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Governments of National Unity: Analyzing the Conditions Influencing Dissolution

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Governments of National Unity: Analyzing the Conditions Influencing Dissolution Governments of National Unity: Analyzing the Conditions Influencing Dissolution Prepared for the U.S. Government Office of South Asia Analysis By Dylan Blake Olivia Butler Ryan Dunk Michelle Duren Katie Jenkins Joel Lashmore Allison Sambo Workshop in International Public Affairs Spring 2015 ©2015 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System All rights reserved. For an online copy, see www.lafollette.wisc.edu/research-public-service/workshops-in-public-affairs [email protected] The Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs is a teaching and research department of the University of Wisconsin–Madison. The school takes no stand on policy issues; opinions expressed in these pages reflect the views of the authors. The University of Wisconsin–Madison is an equal opportunity and affirmative-action educator and employer. We promote excellence through diversity in all programs. Table of Contents List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. iv List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ iv Foreword ......................................................................................................................................... v Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... vi Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... vii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Literature Review ............................................................................................................................ 2 Contextual Factors ...................................................................................................................... 2 Government Output .................................................................................................................... 4 Survival Model and Methods .......................................................................................................... 8 GNU Selection and Dating ............................................................................................................. 8 Data Description ......................................................................................................................... 8 Dependent Variable: Dissolution ................................................................................................ 9 Independent Variables .............................................................................................................. 10 Statistical Model ....................................................................................................................... 11 Survival Model Results ................................................................................................................. 12 Model 1: Dissolution with Conflict .......................................................................................... 12 Model 2: Dissolution without Conflict ..................................................................................... 15 Contextual Factors .................................................................................................................... 18 Government Output Factors ...................................................................................................... 18 Case Studies: Variations in Power-Sharing .................................................................................. 20 Tajikistan: 1997 General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord .... 20 Yemen: The 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement ........................................................ 22 Sudan: 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ....................................................................... 25 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations .................................................................................. 28 Take No Action ......................................................................................................................... 28 Increase Access To and Role in International Organizations for GNUs .................................. 29 Strengthen Government Institutions ......................................................................................... 29 Incentivize Multi-Dimensional Power Sharing ........................................................................ 29 Appendix A. Governments of National Unity 1975-2012 ............................................................ 31 Appendix B. Technical Notes ....................................................................................................... 37 Semi-Parametric Model ............................................................................................................ 37 Cox Model ................................................................................................................................ 37 Time-Variant Covariates ........................................................................................................... 38 Breslow vs. Efron Method for Approximating Discrete Likelihood of Failure ....................... 38 Frailty ......................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Appendix C. Model Specifications and Results ........................................................................... 39 References ..................................................................................................................................... 44 List of Tables Table 1. Data Description ............................................................................................................... 9 Table 2. Predicted Relationship between Covariates and the Hazard Rate of Failure ................. 10 Table 3. Model 1 Dissolution with Conflict Results ..................................................................... 12 Table 4. Model 2 Dissolution with Peace Results ........................................................................ 15 Table A1. Database of identified GNUs, Country, Start and End Dates, Dissolution, and Type of Power-sharing Agreement ............................................................................ 31 Table A2. Listed Citations for Governments of National Unity ................................................... 34 Table C1. Model 1 Failure Results with Coefficients and Confidence Interval ........................... 39 Table C2. Model 2: Success Results with Coefficients and Confidence Interval ........................ 40 Table C3. GNU Summary Statistics by Duration, Model 1: Failure ............................................ 40 Table C4. GNU Summary Statistics by Duration, Model 2: Success ........................................... 41 Table C5. GNU Summary Statistics by Outcome of Interest ....................................................... 41 Table C6. Summary Statistics for Rule of Law Index .................................................................. 41 Table C7. Summary Statistics for Rule of Law Index, continued ................................................ 41 Table C8. Summary Statistics for GDP Growth ........................................................................... 42 Table C9. Summary Statistics for GDP Growth, Continued ........................................................ 42 Table C10. Summary Statistics for Ideological Conflict .............................................................. 42 Table C11. Summary Statistics for Ideological Conflict, Continued ........................................... 42 Table C12. Summary Statistics for Outcome: Stalemate .............................................................. 43 Table C13. Summary Statistics for Outcome: Stalemate, Continued ........................................... 43 List of Figures Figure 1. Dissolution Outcomes ................................................................................................... 10 Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier Survival Distribution Function: Dissolution with Conflict Model ........ 14 Figure 3. Smoothed Hazard Function, by Median Rule of Law ................................................... 14 Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier Survival Distribution Function: Dissolution without Conflict Model ......................................................................................................................... 16 Figure 5. Smoothed Hazard Function, by Ideological Conflict .................................................... 17 iv Foreword The La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin−Madison offers a two- year graduate program leading to a Master of Public Affairs or a Master of International Public Affairs degree. In both programs, students develop analytical tools with which to assess policy responses to issues, evaluate implications of policies for efficiency and equity, and interpret and present data relevant to policy considerations. Students in the Master of International Public Affairs program produced this report for the U.S. Government Office of South Asia Analysis. The students are enrolled in the Workshop in International Public Affairs,
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