is very likely with the immediate task of monitoring the to be politicized throughout the electoral withdrawal of Russian forces after the Russo- period.1 Georgian war. Since completing this initial 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 74 74 • MISSION NOTES its deployment it has been denied access to EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) both of the disputed territories. To foster confidence building among parties to the conflict, EUMM co-facilitates • Authorization Date 15 September 2008 (EU Council Joint monthly Incident Prevention and Response Action 2008/736/CFSP) • Start Date October 2008 Mechanism (IPRM) meetings, with the OSCE • Head of Mission Andrzej Tyszkiewicz (Poland) in South Ossetia and the UN in Abkhazia. • Budget $30.85 million (1 October 2011– These meetings provide a venue for discuss - 30 September 2012) ing critical issues, including border incidents • Strength as of Civilian Police: 59 and questions of boundary demarcation. The 30 September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 216 IPRM’s “hotline” system, administered by National Civilian Staff: 114 EUMM, has served as a critical mechanism for defusing tensions and developing shared understanding of events along the administra- tive boundary lines. In April 2012, Abkhazia’s OSCE Office in Baku de facto foreign minister declared the head of EUMM, Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, persona non • Authorization Date 16 November 1999 (Permanent Council grata, citing alleged disrespect toward Ab - Decision no. 318) khazia.2 As a result, Abkhaz representatives • Start Date 17 July 2000 have refused to join subsequent IPRM meet- • Head of Mission Ambassador Koray Targay (Turkey) ings to date. • Budget $3.7 million (1 January 2012– EUMM’s claim that it has the right to ac- 31 December 2012) cess the breakaway regions was further bol- • Strength as of International Staff: 10 stered by an OSCE resolution adopted on 9 30 September 2012 National Staff: 27.5 July 2012 that calls on parties “to allow the Note: The OSCE Office in Baku has twenty-seven full-time and one part- time national staff. European Union Monitoring Mission unim- peded access to the occupied territories of Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia, Geor- gia.”3 Calling the breakaway regions “occu- OSCE Office in Yerevan pied territories” provoked harsh reactions from Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, but re- flects the EU’s position that the regions are • Authorization Date 22 July 1999 (Permanent Council part of Georgia’s territory. Decision no. 314) • Start Date 16 February 2000 To support mediation between the par- • Head of Mission Ambassador Andrey Sorokin (Russia) ties, the EU has also appointed a Special En - • Budget $3.6 million (1 January 2012– voy to the region. Since June 2011, Philippe 31 December 2012) Lefort has been double-hatted as EU Special • Strength as of International Staff: 6 Representative (EUSR) for the South Cauca- 30 September 2012 National Staff: 40 sus and the Crisis in Georgia. The EUSR is responsible for developing and maintaining contacts with key political actors in the crisis surrounding Georgia, and co-chairs the Geneva task within the first months of its deployment, discussions with the UN and OSCE. Launched the mission has focused on monitoring, stabili - in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 war, zation, normalization, and building confidence the Geneva discussions bring together repre- between the parties. EUMM conducts patrols sentatives from Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, along the administrative boundary lines with South Ossetia, the UN, the OSCE, and the Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, since EU about four times a year to address key 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 75 CAUCASUS AND MOLDOVA • 75 political, security, and humanitarian dimen- sions of the conflict.