The ERTMS/ETCS Signalling System an Overview on the Standard European Interoperable Signalling and Train Control System

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The ERTMS/ETCS Signalling System an Overview on the Standard European Interoperable Signalling and Train Control System The ERTMS/ETCS signalling system An overview on the Standard European Interoperable signalling and train control system CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 5 1.1 CONTEXT................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 PURPOSE AND RECIPIENTS ........................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.3 CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 1.4 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND ARTICLES ........................................................................................................................................ 6 1.5 ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................. 7 2 SOME HISTORY ABOUT RAILWAY SIGNALLING ................................................. 9 2.1 EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING BLOCK SYSTEMS .................................................................................................................................. 9 2.1.1 THE TRACK CIRCUIT ............................................................................................................................................................................ 10 2.1.2 THE AXLE COUNTER ............................................................................................................................................................................ 11 2.2 ATP SYSTEMS ............................................................................................................................................................................12 2.3 SAFE BRAKING CURVE ................................................................................................................................................................ 13 2.4 FROM NATIONAL ATP TO ERTMS/ETCS ........................................................................................................................................ 14 3 HS/HC RAILWAY LINES ................................................................................ 16 3.1 DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................................................ 16 3.2 TARGETS ................................................................................................................................................................................. 16 3.3 IMPLEMENTATION IN EUROPE .....................................................................................................................................................17 3.4 IMPLEMENTATION IN ITALY ....................................................................................................................................................... 18 3.4.1 ERTMS/ETCS ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 18 3.4.2 GSM-R ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 18 3.4.3 CSS - HS .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 19 4 ERTMS PROGRAMME ..................................................................................20 4.1 SOME HISTORY ABOUT ERTMS ................................................................................................................................................... 20 4.2 ADVANTAGES OF ERMTS ............................................................................................................................................................21 4.3 MODIFICATION OF ERTMS/ETCS SPECIFICATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 22 5 ETCS COMMAND-CONTROL AND SIGNALLING SYSTEM ................................... 24 5.1 ETCS LEVELS............................................................................................................................................................................. 24 5.1.1 ETCS - LEVEL 0 .................................................................................................................................................................................... 24 5.1.2 ETCS - LEVEL 1 .................................................................................................................................................................................... 24 5.1.3 ETCS - LEVEL 2 .................................................................................................................................................................................... 25 5.1.4 ETCS - LEVEL 3 .................................................................................................................................................................................... 26 5.2 ARCHITECTURAL DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................................................... 28 5.2.1 TRACKSIDE SUBSYSTEM ...................................................................................................................................................................... 29 5.2.1.1 ETCS ..........................................................................................................................29 5.2.1.1.1 RBCs .............................................................................................................................................. 30 5.2.1.1.2 NTG ............................................................................................................................................... 31 5.2.1.1.3 KMS ............................................................................................................................................... 31 5.2.1.1.4 EUROBALISES ................................................................................................................................ 31 5.2.1.1.5 LEU ................................................................................................................................................ 32 5.2.1.1.6 MARKER BOARDS .......................................................................................................................... 32 5.2.1.2 IXL ............................................................................................................................. 33 5.2.1.3 ATS ............................................................................................................................ 34 5.2.2 TRAINBORNE SUBSYSTEM .................................................................................................................................................................. 35 5.2.2.1 EVC ........................................................................................................................... 35 5.2.2.2 DMI ........................................................................................................................... 35 5.2.2.3 Odometry subsystem................................................................................................ 37 5.2.2.3.1 Wheel Sensor ................................................................................................................................ 38 5.2.2.3.2 Radar ............................................................................................................................................ 38 5.2.2.3.3 Accelerometer ............................................................................................................................... 39 5.3 FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 40 5.3.1 TRACKSIDE SUBSYSTEM ...................................................................................................................................................................... 40 5.3.1.1 IMPROVED SAFETY ................................................................................................... 40 5.3.1.1.1 Movement Authority .................................................................................................................... 40 5.3.1.1.2 Temporary Speed Restriction ........................................................................................................ 41 www.railwaysignalling.eu© 2013-2014 The ERTMS/ETCS signalling system Riproduction, use or disclosure of third parts without reference or express autorithy is forbidden. Equelly, if you recognize contents cited without explicit reference, please report to the staff and we’ll provide an update. Page 2 of 58 5.3.1.1.3 Dynamic Speed Monitoring ..........................................................................................................
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