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Chinese Officials & Surgeons associated with FORCED ORGAN HARVESTING INDIVIDUAL PROFILES Bo Xilai 1 Huang Jiefu 29 Jia Chunwang 48 Jiang Zemin 55 Li Dongsheng 67 Li Lanqing 80 Liu Jing 89 Luo Gan 105 Qiang Wei 119 Wang Lijun 136 Wu Guanzheng 157 Zhou Yongkang 172 Zheng Shusen* 187 COLLECTION of DRAFT CANADIAN MAGNITSky ACT SUBMISSIONS SHARED IN CONFIDENCE Prepared & written by THe Falun Dafa Association of Canada 2018. *ADDITIONAL SUBMISSION Written by Matthew Robertson. CONTENT DIRECTLY RELEVANt TO FORCED ORgAN HARVESTING HIGHLIGHTED FOR EASE OF REFERENCE. Canada Magnitsky Act Submission Falun Dafa Association August 2018 Perpetrator: BO, Xilai （薄熙来） Personal Information Full Legal Name of Perpetrator: BO, Xilai (薄熙来) Gender: Male Country: People’s Republic of China Date of Birth: July 3, 1949 APPOINTMENTS • 1993 – 1999, Deputy Secretary of Dalian Municipal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Committee, Mayor of Dalian, Liaoning Province.1 • 1999 – 2000, Secretary of Dalian Municipal CCP Committee, Mayor of Dalian, member of Liaoning Provincial CCP Standing Committee • 2000 – 2001, Deputy Secretary of Liaoning Provincial CCP Committee, Acting Governor of Liaoning Province • 2001 – 2004, Deputy Secretary of Liaoning Provincial CCP Committee, Governor of Liaoning Province • 2004 – 2007, Minister of Commerce, Deputy Secretary of the Leading CCP Members’ Group of Ministry of Commerce, Secretary of the Leading CCP Members’ Group of Ministry of Commerce • 2007 – 2012, member of the CCP Central Politburo Committee, Secretary of Chongqing Municipal CCP Committee.2 • 2013 – Present, Imprisonment3 BACKGROUND 1. Bo Xilai, born July 3, 1949, is the son of senior Party leader Bo Yibo, one of the “eight elders” who controlled the Party-state during Deng Xiaoping’s era. 1 Bo Xilai Resume (https://web.archive.org/web/20071127054645/http://news.xinhuanet.com:80/ziliao/2002- 02/21/content_285068.htm) 2 Bo Xilai Baidu, (https://baike.baidu.com/item/) 3 On September 22, 2013, Bo Xilai was sentenced to life imprisonment for bribery, corruption, and abuse of power (See: https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/) 1 Canada Magnitsky Act Submission Falun Dafa Association August 2018 2. Bo Xilai and his family were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Bo Xilai, then seventeen years old, was imprisoned for five years on charges of counterrevolutionary activities. It is said that prison life taught Bo Xilai the ways of the prison, and convinced him that might is right4. 3. Bo Xilai is keen to continue his father’s legacy. With the help of his powerful father, he launched his political career as a local Party official of a county in Dalian city of Liaoning province in the early 1980s5. 4. Bo Xilai was swiftly promoted to become the mayor of Dalian city in the 1990s. As Dalian mayor, Bo Xilai and his wife, Gu Kailai amassed immense wealth by corrupt means6. They once worked with a British businessman, Neil Heywood, who helped move their wealth overseas7. Neil Heywood was later murdered by Gu Kailai on November 14, 2011. The murder of Neil Heywood was an international news event8. 5. Bo Xilai’s political career reached a stalemate in 1997 during the 15th National Party Congress when he failed to obtain the coveted appointment of provincial Party secretary and membership in the Central Committee. For his efforts at self-promotion, he received zero votes and remained mayor of Dalian city in Liaoning province. 6. In July 20, 1999, then Party chief, Jiang Zemin, launched the persecution of Falun Gong. A month later in August 1999, Jiang Zemin made a rare visit to Liaoning province. The purpose of the visit was said to identify and muster local party officials who are willing to be complicit in Jiang Zemin’s policy of eradication against Falun Gong9. According to Bo Xilai’s former chauffeur, Mr Wang, Jiang Zemin told Bo Xilai in explicit terms that, “you have to demonstrate toughness towards Falun Gong, only then can you have the capital to advance.”10 4 Epoch Times Report, October 16, 2012 (http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/12/10/17/n3707619.htm); Epoch Times Report, May 12, 2010 (http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/10/5/12/n2906158.htm) 5 Epoch Times Report, May 12, 2010 (http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/10/5/12/n2906158.htm) 6 Epoch Times Report, October 17, 2012 (http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/12/10/17/n3707619.htm) 7 Soltis, Andy (17 April 2012). "China's toxic twist". New York Post. 8 Malcolm Moore (17 April 2012). "Briton 'was poisoned after threatening to expose Bo's web of money'". The Daily Telegraph (UK). p. 14. 9 Epoch Times Report, October 17, 2012 (http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/12/10/17/n3707619.htm) 10 Epoch Times Report, October 17, 2012 (http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/12/10/17/n3707619.htm) 2 Canada Magnitsky Act Submission Falun Dafa Association August 2018 7. Following Jiang Zemin’s visit, Dalian city, under Bo’s leadership, quickly became the vanguard in the national eradication campaign against Falun Gong. Falun Gong practitioners all over the country were being sent to Dalian for torture and brainwash11. 8. In 2000, Bo Xilai was promoted to become the acting governor of Liaoning province. In 2001, he formally became the governor of Liaoning. In 2007, he became a member of the Central Politburo and Secretary of Chongqing Party Committee. 9. Bo Xilai’s political career was cut short in February 2012 by the defection of his subordinate—Wang Lijun reportedly turned over large amounts of evidence of Bo Xilai’s corruption12 and gross human rights violations against Falun Gong practitioners to the Chinese Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and to the U.S. Consulate13. 10. Bo Xilai was dismissed as Chongqing party chief in March 15, 2012. On September 28, 2012, Bo Xilai was expelled from the Party14. The decision was ratified by a full plenary session of the Chinese Central Committee. Bo was removed from all public posts on October 26, 201215. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on September 22, 201316. 11. There are reasons to believe that Bo Xilai controls significant wealth overseas through intermediaries such as the murdered Neil Heywood. While Bo has been committed to prison, efforts to account and confiscate those ill-gotten assets are ongoing17. 12. Bo Xilai has been the subject of lawsuits by victims of human rights violations in many countries. In November, 2007, New South Wales Supreme Court in Sydney issued default judgment against Bo Xilai 11 Epoch Times Report, October 17, 2012 (http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/12/10/17/n3707619.htm) 12 Bill Gertz, China probes police official after Obama administration rejected asylum request, Washington Free Beacon, 10 February 2012. 13 Epoch Times Report, June 20, 2012 (https://www.theepochtimes.com/source-wang-lijun-told-u-s-officials-of-organ- harvest_1484282.html); Minghui Report, April 11, 2012 (http://search.minghui.org/mh/articles/2012/4/11/-“”- 255519.html) 14 Xinhua Report, September 28, 2012 (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/28/c_131880079.htm) 15 BBC Report, October 25, 2012 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20091588) 16 BBC Report, September 22, 2013 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-24170726) 17 South China Morning Post Report, December 22, 2014 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1667708/luxury- french-villa-jailed-chinese-politician-bo-xilai-sale-hk66-million) 3 Canada Magnitsky Act Submission Falun Dafa Association August 2018 for the torture of a Falun Gong practitioner, Pan Yu18. On November 11, 2009, Bo Xilai was indicted in Spain for genocide and torture of Falun Gong practitioners under exercise of universal jurisdiction. OVERVIEW 13. As the top ranking official in Dalian city, Liaoning province and finally, Chongqing City, Bo Xilai was an active partner in crime in driving the policy of extermination of Falun Gong in his regions. 14. During his leadership, both Liaoning Province and Chongqing City reported some of the worst persecution of Falun Gong practitioners. Falun Gong practitioners were imprisoned and tortured in large numbers. Many were permanently disabled or killed in captivity and tortured. Many more were illegally rounded up, and forcibly taken to forced transformation facilities where they were subjected to brainwash. 15. According to available information, during Bo Xilai’s tenure as mayor of Dalian there were 15 reported cases of Falun Gong practitioners being tortured to death19. During Bo Xilai tenure as governor of Liaoning Province, there were 103 reported cases of Falun Gong practitioners killed through torture—a figure that was ranked fourth in the country20. In 2007, when Bo Xilai moved to Chongqing, there were about 20 reported cases of Falun Gong practitioners being tortured to death21. 16. Under Bo Xilai’s directives and policies, forced labour camps and prisons such as the Masanjia Forced Labour Camp22, Dabei Prison, Zhangshi Forced Labour Camp, Longshan Forced Labour Camp, Dalian Forced Labour Camp subjected Falun Gong practitioners to some of the most agonizing and cutting edge torture methods, which were subsequently modelled after by other jurisdictions. 17. Large-scale killing of Falun Gong practitioners by means of forced organ harvesting is also likely to have started in Liaoning province under Bo Xilai’s leadership. The earliest reported case of forced organ harvesting and industrial sale of human cadaver happened in Dalian city of Liaoning province when Bo Xilai was mayor. Indications of forced organ harvesting were mostly found in Liaoning province*. 18 Minghui Report, November 8, 2007 (http://en.minghui.org/emh/articles/2007/11/8/91197.html) 19 WOIPFG Report, December 18, 2003 (http://www.zhuichaguoji.org/node/279) 20 Minghui Report, April 25, 2004 (http://en.minghui.org/emh/articles/2004/4/25/47383.html) 21 Minghui Report, March 8, 2012 (http://www.minghui.org/mh/articles/2012/3/8/253965.html) 22 Minghui Report, August 11, 2003 (http://www.minghui.org/mh/articles/2003/8/11/ 55444.html) * Ethan Gutmann, "The Slaughter" (2014), p.
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