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Citation for published version: March, L 2009, 'Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just and Parastatal Opposition', Slavic Review, vol. 68, no. 3, pp. 504-527.

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Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition Author(s): Luke March Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Fall, 2009), pp. 504-527 Published by: Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621653 . Accessed: 03/02/2014 06:03

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Luke March

a a Contemporary Russia is not . This is hardly contentious statement outside Russia itself, where the consensus view (as shown most as starkly by Freedom House's reclassification of Russia "not free" since 2005) is that under the presidency of , Russia moved from a "hybrid regime" (an amalgam of democratic and authoritarian elements zone dic occupying the "gray" between and outright tatorship) to something approaching full-scale .1 Nevertheless, the nature, salience, and future of the democratic potential within Russia is still very much debated, even as the Russian authorities (most recently rebut with their promulgation of the concept "") ever criticism more insistently.2 an on the In parallel, increasing emphasis has been placed viewing as party (Edinaia Rossiia) illustrating the paradoxes of Rus one claims to be a sian party . On the hand, the Kremlin creating a modern . On the other, United Russia is "party of power" that recalls that has produced the kind of "dominant power politics" as and South "hegemonic party systems" such those in , Taiwan, on Korea.3 There has, however, been far less focus the increasingly di This is a as Robert Dahl minished political opposition.4 mistake: notes,

are: about 1. Some early examples of this view Larry Diamond, "Thinking Hybrid A. Regimes, "Journal ofDemocracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21-35; and Lucan no. 2 Way, "The Rise of Competitive ," Journal of Democracy 13, (April 2002): 51-65; and Graeme Gill, "A New Turn to Authoritarian Rule in Russia?" Democrati no. zation 13, 1 (February 2006): 58-77. some to the view that Russia is not a see "Rus 2. For notable exceptions democracy, Russian Presidential or sia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: ?Affirming Democracy at for 7 March 2008 accessed 15 Confirming Autocracy?" www.russiaprofile.org (last May or Russia and International 2009). Richard Sakwa, "'New ' Twenty Years' Crisis? demo Politics," InternationalAffairs 84, no. 2 (March 2008): 241-67 insists thatRussia's still rosier than its bleak international cratic potential is image suggests. can found in 3. An excellent account of recent reforms to the party system be under Post-Soviet no. 4 Kenneth Wilson, "Party-System Development Putin," Affairs 22, its antecedents before (October-December 2006): 314-48. Studies of United Russia and Russian this volume include Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, "The Party of Power in Politics," Acta Political InternationalJournal ofPolitical Science 35, no. 2 (Summer 2000): Out: Parties of Power 123-45; Regina Smyth, "Building Capacity from the Inside Politics and no. 4 and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia," Society 30, "Parties of Power (December 2002): 555-78; Zoe Knox, Pete Lentini, and Brad Williams, over Civil Problems Post- and Russian Politics: A Victory of the State Society?" of no. and Andrew Konitzer and K 53, 1 (January-February 2006): 3-14; Stephen Wegren, " and Political Recentralization in the Russian : United Russia as the Party of Power," Publius 36, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 503-22. A 4. A notable exception isVladimir Gel'man, "PoliticalOpposition inRussia: Dying no. Species?" Post-SovietAffairs 21, 3 (July-September 2005): 226-46.

Slavic Review 68, no. 3 (Fall 2009)

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means the symbiosis of opposition and regime that studying the former inevitably illuminates the latter.5 on My focus here is the party Just Russia: Motherland/Pensioners/ as a case Life (Spravedlivaia Rossiia, hereafter Just Russia) study of the in problems and issues confronting opposition Russia. A self-proclaimed "new socialist" party, Just Russia was established on 28 October 2006 through the merger of three smaller left-leaning groups, Motherland (Rodina), theRussian Party of Life (Rossiiskaia partiia zhizni), and the Russian Pensioners' Party (Rossiiskaia partiia pensionerov) .6 In the Rus sian Duma of 2007, Just Russia gained 7.7 percent of the vote and one 38 seats?last place but still of only four parties currently represented in Russia's . nature Just Russia's is poorly understood: skeptics viewed it initially as a Kremlin pocket opposition ("the opposition of the master's maid to the master's butler"), entirely fake and designed essentially to fool the electorate.7 More optimistic analysts believed that Just Russia was a more serious alternative "party of power," possessing the potential either for or greater (albeit limited) multipartism and opposition serious elite level conflict.8 In the event, during the December 2007 election campaign, neither view was to never confirmed; contrary optimists, Just Russia challenged as a United Russia's hegemony "party of power" and serious elite conflict did not to openly erupt. Contrary pessimists, Just Russia limped into par liament, despite widely reported Kremlin indifference. aim here is threefold. to My First, understand why Just Russia emerged. Why, unlike previous disastrous attempts at forming a moderate left oppo sition, did it attain (however modest) success in 2007? Second, to examine what Russia Just illustrates about the role of opposition within the Rus sian Does it indicate or party system. greater pluralistic potential merely a greater imitation of it?What does Just Russia reveal about the way the Kremlin success "manages" opposition and its in doing so? Third, to re flect on the role of in opposition parties "electoral authoritarian" regimes: how are or even they manipulated manufactured; how much "opposition" can even they profess? The answer to these will questions show that both optimists and pessi mists are Russia can as a partly right. Certainly, Just be understood regime created aimed at "parastatal party" providing limited competition for the main of to most "party power" (United Russia). Contrary the skeptical

5. Robert Alan Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western (New Haven, 1966). 6. Russia" is to some other translations "Just preferred (e.g., "AJust Russia," "Russia of to "United Russia" and to others "Fair Justice") by analogy (e.g., Russia") because its slogan "social is a if term. justice" recognized, disputed, left-wing 7. Vladimir Pribylovskii,quoted inNabi Abdullaev, "New Party Says Kremlin Knows Moscow 30 October 2006. Two other Best," Times, analysts holding this view are Boris Ka garlitskii and Boris Makarenko (partly). 8. For see "A Test-Tube examples, Georgy Bovt, Party," Russia Profile 4, no. 1 (27 Feb Alexei ruary 2007): 10; Makarkin, "Election Speculations," Russia Profiled no. 8 (3 Sep tember 7-8. Vitalii Tretiakov and 2007): Igor Bunin expressed similar views.

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a analyses, however, while Just Russia is heavily manipulated "virtual" op not a to position, it is simply fake designed dupe the electorate but rep resents long-term Kremlin strategic interests in channeling opposition an and thus stabilizing the political regime. Moreover, it has identifiable, ideological position (left-wing social democratic) and electorate, which it, albeit imperfectly and partially, represents. As the optimists argued, Just Russia's evolution indicates the plural ism of competing Kremlin interests and the potential for elite conflict. was Although this conflict effectively contained in the 2007-8 elections, a Just Russia is illustrative of the fundamental paradox of "managed op a an as a position" for regime that needs opposition legitimation of its to too ceases to authority govern. If that opposition is stage-managed, it an or too become opposition in any meaningful visible sense; if it is op can a an positionist, it rapidly evolve from management problem into unmanageable problem.

"Parastatal" Oppositions in "Electoral Authoritarian" Regimes are a are Although parties necessary feature of democracy, they far from a as sufficient element. Analysts have noted that the rise of democracy "the only game in town" has been accompanied by the rise of "pseudode exist mocracy," whereby multiparty systems and organized oppositions are in regimes that substantively undemocratic.9 "Pseudodemocracies" com range from "feckless pluralist" semi-democracies, with (imperfectly) to "electoral" or au petitive party systems and civil liberties, "competitive" thoritarian regimes.10 The latter demonstrate "hegemonic party systems" rul embodying "dominant power politics" whereby "an institutionalized use of media ing party makes extensive coercion, patronage, control, to and other tools to reduce opposition parties decidedly 'second-class' cannot The status," and the "licensed opposition" challenge for power.11 a is difficult to because precise degree of regime's democracy ascertain, at to be demo nondemocratic regimes have become expert pretending cratic, and almost none would admit that they rule in defiance of the over demos. Nevertheless, because of increased Kremlin control political an "electoral life, there is every basis for saying that Russia is precisely such authoritar authoritarian" system, where "by placing elections under tight

no. 9. Larry Diamond, "Is theThird Wave Over?"Journal ofDemocracy 7, 3 (July 1996): 20-37, and Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," 21-35. and "dominant see Thomas 10. On "feckless pluralism" power politics," Carothers, "The End of theTransition Paradigm, "Journal ofDemocracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 5 21. On "electoral authoritarianism," see Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," "From Electoral Journal ofDemocracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 36-50, and Andreas Schedler, Authoritarianism to Democratic Consolidation," in Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, and Electoral Riordan Roett, eds., Mexico's Democracy at Work: Political and Dynamics (Boulder, see and "The Rise Colo., 2004), 9-38. On "competitive authoritarianism," Levitsky Way, of Competitive Authoritarianism." 11. Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" 25. For the concept of "hegemonic party sys A tems," see Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: Framework for Analysis (Cambridge, Eng., 1976), 230-38.

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on ian controls [elites try] to cement their continued hold power. Their dream is to reap the fruits of electoral without running the risks of democratic uncertainty."12 Many analysts note that under electoral authoritarianism, opposition are to to parties "permitted exist largely shore up the perception of the to to dominant party's right govern," that is, their principal role is pro most vide external and internal legitimacy.13 For all but the dictatorial more a mere indeed regimes, opposition is than facade, however, and to fulfills several important functions: responding the public, providing elite recruitment and training, and stabilizing the regime. For example, hegemonic party systems encounter the contradiction cannot or that the "part" democratically effectively encompass the whole. A party cannot incorporate all national interest groups and policy plat forms without losing its internal ideological and organizational cohesive ness: accordingly, there arises the need for "a mechanism by which regime can some perpetuation be reconciled with degree of political pluralism."14 as Regimes such Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) an before 1988 and Putin's Russia therefore developed interest in "man not aging" but destroying political competition, guaranteeing opposition a groups "a limited voice in public affairs, including degree of indepen dent political space in the public square, in return for abiding by the set rules down by the ."15 "Competitive" multiparty elections own that the regime invariably wins reinforce its legitimacy, and simul taneously allow mobilization of and responsiveness to public demands, thereby preempting potential problems.16 an Similarly, limited competition acts as antidote to the centralized a and bureaucratic tendencies of single . It offers lower-level career party cadres alternative paths and thus limits the risk of defec tions from the regime, while co-opting opposition elites into regime sanctioned activity and marginalizing extra-systemic opposition. Overall, it bolsters regime stability by reducing (particularly electoral) unpredict ability, hard-wiring competitiveness and responsiveness, and combining openness with control. Unsurprisingly, hegemonic party systems are the most durable form of authoritarianism. is as as a "Managed opposition" paradoxical "one-party democracy," a however, and electoral authoritarian regimes have evolved panoply of to methods prevent the paradox from becoming too blatant, many of

12. "Menu of Schedler, Manipulation," 36-37.1 prefer the term electoral authoritarian to as terms such managed pluralism because ithighlights that elite authority and control rather than pluralism are the driving rationales of the political regime and also embeds Russia a rich within comparative literature. This is, however, not at all to assert that an authoritarian Russia is a "USSR-lite" or has no democratic potential. 13. Dorothy J. Solinger, "Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico," Journal ofDemocracy 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 31. 14. Nikolas K. "Mexico and Russia: Mirror Gvosdev, Images?" Demokratizatsiya: The Journal ofPost-Soviet 10, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 493. 15. Ibid. 16. Hermann Giliomee and Charles The Simkins, eds., Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy (Amsterdam, 1999).

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one extreme are which have been employed simultaneously.17 At coercive as or methods, such harassment, intimidation, assassination of opposition more are candidates. More subtle and hence widely favored administrative or methods including rigging ballots; bribing, compromising, otherwise co-opting opposition candidates; and inducing party splits. Much used are are (because they formally legal and predictable) strict registration or requirements that allow undesirable parties to be banned otherwise or pressured electoral systems that strongly favor the governing party.18 a Overall, hegemonic parties practice what might be called "syncretic he norms gemony," whereby through cultural and co-optative practices they as successfully represent themselves national leaders and delegitimize the as opposition disloyal.19 to The understudied facets of party hegemony of particular relevance are Just Russia direct attempts to form "parastatal" parties (that is, those partiallyor completely controlled by the state) thatmimic opposition and to attempt channel it in regime-supporting directions, particularly used in by regimes during times of political change. For example, authoritar ian the Chun Doo-hwan regime from 1980 to 1987 banned in to opposition parties and created loyal opposition parties order co-opt were un opposition activists.20 More durable Mexico's opposition parties to the der the PRI regime. In addition the partial co-optation of principal the Authentic of the Mexi opposition National Action Party (PAN), Party can Revolution (PARM) and the Party of the Cardenist Front of National were Reconstruction (PFCRN) archetypal parastatal parties. They always as mechanisms endorsed PRI presidential candidates and mostly served to seats on the basis for leaders get congressional and enrich themselves acted as "electoral scabs" whose elec of their parties' registrations.21 They to toral participation undercut PAN's inclination boycott.22 was to In More blatant still 's contribution party building. 1996, General Abacha allowed five parties to register, which then "inde This pendently" all endorsed his (unopposed) presidential candidacy.23 General had not might have seemed absurd ifhis predecessor Babangida one "a little to the left" So founded two pro-regime parties in 1989, (the one to National cial Democratic Party, SDP) and "a little the right" (the as of a "transition" to With iden Republican Convention) part democracy. and fund tical headquarters and near-identical party programs regime

see "Menu of 17. For example, Schedler, Manipulation." 18. Gvosdev, "Mexico and Russia." The 19. The term syncretichegemony is my own but cf. Giliomee and Simkins, eds., Awkward Embrace. included the Democratic Korean the Democratic 20. These parties Party, Society e-mail 6 March Party, and the Korean People's Party. Youngmi Kim, communication, 2008. 21. Steve Wuhs, e-mail communication, 21 February 2008. in Mexico: Evolution and in 22. Jose Antonio Crespo, "Party Competition Prospects," 57-82. Kevin J.Middlebrook, ed., Dilemmas ofPolitical Change inMexico (London, 2003), O. and Victor Adefemi Socio 23. Festus Egwaikhide Isumonah, "Nigeria Paralysed: political Life under General Sani Abacha," Africa Development 26, nos. 3-4 (2001): 219-41.

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were as ing, the parties mocked the "Yes Party" and "Yes, Sir Party," respec as a to tively.24Yet, warning democracy managers everywhere, the parties a took on life of their own, becoming vehicles for "moneybags" to unite around clientelistic and ethnic rather than programmatic cleavages. The to army refused recognize the victory of the SDP candidate Chief Abiola in the 1993 elections, arrested him, and suspended the transition. Moreover, it is often forgotten that many communist regimes were a (theoretically) "hegemonic party systems" where the ruling party led "" government of noncommunist parties. In East Germany, as for example, parties such the German Liberal Democratic Party and National Democratic Party had very circumscribed roles in candidate se lection and election campaigns but had guaranteed parliamentary rep as to resentation.25 These "parties" acted "transmission belts" integrate and monitor influential social groups that the Communist Party could not completely subjugate (for example, the Christian and peasant strata). means was aware Putin's KGB service in Dresden in the 1980s he surely of the "Dresden party system" and the "constructive" role played by para statal multipartism.26

"Virtual" Opposition and Regime in Russia

What relevance do such examples have to Russia? Until Putin came to most observers power, would have answered "little," but this has begun to change. Only belatedly have analysts started to move beyond a con of the Russian as a one ceptualization party system quasi-European with recognizable ideological party families (usually "liberal/reformist," "na and cen tionalist," "communist/left" "centrist/party of power").27 The tendencies under Putin to tralizing have led increased attention being to Kremlin of the paid management party system and far greater analysis of the notion of the "party of power" (partiia vlasti).28 Some state of an that the "party power" is entirely sui generis post Soviet This is untrue. phenomenon.29 It has strong similarities to hege monic parties like the PRI in terms of both presidential control over the and the party dominance exercised through parastatal mechanisms and

24. O. The Politics Julius Ihonvbere, Nigeria: ofAdjustment and Democracy (New Bruns wick, N.J., 1994). 25. Ghita Ionescu, ThePolitics of theEuropean CommunistStates (London, 1967). 26. Vladimir Ryzhkov, cited in Vladimir Gel'man, "The Transformation of Russia's Party System,"Russian AnalyticalDigest, no. 19 (17 April 2007): 12-14. 27. For Russia's New Politics: The a example, Stephen White, Management of Postcommu nist and ton Society (Cambridge, Eng., 2000), Timothy J. Col and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and The Russian Elections 1999 and 2000 Managed Democracy: of (Washington, D.C., 2003). 28. Wilson, "Party-System Development under Putin"; Oversloot and Verheul, "The of Power in Party Russian Politics"; Smyth, "Building State Capacity from the Inside Out"; Knox, Lentini, and Williams, "Parties of Power and Russian Politics"; and Konitzer and Wegren, "Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation." 29. For example, Knox, Lentini, and Williams, "Parties of Power and Russian Politics."

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clientelistic arrangements. The crucial difference between the party of power and other hegemonic parties is that whereas the latter have mass membership, coherent structures, and consistent and are the central conduits for policy making and patronage, in the former, the source of authority lies entirely outside the party (in presidential struc . never tures) Moreover, the party of power is completely "in power" but a simply disposable component of broader regime-type relationships? a that is, "hegemonic bloc" in the Gramscian sense?used instrumentally by those already in power to remain there. Only under Putin has the party a more of power assumed PRI-like form in which United Russia professes a liberal-conservative program, but the political elite (above all Putin and to to Dmitrii Medvedev) refuse subordinate themselves completely party membership, indicating United Russia's still-disposable status. not con Of course, the Russian authorities' managerial efforts are fined to the party of power, and this is increasingly reflected in Russia as a watchers' conceptualizations of the party system whole. For example, Henry Hale identifies "ideocratic" (single-issue and protest parties), pro grammatic parties (with consistent, identifiable ideologies), and "clien telistic parties" including the parties of power.30 Richard Sakwa identifies a more similar constellation, although tilted somewhat toward pro-regime a parties: "programmatic parties" (with clear adopted by intra set soon as some party democracy), "project parties" up before elections short-term elite machination, and "regime parties," including the party of power, "established tomanipulate and shape political space."31 Such char are as acterizations useful parsimonious general ideal-types but do not get us as especially far with understanding particular parties such Just Russia (which has program, project, and regime/clientelistic elements). more on Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul focus explicitly pro some our regime parties and provide relevant typologies for study here: to the "adjunct/alternative party of power," which is ideologically identical a as a to the elite on "party of power" but designed sparring partner keep new a its toes and test personnel, and "favored opposition party" (parties as are crossers and such Rodina in 2003 that "professional double fakers" to who channel opposition support the elite).32 These typologies provide a range of elite options that makes Mexico and Nigeria's parastatal parties to the look amateurish, but they remain static, with little attempt analyze The most such at dynamic interaction between regime parties. significant Wilson tempt is undoubtedly Andrew Wilson's concept "virtual politics."33 argues that the Leninist "culture of deceit" with its "organized victories,"

Not Parties in Federalism and the State 30. Henry E. Hale, Why Russia?Democracy, (Cam bridge, Eng., 2006). 31. Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, 2d ed. (London, 2007), 101-2. Political Parties and 32. Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, "Managing Democracy: Transition Politics no. 3 the State in Russia, "Journal of Communist Studies and 22, (September 2006): 383-405. in thePost-Soviet World Ha 33. Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy (New see "Politika: Par ven, 2005). On the concept of virtuality, also Oksana Gaman-Golutvina, no. 9 tii i vlast'," Svobodnaia mysl' 21, (2004): 85-92.

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led fake plebiscites, and satellite parties infiltrated by double agents has to a falsification of the entire electoral process whereby parties (and poli are to tics in general) manipulated by the elite monopolize power and to the competition for it.34The aim of the elite is simultaneously avoid a in a real politics and to mimic it, process which "designer parties" play great role. can assumes Wilson's approach be criticized: it that post-Soviet politi cal culture is, sui generis, ignoring instances of manipulation practiced a elsewhere; it assumes greater degree of coordination and control than the Kremlin has managed (especially in the El'tsin era), and (as shown to a amount com above) the degree which limited of genuine "healthy it can too petition" is necessary for regime survival. Moreover, give much credence to unverifiable rumor.35 Nevertheless, the approach is illuminat ing. Wilson does not argue that all politics is faked but that it ismultidi even mensional.36 Indeed, the mimicry of public politics is itself deeply are political?"virtuality" indicates that the political stakes extremely high. Leninist practice of kto-kogo ("who beats whom") is echoed in the on means emphasis ends justifying and the elite's unscrupulousness in deliberately blurring the distinction between real and fake in the service a of genuine political contest.37 evo Virtual politics is of great utility in understanding the origins and lution of Just Russia, in particular itsmultidimensionality and how real are a and virtual combined. The party is not simply Potemkin party. On one a level it is left-wing social democratic programmatic party appealing to voter on an paternalist sentiment; another, "alternative party of power" a designed to spar with the elite while representing careerist project for on a elements of that elite; yet another it is "project /favored opposition more party" designed to marginalize independent opposition (particu larly the communists). During its short life to date, the party has vacillated between these three facets and this explains why it has arguably failed to achieve any of its principal aims.

The Regime's Left Leg? Why JustRussia Emerged Russia is a no secret. was That Just Kremlin creation is The project initi ated by deputy presidential chief of staffVladislav Surkov. With remark able Surkov to a on candor, stated conference of the Russian Party of Life March "The no 24 2006: problem is that there is alternative to the large in no on scale party; society there is 'second leg' which to step when the . . . first has gone numb. This makes the system unstable the task of the

34. Wilson, Virtual Politics, 38. 35. As one Wilson's that communist leader just example, allegation Gennadii Ziuga nov took from "father of Aleksandr Iakovlev is money perestroika" scarcely credible (they were and its source is political enemies), anticommunist kompromat. See Wilson, Virtual Politics, 224. 36. Ibid., 46. 37. For Andrew "The Putin Succession" example, Wilson, (unpublished paper, 2008).

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to a coming political period is bring into being political force that can, at some now point, replace the dominant party."38 The main surprise of this statement was its audience. The Russian of Life was an Party archetypal "favored opposition project" that had shown anything except life and looked poor timber for such a "second It was if at leg." known, all, for vaguely populist and ecological platforms (including the protection of the Russian muskrat) and saw itself as "nei nor a ther left right."39 In 2003, it had gained meager 1.96 percent of the vote in alliance with the quasi-socialist (and similarlyplatitudinous) Party of Russia's Rebirth (Partiia vozrozhdeniia Rossii). For the Kremlin, the was undoubted advantage of the Russian Party of Life the complete loyalty of its leader, Sergei Mironov, speaker of Russia's upper house, the Federa tion Council. Mironov had known Putin since 1994 and proved his worth ran (and lack of presidential potential) in 2004 when he an "insurance" campaign in support of Putin, coming in last.40 a The Kremlin's intention to form "left leg" of the party system has a was been proclaimed for long time and first signaled in 1995 when then a speaker of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin headed left(ish) alternative to the main party of power Our Home Is Russia (Nash dom?Rossiia). Ryb were a a mere kin's efforts fiasco, gaining 1.1 percent of the December 1995 vote and succeeding only in giving the termRybkinizatsiia (betrayal to sev followed by oblivion) the . The project failed for reasons. was too name eral First, it simply public (the "Ivan Rybkin bloc" laid bare its artificiality). Second, itwas premature. In 1995, the elector was ate still too polarized and the left brand "too closely associated with to antisystemic opposition [that is, the communists] for the voters back was 'loyal' reds."41 Third, itwas poorly executed: the El'tsin-era elite too at one ambivalent about and incompetent party building to create party of power, let alone two, and key elite figures joined neither. After the 1996 presidential elections crowned the Communist Party of as the Russian Federation (KPRF) the principal opposition, the Kremlin an on dropped the idea of forming independent left, focusing instead trying to coerce, co-opt, and corrupt the communists into assuming the a role of "His Majesty's loyal opposition" in two-party system. Communist

38. Surkov's statement at "Vstrecha gruppy deputatov ot Rossiiskoi partii ZHIZNI s zamestitelem Rukovoditelia Administratsii Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii?pomoshch of nikom Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii V. Iu. Surkovym," at the Web site of Russian Party no This announcement was Life, www.RPVITA.ru (accessed 22 May 2007; longer available). not see "Goszakaz na 16 allegedly for public consumption, partiiu budushchego," August 2006, atwww.lenta.ru/articles/2006/08/16/surkov/ (last accessed 15May 2009). 39. "Mironov, Sergei,"Lentapediia, 19December2007, atwww.lenta.ru/lib/14159448/ full.htm (last accessed 15May 2009). See also www.mironov.info/Publications/6226.html (last accessed 15May 2009). more on see Virtual 93. 40. For the Russian Party of Life, Wilson, Politics, 41. Wilson, Virtual Politics, 94. See also Knox, Lentini, and Williams, "Parties of Power and Russian Politics," and Laura Belin, "Ivan Rybkin: An Insider Falls Out," RFE/RL special at report The Russian Federation Votes 2003-04, www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/ bio/rybkin.asp (accessed 14March 2008; no longer available).

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opposition became increasingly compromised and "cosmetic."42 Never theless, itwas only with the advent of Putin that the attempt to "tame" the communists really accelerated. Putin consistently challenged the KRPF to a reform (into modern social democratic organization) or die, even sug rename gesting they themselves the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party.43 Furthermore, the experience of elite splits in the 1999 Duma elections a "scared the Kremlin straight" into realizing the necessity of united party of power. This centralization placed increasing administrative pressure on the communists (most notably through the Kremlin-created Rodina bloc in the December 2003 elections that helped halve the communist vote) .44 to a The KPRF had proved unwilling and unable become fully construc were over an tive opposition, but they losing any braking capacity such to attempt. According Rodina leader Dmitrii Rogozin, Putin told him in 2003: "Instead of the communists sooner or later a serious and modern must thinking left party arrive. And that will be good for the country."45 Nevertheless, Putin cannot be taken at his word: the Kremlin has seemed to concerned keep the communists "in the box," marginalized but ma moments as nipulable at key (such in 2004 presidential elections and the were to 2005 Moscow city Duma elections, when they exploited attack Rodina), and has repeatedly shied away from replacing the communists a more altogether with potentially unpredictable opposition. As Kremlin to strategists (reported be assiduous students of public opinion) undoubtedly realized, the KPRF's decline did not result in the a elimination of opposition sentiments but rather in "huge unfulfilled niche of left-statist orientation."46 In post-2000 conditions of fast increas but ing unevenly distributed national wealth, it is unsurprising that various an opinion polls showed increase in voters' redistributionist sentiments. In polls conducted by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public tsentr Opinion (Vserossiiskii izucheniia obshchestvennogo mneniia, in March 46 VTsIOM) 2007, percent of respondents said they supported "" (although only 10 percent of those considered it feasible in Russia) ,47Mikhail Khodorkovskii's expectation of an electoral "Left Turn" have been an may exaggeration, but nevertheless, spontaneous public demonstrations against the government's mishandled monetization of benefits reform of 2005 and strong regional performances for Rodina and the Russian Pensioners' Party thereafter indicated that leftist rhetoric had These two on potential. anticommunist projects increasingly took an

42. Luke "The Russian Communist in A March, Party 2000: Cosmetic Opposition," Analysis ofCurrent Events 12, no. 7-8 (December 2000): 15-19. 43. Anna Nikolaeva and Elena "Urok Rudneva, predannosti," Vedomosti, 29 June 2007, 2. 44. Hale, WhyNot Parties inRussia ? 229. 45. Dmitrii Rogozin, Vrag naroda (Moscow, 2006), 380. 46. PutevoditeVpo vyboram:Politicheskaia Rossiia-2007 (Moscow, 2007), 211. no v 47. "Press-vypusk 656: Sotsializm Rossii: Vozmozhen li on? I nuzhen li?" at wciom .ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/4243.html(last accessed 15May 2009).

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autonomous more momentum and aspired to than the 1-2 percent niche envisaged for them by the Kremlin. a Electoral arithmetic encouraged renewal of Kremlin attempts to monopolize the left electorate, but shorter-term concerns with the post a Putin succession made this priority. As Surkov's comments about United was Russia's "numbness" indicated, there deep Kremlin dissatisfaction was seen as with the main party of power. United Russia electorally inert, un polling consistently far short of Putin's personal rating. Moreover its erringly disciplined in the Duma made its bureaucratism and the same "complete paralysis of political life" all too public, at the time as its a center-right profile (for example, support for flat-rate income tax and its lax attitude toward business corruption) made it ill-equipped to tap mod erate voters leftist (perhaps 30 percent of the population) who supported Putin personally but not his government's neo-liberal social policy.48 Un surprisingly there had been discussions about splitting United Russia into a left and right wings in order to inject modicum of dynamism. was a United Russia's inertia particular problem given the Kremlin's a adoption of proportional representation system for the 2007 elections. over As intended, this gave the Kremlin greater control regional candi date nominations, but it also meant that United Russia would need ap to same proximately 66 percent of the vote attain the number of seats (approximately 300) it had after 2003, when it had dominated single mandate district races. Hence an urgent need arose to tap those Putin were supporters at the "electoral periphery" of United Russia, who prone more to drifting toward opposition-minded projects like Rodina.49 As Kremlin-connected commentator Sergei Markov declared, the idea of Just over Russia "was to have Putin's influence spread all the political field."50 was an In this way, Just Russia very much "alternative party of power," forc more ing United Russia to campaign vigorously without threatening its dominance. was as an Simultaneously, Just Russia intended to act official "opposi ever more tion" that channeled and neutralized social protest, important with the KPRF's decline. As Surkov told the Party of Life in March 2006: it is "better that the electorate that is opposed to all forms of administra tion is attracted to you than to destructive forces."51 Indeed Just Russia as the Kremlin had advo quickly helped streamline the party system long Russia to become cated, "vacuuming up" defunct projects. Just promised as the "center of the [left] solar system," absorbing parties such Gennadii

from Russia no. 2 48. Quote from Georgy Bovt, "Competition Above," Profile 4, (19 March 2007): 13. For other discussion, see Aleksandr Buzgalin, "Pokhorony KPRF Nezavisimaia 16 March and Aleksei "Po okazalis' prezhdevremennym," gazeta, 2007, 3, Kiva, no. at www modeli 'suverennoi demokratii,'" Literaturnaia gazeta, 10 (14-20 March 2007), .lgz.ru/archives/htmLarch/lgl02007/Polosy/2_l.htm (last accessed 15May 2009). of Political inter 49. Aleksei Makarkin, vice president of the Center Technologies, view, Moscow, 16 April 2008. "Another Same Russia 50. Markov quoted in Dmitry Babich, Vote, Results," Profile 4, no. 3 (April 2007): 7-8. 51. Surkov's statement at "Vstrecha gruppy deputatov."

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Gudkov's People's Party and Vasilii Shestakov's Socialist United Party of an was Russia.52 This is indication of the project's virtuality?the latter perhaps Russia's most misnamed party, having had four leaders and as many splits since 2003, whereas the former's authoritarian social policy a had earned it the label the "Party of Death," strange ally indeed for the Partyof Life! was to Clearly, Just Russia also intended buttress the Kremlin's legiti macy in the outside world and rebut western protests about the unfairness race. com of the electoral As Surkov stated in March 2007: "Just Russia peted confidently in these elections, showing that the ferocity of [the] po litical is not . . . a battle waning. Any democracy is characterized by steady . . . ran list of primary players that four parties successfully shows that the political playing field has basically been formed."53 Nevertheless, Just Russia's development was more contentious than this implies: the Russian press portrayed the demise of one of its pre as due in to a decessors, Rodina, part conflict between Surkov and Igor' Sechin's silovik clan in a the Kremlin. Surkov had envisaged limited aim for Rodina of the not harassing communists but threatening his favored United Russia. The Sechin group in contrast intended for Rodina under to a a Rogozin become real contender for power.54 Elements of similar conflict were present in Just Russia's emergence. Its leader Mironov often echoed the concerns of the as a siloviki centralizing "third-term" lobbyist for the term to (repeatedly calling president's be extended). According to was to many, Surkov pressured by the siloviki create Just Russia, which was to act as a vehicle for restraining United Russia and to guarantee the a siloviki position in the post-Putin firmament.55 Such are characterizations both simplistic and unverifiable. More accurate would to see as a be Just Russia compromise between Kremlin better characterized as as elites, shifting "factions" than rigid "clans," that was created for a of multiplicity reasons.56 Mironov's relationship to the siloviki is Some see him as Sechin's ambiguous. confidant, others deny but no one to this, questions his closeness Putin.57 Just Russia reflects the

52. Mironov in Dmitrii Sergei quoted Vladimirov, "Otkrytie solnechnoi sistemy: Mi ronov ob"edinit' vsekh krome Rossiiskaia 13 gotov levykh, kommunistov," gazeta, April 2007, at accessed www.rg.ru/2007/04/13/mironov.html(last 15 May 2009). 53. "Russia: Kremlin 'Parties of Jonas Bernstein, Power' Sweep Regional Ballots," 13 March Web site at 2007, RFE/RL www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/9ac0ed04 a263-43e3-bc5c-f31176f51c3a.html (last accessed 15May 2009). 54. See Alexei Titkov, PartyNumber Four: Rodina: Whence and Why? (Moscow, 2006). 55. For an overview of different scenarios, see interview with Aleksei Ziudin, "No vaia 'Zhizn" v at Politkom.ru polutorapartiinoi sisteme," (accessed 10 September 2006; no longer available). 56. Sakwa, Putin, 81. 57. For Andrei "Tatar example, Smirnov, Treaty Suggests Dissent Inside Kremlin on Eurasia no. Regional Policy," Daily Monitor 4, 33 (15 February 2007), at www.jamestown. org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews [ttjnews] =32494&tx_ttnews [backPid]=171 &no accessed 15 and _cache=l (last May 2009), "Sergei Mironov-lichnost' neordinarnaia," Vechernaia at Moskva, www.vmdaily.ru/article.php?aid=43665 (last accessed 15 May 2009). Aleksei Makarkin sees the siloviki as disinterested in fundamentally party building and towards Russia. Russia due to skeptical Just Just originated largely Mironov's personal ini

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economic protectionism attributed to the siloviki but (unlike Rodina) not their . Surkov clearly supported Just Russia under the condi not tion that itmerely criticized but did "spar with" United Russia, and, some although it used Putin's image in regional contests (for example, in Lipetsk) Surkov forbade it to use "administrative resources."58 Moreover, create Putin admitted he helped Just Russia and repeatedly supported it as a a part of constructive opposition in normal multiparty system.59 A Just was Russia leader, Shestakov, Putin's judo trainer and his cousin Igor'Pu tin (director of Samara Reserve factory) reportedly switched to Just Russia from United Russia. Yet Putin also sought to limit Just Russia's ambitions, on as a stating 1 February 2007: "This political battle is good matter of . . . principle, and the fiercer the competition, the better. I hope that it an . . . will be intense political battle that does not resort to mudsling so ing, insults and on."60 The problem of simultaneously encouraging and was so limiting Just Russia to plague its development, like many regime as a our projects before it: Surkov indicated, "I fear battle among own."61

Organization and Political Profile

After Surkov gave the green light, Just Russia quickly coalesced. A major was sign of Kremlin coordination that Rodina and the Pensioners' Party were thoroughly "worked over" prior to merger: their independent lead ers were were (Rogozin and Valerii Gartung) replaced and they deregis tered from the majority of regional election campaigns in March 2006. Once "tamed," their new leaders met with Putin and, in October 2006, ran decided to merge with the Party of Life, although each party separate regional campaigns that month.62 However, the Party of Life competed in which can be seen as directly with the Pensioners' Party four regions, an attempt to increase its "brand" value prior to merger. The effect of Kremlin support was immediate?the Party of Life (previously rarely poll to in Tuva and ing more than 5 percent) "came life," gaining 33 percent in defeating United Russia's mayoral candidate Samara. most and Just Russia formally united around the nationally developed statutes. The of Life and Pen centralized party, Rodina, adopting its Party movements. three main con sioners' Party transformed into public The stituentparties shared leading posts equally,with Mironov (Partyof Life) as chairman, Aleksandr Babakov (Rodina) as secretary of the presidium of as central council the central council, and Igor' Zotov (Pensioners' Party)

in Putin and Surkov. Mos tiative; he succeeded persuading thereby Makarkin, interview, cow, 16April 2008. at 58. Surkov's statement "Vstrecha gruppy deputatov." sUchastimami Kluba 59. For example 'Vstrecha Mezhdunarodnogo Diskussionnogo accessed 15 'Valdai,'" atwww.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/09/144011.shtml (last May 2009). with the Russian and 1 60. "Transcript of Press Conference Foreign Media, February 2007, Round Hall, Kremlin, Moscow," atwww.kremlin.ru (last accessed 15 May 2009). 61. Surkov's statement at 'Vstrecha gruppy deputatov." 62. "Partiinyiperedel," 15August 2006, at lenta.ru/articles/2006/08/15/party/ (last accessed 15May 2009).

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secretary. This "shotgun wedding" remained contentious, however, and intraparty rivalries hindered Just Russia in the March 2007 regional elec was tions. After the 2007 Duma campaign, it suggested that the Party of was an Life attempting intraparty putsch, with Mironov favoring his pro as as teges such Nikolai Levichev (who replaced Babakov fraction leader). The ongoing ill-feeling between Babakov and Levichev and the particular prejudice directed against Pensioners' Party personnel complicated party performance.63 Nevertheless, the party organization crystallized, ultimately claiming a almost 500,000 members by November 2008, million short of United Russia, but dwarfing Rodina and the KPRF (both with approximately 180,000). The party inherited the majority of Rodina's Duma fraction with additions from independents and United Russia defectees, numbering 33 by mid-2007. In early 2007, the party also formed three youth organi was zations: Pobeda the "official" organization aiming to link the youth as wings of parties such the Social Democrats and People's Party; Ura! on more (based the former Rodina youth movement) appealed to radical as elements of the electorate opposed to official youth movements such Nashi; finally,Liga spravedlivosti played a political technological and agitational role.64 Although Just Russia also made attempts to court trade unionists, the main unions remained unswervingly loyal to United Russia.65 Certainly the party swiftly attracted sponsorship; by March 2007 were its campaign funds ($17 million) second only to United Russia's ($25 million).66 Influential donors included former Rodina members Aleksandr Lebedev, president of the National Reserve Bank, and Baba kov (whose wealth comes from the communications sector) .67Mironov's power base, the Federation Council, included six dollar-billionaires and a dozen dollar-millionaires, although the extent to which these individuals was supported Just Russia unclear.68 According to Natal'ia Morar', Gaz

63. Rossiia' snova "'Spravedlivaia stanovit'sia Partiei zhizni," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 11 December 2007, atwww.ng.ru/politics/2007-12-ll/3_esery.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). 64. Natal'ia Kostenko, "'Spravedlivaia Rossiia' organizuet molodezhnyi front," Neza visimaia 15 October ac gazeta, 2007, atwww.ng.ru/politics/2007-10-15/3_esery.html (last cessed 15May 2009). 65. rvut chlenov na Igor' Romanov, "Partiitsy profsoiuzov chasti," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 April 2007, at www.ng.ru/printed/77801 (last accessed 15May 2009). 66. Andrei "Pod znamenami na meste Riskin, raznymi shagom marsh," Nezavisimaia 12 March at ac gazeta, 2007, www.ng.ru/ngregions/2007-03-12/13_region.html (last cessed 15May 2009). 67. "A Just Division," Moscow News, 5 July 2007, at www.mnweekly.ru/politics/ 20070705/55260906.html (last accessed 15 May 2009). Babakov is also former chair of the board of directors of TsKA football club. Lebedev's personal fortune is estimated at while $3.6 billion, another prominent party supporter was Andrei Molchanov, former head of the construction in northwest a LSR, largest company Russia, with personal for tune at estimated $660 million. By 2008, Lebedev had split fromJust Russia. 68. "Nationalism Dmitry Shusharin, Gives Way to Social Promises in Russia," RIA 13 March at Novosti, 2007, en.rian.ru/analysis/20070313/61934418.html (last accessed 15May 2009).

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to prom and the presidential administration also made contributions Just Russia to the tune of $50-100 million.69 soon a On the other hand, the party did develop clear, if inconsistent, a ideological profile. By early 2007 (with view to combating the communists) as a Just Russia pitched itself catch-all socialist rather than social democratic as party, while still using slogans such "New socialism, and even humanism," "Socialism 3.0," and the "."70 Party documenta was terms even tion replete with leftist like solidarity, socialjustice, exploitation. a more The party also offered radically redistributionist (even revanchist) of profile than modern social democracy, rejecting the idea of "equality op taxation taxes on portunities." It proposed progressive alongside windfall luxury goods and profits from 1990s privatizations and suggested using the Stabilization Fund to redistribute private companies' super-profits, raise pensions, and subsidize social utilities and welfare.71 The party promised to a market economy but not a market society and pledged combat large was the of the scale capital.72 Its radical image reinforced by tendency press as to refer to itsmembers the "Esery" (SRs), implying continuity with the prewar left-populist Socialist Revolutionaries. was in sense of Just Russia also strongly populist, both the "cheap" to in itsmarked anti-establishment promises all and sundry, and ethos, and which was directed at the corruption and bureaucratism of local elite United Russia functionaries, or at the "state of elites and clans" in gen at never at eral, but rarely the federal government and symptomatically as more than crimi the president. It attacked local bureaucrats nothing as de nal swindlers, while simultaneously presenting itself the unsullied on Hence fender of democratic freedoms trampled by central (ist) diktat. of from restrictive its complaints about the exclusion candidates elections, of Russia electoral legislation, and the nonelection governors. Just explic to vote those who have voted itly sought tap the protest (especially might was removed from the ballot in while "against all" before this option 2006) own in the with an of attempting to mask its origins bureaucracy image to Russians" being the "party of working people" planning give "ordinary a greater role in decision making.73

69. Natalia Morar', '"Chernaia kassa' Kremlia," 10 December 2007, at newtimes.ru/ 15 magazine/issue_44/article_7.htm (last accessed May 2009). 'Doverie vo imia at 70. "Predvybornaia programma: budushchego,'" www.spravedlivo .ru/information/section_ll/section_54 (last accessed 15May 2009). zaiavlenie Rossiia: 71. "Programmnoe partii 'Spravedlivaia Rodina/Pensionery/ at 1 March 2008; no Zhizn,'" spravedlivo.ru/about/documents/section_371 (accessed and "Politicheskaia at longer available); platform partii," www.spravedlivo.ru/about/ no documents/section_599 (accessed 1 March 2008; longer available). 72. Boris Makarenko and Tatiana Stanovaia, "Sotsializm vmesto sotsial-demokratii," no at Politkom.ru (accessed 10 March 2007; longer available). see the interview with Mironov: nakhodims'ia v 73. For example, "My oppozitsii at k politicheskomu monopolizmu," www.spravedlivo.ru/press/section_326/564.smx i (accessed 13 February 2007; no longer available); "Sergei Mironov: Sotsialnyi ideal at sovremmenoi politike," www.spravedlivo.ru/press/section_326/1427.smx (accessed no and the at 25 February 2008; longer available); party manifesto, www.spravedlivo.ru/ no english?action=articles&id+3 (accessed 25 February 2008; longer available).

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Clearly Just Russia intended to compete with United Russia and the KPRF simultaneously, although its competition against the communists became increasingly important. It attacked the communists (unironi as an to cally!) obsolete "pseudo-opposition," and its proposals merge were to as the left designed paint the communists the main obstacles to was left-wing unity. More brazen still its appropriation of Soviet style and the KPRF not a or symbolism. Even did have Politburo Orgburo like Just were Russia, although these reconstituted (as the Presidium and Central Council) inMarch 2008. In April 2007, JustRussia successfully lobbied Putin to prevent United Russia from removing the hammer and sickle from the Banner Victory (the flag of the Russian Army) .74 was a Although Just Russia strongly programmatic party, it remained a and inconsistent strange amalgam. In July 2008, the party joined the Socialist International as an rather than observer, the European Left Party as some of its radical policies implied. Nevertheless, its support for Rus sian values" tolerance for same-sex "family (rejecting marriage and drug made its accommodation to more legalization) the libertarian family of socialists were European problematic. Furthermore, its socialist principles to impossible square with its leadership by multimillionaires, and, as a re be to sult, parallels might drawn the Social Democratic Party of an (United), oligarchic vehicle alleged to have as much relation to social as a democracy Mercedes to a tractor.75

Electoral Promise and Predicament

Although Just Russia has continually denied that it is in any way the re it has become gime's "sparring partner," already obvious that its "regime" and facets are of more "project" importance than its "programmatic" el ements. was not The question whether this was a party of power but of "how much How was to power"? able it challenge United Russia's near and how able was its stance a monopoly, pseudo-opposition of becoming real opposition? In the March 2007 regional elections, Just Russia threatened to be come such a real just opposition. It finished among the top three in 12 out of 14 came in third in second in and first in regions, 6, 5, 1 (Stavropol'), 15.53 of gaining percent the party list vote and 11.7 percent of seats, a nar row third to the communists (see table l).76 This exceeded the combined of the of and the performance Rodina, Party Life, Pensioners' Party in 2003 .The was (13.99 percent) performance certainly patchy, exceeding the 2003 level of its three in 6 predecessors regions, stabilizing in 4, and its vote seeing fall in 4 regions, and Just Russia was far less successful when its local were not organizations co-coordinated and the party lacked lo cal notables. that the full Nevertheless, given merger of three parties had

74. Ivan Iartsev, znamia at Politkom.ru "Esery podniali pobedy," (accessed 26 April 2007; no longer available). 75. Wilson, Virtual Politics, 134. 76. Data from Russian Central Electoral Commission, at www.cikrf.ru/cikrf/actual/ regvibory_110507.jsp (last accessed 15May 2009).

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Table 1 Just Russia's Electoral Performance

DateRegion Result Region Date Result

Dagestan 11-03-2007 10.68 Kalmykiia 02-03-2008 4.99 Komi 11-03-2007 15.49 Sakha 02-03-2008 14.56 Stavropol 11-03-2007 37.64 Altai K 02-03-2008 7.70 Vologda 11-03-2007 20.91 Amur 02-03-2008 5.62 Leningrad 11-03-2007 20.94 Ivanovo 02-03-2008 10.27 Moscow 11-03-2007 8.86 Rostov 02-03-2008 5.13 Murmansk 11-03-2007 16.18 Sverdlovsk 02-03-2008 6.26 Omsk11-03-2007 4.83 Ulianovsk 02-03-2008 7.77 Orel11-03-2007 12.60 Iaroslavl' 02-03-2008 deregistered Pskov 11-03-2007 15.68 Zabaikal'skii 12-10-2008 9.29 Samara 11-03-2007 15.14 Irkutsk 12-10-2008 8.12 Tomsk 11-03-2007 7.90 Kemerovo 12-10-2008 5.51 Tiumen 11-03-2007 8.78 Sakhalin 12-10-2008 8.50 St. Petersburg 11-03-2007 21.90 Chechnia 12-10-2008 9.20 Krasnoiarsk 24-04-2007 12.40 Kabardino- 01-03-2009 12.26 Buriatiia 02-12-2007 11.96 Balkariia Mordoviia 02-12-2007 1.56 Karachaevo- 01-03-2009 5.02 Kamchatka 02-12-2007 deregistered Cherkesiia North Osetiia 02-12-2007 8.92 Tatarstan 01-03-2009 4.83 Udmurtia 02-12-2007 12.94 Khakasiia 01-03-2009 7.18 Penza 02-12-2007 7.04 Arkhangelsk 01-03-2009 17.84 Saratov 02-12-2007 13.52 Briansk 01-03-2009 8.61 Smolensk 02-12-2007 13.55 Vladimir 01-03-2009 8.84 StateDuma 02-12-2007 7.76 Volgograd 01-03-2009 13.34 Bashkortostan 02-03-2008 3.46 Nenets 01-03-2009 12.70

Overall average: 10.96

Sources: "Russia's Party System and the 2007 Duma Election," Russian Analytical Digest, no. 04 31 (27 November 2007); "Partiia regional'noi vlasti," Kommersant", March 2008, at www.kommersant.ru/daily.aspxPdate=20080304, and "Resul'taty regional'nykh vy v s v borov sravnenii resul'tatami vyborov Gosdumu 2 dekabria 2007 goda," Kommersant", at accessed 14 October 2008, www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspxPDocsID=1040899 (last no 7 May 2009); www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom (accessed 15 April 2009; longer available).

on eve at least indicated only occurred the of the election, the results Just as a Russia's potential national force.77 were Nevertheless, theMarch 2007 elections also the party's high-water on mark. It succeeded best where it was able to capitalize disaffection within the elite and to capture the protest vote (as in Stavropol', Vologda, election St. Petersburg, and Samara). Its Stavropol' sensation (the only where United Russia lost) was achieved where United Russia governor

77. For details on the 2007 elections, see Boris Makarenko and Aleksei Makarkin, Presentatsiia at Politkom.ru "Regional'nye vybory-2007: 'Spravedlivoi Rossii,'" (accessed 12March 2007; no longer available).

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was Aleksandr Chernogorov deeply unpopular. Just Russia exploited his as acrimonious divorce with slogans such "Sell the Bendey, pay the Ali was a As mony."78 This potentially disastrous scenario for the authorities. . . . to one Kremlin official noted: "The most dangerous thing would be one tear administrative resources apart and pit part against another."79 a at was Just Russia's successes involved real, dirty conflict with lot stake. It as a was emerging "second party of power" and rapidly attracting disaf fected members of the elite either in current conflict with United Russia or sensing their exclusion from the post-Putin landscape. New adherents included elected mayors in conflict with appointed United Russia gover on nors, disgruntled ex-governors, those far down United Russia's party or list, deputies from single mandate districts minor parties facing elec as toral oblivion (such Iabloko, Union of Right Forces [Soiuz pravykh sil, SPS], and even the KPRF's youth wing). was as On the positive side, Just Russia acting intended, solving the problem of "vertical mobility" caused by United Russia's relative electoral inertia, bringing different elite groups into the spoils system and allowing to seen as disaffected elites engage in opposition without being outright same as "traitors." On the other hand, Just Russia faced the dilemma Ro to to dina before it.According experts, it appeared be able to take votes In to com from all other parties.80 order compete effectively with the to munists, however, itwould need outbid them in "oppositionness." Yet core since the communists had already been pared down to their vote, any was to occur electoral expansion disproportionately likely at the expense of United Russia. Moreover, where elite conflict discredited both United as in Russia and Just Russia, Krasnoiarskii krai and the Volgograd mayoral elections, the communists were the main beneficiaries.81 was as Even this limited competition threatening the Kremlin con templated life after Putin, threatening divisive elite conflict akin to 1999 a rather than seamless succession. With Kremlin figures warning that Just a Russia had "gone too far," truce was reached after the March 2007 elec tions. Mironov and United Russia governor Valentina Matvienko agreed not to act as the for "locomotives" their party lists in St. Petersburg (which would have brought elite heavyweights into head-on conflict). United to as Russia agreed support Mironov St. Petersburg assembly representa tive to the Federation Council, removing threats to his speakership, while the United in Russia and Just Russia fractions the St. Petersburg assembly

78. Carl Tricks in Schreck, "Dirty Popular Campaign Battles," Moscow Times, 9 March 2007, atwww.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/03/09/011.html (last accessed 15 May never 2009). Chernogorov recovered his authority after thisdefeat and resigned inApril 2008. 79. Cited inJohnsons Russia List, no. 217 (28 September 2006) atwww.cdi.org/russia/ johnson/default.cfm (accessed 25 March 2008; no longer available) 80. "General'naia v Gosdumu: Rossiia Olga Korotkova, repetitsiia vyborov opiat' polevela," Komsomolskaiapravda, 13March 2007, at www.kp.ru/daily/23868.7/64403 (last accessed 15May 2009). 81. On the success of communist Roman in 31-year-old Grebennikov Volgograd's election on 20 see mayoral May 2007, "Volgogradskaia bitva," 21 May 2007, at www.lenta .ru/articles/2007/05/21/red (last accessed 15May 2009).

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as a pledged cooperation.82 Mironov later emphasized Just Russia's role on as constructive opposition that concentrated the communists its chief opponents.83 con Just Russia's 2007 Duma campaign revealed both the Kremlin's cern to keep itwithin manageable bounds and its increasing disinterest in to the project. True enough, the Kremlin refused register the "Great Rus statutes on sia" party in 2007 despite its party being modeled exactly Just Russia's. Great Russia was formed by ex-Rodina nationalists who had been was excluded from Just Russia and formed with probable support from si over loviki disappointed by the lack of influence Just Russia's platform and to to to policies. Dmitrii Rogozin's appeals former Rodina members defect a his party represented real danger.84 However, the continued existence to an of two left-wing "spoiler parties" that threatened set up alternative to maneuver left-wing party indicated Surkov's desire limit Just Russia's room. were a ing The "Patriots of Russia" headed by Gennadii Semigin, longtime Surkov confidant; the Party of Social Justice (Partiia sotsial'noi was one of Medvedev's spravedlivosti) led by Aleksei Podberezkin, analysts and a former Kremlin "agent of influence" within the KPRF.85 momentum as Moreover, Just Russia lost and electoral support the as December 2007 election approached. Significantly, the party's electoral as left lists were drawn up, "politically interesting" personalities (such the finan wing economist Sergei Glaz'ev and Aleksandr Lebedev, party a in were cier who had fought fierce Moscow mayoral campaign 2003) the list excluded, allegedly under Kremlin pressure.86 Heading party with Mironov were Svetlana Goriacheva, an ex-communist Duma deputy, and Ura! both of whom had Sergei Shargunov, leader of the youth movement, influ radical anti-establishment images but negligible national political was list once itwas revealed he ence. Shargunov dropped from the party and had formerly been a member of the radical a Putin critic, and Ura! was disaffiliated.87 across was Putin's decision The biggest shot the bow September 2007 to head the United Russia party list,which instantly destroyed Just Russia's as true to the Good raison d'etre the presidential party trying protect The Kremlin had Tsar from the "evil boyars" (in United Russia). finally can sum the decided to avoid all risks in "operation successor." We up in table The Russia Kremlin's thinking about Just Russia 2. Just project

i at Politkom.ru 82. Ivan Iartsev, "Piterskaia partiia-edinaia spravedlivaia," (accessed 21 March 2007; no longer available). Mironova na Tsentral'nom sovete Ros 83. "Vystuplenie Sergeia partii 'Spravedlivaia at siia,'" (12 April 2007) www.spravedlivo.ru/about/section_10/section_297/1805.smx (accessed 14 February 2008; no longer available). "Patriocheskii Moskovskie 6-12 2007, at www 84. Igor' Dmitriev, gambit," novosti, July no .mn.ru/issue/2007-26-7 (accessed 19 March 2008; longer available). 'S Novoi at 85. Andrei Kamakin, "Operatsiia Dumoi,'" Itogi, 8January 2007, www.itogi accessed 15 .ru/Paper2007.nsf/Article/Itogi_2007_01_06_1534.html (last May 2009). at Politkom.ru 86. Tat'iana Stanovaia, "Sud'ba 'Spravedlivoi Rossii,'" (accessed 29 October 2007; no longer available). 87. Kseniia Veretennikova, "'Ural' Tovarishchi," Vremia novostei, 22 October 2007, at www.vremya.ru/2007/193/4/189654.html (last accessed 15May 2009).

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Table 2 Just Russia in the Kremlin's Calculations

Risks Advantages

of Real Semblance competition competition Co-optation of elite and social Incentivizing opposition opposition communists Marginalization of communists Martyring of United Russia within Guarantee of pro-Kremlin parliamentary Weakening majority parliament Jolt forUnited Russia Discontent within United Russia room for Unclear to Increasing Putin's/successors' relationship Putin/successor maneuver for successor becomes fake Party campaigns Opposition visibly

initially offered many advantages: "managed" opposition and limited elite to to a turnover, the potential marginalize the communists and provide In it "sparring partner" for United Russia during the campaign. addition, risks could increase the pro-Kremlin deputies within the Duma, limiting a successor an during the transition to and providing alternative presi dential party (or at least electoral cheerleader) .Just Russia simply offered to over too many risks, however: elite sparring threatened spill into real as competition (whereby the communists, the only semi-independent op as position, might benefit "martyred outsiders"). Still worse, effective elite not competition potentially threatened only the positions of individual United Russia deputies and regional leaders but the very dominance of as United Russia within the state Duma the guarantor of the stability of "op eration successor." The more effective Just Russia was, the more it risked an as more more elite split in 1999, but the controlled itwas, the it looked was simply fake. In these circumstances there little prospect of alternative scenarios, whereby for instance the two parties of power might have sup or ported rival presidential successors, Just Russia might have become the a successor as soon as main presidential party behind candidate. Instead, was no was it longer useful, Just Russia simply dropped?indicating the profound risk-averseness of Putin's Kremlin, and suggesting that, until was most an succes the last, there likely array of Kremlin plans for the one sion rather than long-term project. Ultimately, turning the election a on into plebiscite Putin's record maximized United Russia's reliance on over him and his control parliament and party and minimized the risks of or unexpected elite conflict defection represented by projects like Just Russia. After being abandoned by Putin, Just Russia floundered badly, try to as ing unconvincingly present itself the only force guaranteeing Putin's "national leader" status. In nonparty 2003 Rodina had possessed enough "virtual" and elite to a independence support pull off successful regime sponsored "anti-elite" campaign. In 2007, Just Russia lacked charismatic consistent and leaders, regime support, distinct campaign messages several to (with parties claiming profess "social justice"). It hemorrhaged

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members and funders, already disaffected by the leaders' personnel choices but apparently dismayed that Putin had not decided to head what was true self-evidently (to them) his party, with its regional branches split ting in Voronezh, Sverdlovsk, St. Petersburg, Kirov, and Kamchatka.88 over Just Russia's eventual result, squeaking the 7 percent barrier to was a become the fourth Duma party, far cry from its expectations of second place, but under the circumstances a success of sorts. Fraud cannot out be ruled entirely, although it is notable that both pre- and post-election polls corroborate Just Russia's vote share.89 The authorities not did abandon Just Russia entirely?for example, Kremlin consultant was Vadim Konovalov appointed to head the party's Duma apparat dur ing the election campaign.90 Apparently, although Just Russia had lost terms its tactical utility for the Kremlin in of "operation successor," the a longer-term project of "relevant left" had been confirmed. Yet perhaps the simplest explanation for why Just Russia survived at all is that it (albeit minimally) preserved itsmain function of representing center-left voters too moderate and too pro-Putin for the KPRF and too distrustful of its bureaucratic, monopolistic tendencies to vote for United Russia. In addi on some tion, its continued emphasis pension issues may have preserved residual loyalty from Pensioners' Party voters. a Moreover, under Medvedev's presidency, Just Russia preserved frag omens were ile niche. Initially, the not promising. The decision by the party to support Medvedev's candidacy in December 2007 (along with was a three other parties) purportedly spontaneous democratic decision reached through party discussion of Medvedev's "social" credentials. This remarkably Abacha-esque group "coronation" made Medvedev's eventual election a fait accompli, however, and as communist leader Ivan Mel'nikov an noted, made absolute mockery of intraparty democracy.91 Although was this decision logical in terms of providing Just Russia immediate vis was a maneuver ibility and the promise of favors returned, it self-defeating for the party qua party. In the 2 March 2008 regional elections, Just Rus to a ten sia scraped poor fourth, averaging just 7.31 percent in regions,

"Ataka na Moskovskie October 88. For example, Aleksei Ziudin, Mironova," novosti, 26 no 1 November 2007, at www.mn.ru/issue/2007-42-7 (accesssed 19 March 2008; longer available); by the end of 2007, JustRussia was only the fifthbest-funded partywith assets of $14.98 million, see www.cikrf.ru/politparty/finance/rashod.jsp (last accessed 15 May 2009). Russia's result was see Nikolai 89. For allegations that Just artificially inflated, Petrov, of Duma Elections for Russia's Electoral Russian "The Consequences the State System," AnalyticalDigest, no. 32 (14 December 2007): 5-8. For Just Russia compared with elec no. toral forecasts, see "The Results of the Duma Elections," Russian Analytical Digest, 32 (14 December 2007): 10. Ivan and Natalia "Eseram dali dobro: Novaia 90. Igor' Romanov, Rodin, Kostenko, Nezavisimaia November Duma skoree vsego okazhetsia chetyrekhpartiinoi," gazeta, 29 2007, accessed 15 atwww.ng.ru/politics/2007-ll-29/l_esery.html (last May 2009). 'Dmitrii Medvedev': 91. Ksenia Veretennikova and Andrei Denisov, "Natsproekt Vremia 11 December Vladimir Putin nazval tret'ego prezidenta Rossii," novostei, 2007, 1-2, atwww.vremya.ru/2007/227/4/193865.html (last accessed 15May 2009).

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failing to surpass the 7 percent barrier in half of these (see table 1), and losing the protection from administrative pressure it had earlier enjoyed. not as a Just Russia could combine full support for Medvedev president at to federal level and opposition United Russia in the regions, and its fail ure to own present its presidential candidate contrasted poorly with the Liberal Democratic of Russia Party (Liberarno-demokraticheskaia partiia Rossii)and KPRF.92 Yet in the longer term, Just Russia regained its elite patronage. At the April 2008 congress (held in theKremlin) itspopulist rhetoric and com a munist style receded in favor of left-wing social democratic program as an on dressed up "new socialism" that promised emphasis individual democratic and social and rights, progressive taxation, high social spend In the and ing.93 October 2008 March 2009 regional elections itmargin on ally improved itsDecember 2007 performance with an average vote of was 9.37 percent (see table 1). More significantly, the party not debarred contest from any (even Chechnia), and placed third (ahead of the Liberal Democratic Both Party). Surkov and Medvedev spoke favorably of Just Russia's central role within the party system, and there were even sugges tions that Medvedev was patronizing Just Russia directly. Certainly, when Podberezkin's Partyof Social Justicejoined JustRussia in September 2008 (shortly followed by the Russian Ecological Party "Greens"?Rossiiskaia ekologicheskaia partiia "Zelenye"), Just Russia gained closer links with both Medvedev and and a Surkov, certain, circumscribed, distancing of Russia from Putin was observable Just (for example, the party opposed the 2009-11 on first a budget reading, and its 2008 program promised signifi cant reversal of Putin-era centralization).94 An indication of Just Russia's to was a possible centrality Medvedev's calculations indicated in June 2008 toMedvedev's think the Institute of report tank, Contemporary Develop which a state-directed ment, envisaged gradual liberalization of the politi cal over two electoral terms. In system this, Just Russia could potentially become Russia's second United party (after Russia), providing its ideology and were renewed and that the personnel authorities stopped using "ad ministrative resources" it.95At the time of against writing, though, such liberalization remains fictional: Medvedev's November 2008 proposals to decrease party registration requirements and to delink Duma elections from elections were presidential positive developments offset by the two increase in the term. a more year presidential Perhaps telling indicator of "business as usual" under Medvedev was that was Just Russia deregistered from the 26 April 2009 mayoral elections in theOlympic cityof Sochi.

92. "Partiia regional'noi vlasti," Kommersant", 14 March 2008, at www.kommersant accessed 15 .ru/daily.aspx?date=20080304 (last " May 2009). 93. Partii Rossiia at the Russia Web www. Programma "Spravedlivaia Just site, spravedlivo .ru (last accessed 15May 2009). 94. Especially proposals for an elected Federation Council and the restoration of the pre-2007 Duma electoral system. 95. Demokratiia: Razvitie Rossiiskoi modeli (Moscow, 2008), at newtimes.ru/Files/lll/ democratic.doc (last accessed 15 May 2009).

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even cam A 77 percent victory for the United Russia candidate (without was paigning) in microcosm.

as Just Russia emerged in 2006-7 the coincidence of several factors. were to more Principal among these the Kremlin's long-term wish provide as predictable competition for United Russia. Just Russia would function an "alternative party of power," testing United Russia's electoral and policy an responses while providing outlet for the opposition. Simultaneously, was seen as a Just Russia "favored opposition party" continuing the long term were term aim of marginalizing the communists. Shorter aims to provide for stability during the post-Putin succession period, maximiz over ing Putin's support the electoral field while incorporating competing elites into the policy process and adding to domestic and external elec toral legitimacy. In this way, Just Russia directly parallels parastatal parties in countries like Mexico and Nigeria. This project achieved mixed results. Unlike previous regime-led a "moderate" socialist opposition, Just Russia gained niche in parliament. reason Part of the is simply increasingly effective Kremlin management use a of the party system. Backed by astute of electoral technology and to popular president, the Kremlin is able (within limits) conjure parties was 30 to order. Putin's personal popularity vital when upwards of percent of the electorate declared they would vote for anyone of Putin's choice. a are The prospects for managed opposition far better when the manager The 1999 elec himself is popular (unlike for much of the El'tsin period). more tions had already shown that the "Putin effect" could be shared by one so of his than party (Union of Right Forces and Unity), the ability same endorsement to boost two "parties of power" is undoubted. By the were the token, the limits to Just Russia's growth defined by Kremlin, and concern of the increasing regime with the destabilizing potential project led to its near-abandonment. an it is not en Although Just Russia is entirely manipulated party, its tirely manufactured: its survival after the Kremlin withdrew explicit to reflects blessing appears be because its socialist(ic) platform long-term electoral realities: the decline in support for the communists alongside anti-establishment tendencies. Given the persistence of moderate leftist a freer and fairer electoral environment in Russia, such a socialist party without the Kremlin's and might conceivably perform better interference, the 15-20 percent of the vote promised by itsMarch 2007 showing isnot inconceivable. reveals several about Russian The trajectory of Just Russia things This article endorses the view of Russian politics. contemporary politics is distorted and ma as a virtualized realm, where public politics heavily to an imitation of and within an nipulated provide pluralism democracy of Russia is evident in several authoritarian regime. The "virtuality" Just an "insider" to be an an anti-elite paradoxes; party claiming "outsider"; Mironov's Pauline conversion to party with millionaire backers; socialism; leaders' mutual friend United and Just Russia's mutual enmity and their

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a ship; and most graphically, Just Russia's sudden support for presidential never even candidate it had previously acknowledged.96 not a Virtual politics is fictional politics, however. Just Russia has real existence, a concrete structure, members, supporters, it even has Duma as are members (such Goriacheva and Oleg Shein) who convinced social to an ists, but overwhelming degree it operates within constraints imposed even from above. Similarly, pluralism in Russia is not entirely imitational, in the party realm, and the emergence of Just Russia revealed significant elite competition within the Kremlin (over the function and role of op at position) and the local level (over office and material incentives). The party maps only partially onto popular conceptualizations of Kremlin "clans" with support by the Sechin group and its reputed loss of influ ence only part of the explanation. Rather, Just Russia's rise and (near) fall indicates shifting constellations of short-term elite interests, with several Kremlin groups supporting its emergence in 2006 and losing interest in 2007. Its genesis certainly indicates deep elite tensions behind-the-scenes a concern and near-paranoid Kremlin with preventing opposition mobi lization in the public realm. Just Russia also indicates the limits of virtual even politics: this "tamed" opposition threatened, briefly, to escape its masters' control. The Kremlin may create parties to order but it cannot always order them to behave. some Just Russia is another indication that regimes have become very at skilled imitating multiparty democracy. The party has precedents in communist "" where plebiscitary support rather than informed was choice the operating electoral principle. Moreover, it has close in an parallels other parastatal "opposition" parties that play under studied but role in important regime survival and "democratic" legiti Kremlin macy. Undoubtedly technologists would abhor any comparison to but Russia's Nigeria, parastatal parties (the latest being Right Cause a of [Pravoe delo], shotgun marriage three liberal parties clearly mod elled on serve similar to Just Russia) basically functions presidentially de creed party systems: furthering ostentatious multipartism while control elite and access to ling mobilization spoils. Arguably the differences are not in kind but in Kremlin elites are degree: simply better (more imagi more more native, sophisticated, and subtle) than Nigerian at their The not managing opposition. parallel is heartening: in 2007-8 the highly choreographed Russian election campaign looked ever less like a democracy ("sovereign" or not) and ever more like authoritarianism. It is clear that elite circles are now discussing managed political liberalization. the Kremlin's democratic can Nevertheless, pretensions be taken seriously it only when manages its opposition far less.

96. On Boris and Mironov's see Gryzlov friendship, "Mironov, Sergei," Lentapediia, 19 December 2007, atwww.lenta.ru/lib/14159448/full.htm (last accessed 15May 2009).

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