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Profiles of Major Party Leaders

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Profiles of Major Party Leaders Beiji A CHINESE WEEKLY OF NEWS AND VIEWS Vol. 30, No. 46 November 16-22, 1987 Profiles of Major Party Leaders stock Market Slump: Causes & Effects Ye Chenghu (second left), a Han Party secretary of Menlouxia Yaozu Township in Xintian County, Hunan Province, drinking wine with the masses out of the same bowel. Ye has lived in this Yao area for over 10 years, and has always been eager to help the Yao people develop their economy. Over the last three years, the agricultural output value of his township has increased at an annual rate of 25 percent. by Long Qiyun BeijingR?>ir HIGHLIGHTS OF THE WEEK . Mi. \o 4(. NOV. iDIS• Introducing Top Party Leaders CONTENTS • The new 13th Central Committee of the Communist NOTES FROM THE EDITORS 4 Party of China has selected its leaders. Their profiles, CiiiiiiMi! I.iik'rpiisL-> Ilir.mi.'li some with facts published for the first time, are this issue's \1>irlM.-i top story (p. 14). EVENTS/TRENDS 5-9 I'oil Imliciucs MiML- ('i>nriili.MKL' III Kctorii VKiinkiiul tiiL-L-is '1 aiu.in Huan Xiang on the Stock Market Crash VisimiN l)lk-i;iK l\pl;n!i 1 ;iriiil;iiul Plan • The economist Huan Xiang, director-general of the S^.iciiv.v Pi,in M;ik-lK-> (i(i;il> Centre of International Studies of the State Council, lllliLMIlk- DlvJil'^L-. I iidui discusses some of the factors contributing to the crash and ('i)iili-nl its impact on the West's economy. Failing to remove the \\Lvkl\e causes, Huan predicts, will leadd to continuing instability on the world's stock markets and perhaps a worldwide INTERlylATlONAL 10-13 economic recession (p. 29). USA-USSR: Soviets Bite the Bullet in Arms Talks South Asia: SAARC Conliiuics lis Move I-orwartl So\icl L'nion: 70 Years Al'icr Open Policy and Cultural Ferment The October Revolution IJiiitcd Slates: Economy • The concluding instalment of a travelogue which Conlinucs to Grow examines the conflicts of values and the changes in Profiles of Top Party lifestyles of Chinese society under the impact of the open Leaders 14 policy (p. 23). Deliberations on China's 2nd Revolution (II): Breaking the Ossified Mentality 21 Open Policy and Cultural Guiding Enterprises Through the IVIarket Ferment (III) 23 Causes and Impact of the • Zhao's report to the 13th Party Congress discusses the Stock Market Crash 29 need to establish new economic mechanisms which will Revision of Some Articles allow the state to regulate supply and demand through Of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China 30 economic, legal and administrative means, and allow the Biographical Notes 32 market to guide enterprises to correct management decisions. The report shows planning can be integrated FROM THE CHINESE PRESS 36-37 with the market and outlines the means for doing this (p. BUSINESSA«ADE 38-39 4). CULTURE/SCIENCE 40-41 COVER: PkUiiV ol a Mij.ir |->i'\\v;ieJ lighthouse, a pri/c wtuner. Published every Monday by Subscription rates (1 year) USA US$24.00 General Editorial Office Tel: 893860 BEIJING REVIEW English Dept Tel: 831.5599 Ext. 546 Australia A.$24.00 Canada Can.$23.00 ?4 Baiwanzhuanq Road Distributed by China International Book New Zealand NZ.$33.00 Belling 10003/ Trading Corporation (GUOJI SHUDIAN) The People s H.p,ihl . o! CM P.O. Box 399, Beijing, China £13.00 m NOTES FROM THE EDITORS Guiding Enterprises Througli Market by Jin Qi hao Ziyang's October 25th and its reward can be sought only ced and co-ordinating the devel• Zreport to the 13th Party through the exchange of commod• opment of various economic Congress says the aim of the ities. Only in this way can socialist sectors. Changes in supply and economic reform is the establish• production be rapidly developed demand, and competition, will ment of a mechanism by which and co-ordinated while constantly force enterprises to be flexible in "the state regulates the market, meeting the people's growing making their decisions. and the market guides enterpr• material and cultural needs. The regulatory mechanisms to ises." Zhao elaborated by saying it Meanwhile, there exists a basic be used for these purposes include: would work by having "the state difference between the socialist • Formulating and imple• regulate the relations between and capitalist commodity menting correct economic supply and demand through economies because of their policies. This implies choosing the economic, legal and necessary differing ownership systems. formulas for the optimal deploy• administrative means and create a Under the socialist system, which ment of resources. Planning will suitable economic and social is based on public ownership there mainly regulate the long-term environment in which enterprises is no fundamental conflict of changes in the economic structure, are guided towards correct interests. As far as the entire while the market, through its management decisions." society is concerned, this makes it quick response to fluctuations in This is the practical application possible consciously to maintain a demand, will mainly regulate the of the theory of a planned balanced economic development. short-term changes. commodity economy in macro- The reform is aimed at translating • Establishing a rational price economic control. It provides an this possibility into reality through system and the means to regulate answer to the long-standing regulation by both planning and it. Planning will attempt to controversy of whether planning the market. regulate those factors which go to can be integrated with the market The key to achieving this is decide prices, including interest and how that can be done. revamping the overly centralized rates, taxes and tax rates, and Traditionally, the socialist planning system so that the depreciation rates. The market planned economy and the com• market can fully play its role. That will regulate the actual prices modity economy were thought to is to say, planning must be based themselves. be mutually exclusive. The on the exchange of commodities • Establishing a suitable inves• commodity economy was bound and the law of value; guidance tment structure. Planning should up with private ownership and planning should be taken as the decide the scale of investment in was often equated with capitalism. dominant factor, and medium- capital construction and in fixed Meanwhile, the system of public and long-term plans should be assets, general investment policies ownership having eliminated ex• stressed. Generally, the plan and key construction projects. The ploitation, property is publicly should only be an outline which market should regulate the owned, collective labour is allows for flexibility. It should not operation and management of encouraged, and distribution is be all-inclusive or rigidly ordinary projects and the produc• based on the principle "to each controlled. tion of capital goods. according to his work." This In implementing the plan by • Establishing an appropriate meant the exchange of equal economic, legal and necessary consumption structure. Planning labour can be realized without administrative means, the state should design the consumption using the market or currency. should seek to keep a primarily structure and set the levels in However, solid socialist expe• balanced development of general accordance with the overall rience has proved this to be supply and demand. This includes capacity now or at any given point Utopian. It was found that the maintainig a proper ratio between as planned in the future. The exchange of labour can be accumulation and consumption; market will regulate variety, properly realized only through the achieving a balance in funds, quality and quantity of market and an objective criterion materials, and credit; keeping commodities. forjudging the value of the labour foreign exchange accounts balan• • The state will keep a few 4 BEIJING REVIEW. NOVEMBER 16-22. 19X7 EVENTS/TRENDS Poll Indicates More Confidence In Reform hinese workers, scientists, The establishment of channels Cgovernment employees, entre• of communication between off• preneurs, students and farmers are icials and citizens were seen as now more optimistic about necessary by 87.6 percent of China's political reforms than respondents, 4 percent said it was they were before the 13th National not necessary, and 8.4 percent Congress of the Chinese Commu• were undecided. mandatory plans and direct those nist Party. This was the indication The poll also indicated an enterprises and financial organiz• of a poll conducted in Beijing on unchanged attitude in people over ations which constitute the November 1, the day the congress the age of 61 on the separation nation's economic lifelines. It will closed. , between Party and government also decree the distribution of At 16 locations in the capital, administrative functions. Before scarce, important materials, using including Wangfujing Street, Beij• the congress, 66.7 percent were these as levers for regulating the ing Railway Station, Beijing optimistic, none were pessimistic, market and controlling prices. University, Tiananmen Square and 33.3 percent registered no Nevertheless, it is still necessary to and the Beilaipingzhuang Free opinion. The figures were the same apply here the principle of Market, the China Social Survey after the congress. On the question exchange at equal value and Institute distributed question of handing over more power to reasonably balance the interests of cards to 4.550 people and 3,541 low-level leaders, elderly citizens all quarters. responded to the questions on were more optimistic than the All this is not mere theory, but China's political reform, a major young. After the congress, 47.7 has already been put into practice, issue addressed at the Party's 13th percent of people between 18 and totally or partially. The categories Congress. Of these, 65.2 percent 30, and 78.6 percent above the age of industrial goods earmarked for were Beijing citizens and the rest of 61 were optimistic.
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