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4.2

Caucasus and Moldova

Increased clashes between Azerbaijan the conflict, focusing instead on issues of and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh became press freedom and justice. a growing challenge in 2012, while the stale- As clashes broke out over Nagorno- mate between Georgia and its breakaway terri- Kara bakh in the early 1990s, the former So- tories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia contin- viet republics of Moldova and Georgia suc- ued. In contrast, some positive developments cumbed to secessionist wars. Despite various were observed in the Moldova-Transdniestria cease-fire agreements, the conflicts remain dispute, where actors showed a new willing- unresolved. ness to cooperate on settling the long-standing Despite their inability to politically solve conflict. the conflict, the Russian-led Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC), the OSCE mission, and, since 2005, the EU Bor- Background der Assistance Mission (EUBAM) assisted in At the close of the Cold War, Armenia and Azer- preventing renewed outbreak of violence be- baijan were drawn into a war over Nagorno- tween Moldova and the Transdniestria region Karabakh. Populated by an ethnically Armen- after a cease-fire was reached in 1992. ian majority, this region within Azerbaijan In Georgia, the UN deployed military ob- unilaterally declared independence in 1991. servers to the secessionist region of Abkhazia, Fighting stopped by and large with a cease-fire while the OSCE had a presence in Tbilisi that agreement in 1994, but the territorial dispute engaged with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. has yet to be settled. Since 1992, international Violent conflict was curtailed until 2004, when engagement to settle the conflict has been co- Russia began to strengthen its ties with Ab - ordinated primarily by the Organization for khazia and South Ossetia. Russo-Georgian ten- Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). sions culminated in a 2008 war that ended de- The organization’s efforts to solve the frozen cisively in Russia’s favor. After the war, Russia conflict are guided by the Minsk Process, recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia and jointly co-chaired by France, Russia, and the South Ossetia, amid harsh critiques of the inter- United States. Settlement of the conflict is also national community. Differences between Rus- guided by a Special Envoy based in Georgia— sia and Western powers on the breakaway re- the Personal Representative of the Chairman- gions’ sovereignty status led to the closure of in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the the OSCE and UN missions in Georgia, leaving OSCE Minsk Conference (CiO Personal Rep- the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), estab- resentative)—a position held by Ambassador lished shortly after the war ended in 2008, as Andrzej Kaspryzk since 1996. He is supported the sole peacekeeping presence on the ground. by field office staff in Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, However, despite closing their missions, both and Stepanakert. The OSCE’s offices in Arme- the UN and the OSCE remain involved in po- nia and Azerbaijan are not involved in settling litical efforts to resolve the Georgian conflict.

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Armenia and Azerbaijan CiO Personal Representative on the Minsk Conference Since 1994, Armenian troops have held Nagorno-Karabakh and a significant part of • Authorization Date 23 March 1995 (Doc. 525/95) southwest Azerbaijan. Though the front line • Start Date 10 August 1995 has always been highly militarized, signifi- • Head of Mission Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland) cant military buildup occurred in 2012, with • Budget $1.5 million (1 January 2012– both sides investing in sophisticated defense 31 December 2012) systems. Armed clashes increased markedly • Strength as of International Staff: 5 and the number of conflict-related casualties 30 September 2012 National Staff: 11 in 2012 was the highest since 1994. These developments notwithstanding, the French, Russian, and US co-chairs of the Minsk Group travel to Baku and Yerevan every EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) two months to meet with the Azeri and Armen- ian presidents. The meetings serve as a forum • Authorization Date 7 October 2005 (Memorandum of to identify basic principles for a comprehensive Understanding) peace settlement. Minsk Group meetings have • Start Date 30 November 2005 also discussed mechanisms to investigate • Head of Mission Udo Burkholder (Germany) cease-fire violations along the front line and • Strength as of International Staff: approx. 100 the development of both military and civilian 30 September 2012 National Staff: approx. 120 confidence-building measures. In May and July Source: EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, 9 January 2012 the co-chairs combined meetings in Baku 2013, http://www.eubam.org/en/about/who_we_are. and Yerevan with travels to Nagorno-Karabakh to discuss matters on the ground with de facto leaders of the breakaway region. The Minsk Group’s efforts in mediating Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC) between Azerbaijan and Armenia were strongly supported by CiO Personal Representative • Authorization Date 21 July 1992 (Agreement on the Kaspryzk, who took part in all the group’s ac- Principles Governing the Peaceful tivities. He also maintained regular contact Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniester Region) with de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities • Start Date July 1992 to discuss developments at the line of contact • Heads of Mission V. Birca (Moldova), V. Bugaev between Karabakhi and Azerbaijani armed (separatist), A. Zverev (Russia), forces. In keeping with his mandated tasks E. Sidorov (Ukraine) and the consent, support, and involvement of • Strength as of Troops: 1,102 all relevant authorities, the CiO Personal Rep- 30 September 2012 Military Observers: 40 resentative further scheduled bimonthly mon- itoring exercises at the line of contact. Increased remilitarization, violent inci- dents at the front line, and hostile rhetoric un- dermined the Minsk Group’s mediation efforts to defuse Azeri-Armenian tensions through- Georgia out 2012. Both countries are scheduled to At the request of the Georgian government, hold presidential elections in 2013 and the EUMM was established in September 2008, conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is very likely with the immediate task of monitoring the to be politicized throughout the electoral withdrawal of Russian forces after the Russo- period.1 Georgian war. Since completing this initial 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 74

74 • MISSION NOTES

its deployment it has been denied access to EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) both of the disputed territories. To foster confidence building among parties to the conflict, EUMM co-facilitates • Authorization Date 15 September 2008 (EU Council Joint monthly Incident Prevention and Response Action 2008/736/CFSP) • Start Date October 2008 Mechanism (IPRM) meetings, with the OSCE • Head of Mission Andrzej Tyszkiewicz (Poland) in South Ossetia and the UN in Abkhazia. • Budget $30.85 million (1 October 2011– These meetings provide a venue for discuss - 30 September 2012) ing critical issues, including border incidents • Strength as of Civilian Police: 59 and questions of boundary demarcation. The 30 September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 216 IPRM’s “hotline” system, administered by National Civilian Staff: 114 EUMM, has served as a critical mechanism for defusing tensions and developing shared understanding of events along the administra- tive boundary lines. In April 2012, Abkhazia’s OSCE Office in Baku de facto foreign minister declared the head of EUMM, Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, persona non • Authorization Date 16 November 1999 (Permanent Council grata, citing alleged disrespect toward Ab - Decision no. 318) khazia.2 As a result, Abkhaz representatives • Start Date 17 July 2000 have refused to join subsequent IPRM meet- • Head of Mission Ambassador Koray Targay (Turkey) ings to date. • Budget $3.7 million (1 January 2012– EUMM’s claim that it has the right to ac- 31 December 2012) cess the breakaway regions was further bol- • Strength as of International Staff: 10 stered by an OSCE resolution adopted on 9 30 September 2012 National Staff: 27.5 July 2012 that calls on parties “to allow the Note: The OSCE Office in Baku has twenty-seven full-time and one part- time national staff. European Union Monitoring Mission unim- peded access to the occupied territories of Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia, Geor- gia.”3 Calling the breakaway regions “occu- OSCE Office in Yerevan pied territories” provoked harsh reactions from Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, but re- flects the EU’s position that the regions are • Authorization Date 22 July 1999 (Permanent Council part of Georgia’s territory. Decision no. 314) • Start Date 16 February 2000 To support mediation between the par- • Head of Mission Ambassador Andrey Sorokin (Russia) ties, the EU has also appointed a Special En - • Budget $3.6 million (1 January 2012– voy to the region. Since June 2011, Philippe 31 December 2012) Lefort has been double-hatted as EU Special • Strength as of International Staff: 6 Representative (EUSR) for the South Cauca- 30 September 2012 National Staff: 40 sus and the Crisis in Georgia. The EUSR is responsible for developing and maintaining contacts with key political actors in the crisis surrounding Georgia, and co-chairs the Geneva task within the first months of its deployment, discussions with the UN and OSCE. Launched the mission has focused on monitoring, stabili - in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 war, zation, normalization, and building confidence the Geneva discussions bring together repre- between the parties. EUMM conducts patrols sentatives from Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, along the administrative boundary lines with South Ossetia, the UN, the OSCE, and the Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, since EU about four times a year to address key 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 75

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political, security, and humanitarian dimen- sions of the conflict. EU Special Representative for the In light of the suspended IPRM meetings South Caucasus and Crisis in Georgia on the Abkhazian side, the Geneva talks • Authorization Date 25 August 2011 (EU Council Decisions gained importance as the only remaining plat- 2011/518/CFSP and 2012/326/CFSP) form for institutionalized dialogue between • EUSR Philippe Lefort (France) interlocutors on both sides as well as the in- • Budget $2.6 million (1 October 2011– ternational community. The restoration of 30 September 2012) IPRM meetings with Abkhazia was made the • Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 14 central issue of the twenty-first round of the 30 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 8 Geneva talks in June 2012, but the discussion made no progress in this regard. The Geneva meetings generally made limited progress in 2012. They were overshadowed by an in- OSCE Mission to Moldova creasing level of apprehension between Rus- sia and Georgia in advance of Georgian elec- • Authorization Date 4 February 1993 (19-CSO/Journal no. 3, tions in October. In January 2012, Georgia’s Annex 3) foreign minister accused Russian authorities • Start Date 25 April 1993 of trying “to kill” the Geneva talks by refus- • Head of Mission Ambassador Jennifer Leigh Brush ing to discuss security arrangements and hu- (United States) manitarian core issues.4 As in previous years, • Budget $2.7 million (1 January 2012– the key issue of tensions was Russia’s refusal 31 December 2012) to commit to a nonuse-of-force pledge, which • Strength as of International Staff: 13 Georgia made in 2010. 30 September 2012 National Staff: 36

Moldova In September 1990, Transdniestria, a thin strip proposal supported by the OSCE and EU. As of land on Moldova’s eastern border with in previous years, Russia and de facto Trans- Ukraine, declared independence. Since clashes dniestrian authorities continue to reject this and a subsequent truce in 1992, Trans dniestria proposition. has maintained de facto independence in this Since 1993 the OSCE mission’s major frozen conflict. The cease-fire agreement cre- task has been to assist in negotiating a lasting ated the Joint Control Commission Peacekeep- political settlement of the Transdniestrian ing Force, comprising Russian, Moldovan, and conflict. In June 2012 the OSCE mission fa- Transdniestrian troops, to supervise the cease- cilitated a three-day conference in Germany, fire in the security zone. bringing together Moldova’s prime minister Although the JCC has successfully pre- and Transdniestria’s de facto president. The vented a renewed outbreak of armed conflict meeting was considered a success, as the two since 1992, tensions related to the free move- parties agreed to accelerate the elimination of ment of people and goods have challenged barriers in communication, transportation, and the mission from the outset. In January 2012 banking, and to restore transport corridors be- a Moldovan died after being shot by a Rus- tween Moldova and Transdniestria. sian JCC soldier at a checkpoint while driv- A major breakthrough in restoring trans- ing to a gas station. In response, Moldova re- port corridors was reached with the resump- iterated a demand it has made for years—to tion of freight rail traffic through the Trans - transform the peacekeeping mission into a civil- dniestrian region in April 2012. EUBAM ian operation with an international mandate, a played a key role in supporting this agreement. 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 76

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Deployed in 2005 to monitor trade between to date the 5+2 meetings have generally Ukraine and Moldova through Transdnies- avoided addressing more critical issues. trian territory, in 2012 EUBAM facilitated technical expertise and conducted seminars to train customs experts from Chisinau and Conclusion Tiraspol in aiding implementation of the rail While new openings for a settlement of the cargo agreement. long-standing frozen conflict in Moldova Diplomatic discussions on the frozen con- have begun to appear, the risk of continued vi- flict are intended to take place in the “5+2” olence between Azerbaijan and Armenia over format, involving Moldova, Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh is high. Scheduled elec- Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, plus the Eu- tions for 2013 in Armenia and Azerbaijan ropean Union and United States as observers. have fostered reluctance of political leaders However, the talks, initiated in 2005, were to undertake diplomatic solutions that have a suspended only a year later until November high likelihood to politicize the Nagorno- 2011, when they were eventually resumed. Karabakh conflict in the lead-up to the voting. Since then, 5+2 meetings have been held every Parliamentary elections in Georgia in Oc- two months. Since their resumption, these tober 2012, meanwhile, heralded the coun- meetings—chaired by the Special Represen- try’s first peaceful, democratic transition, in tative of the OSCE Chairperson-in- Office for which current president Mikhail Saakashvili the Transdniestrian Settlement Process—have conceded defeat to the opposition Georgian been an important forum for communication. Dream coalition. However, Saakashvili will A milestone was reached in the April 2012 remain in power for another year, with exten- meeting when Moldovan and Transdniestrian sive executive oversight, before stepping down officials agreed on common principles and as president, after which phased-in changes to mechanisms for negotiation. Subsequent meet- the constitution will assign executive powers ings developed an agenda for the negotiation to the prime minister. The impact that this process, including social and economic ques- election will have on the conflict thus remains tions, humanitarian issues and human rights, to be seen, although some observers have and security issues and the political settlement voiced cautious optimism that coalition leader of the conflict. In the September 5+2 meeting, Bizdina Ivanishvili’s promise to improve re- the Moldovan prime minister and the Trans - lations with Russia may help to break the con- dniestrian leader agreed to an intensified flict’s stalemate. meeting schedule to work toward an agree- Given the circumstances on the ground, ment on outstanding issues. While this is a the international community’s presence in the positive development and discussions have region, particularly through the OSCE and EU generated progress on a number of small steps missions, remains vital to addressing the out- to minimize obstacles in the area of eco - standing issues and to further building confi- nomics, transportation, and communications, dence between the various conflict parties.

Notes 1. “Caucasus Business Forecast Report,” Business Monitor International, 13 July 2012. 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Abkhazia, “Statement of the MFA of Abkhazia,” 25 April 2012, http://mfaapsny.org/en/information/index.php?ID=78&sphrase_id=466. 3. OSCE, “Resolution on the Situation in Georgia,” 9 July 2012, http://www.oscepa.org/publications/ declarations/doc_download/1266-monaco-declaration-english. 4. “Georgian FM: Geneva Talks Stalled,” Civil Georgia, 25 January 2012, http://www.civil.ge/eng/ article.php?id=24380.