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Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime Edinburgh Research Explorer Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime Citation for published version: March, L 2009, 'Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition', Slavic Review, vol. 68, no. 3, pp. 504-527. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621653> Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Published In: Slavic Review Publisher Rights Statement: © March, L. (2009). Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition. Slavic Review, 68(3), 504-527. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 03. Oct. 2021 Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition Author(s): Luke March Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Fall, 2009), pp. 504-527 Published by: Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621653 . Accessed: 03/02/2014 06:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Slavic Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.215.19.170 on Mon, 3 Feb 2014 06:03:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition Luke March a a Contemporary Russia is not democracy. This is hardly contentious statement outside Russia itself, where the consensus view (as shown most as starkly by Freedom House's reclassification of Russia "not free" since 2005) is that under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia moved from a "hybrid regime" (an amalgam of democratic and authoritarian elements zone dic occupying the "gray" between liberal democracy and outright tatorship) to something approaching full-scale autocracy.1 Nevertheless, the nature, salience, and future of the democratic potential within Russia is still very much debated, even as the Russian authorities (most recently rebut with their promulgation of the concept "sovereign democracy") ever criticism more insistently.2 an on the In parallel, increasing emphasis has been placed viewing as United Russia party (Edinaia Rossiia) illustrating the paradoxes of Rus one claims to be a sian party politics. On the hand, the Kremlin creating a modern party system. On the other, United Russia is "party of power" that recalls that has produced the kind of "dominant power politics" as and South "hegemonic party systems" such those in Mexico, Taiwan, on Korea.3 There has, however, been far less focus the increasingly di This is a as Robert Dahl minished political opposition.4 mistake: notes, are: about 1. Some early examples of this view Larry Diamond, "Thinking Hybrid A. Regimes, "Journal ofDemocracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21-35; Steven Levitsky and Lucan no. 2 Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 13, (April 2002): 51-65; and Graeme Gill, "A New Turn to Authoritarian Rule in Russia?" Democrati no. zation 13, 1 (February 2006): 58-77. some to the view that Russia is not a see "Rus 2. For notable exceptions democracy, Russian Presidential or sia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Election?Affirming Democracy at for 7 March 2008 accessed 15 Confirming Autocracy?" www.russiaprofile.org (last May or Russia and International 2009). Richard Sakwa, "'New Cold War' Twenty Years' Crisis? demo Politics," InternationalAffairs 84, no. 2 (March 2008): 241-67 insists thatRussia's still rosier than its bleak international cratic potential is image suggests. can found in 3. An excellent account of recent reforms to the party system be under Post-Soviet no. 4 Kenneth Wilson, "Party-System Development Putin," Affairs 22, its antecedents before (October-December 2006): 314-48. Studies of United Russia and Russian this volume include Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, "The Party of Power in Politics," Acta Political InternationalJournal ofPolitical Science 35, no. 2 (Summer 2000): Out: Parties of Power 123-45; Regina Smyth, "Building State Capacity from the Inside Politics and no. 4 and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia," Society 30, "Parties of Power (December 2002): 555-78; Zoe Knox, Pete Lentini, and Brad Williams, over Civil Problems Post-Communism and Russian Politics: A Victory of the State Society?" of no. and Andrew Konitzer and K 53, 1 (January-February 2006): 3-14; Stephen Wegren, "Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation: United Russia as the Party of Power," Publius 36, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 503-22. A 4. A notable exception isVladimir Gel'man, "PoliticalOpposition inRussia: Dying no. Species?" Post-SovietAffairs 21, 3 (July-September 2005): 226-46. Slavic Review 68, no. 3 (Fall 2009) This content downloaded from 129.215.19.170 on Mon, 3 Feb 2014 06:03:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Managing Opposition in aHybrid Regime 505 means the symbiosis of opposition and regime that studying the former inevitably illuminates the latter.5 on My focus here is the party Just Russia: Motherland/Pensioners/ as a case Life (Spravedlivaia Rossiia, hereafter Just Russia) study of the in problems and issues confronting opposition Russia. A self-proclaimed "new socialist" party, Just Russia was established on 28 October 2006 through the merger of three smaller left-leaning groups, Motherland (Rodina), theRussian Party of Life (Rossiiskaia partiia zhizni), and the Russian Pensioners' Party (Rossiiskaia partiia pensionerov) .6 In the Rus sian Duma elections of 2007, Just Russia gained 7.7 percent of the vote and one 38 seats?last place but still of only four parties currently represented in Russia's parliament. nature Just Russia's is poorly understood: skeptics viewed it initially as a Kremlin pocket opposition ("the opposition of the master's maid to the master's butler"), entirely fake and designed essentially to fool the electorate.7 More optimistic analysts believed that Just Russia was a more serious alternative "party of power," possessing the potential either for or greater (albeit limited) multipartism and opposition serious elite level conflict.8 In the event, during the December 2007 election campaign, neither view was to never confirmed; contrary optimists, Just Russia challenged as a United Russia's hegemony "party of power" and serious elite conflict did not to openly erupt. Contrary pessimists, Just Russia limped into par liament, despite widely reported Kremlin indifference. aim here is threefold. to My First, understand why Just Russia emerged. Why, unlike previous disastrous attempts at forming a moderate left oppo sition, did it attain (however modest) success in 2007? Second, to examine what Russia Just illustrates about the role of opposition within the Rus sian Does it indicate or party system. greater pluralistic potential merely a greater imitation of it?What does Just Russia reveal about the way the Kremlin success "manages" opposition and its in doing so? Third, to re flect on the role of in opposition parties "electoral authoritarian" regimes: how are or even they manipulated manufactured; how much "opposition" can even they profess? The answer to these will questions show that both optimists and pessi mists are Russia can as a partly right. Certainly, Just be understood regime created aimed at "parastatal party" providing limited competition for the main of to most "party power" (United Russia). Contrary the skeptical 5. Robert Alan Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, 1966). 6. Russia" is to some other translations "Just preferred (e.g., "AJust Russia," "Russia of to "United Russia" and to others "Fair Justice") by analogy (e.g., Russia") because its slogan "social is a if term. justice" recognized, disputed, left-wing 7. Vladimir Pribylovskii,quoted inNabi Abdullaev, "New Party Says Kremlin Knows Moscow 30 October 2006. Two other Best," Times, analysts holding this view are Boris Ka garlitskii and Boris Makarenko (partly). 8. For see "A Test-Tube examples, Georgy Bovt, Party," Russia Profile 4, no. 1 (27 Feb Alexei ruary 2007): 10; Makarkin, "Election Speculations," Russia Profiled no. 8 (3 Sep tember 7-8. Vitalii Tretiakov and 2007): Igor Bunin expressed similar views. This content downloaded from 129.215.19.170 on Mon, 3 Feb 2014 06:03:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 506 Slavic Review a analyses, however, while Just Russia is heavily manipulated "virtual" op not a to position, it is simply fake designed dupe the electorate but rep resents long-term Kremlin strategic interests in channeling opposition an and thus stabilizing the political regime. Moreover, it has identifiable, ideological position (left-wing social democratic) and electorate, which it, albeit imperfectly and partially, represents. As the optimists argued, Just Russia's evolution indicates the plural ism of competing Kremlin interests and the potential for elite conflict. was Although this conflict effectively contained in the 2007-8 elections, a Just Russia is illustrative of the fundamental paradox of "managed op a an as a position" for regime that needs opposition legitimation of its to too ceases to authority govern.
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