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Debating Russian Demographic Security: Current Trends and Future Trajectories

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Debating Russian Demographic Security: Current Trends and Future Trajectories Graeme P. Herd and Gagik Sargsyan DEBATING RUSSIAN DEMOGRAPHIC SECURITY: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE TRAJECTORIES President Putin in his annual 2006 address to the Federal Assembly argued that demographic decline was Russia’s most acute problem.1 He also instructed Igor Ivanov, then the secretary of the Security Council, to focus on the three main threats to Russia: “First, technological breakdown problems, the threat of a possible technological breakdown. Second, the threat related to unfavorable demographic developments, and third, the threat in the sphere of national security, defence issues primarily.”2 The importance of the issue as a priority, even amongst other panFederation projects, was evidenced by Putin’s initiative in June 2006 to rename the Council on National Projects to the Council on National Projects and Demographic Policy (officially the Council for the Implementation of Priority National Projects and Demographic Policy).3 Other elite figures have also noted the demographic crisis through the prism of state securi ty. Putin’s representative to the Far Eastern Federal Distinct, Kamil Iskhakov, has stated that ANALYSES for Russia to successfully modernize “we have to stop the outflow of population” as over the last 15 years the population of the Far East has reduced by 20 percent “due to migration and the imbalance of birth and death rates.”4 Vasiliy Smirnov, the deputy head of the General Staff, noted the militarysecurity consequences of demographic decline as the conscript recruitment pool diminishes by 100,000 new recruits each year.5 Party political representa tives have tended, perhaps as befits politicians, to dramatize the demographic crisis, describing it in apocalyptic terms: an “extraordinary demographic crisis” and a “demograph ic catastrophe.” Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov, leader of Russia’s Party "Fair Russia" (whose platform is based on resolving the demographic crisis), noted that Russia might have only 52 million people by 2080 if urgent measures are not taken. Communist Party of Russia leader Gennady Zyuganov has stated that “the country is losing its popula tion. It has lost 10 million people in 15 years, of whom nine million are Russians. The preser vation of the people is such a crying problem that it cannot be avoided.”6 Patriarch Alexei II has also joined this chorus of concern, stating: “We are living in the days where the death of our people has begun.”7 This article briefly examines the relationship between demographic decline, the associated migration changes within the Russian Federation and how this impacts on Russian stability. It identifies the effects of demographic decline on political processes and socioeconomic con ditions in Russia and demonstrates their security implications and consequences. It con cludes by proposing policy recommendations to better manage demographic decline by SECURITY INDEX No. 2 (82), Volume 13 51 countering the worst effects of the destabilizing security dilemmas that arise within and between the political, economic, and societal security sectors. DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS Putin has noted that “profound demographic studies” are not yet being conducted in Russia, even though “we do need this systemic information.”8 The Russian October 2002 census results have confirmed trends already anticipated by many demographers. According to the U.S. census bureau, Russia’s population is set to fall annually by 400,000 and thus 10 million by 2025.9 The UNDP calculates the annual decline at 840,000 or falling by 21 million by 2025, a quarter—or 31 million—by 2050.10 The Russian population dropped by 4,371,200 between 1992 and 2002—“the natural decline of the population was 7,399,800, a decline of 5 percent from the 1989 to the 2002 census: this figure consisted of 20,540,000 births and 27,939,800 deaths.”11 The Russian population is declining fast, by an estimated 700750,000 people each year. Between January and July 2006, for example, the Russian population fell by more than 380,000, to 142.4 million.12 Russia’s Economic Development Ministry’s socioeconomic devel opment forecast for 20062009 reports that by 2009 Russia’s population will have fallen to between 140.4 and 140.7 million.13 In projecting Russian population levels between 1950 and 2050 (see Figure 1 below), it is inter esting to note that although the United States Census Bureau and the United Nations Population Division provide estimates, neither the Federal Service of State Statistics (Rosstat) or, as far as we know, any other official Russian projections for that time period are provided. However, there are a few studies (most of them generally covering the period until 2020) that have been undertaken by Russian specialists. Anatoly Vishnevsky and Evgeny Andreyev, for example, provide a survey and projection from 1950 to 2050.14 In one calculated projection for 20002050 they do not take into account a possible positive migration growth, thereby allow ing us to view clearly the impact of migration on Russian demographic trends. Vishnevsky and Andreyev’s final figure for total Russian population by 2050 is 103.3 billion (with low fertility and decreasing death rates and zero migration growth), while those of the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations are higher by approximately 10 million.15 Figure 1. Population Prospects, 1950–205016 146,560 160,000 146,709 145,600 140,000 134,233 129,230 134,293 134,200 128,180 128,000 120,000 111,752 102,702 109,187 101,936 102,200 103,300 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 Persons, in thousands 20,000 0 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 Years US Census Bureau UN Population Division Vishnevsky A., Andreyev E. 52 DEBATING RUSSIAN DEMOGRAPHIC SECURITY: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE TRAJECTORIES Vishnevsky and Andreyev (see Figure 2, below) also suggest that only with increasing fertility and falling death rates do their projections approximate those of the United Nations or U.S. Census Bureau estimates. Figure 2. Population Projection Given Zero Migration Growth17 160 140 120 100 80 60 Millions of persons 40 20 0 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 Years Low Fertility/High Death Rates Low Fertility/Decreasing Death Rates Increasing Fertility/High Death Rates Increasing Fertility/Decreasing Death Rates The Center for Demography in Moscow reported 793,000 more deaths than births in 2004. In 2004 the average birth rate in Russia stood at 132 live births per 100 women of child bearing age (between 15 and 49 years) “and this is insufficient to ensure even the simple reproduction of the population.”18 In 198687 the fertility rate was 2.19 births per woman, this fell to 1.17 in 1999 and rose to 1.34 in 2006, but 2.14 births per woman is still needed ANALYSES to allow for the mere reproduction of the population. In 2006 Yekaterina Lakhova, the chair woman of the State Duma Committee for Women’s Affairs, reported that almost half of Russian families are childless: “What’s the Russian family like today? It’s mainly childless. In almost half of families (out of 41 million families) there aren’t any children at all.”19 While birth rates have been consistently falling for more than two decades, a number of longer term factors, not the least of which is poor health conditions, have brought about an increase in the death rate. Between 1989 and 1994, life expectancy for Russian men fell by more than six years and the gender gap in mortality is startling: by 2006 Russian women were living to 72 years on average, men to just 59 years. If these trends are not reversed or offset by mass immigration, by 2050 the Russian population will have fallen by 50 million, taking it below 100 million.20 Migration to Russia of ethnic Russians and Russianspeaking populations from outside the Russian Federation fails to compensate for the natural decrease in the population, though experts and specialists admit that exact figures are lacking.21 Basic trends are, however, clear. In Figure 3 we can see that there is a marked decrease in the total annual number of arrivals in Russia between 1994, the peak year of immigration, and 2004, with numbers once again on the rise by 2005. This increase is almost exclusively accounted for by immigration from CIS states: the number of arrivals from nonCIS countries is not only very small in absolute numbers but also even this small number is slowly decreasing. SECURITY INDEX No. 2 (82), Volume 13 53 Internal migration in Russia is commonly referred to by specialists as one of “zapadny dreif,” that is, “western drift.”22 This metaphor of population shift and redistribution captures a very important new phenomenon, namely the reversal of the 20th century trend of movement from West to East: in the 21st century the movement is from East to West.23 One of Russia’s leading demographers, Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, notes that “The territorial preferences of the popu lation have divided Russia into two opposite parts: The Southwestern zone of inflow and the Northeastern zone of outflow. The separation cuts through MoscowSt. PetersburgKazan.”24 Nikita Mkrcthian provides a more detailed description of internal migration patterns by analyz ing internal migration on the federal level (seven federal districts) and the regional level. According to Mkrtchian, since 1991 Russia’s population has mainly been moving from the Siberian and Far Eastern Federal Districts to the Central and Western Districts. As Putin noted, “The income of the population in real terms is 85 per cent of the average level in Russia, and the cost of life in the [Siberian Federal] District is higher then the average in Russia…”25 The Russian Far East, which constitutes 41 percent of Russian territory, lost two million inhabitants over the last 14 years—only six percent of the population live there.26 Figure 3.
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