Chernobyl Box: RAC Box 8
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records Folder Title: Chernobyl Box: RAC Box 8 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC Withdrawer :RECORDS MJD 4/27/2005 File Folder CHERNOBYL FOIA F05-097 Box Number HARRIS, WILLIAM 6 ID DocType Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 9126 REPORT RE CHERNOBYL 5 5/1/1986 B 1 B3 D 8/31/2006 NLRRF0S-097 9127 PAPER RE CHERNOBYL DISASTER 3 4/29/1986 Bl B3 PAR 8/31/2006 NLRRF0S-097 9128 DRAFT CABLE RE ACCIDENT 2 ND Bl R 11/21/2007 NLRRF0S-097 9130 REPORT RE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT 4 5/1/1986 B3 PAR 8/31/2006 NLRRF0S-097; UPHELD 6/16/2010 M08-125/1 #9130 9131 CABLE 2115272 JUL 86 2 7/21/1986 Bl R 11/21/2007 NLRRF0S-097 Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 Natlonal security classlfled Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose Information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial Institutions [(b)(S) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] C. Closed In accordance with restrictions contained In donor's deed of gift. WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name Withdrawer EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC: MJD 4/27/2005 RECORDS File Folder FOIA CHERNOBYL F05-097 HARRIS, WILLIAM Box Number 90907 6 ID Document Type No of Doc Date Restric- Document Description pages tions 9126 REPORT 5 5/1/1986 Bl RE CHERNOBYL Freedom of Information Act- [5 U.S.C. 552(b)J 8-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIAJ 8-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIAJ 8-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIAJ 8-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIAJ 8-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIAJ 8-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA) 8-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIAJ 8-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIAJ C. Closed In accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift. NIO/USSR et a 1. 29 Aprii 1986 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER This is a very preliminary and tentative effort to scope out the implications of tnis disaster and related intelligence tasks. Althoug h it is by far the largest nuclear power plant accident in world history, the im.-n ediate effects are still far from clear. If we accept Soviet official claims that two people died in the immediate event at the plant and the other three reactors were shut down, then the Soviets did use forewarning of a meltdown (possibly up to 24 hours) to evacuate the plant. But this is still very uncertain. We have reports that evacuations in a 30 km radius are taking place. If these started well before the actual meltdown, immediate loss of life in the neighborhood may be quite small. But we also have rumors of hundreds, even thousands, of dead already, and of hospitals being heavily taxed. This suggests that only the plant took advantage of early warning. Agains, very uncertain .. Long-term effects, resulting from radiation and associated ecological impact, are very difficult to predict on the basis our sparce current data, and will be . influenced by variables such as weather and winds in the immediate future and Soviet protective measures. Apparent)y the fire in the grap~ite of the reactor continues to ir,ject n:ew radioactive contaminants into the atmosphere. H: ~ Some impli6~tions·'" _,,) Tne direct impact of the facility loss on the Soviet power economy is likely to be small. If the Soviets are obliged for safety reasons to shut down other reactors, it could have a noticeable impact. Large economic impacts could well arise from: The disruption of large areas downwind of the radiation source due to evacuations, shutdown of plants and facilities, and decontamination activities. The impact of radiation on agriculture, especially the dairy industry. Polution of water supplies, especially downstream on the Dniepr toward Kiev. 1 n:: :;c .. : c ; ·1;71: . ~ :: o-=7 t.r1f c,: c i c::;--:: t, ~ ~i · c-=: 1 -:_-.c ~- ~-: ~ :r:= ::J;-";;:;;e:: c: ctsJt l t es 61reacj· suff erec anc exo~c t ec ovEr t nE 1onger t erm. Even i f t ~e numb er of peop1 e phy sica l ly eff ected i n t he snort ru n is small , the l ingeri ng pub li c health effects of t his ki nd of radiological event coul d magnify social i mp act. A ma j or co ncern of Soviet citizens wil l be now well their syste~ looked out for the i r safety. And it will be of great importance to the regi me t o influence the way t nis is perceived, either by effective action or, as is the usual Soviet practice, by manipulating inf orrr, ati ori . The di saster co ul d exacerba t e ethnic and class resentments beca use, on present ev i dence! it seems likely that lower classes and Baltic and Ukraini an po pu lations will suffer disproportionately. If there is widespread death, illness, and dislocation, this event will be a severe psychological blow to the Gorbachev regime and its gospel of optimism, even if the economic effects are limited. No matter what the regime does or says, many Soviets will blame their suffering on a negligent system which only looks out for the nomenklatura. in a population where ancient superstitions still play a role, Chernobyl will be an evil omen. ln any case, the system under Gorbachev 1 s new leadership ~ill be put to a politically and psychologically important test: Di d it react with the honesty, efficiency, promptness, and public-mindedness he calls for? Or did : it manifest the usual sloth, carelessness, evasions, and outriont_- .,; r lies? Moscow w~ j show a strong inclination to find prominent people to blame and punis ~. Shcherbitskiy, the Ukrainian party boss, is likely to come under renewed fire . Although East European customers for Soviet electric power may face some disruptions and Soviet nuclear power plants are likely to lose their market for a while, the principal international effect s of this event are likely to political and psychological: Gov ernments and publics in both East and West Europe could be alienated in lasting ways by Soviet failure to provide any early warning, when something liKe three days were available. This will noticeably dull Soviet persuasiveness on all manner of negotiations, from arms control to trade, and their related propaganda efforts. _;f-efii SECREI ') ::, -:. a::ci:e r-.: Yrl ! i unocJ:i te- ci ·i.Y in ~p~r e tr,~ ~r ee r1 enc ot r1e r e~~tron~entally ori eGtec po 1it ica 1 mov ements t o ne ~ efforts directed ag 5inst nuclear power. If there are tangible environmental imoacts in West Europe, such a rise in the rate of cance r deaths, these could linger as problems for Soviet diplomacy in the years ahead. Some Intellioence Tasks Our ma in tasks wil l be to assess the magnitude of this accident and to track _tn~ implica~ions n~ted above and others that will surely develop, tecnn1ca :, economic, soc1al, and political. In addition, we can already identify some other intelligence concerns. The ca uses and phenomenology of this accident are of great interest simply because of the insight they will provide into nuclear safety and protective measures, a world-wide concern. Redactad- -Redactad--Redacted---Redacted---Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted--·-Redacted-- - - -Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted--Redacte Redacted-. --Redacted--Redacted--Redacted-· -Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted-- ---Redacted-· --Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted-- Redacted- -Redacted- -Redected-Redacted--Redacte1 Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted- -Redacted---Redacted--Redacted--Redacied- -Redacted-- - --Redacted- -Redacted-- Redacted--Redacted-- Redacted--Redacted--Redacted--Redacted--Redacte, Redacted- -Redacted- -Redacted- - ·-Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted--Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted- ---Redacted- -Redacted---Redactetl--Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted-:--Redacted--Redacted - -Redactec Redacted- -Redacted---.J4..---Redacted- -Redacted- ·-Re_dacted--Redacted--Redacted---Redacted--Redacted- ---Redacted-- -Reda(#e~Redacted--Redacted-- Redacted- -Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted ~ . Redacted--Redacted- ,-. -Redacted-- Redacted- -Redacted--Red.acted- -Redacted--Redacted--Redacted- - -·- -Redacted- -Redacted-~ - Redacted-_- . -. -Redacted--Redacted--Redacted- -Redacted--Redacted-- Redacted ' O,...,.J,.. ,..1,.. ,.1 D n. rlo rforl ----·-- · Oorlorforl .. DoMorfn,.J Po,fo,../or/_ _, __ _: Por/o,../or/_ ' - - RPrl::>r-fpr/_ _ Ror/::,,-.fpr/ __ Unless the Soviet government is uncharacteristically prompt and candid in disclosing information about this accident, US intelliaence will be a pri~cipal source o! ~ata and_an~lys~s on it, to inform~everything from us policy to world op1n1on.