Corruption Scandals Puts a Large Part of the New Middle Class at Risk
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Here a Causal Relationship? Contemporary Economics, 9(1), 45–60
Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C. Stephenson Harvard Law School http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/ March 2021 Aaken, A., & Voigt, S. (2011). Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? Economics of Governance, 12(4), 301–324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0100-8 Aaronson, S. A. (2011a). Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? Available at SSRN 1922190. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922190 Aaronson, S. A. (2011b). Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Public Administration and Development, 31(1), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.588 Aaronson, S. A., & Abouharb, M. R. (2014). Corruption, Conflicts of Interest and the WTO. In J.-B. Auby, E. Breen, & T. Perroud (Eds.), Corruption and conflicts of interest: A comparative law approach (pp. 183–197). Edward Elgar PubLtd. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN_batch:ELGAR01620140507 Abbas Drebee, H., & Azam Abdul-Razak, N. (2020). The Impact of Corruption on Agriculture Sector in Iraq: Econometrics Approach. IOP Conference Series. Earth and Environmental Science, 553(1), 12019-. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/553/1/012019 Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014). Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 111(Journal Article), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 Abbink, Klaus. (2004). Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(4), 887–906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008 Abbink, Klaus. -
Structural Change for Equality an Integrated Approach to Development
2012 structural change for equality An Integrated Approach to Development Thirty-fourth San Salvador, session 27 - 31 August of eclac 2012 structural change for equality An Integrated Approach to Development Thirty-fourth San Salvador, session 27 - 31 August of eclac Alicia Bárcena Executive Secretary Antonio Prado Deputy Executive Secretary The preparation of this document was coordinated by Alicia Bárcena, Executive Secretary of ECLAC, in collaboration with Antonio Prado, Deputy Executive Secretary, Mario Cimoli, Chief of the Division of Production, Productivity and Management, Juan Alberto Fuentes, Chief of the Economic Development Division, Martin Hopenhayn, Chief of the Social Development Division and Daniel Titelman, Chief of the Financing for Development Division. The drafting committee also comprised Wilson Perés and Gabriel Porcile, in collaboration with Martín Abeles, Verónica Amarante, Filipa Correia, Felipe Jiménez, Sandra Manuelito, Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Esteban Pérez-Caldentey and Romain Zivy. The following chiefs of substantive divisions, subregional headquarters and national offices of ECLAC participated in the preparation of the document: Hugo Altomonte, Hugo Beteta, Luis Beccaria, Inés Bustillo, Pascual Gerstenfeld, Dirk Jaspers_Faijer, Juan Pablo Jiménez, Jorge Mattar, Carlos Mussi, Sonia Montaño, Diane Quarless, Juan Carlos Ramírez, Osvaldo Rosales and Joseluis Samaniego. Contributions and comments regarding the various chapters were provided by the following ECLAC staff members: Olga Lucía Acosta, Jean Acquatella, -
Monitoring Elac2007: Progress and Current State of Development of Latin American and Caribbean Information Societies
23 Monitoring eLAC2007: Progress and current state of development of Latin American and Caribbean information societies Observatory for the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean (OSILAC) 23 Monitoring eLAC2007: Progress and current state of development of Latin American and Caribbean information societies Observatory for the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean (OSILAC) September 2007 This document was prepared in the framework of the Observatory for the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean (OSILAC), as a DDPE (División de Desarrollo Productivo y Empresarial) project, which receives financial support from the Institute for Connectivity in the Americas (ICA), the Pan-Americas Program of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the European Commission’s @LIS Project. The document has been elaborated by Valeria Jordan and coordinated by Martin Hilbert, with contributions from Doris Olaya, Soledad Parada and Wilson Peres. The collaboration of Francisca Lira is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed herein have not been subjected to editorial revision, and are the sole responsibility of the authors. They should not be construed as reflecting official positions of the European Union, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) or any of the other organisations that participated in producing the document. United Nations Publication LC/W.151 Copyright © United Nations, September 2007. All rights reserved. Printed at United Nations, Santiago, Chile. Requests for authorization to reproduce this work in whole or in part should be addressed to the Secretary of the Publications Board, United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY 10017, United States. The member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce the work without prior authorization. -
Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Chile 1 Chile – Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report This report, submitted by Chile, provides information on the progress made by Chile in implementing the recommendations of its Phase 4 report. The OECD Working Group on Bribery's summary of and conclusions to the report were adopted on 12 March 2021. The Phase 4 report evaluated and made recommendations on Chile's implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2009 Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. It was adopted by the 44 members of the OECD Working Group on Bribery on 13 December 2018. PHASE 4 FOLLOW-UP: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON CHILE’S TWO-YEAR WRITTEN REPORT 2 Table of Contents Chile Phase 4 – Two Year Written Follow-Up Report Summary and Conclusions ........................ 3 Annex – Written Follow-Up Report by Chile ................................................................................... 17 PHASE 4 FOLLOW-UP: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON CHILE’S TWO-YEAR WRITTEN REPORT 3 Chile Phase 4 – Two Year Written Follow-Up Report Summary and Conclusions Summary of findings1 1. In December 2020, Chile submitted its Phase 4 written follow-up report to the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB or the Working Group). The report outlined Chile’s efforts to implement the 48 recommendations and to address the follow-up issues identified during its Phase 4 evaluation in December 2018.2 In light of the information provided, the Working Group concludes that Chile fully implemented 3 recommendations, partially implemented 17 recommendations, and did not implement 28 recommendations. -
The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals*
Political Science Research and Methods Page 1 of 19 © The European Political Science Association, 2015 doi:10.1017/psrm.2015.8 Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals* PABLO FERNÁNDEZ-VÁZQUEZ, PABLO BARBERÁ AND GONZALO RIVERO orruption scandals have been found to have significant but mild electoral effects in the comparative literature (Golden 2006). However, most studies have assumed that voters C punish all kinds of illegal practices. This article challenges this assumption by distin- guishing between two types of corruption, according to the type of welfare consequences they have for the constituency. This hypothesis is tested using data from the 2011 Spanish local elections. We exploit the abundance of corruption allegations associated with the Spanish hous- ing boom, which generated income gains for a wide segment of the electorate in the short term. We find that voters ignore corruption when there are side benefits to it, and that punish- ment is only administered in those cases in which they do not receive compensation. lections are supposed to allow voters to “throw the rascals out” (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). Hence, we would expect corruption scandals to have a strong effect on the Eelectoral performance of the politicians involved in them. However, recent literature shows that electoral retribution to dishonest behavior in office is rather mild and that it does not always prevent implicated individuals from being re-elected (see Golden 2006). We claim in this paper that the economic externalities associated with the corrupt activity are a relevant dimension that can account, in some cases, for the lack of a strong punishment to misbehaving politicians. -
Sustainability of Current GM Crop Cultivation
Sustainability of current GM crop cultivation Review of people, planet, profit effects of agricultural production of GM crops, based on the cases of soybean, maize, and cotton A.C. Franke, M.L.H. Breukers, W. Broer, F. Bunte, O. Dolstra, F.M. d’Engelbronner-Kolff, L.A.P. Lotz, J. van Montfort, J. Nikoloyuk, M.M. Rutten, M.J.M. Smulders, C.C.M. van de Wiel, M. van Zijl Report 386 Sustainability of current GM crop cultivation Review of people, planet, profit effects of agricultural production of GM crops, based on the cases of soybean, maize, and cotton A.C. Franke1, M.L.H. Breukers2, W. Broer3, F. Bunte2, O. Dolstra1, F.M. d’Engelbronner-Kolff4, L.A.P. Lotz1, J. van Montfort4, J. Nikoloyuk4, M.M. Rutten2, M.J.M. Smulders1, C.C.M. van de Wiel1, M. van Zijl3 1 Plant Research International (PRI), Wageningen UR, Wageningen, the Netherlands 2 LEI, Wageningen UR, the Hague, the Netherlands 3 CREM, Amsterdam, the Netherlands 4 Aidenvironment, Amsterdam, the Netherlands Plant Research International, part of Wageningen UR Report 386 April 2011 © 2011 Wageningen, Foundation Stichting Dienst Landbouwkundig Onderzoek (DLO) research institute Plant Research International. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the DLO, Plant Research International. The Foundation DLO is not responsible for any damage caused by using the content of this report. Plant Research International, part of Wageningen UR Address : P.O. -
Gender Policies and Armed Forces in Latin America's Southern Cone
Gender Policies and Armed Forces in Latin America’s Southern Cone By Sabina Frederic & Sabrina Calandrón The present article first examines the contribution of international organizations to the formulation and implementation of gender integration policies in the armed forces of the Latin American Southern Cone’s three main countries : Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It focuses on and accounts for the various policy contents and levels of implementation in those nations during the 2000-2014 time-bracket as a result of the dissemination of United Nations (UN) Resolution 1325. The said resolution, adopted in 2000, reaffirmed the crucial role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction, and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.1 The study analyzes the responses, influenced by their respective national contexts, of each of the three countries to that UN Resolution. It will additionally highlight the long- standing local initiatives of the three countries on this subject, and also the various points of contact at the transnational level : the latter clearly shows the distinct regional dimension of gender integration policies in the armed forces of Argentina, Chile, and – to a lesser extent – Brazil. It focuses on the factors that have contributed to such regional policy coherence, as well as those differentiating their gender agendas and policies. The particular concerns of each country, its government procedures, and the situation of its national defence institutions in the context of the democratization of the State and its armed forces are examined along the way. -
Watchdogs That Do Not Bite, Nets That Do Not Catch and “Perps” Policing Themselves: Why Anti-Corruption Multi-Level Governance Efforts Fail in the Philippines
Watchdogs that do not Bite, Nets that do not Catch and “Perps” Policing Themselves: Why Anti-Corruption Multi-Level Governance Efforts Fail in the Philippines. A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School Of the University of Cincinnati In partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the Department of Political Science Of the College of Arts and Science By Grace Yllana B.A. University of Cincinnati March 2013 Committee Chair: Laura Jenkins, Ph.D i ABSTRACT The transnational nature of grand corruption in developing countries, and its resistance to the onslaught of Anti-Corruption Multi-Level Governance (ACMLG) efforts over the past two decades, has been an increasing source of concern for the international community. More disturbing is why, despite vast resources devoted to such efforts, have corruption levels not gone down, particularly in the Philippines, a country celebrated for its return to democracy with the advent of the People Power Revolution that ousted the Marcos dictatorship. The hypothesis that ACMLG does not lower levels of corruption is tested by comparing and contrasting one country, the Philippines with five other countries of similar background to see what may account for similarity or differences in ACMLG outcomes. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are used in comparing the presence and activities of AC MLG such as international and national legal frameworks, government programs and agencies, and civil society participation to corruption indices reported by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, World Bank World Governance Indicator for Control of Corruption, Global Financial Integrity’s Flow of Illicit Funds Index, Global Integrity Scorecard corruption score and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. -
D3.3.1 the Chilean Transition from Non-Corrupt Economic Underperformer to Most Developed and Least Corrupt Country in Latin America
This project is co-funded by the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development of the European Union D3.3.1 The Chilean transition from non-corrupt economic underperformer to most developed and least corrupt country in Latin America Author: Patricio Navia School of Political Science, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile and Liberal Studies Program, New York University GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies 28 May 2015 KEYWORDS Corruption, Anti-Corruption, Chile, Democracy Patricio Navia, Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, New York University GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies ([email protected]) \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ © 2015 GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Introduction Chile stands today as Latin America’s most developed economy and the least corrupt country in the region. Fifty years ago, Chile was an economic underperformer in Latin America but was already regarded as one of the least corrupt countries in the hemisphere. Here, I trace the historical roots of Chile’s low tolerance for corruption and analyze how the country has successful remained free from significant corruption scandals despite the greater access to information and more demands for transparency that often result in uncovering corruption in areas that were previously inaccessible to the press and civil society. I pose how the economic transformations that Chile began to undertake under military rule (1973- 1990) and consolidated once democracy was restored in 1990 have created a stronger civil society, a freer press and have increased demands for transparency. As a result, there is more information on corruption scandals today than ever before as the number of relevant and influential social and political actors has increased and there is less room for corrupt practices that involve those with access to power. -
The Gonzalo Sánchez De Lozada Disjuctive Presidency (2002-2003)
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA: THE CASES OF BOLIVIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND PERU By ANA MARÍA DE LA QUINTANA A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2012 1 © 2012 Ana María De la Quintana 2 To Anita, Marcelo and Miki 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS During the making of this dissertation as well as during my graduate years the most important people who were unconditionally supporting me were my parents. I am glad there is a formal space such as this to thank one’s parents and family. My father and mother Marcelo and Anita kept me going, without their love, encouragement, and support a Ph.D. would not have been possible. I am greatful to my siblings Jimena and Roberto and, to my extended family Ana Cristina, Eddy, César and Olga for believing in me and making sure I reach my goal. My advisor, Leslie Anderson, was always supportive of me in my quest to focus on relevant questions, her advice not only helped me seek for the most rigorous ways of addressing my inquires but also stimulated me so I did not to shy away from useful and valuable scholarship. She is certainly a wonderful adviser and academic mentor. The members of my committee: Larry Dodd, Katrina Schwartz, Connor O'Dwyer, Jesse Dallery have been invaluable to me in helping me to improve this dissertation, their advice and encouragement supported me in this journey. I am thankful to my wonderful professors and friends Richard Scher, Aida Hozic, Richard Conley, and to all my devoted professors at the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida, in particular to Philip Williams, Ben Smith, Patricia Wood, Lynn Leverty, Beth Rosenson and Goran Hyden. -
Mexico: the Role of Informal Institutions
PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND BUDGET-MAKING IN ARGENTINA AND MEXICO: THE ROLE OF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government by Lorena Giselle Buzón Pérez, M.A. Washington, DC May 6, 2013 Copyright 2013 by Lorena Giselle Buzón Pérez All Rights Reserved ii PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND BUDGET-MAKING IN ARGENTINA AND MEXICO: THE ROLE OF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS Lorena Giselle Buzón Pérez, M.A. Dissertation Advisor: John Bailey, PhD ABSTRACT Latin American political systems are characterized by powerful presidential institutions vis à vis legislatures. Presidents hold significant power resources to control the budget process, leaving the congress as a mere rubberstamp. This situation is bolstered not only by formal institutional engineering, but also by informally institutionalized mechanisms at the macro (political system) and micro (budget process) levels. Building on the literature on institutions, executive-legislative relations, and budget-making, this dissertation addresses the following question: How have informal institutions influenced presidential control over the allocation of resources in Argentina and Mexico from 1994 to 2006? My core argument is that when political decision makers resort to informal macro institutions (control over nominations and political careers, and clientelism) and micro institutions (delegation of powers, and the tactical use of economic data and revenue estimates for budgetary projections,) this tends to enhance the power of the president and governors vis à vis the legislature in countries with PR electoral rules and low legislative reelection rates, or where there is no immediate iii reelection. -
Income and Beyond: Multidimensional Poverty in Six Latin American Countries
Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI) Oxford Department of International Development Queen Elizabeth House (QEH), University of Oxford OPHI WORKING PAPER NO. 17 Income and Beyond: Multidimensional Poverty in six Latin American countries Diego Battiston1, Guillermo Cruces2, Luis Felipe Lopez Calva3, Maria Ana Lugo4 and Maria Emma Santos5 September 2009 Abstract This paper presents empirical results of a wide range of multidimensional poverty measures for: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay, for the period 1992–2006. Six dimensions are analysed: income, child attendance at school, education of the household head, sanitation, water and shelter. Over the study period, El Salvador, Brazil, Mexico and Chile experienced significant reductions of multidimensional poverty. In contrast, in urban Uruguay there was a small reduction in multidimensional poverty, while in urban Argentina the estimates did not change significantly. El Salvador, Brazil and Mexico together with rural areas of Chile display significantly higher and more simultaneous deprivations than urban areas of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. In all countries, access to proper sanitation and education of the household head are the highest contributors to overall multidimensional poverty. Keywords: Multidimensional poverty measurement, counting approach, Latin America, Unsatisfied Basic Needs, rural and urban areas. JEL Classification: D31, I32. 1Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS), Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina