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2005 Defining Venezuela's "Bolivarian Revolution"
Trinkunas, Harold A.
Military Review, July - August 2005 http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43090 Defining Venezuela’s “Bolivarian Revolution” Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D.
INDING A MOMENT in the history of U.S.- The Bolivarian revolution has produced a new FVenezuelan relations when tensions between constitution, a new legislature, a new supreme court the two countries have been worse than at the pres- and electoral authorities, and purges of Venezuela’s ent time is difficult. Some in the U.S. Government armed forces and state-owned oil industries. These perceive President Hugo Chávez Frias as uncoop- policies consolidated Chavez’s domestic authority erative regarding U.S. regional policies on coun- but generated a great deal of opposition in Ven- ternarcotics, free trade, and support for democracy. ezuela, including a failed coup attempt in 2002. Venezuela’s alliance with Fidel Castro’s Cuba, its Even so, after his victory in a presidential recall opposition to Plan Colombia, and its perceived referendum during the summer of 2004, Chávez sympathy for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of seems likely to consolidate his grip on power and Colombia (FARC) and other radical organizations even win reelection in 2006. are further irritants to the relationship. On the other Although the Bolivarian revolution is mostly side. Venezuelan leaders in the Chávez administra- oriented toward domestic politics, it also has an tion believe the United States is fundamentally important foreign policy component. Bolivarian opposed to the success of the Bolivarian revolution foreign policy seeks to defend the revolution in and that U.S. hegemony in the current world order Venezuela; promote a sovereign, autonomous lead- must be checked. ership role for Venezuela in Latin America; oppose Although officials in both countries occasionally globalization and neoliberal economic policies; and express hope that relations will improve, this is un- work toward the emergence of a multipolar world likely to happen given the perceptions each coun- in which U.S. hegemony is checked.2 The revolu- try’s foreign policymakers hold of each other.1 tion also opposes the war in Iraq and is skeptical Since he was elected president in 1998, Chávez of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The has transformed Venezuelan Government and soci- United States has worked fruitfully in the past with ety in what he has termed a Bolivarian revolution. Venezuela when the country pursued an indepen- Based on Chávez’s interpretation of the thinking dent foreign policy, but the last three policies run of Venezuelan founding fathers Simón Bolívar and directly contrary to U.S. foreign policy preferences Simón Rodríguez, this revolution brings together a and inevitably have generated friction between the set of ideas that justifies a populist and sometimes two countries.3 authoritarian approach to government, the integra- Still, the geopolitics of oil make it difficult for the tion of the military into domestic politics, and a United States and Venezuela to escape their tradition- focus on using the state’s resources to serve the al economic and political partnership. The United poor—the president’s main constituency. States is Venezuela’s most important consumer of its main export—oil. As a market, the United States The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the De- possesses key advantages for Venezuela, such as partment of Defense, or any other government office or agency.—Editor geographic proximity, low transportation costs, and
MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 39 an ever increasing demand for energy. Access to Cooperation and Conflict large Venezuelan oil deposits across short, secure The strategic importance of Venezuela to the sea lines of communication is undoubtedly a stra- United States only truly emerged after the discov- tegic asset for the United States. Also, the United ery in 1914 of major oil deposits in Venezuela. In States and Venezuela have often found common a sense, the United States was present at the cre- political ground after Venezuela democratized in ation of the Venezuelan oil industry. American oil 1958, particularly as the rest of Latin America companies and the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation moved away from authoritarianism during the created the physical infrastructure for Venezuela 1980s and 1990s. to become the largest oil exporter in the Western Nevertheless, friction between the United States Hemisphere. They also were key in shaping Ven- and Venezuela on trade policies, human rights, and ezuelan oil legislation and the role this natural regional politics is not new. What is different today resource would play in politics. The strategic im- about Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign policy is that portance of Venezuelan oil to the United States was it seems to be increasingly at odds with the United confirmed during World War II and reconfirmed States precisely in the areas that once brought the time and again during each political or military two countries together—oil and democracy. crisis of the Cold War and beyond. Venezuela is increasingly ambivalent about its Despite or perhaps because of these close ties, role as a key supplier of oil to the United States, friction arose between Venezuela and the United reaffirming its belief in the importance of the U.S. States over the U.S. preference for private owner- market yet threatening to deny access to oil as a ship of the oil industry in Venezuela, led by interna- strategic lever against U.S. policies. Chávez has tional corporations, and Venezuela’s preference for reinvigorated OPEC, which seemed moribund dur- policies that maximized national control over this ing the 1990s, and he has sought to build direct ties strategic asset. Beginning in the 1940s, Venezuelan to other non-OPEC oil producers, such as Russia, democratic governments sought greater access to and new markets, such as China. a share of the oil profit, initially through higher Ironically, just as U.S. President George W. royalties and taxes but, eventually, by state control Bush’s administration has become more vocal of the industry itself. Venezuela also promoted its about advocating democratization globally, Ven- views regarding the importance of national control ezuela and the United States have fallen out of of oil production in developing countries through step. Increasingly, Venezuela espouses an alterna- its leading role in the creation of OPEC.4 tive vision of participatory democracy that empha- To the credit of both governments, disagreements sizes mass mobilization and downgrades the role over oil policy were always resolved peacefully. of institutions. Venezuela also views U.S. support Venezuela developed a reputation as a reliable for representative democracy in Latin America as supplier of oil to U.S. markets, particularly in mo- thinly disguised meddling. ments of international crisis. One historic missed To what extent does Venezuela’s Bolivarian for- opportunity, at least from the Venezuelan perspec- eign policy represent a historic break with the past? tive, was that the United States never appeared to Does it represent a threat to U.S. interests? In some be interested in institutionalizing a special relation- ways, current friction between the two countries is ship with Venezuela over oil, which they blamed a replay of earlier disagreements over oil and de- on opposition by American oil companies.5 mocracy. What is new about Chávez’s Bolivarian Oil wealth generated during the 1970s allowed foreign policy is that it has moved beyond Venezu- Venezuela to pursue a more assertive foreign policy ela’s traditional efforts to maintain an independent that often irritated the United States. Venezuela’s foreign policy and maximize oil revenue to one of leading role in OPEC gave it a new prominence explicitly seeking out allies in a bid to check U.S. during the oil crises of the period. Venezuelan Pres- power and influence in Latin America. From the ident Carlos Andrés Pérez also promoted a Venezu- perspective of U.S. policymakers, this goal might elan leadership role in the nonaligned movement, seem unfeasible for a country with Venezuela’s which was often critical of U.S. policies. limited power and resources. Nevertheless, it is the In 1974, Venezuela reestablished diplomatic main axis of Bolivarian foreign policy. relations with Cuba.6 Venezuelan support for
40 July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW LATIN AMERICA the overthrow of dictator Anastasio Somoza in the same side of the Cold War divide. During this Nicaragua in 1979 showcased a willingness to period, Venezuela essentially sought to maintain an actively subvert governments once considered autonomous and sovereign foreign policy, promote U.S. allies. Venezuela also sought to contain and like-minded democratic governments in the region, change U.S. Central American policies during the and moderate U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. 1980s through its leadership role in the Contadora However, it was also careful not to place itself on a group, promoting confidence building and regional collision course with any core U.S. foreign policy peace negotiations as alternatives to a more con- interests. frontational United States stance with Nicaragua and Cuba.7 Bolivarian Foreign Policy Certainly Venezuelan influence in the region The current distance in U.S-Venezuelan re- during the Cold War, especially when backed by lations is greater than any gulf between the two abundant oil money, occasionally frustrated U.S. countries during the 20th century. Even on a designs. But these actions did not preclude frequent superficial level, the tone of current government cooperation between the two countries. After the exchanges is often unfriendly, personalized, and 1958 transition to democracy, Venezuela’s political frequently characterized by the use of derogatory leaders were firmly convinced of the importance of language.10 This cannot be attributed entirely to supporting like-minded governments in the region U.S. policy toward Venezuela or Latin America, and opposed the Cuban revolution model on both which differs only at the margins from the param- ideological and pragmatic grounds. U.S. Presidents eters established by U.S. administrations during John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson cooper- the 1990s. ated with the Venezuelans in defeating a Cuban- At its core, U.S. policy toward the region has backed insurgency in Venezuela during the 1960s. pushed for free elections, open markets, and free United States and Venezuelan militaries developed trade. The steady trend toward the election of strong mutual security and defense links through center-left governments in Latin America during this experience. the 2000s has produced little reaction from the Venezuela’s first leader of the democratic pe- Bush Administration other than a commitment to riod, Rómulo Betancourt, promulgated a doctrine develop friendly working relations while mostly of nonrecognition of both leftwing and rightwing adhering to its basic policies on democracy, mar- dictatorships in the Americas. With respect to kets, and trade.11 Even the greater willingness of rightwing dictatorships, this was a step too far the Bush administration to employ military force in for the United States, which often saw rightwing support of foreign policy and GWOT has not trans- authoritarian regimes as strategic partners in the lated into much of a difference for Latin America. Cold War.8 Venezuela and the United States found The growing U.S. involvement in Colombia is common ground in El Salvador during the 1980s only the continuation of a trend established long when both provided political support to President before the 2000 elections in the United States. In José Duarte’s Christian Democratic Government. fact, the great reduction in the use of U.S. military Venezuela also provided funding and security force in the region since the end of the Cold War assistance to assure the survival of the elected is notable when recalling previous U.S. efforts government of Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua during the 1980s in Grenada, Central America, after the Sandinista Government ended in 1990. and Panama.12 More important, the United States cooperated The changing pattern of Venezuela’s foreign extensively with Venezuelan political leaders after relations since Chávez’s election, particularly its the 1992 coup attempts to ensure the continuity of growing closeness to traditional U.S. adversaries representative government.9 such as Cuba and Iran and such potential challeng- Until 1998, leaders in both the United States and ers as Russia and China, disturbs many in the U.S. Venezuela understood they had important com- foreign policy establishment. At the same time, the mon economic interests that required sustaining Chávez administration is completely convinced a generally positive bilateral relationship. In addi- the United States is hostile to the success of its tion, both countries were democracies that valued revolution, pointing to the April 2002 coup at- freedom and individual liberty, placing them on tempt as evidence, correct or not, of U.S. designs
MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 41 on its survival. This begs the question: What are the aims of Army S U Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign policy, and are they the source of the growing political distance between the two countries? Chávez’s first foreign poli- cy objective was revitalizing OPEC, and he has succeeded completely, although he did benefit from burgeoning de- mand for energy in China, India, and the West. Such an objective represents a return to Venezuela’s 1970s policy of strong support for OPEC. Chávez has reached out to all Venezuelan officers seated with a U.S. major look over an operations order during a U.S. Southern Command exercise in 2001. Venezuela has since severed all other OPEC members whatever military-to-military links with the United States. their politics, even those on Washington’s short list of least favorite regimes, called Petrosur, to foster stronger regional integra- such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq (before the overthrow tion in the energy sector. At a hemispheric defense of the Hussein dictatorship).13 ministerial meeting in 2000, the Chávez adminis- Chavez has also invested a great deal of time tration unsuccessfully proposed integrating Latin in building relations with Russia and China, the American militaries and creating a regional defense former because of its important oil production alliance without U.S. participation.16 These propos- capacity, the latter because it is perceived as a als fit the Bolivarian theme of regional integration major potential consumer of Venezuelan exports. and suspicion of the United States. Beyond oil, these two countries are key partners The Chávez administration has also dissented in Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign policy because from the regional political trend toward insti- they represent alternative sources of technology tutionalizing international policies that defend and military equipment, and their decisions to co- representative democracy in the region, such operate with Chávez are unlikely to be influenced as the Organization of American States (OAS) by U.S. objections. The logical objective of this Democratic Charter. Instead, it has showcased policy is to reduce Venezuelan political, economic, its own “participatory democracy” as a superior and military dependence on the United States. We alternative. The election of Chilean José Miguel should remember that Venezuela will find it diffi- Insulza as secretary-general of the OAS with Ven- cult in the short term to escape its connection to the ezuelan backing is a limited victory on this issue U.S. oil market because the refineries most capable for Chávez.17 Chile has been one of the regional of processing the particular variety of heavy crude countries most supportive of representative democ- oil increasingly produced in Venezuela are almost racy and resistant to Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign all located in the United States.14 policy, particularly after Chávez’s comments sup- In Latin America, Venezuela has sought to porting Bolivian access to the Pacific Ocean at achieve a position of leadership and to rally support Chile’s expense. However, the OAS may lower for regional policies and institutions that exclude the profile of its democracy-promotion activities the United States. One particular area of friction in the future. has been the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of In relation to security measures, Venezuela has the Americas, to which Chávez has proposed an suspended all military-to-military links with the alternative—the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin United States and has sought alternative sources America and the Caribbean.15 He also called for an of military expertise and equipment from Brazil, alliance of state oil companies in Latin America, China, and Russia. Given the central role the
42 July-August 2005 MILITARY REVIEW LATIN AMERICA military plays in supporting the Chávez administra- resolved the standoff, but not before revealing the tion in Venezuela, the United States takes the loss lack of sympathy in the region for Colombia and of these military-to-military contacts seriously. its ally, the United States.22 Clearly, Venezuela wants to reduce its dependence Venezuela also entered a de facto alliance with on the United States in security and foreign policy Cuba. Cuban leader Fidel Castro is an important and develop an alternative network of allies.18 political ally for Chávez, and Cuba is a source Chávez is now focusing on communicating his of technical expertise to support the Bolivarian message more effectively internationally. As part of revolution. The influx of Cuban doctors, educators, an effort to increase its regional political and com- sports trainers, and security experts into Venezuela munications reach, the Venezuelan Government helps Chávez’s administration meet the demands is developing a regional alternative—Telesur—to of its key constituencies. In particular, Cubans U.S.-owned media outlets such as CNN. Telesur is provide politically reliable personnel to staff new also seen as an important mechanism to circumvent government poverty alleviation programs. For the role of privately owned Venezuelan media example, Barrio Adentro places Cuban medical companies, which are perceived as actively hostile personnel in many poor neighborhoods. In return, to the revolution.19 Cuba receives nearly 60,000 barrels of oil a day, The Venezuelan Government has also provided either on favorable payment terms or as a form of support to sympathizers across the Americas, in the trade in kind.23 Given the longstanding hostility United States, and throughout the developed world, between Washington and Havana, it is not sur- often sponsoring local Círculos Bolivarianos (Boli- prising that the new Caracas-Havana alliance has varian circles) to bring together its supporters over- generated suspicions in the U.S. foreign policy seas.20 This has provoked friction with a number of establishment. neighboring states, which suspect that the Chávez administration has aided political groups that are The Bottom Line either semi-loyal (Bolivia) or disloyal (Colombia) Venezuelan and U.S. national interests have to local democratic regimes. In particular, they never been identical. We should expect disagree- worry that the boom in Venezuelan oil revenues ment even in a relationship historically character- might translate into substantial material support for ized by the mutual interdependence generated forces opposed to the current democratic order in by oil, but when it comes to Chávez’s Bolivarian the politically volatile Andean Ridge. foreign policy, politics trumps economics. Chávez Since Chávez came to office, U.S. policymakers seems likely to win reelection in 2006, and have expressed concern about Venezuela’s relations it appears he will be around for a considerable with Colombia and Cuba. Venezuela has always period of time, which puts the United States in a had a tense relationship with Colombia because bind when it comes to dealing with the Bolivarian of border disputes and spillover effects of its revolution. neighbor’s multiple violent insurgencies. Tensions A policy of engagement, which is what the have worsened since Chávez became more vocal U.S. Government attempted in the first 2 years of in his opposition to Plan Colombia. Chávez’s administration, appears unlikely to gener- Colombian accusations of Venezuelan material ate a solid working relationship given Venezuela’s and moral support for the FARC have found a sym- Bolivarian foreign policy objectives. The United pathetic ear among U.S. policymakers.21 One of the States’ efforts to work with Venezuela since 1998, most salient indications of how much relations be- even on such noncontroversial issues as disaster tween the two countries have worsened is the case relief, have met with rejection. However, there ap- of the kidnapping of FARC leader Rodrigo Granda pears to be little sympathy, in Latin America and on Venezuelan territory in 2005. The Colombian internationally, for a policy of confrontation with Government paid a reward, allegedly to members the Venezuelan Government. International reaction of the Venezuela security forces, for the delivery to the 2002 coup in Venezuela and the reaction in of Granda to its territory. This led to weeks of ten- Latin America to the Venezuela-Colombia crisis sions between the two countries and a border trade over Granda’s kidnapping confirm this. If Wash- embargo by Venezuela against Colombia. Media- ington pursues such a diplomatic policy toward tion efforts by Brazil and other regional powers Chávez, he has already demonstrated that the likely
MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2005 43 outcome would be the isolation of Washington and its neighbors, particularly in light of Colombia’s its regional allies—not of Venezuela. growing strength. Even the development of alter- Washington’s dilemma does not mean Venezu- native markets for Venezuelan oil exports seems ela’s Bolivarian foreign policy is likely to succeed difficult to justify on anything other than political to any great extent. Venezuela has achieved its grounds since the economics of oil so strongly minimum foreign policy objective—the defense favor a U.S.-Venezuelan trade relationship. of the revolution. However, its leadership role in A final question remains. Will Venezuela’s new Latin America is still limited at best, and its ef- political model be emulated across the region? forts to construct alternative regional institutions This seems unlikely. The Bolivarian revolution, have failed. Brazil still remains South America’s which is not a coherent ideological model that leading power with long-established ambitions of can be replicated in other countries, depends on its own. Chávez’s personality, charisma, and drive. The Venezuela has succeeded in revitalizing OPEC, Bolivarian revolution increasingly depends on dis- although worldwide demand for energy in the tributing large amounts of oil income to serve key 2000s was likely to provide this opportunity even constituencies in Venezuela. Other Latin American in the absence of Chávez’s leadership. Venezuela’s countries lack such resources, and in the past have alliance with Cuba serves mostly to strengthen the not had much success at redistributing wealth. Chávez administration in domestic rather than in- This does not mean, however, that the underlying ternational politics. Despite Venezuelan opposition sources of political volatility in Latin America, to Plan Colombia, the Colombian state has become such as poverty, extreme income inequality, and stronger and better prepared to deal with violent poor economic policies, will soon disappear. Much nonstate actors within its territory, and the FARC to the consternation of Washington, governments has lost ground since Chávez came to power. that sympathize with some elements of the new Venezuela’s new alliances with Russia and Venezuelan foreign policy will emerge, particularly China are unlikely to produce much in the way in the Andean region where democracy seems most of military advantage for this country vis à vis vulnerable. MR
NOTES 1. Juan Forero, “U.S. Considers Toughening Stance toward Venezuela,” New 13. Ibid. York Times, 26 April 2005. 14. Joanne Shore and John Hackworth, “Impacts of the Venezuelan Crude Oil 2. Elsa Cardozo da Silva and Richard S. Hillman, “Venezuela: Petroleum, Production Loss,” Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Democratization and International Affairs,” in Latin American and Caribbean Washington, D.C., 2003; Daniel Fisher, “Hugo’s Folly,” Forbes.com., on-line at Foreign Policy, eds., Frank O. Mora and Jeanne K. Hey (Lanham, MD: Rowman < www.forbes.com/business/energy/2005/02/03/cz_df_0203citgo.html>, accessed & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 158-60, 11 July 2005. 3. Carlos A. Romero, “The United States and Venezuela: From a Special 15. “Chávez: Venezuela no está interesada en tratado de libre comercio con Relationship to Wary Neighbors,” in The Unraveling of Representative Democracy EEUU” [Venezuela is not that interested in free trade with the United States], El in Venezuela, eds., Jennifer L. McCoy and David Myers (Baltimore: The Johns Universal (12 July 2004). Hopkins University Press, 2004), 144-46. 16. Romero, 143. 4. Terry L. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petrostates (Berkeley: 17. Joel Brinkley and Larry Rohter, “Chilean, Once Opposed by U.S., is Elected The University of California Press, 1997). Head of O.A.S.,” New York Times, 3 May 2005. 5. Frank Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela (California: Stanford Uni- 18. Juan Forero and Brian Ellsworth, “Arms Buying by Venezuela Worries U.S.,” versity Press, 1975). New York Times, 15 February 2005; “Venezuela Ends Military Ties and Evicts 6. Cardozo and Hillman, 150-52. Some U.S. Officers,” New York Times, 25 April 2005; Pedro Pablo Peñaloza, “No 7. Michael Barletta and Harold Trinkunas, “Regime Type and Regional Security aceptamos críticas a reequipamiento de la FAN [Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales]” in Latin America: Toward a ‘Balance of Identity’ Theory,” in Balance of Power: [We do not accept criticism of reequipment of the FAN (National Armed Forces)], Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds., T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and El Universal (28 April 2005). Michel Fortmann (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 334-59. 19. Pascal Fletcher, “Chávez TV Channel Aims to be Latin American Voice,” 8. Harold A. Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: Reuters, 12 April 2005. A Comparative Perspective (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 20. Casto Ocando, “Redes chavistas penetran en EEUU” [Chavista networks forthcoming 2005). penetrate United States], El Nuevo Herald, 12 March 2005. 9. Ibid. 21. Trinkunas, 2005. 10. Maria Lilibeth da Corte, “Lagos le echó un balde de agua fría a Rice” 22. “Brasil facilitará dialogo entre Venezuela y Colombia por crisis” [Brazil [Lagos throws a bucket of cold water on Rice], on-line at
Harold A. Trinkunas is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, School of International Graduate Studies, Monterey, California. He received a B.S. from the University of Pennsylvania and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Stanford University.
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