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Russian Analytical Digest No 19: Political Parties

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Russian Analytical Digest No 19: Political Parties No. 19 17 April 2007 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical ddigestigest www.res.ethz.ch www.russlandanalysen.de POLITICAL PARTIES ■ ANALYSIS Russia at the Crossroads? Th e Realignment of the Party System 2 By Petra Stykow, Munich ■ TABLES AND DIAGRAMS List of Offi cially Registered Political Parties, 2007 5 Party Ratings and Monthly Snapshots of Voter Preferences 5 Which Political Group Has Made a Good, Positive Impression on You Recently? (April 2007) 7 ■ OPINION A Destructive Combination: Why Democratic Institutions Can Destroy Democracy 11 By Petra Stykow, Munich ■ ANALYSIS Th e Transformation of Russia’s Party System 12 By Vladimir Gel’man, St. Petersburg ■ ANALYSIS Th e Regional Dimension of Russia’s 2007–2008 Elections 15 By J. Paul Goode, Norman, Oklahoma ■ ANALYSIS Parties in the Russian Political Context: What Has Changed? 18 By Igor Rabinovich, Ufa ■ REGIONAL REPORT Elections in Komi: A Sign of Future Victory or Defeat? 19 By Yury Shabaev, Syktyvkar Research Centre for East Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 19/07 ddigestigest Analysis Russia at the Crossroads? Th e Realignment of the Party System By Petra Stykow, Munich Abstract A structural realignment is taking place in the president’s camp in preparation for the fi fth State Duma elec- tions on December 2, 2007. Th e elite groups supporting the “Putin System” are contending in a surprisingly open competition between two “parties of power” whose agendas are practically indistinguishable in terms of substance. So far, the electorate has not responded to this staged competition. Voter Preferences and the Next Elections Impact of New Legislation on Parties and residential elections are scheduled in Russia for Elections PMarch 2008. According to his own statements, he restructuring of the party landscape is a re- incumbent Vladimir Putin will not run for re-elec- Taction to the reforms of party and electoral law tion. Whether the “Putin System” will remain viable since 2001. Th eir declared aim has been to centralize without its central fi gure is a question that is vividly and consolidate the party system and subsequently to debated. Th e elections to the State Duma on Decem- strengthen parliamentarianism. Indeed, the amended ber 2, 2007 are expected to deliver important signals legislation on political parties has reduced the number as to how the secession will be resolved. Th ese elec- of registered parties to only 17, eliminating smaller tions are the background for an emerging competition and unstable formations. Besides, parties now are the between certain groups within the Russian elite that only organizations permitted to fi eld candidates for so far seemed to be fully integrated into the existing parliamentary elections. As a consequence, the po- system. Th ey now are determined to have a say in its litical arena became easier to monitor, compared, for future prospects. example, to the 2003 elections, when 27 parties and Th e “traditional” opposition is barely aff ected fi ve electoral blocs (the latter consisting of 12 parties by these developments. Th ere have been no struc- and one “social movement”) were in competition with tural, personnel, or programmatic changes in this one another. camp in the past months. Th e electoral support for Even more grave than the eff ects of the party leg- the Communists and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal islation will be the impact of the new electoral law Democratic Party has not changed since the last Duma that will take full nationwide eff ect for the fi rst time elections in December 2003. Both parties can expect in December: It mandates a shift from a mixed elec- to earn roughly 10–15 percent of the votes. Th e elec- toral system that combined voting in single-mandate toral basis of the (social-) liberal Yabloko Party and the constituencies and party-list proportional representa- (economically) liberal Union of Right Forces is con- tion to a strictly proportional electoral system where tinuing to erode slowly, and both parties will probably deputies are elected solely on the basis of party lists. fail to pass the 7 percent threshold to the Duma again. Th us, it is now impossible to win a Duma seat as an On the other hand, there is vibrant voter approval for “independent” by securing a simple majority of votes. the United Russia party, which has acknowledged the Instead, every candidate for a parliamentary seat has president as its “moral leader”. Compared to the 2003 to compete for a promising place on a party list. Th e elections, it has accrued another 10–15 percent and result is that party organizations have become more would win approximately 50 percent of the vote if important than ever in Russia’s history, and most im- elections were held today. portantly, that candidates are becoming increasingly Th e stagnation of the “traditional” opposition dependent on the party apparatuses. Furthermore, the should not obscure the possibility that the political new rules severely jeopardize the political prospects of playing fi eld may shift in a dynamic manner during the leaders of smaller parties that have no chance of the next few months. Th e rivalry between ambitious clearing the 7 percent hurdle. groups with disparate power resources opens space for contingent developments that nobody can fully con- Just Russia: Th e “New Left” project trol or predict. Th e upcoming Duma elections have or these reasons, ambitious politicians have un- set off processes bringing forth new structures and Fdertaken a number of initiatives since the sum- profi les in the hitherto diff use pro-presidential center mer of 2006 to enhance their electoral prospects by of the party spectrum. merging their respective parties. Th e various projects’ 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 19/07 ddigestigest ability to succeed depends on several factors. One key Ministry of Justice to investigate alleged abuses. At determinant is the parties’ individual political clout the same time, in the Duma, United Russia has been and the “chemistry” between the politicians involved. trying for months to enforce ever more changes to the Furthermore, success is shaped by the force of Putin’s electoral law in order to improve the party’s chances at “strong hand”: Th e restructuring of the party system is the polls in December. Th e Just Russia faction in par- highly controversial because the logic of bottom-up liament, for its part, demands legislation to counter its self-organization is not the only determinant of the rival’s practice of forcing new members into the party. future outcome. Th is logic suggests that political ac- Th e “New Left” can be expected to gain additional tors by themselves modify their strategies in reaction weight as soon as it manages to dispel any remaining to changing conditions in their environment. Instead, doubts that it has serious prospects at the elections. party-building in Russia is also managed from the top Th ere are already signs that the new party has begun by the head of the executive branch. to attract politicians who are dissatisfi ed with the It is well known that Putin’s strategy to build a large, amorphous United Russia party, but support “directed democracy” consists of direct intervention in Putin’s policies. Just Russia is also attractive for rela- the institutionalization of political actors. Th e goal is to tively well-known politicians because there is so far create a coherent and controllable intermediary space little competition for promising slots in the new party. between the state and its citizens. Th is strategy, which Since its existence has ended the necessity for regional is best documented in the civil society arena, but also elites to join United Russia in order to secure access extends to interest groups in the broadest sense, now to the “administrative resources” within the presiden- is being extended to the party system, where only a tial vertical axis of power, their future voting behavior limited diversity is becoming institutionalized. With within the regions also becomes less predictable. the approval and the support of the presidential ad- ministration, the system thus develops several “pillars” Two “Parties of Power” and the Source of in the parliamentary-party arena that compete among “Power” themselves without representing meaningful policy he rivalry between the two parties is so bitter be- alternatives. In July 2006, the Rodina and Russian Tcause the confl ict is a domestic one within the Party of Life parties announced they would “create Russian power elite. While it is true that in earlier a strong left-wing patriotic force”; one month later, elections, the “party of power” has always been at- they were joined by the Russian Pensioners’ Party. On tended by smaller pro-presidential parties, these have October 28, this “New Left” alliance brought forth a primarily siphoned additional votes from the opposi- new party: Just Russia: Motherland/Pensioners/Life. tion (e.g., “Rodina” in the 2003 elections). Th e “New Just Russia has achieved offi cial registration, is repre- Left”, too, appeared initially to enjoy the protection of sented in parliament with a faction of its own (29 dep- the presidential administration as a counterweight to uties) and is led by Sergei Mironov, the chairman of the Communist Party. It also appeared to be a clever the Federation Council. Its leaders have thus signifi - strategy for enhancing the legitimacy of the political cantly enhanced their chances of being re-elected to system by creating “virtual” electoral alternatives. In parliament under the new proportional representa- the meantime, however, United Russia and Just Rus- tion system. Furthermore, all observers agree that this sia are mainly competing for personnel and adminis- project is supported by infl uential groups within the trative resources within the pro-presidential camp.
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