29 febbraio 2012

Alla vigilia delle presidenziali: dalle proteste, al ruolo della classe media, alle relazioni con Ue e Italia Oleg Barabanov(*)

L’atmosfera alla vigilia delle elezioni presidenziali in è molto effervescente a causa di un’inattesa attivazione della società civile, a partire dall’ufficializzazione dei risultati delle elezioni alla Duma del 4 dicembre 2011. Pochi giorni dopo migliaia di moscoviti sono scesi in strada per dare vita a una imponente e variegata manifestazione, la più grande protesta a Mosca dai tempi della perestroika e della dissoluzione dell’Unione Sovietica. Quali sono le cause di questo movimento di protesta? Sicuramente c’è stato un effetto contagio da parte della Primavera araba. Ma come dimostra la storia contemporanea i soli fattori esterni non sono sufficienti a comprendere e spiegare dinamiche così complesse. La Rivoluzione arancione in Ucraina di fine 2004 non ebbe, per esempio, alcun effetto sul precedente ciclo elettorale russo (2007-2008), a differenza di ciò che si attendevano molti esperti e analisti in Occidente. Per questo ciò che accade oggi in Russia deve essere letto in chiave interna e non soltanto analiz- zando il comportamento della classe media nelle grandi città russe. In generale, una nuova classe media era già emersa durante il precedente ciclo elettorale (2007-2008) in quanto quelli erano gli anni del cosiddetto “decennio grasso”, il periodo della continua crescita dell’economia russa grazie agli alti prezzi del petrolio. Tale benessere aveva consentito di aumentare i salari che in molte città russe hanno addirittura superato i livelli delle retribuzioni nell’Ue. Tuttavia in quel periodo la classe media non ha avanzato richieste politiche, né ha espresso la volontà di un maggiore coinvolgimen- to nella gestione della cosa pubblica. Mi sembra che il catalizzatore attuale dell’attivismo sociale della classe media sia proprio la crisi del 2009 in quanto si teme che il livello di benessere e il nuo- vo stile di vita raggiunti in precedenza possano essere compromessi. Le motivazioni delle proteste russe non appaiono perciò troppo dissimili da quelle che hanno ali- mentato il movimento newyorkese di “Occupy Wall Street”, che pacificamente denuncia i guasti del capitalismo finanziario e quello degli “Indignados” europei che contestano il sistema bancario e auspicano maggiore equità e più lavoro. In questi due casi è stata proprio la crisi a mettere in moto la protesta popolare e si è assistito alla trasformazione della consumerist society in società dei cittadini. Affermo questo non in riferimento alle Ong che sono sempre state attive sia nell’Ue che negli Usa, ma alla classe media, intesa sia come white collars che come blue collars. Negli Stati Uniti il passaggio da semplici consumatori a cittadini è stato ancora più interessante che nell’Ue. Il movimento “Occupy Wall Street” ha ricordato a molti in Russia il senso civico che emer- se duranti i primi anni della perestroika. L’euforia che si coglieva al parco Zucotti a New York mo- stra che molti dei partecipanti a queste proteste per la prima volta si sono sentiti non semplicemen- te consumatori, felici della propria vita, ma cittadini finalmente consapevoli. Un esempio molto inte- ressante è il discorso (postato su Youtube) – una sfilza di slogan popolari e piuttosto banali – che il

Le opinioni espresse sono strettamente personali e non riflettono necessariamente le posizioni dell’ISPI. Oleg Barabanov, direttore del Dipartimento di Politiche pubbliche europee dell’Istituto degli Studi europei dell’Università statale di Mosca di Relazioni internazionali – MGIMO –, autore del recente libro Italia dopo la guerra fredda: dalla media potenza verso il mondo dei protagonisti, pubblicato dalla Casa editrice dell’Università MGIMO. 2 ISPI - Commentary

filosofo sloveno Slavoj Zizek ha pronunciato a parco Zucotti e che i presenti hanno ripetuto frase dopo frase per circa mezz’ora. Tutto ciò mi ha fatto tornare alla mente le prime proteste di massa ai tempi della perestroika. Ed è esattamente la trasformazione della classe media da consumatori in cittadini in seguito ai guasti della crisi che ha spinto molti russi a scendere in piazza nelle grandi città. Alle preoccupazioni per le conseguenze dell’esito delle elezioni presidenziali si aggiunge una certa apprensione dei russi rispetto alla stabilità monetaria europea e alla tenuta dell’euro. Sin dall’inizio della crisi dell’euro in Russia si sono delineate due tendenze contrapposte rispetto a questo tema. Da una parte, una parte dell’opinione pubblica russa ha espresso un certo compiacimento nel con- statare che anche l’Ue stava attraversando un momento critico sia in termini economici che di cli- ma di opinione e quindi di legittimità della stessa costruzione europea. Questo sentimento si spie- ga col fatto che l’opinione pubblica russa si è stancata delle “lezioni” impartite dall’Ue al paese e dell’atteggiamento di superiorità ostentato da alcuni suoi funzionari. Si è parlato a lungo di “neo- imperialismo” e “neo-colonialismo” per descrivere il rapporto asimmetrico fra Ue e Russia. Questa insofferenza è emersa soprattutto durante l’amministrazione Obama. In seguito alla politica del reset the button del 2009, il presidente statunitense ha abbandonato i tradizionali toni paternalistici nei confronti della Russia e ha optato per un approccio più pragmatico. Un ruolo importante nel giudizio dei russi nei confronti dell’Ue lo ha giocato il recente rafforzamen- to dei rapporti strategici russo-cinesi. Solo nell’ultimo anno (e in relazione con la crisi dell’euro) si può cogliere un cambiamento di fondo nel tono e nelle dichiarazioni di molti esperti e politologi cinesi. A partire dall’estate-autunno 2011 molti di loro hanno iniziato a parlare apertamente di un mondo futuro sino-centrico, di come l’ordine mondiale sia entrato in una fase di trasformazione senza ritorno indietro (prima i cinesi si rifiutavano di trattare di questi temi e sottolineavano che il loro paese non nutre ambizioni globali). In questa nuova prospettiva, i cinesi hanno iniziato a defi- nire la Russia come il “sostegno strategico” o come la “schiena strategica” della Cina e hanno pro- gressivamente cercato una convergenza con Mosca riguardo a decisioni e posizioni in ambito in- ternazionale. Il formato Brics (Brasile, Russia, India, Cina e Sudafrica) ha contribuito in maniera rilevante a questa nuova tendenza. Non bisogna dimenticare che la Cina è l’unica grande econo- mia che nonostante la crisi e, a differenza dell’Ue, ha continuato a crescere. Questo dato ha spinto molti a considerare la possibilità che la Cina possa sostituirsi all’Ue come partner economico stra- tegico della Russia e che l’aquila russa possa realmente guardare non più solo a ovest ma sempre di più anche a est. Nel corso del 2011 la Russia ha perduto perciò percettibilmente interesse verso l’Ue e ha ri-orientato i suoi interessi verso la Cina. Allo stesso tempo, in Russia si riscontra anche un’altra posizione che rimane tuttora molto forte. Dal momento che l’Ue è il cliente principale delle esportazioni russe di gas e petrolio, il permanere della crisi e un’eventuale diffusione della recessione nei diversi paesi membri dell’Unione Europea finirà con l’avere riverberi negativi sulla stessa crescita russa. È necessario perciò che la Russia adotti misure serie per aiutare i paesi dell’Ue a uscire dalla crisi perché solo così sarà in grado di salvaguardare anche i propri interessi economici. Questa è stata anche la posizione del presidente Medvedev. La Russia non ha perciò esitato a sostenere l’euro sia all’interno del Fmi che, indiret- tamente, sul mercato, acquistando le obbligazioni dei paesi della zona euro. La Russia ha quindi accolto positivamente la formazione di un nuovo governo in Italia sotto la guida dell’ex commissa- rio europeo Mario Monti. È nell’interesse russo che l’Italia si salvi e le chance che Monti porti il paese e il suo sistema finanziario fuori dalla crisi sono più alte (rispetto a quello che è riuscito a fare Berlusconi). La Russia è pronta a sostenere l’Italia in questi sforzi. Tuttavia a Mosca si teme che il governo Monti possa vacillare a causa della crescente opposizione dei sindacati alle misure di contenimento della spesa pubblica e dell’ostilità di varie lobby a una liberalizzazione di alcuni comparti dell’economia. Si potrebbe aprire allora una pericolosa fase di instabilità che potrebbe creare una grave falla a livello europeo. ISPI - Commentary 3

È probabile anche che la nuova presidenza russa sia più assertiva nel relazionarsi con Bruxelles. La nomina a presidente del Comitato per gli affari esteri della nuova Duma del conduttore televisi- vo Aleksei Pushkov (sostituisce Konstantin Kosachev, politico dallo stile diplomatico e moderato), noto per le sue simpatie per visioni radicali e per il rafforzamento della posizione internazionale russa, va in questa direzione. La Russia continuerà la politica dell’energy superpower sia nei rap- porti con i paesi dello spazio post-sovietico che con quelli europei. Dopo l’avvio del Nord Stream l’attenzione principale sarà sulla realizzazione dell’altro progetto di gasdotto – South Stream. Rela- tivamente a quest’ultimo appare evidente la stretta collaborazione costruttiva con l’Italia in quanto proprio l’Italia potrebbe in prospettiva diventare il consumatore-chiave del gas trasportato dal South Stream, mentre Eni è già uno dei partner principali di Gazprom nella costruzione di tale ga- sdotto. Così i rapporti tradizionalmente stabili tra l’Italia e la Russia riceveranno uno stimolo ag- giuntivo per il loro ulteriore rafforzamento. Dal momento che l’ex cancelliere tedesco Gerhard Schröder presiede il consorzio del Nord Stre- am, a Mosca si vocifera (sono apparsi alcuni articoli in tono ironico) che la stessa carica per il South Stream potrebbe ora toccare all’ex presidente del Consiglio Silvio Berlusconi. Tuttavia que- sta opzione sembra poco plausibile. Non è un segreto che la leadership russa abbia avuto relazioni molto strette con l’ex presidente del Consiglio Silvio Berlusconi. Il presidente e poi primo ministro della Federazione Russa, , aveva costruito un rapporto personale di amicizia ed empatia con Berlusconi. L’Italia e la Russia hanno maturato visioni comuni per le questioni di politica internazionale e hanno sviluppato in maniera attiva i loro rapporti bilaterali sia politici che economici. Per di più l’Italia di Berlusconi ha spesso contribuito a stimolare all’interno dell’UE un dibattito su tematiche di particolare interesse per la Russia come la questione dell’abolizione dei visti tra l’area Schengen e la Russia, che costi- tuisce uno dei punti più critici nel dialogo Mosca-Bruxelles. Ebbene la proposta di abolire il regime dei visti è stata per la prima volta lanciata dallo stesso Silvio Berlusconi durante la presidenza ita- liana dell’Ue nel 2003. Inoltre, in occasione del conflitto russo-georgiano dell’agosto 2008, l’Italia ha sostenuto l’azione diplomatica svolta dalla presidenza di turno detenuta dal presidente francese, Nicolas Sarkozy, che ha mediato fra e Russia al fine di pervenire a un accordo (12 agosto) in sei punti per il cessate-il-fuoco. L’Italia si è opposta anche alla convocazione di una riunione di emergenza dei capi di stato e di governo come invocato da Lettonia, Polonia, Repubblica Ceca e Svezia e all’applicazione di sanzioni nei confronti di Mosca. L’Italia si è alla fine allineata alla decisione del Consiglio europeo straordinario (1 settembre 2008) che ha definito la reazione russa in Georgia sproporzionata. Il presidente del Consiglio italiano tuttavia sottolineò la propria perplessità sul con- cetto di “proporzionalità della reazione” in un contesto complesso come quello della Georgia. Non sorprende quindi che, in seguito alle dimissioni dell’ex premier italiano, Putin abbia espresso pubblicamente il suo apprezzamento nei confronti di Berlusconi. Negli ambienti politici russi si è sentita, diciamo, una certa nostalgia per Berlusconi dopo la sua uscita di scena, temendo che ciò potesse avere un impatto negativo sulle relazioni con Roma. La reazione russa al nuovo governo italiano è stata di neutralità, nonostante non ci fossero motivi per essere critici nei suoi confronti. L’Italia insieme alla Germania è tra i partner economici dell’Ue tra i più importanti della Russia e un default dell’economia italiana non corrisponde affatto agli interessi russi, anzi a Mosca c’è molta apprensione sulla tenuta dell’euro. Nella misura in cui il nuovo primo ministro Mario Monti sarà in grado di stabilizzare l’Italia e quindi di salvaguardare l’euro, ciò sarà estremamente apprezzato dalla leadership russa. In generale i politici russi non si attendono cambiamenti sostanziali nei rapporti con l’Italia. L’interdipendenza energetica fra Italia e Russia è molto forte così come molto attive sono le piccole e medie imprese (Pmi) italiane in Russia. L’operato di queste ultime viene coordinato dalle Camere 4 ISPI - Commentary

di commercio delle diverse regioni italiane all’interno di accordi tra le regioni italiane e quelle russe. Il totale degli investimenti diretti italiani in Russia supera i 10 miliardi di euro e se togliessimo gli investimenti diretti esteri in Russia provenienti da paesi membri Ue, quali Cipro, Lussemburgo, Gran Bretagna, il cui totale ammonta a circa 20-40 miliardi di euro (una parte importante di questi però consiste in capitali russi che ritornano in patria), allora l’Italia risulterebbe tra i leader Ue in termini di investimenti in Russia. La storia degli ultimi vent’anni mostra che l’Italia è sempre stata, sotto qualsiasi governo, desidero- sa di instaurare un dialogo costruttivo con la Russia. Ad esempio, proprio nel 2000, quando l’Italia era guidata da un governo di centro-sinistra, il ministro degli Esteri Lamberto Dini si adoperò in sede di Consiglio d’Europa (l’Italia ne deteneva allora la presidenza) affinché la Russia non fosse sospesa dall’Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio d’Europa a causa della seconda guerra cece- na. Quindi Mosca si attende un mantenimento delle dinamiche positive nei rapporti politici bilaterali anche con il nuovo governo. Dubbi sorgono tuttavia per altri aspetti. In primo luogo, l’influenza della Russia sui rapporti italo- americani. Silvio Berlusconi ha cercato di presentare l’Italia come un “ponte” tra Washington e Mosca. E questa politica era molto efficace, soprattutto durante l’amministrazione Bush. In quel periodo, grazie ai suoi rapporti personali sia con Bush che con Putin, Berlusconi riuscì ad ammor- bidire diverse tensioni tra la Russia e gli Stati Uniti. Alla realizzazione di questo “ponte” ha contri- buito molto anche l’operato dell’ex ministro degli Esteri Franco Frattini, considerato a Mosca uno dei politici italiani più filo-americani. Nonostante l’amministrazione Obama e un dialogo aperto con gli Usa, la Russia tuttavia rimane interessata alla presenza di simili “ponti” allo scopo di elaborare dei framework di dialogo più flessibili e trovare forme di compro- messo su questioni particolarmente complicate nei rapporti russo- La ricerca ISPI analizza americani (quali la difesa anti-missile e altre). Di conseguenza è le dinamiche politiche, nell’interesse della Russia che l’Italia perseveri in una politica estera strategiche ed economiche di mediazione fra Washington e Mosca. Per ora il governo guidato del sistema internazionale da Monti non ha avuto occasione di dare segnali chiari su questo con il duplice obiettivo di punto. La nomina a ministro degli Esteri di Giulio Terzi di informare e di orientare Sant’Agata, ex ambasciatore italiano negli Usa, indica però che le scelte di policy. avere stretti rapporti con Washington sarà una delle priorità della I risultati della ricerca politica estera italiana. vengono divulgati Un’altra questione che ancora non appare chiara a Mosca è in che attraverso pubblicazioni modo i rapporti tra Roma e Bruxelles all’interno dell’Ue influenze- ed eventi, focalizzati su ranno i rapporti con Mosca. Prima Berlusconi conduceva una politi- tematiche di particolare ca estera più autonoma da Bruxelles e questo consentiva all’Italia di interesse per l’Italia e le sue relazioni internazionali. posizionarsi come “ponte” non solo tra Mosca e Washington, ma anche tra Mosca e Bruxelles. Tuttavia, Berlusconi non era visto Le pubblicazioni online positivamente da alcuni politici e funzionari Ue e, non è un segreto, dell’ISPI sono realizzate che molti a Bruxelles esplicitamente auspicassero le sue dimissioni. anche grazie al sostegno Ciò ovviamente ha indebolito il suo potenziale “lobbistico” presso la della Fondazione Cariplo. Commissione europea. È evidente ora che Mario Monti, a differenza di Berlusconi, con la sua politica estera non si permetterà una simile autonomia dalla Commissione europea, ciò nonostante la sua auto- ISPI rità a Bruxelles è senza dubbio decisamente più elevata rispetto a Palazzo Clerici quella del suo predecessore. Se la Russia riuscisse ad accordarsi Via Clerici, 5 I - 20121 Milano su alcune questioni cruciali con l’Italia, allora nuovamente essa po- www.ispionline.it trebbe rafforzare la propria posizione in ambito europeo e persegui- re più agevolmente i propri interessi nazionali. © ISPI 2012

Philip Hanson No. 100 – MARCH 2012

Economic challenges for Putin Abstract

After the economic boom in the period 1998-2008, when GDP growth averaged 6.8%, now Russia is recovering from the global crisis faster than most Western economies. In his first two presidential terms, 2000-2008, Vladimir Putin was Nevertheless, its recent growth lucky. The massive devaluation of the rouble in 1998 had kick- rate of 4% is below-par for an started Russia’s economic recovery; then rising oil prices, sup- emerging-market economy, ported by abundant cheap credit from abroad to Russian compa- and it is not expected to im- nies, together with growth in Europe – Russia’s main export mar- prove. ket – produced a boom. When things went wrong, from 2008, Russia might have fallen into Putin was at least somewhat less conspicuously in charge. Now the so-called “middle-income he returns to the presidency at a time when the economy, though trap”. The economy of the growing again, faces big problems. country is confronted with challenges such as: a declin- Russia has not returned to the boom of 1998-2008, when GDP ing working-age population, growth averaged 6.8% and personal real incomes were growing lack of technology, oscillating faster still. Russia’s recent growth rate of 4% would be welcome oil price, reduction of interna- in the West, but it is below-par for an emerging-market economy, tional credit, Europe’s stagna- and it is not expected to improve. Indeed there are scenarios in tion. which it could get a lot worse. In addition, there are big question Next President’s legitimacy will marks about the public finances. even more depend on the eco- Some Russian analysts have suggested that Russia has fallen nomic performance of the into the “middle-income trap”. A number of initially fast-growing country. middle-income countries experienced, at around $16,000 per capita GDP (international purchasing power, 2005 prices), a slow- down. This was apparently because the scope for catching up the developed world by absorbing foreign technology and by the movement of resources out of low-productivity into higher- productivity lines of production began to narrow. This might be part of the problem for Russia but other influences Philip Hanson is Professor at the are more obviously at work. The working-age population has University of Birmingham , Centre for started to decline, and there is now much slower growth of inter- Russia and East European Studies and Associate Fellow of Chatham national credit to Russian banks and non-bank corporations; House. moreover, the European economy is in bad shape and there is uncertainty about future oil prices.

Last year the Higher School of Economics Institute of Demographics projected an 11 million decline in working-age (*) The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not population over ten years, in the absence of net immigration. This necessarily reflect the position of is a profound change. During the boom, employment was growing ISPI.

2 ISPI - Analysis

at about 1% a year and the working-age population was also increasing, even while the total popu- lation was in decline. Now the state statistical agency projects a fall of just over 10 million in work- ing-age population between 2010 and 2030, even after allowing for net in-migration of 4.5 million. A steep fall in the number of young labour-force entrants has already begun. This means that the problem is not just one of reduced labour inputs. Young people are more geographically and occu- pationally mobile than older workers, and more open to the upgrading of education and skills. The drop in their numbers will therefore slow productivity growth from occupational shifts and improve- ments in human capital. The slow-down in international credit has been abrupt. Loans outstanding to Russian banks rose four-and-a-half-fold in the three years to October 2008; three years later the total was down by about a fifth. The corresponding figures for non-bank corporations are a three-fold increase and very slightly (5.7%) up. There is no prospect of lending returning any time soon to its former growth rate. Europe’s weakness matters because about half of Russia’s exports go there. As for the oil price, it is perfectly true that it may well rise further; but recent experience has reminded everyone that the price can fall as well as rise. These circumstances point to a trend rate of growth over the next decade of around 4% a year. If the capital stock continues to grow at about 3% annually, while the labour force declines at per- haps 0.5% a year and productivity growth, for the reasons suggested above, weakens somewhat, it is hard to make a case for 5%, let alone more. And if there were to be a sustained fall in the oil price, the Russian economy could slow down or even go into reverse. So growth prospects are problematic. So is the outlook for the public finances. Some ambitious public spending has been approved for the next few years, especially on the mili- tary, but budget plans do not allow for sustained falls in the oil price. The capacity of the government to resist further the big spenders is in some doubt following the challenges to Putin’s authority. The temptation to keep the defence and welfare lobbies on side will be stronger than before. Figure 1 shows official budget plans for 2012-14 and budgets from 2015 through 2020 as projected in a 2020 strategy document. The chart also shows the assumed average annual Urals oil price in each year. The picture is one of continued deficits but at the same time (and optimistically) no sig- nificant fall in the oil price. This year Urals oil would need to average $116/barrel for the federal budget to break even. Figure 1 - Russia: federal budgets actual and planned, 2010-20 and the average annual Urals oil price (% of GDP and US $/barrel)

25 120

100 20

80 15

60

10 40 Average annual Urals oil price ($/b)

Federal budget income & expenditure (% GDP) (% expenditure & budget income Federal 5 20

0 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

revenue spending oil price ISPI - Analysis 3

Experts advising the government on its economic strategy have La ricerca ISPI analizza le called for all the standard institutional changes, including inde- dinamiche politiche, strategi- pendent courts and a level playing field for all firms. Aleksey che ed economiche del siste- Kudrin, the former finance minister, has called for automatic ma internazionale con il du- spending cuts if the oil price falls. Russia’s leaders are unlikely to plice obiettivo di informare e di orientare le scelte di policy. liberalise the economy because their own power depends on corrupt links with business. They are unlikely to curb spending I risultati della ricerca ven- because of the fragility of their political base. gono divulgati attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi, focal- Putin could be lucky again. If he isn’t, the outlook is not good. izzati su tematiche di partico- lare interesse per l’Italia e le sue relazioni internazionali e articolati in:

9 Programma Africa 9 Programma Caucaso e Asia Centrale 9 Programma Europa 9 Programma Mediterraneo e Medio Oriente 9 Programma Russia e Vicini Orientali 9 Programma Sicurezza e Studi Strategici

9 Progetto Argentina 9 Progetto Asia Meridionale 9 Progetto Cina e Asia Orientale 9 Progetto Diritti Umani 9 Progetto Disarmo 9 Progetto Internazionaliz- zazione della Pubblica Amministrazione

Le pubblicazioni online dell’ISPI sono realizzate anche grazie al sostegno della Fondazione Cariplo. SPI Palazzo Clerici Via Clerici, 5 I - 20121 Milano www.ispionline.it © ISPI 2012

No. 215 - MARCH 2012 Laura Petrone

The Russian Opposition Abstract and the 2011 Duma Elections. (*) Potential and Problems of a Multifaceted Movement The Russian opposition is increas- ingly in the spotlight after the December mass protests. The scale of the demonstrations was such that they received high reso- nance in the media. Even State- controlled news outlets, which usually omit coverage of political Following the last Duma elec- constraints come into evi- dissent, thoroughly reported on tions (December 4th) Moscow dence with regard to the Rus- the opposition’s rallies and slo- has witnessed some of the sian case, notably the room gans. This movement has signifi- largest protests against the for manoeuvre available to cant implications for the next presidential elections, strengthen- Kremlin in years, with thou- opposition forces in a regime ing the idea in society of unfair sands of citizens with different of limited pluralism that circum- elections as well as casting doubts political affiliations and back- scribes social diversity and on the Duma’s legitimacy. Many grounds taking to the streets. constricts the expression of challenges still lie ahead arising While the cause of free and political dissent. from both external and internal fair elections ensured the op- constraints to the movement itself. The demonstrations in Bolot- position movement had an On the one hand the opposition naya Square and Sakharov effective “glue” capable of encounters serious institutional Avenue in Moscow, following smoothing out fracture lines, constraints to the participation in denouncements of ballot- its capacity to seize the oppor- the political arena; on the other it stuffing and fraud by Mr. suffers from profound divisions tunity to structure and consoli- Putin’s party United Russia and divergent positions concern- date a real alternative to during the Duma elections, ing strategic issues. Thus it risks Putin’s rule appears quite de- to become even more detached were rather unexpected fective. More particularly, from the population. On the eve of events. Over the months pre- some problems have emerged the presidential elections the in- ceding the electoral cam- in reaching a consensus re- cumbents are responding with a paign, Russian opposition pretty effective strategy of con- garding drawing the bounda- forces were unable to mobi- tainment of dissent centered on ries of its participation. lise dissatisfied citizens in the mobilisation of pro-Kremlin supporters in mass counter- The aim of this analysis is mass protests and initiatives. protests. two-fold: firstly, it seeks to Up until December only a few determine the strengths and hundred participants attended weaknesses of the Russian the biggest rallies organised Laura Petrone, ISPI Associate Researcher. opposition movement, with a in the capital and other major special focus on the strategies cities, showing the opposition used during the electoral groups’ inability not only to campaign for the 2011 Duma consolidate supporters but elections. Secondly, it dis- also to interact with each cusses to what extent the other. This was especially true opposition forces in Russia for those youth movements, have sought to take advan- from both the left and right tage of the political opportuni- wing of the , (*) The opinions expressed herein ties currently available to un- which in recent years have are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of dermine the ruling power. In proven to be relevant actors in ISPI. this regard, some institutional the extra-parliamentary oppo-

2 ISPI - Policy Brief

sition. Interestingly, during parliamentary elections. The In addition, when analyse that time the anti-government party or movement’s political willingness to take part in initiative that managed to orientation represents a fur- institutionalised political ef- bring most people onto the ther criterion: we can place forts, strong differences arise streets was the “Russian the United Civil Front, among these political group- March” which took place on PARNAS and Yabloko within ings: apart from the estab- November 4th, the day of Na- the liberal-democratic land- lished opposition parties tional Unity, and was pro- scape, while the (CPRF, Yabloko, Just Russia moted by different nationalist (Levy Front) encompasses a and the LDP) the others are organisations. range of left and ultra-left mostly grass-roots move- political organisations such as ments refusing to participate Considering this fact, what the CPRF, the Vanguard of in official politics. The only does the sudden resurgence Red Youth, the Revolutionary exception is Parnas, which of Russian opposition initia- Communist Youth League has sought political recogni- tives and the wider support (Bolshevik) and the Russian tion in vain. The People’s among the population soon Communist Workers Party Freedom Party was founded after 2011 Duma elections Revolutionary - Party of in 2010 by Mikhail Kasyanov, explain? What is the opposi- Communists (RCWP-RPC). Vladimir Ryzhkov, Boris tion’s potential to mobilise Despite the ideological dis- Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, citizens in mass protests after tance, starting from 2006 four experienced figures and these events? What are the some representatives from former high-ranking govern- problems of coalition building the leftist movements, such as ment officials, with the de- related to common pro- the clared intention to participate grammes and policies for leader Eduard Limonov and in the 2011 Duma elections. these movements? Sergei Udaltsov of the Van- Nevertheless, the Party was guard of Red Youth, have denied registration with the The multiple faces gathered with some right-wing justification that it had not of opposition as well as mainstream liberal provided for rotation of lead- representatives (Garri Kas- ership on its platform and that The distinction between sys- parov and human activist the information contained in temic and non-systemic (sis- ) in an the documents presented for temnaya-vnesistemnaya) umbrella coalition called “The registration did not comply opposition constitutes the Other Russia”. What is worth with the procedures envis- primary criterion characteris- noting here is that this coali- aged by the Russian Law on ing Russian opposition forces. tion constituted the most rele- Political Parties2. These are terms coined vant attempt ever accom- mostly by the media to distin- The systemic and non- plished in post-Soviet Russia guish between those opposi- systemic distinction proves to to bring together different be especially useful when tion parties which are regis- forces of the opposition uni- examining the opposition’s tered, and thus recognised by verse. The coalition suc- the State, and those which protests during the last Duma ceeded in organising several have been refused formal elections. Deep divisions joint protest actions such as emerged firstly over the recognition. Hence, while the the “March of the Discon- strategies to be adopted at Communist Party of the Rus- tented” in December 2006, sian Federation (CPRF), the the ballot boxes, with Par- and during the latest elections Liberal Democratic Party nas’s prominent leader Boris signed a declaration pledging Nemtsov inviting voters to (LDP) and Just Russia are to boycott the 2011 Duma systemic opposition parties, elections due to their illegiti- Parnas (the People’s Free- 1 macy . dom Party) was denied regis- tration in the 2011 Duma elec- octat’sya chestnym, 25 November tions, and Yabloko was cut off 2011 (http://www.leftfront.ru/ 48E54 1 http://www.theotherrussia.org/2011 398C28CD/4ED00B6EBE15F.html). from the political arena with 2 the introduction of the 7% /10/0 5/russian-oppositionists-unite- http://svobodanaroda.org/about/ to-boycott-duma-elections/, S. party _documents/refusal_to_ electoral threshold in the 2007 UDALTSOV, Boycot kak sposob register.php.

ISPI - Policy Brief 3

spoil their ballots3. The aim attacks from the authorities. the State was damaged to the was to reach the 7% threshold LiveJournal, considered the extent of no less than US$4 for the elections to be annulled platform most suited to oppo- billion6. He also created the and rerun, but at the cost of sition initiatives, was the tar- Internet project “RosPil”, a taking votes away from CPRF get of a heavy hacker attack system of monitoring abuse in and Just Russia, the principal last April which bloggers government requests for ten- opposition parties challenging claimed could not have been ders, which is entirely funded UR’s monopoly in the Duma. possible without the full en- by voluntary donations from dorsement of the authorities. citizens. By the time the pro- Significantly, during the elec- The alleged aim was to leave ject became active a number toral campaign the debate on Russian bloggers without a of state agencies had re- whether and how to vote ap- single, stable arena and dis- moved the most dubious ten- peared to have its privileged perse them to social networks der dates and contract time- locus more on the web than in where it is easier to fight indi- tables from their websites7. party congresses and press vidual users5. conferences. In particular, a Nevertheless, Navalny also strong resonance was re- espouses nationalist sympa- ceived for the initiative “How The “Navalny effect” thies that often come at odds to vote properly so they won’t with his supporters, who are One of the symbols of the steal your vote” from a group largely liberals. As a “national Russian protest movement is of anonymous bloggers who democrat”, as he defines him- the blogger Aleksey Navalny, advised people not to skip the self, he has attended the Rus- who was arrested together elections and to vote for any th sian March since it began in 4 with 300 activists on 5 De- party except United Russia . 2006. He was a co-organiser cember when some 6,000 In fact the huge investment on of the last march in November people gathered in Moscow to the Internet both by incum- 2011 and appeared as a protest about the election bents and opposition forces speaker alongside neo-Nazis fraud. Navalny, who ahead of was one of the most remark- and skinheads, who chanted the elections had been urging able phenomena in the last slogans like “Russia for Rus- viewers of his blog to vote for election campaign. While sians” and “enough feeding any party but United Russia, 8 parties’ websites received the Caucasus” . gained broad popularity by little public attention and me- coining the expression “Party In reality Navalny appears to dia coverage, the social net- of Swindlers and Thieves” to address two different, appar- works, blogs and fora played describe the party in power. A ently antithetical forces of the a leading role in the public lawyer by profession, he is not opposition movement: the debate. On the one hand the affiliated with any political urban, educated middle class, party in power, United Russia, organisation. His activism has and Russians with nationalist has been regularly portrayed been primarily oriented at sympathies. Whether he will by bloggers and critics as the denouncing theft in state-run succeed in solving this ambi- party of bureaucrats respon- corporations and United Rus- guity and appealing to both sible for rampant corruption sia’s failures and broken groups in the long run is diffi- and weak political and social pledges: on his web page he cult to predict. Navalny tried to rights in Russia; on the other published confidential docu- clarify his position better on hand, Internet bloggers and ments about «the numerous the eve of the November opposition parties have been economic crimes committed march, claiming that he hoped reported to suffer continuous by Transneft, its subsidiaries to change the annual Russian

and contractors during the 3 In his popular slogan «Nach- construction of the Eastern 6 nach, golosuy protiv vsech» Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipe- http://navalny.ru/, http://www. Nemtsov suggested voting against line», for which he argued that komme rsant.ru/factbook/191904? everybody. To be true, Russian stamp=634592611516054051. 7 voters were previously able to vote http://rospil.info/about. “against all”, but that option was 8 A. GORBACHEV, Po Moskve removed from ballots in 2006. 5 A. ODYNOVA, State Blamed in proshlis’ “Russkim Marshem”, in 4 http://ru-cprf.livejournal.com/107 LiveJournal Attack, in «The Mos- «Nezavisimaya Gazeta», 5 No- 688 2.html. cow Times», 6 April 2011. vember 2011.

4 ISPI - Policy Brief

March and the nationalist that the movement turned out ence to nationalists’ popular movement that drives it, into a to be a real threat for the slogans: «When they start moderate force that could one presidential administration, shouting, “Stop feeding the day be transformed into a po- with the parliamentary elec- Caucasus” tomorrow their litical organisation. Yet as Alek- tions approaching. rallying cry will be “Stop feed- sei Mukhin, head of the Center ing Siberia, the Far East, the The last two years have seen for Political Technologies, has Urals, the Volga region or the the ultra-right movement at- noted, Navalny will have little Moscow area. […] The self- tempting to gain attention in luck because the radical na- determination of the Russian the public sphere, in particular tionalists will not fully accept his people consists in a multieth- by holding various public moderate stance9. nic civilisation with the Rus- events and protests. The sian culture at its core. The clashes in Manezh Square in Russian people have con- The Rise of the Moscow on 11th December firmed their choice time and 2010 and similar more recent Nationalist Movement again – and not through plebi- events (e.g. the protest ac- scites or referendums, but The other massive opposition tions following the murder of with their blood, during all of event was the Russian March former colonel Yuri Budanov th their thousand-year on 4 November, which gath- in June 2011) demonstrated history»13. ered 10,000 sympathisers. the high topicality of the na- What it is worth noting here is tionalist issue in Russia and that this event acquired tre- the leadership’s difficulty in After the December 2011 mendous relevance, more controlling it. While the level events. What’s Next? than ever before, for two main of racist violence has signifi- reasons. Firstly, according to cantly decreased starting from Following December’s mass Levada Center data, on the 2009, dangerous propagators demonstrations, the opposi- eve of the Duma elections a who regularly spread propa- tion appears divided with re- third of Russians supported ganda and call for violence gard to the means to be used the slogans of radical nation- remain outside the attention of in protest actions. After an alism: 62% of respondents initial period of common th the law enforcement agen- questioned between 18-28 cies, as documented by the stance in denouncing fraud in November 2011 definitely or Sova Center12. The Kremlin the elections, the systemic probably supported the slogan has appeared ambiguous in opposition started distancing “Enough feeding the Cauca- itself from the “street opposi- 10 addressing migration-related sus!” . Secondly, the nation- issues, and especially in han- tion”. The leader of the CPRF alist attitude to the upcoming dling the anger voiced against Gennadii Zyuganov has re- elections became the major migrant workers from North cently accused the non- theme of the March, with the Caucasus and Central Asia, systemic parties (Parnas and leaders urging people to vote as the country’s oil-fuelled Yabloko) of using popular for any party other than wrath to their advantage. Fur- 11 economic boom has given United Russia . This meant way to the hardship of the thermore, earlier in December global financial crisis. Putin’s representatives of the CPRF condemned the European 9 A. BRATESKY, Russian March recent article Russia: the Eth- nicity Issue seems to be an Parliament resolution against Resists Navalny, in «The Moscow the Duma election, which Times», 7 November 2011. attempt to remedy religious 10 In «Press-vypusk», Rossyane ob and ethnic intolerance as a urged Moscow to hold new, obstanovke na Severnom Kavkaze, serious threat to the State and free and fair elections after natsionalizme, politike i finansiro- social cohesion, with refer- registering all opposition par- vanii regiona, lozunge “Khvatit kormit’ Kavkaz”, 15 December 2011, http://www.levada.ru/15-12- 2011/rossi yane-ob-obstanovke-na- 12 N. YUDINA - V. ALPEROVICH, severnom-kav kaze-natsionalizme- Summer 2011: A New Batch of politike-i-finansir ovanii-regio. Neo-Nazi Convicts and Dreams of 11 A. KOZENKO, Russkiy demarsh, a Second Manezh, http://www. 13 V. PUTIN, Rossiya: Natsional’nyi in «Kommersant», 200, 4741, 25 sova-center.ru/en/ xenophobia/ vopros, in «Nezavisimaya Gazeta», October 2011. reports-analyses/2011/11 /d22976/. 23 January 2012.

ISPI - Policy Brief 5

ties, as interference in Rus- The “glue” of the December distribution of seats in the sian domestic affairs14. and February protests that lower house. At the same time managed to bond together Russian leaders have in- Yet within the non-systemic diverse expressions of the vested a great deal in the opposition spectrum there Russian opposition was the “party in power”. As a result, have been some considerable election results, which were over the last decade the party efforts to act as a unified marked by a decrease in landscape has emerged as movement, especially in view votes for the UR party and one strongly tilted in favour of of the upcoming presidential fraudulent electoral activity. one political party, namely elections. The most visible Russian voters appeared to UR, which has strongly bene- example is the establishment be sorely disappointed with fitted from State resources. As of a “Civic Movement” Putin’s decision to run for a commentators have pointed (grazhdanskoe dvizhenie) on third term as President, and in out, since 2003 the ruling January 17th, with the aim, as general by his determination to party has exercised a monop- stated in the founding docu- stay in power for the next oly of power to the extent that ment, to protect people’s right twelve years, considering the all three different party con- to free expression, civil liber- extension of the presidential figurations (CPFR, Just Rus- ties and social justice. The term from 4 to 6 years ensured sia, Liberal Democratic Party) new movement brings to- by a law passed in 2008. So even when taken together, gether politicians, human far, however, the opposition have failed to provide a sig- rights activists, ordinary citi- has not shown the ability or the nificant alternative17. zens and opposition groups, will to structure and consoli- against election fraud, corrup- Alongside these structural date a real alternative to tion, and arbitrariness of State conditions, the Russian oppo- Putin’s rule, due to elements officials. The initiative group sition’s profound divisions and which are both internal and includes both parliamentary poor strategy should be external to the movement it- opposition members such as stressed. The economic crisis self. Just Russia members, and in Russia represented a fun- members of the “non- First and foremost, institu- damental problem for the systemic” opposition (Parnas, tional constraints represent a authorities as it threatened the Left Front and nationalist or- decisive factor. The non- very legitimacy of a regime ganisations). The movement systemic opposition has been that had been to a significant has managed to preserve its shut out of the electoral proc- extent based on satisfaction unity with the broad anti-Putin ess for a decade as result of with the perceived economic cause so far, putting aside the incumbents’ interventions achievements of its leadership any issue which could raise in the arena of political com- over the previous decade. relevant disagreement15. As a petition aimed at curbing dis- Research and social surveys result the February 4th dem- sent and pluralism. The legis- show that attitudes to protest onstration evidenced protest- lative measures adopted in Russia have been increas- ers from various party and since 2001 reveal the inten- ing over recent years, notably non-party affiliations – democ- tion to achieve simplification under the harsh conditions of rats, nationalists and commu- of the party landscape the economic crisis18. But nists – marching side-by-side through mechanisms favour- whether or not this has to demand democratic reform, ing the disappearance or brought about greater legiti- release of th e country’s politi- marginalisation of the minor macy for the opposition forces cal prisoners and free and fair political forces. This is the 16 elections . direction behind both the strict 17 regulations envisioned for V. GEL’MAN, Politicheskie partii v Rossii: ot konkurentsii - k ier- registration of new political arkhii, in «Polis», 5, 2008, pp.135- 14 N. ZVEREV, Parlamentskaya parties and the raising of the 52. oppositsiya otmezhevalas’ ot ulich- electoral threshold from 5 to 18 V. FEKLYUNINA - S. WHITE, noy, in «Nezvisimaya Gazeta», 20 7% for access to proportional Discourses of ‘Krizis’: Economic December 2011. Crisis in Russia and Regime Legiti- 15 http://com10dec.ru/board/2-1-0-8. macy, in «Journal of Communist 16 A. GORBACHEV, Bolotnaya nykh s vlasyami, in «Nezavisimaya Studies and Transition Politics», 27, ploschad’ sobrala vsekx nesoglas- Gazeta», 5 February 2012. 3-4, pp. 385-406.

6 ISPI - Policy Brief

inside and outside Parliament while only 22% of respon- character of the Russian pro- is another issue. The above dents recognise that the op- test initiatives: social themes paragraphs have briefly de- position does have such a were overall absent from the picted the main forces en- programme. Although the December 24th protests, compassing what is known as numbers of sympathisers with whose demands had mainly the Russian opposition uni- leaders of the non-systemic political and civic orientations. verse. In reality these forces opposition slightly increases Indeed, the holding of new have a weak national pres- among Muscovites, the main elections for the State Duma ence, and it remains to be reasons for not supporting the and removal of the chair of seen whether they will be opposition’s cause seem to be the Central Electoral Com- capable of sustaining a the same e.g. their inade- mission have been the unify- movement against the current quacy in addressing concrete ing, main claim of the protest leadership in the long run. problems, and their inability to movement so far. Most importantly, they are yet represent people’s interests In addition, a significant ele- to come together and decide and to provide positive ment of the recent mass dem- to run a single candidate who ideas20. onstration held in Moscow on could challenge Putin in the However it should be noted February 4th was the atten- next presidential elections. that this opposition has man- dance of the rival rally According to some estimates19, aged to spread among the “against the orange revolu- the “non-official” opposition is public the idea that UR is a tion” organized by pro-Putin not credible to the majority of “party of crooks and thieves”, activists and public personali- Russians (58%). In particular, which became the main ties (including the leader of the level of trust that citizens theme of the electoral cam- the international “Eurasian give to the representatives of paign. Mr. Udaltsov, arrested Movement”, ) this opposition is strikingly low: at an unsanctioned protest on with the participation of 3% of respondents trust Boris the Election Day on Decem- 138,000 people according to Nemtsov of Parnas, with the ber 4th, has recently invoked some estimates. In their other co-chairs Vladimir the Occupy Wall Street speeches the organizers pub- Ryzhkov and Mikhail Kasyanov movement, calling the pro- licly condemned the anti- scoring 3% and 2% respec- testers “the 99 percent” and government protests as an tively. 2% of respondents trust saying that Russia was led by attempt to change the regime the leader of the “United Civil a corrupt 1% of bureaucrats in Russia with the blessing of Front”, , while and oligarchs. In these times the West21. Although it is only 1% trust Aleksey Navalny. of widespread dissatisfaction quite difficult to ascertain the and distrust of politics in spontaneity of such mobiliza- The principal reasons for this Western , estab- tion – also considering that attitude can be found in two lishing a parallel between the the United Russia party was surveys by the Levada Cen- Russian opposition and the its main sponsor – this mas- tre, the first conducted on a Occupy Wall Street move- sive participation at the pro- nationwide representative ment and in general the In- government rally indicates sample of the urban and rural dignados sounds pretty tempt- that Putin still has the support population, and the second ing. Nevertheless it is likely to of a large part of Russian solely within the city of Mos- overshadow the peculiar citizens. But at the same time cow: 49% of respondents it proves that the incumbents surveyed on a national scale are seriously concerned about think that the opposition criti- 20 Vybory v Gosdumu, chast 3. Ob the “orange threat” and are cises the authorities without oppositsii I kritike vlasti, 7 Decem- seeking to mobilize their sup- having a coherent programme ber 2011, http://www.levada.ru/07- porters ahead of the next for the country’s development, 12-2011 /vybory-v-gosdumu-chast- presidential elections. 3-ob-oppozit sii-i-kritike-vlasti; Moskvichi ob oppositsii i aktsii 19 V. KRAMAEV, Nesistemnoy protesta, 19 December 2011, oppozitsiy ochertili uzkiy krug. http://www.levada.ru/19-12-2011/ Nakanune vybory ona ne mosk vichi-ob-oppozitsii-i- 21 P. MORDASOV, Poklonnaya pol’zovalas’ doveriem rossiyan, in aktsiyakh-protesta-vystupleniyakh- antioranzhevaya gora, in «Nezav- «Kommersant», 8 December 2011. v-podderzhku-edinoi-rossii. isimaya Gazeta», 2 June 2012.

ISPI - Policy Brief 7

Final remarks La ricerca ISPI analizza le di- The protests following the namiche politiche, strategiche Duma elections have signifi- ed economiche del sistema cant implications for the next internazionale con il duplice presidential campaign, obiettivo di informare e di o- strengthening the idea within rientare le scelte di policy. Russian society of unfair elec- tions, as well as casting I risultati della ricerca vengono doubts on the Duma’s legiti- divulgati attraverso pubblica- macy. This widespread dis- zioni ed eventi, focalizzati su content is expressed to a tematiche di particolare inte- large extent by the new urban resse per l’Italia e le sue rela- middle class of professionals zioni internazionali e articolati and entrepreneurs concen- in: trated in the big cities. These people are increasingly aware 9 Programma Africa of their rights and expect the 9 Programma Caucaso e Asia authorities to respect them. Centrale Thus the protests are seen by 9 Programma Europa 9 Programma Mediterraneo e the Russian leadership as a Medio Oriente fairly serious challenge to 9 Programma Russia e Vicini their power, precisely be- Orientali cause they are engaging the 9 Programma Sicurezza e highly skilled part of the popu- Studi Strategici lation, that same part which should provide the greatest 9 Progetto Argentina support in carrying out the 9 Progetto Asia Meridionale modernisation plan. 9 Progetto Cina e Asia So far the Kremlin’s strategy Orientale 9 Progetto Diritti Umani has not envisaged any form of 9 Progetto Disarmo repression or intimidation; 9 Progetto Emergenze e Af- instead the incumbents give fari Umanitari the impression that they are 9 Progetto Internazionaliz- listening to the protesters by zazione della Pubblica establishing an inquiry into Amministrazione reports of electoral fraud and blaming lower functionaries for Le pubblicazioni online sporadic rigging of the elec- dell’ISPI sono realizzate anche tions. The policy proposals grazie al sostegno della recently announced by Presi- Fondazione Cariplo. dent Medvedev, just as those reinstating the direct election ISPI of governors and easing reg- Palazzo Clerici istration of political parties, Via Clerici, 5 move in that direction as well. I - 20121 Milano This proves that interplay www.ispionline.it between the State and society is extremely important in Rus- Per informazioni: sia: in this context reliance on [email protected] [email protected] authoritarian methods is insuf- ficient and staying in power © ISPI 2012 requires responding creatively to a changing society

No. 216 - MARCH 2012 Tomislava Penkova

Putin and the new political activism in Russia(*) Abstract

The unprecedented protests following Russia’s 2011 parlia- mentary elections signalled a declining popular endorsement of Putin’s regime. In response to citizens, incumbent Premier and likely winner of 4 March presi- The last three months in Rus- poses much more problems dential race published a number of articles outlining his electoral sia have been characterised than solutions and is not con- platform. by a very intense, shifting, venient for any party (neither and unpredictable internal for the population, nor for the In internal affairs, he shows an political dynamics. December political leadership, nor for the apparently accommodating protests, following the alleged country and the adjacent re- stance promising greater peo- frauds that marred State gion, EU included, given the ple’s participation in politics. However, this is a difficult task Duma elections, represented ongoing economic turbu- to accomplish considering the for the first time in the last lences). characteristics of the power twenty years a manifestation Moreover, the absence of a vertical and Putin’s overt disdain of popular activism and inter- clear-cut reform agenda as for opposition outside the Duma. est in the political course of His goal seems to be to render well as of a charismatic and the country. Voters appeared forms of future discontent more strong leader capable to unite indeed to be more demand- manageable. the outside-Duma opposition ing. They wanted to see diminishes significantly the Putin is also trying to restore his changes either in personnel or chances that a revolution image and authority by recalling in (the absent) ideology, while occurs. national values and traditions of parties elected to parliament which he allegedly becomes a did not meet these expecta- Experts’ debates on the future fierce defender. It is likely that tions. People’s discontent was scenarios of development in the next presidency will not be mostly genuine, not stimu- Russia – status quo and stag- an easy period but rather a tur- lated from abroad although nation; authoritarian moderni- bulent transitional phase of Rus- sia’s internal political evolution. the West supported it after- sation; liberal-democratic wards. The fact that rallies reform promotion; or revolu- have been a domestic product tionary-democratic reforms - challenges significantly the animated further the already Tomislava Penkova, Associate Kremlin’s rule. Changes in lively political post-electoral Research Fellow ISPI, Programme Russia’s domestic politics still atmosphere. However, be- on Russia and EU Eastern remain an exclusive domain Neighbourhood; Assistant Professor sides any predictions and at the Catholic University of Milan. of the political elite’s their questionable realisation (re)action. Protests did not as well as questions about the possess the necessary force underlying reasons (political, and scope to provoke them in ideological, economic) that led a bottom-up manner but they people to take to the streets, are a signal that a top-down what is relevant is that their (*) The opinions expressed herein change is urgently required. demands became a sort of are strictly personal and do not For this reason, a revolution- requisites for the next presi- necessarily reflect the position of ary scenario seems unlikely. It dency. In fact, demonstrators ISPI.

2 ISPI - Policy Brief

succeeded in conveying their pose not only to allow Putin to future. He often addresses message to the federal au- stay in power, but also to Russians using ‘We’ and, in thorities. In slightly more than preserve and even broaden general, verbs in first person a month (between 16 January the basis of his electorate plural. This usage seems two- and 27 February 2012), in- since Medvedev, contrary to fold. On the one hand, it hints cumbent Premier Vladimir Putin, was perceived as a at himself as the personifica- Putin, the likely winner of the liberal politician. The tandem tion of the nation’s voices, presidential race1, published indeed responded to a “wider hopes and concerns, as well seven articles in newspapers range of mutually complemen- as of its achievements and with different political orienta- tary constituencies”3, but as sacred aspirations because tion2 as an expression of his Medvedev’s presidency pre- he is part of that nation. electoral programme and a sented some features of con- On the other hand, “We” re- response to the citizens’ de- tinuity with Putin’s ones, its fers to himself as the core of mands. This analysis will out- power to unify people de- Russia’s political leadership, line Putin’s vision on how the clined. Nevertheless, Putin’s which has the final say on next presidency should en- candidacy is still backed by national politics. Often these gage with Russians within the the majority of Russians. Yet, two images and dimensions – domestic political domain. this seems not enough as it popular (together with ordi- was mainly the so-called mid- nary people and being one of dle class, the part of society Searching for a dialogue them) and institutional (he and on which Putin relies the most President Medvedev, the and greater national unity for the implementation of his government) – merge and blur policies, to attend the pro- December 2011 Duma elec- the reader’s perception where tests. Putin’s somewhat de- tions showed that Putin did one ends and where the other layed electoral campaign not enjoy any longer the lev- starts. Interestingly enough reflected entirely the issue of els of support he did in the there is no direct reference to rallies. previous electoral cycles. It ‘you’, meaning Russia’s op- also pointed out that the tan- As he admitted at the end of position; there is no inten- dem Dmitri Medvedev- his first article Rossia sosre- tional and explicit identifica- Vladimir Putin, a rather unique dotachivaetsia – vyzovy, na tion of two contrasting or governing arrangement, had kotorye my dolzhny otvetit’ clashing camps and their exhausted its potential to (Russia is concentrating – the respected members as the attract supporters. Previously challenges to which we must emphasis is put on the value the tandem served the pur- respond), the series of articles of being united. he had published on eco- The search for a dialogue with 1 nomic, political, security and The state-run All-Russian Center people aims at uniting as foreign policies, should be for the Study of Public Opinion many citizens as possible and (VTsIOM) predicts presidential viewed as an attempt to convincing those who in De- candidate Vladimir Putin will win launch a wider discussion with the election in the first round of Russians on his concrete cember showed distrust and dissatisfaction with Putin’s voting with 58.6% of the vote. The policy proposals. Putin’s remaining candidates are headed leadership. Perhaps Russia’s by Communist Party leader Gen- overall tone when referring to his fellow citizens evokes an Premier deliberately chose nady Zyuganov with 14.8% of the not to react in a harsh manner vote, followed by LDPR leader apparent willingness to en- suppressing violently manifes- with 9.4%, gage in a sincere dialogue businessman Mikhail Prokhorov (rather than an electoral tations, but to openly accept with 8.7%, and A Just Russia monologue) among peers on them and build on them his leader Sergei Mironov trailing the the country’s progressive electoral programme. Nothing pack with 7.7%. See http://www. can be more powerful in poli- themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ tics than using people’s de- state-run-poll-has-putin-winning-elec tion-in-first-round/453373.html. 3 F. Shaolei, Vladimir Putin is the mands to legitimise one’s own 2 The text of all Putin’s articles leader who actually leads Russia, rule. A forced suppression of could be found at: http://www. 10 November 2011, http://valdai protests would have only ex- rg.ru/tema/avtor-Vladimir-Putin/ club.com/politics/34480.html FENG acerbated disapproval of fed- index.html. Shaolei.

ISPI - Policy Brief 3

eral policies and further un- democratic principles, in real- elections, this would signifi- dermined the image of the ity was deteriorat- cantly improve confidence in political elite. Putin’s political ing because its societal com- his candidacy and would needs a durable and ponent (namely people’s di- prove his sincere willingness broad support by the elector- rect participation in politics) to introduce changes to the ate to be sustainable in the was missing. electoral system. Legitimacy long-term. In his previous also refers to delivering con- presidential terms, “Putin was Medvedev’s presidency ad- crete results on specific poli- not simply able to appeal to a hered to the rationale of cies, not only electoral slo- variety of constituencies, power vertical and sovereign gans. In the past Putin has many of which would be ex- democracy. Thus, today the indeed identified challenges to clusive if his ideas were entire political system in Rus- Russia’s future and advanced enunciated more clearly, but sia appears close and hardly workable solutions (also the very nature of Putin’s accessible for non-Kremlin’s thanks to the favourable eco- centrism acted to reconcile people, leaving little or no nomic conditions). This posi- antagonistic and contradictory space for the development of tive experience has been now social programmes. He was a new political elite. It lacks a frequently exploited in his thus able to transcend narrow regular dialogue with people articles as a basis for national party politics and affiliation and ignores their perceptions, unity and evidence of his with either left or right not by mood, and societal trends. genuine motivation to contrib- an act of evasion, but by a This characteristic has pre- ute one more time to national distinct type of political praxis vented the Kremlin’s leader- progress. Finally, besides the that transcended the classic ship from timely identifying domestic dimension, legiti- political cleavages of the age popular needs/expectations macy has also external impli- of modernity”4. Today, when so that at the end manifesta- cations. A legitimate president society appears more frag- tions were almost inevitable. enjoys stronger respect in mented, greater unity is even December protesters de- international relations. more than ever needed. manded primarily that the Kremlin listens to their voice The image of a person that is In the period 2000-2008, Putin and that both political and supported by his population was a transitional leader who social dimensions in domestic averts foreign pressure or reasserted and strengthened politics are combined for a interference in internal affairs. State prerogatives and struc- viable and consensus-driven This is indeed a sensitive tures (following El’tsin’s era of legitimate governance. issue for Russia after years of decentralisation). His power hardly reached rapproche- vertical was an exclusively Legitimacy has several nu- ment with the West and its State/politics-oriented system. anced meanings. It refers to institutions. Moreover, given In addition, the notion of sov- Russian people’s trust in po- the unstable political and eco- ereign democracy was a justi- litical authorities and the con- nomic situation around Russia fication for greater self- viction that what they pursue its leadership should ensure reliance in international rela- is good for the nation and it is domestic stability in order to carried out in accordance with tions and an expression of the 5 allow the country to maintain belief that the country should its laws . If people trust their its power on regional and follow its own evolutionary politicians’ deeds, elections international arena. Hence, path and problems arising will be supposedly fair. On the legitimacy implies stability. along that process should be contrary, what we are wit- resolved by the country itself. nessing now is a lack of trust Is change of the political Although both the power ver- by some segments of the tical and sovereign democ- Russian society vis-à-vis system possible? Putin’s governance. If he en- racy did not explicitly reject The need to coalesce both sured honest and transparent political and social dimensions in the political system entails 4 Richard Sakwa, Putin’s leader- 5 a modification the system’s ship: character and consequences, The reversed question – Does the rationale itself. Putin’s article in Europe-Asia Studies, 60, 6, ruling elite trust people’s choices and 2008, pp. 881-882. demands? – is equally important. Demokratia i kachestvo gos-

4 ISPI - Policy Brief

sudarstva (Democracy and active right, consisting in the In the economic field, Putin the quality of the state)6 dis- «possibility for citizens to proposes to reduce signifi- plays his positive attitude on a shape the legislative agenda, cantly the share of the State broader involvement of Rus- advance their own projects in certain economic sectors by sian citizens in the state’s and formulate priorities». 20167. It is worth noting that it government. Most importantly, is the economic factor that in he acknowledges this fact, he The article contains a number Putin’s view determines Rus- shows that he listens to peo- of concrete examples on sia’s leading role in the world. ple, to their aspirations and these changes. In the last The country should have a needs, and he respects them. months of his presidency, diversified economy with a In a rhetorically elegant style, Medvedev advanced a liberal competitive modern technolo- he points out that the new, package of political reform gies-based industry and infra- changed people’s demands proposals to the State Duma structure, should be able to towards the political elite and dealing with easing the regis- attract highly qualified human the accomplishments of the tration procedures of political resources (while reducing middle class (beyond their parties and elections, return to dependence on import of individual wellbeing) are in- direct elections of governors, western technologies), and deed a result of the authori- and abolition of the need to possess developed service ties’ hard work in the last dec- gather signatures for parties sector and efficient agricul- ade. «Today the quality of our that have federal candidates ture. Only such an economy State lags behind the soci- lists. Putin also foresees dis- can guarantee to Russia its ety’s readiness to take part in cussion within society of all stability, sovereignty, and it. Our civil society became bills, decisions, and pro- wellbeing. Similarly to domes- much more mature, active grammes adopted at any tic politics, economic ad- and responsible. We have to federal level, an assessment vancement should benefit update the mechanisms of our of current laws and the effec- from the initiative of private democracy. They should in- tiveness of their implementa- Russian economic actors and volve increased social active- tion; as well as reinforcement bestow on them greater par- ness». Putin even defines of the functioning of self- ticipation in national affairs. what a democracy is. It is the regulatory organisations «fundamental right of people within civil society. He pro- While all these proposals are positive, the unsolved ques- to choose their political lead- poses to introduce a compul- ership but also the possibility sory examination by the par- tion remains whether they will (not right – author’s empha- liament of those citizens’ ini- be able to introduce a real sis) to influence continuously tiatives that are supported by breakthrough and change in the political leadership and not less than 100,000 signa- the current power vertical system. How can that system the decision-making process. tures collected on internet. by reformed without provoking This entails that democracy Hence Internet becomes a a collapse of the State struc- should envisage mechanisms means for dialogue with the tures or even major disor- for constant and direct peo- citizenry at all levels (federal, ders? In late December 2011, ple’s intervention and control regional, municipal) and ide- Putin acknowledged that the over authorities as well as ally an evidence of the trans- Russian political system was effective channels for recipro- parency and public accessibil- imperfect and that he was cal communication». Further ity of Putin’s future govern- preparing to improve it. How- on, the text clarifies that there ance (he speaks of internet- ever, he stated that reforms is a «passive right, i.e. the democracy and electronic would be evolutionary and possibility that a citizen reacts government which will dis- gradual, which hints at con- to ideas and projects ad- close to people all necessary firming elements of continuity vanced by political authorities information about governmen- or by the legislative power» tal and municipal authorities’ and there should be also an 7 activities). He also advances Vladimir Putin, Nam nuzhna proposals to strengthen the novaya ekonomika (We need a power and responsibilities at new economy), in Vedomosti, 30 6 See http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/06/ regional and municipal levels. January 2012, http://www.rg.ru/ demokratia.html. 2012/01/30/putin-ekonomika.html.

ISPI - Policy Brief 5

with the current system. The that the Centre, namely the consolidation one which latter became rather rigid so Kremlin, will continue to carry would have occurred had any major alterations risk out the ultimate (financial and manifestations not taken resonating in all its constitut- personnel) governability of the place. ing parts and hence destabi- country. «The country needs lising it. This could be ex- a strong, efficient, based on The missing link – Russia’s plained with the fact that «as [people’s] respect federal Putin centralised power he Centre that is a key political party system unchanged imported into the Kremlin the stabiliser of the balance of The party system is an intrin- conflicts that in a more plural- inter-regional, ethnic and reli- sic element of the rationale of istic system are played out in gious relations», reads the the political system. The past society»8. Those conflicts final paragraph of the section dominance of the party of emerged in December. The on Russian of the power – United Russia (UR) – contradictions and ambiguities article Demokratia i kachestvo in the State Duma was the of the system have fostered gossudarstva. Radically modi- backbone of Putin’s regime people’s discontent. Nowhere fying the system in a such architecture ensuring that no Putin speaks of changing the turbulent moment in current political threats arise to that system itself; instead, he uses international affairs would regime. After December 2011 terms such as upgrade, fine- expose Russia to dangerous elections UR still formally tune, but never change. Both external influences (Putin controls the party system and concepts – power vertical and knows that he cannot operate the legislative process (oppo- sovereign democracy – seem in a vacuum). The country has sition parties sitting in the to maintain applicability al- just stabilised its foreign policy parliament are often consid- though minor adjustments (relations with the US and the ered as a kind of fictitious may be introduced for two European Union have been opposition). Nevertheless, it main reasons: to preserve the reset and foreign policy cannot control the outside of political system and its func- seems a tool for domestic parliament opposition. That tioning (see below party sys- advancement – see Russia’s part of society responds to tem) and to achieve greater modernisation partnership different logic and values. In control/access to people’s with the EU) and Putin has 2011, Putin created the so- needs so as to be able to succeeded in persuading the called Russian Popular Front, react accordingly and timely West to abandon its previous which transcended the and avoid future even wider “lecturing to its younger part- framework of UR and was manifestations of dissent. ner” attitude. Therefore, allow- aimed to unite people with ing possible external interfer- Overall, such corrections will different backgrounds and ences would be both risky and not resonate on the rationale political orientations, but it did harmful. In other words, the behind the current system; not receive the desired re- main challenge to Putin, as they will simply make control sponse. Russia’s likely next President, over it more manageable. is to synthesise in a harmo- That negative result was the Putin has stated this explicitly. nised way the foundations of first signal of Putin’s declining For example, while dealing the political system with peo- ability to unite Russia’s popu- with Russian federalism and ple’s demands. lation as he did in the past. It the proposal to return to direct seems then that citizens’ dis- popular election of governors, This suggests another transi- sent could be moderated by Putin stressed that the Presi- tional period (to some extent appealing to the implementa- dent will nevertheless pre- Medvedev’s identification as a tion of shared values – an serve all instruments of con- liberal leader stimulated this element that is present in all trol over governors, including trend which now has to find a Putin’s articles (see below) the possibility to dismiss modus vivendi within Russia’s and which plays the role of a them. This stance suggests internal affairs9) and not a connection between the soci-

8 R. Sakwa, Putin’s leadership: 9 Interestingly enough, liberal per- as such could not become the character and consequences, cit., sonalities were allowed to enter the founding ideology of Russia’s p. 883. government system, but political system.

6 ISPI - Policy Brief

ety and the Kremlin. The sys- obscure to the reader, what is While stability for survival in temic rigidity and ideological important is an attempt to conditions of economic and amorphousness of UR cer- draw the attention on a mix of political adversity was the tainly cannot perform that task values and national interests main theme of Putin’s previ- (even if it undergoes a re- that, according to the Kremlin, ous presidencies, now stabil- branding process, as some may help solving the current ity returns to be an ordering suggested in the beginning of impasse on trust building. principle with its primary ref- February). It should be noticed erence to predictable, peace- The constant reference to that Putin’s ambiguous relation ful and resilient to challenges Russian intellectuals, histori- to UR (overt support coupled development of domestic cal personalities and cultural with a lack of formal member- affairs. The use of adequate roots in general is particularly ship in it) facilitates his actions resources (in its broadest striking. Putin’s words are and confers to him greater meaning) will strengthen the presented as an expression of room for maneuver in relation country’s role and will guaran- his profound sense of Rus- to the “management” of val- tee progressive advancement. sianness and as an evidence ues. that his strategies will act In Putin’s first article (Rossia Putin’s articles intentionally within that cultural and politi- sosredotachivaetsia – vyzovy, avoid mentioning the opposi- cal framework. It is also worth na kotorye my dolzhny ot- tion, especially not registered noting that the West is ap- vetit’) stable development (i.e. one. This is not a sign of po- proached in a positive way readiness to face and to re- litical comprehensiveness and (exception is made in the spond to challenges, to par- it is at odds with his claims to security field where NATO/US ticipate in shaping the world reach all societal parties. To regional and international ini- processes) is opposed to some extent the lack of a tiatives continue spurring fric- stagnation (i.e. passive ac- clear and appealing alterna- tions). The West is depicted as ceptance and/or assistance to tive to Putin does not put a source for best practices in global processes). As such, much pressure on him to political and economic do- stability allows a gradual evo- change the party system. mains; it is emphasised that lutionary development of so- However, this situation is risky Russia belongs to the Euro- ciety and economy as well as because it allows dissenters pean civilization and that Rus- the success of long-term poli- to gradually mature their po- sia should converge and har- cies. Stability is also opposed litical platform in the next monise its legislation and gov- to Russia’s cyclical revolu- years and to challenge the ernance practices with interna- tionary drives. The latter inter- political regime more strongly tional norms and criteria. rupt the gradual evolutionary from outside where Putin is course. The reference to revo- The overall feeling when read- currently weak. lutions or unexpected ruptures ing the articles is the impor- with a certain political line tance of securing a better hints at the protests and the future for Russia and Rus- The power of values possibility that a radical sians. This paramount goal Shared values (Russian lan- change may put at risk what (heightening the electoral guage, culture, religion, and the Kremlin sees as a long- rhetoric) permeates all of so on) create integration and term prosperity. Revolutions them along with the idea that render diverse segments of in Putin’s opinion may lead to it is Putin, who initiates the Russia’s society more ho- short-term gains, but sooner wider debate on national pri- mogenous and easy to be or later they will reveal their orities and long-term choices addressed in politics. Reitera- shortsightedness. Such a regarding the country’s devel- tion of common Russian val- statement carries a clear rhe- opment. This is indeed the ues is an incontestable basis torical content but it also tries quest for legitimacy of his on which to build what Putin to establish a new value (sta- presidential bid based on calls a «new state conscious- bility) against Russia’s path values such as stability (both ness» – a state guaranteeing dependency on recurring political and economic), socie- better living and working con- revolutionary drives. Thus, tal solidarity, Russia’s great- ditions. While the exact con- although acting within the ness and State-centrism. tent of the notion remains framework of Russia’s history,

ISPI - Policy Brief 7

Putin attempts to break it and Russia and other countries: reach as many voters as pos- adjust it to modern circum- Russia is neither an ethnic sible emphasising common stances. state nor a melting pot like the values and identity as factors US, it is has its own, unique of national union, while relying Putin also depicts solidarity, model – it is a «multinational less on ideologies or private respect for others and the historical state» and a «multi- interests. Unlike in the past, State as such (national inter- ethnic civilization». It is a state his future political agenda ests), unity of citizens, inter- built on a long-standing proc- needs to take into greater personal trust as another ess of mutual adaptation, account Russian citizens’ traditional Russian value and penetration and union of peo- demands. Much in this proc- calls for its restoration in eve- ples at all levels of social life. ess of interplay will depend on ryday activities. Referring to It represents a «unity in diver- the protesters’ potential to national traditions, patriotism sity», as Putin puts it, where formulate a concrete alterna- and components of culture is there is a respect for recipro- tive to Putin’s political agenda a powerful psychological tool cal obligations but also for for change. So far, the latter is to unite people in a moment of shared values of coexistence. missing. Alone they are un- uncertainty for the current able to reverse the current This notion recalls the Euro- political leadership but it is a political system, they are not pean Union motto «united in difficult aim to achieve in a the conclusion of a process, diversity» and somewhat society where atomization but the beginning. Their value evokes Russia’s European processes have already be- is the signal that the system roots. Despite commonalities gun to undermine the sense should be opened if it is to be with Europe and thus a natu- of collectiveness. rendered stronger and resil- ral predisposition to rap- ient to political and economic Finally, in his first article Putin prochement to the latter, provocations. Judging by devotes a considerable atten- Putin’s Russia retains its dis- Putin’s electoral programme, tion to Russia’s greatness tinctiveness; it cannot be he appears willing to launch a (and national pride). It reads merged into other bigger po- dialogue with Russian citi- that Russia is called to play its litical or cultural “projects” zens, meanwhile he also pre- due role based on its «civilisa- because it constitutes itself serves some rigid traits of the tional model, great history, such a “project”. As a result, system as a whole. Thus, he geography and cultural gene Putin continues, Russian stresses the need to upgrade combining fundamental foun- people have the great mission it but confirms a general con- dations of the European civili- to strengthen their civilisation tinuity with the past success zation with a centuries-old and to safeguard Russia’s stories of his and Medvedev’s experience of interaction with cultural nucleus. Russia’s presidencies. He emphasises the East, where now new state-centric tradition serves national uniqueness and Rus- centres of economic and po- this purpose because it is sian values/features that litical power arise». Such an through the State and its insti- should be protected, while approach has concrete reper- tutions that national societal promoting convergence to- cussions on Russia’s foreign outlook and mentality are wards Western standards on policy and notably Putin’s shaped and passed on gen- a selective basis and in ac- proposal for a Eurasian eco- erations. nomic union. According to cordance with the country’s Putin, the country’s civilisation values. Conclusions and intrinsic features render it These examples indicate the the natural core of this project. It is very likely that Putin will persistence of ambiguities in Russia’s uniqueness is linked win March presidential elec- today’s Russian domestic also to its sovereignty and tions although the fight will be domain and they indicate that guarantees for its preserva- serious. The question is how the next presidency will be tion. In the second article he will trump his rivals as well another transitional (instead of titled Rossia: nachional’nyi as what and how of his elec- consolidation) phase of politi- vopros (Russia – the issue of toral programme will be im- cal development. In other nationalism), Putin stresses plemented. At present, it is words, the next years will the basic difference between evident that he is trying to define the orientation of popu-

8 ISPI - Policy Brief

lar discontent – a confirmation of the need to have a national La ricerca ISPI analizza le di- leader (with his power struc- namiche politiche, strategiche tures) or to be led by reform ed economiche del sistema agendas (lesser emphasis on internazionale con il duplice personalities). This is dilemma obiettivo di informare e di o- that Russia’s middle class rientare le scelte di policy. should solve while interacting with the power-centre in order I risultati della ricerca vengono to determine the country’s divulgati attraverso pubblica- political future. zioni ed eventi, focalizzati su tematiche di particolare inte-

resse per l’Italia e le sue rela- zioni internazionali e articolati in:

9 Programma Africa 9 Programma Caucaso e Asia Centrale 9 Programma Europa 9 Programma Mediterraneo e Medio Oriente 9 Programma Russia e Vicini

Orientali 9 Programma Sicurezza e Studi Strategici

9 Progetto Argentina 9 Progetto Asia Meridionale 9 Progetto Cina e Asia Orientale 9 Progetto Diritti Umani 9 Progetto Disarmo 9 Progetto Emergenze e Af-

fari Umanitari 9 Progetto Internazionaliz- zazione della Pubblica Amministrazione

Le pubblicazioni online dell’ISPI sono realizzate anche grazie al sostegno della Fondazione Cariplo.

ISPI Palazzo Clerici Via Clerici, 5 I - 20121 Milano www.ispionline.it

Per informazioni: [email protected] [email protected]

© ISPI 2012

7 marzo 2012

Russia: senza alternative. Sviluppo o declino

Aldo Ferrari(*)

Nonostante la netta vittoria di Putin, non vi è dubbio che si stia chiudendo la lunga fase politica iniziata nel marzo del 2000, quando egli ottenne il suo primo mandato. Una fase che può essere definita di “generale consenso”, determinata soprattutto dal sostanziale miglioramento della situa- zione economica interna (dovuta peraltro essenzialmente all’alto prezzo di petrolio e gas) e dalla diffusa percezione di un rafforzamento della posizione internazionale del paese. Le numerose om- bre di questa fase – involuzione autoritaria, corruzione devastante, insufficiente diversificazione dell’economia, inarrestabile declino demografico, mancata soluzione della conflittualità nel Cauca- so settentrionale, crisi economica del 2008-2009 – non avevano scalfito la vasta popolarità di Putin e la stabilità del sistema politico-economico di cui egli è stato rappresentante e garante anche do- po aver ceduto a Medvedev la carica nel 2008. In un certo senso, nonostante le sue pesanti rica- dute politiche ed economiche, la “vittoria” nella guerra con la Georgia nell’agosto di quell’anno ha segnato l’apogeo di tale consenso. Una situazione sostanzialmente mantenutasi, pur se con alcuni segnali d’allarme, anche nei tre anni successivi. In questi ultimi mesi, però, l’insuccesso del partito presidenziale alle elezioni dello scorso dicembre e la comparsa di un’opposizione consistente e decisa hanno profondamente mutato la situazione politica del paese, anche se non è chiaro sino a che punto sia reale la prospettiva che per la Russia possano aprirsi scenari simili a quelli, peraltro molto deludenti, delle “rivoluzioni colorate” (Georgia e Ucraina) di alcuni anni fa o addirittura delle “primavere arabe”. Comunque la si voglia valutare, un’eventualità di questo genere determinerebbe una situazione quanto mai rischiosa. Nonostante i numerosi problemi interni, la Russia continua, infatti, a essere un attore politico e militare (dal seggio al Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’Onu all’ancora imponente ar- senale nucleare) di primaria importanza soprattutto nello spazio eurasiatico, capace inoltre di influi- re notevolmente sulla scena internazionale attraverso un uso spregiudicato delle sue enormi risor- se naturali. Uno sviluppo negativo della situazione politica russa avrebbe quindi ricadute quanto mai preoccupanti su scala globale. Per scongiurare un’evoluzione di questo tipo, il nuovo (o vec- chio presidente) dovrà quindi affrontare una sfida di enorme importanza storica per la Russia. Non è in gioco, infatti, solo il potere personale di Putin e del suo entourage, ma la capacità di innescare quel processo di reale modernizzazione – politica oltre che economica – del quale il paese ha as- solutamente bisogno. In effetti, tra gli attori principali della scena internazionale, la Russia è con ogni probabilità quello il cui futuro appare più incerto, in bilico tra due scenari fortemente contra- stanti: da un lato una prospettiva di crescita che potrebbe portarla definitivamente ai vertici della scena politica ed economica internazionale, dall’altro una parabola di declino e di sostanziale mar- ginalizzazione. Il futuro del paese si gioca in gran parte sul successo del progetto di rinnovamento che la dirigenza russa riuscirà a realizzare nei prossimi anni. Per mantenere il passo con competi- tori sempre più dinamici (a partire dalla Cina), la Russia dovrebbe superare in maniera definitiva il lascito negativo del periodo sovietico. Questo richiederebbe però alla sua leadership, che di tale lascito risente ancora fortemente, di spostare con decisione la priorità dal “controllo” allo “sviluppo” del paese, liberando energie – politiche, economiche e culturali – sinora soffocate o comunque non

Le opinioni espresse sono strettamente personali e non riflettono necessariamente le posizioni dell’ISPI (*)Aldo Ferrari, responsabile dei Programmi Russia e Caucaso-Asia Centrale dell’ISPI e docente all’Università Ca’ Foscari. 2 ISPI - Commentary

valorizzate. È questo che domandano la parte più consapevole La ricerca ISPI analizza dell’opposizione e i membri della stessa élite politico-economica del le dinamiche politiche, paese. Nonostante tutti i dubbi che legittimamente si possono nutri- strategiche ed economiche re sull’effettiva capacità, e volontà, di Putin di procedere in questa del sistema internazionale direzione, è tuttavia interesse comune della Russia e della comunità con il duplice obiettivo di internazionale che tale processo abbia effettivamente luogo, peral- informare e di orientare tro senza rotture traumatiche, coniugando il più possibile rinnova- le scelte di policy. mento e stabilità. I risultati della ricerca vengono divulgati attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi, focalizzati su tematiche di particolare interesse per l’Italia e le sue relazioni internazionali.

Le pubblicazioni online dell’ISPI sono realizzate anche grazie al sostegno della Fondazione Cariplo.

ISPI Palazzo Clerici Via Clerici, 5 I - 20121 Milano www.ispionline.it

© ISPI 2012

7 marzo 2012

Un paese bloccato. Eppur si muove Alessandro Vitale(*)

La Russia uscita dalle elezioni presidenziali ha visto la rilegittimazione del leader e la riconferma del suo carisma, per quanto affievolito, in larghi strati, maggioritari, di popolazione. Il successo questa volta è stato facilitato, più che dai probabili brogli, dal possesso di ingenti strumenti propa- gandistici – finanziati con i proventi dell’esportazione di idrocarburi – e di controllo sociale, sui quali non potevano contare le frastagliate e disorganizzate forze di opposizione. Il Paese sembra ora avviarsi sulla via della continuità e della stabilità: due condizioni largamente propagandate nella campagna elettorale. Ma su quali basi quelle due direttrici potranno svilupparsi? La vittoria elettorale di Putin, già titolare della carica presidenziale, ha stabilizzato quest’ultima, ma reiterandola ha anche posto le premesse per ulteriori freni al rinnovamento interno, sempre più impellente in un Paese bloccato dal suo obsoleto sistema politico, pieno erede di quello, settan- tennale, formalmente abbattuto dalla debole “Primavera della Russia” del 1991-1993, agilmente “recuperata” da un apparato politico e amministrativo che aveva sviluppato nei decenni un’estesa capacità di dominio interno. Nel contesto attuale sarà ancor più facile consolidare la rete di potere di una classe politica erede del sistema sovietico, il suo controllo sui gangli vitali della Russia, il suo patrimonialismo, il suo senso di onnipotenza, paralizzando gli incentivi a introdurre le parziali riforme prospettate e con ogni evidenza ormai necessarie. È estremamente difficile che da conti- nuità e stabilità di questo tipo, di lunga durata, scaturisca quell’autoriforma interna chiesta da larghi strati di popolazione, dai giovani che non hanno conosciuto il sistema sovietico e dagli ancora esi- gui imprenditori che cercano a fatica di operare al di fuori dei monopoli statali. Queste stabilità e continuità incentivano l’aumento della centralizzazione del potere (nei confronti della quale sono ormai insofferenti, nelle regioni periferiche, anche coloro che pur supportano il rieletto Presidente), che incrementa inevitabilmente il già elevato livello di corruzione, di persecu- zione fiscale degli operatori economici indipendenti, di costosa burocratizzazione, di parassitismo politico-burocratico, di sfruttamento dell’export di gas e petrolio a vantaggio di una ristretta cerchia di persone, che getta solo le briciole a una popolazione che incomincia a sentire gli effetti della crisi del 2009. Queste stabilità e continuità incentivano la prosecuzione di una lunga fase di restau- razione politica, iniziata già nel 1993, in pieno periodo eltsiniano e non con l’ascesa di Putin al potere, nel 1999, come spesso viene sostenuto. Al di là dell’impressione di stabilità e sicurezza confortante che il leader riesce ancora a dare a buona parte della popolazione, rimane la realtà di un sistema politico che blocca l’evoluzione civile ed economica della Russia, in cui nemmeno il livello di criminalità e di sicurezza interna corrisponde alle statistiche ufficiali e alla diffusa perce- zione e in cui sanità, istruzione, servizi pubblici continuano ad assomigliare a quelli di un Paese rimasto in fase post-bellica. È tuttavia probabile che il fosco quadro attuale, tipico delle fasi di lunga restaurazione, finisca per scontrarsi con forti pressioni presenti in correnti sotterranee e di direzione contraria, che fanno ribollire la Russia anche quando appare normalizzata e stabilizzata. Si tratta delle forze dell’inno- vazione, delle istanze maturate sull’onda lunga dell’esplosione e della diversificazione dei

Le opinioni espresse sono strettamente personali e non riflettono necessariamente le posizioni dell’ISPI. (*)Alessandro Vitale, Dipartimento di Studi Internazionali, Università degli Studi di Milano. 2 ISPI - Commentary

bisogni, delle reti, della rivoluzione industriale in atto, basata sull’informatica e la comunicazione diffusa, che già avevano contribuito a rendere obsoleto il sistema sovietico e che non sono più facilmente controllabili con strumenti politici invecchiati e inefficaci. In questo contesto, un sistema autarchico e rigidamente controllato sulla base delle banali formule politiche elaborate dall’entourage presidenziale (“democrazia sovrana”, “verticale del potere”, ecc.) finirà per scontrarsi con istanze di liberazione e di La ricerca ISPI analizza riattivazione della vita civile e dell’economia, ben al di là della super- le dinamiche politiche, ficiale richiesta di democrazia – auspicata in particolare in Occiden- strategiche ed economiche te – forma di governo che può anche sussistere alla presenza di del sistema internazionale centralizzazione, dirigismo, mancanza di libertà politica. con il duplice obiettivo di informare e di orientare La società russa sta cambiando a ritmi ben diversi rispetto a quanto le scelte di policy. non si renda conto il potere politico, negli ultimi quindici anni sordo di fronte a queste istanze. Essa sta cercando di ritrovare, fra l’altro, I risultati della ricerca forme di riorganizzazione dal basso che sono già esistite in Russia vengono divulgati – contrariamente ai luoghi comuni ripetuti in Occidente anche in attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi, focalizzati su questi giorni – in forme molto più marcate di quanto non si pensi, 1 tematiche di particolare nel periodo pre-1917 . La Russia sta ancora facendo i conti con interesse per l’Italia e le sue l’eredità sovietica, che ha atomizzato ed egualificato gli individui di relazioni internazionali. fronte al sovrano collettivo (il partito), devastando la cooperazione sociale e lasciandoli soli di fronte al suo totem. Quando quest’ultimo Le pubblicazioni online è crollato, è subentrato il vuoto, di valori e di autostima. Tuttavia, dell’ISPI sono realizzate allorché il processo di lenta e faticosa ricostituzione del tessuto so- anche grazie al sostegno ciale si sarà concluso, forme e concezioni primitive di organizzazio- della Fondazione Cariplo. ne del potere e di gestione della cosa pubblica, come quelle ancora vigenti in Russia, dovranno fare i conti non solo con nuovi e cre- ISPI Palazzo Clerici scenti bisogni e aspettative, ma anche con tradizioni che non pos- Via Clerici, 5 sono essere ridotte a stereotipi semplicistici quali l’“orientalismo” o 2 I - 20121 Milano la mentalità autocratica . La durata del processo dipenderà anche www.ispionline.it dall’ostinazione o meno dell’Occidente a mantenere antistoriche chiusure di fronte alla Russia, ormai ingiustificate e pretestuose, a © ISPI 2012 vent’anni dalla fine del confronto bipolare freddo.

1 Numerose ricerche storiche hanno confermato nel decennio scorso l’esistenza in Russia, nel periodo pre-rivoluzionario, di forme diffuse di solidi legami sociali e solidaristici non-statali, che funzionavano da contrappeso al monopolio statale in molti settori. Per una rassegna, si veda B. EVANS Jr. - L.A. HENRY - L. MCINTOSH SUNDSTROM (Eds.), Russian Civil Society, A Critical Assessment, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York – London, 2006. 2 A questo proposito sono di grande interesse i recenti libri di Vladmir Medinskij, che contestano i miti più diffusi sulla Russia. Si veda ad esempio il suo O tjage russkich k “sil’noj ruke” i nesposobnosti k demokratii (Sull’attrazione dei russi per la “mano forte” e l’incapacità di democrazia), Olma, Mosca, 2010.