Populism, Dimensions and Topics in the Social Media Communication of Tomio Okamura

MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA

Fakulta sociálních studií

Katedra politologie

Populism, dimensions and topics in the social media communication of Tomio Okamura

Magisterská diplomová práca

Dominika Betáková (UČO 414600)

Vedúci práce: Mgr. Petr Voda, Ph.D.

Obor: Politologie

Imatrikulačný ročník 2015

Brno 2018

Declaration of authorship I declare that I have written the Master’s degree thesis “Populism, dimensions and topics in the social media communication of Tomio Okamura” independently and I have used only the sources that are mentioned in the References part.

………………………………

In Brno, 29. 05. 2018 signature

Poďakovanie

Na tomto mieste by som chcela poďakovat vedúcemu práce, Mgr. Petru Vodovi, Ph.D., za trpezlivosť, ochotu a cenné rady. Tiež by som chcela poďakovať M.A. et Mgr. Jurajovi Medzihorskému, Ph.D., ktorého workshop mi pomohol v oblasti spracovania textových dát.

Ďalej by som chcela poďakovať rodičom a blízkym za neutíchajúcu podporu a trpezlivosť.

Anotácia

Diplomová práca skúma populizmus a témy vo Facebookovej komunikácii Tomia Okamury, lídra politickej strany Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD). Štúdia aplikovala dva typy kvantitatívnej obsahovej analýzy. Ako prvá je prevedená kvantitatívna obsahová analýza prostredníctvom ručného kódovania, ktorá je využitá na preskúmanie množstva a charakteru Okamurovho populizmu. Následne je aplikovaná počítačom asistovaná automatizovaná kvantitatívna obsahová analýza, konkrétne latentná Dirichletova Alokácia ako typ modelovania tém s cieľom preskúmať prevládajúce témy v Okamurovej komunikácii na sociálnej sieti. Práca poskytuje náhľad na Okamurovu komunikáciu prostredníctvom sociálnej siete Facebook behom volebnej kampane v roku 2017.

Kľúčové slová:

Populizmus, Tomio Okamura, Svoboda a přímá demokracie, politická komunikácia, sociálne médiá, sociálne siete, SPD, kvantitatívna obsahová analýza, modelovanie tém, latentná Dirichletova alokácia, Facebook, volebná kampaň

Abstract

The thesis investigates the populism and topics in Facebook communication of Tomio Okamura, leader of the party Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). The study conducts two types of quantitative content analysis. Firstly, hand-coded quantitative content analysis is used for examining the amount and nature of Okamura’s populism. Secondly, automated computer- assisted quantitative content analysis, specifically latent Dirichlet allocation as a type of topic model is applied to investigate the topics prevalent in Okamura’s social media communication. The thesis provides a picture of Okamura’s communication on social media platform Facebook during the election year 2017.

Keywords:

Populism, Tomio Okamura, Freedom and Direct Democracy, political communication, social media, social network sites, SPD, quantitative content analysis, topic modeling, latent Dirichlet Allocation, Facebook, electoral campaign

Table of contents

Introduction ...... 6

1) Tomio Okamura and Freedom and Direct Democracy ...... 9

2) Conceptual overview ...... 11

What exactly does populism mean? ...... 11

The perspectives on the study of populism ...... 12

Populism as a thin ideology ...... 13

Populism as a set of ideas ...... 15

Populism as a political logic ...... 15

Populism as a communication style ...... 16

Populism as a political style ...... 16

Populism as a political mobilization or strategy ...... 17

3) The applied perspective ...... 17

4) Do social media represent a new opportunity for populism? ...... 22

5) Previous research ...... 28

Research on populism in the Czech Republic ...... 28

Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages .. 31

Studies that applied hand-coding ...... 31

Studies that applied automated quantitative methods ...... 35

6) Methodology ...... 37

Research objective ...... 37

Methods ...... 39

Method regarding hand-coded quantitative content analysis ...... 39

Method regarding automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis...... 43

The data and the time frame ...... 47

Coding rules regarding hand-coded quantitative content analysis with examples ...... 49

7) Analytical part ...... 60

General findings from hand-coded quantitative content analysis...... 60

Automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis ...... 63

Introduction to the part ...... 63

Data cleaning and parsing ...... 64

The most used words by Okamura ...... 67

What data types were shared the most? ...... 70

Identyfing the number of topics ...... 70

Chosen topic model with 53 topics ...... 73

The proportions of topics in the corpus ...... 77

Topics in the most liked, commented and shared Facebook posts ...... 80

Selected topics’ prevalence in time ...... 85

Conclusion ...... 90

Attachments ...... 94

References ...... 104

Number of characters: 174 061

Introduction

Over the last decade, populist parties have grown across Europe and they enjoy electoral success and attract new members. They claim to speak for “the good and honest people” and attack the “out-of-touch” and mainstream elites. Furthermore, it is often problematic to identify them on the left-right political spectrum, because some of them often combine the elements from both ends of the spectrum combining it with populist language (Bartlett 2014: 92; Bartlett and Birdwell and Littler 2011: 25-26).

Elections in both Europe and United States of America (USA) have proven that populism is gaining attraction of voters – for instance, presidential candidate Norbert Hofer in Austria, Marine Le Pen in France, party leader Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and the current President of the USA Donald Trump all have in common the label “populists” (Engesser and Fawzi and Larsson 2017: 1279).

Therefore, populists have established themselves as powerful political forces and have become “integral members of coalition governments”. Specially, right-wing populist parties often share a concern regarding their national or European identity, which they perceive as being threatened by immigration. Anti-immigrant parties gained votes (apart from the cases mentioned above) in Italy (Lega Nord), Denmark (Danish People’s Party), Sweden (Sweden Democrats) and Finland (True Finns) (Bartlett and Birdwell and Littler 2011: 25-28).

As Mudde (2000: 44-45) notes, post-communist Europe is not an exception. The author argues that the “communist rule created a perfect social environment for mass support of political populism”, one of the reasons being the anti-elitist atmosphere during the democratization period. Specifically, populism in Czech Republic can be attributed to the voter dissatisfaction of the development after democratization in 1989 (Císař and Štětka 2017: 287).

This could be due to unemployment, economic decline or corruption and governance (Hanley and Sikk 2016: 527). Nowadays, alleged populist parties in Czechia include Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO 2011), Free Citizens Party (SSO), Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and former Dawn of Direct Democracy (Dawn, later named National coalition) and former Public Affairs (VV) (Císař and Štětka 2017: 287).

Although, what criteria need to be met to label a political actor as a populist? Populism as a term is one of the most popular used, even though it is also one of the most contested ones.

There is no consensus on what elements constitute populism, although some conceptualizations are more accepted than others (Reinemann et al. 2017: 12).

These elements that are not entirely agreed upon are for instance appeal to the people, attacks on elites, whether the exclusion of “others” should be regarded as part of populism, the emphasis on crisis or threat, the role of a charismatic leader or rhetorical features such as tabloid style or dramatization (Reinemann et al. 2017: 12-21; Wirth et al. 2016: 13; Canovan 1999: 5, 6; Moffitt and Tormey 2013: 391; Taggart 2000: 93-94; Ernst et al. 2017a: 1360).

As Aalberg and de Vreese (2017: 3) note, even though populism is well-known and established phenomenon, its communicative elements are underexplored. Populist political communication, as an essential characteristic of the populist phenomenon which seems to be increasingly pervasive in Europe, has often been neglected, especially regarding populists as communicators, the media and the impact of this communication on voters. “Yet – in light of the current large-scale social, political, and economic turmoil of recent populist backlashes against governments, and of the changing media environment – the study of populist political communication has never been more important” (Aalberg and de Vreese 2017: 3).

Reinemann et al. (2017: 13) suggest a view on populism as a phenomenon “(…) mostly reflected in the oral, written, and visual communication of individual politicians, parties, social movemenents, or any other actor that steps into the public sphere (…)” (Reinemann et al. 2017: 13). Authors suggest that this perspective on populism does not contradict that political actors, the media or voters can have ideologies or hold attitudes that can pave the way for the acts of communication in which the core populist elements can be empirically identified and measured (Reinemann et al. 2017: 13-14).

Especially, Krämer (2017: 1293) together with Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017: 1280) claim that the research on populism has mostly ignored the potential interplay of populism and the Internet. Studies that examined populist actors and social media are mentioned in the chapter Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages.

As Bartlett (2014: 95) suggests, “social media could be a game-changer” when it comes to mobilizing voters during election time. Furthermore, social media are suitable for challengers, because Facebook and Twitter groups are convenient for spreading the mobilizing messages with almost no costs (Bartlett 2014: 95).

The Internet could serve as a tool for populist actors to bypass traditional media and communicate directly with voters without a filter and frame issues as they like. Populist actors

“(…) often strive to demonstrate that they, not the established media, represent the people’s interests and consequently need a platform to convey this very message and their further claims. It is on this platform that they can criticize the media for being unfair and unbalanced and thus put them under pressure to cover them more intensively and favorably” (Krämer 2017: 1303).

One could hypothesize how many of the fans and followers of populists on social media do really vote for them. Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler (2011: 78) claim that: “Across the data set of political parties, 67 per cent of online supporters reported to have voted for the populist political party at the most recent national election” (Bartlett and Birdwell and Littler 2011: 78).

Based on the information mentioned above, a populism on social media in Czech Republic should be empirically investigated. The Master’s thesis examines the official Facebook account of Tomio Okamura, the leader of the alleged populist party Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), which achieved almost 11 % share of national vote during 2017 Parliamentary elections (Volby.cz 2017b).

Specifically, the thesis focuses both on detecting and examining populist elements in Okamura’s communication and on identifying and investigating topics prevalent in his social media communication during the election year 2017.

The research questions are as follows: o What is the proportion of populist and non-populist sentences in Okamura’s Facebook posts? o Which populist dimension was used the most? o What type of elite was criticized in the populist and conflictive sentences? o What is the proportion of original and re-used sentences in Okamura’s posts? o Which words occurred the most in Okamura’s Facebook posts? o What type of posts Okamura shared the most? o Which topics can be identified in Okamura’s Facebook posts? o Which topics Okamura used most frequently? o Which of these topics appeared in the most shared, liked and commented Okamura’s Facebook posts? o How the usage of selected topics used by Okamura changed throughout the election year 2017?

The research questions can be separated into two parts. The first four research questions regarding the populism would be answered through hand-coded quantitative content analysis

8 using a sample of Facebook posts. The last six research questions representing the second set of research questions would be answered through automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis, specifically using latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) as a type of topic model using all Okamura’s Facebook posts during the election year 2017.

Answering the research questions would provide the questions regarding the nature and the amount of populism in Okamura’s Facebook communication together with topics that are present in his posts, how often they were used and which of them resonated well with the audience – in this case, Okamura’s Facebook fans. Generally, what (topics) and how (if populistic) did Okamura communicate during the campaign 2017 and how did it resonate with the public?

The thesis’s theory begins with briefly introducing Okamura and his party, SPD. Afterwards, the perspectives on the conceptualization of populism would be presented and concluded towards the most applicable and suitable model for the study’s research objective. The relationship between populism and social media would be introduced in detail followed by the current state of research. The next section would focus on the methodology and the data. The analytical part is divided into two sections regarding both type of quantitative content analysis. At the end of the thesis the conclusion would be presented.

1) Tomio Okamura and Freedom and Direct Democracy

Tomio Okamura was born on 4th of July in 1972 in Tokio to the family of Czech mother and Japanese-Korean father. He spent the childhood both in former Czechoslovakia and Japan while attending Czech primary school and high school. Moreover, he spent some time in a foster home. Afterwards he worked in Japan while one of his jobs included selling beverages and food in a cinema. He arrived back to Prague when he was 21 and became an entrepreneur in the field of tourism in 1995. Nowadays his business involves services for tourists, company for delivering Japanese food and a software company. Okamura also worked as a foreign commentator for British BBC, published five books and, according to his own words, participates in charity activities (Tomio.cz 2011).

Regarding his political career, Okamura was elected as a senator in Czech Senate elections 2012 without a party affiliation (Senate is an upper house of the Parliament of the Czech Republic) (Tomio.cz 2011; Volby.cz 2017c). Okamura intended to become a presidential candidate in 2013 Presidential elections, which was the first direct presidential elections held

9 in Czech Republic. Although, the Interior Ministry banned his candidacy because of an inadequate number of authentic petition signatures (Kaniok and Havlík 2016: 28). Even though Okamura appealed to The Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, he could not run in the presidential elections (iDNES.cz 2012).

Afterwards Okamura established political party Dawn of Direct Democracy and even though the party was registered a short period before 2013 Parliamentary elections, it exceeded the electoral threshold and gained 14 seats in the lower house, Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, Okamura became a Member of parliament (MP) and lost his senate seat (Kaniok and Havlík 2016: 28; Denik.cz 2013).

“The key element of Dawn’s discourse was an unending emphasis on direct democracy as the most important element of any proposed reform of the political system. The current setup of the political system of the Czech Republic – a representative parliamentary democracy with a proportional voting system – was understood by Okamura as the main culprit of the political crisis. Direct democracy would be further supplemented by a reform of the voting system, the option of recalling politicians in office, material responsibility, and the introduction of a presidential system” (Kaniok and Havlík 2016: 28).

As Havelka (2016: 19-20) notes, the party’s intentions and interests were not clear and could be regarded as an example of “populist anti-politics”. Dawn “(…) is questioning the as- of-yet fully settled institute of the political system. With its one-sided calls for introducing referendums, this movement is attempting to change the constitution instead of finding political solutions to specific problems” (Havelka 2016: 19, 20). Although the success of his newly established party, Okamura was forced to leave the movement (together with Radim Fiala) due to conflicts regarding the financing of the party (iDNES.cz 2015a).

Afterwards Okamura established a new party called Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), which was successful in 2017 Parliamentary elections gaining 22 deputy seats (iDNES.cz 2015b; Volby.cz 2017d). The first post on the SPD official Facebook account appeared on the 5th of May 2015 stating that Okamura and Fiala were forced to leave their party Dawn and filled a form for registration of their new political project, SPD (Facebook.com 2018b). According to party manifesto, SPD requests direct democracy through referendums (including a national referendum on leaving the European Union - EU), calls for law and order, national sovereignty, traditional values and rejects the “multicultural ideology” (SPD.cz 2017).

As Okamura writes on his blog: “The current system is ill from the roots – proportional electoral system could not allow creating powerful government – the government has to corrupt

10 the coalition parties, the deputies and even the voters. The current system is not a real democracy – political scientists call it oligarchy – the government of powerful” (Okamura.blog.iDNES.cz 2013).

As Císař and Štětka (2017: 288-289) note, Okamura is concerned with “(…) hardworking, but also culturally defined nation (…)”, meaning “(…) his public discourse is aimed against foreign elements in the Czech nation and immigration in general” (Císař and Štětka 2017: 288-289).

To conclude, Okamura started his political carreer as a senator and now serves as an MP. He successfully established his first party Dawn, which gained 6.88 % of the votes in the Parliamentary elections 2013 and then his current party SPD, which achieved 10.64 % of national vote during Parliamentary elections 2017 (Volby.cz 2017a; Volby.cz 2017b). Importantly, SPD is often referred to as far-right or far-right populist party because of its anti- establishment appeal, anti-immigration rhetoric and European Union (EU) reforms (Economist.com 2017; Kopeček 2018: 2). Therefore, the thesis would investigate Okamura’s populism and topics during 2017 campaign.

2) Conceptual overview

This chapter represents a conceptual overview of the term populism and discusses the main perspectives that researchers apply when studying the phenomenon together with the definition of populism used in the thesis. The first part presents the problems emerging from the vagueness of the term. The second part is divided into six subsections, while each of them introduces a different perspective on populism.

What exactly does populism mean?

According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013: 493-496) the roots of populism can be found in the nineteenth century with the emergence in Russia and USA (Narodniki and People’s Party). Afterwards the phenomenon was linked to the presidency of Juan Domingo Perón in Latin America in the twentieth century. Nowadays populism is associated with the emergence of radical right parties in Europe.

Taggart (2004: 270) argues in a similar manner:

“Latin America, the United States, Canada, Russia and Africa have all experienced signiﬁcant populist movements or populist moments. From the experience of the narodniki in pre-revolutionary Russia, through the US populists of the 1870s, Juan Perón in Argentina, Social Credit in Alberta in the 1930s, to the experience of Nyerere in Tanzania, we have a welter of non-European populist moments. Europe is therefore experiencing a contemporary form of a much wider phenomenon. In contemporary Europe, populism’s most visible presence has been through the far right where, variously mixed with an agenda of anti-immigration, hostility to taxation and ethnic regionalism (…)” (Taggart 2004: 270).

Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 1-2) claim that the rise of populism (specially in Western Europe) is due to unsuccessful reactions of traditional parties to modern phenomena like globalization, European integration and immigration. Electorate perceives politics as irrelevant and incompetent, while populists offer simple, common-sense solutions together with the rhetoric of common citizens.

On the contrary, there even exist scholars that argue for abandoning the populism as a social science concept. This could be due to the vague usage of the term itself (Reinemann et al. 2017: 12-13).

“(…) it is often used as a swearword by politicians, journalists, and citizens to accuse others of cheap propaganda with emotional arguments, of presenting simple solutions to complex problems (simplification), and of floating with the tide of public opinion (opportunism) or to compromise parties and politicians by associating them with actors on the fringes of the political spectrum (extremism, radicalism)” (Reinemann et al. 2017: 12-13).

Wirth et al. (2016: 6) similarly suggest that populism was used by some groups as a weapon for attacking and accusing certain political parties of being populist in the second half of twentieth century. Gidron and Bonikowski (2013: 3) bring the similar finding: “The challenge of defining populism is at least partially due to the fact that the term has been used to describe political movements, parties, ideologies, and leaders across geographical, historical, and ideological contexts” (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013: 3).

The perspectives on the study of populism

As Moffitt and Tormey (2014: 381) note, there is no general agreement in academic literature on how to correctly conceptualize populism. “Dominant definitions of populism often attempt to fit a square peg in a round hole, and fail to capture the specificity of the phenomenon” (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 381). As would be demonstrated below, there is not even an

12 agreement on how many established perspectives on populism there are. Therefore, a brief overview of typologies of views on populism would be presented.

Some authors define three main conceptual perspectives on populism, although name them differently. For instance, Gidron and Bonikowski (2013: 5) differ between populism as an ideology, as a discursive style and as a form of political mobilization and Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017: 1280) distinguishes between populism as an ideology, as a discursive style and as a form of political mobilization. The latter scholars suggest that the mentioned views do not represent different elements of populism, neither are mutually exclusive (Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson 2017: 1280).

“Therefore, we suggest the following clarification: The approach of populism as ideology defines populism as a set of ideas and focuses, within the context of the special issue at hand, on the content of populist communication (What?). The approach of populism as style conceives of populism as mode of presentation and is interested in the form of populist communication (How?). The approach of populism as strategy refers to populism as a means to an end and focuses on the motives and aims of populist communication (Why?).” (Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson 2017: 1280)

Moreover, some autors apart from presenting different conceptualizations offer their own perspective, such as Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012: 5-10) who propose a minimal definition (populism as a thin-ideology, would be discussed in detail below) and Moffitt and Tormey (2014: 383-391) who present their conceptualization – populism as a political style.

Based on what is mentioned above with the review of the literature, there could be distinguished between populism: as a thin ideology (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Wirth et al. 2016), as a set of ideas (Taggart 2000), as a political logic (Laclau 2005), as a communication style (Canovan 1999; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Reinemann et al. 2017), as a political style (Moffitt and Tormey 2014) and as a political mobilization or strategy (Jansen 2011).

These conceptualizations are in detail presented below.

Populism as a thin ideology

The perspective on populism as a thin-centred ideology was established and influenced by authors such as Freeden (1998), Mudde (2004) and Stanley (2008).

Freeden (1998: 750) defines the concept of “thin-centred ideology” as:

“A thin-centred ideology is one that arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts. The consequence is a structural inability to offer complex ranges of argument, because many chains of ideas one would normally expect to find stretching from the general and abstract to the concrete and practical, from the core to the periphery, as well as in the reverse direction, are simply absent” (Freeden 1998: 750).

Mudde (2004: 543-544) utilizes this concept and defines populism as: “(…) an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543-544).

Stanley (2008: 100-102) notes that populism uses ideas that focus on the concept of “the people”, although it does not add the justification of its ideology. The author also suggests that the core of populism lies in the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, while the former is perceived positively and the latter negatively. Moreover, one of its core elements is the idea of “popular sovereignty” (Stanley 2008: 100-102).

Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012: 7-8) suggest that the minimal definition as proposed by Mudde arises from a classical categorization, which is suitable for the conceptualization of populism, because it focuses on “the lowest common denominator between all manifestations of a particular phenomenon” (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2012: 7-8). According to the authors, this view could lead to identifying the core elements of populism and it allows distinguishing between other thick (as socialism or liberalism) or thin ideologies (as nationalism or ecologism) (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2012: 8-9). Furthermore, scholars argue that this conceptualization is similar to most definitions of populism as a style/strategy/discourse, in the logic that it is consistent in the question of content, although it disagrees on what is important. Moreover, the minimal definition does not hypothesize about the type of populist mobilization, which could problematize the application of the definition (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2012: 8-9).

As was mentioned above, the advantage of perceiving populism as a thin-centred ideology is that it allows the researchers to distinguish between different types of populists. While populism itself focuses on the relationship between the people, the elite and the populist actor himself, populism as a thick ideology (populism combined with other ideologies) defines who belongs to the people and to the elite (Wirth et al. 2016: 8).

As Gidron and Bonikowski (2013:6) claim, Mudde’s approach to populism as a thin ideology is influential and especially used by researchers studying European right-wing

14 populist parties and actors. “Populism here is first and foremost a set of ideas characterized by an antagonism between the people and the elite, as well as the primacy of popular sovereignty, whereby the virtuous general will is placed in opposition to the moral corruption of elite actors” (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013: 6).

Wirth et al. (2016: 40) drew on populism as a thin ideology: “(…) that considers – through a Manichean outlook – society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and for the ‘good’ people it postulates unrestricted sovereignty” (Wirth et al. 2016: 40). The authors themselves tried to create a heuristic model, which would represent a synthesis of different approaches. This model is discussed in detail in chapter The applied perspective.

Populism as a set of ideas

Another approach to populism is the perception of the phenomenon as a set of ideas, which has some similar features as the perspective of a thin ideology. For instance, Taggart (2000: 109-110) defines populism as the manifestation of a “reaction of the ruled against the rulers” that is articulated through “systematic set of ideas” (Taggart 2000: 109-110). The author attributes five typical features to populism: a hostility towards representative politics, a “heartland”, which represents an idealized community, the lack of core values, the fact that it comes as a reaction to crisis and populists’ self-limiting quality (Taggart 2004: 273-276). Taggart’s element “heartland” represents a populist idea of a “good life” which existed in the past. Populists are committed to “the people”, who are occupants of the heartland and populist actors use the argument of popular sovereignty to fight institutions, which are part of representative politics (Taggart 2004: 278).

Populism as a political logic

The view on populism as a political logic can be represented by Laclau (2005: 117) who writes: “(…) by 'populism' we do not understand a type of movement - identifiable with either a special social base or a particular ideological orientation - but a political logic” (Laclau 2005: 117). This approach could also be named as the discursive one.

Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012: 6-7) summarize Laclau’s definition as a hegemony between two camps – the ones that have power and the powerless (“the people”). Authors point

15 out to problems when applying his theory in research, which is in line with the critics by Moffitt and Tormey (2014: 384-385). They note that Laclau’s concept is too broad as a conceptualization to apply in research, because he claims that practically all politics is populism (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2012: 6-7; Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 384-385).

Populism as a communication style

This perspective can be represented by Canovan (1999), Jagers and Walgrave (2007) and Reinemann et al. (2017). For instance, Canovan (1999: 5-7) emphasizes the populist style and “the populist mood”. The populist style consists of depicting populists themselves as speaking simply and directly to ordinary people, while they stress the distrust in politicians and their bureaucratic rhetoric. They propose simple and direct solutions opposing the complex ones preferred by professional politicians. The second element Canovan stresses is the populist mood, which is characteristic in its emotional impact used to mobilize people (Canovan 1999: 5-7).

Jagers and Walgrave (2007: 322) defines populism as communication style in politics applied by political actors with reference to the people. According to them, this definition is thin, while the thick one consists of three elements: an identification with the people and referencing to them (this is the only element present in their thin definition), anti-elite attitude and the vision of the people as a monolithic group, while there exist groups that are excluded (Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 322).

Reinemann et al. (2017: 23-24) believe that populism itself is mostly demonstrated through communication (their perspective was presented in the Introduction). Authors conclude that: “Although we find a great variety of definitions and definitional criteria in the literature on populism, consensus seems to be growing that references to, or the communicative construction of, ‘the people’ should be regarded as the key component of populist messages, with anti-elitism and anti-out-group stances serving as optional additional elements” (Reinemann et al. 2017: 23-24).

Populism as a political style

Moffitt and Tormey (2014: 387) criticize both Canovan (1999) and Jagers and Walgrave (2007) on the grounds of focusing on rhetorical features and not on the idea of “political style”,

16 which could be utilized in a comparative research. Therefore, authors propose a definition of populism as a political style: “(…) we deﬁne the concept of political style as the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations” (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 387). Scholars define the characteristics of populist political style as an appeal to “the people”, who possess the sovereignty, a crisis (could be caused by “the elite” or other entities representing the establishment), and the directed, “common sense” language (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 391-392).

Populism as a political mobilization or strategy

According to Jansen (2011: 75-82), who depicts populism from a view of political sociology, there is a need to shift the attention from populism as a “thing” to the “nature” of populism. The author proposes to distinguish between popular mobilization and populist rhetoric, while the term populist mobilization should only be used when both elements are present. In Jansen’s terms, populist mobilization should be understood as a political project (Jansen 2011: 82).

3) The applied perspective

Different perspectives and conceptualizations of populism were introduced above, while this section discusses the conceptualization of populism as used by the thesis. Regarding these perspectives, Pauwels (2011: 99) suggests that the perspective on populism as a thin ideology emerged from the conceptual debate as the winning one. Moreover, he notes that the question whether the political actor is populist or not is difficult to answer. According to him, Mudde’s conceptualization of populism as a thin ideology is specific enough to apply in research: “His threshold is rather high since a populist party should consider (1) the people as a homogeneous and pure entity, (2) the elite as a homogeneous and corrupt entity, (3) the people and the elite as two antagonistic groups, and (4) favour measures to give power back to the people (e.g. direct democracy)” (Pauwels 2011: 100-101).

Furthermore, populism as a thin ideology does not contradict the views mentioned above and it is in line with other authors’ conceptualizations. For instance, Taggart (2004: 274-275) claims that populism itself lacks core values, therefore it can be attached to different ideas, leading to flexibility and incompleteness. In addition, the definition by Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 3) also resembles the one by Mudde (2004). Authors define populism as:

“(…) an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice” (Albertazzi, McDonnell 2008: 3).

As Moffitt and Tormey (2014: 383-384) write, the perspective on populism as a thin- centred ideology has become prevalent in academic literature, especially in research focused on Europe. Although, authors themselves criticize this conceptualization: “Unlike ecologism or feminism, hardly anyone self-identiﬁes as ‘populist’, and there is no kind of wider global ‘populist movement’ or Populist International. There are no key philosophers or theoreticians of populism, or any texts that seek to ‘thicken’ its ‘ideational density’” (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 383-384).

Although this criticism, the perspective on populism as a thin-ideology is prevalent in studies relevant for the thesis (which could also be demonstrated by the number of authors drawing on Mudde mentioned in section Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages).

The most suitable conceptualization of populism for thesis’s research objective is the model introduced by Wirth et al. (2016). The scholars drew on populism as a thin ideology as introduced by Mudde (2004) (Wirth et al. 2016: 8). The aim of the authors’ work was to create “an integrative framework for populism research” by combining different perspectives on populism, such as ideology, strategy or style. Scholars wanted to achieve a model that would be suitable for empirical analysis of a phenomenon of populism that appears in political communication, media or attitudes (Wirth et al. 2016: 4).

“The framework serves as a guide for developing straightforward instruments to identify and quantitatively measure populism in the self-presentation of actors, in news media and other forms of communication, as well as in public opinion. By virtue of the broadness of the framework, it is applicable to longitudinal and crosscultural analyses of populism, as well as the investigation of the flow of populist ideology among political actors, the media, and the public. It is also worth noting that it is a non-normative framework that approaches the study of populism from a primarily analytical perspective” (Wirth 2016: 4).

Authors first define populism in order to create a framework suitable for investigating political communication. Their definition (which was also mentioned in the section Populism as a thin ideology) is as follows: “We define populism as a thin ideology, which considers – in a Manichean outlook – society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic

18 groups, the positively connoted ‘pure people’ versus the negatively connoted ‘corrupt elite’, and it postulates unrestricted sovereignty of the people” (Wirth et al. 2016: 14).

As scholars argue, in empirical research aiming towards identifying and quantitatively measuring populism, it is necessary to first identify populist communication strategies that could be derived from populism as an ideology, which would allow the researchers to incorporate results of populism and communication. “In this framework, we use the three constituents of populist ideology to derive a set of communication strategies expressing support for them. Following this approach in the definition of populist communication strategies, they remain congruent with populist ideologies” (Wirth et al. 2016: 41).

These three core elements of populist ideology are: “the people” as a monolithic and virtuous group (manifested by inclusion or exclusion of individuals, stressing achievements or virtues of the in-group – the people, or expressing the closeness of populists to the people), the criticism of elites (could be demonstrated by blaming the elite, emphasizing their negative attributes or describing them as a threat) and demanding the shift in possessing the power (by denying power to the elites or requiring sovereignty for the people) (Wirth et al. 41-42).

The populist communication strategies are the complements of the populist ideology, therefore these strategies need to be operationalized and could be measured through content analysis. Scholars suggest that the texts that are created by political actors themselves could be examined as an object for inspecting the flow of populist communication. “Irrespective of which politician or party is speaking, the degree of populist communication in any text can be determined, thereby revealing how prevalent it is across the political spectrum” (Wirth et al. 2016: 43).

The integrative framework proposed by Wirth et al. (2016: 47) consists of three core elements mentioned earlier, while each of these elements is demonstrated through certain populist communication strategies. Authors derived these key components (could also be understood as dimensions) from their minimal definition of populism as an ideology (Wirth et al. 2016: 47).

“As specified above, we understand populism in a broad sense as advocative toward the people and conflictive toward the elite. This dichotomy may be differentiated into three constituents of populist ideology. While Anti-Elitism is clearly conflictive toward the elite and People-centrism is advocative toward the people, the constituent of restoring sovereignty may be divided into an advocative and a conflictive aspect, as the power is taken from the elite and given to the people (…)” (Wirth et al. 2016: 47).

Scholars’ model is presented below as a Figure 1. Figure 1: The concept of populism as the ideology according to Wirth et al. (2016). Source: Wirth et al. (2016: 47)

Restoring sovereignty is positioned in the center of the model because it forms the relationship between the people, the elite and the populist actor. The populists claim that the people should be possessing and exercising power that comes from the popular sovereignty (that needs to be restored), while the elites or the others are preventing the people from their right. This dimension consists of advocative and conflictive aspect. The advocative request is named “Claiming popular sovereignty”, which could be expressed as a general claim demanding more power to citizens or in a specific request for introducing direct democratic elements (Wirth et al. 2016: 48).

Regarding people-centrism, populists present the people in a positive way and try to demonstrate their closeness to them as an in-group, allowing them to be perceived as members of ordinary people. “People centrism means that the populist claim for unrestricted popular sovereignty is closely connected to specific understandings and valorization of the people. First, to be able to speak on behalf of the people and their interests, populists necessarily regard the people as a monolithic entity” (Wirth et al. 2016: 49-50).

Although not all groups are considered as part of the people, so some actors are excluded from this this in-group (Wirth et al. 2016: 49-50). For instance, concerning populist radical-right parties, Mudde (2007: 64) distinguishes between four types of enemies (out-groups). These could be enemies: “(…) (1) those within both the nation and the state; (2) those outside of the nation but within the state; (3) those within the nation

20 but outside the state; and (4) those outside both the nation and the state (…)” (Mudde 2007: 64).

Therefore, communication strategies aggregated in people-centrism include emphasizing the virtues and achievements of the people and demonstrating closeness to them. Furthermore, people are perceived as a monolithic entity, meaning they are treated as having common will, desires and feelings (Wirth et al. 2016: 49-50).

Anti-elitism as the third dimension of the model represents the attitude towards elite as “the evil counterpart to the people”. Populists describe elites with negative attributes, but the identification of the elite vary depending on the type of populism (it could be supranational institutions, foreign governments or domestic elites in right-wing populism or economic elite, such as influential or wealthy corporations or individuals in left-wing populism). Communication strategies aiming towards elite could be the criticism or blame shifting, discrediting and exclusion (Wirth et al. 2016: 50-51).

Nine communication strategies as defined by Wirth et al. (2016) can be found below as the Table 1.

Table 1: Measurement instruments (nine populist communication strategies). Source: Wirth et al. (2016: 52) Discrediting the Elite Anti-Elitism Blaming the Elite Conflictive Excluding the Elite from the People Denying Power to the Elite Restoring Sovereignty Demanding Power for the People Stressing Virtues of the People Advocative Praising Achievements of the People People-Centrism Stating a Monolithic People Demonstrating Closeness to the People The definition proposed by Wirth et al. (2016) combines elements that were attributed to populism in most of the definitions above: the people, the elite and the sovereignty. Moreover, it is suitable for quantitative content analysis of a populist actor.

In addition, a similar conceptualization or populism was used in Czech context when Kaniok and Havlík (2016: 24-26) investigated populism and Euroscepticism of four alleged Czech populist or Eurosceptic parties (including Okamura’s former party Dawn). Authors

21 conducted content analysis with the usage of hand-coding on press releases regarding the EU and they conceptualized populism as consisting of three elements corresponding to three dimensions as used by the thesis (people-centrism, anti-establishment appeal and the requirement for restoring popular sovereignty) (Kaniok and Havlík 2016: 24-26).

Furthermore, Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017) propose their heuristic model populism suitable for investigating populism on social media, which utilizes almost identical elements as the model by Wirth et al. (2016). The conceptualization of populism by Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017) is discussed in detail in the following chapter Do social media represent a new opportunity for populism?

4) Do social media represent a new opportunity for populism?

The current chapter presents an intersection between populism and social media. The social media and traditional media would be compared together with their relation to political actors. The interplay of populism and social media would be discussed.

According to McNair (2011: 4), political communication could be defined as a “(…) purposeful communication about politics (…)”, which also includes each form “(…) of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives” (McNair 2011: 4).

Since 2010, the usage of Internet and specially, social network sites (including Facebook and Twitter) started to be included in political communication used by political actors in order to communicate with electorate (McNair 2011: xviii).

Social network sites could be defined:

“(…) as web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public proﬁle within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site” (Boyd and Ellison 2007: 211).

Social network sites attracted millions of worldwide users and became a daily routine for many of them. They allow individuals to communicate both with people from their “offline” world or with complete strangers. Social network sites differ on many instances, for example visibility and access of the site (Boyd and Ellison 2007: 210-211).

Starting as a social network site for college students, Facebook expanded in September 2005 to include everyone (Boyd and Ellison 2007: 218). In January 2018 Facebook had 2.167 billion monthly active users worldwide, emerging as the most popular social network site in the world (according to monthly active users statistic) (Statista.com 2018a). The number of monthly active users of Facebook in Czech Republic was 4.22 million at the beginning of 2016 (Statistica.com 2018b).

Facebook has a few distinguishing features (compared to other networking sites): a one’s profile on Facebook could be either public (this feature is also used by political actors), when anyone can like or follow the page or private (where only users that are part of the same network – user’s approved “friends” can see the whole profile). Moreover, Facebook includes the platform Facebook for developers, which allows developers to build applications for various tasks including gathering the data (Boyd and Ellison 2007: 213-218).

Social network sites could be understood as a subcategory of social media (Cohn 2017). Merriam-Webster dictionary defines social media as: “forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos)” (Merriam-Webster 2018).

The logic of social media platforms is different than the logic of traditional mass media in three instances: production of the media, distribution and media usage (Klinger and Svensson 2015a: 1245-1246).

These differences can be found in Table 2.

Table 2: Differences between mass media logic and network media logic. Source: Klinger and Svensson (2015a: 1246)

Because of their different logic social media represent a challenge to political actors. On the one hand, political actors seek visibility during electoral campaigns and social media platforms which promote personalization could be utilized by candidates as a tool for self- presentation. On the other hand, this self-presentation of candidates can also harm their political party (Klinger and Svensson 2015b: 34-35).

Chadwick (2013) suggests that older (traditional) media and new media (social media) interact together to build a “hybrid media system” (Chadwick 2013: 4):

“Actors in this system are articulated by complex and ever-evolving relationships based upon adaptation and interdependence and simultaneous concentrations and diffusions of power. Actors create, tap, or steer information flows in ways that suit their goals and in ways that modify, enable, or disable others’ agency, across and between a range of older and newer media settings” (Chadwick 2013: 4).

The usage of social media by political actors can be valuable during election campaigns because of their participatory and interactive potential. Moreover, political actors can utilize them by bypassing the traditional media and speaking directly to voters (Kalsnes 2016: 1-2). As Ernst, Engesser and Esser (2017: 253) note: “Social media have changed politics. The days of politicians being almost entirely dependent on professional journalists to distribute their messages to the wider public are over” (Ernst and Engesser and Esser 2017: 253).

Lilleker, Tenscher and Štětka (2015: 762) suggest that Facebook is perceived as a catch- all medium that became a feature of campaigning. As authors claim according to their research (self-reporting questionnaires filled by employees), Facebook was labeled as more important for strategists in “transformatory systems” which are fragile and fragmented. Therefore, authors hypothesize that Facebook could be used for building awareness and target voters in systems with low partisan loyalty (Lilleker and Tenscher and Štětka 2015: 762).

As researchers write: “Party strategists in younger democracies seem to see Facebook as more important (possibly due to higher personalization in weak party systems and the lack of tradition within parties permits greater innovation)” (Lilleker and Tenscher and Štětka 2015: 761).

Electoral campaigns integrate both traditional (for instance television or newspapers) and social media to mobilize voters or to collect behavioral and demographic data about their supporters. The data gathered enables the campaign to target different groups online. What is of importance here is that social media and online tools in general provide a direct access to the public (and public can share, respond or create own content), while this direct access provide a chance to bypass traditional media and journalist as gatekeepers (Chadwick and Dennis and Smith 2016: 9-11).

As was mentioned above, populist actors request directed and unmediated access to the peoples’ problems and complaints (Kriesi 2014: 363). Gerbaudo (2015: 70-71) named the product of populist adaptation of social media “Populism 2.0”. Although, it needs to be mentioned that the author understands populism as a neutral term rather than pejorative, pointing out to some of its positive effects (Gerbaudo 2015: 70-71).

“Contemporary social media activism comes to reflect some rhetorical features traditionally associated with populism, but updated in a way that fits the dynamics proper to the communicative architecture of Web 2.0, with its valuing of interactivity and participation. In this context, traditional features of populism (appeal to unity, anti- establishment and anti-institutional rhetoric, strive for direct democracy, suspicion of intermediaries) come to be matched with a set of tropes that make up what we could call the ‘ideology of social media’ (interactivity, openness, directness). Emerging movements and parties in the popular wave utilise these social media features as means to appeal to a highly diversified yet homogeneous mass of Internet users and to address the ideal subject of the ‘generic Internet user’ to be mobilised against economic and political elites” (Gerbaudo 2015: 68).

As Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017: 1280) argue, “(…) there has been relatively little research on populism on the Internet” (Engesser and Fawzi and Larsson 2017: 1280). Studies dedicated to the interplay of populism and social media are mentioned in the chapter Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors

Authors introduce a heuristic model of populism as a thin-ideology with its core elements almost identical to the features in model by Wirth et al. (2016) used in the thesis. The difference is the explicit positioning of “others” in the model, while this element is not included in model by Wirth et al. (2016) (Engesser and Fawzi and Larsson 2017: 1281; Wirth et al. 2016: 47).

“The model is based on the idea of a struggle over political sovereignty. The people is regarded as the ultimate sovereign but the elite is assumed to betray the people and to deprive it of its legitimate right to exercise power. The populist actor pitches himself as a challenger of the elites and as an advocate of the people. S/he aims at wrenching the sovereignty from the elites and at restoring it to the people. The elite is also assumed to engage in a complicity with ‘the others’ and to favor them over the people. ‘The others’ supposedly rival the people and illegitimately attempt to seize sovereignty but the populist actor aims at excluding ‘the others’ from society” (Engesser and Fawzi and Larsson 2017: 1281-1282).

Figure 2: Heuristic model as introduced by Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017). Source: Engesser and Fawzi and Larsson (2017: 1281)

Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017: 1282-1283) reason in the similar manner as Wirth et al. (2016), meaning that “the people”, popular sovereignty and the “antagonism between the

26 people and the elites” are the most important elements for populism (Engesser and Fawzi and Larsson 2017: 1282-1283). Moreover, scholars show how populist logic manifests itself through online opportunities. This information can be found below in the Table 3.

Table 3: The interaction between populist communication logic and online opportunity structures. Source: Engesser and Fawzi and Larsson (2017: 1282)

To conclude, Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017: 1286) suggest that “(…) populist communication logic and online opportunity structures go hand in hand in various regards.” According to them, popular sovereignty is well-suited to be manifested on the Internet, especially because the Internet itself is regarded to possess “(…) the largest democratizing potential of all mass media.” The environment of the Internet is opened to non-elite actors (anyone can create content on the Internet) and the people can be addressed directly, without intermediaries (therefore people-centrism could be more convincing). Moreover, “simplification, emotionalization, and negativity” as a rhetoric tools of populist actors resonate well with the Internet logic, together with targeting and mobilizing the masses of Internet-users. “Finally, the Internet provides populist leaders with personalized communication channels that allow them to exert their charisma and suggestive power” (Engesser and Fawzi and Larsson 2017: 1286).

Bartlett (2014: 93-94) argues that populist actors are keen on social media because social media fits their message and they are non-hierarchical and democratic. Moreover, they represent a substitution to the mainstream media which are strongly distrusted by populists and their supporters, who perceive them as tools of control used by the elites. “Instead, the content is generated by us – the honest, hardworking, ordinary citizens, exactly the people who the populists are defending” (Bartlett 2014: 93-94).

To summarize, social media represent a suitable and potentially powerful instrument for delivering populist messages especially because of their direct and unmediated access to the

27 people with an opportunity to bypass traditional gatekeepers. Secondly, social media offer personalization possibilities which fits the populist rhetoric and thirdly, they offer the opportunity to target specific groups of voters online (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1350-1351).

5) Previous research

This section is separated into two parts, while the first focuses on the research of populism in Czech Republic and the second introduces findings from international research focusing on the interplay of social media and populism.

Research on populism in the Czech Republic

As Císař and Štětka (2017: 285) note, the term populism was not systematically applied or examined in Czech party system before the Parliamentary elections 2010 (with few exceptions), because populism was not a prominent element of Czech politics, meaning mostly political parties at the periphery of political spectrum used the populist rhetoric. Compared to other Central and East European democracies, Czechia had one of the most stable and relatively closed party systems and it was characterized by almost exclusive unidimensional competition (Hanley 2012: 119; Havlík and Voda 2016a: 119).

As far as parliamentary elections since 2010 are concerned, the results of the parliamentary elections in 2010 and mainly 2013 undermined the stability of Czech party system by success of new and anti-establishment political parties (Havlík and Voda 2016a: 119). The elections in 2017 were not an exception. Regarding Okamura’s parties Dawn and currently SPD, Dawn ended up with 6.88 % of the votes in 2013 Parliamentary elections and SPD received 10.64 % of national vote (Volby.cz 2017a; Volby.cz 2017b).

Havlík and Voda (2016b: 3) note that political parties lacking ideological foundation and using populist appeals emerged in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of 1990s. Pop- Eleches (2010: 231) defines these new parties as centrist-populist parties and characterizes them as not adopting radical ideology, although substituting it with anti-political appeal.

According to Havlík and Voda (2016a: 124; 2016b: 4), VV, ANO 2011 and Dawn can be characterized as centrist-populist parties and they “crafted their campaigns around populist rhetoric with a strong antiestablishment appeal” (Havlík and Voda 2016a: 124; Havlík and Voda 2016b: 4).

Pop-Eleches (2010: 231) writes:

“The vague electoral appeal of new/centrist-populist parties goes hand-in-hand with the strong presence of their prominent leaders who create the parties as vehicles for their personal political ambitions usually just prior to elections. Such parties are almost completely unencumbered by ideological constraints and are therefore free to tell the voters what they want to hear” (Pop- Eleches 2010: 231).

The research of populism in Czech Republic mostly focuses on ideology, programs and voters and “not all of it is explicitly framed as research on populism” (Císař and Štětka 2017: 286). Some of the studies that are relevant for the thesis would be listed below.

As was mentioned in the chapter The applied perspective, Kaniok and Havlík (2016: 24- 26) measure populism and Euroscepticism of four Czech parties including the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), ANO 2011, SSO and Dawn through press releases with the usage of hand-coding with n = 84. The selected time-frame was six months in 2014 before the elections to European Parliament (Kaniok and Havlík 2016: 24-26). Regarding results of Okamura’s former party Dawn, it scored 0.43 (mean on a scale 0-3 with 3 being the most populist) (Kaniok and Havlík 2016: 29). Although, both populism and Euroscepticism were measured (Kaniok and Havlík 2016: 24-26).

Štětka and Vochocová (2014: 1361-1367) investigated the usage of Facebook by 13 Czech political parties during 2013 Parliamentary elections. Authors applied content analysis to the time-period of three weeks and measured the number of Facebook posts by parties, the number of comments and replies together with overall likes, shares and “talking about.” Authors hand-coded limited sample of comments in order to answer the question regarding whether the contributors supporting some party will outnumber the ones that criticize it (on a specific party’s Facebook page) (Štětka and Vochocová 2014: 1361-1367).

The researchers’ ranked the Okamura’s party Dawn as the fourth most interactive by the metric of total comments on page. Moreover, the supporters’ reactions when discussing the party on the party’s page were mostly positive (78.6 % of 644 comments), while 71.1 % of comments regarding another party were negative (with 194 comments in total) (Štětka and Vochocová 2014: 1370-1371). As authors suggest, this could be due to alleged deletion of negative comments as a way of moderating the debate by page owners (Štětka and Vochocová 2014: 1372).

Havlík and Voda (2016b: 1-15) focused on the supporters of Czech centrist-populist parties (VV, ANO 2011 and Dawn) together with the effect of value voting and socio- demographic characteristics of their voters. Regarding the supporters of Okamura’s former Dawn, authors state that the voters that depicted corruption as a primary issue were more likely to vote for Dawn than for the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) (which was a reference category), while this was not the case for voters of VV or ANO 2011 (Havlík and Voda 2016b: 19).

Interestingly, younger voters were more likely to vote for these parties. Authors suggest that this could be explained by “young people’s generally lower levels of party identification and/or the tendency to be attracted by simplified populist promises” (Havlík and Voda 2016b: 17). This is in line with cross-national findings by Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler (2011: 17-19), who investigated responses from almost ten thousand Facebook supporters of European populist parties through an online survey. Authors claim that online supporters of populist parties or movements were primarily young men, while on average 63 % of them were under 30 and 75 % were male. Moreover, younger supporters were more likely to depict immigration as a reason for joining populist parties or movements compared to the older supporters (Bartlett and Birdwell and Littler 2011: 17-19).

Regarding Okamura and populist communication, some bachelor or master’s theses dedicated to this issue were written in Czech, for instance Michalová (2017), Čížek (2017), Pechová (2017), Pochopová (2017), Paleček (2017), Křtínová (2017), Vránková (2015) and Janáková (2014). According to the aim and methodology of the thesis, the two latter master’s theses are similar in the logic of the first half of the analytical part of the current study. Although, both Vránková (2015: 27-33) and Janáková (2014: 41-49) depicts the whole document as a unit of analysis compared to the thesis that treats one sentence as a unit (would be defined in the chapter Methodology). Both theses also applied different conceptualizations (compared to the thesis) and therefore the identification of populist elements (Vránková 2015: 27-33; Janáková 2014: 41-49). Furthermore, none of the bachelor’s or master’s theses mentioned above utilized automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis as the thesis would in the second part of the analytical chapter.

Regarding the research on populist actors as communicators, Císař and Štětka (2017: 290) conclude that: “The question whether there is a specific or unique style of communication among Czech political actors that can be defined as populist therefore still waits to be properly answered empirically” (Císař and Štětka 2017: 290).

Based on what was mentioned in this chapter, the studies relevant to the thesis’s objective mostly studied either official party documents, voters or were comparing more political actors. To the author’s knowledge, none of the researches focused exclusively on identifying Okamura’s populism in his Facebook communication together with utilizing the methods of automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis with the time-frame covering the campaign corresponding to the election year 2017.

Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages

Current literature includes studies that focused on the usage of social media by politicians, but not as many investigated the populist usage of Facebook and Twitter (Engesser et al. 2017: 1110). This part of the thesis reviews the current state of research regarding exclusively the social media and populism. Research of this kind will be further separated based on whether it uses hand-coding or automated quantitative methods.

Studies that applied hand-coding

Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology

Engesser et al. (2017: 1109-1114) investigated the usage of Facebook and Twitter by politicians from four western countries, which were selected because in each national party system exist a populist one (Freedom Party of Austria, Swiss People’s Party, the Five Star Movement and the UK Independence Party). The sample included mainstream social democrat and conservative parties from each state as a control group (Engesser et al. 2017: 1109-1114).

The sample of typical posts from official Facebook and Twitter pages of leaders and members of the parties were investigated using qualitative text analysis. The analysis consisted of assigning a social media post to one of predefined categories, while the selected period was six months. Authors perceive the populism itself from the perspective of a thin ideology. The categories they used were derived from the definition of populism by Albertazzi and McDonnell combined with Taggart (both are mentioned in the chapters Conceptual overview and The applied perspective). Therefore, authors defined five key elements of populism that corresponded to their categories (“popular sovereignty, pure people, corrupt elite, dangerous

31 others” and “the glorification of the heartland”), while they claim that the politician that uses all defined elements is a populist actor (Engesser et al. 2017: 1111-1114).

The implementation of hand coding allowed the researchers to further distinguish other concepts within their categories. Their results suggest that the category popular sovereignty had two dimensions – either the speaker emphasized the sovereignty of the people or presented himself or herself as an advocate for the people. The elites that were attacked were either political, economic, legal, supranational or media. The element of ostracization of others could be explicit or implicit, which is also applicable to the category of heartland. Scholars also included the category of posts mentioning both people and the elite (Engesser et al. 2017: 1114- 1121).

Their findings suggest that all predefined key elements of populism appeared across countries, mostly in the posts from alleged populist leaders, although the populist statements also appeared in the posts of mainstream political actors. Besides, the most important finding was that the populism in the social media posts was used in a “fragmented form”, meaning that populistic elements were either isolated or clustered (Engesser et al. 2017: 1121-1123).

Extreme parties and populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries

Ernst et al. (2017a: 1347-1353) in their cross-national study compared the usage of populist communication strategies on social media by various right-wing, center and left-wing politicians from six countries (Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom, United States of America, Italy and France).

Compared to the previous study, this research represents an effort to broaden the scope and to examine more political actors (also alleged populists and non-populists) from various Western democracies and to differentiate between populist strategies used while both Facebook and Twitter were examined (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1348). Authors again draw on a populism as a thin ideology, although they suggest three core concepts of populism and nine political strategies that could be derived from them, as defined by Wirth (could be found in the chapter The applied perspective). The elements and the respective populist strategies exactly correspond to the ones suggested by Wirth (defined in chapter The applied perspective) (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1348-1349).

The sample consisted of politicians from five parties per each country (across the left- right political spectrum) and the investigated time-period was three months. The sample was

32 randomized and the final sample consisted of n = 845 Facebook posts and n = 555 Twitter posts written by 88 politicians (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1353-1354).

The aim of the study was to test whether extreme or opposition parties used more populist communication than moderate or governing parties and which social media platform was used more for populist communication. A semi-automated content analysis was conducted, specifically the authors qualitatively assigned one of nine categories for each post and conducted Analysis of Covariance and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1351-1357).

Researchers’ findings suggest that 10.6 % of all examined social media posts contained at least one populist communication strategy, while the most frequent ones were blaming the elite, discrediting the elite and characterizing a monolithic people. Moreover, politicians that belong to extreme parties used populist communication in social media posts more frequently than the moderate ones. The same applies to politicians from opposition parties compared to the ones that form a coalition. Furthermore, Facebook as a social media platform contained higher extent of posts containing populist communication than Twitter (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1355-1357).

Bipolar Populism? The Use of Anti-Elitism and People-Centrism by Swiss Parties on Social Media

Ernst, Engesser and Esser (2017: 253-254) conducted another cross-national study in a similar manner as the one mentioned above. They investigated social media posts created by 77 politicians from five Western countries with the emphasis on Switzerland. The examined period was three months and again, various parties from left-right political spectrum were selected (Ernst and Engesser and Esser 2017: 253-254). As in their previous study, scholars view the populism through the scope of a thin-ideology, while they again use Wirth’s conceptualization of its three core dimensions and nine populist communication strategies (Ernst and Engesser and Esser 2017: 254-255).

Although, the current study focuses on two dimensions - people-centrism and anti-elitism on both Facebook and Twitter. The descriptive statistics revealed the similar finding as in the previous study, meaning 11 % of all examined statements included at least one populist message, while the mostly used elements were anti-elitism (six percent) and people-centrism (counting for five percent) with the sovereignty hardly used (below one percent). An OLS

33 regression together with quadratic OLS regression were applied revealing that parties on the periphery used more populist communication than the moderate ones (Ernst and Engesser and Esser 2017: 254-256). Moreover, authors argue that: “The farther right a party is located on the political spectrum, the more it uses anti-elitist messages in its social media communication” (Ernst and Engesser and Esser 2017: 256).

Populist communication by digital means: presidential Twitter in Latin America

Waisbord and Amado (2017: 1330-1334) compared the usage of Twitter by allegedly populist and non-populist presidents in Latin America to test whether the former use the platform to interact with citizens. Authors perceive populism from the perspective of a distinctive style of political communication with three characteristic elements: “top-down, leader-centered communication, antagonistic discourse against critics (including journalists and the media) and fixation with news coverage” (Waisbord and Amado 2017: 1331).

Researchers studied interactivity (between the president and his followers) of four populist presidents and four non-populist ones for the period of four years. Moreover, scholars obtained 3200 Twitter posts in the period 2016-2017 from three populist presidents and three non-populist ones. A content analysis using hand-coding was conducted, while the posts were placed into one of three categories corresponding to the authors’ definition of populism mentioned above (Waisbord and Amado 2017: 1334).

Authors argue that all presidents used Twitter in a one-way communication logic to instantly inform his or her followers and not as a tool for interaction with citizens, while this applied both to populist and non-populist presidents. Interestingly, according to daily tweets, populist actors were more active on the platform compared to non-populist presidents. The content analysis revealed that populist presidents’ tweets contained more antagonistic discourse and criticism of the press (on average) than non-populist actors. According to the scholars, Twitter does not represent an interactive change for presidents in general, although it serves as a part of presidential media apparatus for the populist actors. They use it in a traditional way to set the news agenda and criticize media, organizations and individuals. Populists communication on Twitter resembles representation rather than communication and they use it to boost their own opinion (Waisbord and Amado 2017: 1334-1343).

Shifting the blame. Populist politicians’ use of Twitter as a tool of opposition

Van Kessel and Castelein (2016: 600) analyzed the tweets of two alleged populist politicians in Netherlands, namely Geert Wilders (Party for Freedom) and Emile Roemer (Socialist Party), while they focused on the target of their blames. Authors did not explicitly specify on which perspective on populism they are drawing on (Van Kessel and Castelein 2016: 596-598).

The selected period was approximately three and a half years and social media posts that focused blamed on elites were hand-coded with the aim to specify who exactly was criticized and what for (Van Kessel and Castelein 2016: 600-602).

Scholars’ findings suggest that 41.2% of Wilder’s tweets (n = 660) and 36.9% of Roemer’s tweets (n = 445) had adversarial character. Both Wilders and Roemer mostly criticized domestic political actors. The second most attacked elite by Wilders was the EU, while Roemer focused his criticism on unspecified others. The issues that were present in those adversarial tweets had mostly social, economic or financial background. The second most mentioned issue in Wilder’s attacking tweets was European integration, while Roemer’s was other or idiosyncratic, meaning that Roemer was in both instances less critical to the EU Authors suggested that populists change the targets of their criticism and tend to be selective when criticizing. The analysis confirmed author’s hypothesis that that the elites attacked the most would be incumbent domestic parties (Van Kessel and Castelein 2016: 600-611).

Studies that applied automated quantitative methods

Double differentiation in a cross-national comparison of populist political movements and online media uses in the United States and the Netherlands

Groshek and Engelbert (2013: 183-190) examined online self-representation of two alleged populist parties (Tea Party Patriots - TPP and Party for Freedom - PVV) and their leaders (Sarah Palin and Geert Wilders) from the USA and Netherlands. The study adopted the definition of populism by Albertazzi and McDonnell (could be found in the chapter The applied perspective), while focusing on parties’ strategies of “double differentiation”, which means that populist actors distance themselves from the established political system and extremists movements, while they still operate and want to gain influence within the political system itself (Groshek and Engelbert 2013: 184-186).

Data were collected from both parties’ official websites together with two Twitter accounts of the leaders. The time-period examined was approximately two years and the dataset consisted of 83 documents with 190 399 words. Researchers quantitatively investigated the occurrences and frequencies of words, for instance the most frequent words, the frequency of names of party leaders, the co-occurrence of words associated with the party leaders and pairs of words or phrases that appear together within certain clusters (Groshek and Engelbert 2013: 190-195).

One of researchers’ finding was that Wilders precedes his party, meaning he sets the agenda of his party, while Palin was less visible and her party precedes her role as an unofficial leader. Moreover, both Palin and Wilders used Twitter from the role of a commentator, affiliating themselves with the outsiders and opposition (Groshek and Engelbert 2013: 191- 198). Scholars state that: “As identified here, a process of double differentiation was apparent by uniquely applied anti-establishment-from-within-the-establishment presentation techniques by both Palin and Wilders. From these symbolic and official leaders, adversary characterizations were similarly manifest across the distinct issues of the TPP and the PVV” (Groshek and Engelbert 2013: 199).

When populists become popular: comparing Facebook use by the right-wing movement Pegida and German political parties

Stier et al. (2017: 1365-1366) compared the social media communication of German right-wing populist movement Pegida with German mainstream parties. Scholars were interested in whether the audience of the subjects overlapped, what topics they discussed and whether these were similar (Stier et al. 2017: 1365-1366).

The posts were retrieved from official Facebook accounts, affiliated local branches accounts and affiliated politicians. Parties or movements selected included Pegida, Alternative for Germany (AfD) and six other mainstream parties. Moreover, scholars mined the likes and comments on these posts. The time-frame selected was approximately a year and a half (Stier et al. 2017: 1371).

The quantitative analysis proceeded in two steps. The first was user behavior analysis, where authors investigated the overlap of users that liked or commented on some Pegida Facebook post at least once and compared those users to the fans of other parties. The second

36 step was to conduct text analysis revealing the content of social media statements posted by the parties through the usage of latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Stier et al. 2017: 1372).

As expected, scholars’ findings revealed that the biggest overlap in users was between Pegida and AfD (33% of unique users that liked content on Pegida page liked also some posts by AfD). To asses which topics could be labeled as populistic, authors draw on the three criteria of populist communication as defined by Reinemann et al. (could be found in the chapter Conceptual overview). The analysis revealed that Pegida and AfD addressed similar topics. Afterwards, the average populism rating per topic was created, while the most populist were Media bias, Border policy/controls and Political extremism. The populism rating was used to calculate topic salience through time. The findings revealed that the two biggest governing parties, Christian Democratic Union of Germany and The Social Democratic Party of Germany marginalized topics that were used by populists (such as refugee crisis), while there was volatility between the topics of Pegida and AfD (Stier et al. 2017: 1372-1380).

“The AfD increasingly discusses EU – Referenda focusing on the Brexit and referenda in other European countries. Pegida has clearly stressed the topics Crime and Sexual assaults since the New Years’ Eve 2015/2016” (Stier et al. 2017: 1380).

Based on reviewing the current literature regarding populism and social media, the most suitable approach for answering the research questions regarding the nature of populism and identifying the topics would be to investigate the populism itself through hand-coded quantitative content analysis and to examine the topics through automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis.

6) Methodology

This chapter presents the methodology of the thesis. The chapter is divided into sections regarding research objective, methods (both regarding hand coded and automated content analyses), data and the investigated time frame and coding rules regarding hand-coded quantitative content analysis.

Research objective

As is apparent from the theoretical part, the thesis aims toward investigating the social media communication of Tomio Okamura, the leader of the alleged Czech populist party

Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). Generally, the thesis focuses on investigating whether the Okamura’s communication can be regarded as populist and how much and which words and topics appeared in this communication and how popular they were during the election year.

Although, with regards to the complexity of this goal, two types of quantitative content analysis would be conducted. The first analytical part – hand-coded quantitative content analysis would investigate the amount and the dimensions of populism identified in sample of the leader’s Facebook posts using the nine populist communication strategies as defined by Wirth et al. (2016) as guidelines for the practical application. Moreover, hand-coded quantitative content analysis would provide the answers to the questions what type of elite was criticized in the populist and conflictive posts and what is the proportion of original and re-used sentences in Okamura’s Facebook posts.

The second analytical part – automated computer-assisted content analysis would provide information about the most occurring words in Okamura’s social media communication on Facebook, what type of posts were shared, what topics occurs in the Okamura’s Facebook posts, which of them were most frequently and which of them appear in the most liked, commented and shared posts by Okamura’s fans. The selected topics’ prevalence in time would be presented.

The research has a descriptive character and the research questions would be outlined below.

Research questions for the hand-coded quantitative content analysis using a sample of Okamura’s Facebook posts: o What is the proportion of populist and non-populist sentences in Okamura’s Facebook posts? o Which populist dimension was used the most? o What type of elite was criticized in the populist and conflictive sentences? o What is the proportion of original and re-used sentences in Okamura’s posts?

Research questions for the automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis using Okamura’s Facebook posts from entire selected period: o Which words occurred the most in Okamura’s Facebook posts? o What type of posts Okamura shared the most?

38 o Which topics can be identified in Okamura’s Facebook posts? o Which topics Okamura used most frequently? o Which of these topics appeared in the most shared, liked and commented Okamura’s Facebook posts? o How the usage of selected topics used by Okamura changed throughout the election year 2017?

Methods

This section is further separated into two parts regarding two types of quantitative content analysis. For instance, Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2014: 19) define quantitative content analysis as follows:

“Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption” (Riffe and Lacy and Fico 2014: 19).

Method regarding hand-coded quantitative content analysis

For the purpose of measuring the amount of populism in Okamura’s Facebook posts, the model of populism as a thin-ideology by Wirth et al. (2016) would be applied (Figure 1). The authors provide an applicable model with operationalized nine populist political communication strategies (Table 1). As scholars themselves claim, their integrative framework is suitable for quantitative measurement and examination of populism in the media (Wirth et al. 2016: 53).

Moreover, populism conceptualized as a thin-ideology is prevalent in most of the studies mentioned in the section Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages (for instance Engesser et al. 2017; Groshek and Engelbert 2013; Ernst et al. 2017a; Ernst, Engesser and Esser 2017), while Ernst et al. (2017a) and Ernst, Engesser and Esser (2017) use specially the model introduced by Wirth et al. (2016) with hand-coded quantitative categories.

The hand-coded quantitative content analysis could be regarded as the most suitable method for answering the first four research questions based on various reasons.

For instance, if automated quantitative analysis (which is used in the second analytical part of the thesis, although not to answer questions regarding populism itself) would be applied to measure populism in communication, there could be a problem when people-centrism as a dimension of populism would be referenced implicitly (Reinemann et al. 2017: 16-17).

For example, Pauwels (2011: 103-105) in his study regarding populism applies unsupervised method of quantitative content analysis, specifically dictionary method. The author a priori designed a codebook assigning keywords to populist dimensions, therefore he counted the appearance of the pre-defined words in internal and external party literature (manifestos and magazines) (Pauwels 2011: 103-105). Author regarded words such as “the people”, “the elite”, “establishment”, “corruption”, “arrogant”, “promise”, “truth” etc. as an indication of populism (Pauwels 2011: 104-105). In another study with a similar design Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011: 1275) abandoned the whole dimension of people-centrism. Their reasoning is as follows: “Yet not every mention of the words ‘our’ or ‘we’ is a reference to the people. Often, these words refer to the political party instead of the people (e.g. ‘we [the party] propose our plans in the next chapter’). We therefore decided to focus only on words that refer to anti-elitism” (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011: 1275).

This demonstrates that scholars realized that the dictionary method as used by Pauwels (2011) counted the occurrence of the word “we” as a populist trait, although it could refer to the political party. This approached is critized by Engesser et al. (2017: 1110-1122) and Reinemann et al. (2017: 17), while the latter emphasizes the importance of the difference between “the people” as a specific segment that populists apply to, or “the people” as citizens of the specific state (the whole population).

Engesser et al. (2017: 1122) mentioned a similar problem, the latent meanings contained in populist communication: “Besides, we showed that advocacy for the people is more than the mere mentioning of the word ‘people’ as suggested by previous studies. It typically implies the populist actor perceiving himself as a true representative of the people. Sometimes the ‘people’ are speciﬁed further with additional attributes or replaced by the name of the associated country” (Engesser et al. 2017: 1122).

Furthermore, even though Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011: 1275) focused only on the dimension of anti-elitism (instead of counting also references to “the people” as in Pauwels

2011), they can easily label opportunistic actors (or for instance, actors that criticize corruption in government) as populists.

To conclude, a hand-coding perspective is more suitable for the identification of populism manifested through nine populist communication strategies (as defined by Wirth et al. 2016), because the human assessment of the sentences in social media posts would be able to identify any latent meanings and context.

Regarding the application of content analysis, Weber (1990: 12) writes: “A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the text are classified into much fewer content categories. Each category may consist of one, several, or many words. Words, phrases, or other units of text classified in the same category are presumed to have similar meanings” (Weber 1990: 12).

Based on what is mentioned above, the hand-coded quantitative content analysis would consist of assigning pre-defined categories (according to codebook presented below) to the units of analysis (which is also defined below).

The codebook of categories would be a codebook used by Ernst et al. (2017a) in their study Extreme parties and populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries (can be found in the section Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages). The authors applied the nine populist communication strategies as defined by Wirth et al. (2016) that correspond to their categories. Moreover, scholars added examples of their usage (named categories, although the thesis uses the populist strategy as a category) (Ernst et al. 2017b: 1).

Table 4: The codebook for hand-coded quantitative content analysis. Source: Ernst et al. (2017b): 1

Based on reviewing similar researches in the section Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages, the unit of analysis would be one sentence, which is similar to the “statement” as a unit of analysis in Ernst et al. (2017a) and Ernst, Engesser and Esser (2017) (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1354; Ernst and Engesser and Esser 2017: 254). As Weber (1990: 22) suggests: “An entire sentence is often the recording unit when the investigator is interested in words or phrases that occur closely together” (Weber 1990: 22).

The examined time frame and the type of sampling method would be presented in the section The data and the time frame.

Regarding the exclusivity of the categories, one sentence from social media post can contain more populist communication strategies. Therefore, the decision whether the categories should be mutually exclusive or overlapping needs to be made. Weber (1990: 23) notes that categories should be exclusive when the statistical assumption of independence is demanded, meaning when statistical analysis applied needs the independence of data to yield accurate results (for instance regressions, analysis of variance or factor analysis). The thesis does not apply any such analysis that would need the independence of the data, although for practical reasons the categories are regarded as mutually exclusive.

Therefore, one sentence can be assigned only to one category ranging from 0 (a sentence without any populist strategy) to 9 (categories 1 to 9 correspond to nine populist strategies as defined by Wirth et al. (2016) and applied by Ernst et al. (2017a) and Ernst, Engesser and Esser

(2017). The details regarding the coding scheme and detailed rules would be cleared in the section Coding rules regarding hand-coded quantitative content analysis with examples.

Although, when the categories are regarded as mutually exclusive and a sentence consists of more populist strategies, the decision on how to categorize this sentence needs to be made. Weber (1990) concludes: “Logical exclusiveness is a precarious precondition of all classification for subsequent statistical analysis. Therefore, in the Lasswell dictionary, if an entry can be classified under more than one category it is classified in the category that seems most appropriate most of the time for most texts” (Weber 1990: 34).

When facing the problem regarding more populist strategies in one sentence, the solution mentioned above which consists of placing the sentence in the social media post in the category that seems “most appropriate” is very subjective. Thefore, the thesis assigns the sentence to its respective category based on the first identified populist strategy in the sentence.

The reliability of the results should be tested. Although, based on the fact that the research is a master’s thesis that lacks human resources, meaning more coders than the author of the thesis, the inter-coder reliability test would not be conducted. However, a small pilot test would be provided.

Method regarding automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis

In order to answer the second set of questions regarding the frequent words, type of posts and topics in Okamura’s Facebook posts, an automated quantitative content analysis would be applied. Specifically, the thesis would use a topic model. “Topic models are algorithms for discovering the main themes that pervade a large and otherwise unstructured collection of documents. Topic models can organize the collection according to the discovered themes” (Blei 2012: 77).

To begin, a definition of a topic and a word needs to be handled. „Statistically, a topic is a probability mass function over words. For a topic k (k =1, …, K) we represent this probability distribution over words with an M x 1 vector θk where θmk describes the probability the k-th topic uses the m-th word. Substantively, topics are distinct concepts” (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 17).

The topics and words could be understood as follows: “For example, the genetics topic has words about genetics with high probability and the evolutionary biology topic has words

43 about evolutionary biology with high probability. We assume that these topics are speciﬁed before any data has been generated” (Blei 2012: 78).

Therefore, for instance topics that focus the attention to America’s presence in Afghanistan, words like troop, war, Taliban or Afghanistan would have a high probability to being attached to this topic. Furthermore, health-care topic would use words such as insurance, health, care or reform. The co-occurrence of words across corpus (made of documents) is used to estimate the topics (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 17).

The unit of analysis would be one Facebook post and the population of these posts would be referred to as a corpus (Grimmer, Steward 2003: 6).

To decide about which topic model to apply, the research objective needs to be considered. For instance, Stier et al. (2017) in their study When populists become popular: comparing Facebook use by the right-wing movement Pegida and German political parties (can be found in the section Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages) apply latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) as a topic model for investigating the topics prevalent in Facebook posts. LDA was used because it allows the Facebook posts to consist of more than one topic (Stier et al. 2017: 1372).

LDA is a mixed-membership model, which is why the method is suitable for examining social media posts. The method does not assign each document with one topic, but each document can have multiple topics. As a result, LDA can be used to different kinds of data, including data from social networks (Blei 2012: 83).

LDA could be in detail defined as:

“(…) a generative probabilistic model for collections of discrete data such as text corpora. LDA is a three-level hierarchical Bayesian model, in which each item of a collection is modeled as a ﬁnite mixture over an underlying set of topics. Each topic is, in turn, modeled as an inﬁnite mixture over an underlying set of topic probabilities. In the context of text modeling, the topic probabilities provide an explicit representation of a document” (Blei and Ng and Jordan 2003: 993).

Figure 3 below shows where LDA stands as a method compared to other automated text analysis methods.

Figure 3: Methods for text analysis. Source: Grimmer and Steward (2013): 2

LDA is one of the group of probabilistic topic models. The term Dirichlet in its name points to the distribution, while the generative process results in allocating the words contained in documents to different topics. The latent aspect refers to the fact that the model aims towards revealing the hidden structure (Blei 2012: 78-79).

The LDA assumes the topics were created before the documents themselves and treat the documents as containing multiple topics. Although, even though the documents can be examined, the topic structure is hidden. Therefore, the documents are observed, but the topics are latent (the similar logic as in factor analysis – manifest variables are observed, but the factors are latent and derived from manifest variables). The LDA is specific in sharing the same set of topics for all documents, but the proportion of these topics for each document is different. The logic is as follows: each document has topics in different proportions. These topics (that are hidden and responsible for the content of documents) determine the words used in documents. To put simply: topics determine the distribution over words that exist for the whole collection (corpus of documents) (Blei 2012: 78-80).

As Blei (2012: 79) explains: “(…) the goal of topic modeling is to automatically discover the topics from a collection of documents. The documents themselves are observed, while the

45 topic structure—the topics, per-document topic distributions, and the per-document per-word topic assignments – is hidden structure” (Blei 2012: 79).

Technically, the functionality of the model could be simplified as follows:

As was mentioned earlier, LDA presupposes that each document (in our case Facebook post) consists of a mixture of different topics. The proportion of the document (i) that focuses on the topic (k), depicted together as πik, while the collection of proportions across topics are πi

= (πi1, πi2, … , πiK). Document’s proportions are calculated through a common Dirichlet prior -

πi ~ Dirichlet (α), where α represents the shape parameters of distribution. A document (post) contains Ni total words (j = 1, … , Ni), while words are depicted based on the distribution of topics within each document. The model assumes that each word is generated in two steps: 1) to draw the i-th documents topic τij (to obtain the j-th word) - τij ~ Multinomial (1, τi). 2) The specific word is drawn conditional on the assignment of topic – we depict a topic to which j-th word in the i-th document is assigned - Wij ~ Multinomial (1, θk) (Grimmer, Stewart 2013: 18).

What is of importance here is that the algorithms applied by the model do not have any information about the topics (that need to be interpreted by researcher from words that define a topic) (Blei 2012: 79).

One of the biggest advantages of using automated topic-model is that it does not require any input or labeling of documents (therefore the model is unsupervised) (Blei 2012: 78).

As Grimmer and Steward (2013: 15) note:

“Unsupervised learning methods are a class of methods that learn underlying features of text without explicitly imposing categories of interest. Rather than requiring users to condition on known categories beforehand—supervising the methods—unsupervised learning methods use modeling assumptions and properties of the texts to estimate a set of categories and simultaneously assign documents (or parts of documents) to those categories. Unsupervised methods are valuable because they can identify organizations of text that are theoretically useful, but perhaps understudied or previously unknown” (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 15).

The LDA makes three assumptions – the “bag of words” (the word order was discarded), the fact that the order of the documents does not matter and that the number of topics needs to be set beforehand (Blei 2012: 82-83; Grimmer and Stewart 2013: 6).

When performing the LDA, the posts would need to be cleaned and prepared for automate quantitative analysis. The text below represents a brief procedure, which would be discussed in detail in section Data cleaning and parsing.

Okamura’s Facebook posts would be tokenized (splitting the posts into tokens – unigrams) and the punctuation and capitalization would be removed (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 250-251).

Moreover, the stopwords would be deleted. Stopwords are frequent and common words with barely no substantive meaning, such as “and” (“a” in Czech), “but” (“ale” in Czech) etc. (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 251-252).

The most common words and the most uncommon words would be removed, the corpus would be lemmatized and the document term matrix would be created. Details regarding this procedure and the definition of document term matrix are presented in the section Data cleaning and parsing (Grimmer and Stewart 2013: 6-7; Ashnish and Avinash 2016: 19).

What is of importance is that the number of topics to be retrieved would need to be determined beforehand. The question regarding how many topics to retrieve would based on various diagnostics which are presented in the section Identyfing the number of topics.

For instance, Stier et al. (2017: 1374) retrieve 100 topics (that were reduced to 46). Although, the authors’ study compared more parties, therefore the number of cases was higher (Stier et al. 2017: 1374).

The data and the time frame

The data consists of social media posts published by the official Facebook account of Tomio Okamura, the leader of SPD. As Stier et al. (2017: 1370) argue, party manifestos “(…) do not necessarily reveal populist shifts in everyday political communication” (Stier at al. 2017: 1370).

Therefore, it would be reasonable to examine the posts on SPD’s official Facebook account (Svoboda a přímá demokracie Tomio Okamura – SPD, can be found here: https://www.facebook.com/hnutispd/?ref=br_rs). Although, as is evident from the name of the official account, the leader’s name is present in the official party’s account. Moreover, the party often shares the content of Okamura’s personal Facebook account, which could give the impression that the leader is in the center of the attention. Moreover, Tomio Okamura’s official

Facebook account (Tomio Okamura – SPD – can be found here: https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/?ref=br_rs) has 267 106 likes on Facebook (18. 03. 2018) compared to only 33 834 likes of the official party account (18. 03. 2018).

Kessel and Castelein (2016: 600) in their study (which can be found in the section Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages) also focused on the party leader Emile Roomer instead of his party’s account (Socialist party). One of the arguments for this decision was that “(…) many tweets refer directly to the tweets of party leader Roemer” (Kessel and Castelein 2016: 600).

Another argument for investigating the content of Okamura’s official account instead of the account of his party SPD is that SPD often shares Okamura’s content without any accompanying message (this argument is presented in more detail in the section Coding rules regarding hand-coded quantitative content analysis with examples).

Okamura’s posts were retrieved connecting to the Facebook Graph API through the R package Rfacebook created by Barbera et al. (2017). The data were retrieved ex-post on the 8th of February 2018 and would be processed with the open-source R software.

The examined time frame and the type of sampling method needs to be cleared. The thesis inspects the Okamura’s Facebook posts during the campaign, specifically during the election year 2017. Therefore, the time frame ranges since the first post on the first day of the year 2017 (01. 01. 2017, the first day of the year included) to the date of the Parliamentary elections 2017 (21. 10. 2017, the day of the elections included). This yields 570 Facebook posts, although one case needed to be deleted because it was a shared photograph without any accompanying text, so the final number of Okamura’s Facebook posts was reduced to 569 posts during the selected time-period.

What needs to be taken into account is that the hand-coded quantitative content analysis is more labor intensive in the sense of assessing each unit of analysis (in this case single sentence) by human judgement. Therefore, the hand-coded content analysis would use the sample of the data. This sample was set to 150 Facebook posts with the random sampling method. As Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2014: 93) write: “(…) probability samples are necessary if one hopes to use statistical inference” (Riffe and Lacy and Fico 2014: 93). Authors explain that: “Simple random sampling occurs when all units in the population have an equal chance of being selected” (Riffe and Lacy and Fico 2014: 80).

The fact that random sampling would be used offers the possibility to draw conclusions on the whole Okamura’s communication during the election year 2017.

The random sample consisting of 150 posts was drawn from the 569 Facebook posts created during the selected time-frame. This random sample was further deconstructed into sentences, which yields the dataset for hand-coded quantitative content analysis to n = 4003.

The fact that the automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis is automated allows the thesis to inspect the whole selected time-period. Therefore, all Okamura’s posts created during the election year (until the elections) would be examined with the one Facebook post as the unit of analysis. This yields the dataset for this content analysis to n = 569.

The data-frames selected follow the logic that hand-coding is more time-consuming and therefore less affordable, while automated content analysis allows the researcher to study the whole time-period.

Coding rules regarding hand-coded quantitative content analysis with examples

This section focuses coding rules and categories for hand-coded content analysis and presents them in detail. Moreover, the most typical examples of Okamura’s usage of these populist communication strategies (corresponding to categories) are outlined.

The nine populist strategies as defined by Wirth et al. (2016) and applied by Ernst et al. (2017a) and Ernst, Engesser and Esser (2017) were used as guidelines and practical application of three core dimensions of populism (Anti-Elitism, Restoring Sovereignty and People- centrism). Both studies can be found in the section Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages.

Although, when applied, the nine populist strategies proved to be similar to each other. Therefore, the proportions according to three core elements of populism that strategies belong to (three dimensions as mentioned above) woud be presented in the section General findings from hand-coded quantitative content analysis.

Moreover, the type of elite that was criticized when the strategy was conflictive was measured similarly as in Van Kessel and Castelein (2016) (the study can be found in the section Research investigating the social media communication of populist actors and their messages).

When the Okamura’s Facebook posts deconstructed to sentences were coded, the author realized that Okamura regularly attached the same sentences at the end of some posts (these

49 sentences included mobilizing information or hyperlinks to other Okamura’s accounts on different platforms). Therefore, the proportion of sentences that were repeatedly attached at the end of Okamura’s messages were measured.

The fact that Okamura’s account was examined instead of the party’s account has the advantage that the SPD official Facebook account often shares Okamura’s posts without any accompanying message (compared to Okamura’s own account). Moreover, even when Okamura’s post consists of a photograph or of a video, it is mostly either transcribed (the whole transcription of a video is written as a text in the post) or accompanied with a text explaining the context and the message.

As was mentioned in the section The data and the time frame, the dataset for both hand- coded quantitative and automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis consists of 569 posts for the election year 2017. The randomized sample of 150 Facebook posts was created and further decomposed into 4 003 sentences. The sentence was defined by being separated by a dot, a question mark or an exclamation mark. In some cases the sentence was separated by a comma or by the end of the shared hyperlink, because the following part started with a capital letter and logically constituted another sentence.

All sentences were kept as in original (and therefore coded) with the exception of sentences at the end of the Facebook post suggesting who took the photograph (in Czech: “Foto:…”) or who was responsible for the post (in Czech: “Zadavatel:…” or “Zhotovitel:…”). As mentioned above, the sentences with hyperlinks that contained information about the Okamura’s Twitter account or his website were kept and therefore assigned to categories, even though they were regularly copied at the end of the Facebook post. The information about the proportion of original and re-used content is presented in the section General findings from hand-coded quantitative content analysis.

The codebook from Table 4 as used by Ernst et al. (2017b) was used as a guideline. The authors apply the conceptualization of nine populist strategies as defined by Wirth et al. (2016) and provide examples of usage of these nine populist strategies. Their codebook was rearranged for the aim of keeping the order of strategies as in Wirth et al. (2016) with the goal of discriminating between conflictive and advocative strategies and was translated into Czech language. The Czech one can be found in the Attachments and the English codebook can be found below.

Table 5: The English codebook with categories corresponding to nine populist communication strategies with the examples of usage. Source: Ernst et al. (2017b): 1; Wirth et al. (2016): 52

The codebook was enhanced in order to apply to Czech context. For the guidance both Wirth et al. (2016) and Ernst et al. (2017a) were used. The specific coding rules with examples of usage by Okamura would be cleared here. Each category would be presented in detail.

The conflictive strategies are aimed towards the elite (categories 9, 8, 7 and 6). Although, the meaning of the elite needs to be cleared. Jagers and Walgrave (2007: 324) suggest:

“Elites can be political elites (parties, government, ministers, etc.), but also the media (media tycoons, journalists, etc.),the state (administration, civil service), intellectuals (universities, writers, professors) or economic powers (multinationals, employers, trade unions, capitalists). The more diffuse the anti-elitism – that is, directed against general and universal elite categories (e.g., all political parties) – the more fervent and radical it is” (Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 324).

As Ernst et al. (2017a) note, the elite can be “current government or mass media” in case of right-wing populism, which defines the people on an ethno-national principle. In case of left-wing populism, elites can be either economic or religious groups, while the people can be defined as a working class (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1348; Abts and Rummens 2007: 409).

This is in line with the definitions of elite by Wirth et al. (2016) (which can be found in the chapter The applied perspective).

Therefore, the elite in Okamura’s context meant either former government (parties ANO 2011, ČSSD and the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party - KDU-ČSL), Western countries, the EU, the European Commission, the European Parliament, legal authorities (for instance courts or police), Czech National Bank and the media (mostly Public service media - Czech Television – ČT or Czech Radio - ČR).

What is of importance here is that the elite needs to be meant in general, meaning when specific domestic party, named person on non-profit organization was criticized, the sentence was coded as not containing populist strategy. The only exception was when Okamura named all leaders of parties that formed a coalition, therefore the critics is aimed towards the whole government. Each sentence was evaluated in the context of the specific post. Some of the examples are provided below.

When more populist strategies were used in one sentence, the populist strategy used first defined the category to which the sentence belongs.

The translation of sentences and posts were perfomed so that the tone, meaning and form of the message were authentic. The stylistic shortages as in Czech original are kept (Okamura mostly uses long sentences with sometimes incorrect punctuation in direct speech).

Conflictive strategy towards the Elite – Anti-elitism - Discrediting the elite

When applied in practice, this populist strategy includes sentences in which the elite is called by names or with expressive adjectives (for instance lying, censored, manipulated, fake, crazy, the EU dictate etc.). Now sentences that use this communication strategy would be outlined.

Examples of sentences from Okamura’s posts that use this strategy: o “It is clear that without the immigration crisis unleashed by the crazy politics of EU the Europe would be far more secure.” (Czech original: “Je jasné, že bez imigrační krize, rozpoutané šílenou politikou EU, by Evropa byla daleko bezpečnější.”) o “I hope that after the Brexit and the election of Donald Trump this would be another clove to the coffin of Brussels elites.” (Okamura wrote how he wishes good luck to Marine Le Pen in French Presidential elections 2017 and Geert Wilders in Dutch General elections 2017 followed by this sentence) (Czech original: “Po Brexitu a volbě Donalda Trumpa to doufám bude další hřebíček do rakve stávajícím bruselským elitám.”) o “Do not believe the lying and manipulated media that are in hands of politicians and oligarchs.” (Czech original: “Nevěřte lživým a zmanipulovaným médiím, která jsou v rukou politiků a oligarchů.”)

Conflictive strategy towards the Elite – Anti-elitism - Blaming the Elite Besides the definition in codebook, in practice this populist strategy included depicting the elite as the actor that has made a mistake, put the people in the danger, disappointed the people, was a shame or simply failed. Sentences that mentioned a danger, although did not state the actor responsible for it and it could not be deduced from the context were coded as not containing the populist strategy. The sentences using this communication strategy would be outlined.

Examples of sentences from Okamura’s posts that use this strategy: o “The government is permanently admitting migrants from Islamic, Arabic and African countries to the Czech Republic the whole time of its mandate, so it threatens the safety of citizens and the social conciliation.” (Czech original: “Vláda po celou dobu svého působení přijímá natrvalo do České republiky migranty z islámských arabských a afrických zemí a ohrožuje tak bezpečnost občanů a sociální smír.”) o “During your governing the safety essentially worsened, so the soldiers and policemen walk on the streets with machineguns.” (Czech original: “Za vaší vlády se zásadně zhoršila bezpečnost, takže po ulicích chodí vojáci a policisté se samopaly.”)

Conflictive strategy towards the Elite – Anti-elitism - Excluding the Elite from the People

Compared to the previous communication strategy, this category depicts the elites as the ones not doing enough rather than depicting them as the ones that did a mistake. Furthermore, as addition to what is mentioned in the codebook, this strategy also included the elite as not having the will or ability to help the people, or the elite being submissive to supranational organizations. The category also includes the elite as not working on the daily basis or not being able to think critically. Moreover, it also involves the dichotomy typically used by populists – the separation between the elite and the people.

In addition, populists often use the depiction of “others” as the threat to the homogenous people. These others could be minorities, immigrants, people of another race or religion, etc. “Although excluded from the people, the others are also not part of the elite; yet, they are seen as unjustly favored by the elite or sometimes even as their partner in a conspiracy against the people” (Wirth et al. 2016: 12-13).

The inclusion of others in the definition of populism varies by different authors. Although, as Wirth et al. (2016: 13) claim, most of the authors on populism does not include the others as a core element of populism. This is in line with Mudde (2007: 64), who depicts the attacks on “the others” and their exclusion of the people for right-wing populism.

Based on carefully reviewing the literature, the thesis does not regard others as a core element of populism, therefore sentences only attacking “the others” (in Okamura’s posts these were mostly immigrants, minorities or unemployed) were coded as not using populist strategy. The special case included is when the dichotomy between “them” and “us” (mentioning “them” followed by “us”) was obvious and used in one sentence, these sentences were regared as using

54 this populist strategy and therefore fell in this category. This decision was based on Wirth et al. (2016: 49) elaboration of populist communication strategies.

Examples of sentences from Okamura’s posts that use this strategy: o “We also want material responsibility of judges and their time limited mandate because courts and enforceable justice is not working.” (Czech original: “Chceme také hmotnou odpovědnost soudců a jejich časově omezený mandát, jelikož soudy a vymahatelná spravedlnost nefunguje.”) o “The state has to stop supporting the parasitic way of life and ignore the interests of working families with children and pensioners.” (Czech original: “Stát musí přestat podporovat parazitický způsob života a ignorovat zájmy pracujících rodin s dětmi a penzistů.”) o “The government has completely stopped working.” (Okamura expressed the opinion that the government is following their own political interests instead of its’ citizens) (Czech original: “Vláda úplně přestala pracovat.”)

Conflictive strategy towards the Elite – Restoring sovereignty - Denying Power to the Elite

The elite is presented as obstructing the citizens’ demands and the populist wants to reclaim the power back to the people. When applied, this strategy included sentences claiming that the elite will not allow the citizens to decide about their own country or wants the power for themselves instead of giving it to the people.

Examples of sentences from Okamura’s posts that use this strategy: o “You just do not want to give citizens the opportunity to decide by themselves about their future in their country.” (Okamura points out to the alleged denial of government to hold the referendum about Czech Republic leaving the EU) (Czech original: “Vy prostě nechcete dát občanům možnost, aby sami rozhodli o své budoucnosti ve své zemi.”) o “It is a fraud on voters which has to ensure that it will be decided regardless on voters’ will.” (This sentence was used in the context of the alleged plans of the prime minister Sobotka to accelerate the process of the adoption of Euro, while Okamura points out to the alleged denying of referendums by government) (Czech original: “Jde o podvod na voliče, který má zajistit, aby bylo rozhodnuto nezávisle na vůli občanů.”) o “Not allowing the will of citizens is a part of the EU politics.” (Okamura wrote about Catalan independence referendum 2017 in Spain and connected it with the alleged denial of

Czech government not to vote on referendums) (Czech original: “Jde o součást politiky EU nepřipustit prosazení vůle občanů.”)

Advocative strategy for the people – Restoring sovereignty - Demanding Power for the People

This strategy in Okamura’s case involved advocating for the aspects of direct democracy, mostly introducing and proposing a referendum or calling for more direct elections or, simply, calling for more power to the people or invoking the direct democracy in general. Although, the proposal for material responsibility of politicians or the possible withdrawal of politicians by citizens was coded as not containing populist strategy.

Examples of sentences from Okamura’s posts that use this strategy: o “We in SPD promote the referendum on leaving the EU, so that the citizens themselves would decide about their future in their country.” (Czech original: “My v SPD prosazujeme referendum o vystoupení z EU, aby občané sami rozhodli o své budoucnosti ve své zemi.”) o “Dear ladies and gentlemen, finally, I would like to propose the discussion and adopting the law on national referendums again, for the fourteenth time in the current year.” (the sentence was part of the transcript of the video provided by Okamura) (Czech original: “Vážené dámy a pánové, dovoluji si opět navrhnout, jen letos již počtrnácté, abychom konečně projednali a přijali zákon o celostátním referendu.” o “We want the change of political system in the direction to direct democracy, we propose the law on referendums, the withdrawal and a direct personal, material responsibility and criminal liability of politicians.” (Czech original: “Chceme změnu politického systému směrem k přímé demokracii, prosazujeme zákon o referendu, odvolatelnost a přímou osobní, hmotnou a trestní odpovědnost politiků.”)

Advocative strategy for the people – People-Centrism - Stressing Virtues of the People

As Wirth et al. (2016: 49) suggest: “(…) the populist always regards the in-group representing the pure people as being right, and this group is therefore presented in an unambiguously favorable light. Positive attributes of the people may be mentioned to flatter the voters and reassure them of the superb reputation they enjoy with the populist actor” (Wirth et al. 2016: 49).

This strategy includes sentences that present the people as possesing positive attributes (as intelligence and competence etc.), therefore this category involved making remarks about the people in a bright light. Moreover, the populist could claim that the people do not possess any negative attributes.

This strategy was only used in three Okamura’s sentences.

Examples of sentences from Okamura’s posts that use this strategy: o “The movement SPD regards the irreproachable and decent citizen who legally possess a weapon to be the pillar of the state security and not a threat.” (Okamura interpreted the alleged rising number of applications for gun license as caused by government resigning on safety of the citizens in the context of the immigration policy) (Czech original: “Hnutí SPD považuje bezúhonného a řádného občana, který legálně drží zbraň, za pilíř bezpečnosti státu a nikoliv za hrozbu.”) o “Not speaking about the fact that citizens would not allow to pass such a mess like a law on church restitutions.” (In the context of the referendums in other states) (Czech original: “To nemluvím o tom, že občané by nikdy nedovolili schválit takové paskvily, jako byl zákon o církevních restitucích.”)

Advocative strategy for the people – People-Centrism - Praising Achievements of the People

This strategy involves sentences that regard the people as not responsible for the negative development. Populist could also regard people as beneficial to the society and making them responsible for positive development.

Current and former category are very similar, while this strategy was only used in one sentence.

Example of sentence from Okamura’s post that use this strategy: o “The first of them is that if the Supreme Court would comply with the complaint made by part of the senators and deputies, then the threat that companies which were completely against the constitution taken of their money would ask for compensation and the damage caused by dumbly written law would have to be paid by innocent citizens.” (Okamura wrote about how the government allegedly denied their demand for modifying the law on the opening hours of stores) (Czech original: “První z nich je, že pokud Ústavní soud vyhoví stížnosti,

57 kterou podala část senátorů a poslanců, tak je zcela reálná hrozba, že firmy, které zákon zcela protiústavně připravil o peníze, budou žádat po státu náhradu a škody napáchané hloupě napsaným zákonem budou muset platit nevinní občané.”)

Advocative strategy for the people – People-Centrism - Stating a Monolithic People

In practice, the people as a monolithic entity were defined in various ways. As Reinemann et al. (2017: 17) write: “Thus, when populists refer to ‘the people,’ they might explicitly address an in-group or evoke associations that implicitly define it” (Reinemann et al. 2017). The people can be defined either as the people as sovereign, people as class (common people) or people as nations or ethnic groups (Reinemann et al. 2017: 17-18; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 498- 503).

As Canovan (1999: 5) notes: “Merging with this stress on unity, though in some ways at odds with it, is the appeal to our people, often in the sense of our ethnic kith and kin” (Canovan 1999: 5). The author concludes: “(…) this one is divisive, distinguishing our people from those who do not belong - alien immigrants, for example” (Canovan 1999: 5).

What is of importance here is that the populist usage of the people should not point to the whole population, but to a segment of population (the in-group).

Therefore, this category included either when the people were constructed as a specific segment of society, in Okamura’s posts mainly defined on nationalistic principle, for example by pointing out to national aspects of the people, for instance “our culture” (Czech culture), “our traditions” (Czech traditions), “our country”, “our land”, (when defined by Czechs as a nation, not Czechs as citizens - the examples would be provided below), “our people” (when also defined as having Czech nationality, therefore, when the citizens or the voters in general were meant, the sentence was coded as not using populist strategy). Another segment used was “working people”, “working people with children”, “decent people” etc.

This category also included remarks on the heartland. The hearland, as defined by Taggart (2004), was briefly mentioned in the chapter Conceptual overview. In detail, Taggart (2004: 274) notes:

“Examples of heartlands can be derived from the conception of the new populists of a Europe of nations with each having an ethnic and cultural homogeneity. There is a strong implied vision of a world as it ‘was’ in the rejection of immigration, the complications of globalisation and the encroachment of taxation, and the intrusions of the state and its agents

in the form of politicians, intellectuals, bureaucrats and ‘bofﬁns’. The essence of the heartland is that it is the good life but that, unlike utopias, it is a life that has already been lived and so shown to be feasible. It assumes or asserts that there was a good life before the corruptions and distortions of the present” (Taggart 2004: 274).

As was mentioned in the subsection Conflictive strategy towards the Elite – Anti-elitism - Excluding the Elite from the People regarding sentences mentioning “the others”, specifically when only the others were mentioned, the sentence was coded as not using a populist strategy. Although, when one sentence included both the others and the people, while point to the others first, the sentence belonged to the category Excluding the Elite from the People. Therefore, when the others were mentioned first followed by the remark on our people, the sentence was regarded as being conflictive. Although, the people as an in-group can also be constructed through pointing out to the out-group, therefore the category Stating a Monolithic People included sentences that firstly pointed out to the in-group and afterwards the out-group. Examples would be provided below.

Examples of sentences from Okamura’s posts that use this strategy: o “Because at the end, all of us would be asking themselves: did I do something for our children to live in their fathers’ land and in line with our traditions?” (Also sentence that was regularly attached at the end of some posts, part of mobilizing voters) (Czech original: “Protože na konec se každý z nás bude ptát sám sebe: udělal jsem něco pro to, aby mé děti mohly žít v zemi svých otců a podle našich tradic?”) o “We say clearly – GIVE MONEY TO OUR DECENT PEOPLE, NOT TO THE MIGRANTS or other unadaptive.” (Czech original: “Říkáme jasně – PENÍZE DEJME NAŠIM SLUŠNÝM LIDEM, NE MIGRANTŮM či jiným nepřizpůsobivým.”)

Advocative strategy towards the people – People-Centrism - Demonstrating Closeness to the People

When describing the populist strategy, Wirth et al. (2016: 49) note that closeness to the people is very important for populists. Moreover, people need to be assured that the populist is similar to them, so they would trust him to represent their will (Wirth et al. 2016: 49).

“Their challenge is to be perceived as a legitimate member of the ordinary people and, simultaneously, as embodying the will of ‘the’ people. They therefore demonstrate closeness to the people regarding the people’s values, lifestyles, needs and concerns and

present themselves as acting in the name of the people, guided by common sense, defending and protecting the people’s values” (Wirth et al. 2016: 49).

When applied, this category included when Okamura demonstrated his closeness to the people mostly when speaking as their advocate, speaking in their name, claiming how the people reach out to him, how he asked somebody something on the street etc. Alhough, when Okamura refered to just discussing with people or meeting them, the sentence was coded as not containing populist strategy.

Examples of sentences from Okamura’s posts that use this strategy: o “People are really unsatisfied with the government and there are many things that need to be dealt with.” (Czech original: “Lidé jsou s vládou opravdu nespokojení a je toho potřeba spoustu řešit.”) o “Even though more people doubt that we live in the democracy, still few people have an idea about what the real democracy really is.” (Czech original: “Přestože už stále víc lidí pochybuje o tom, že žijeme v demokracii, stále velmi málo lidí tuší, co to skutečná demokracie doopravdy je.”) o “To what usage is the rise of HDP (Gross domestic product, author’s note), when common people’s real salaries are not rising?” (Czech original: “K čemu je růst HDP nebo růst ekonomiky, když obyčejným lidem reálně nerostou příjmy?”

To demonstrate how the nine populist strategies were combined in one post, three Okamura’s posts can be found in the Attachments.

7) Analytical part

The second part of the thesis presents findings from both hand-coded and automated computer-assisted quantitative content analyses. Firstly, the thesis reviews the former - hand- coded quantitative content analysis consisting of assigning the predefined categories to the sentences as the units of analysis.

General findings from hand-coded quantitative content analysis

As mentioned above, the populist strategies were used as guidelines and helped to provide the examples of practical usage, although some strategies, when measured in practice, proved

60 to be similar to each other. Therefore, the results are presented based on their belonging to one of three dimensions of populism.

These overall results can be found in the Table 6.

Table 6: The results of the hand-coded quantitative content analysis. Source: The author

The results show that 17.74 % of all sentences evaluated in the randomized sample (n = 4 003 that also included repeated sentences) contained at least one populist strategy, meaning almost one fifth of Okamura’s sentences examined were populist.

The dimension Anti-Elitism, which includes categories 9, 8 and 7 was the most prevalent with 9.72 % of examined sentences, while People-Centrism was identified in 5.65 % of the examined sentences. Restoring sovereignty was the least used populist dimension with 2.37 %.

Based on the results above, it could be stated that Okamura’s populism on his Facebook account during the election year has mostly had anti-elitistic appeal (although the examined communication was a randomized sample of sentences).

Regarding the results in comparative perspective, the populist dimension Restoring sovereignty was also the least used one by cross-national studies conducted by Ernst et al. (2017a) (Ernst et al. 2017a: 1359; Ernst and Engesser and Esser 2017: 255).

When the strategies by type were compared, meaning advocative for the people and conflictive towards the elite, conflictive strategies were applied more with the difference of 90 sentences.

This shows that the identified populism in Okamura’s social media communication during the election year was rather conflictive towards the elite than advocative for the people (although the examined communication was a randomized sample of sentences).

Table 7: The absolute and relative values of strategies by type. Source: The author

When the sentence was regarded as populist and conflictive towards the elite, the type of actor critized was identified. The categories resemble the ones as measured by Van Kessel and Castelein (2016: 605). These authors distinguished between Political actors, European Union, Economic elites, Media and Other/unspecified (Van Kessel and Castelein 2016: 605).

Although, the thesis used broader categories as follows: Domestic political actors (for instance government, state etc.), Other foreign political actors (for instance western countries, “globalists” etc.), the EU, Economic elites, the Media, the Courts or jurisdiction, Others versus us (this category was used when the sentence fell in the category 7 - Excluding the Elite from the People and were depicted when “the others” were put in contrast with “us”; in practice this category included others as migrans, managers, executors, feminists etc.) and category Unspecified.

The Table 8 representing the results can be found below.

Table 8: The type of actor criticized in sentences belonging to conflictive strategies. Source: The author

As can be seen above, the actor criticized most was domestic political actors, which counts for 40.25 % of the populist sentences using conflictive strategy. The second most criticized actor was the Media with 24.75 % following by the EU, which was critized in 20.25 %.

This shows that when Okamura expressed criticism in a populistic way on his Facebook account during the election year, the blame was mostly placed on domestic political actors, the media and the EU (although the examined communication was a randomized sample of sentences).

The last table in the hand-coded quantitative analysis presents the results of the examination of the proportion of original, repeated and partly repeated sentences in examined Facebook posts.

Sentences that were regarded as original can be understood as not having the exact duplicate in the examined dataset. Sentences identified as partly repeated can be viewed as having part that is original and the part that has a copy. Sentences regarded as repeated have more duplicates exactly matching each word in the sentence.

Table 9: The proportion of original, repeated and partly repeated sentences. Source: The author

The Table 9 shows that more than half of the examined sentences were repeatedly used and copied at the end of Okamura’s Facebook posts (54.51 % of the 4 003 examined sentences).

To conclude, the hand-coded quantitative content analysis provided answers to questions regarding the populism in Okamura’s Facebook communication. Almost one fifth of Okamura’s sentences examined were populist, while his populism was rather conflictive than advocative. The anti-elitism was the most prevalent populist dimension and the type of elite he attacked the most was domestic political actors. As far as the uniqueness of the sentences is concerned, Okamura recycled more than half of the sentenced from the examined posts.

Automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis

Introduction to the part

The second part of the analytical part of the thesis examines the Okamura’s communication on his Facebook account differently. While the previous part inspected the sample of the Facebook posts using hand-coded categories regarding populism, the current

63 section focuses on the whole election year 2017 and the topics that were communicated by Okamura.

The central aim of this part is to identify topics that Okamura communicated, how frequently and which of the topics were present in posts that generated feedback or were popular by Okamura’s fans. The frequency of Okamura’s usage of selected topics during the election year 2017 is to be presented. The secondary objective is to present the most frequent words that Okamura used together with the table representing the number of Facebook posts based on their type (whether it was hyperlink, photograph or video).

As was mentioned in the chapter Methodology, the analyzed corpus consisted of 569 Facebook posts from Okamura’s official account. The analyzed time frame was almost ten months before the Czech Parliamentary elections 2017 (since 1st of January to 21st of October), therefore the analysis would be able to identify topics during the electoral campaign and their prevalence in time. The software used was open-source environment RStudio which uses R as a software and as a programming language for statistical computing, graphics and analyses. The packages thesis used were base, devtools, Rfacebook, readxl, quanteda, stm, stringr, geometry, Rtsne and rsvd.

Data cleaning and parsing

The corpus consisting of 569 posts was cleaned in various steps that would be outlined below. Hyperlinks and websites were deleted (mostly hyperlinks that were regularly attached at the end of the messages, for instance Okamura’s website, Twitter, blog, Youtube channel, transparent bank account, etc.).

The corpus was normalized, while normalization could be understood as “(…) the transformation of words into a more uniform form” (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 250-251). The normalization is necessary because “(…) a computer has to recognize when two words have (roughly) the same meaning, even if they are written slightly differently” (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 250-251).

The important advantage of normalization is that the size of vocabulary is reduced. Another essential part of normalization is making texts lower case, because otherwise the computer would not recognize that two words are the same if one of them consisted of capitalized letter (for instance when the word occurs at the beginning of a sentence) (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 250-251).

Moreover, punctuation is usually discarded when normalizing the corpus (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 17). Therefore, as the next steps, the capital letters were lowered and corpus was tokenized as uni-grams (single words) (Stackoverflow 2018a). The diacritics was removed because of the complexity of Czech language and for the purpose of practical manipulation with text data.

Tokenization splits texts into tokens, while tokens often correspond to words, because words can be understood as “(…) the most common semantically meaningful compontents of texts” (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 250).

The 569 Facebook posts were therefore decomposed into 18 018 tokens.

Another important part of normalization is stemming or lemmatization, while the goal of both techniques is to further simplify the vocabulary. “Stemming removes the ends of words to reduce the total number of unique words in the data set, or reduce the dimensionality of text. Stemming reduces the complexity by mapping words that refer to the same basic concept to a single root. For example, family, families, families’, and familial all become famili” (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 6).

Although, lemmatization represents more advanced technique. The lemmatization requires a dictionary which is used to replace words by their morphological root form (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 251). Lemma can be understood as: “An abstract form, shared by word forms having the same stem and part of speech” (Ashnish and Avinash 2016: 56). “Lemmatization is a more efficient process, which uses vocabulary and morphological analysis of words and removes only the inflectional endings to return the base form of word as output” (Ashnish and Avinash 2016: 63).

When stemmer and lemmatizer are compared, the stemmer is faster, but “cruder algorithm”. “The critical diﬀerence is that a lemmatizer uses context and dictionaries to help discover (for example) that good is the base form of better and best” (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 6). The stemmer is sufficient for modern English as weakly inflected language (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 251).

Although, its application on the corpus in Czech language was questionable, because the stemmer was not able to recognize more complicated suffixes and prefixes, therefore it produced duplicites and did not reduce number of words to their base forms.

Czech language, similarly to other Slavic languages, has its specific features which include complicated grammatical cases with the usage of suffixes and prefixes. Although, there

65 are not as many stemmers and lemmatizers created by information retrieval community that are suitable for Czech language compared with English (Dolamic and Savoy 2009: 714-716).

Based on what is mentioned above, lemmatization is perceived as more suitable method for simplyfing for Czech language compared to stemming. The lemmatization dictionary applied to corpus was retrieved from Michal Boleslav Měchura’s website http://www.lexiconista.com/cs/. The list with lemmas can be found here: http://www.lexiconista.com/Datasets/lemmatization-cs.zip .

The lemmatization dictionary was further modified for thesis needs. The diacritics was removed, the capital letters were lowered, the duplicite lemmas were deleted together with some lemmas that are barely used in the language. The dictionary was improved for the thesis needs with adding political science related lemmas and words (for instance worth, discuss, Euro, Europe, movement, threat, inform, campaign, parliamentary, referendum, tolerate, voter etc.), the names of politicians (for instance Okamura, Bělobrádek, Babiš, Sobotka, Merkel, Clinton, Trump etc.) and words that Okamura regularly uses (for instance censored, disinformation, promise, immigrant, parasite, non-profit, manipulate, Islamic etc.).

The lemmatization dictionary was improved in this logic many times until the most of the tokens were reduced to their lemmas. The final lemmatization dictionary consists of 16 247 entries.

The existing original tokens were converted to lemmatized tokens (if lemma was defined in the dictionary, if not, the original was kept) (Benoit et al. 2018: 106-107; Stackoverflow 2018b).

The lemmatization reduced the number of tokens to 12 446 entries.

As a part of cleaning, “stop words” were removed. “Common words such as ‘the’ in the English language are rarely informative about the content of a text. Filtering these words out has the benefit of reducing the size of the data, reducing computational load, and in some cases also improving accuracy. To remove these words beforehand, they are matched to predefined lists of ‘stop words’ and deleted (Welbers and Van Atteveldt and Benoit 2017: 251).

The list of stopwords removed was constructed from four lists of Czech stopwords from Github.com and enhanced with other words not included in those lists. The stopwords list consist of 601 words like but (Czech “ale”), with (Czech “s”), maybe (Czech “asi”) etc.

Furthermore, both very common words (which appear in more than 99% of documents in the corpus) and very uncommon words (that appear in less than 1% of documents in the corpus) are usually removed (Grimmer and Stewart 2013: 7). Therefore, words that occurred in more than 563 Facebook posts and less than 6 Facebook posts were removed from corpus.

A document term matrix was created through a quanteda package. Document term matrix represents a way of modeling documents, where documents are represented by rows and terms (lemmatized tokens as unigrams) are represented by columns. The value in specific cell present the term frequency count for a certain document (Ashnish and Avinash 2016: 19).

The most used words by Okamura

The creation of document term matrix allowed the thesis to answer one of the research questions, specifically What were the most frequent words in Okamura’s posts?

The second column of Table 10 below represents the Czech words, the second column English translation of the token and the fourth the number of times the word appeared in Facebook posts.

Table 10: The 100 most used words in Okamura’s Facebook posts. Source: The author.

Some of the most used words correspond to parts of messages that were regularly attached at the end of some Facebook posts (for instance to beg, can, watch etc.). The rest of the first 40 most used words have either a political or mobilizating character.

The Table 10 presenting the most used Okamura’s words can provide the first look into the Okamura’s social media communication and offer the first suggestions for the question “What does Okamura say?”

What data types were shared the most?

Table 11 presents the number of Okamura’s Facebook posts by their type. The most prevalent type was video, while this could be due to his shared speeches in the Chamber of Deputies.

Table 11: The number of posts based on their type. Source: The author.

Identyfing the number of topics

For building a topic model, package stm was used. “The Structural Topic Model is a general framework for topic modeling with document-level covariate information. The covariates can improve inference and qualitative interpretability and are allowed to affect topical prevalence, topical content or both” (Structuraltopicmodel.com 2018).

The Structural Topic Model (STM) is suitable for thesis’s needs because of its many advantages. For instance, two of them being that it allows to examine the topic prevalence and typical documents for each topic.

“STM is an admixture with covariates in both mixture components. Users provide a corpus of documents and a number of topics. Each word in a document comes from exactly one topic and each document is represented by the proportion of its words that come from each of the K topics” (Roberts et al. 2018: 60).

The number of topics needed to be determined beforehand. “There is no right answer to the appropriate number of topics. More topics will give more ﬁne-grained representations of the data at the potential cost of being less precisely estimated” (Roberts et al. 2018: 61).

The diagnostic values presented below represent a data-driven approach. Although, determining the number of topics or clusters in unsupervised learning methods is very difficult (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 12; Grimmer and Steward 2013: 19).

As Grimmer and Steward (2013) write:

“Rather than statistical fit, model selection should be recast as a problem of measuring substantive fit. Unsupervised methods for content analysis reduce the information in large text collections substantially. Measures of statistical fit measure how well the models fit by comparing the estimated parameters to the actual data. But this relies on the assumption that the goal is to model well the representation of texts after preprocessing. It is not. The preprocessed texts represent a substantial simplification of the documents. The goal is revelation of substantively interesting information. We think a productive line of inquiry will replace the use of the preprocessed texts with carefully elicited evaluations based on the substance of the model” (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 20).

Based on what is mentioned above, it can be stated that the combination of both measures of fit and researcher’s judgment on interpretation of topics is necessary.

“For small corpora (a few hundred to a few thousand) 5-50 topics is a good place to start. Beyond these rough guidelines it is application speciﬁc. Previous applications in political science with medium sized corpora (10k to100k documents) have found 60-100 topics to work well” (Roberts et al. 2018: 61).

One of the preliminary strategies for setting the number of topics that the package stm provides is the usage of Lee’s and Mimno’s (2014) algorithm (Lee and Mimno 2014: 1319; Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 13).

When the algorithm was applied on the corpus, it suggested retrieving 54 topics.

“We emphasize that this procedure has no particular statistical guarantees and should not be seen as estimating the “true” number of topics. However it can be useful place to start and has the computational advantage that it only needs to be run once” (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 13).

In order to determine the topic model with suitable fit and interpretable topics, diagnostic values for topic models with different number of topics were retrieved. All models were Structural Topic Models with initialization Latent Dirichlet Allocation via collapsed Gibbs sampling, which “(…) is the default option and uses several passes of collapsed Gibbs sampling to initialize the algorithm” (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 28).

Figure 4: Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics for topic models with 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 and 58 topics. Source: The author

Held-Out Likelihood offers the possibility of comparing models “to see how well each model does in predicting words within the document” (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 35). Semantic coherence is a diagnostic developed by Mimno et al. (2011) and “(…) it is maximized when the most probable words in a given topic frequently co-occur together” (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 11; Mimno et al. 2011: 262). Mimno et al. (2011: 270) claim that: “(…) our topic coherence metric correlates with expert opinions of topic quality for standard LDA” (Mimno et al. 2011: 270).

Therefore, both held-out likelihood and semantic coherence should be higher, while residuals should be lower. “While no fool-proof method has been developed to choose the number of topics, both the residual checks and held-out likelihood estimation are useful indicators of the number of topics that should be chosen” (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 35-36).

Based on what is mentioned above, topic models with 53, 54 and 55 topics have the highest held-out likelihood diagnostic. When assessing the residuals, models 53 and 54 display

72 the lowest values. Regarding the semantic coherence, model 53 displays higher semantic coherence than model 54. The author constructed various topic models with different number of topics and finds that the topic model with 53 topics is the most interpretable one and stands well at the diagnostics. The model is presented below.

Chosen topic model with 53 topics

Topics can be in detail explored through two ways. “The ﬁrst approach is to look at collections of words that are associated with topics. The second approach is to examine actual documents that are estimated to be highly associated with each topic. Both of these approaches should be used” (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 14).

The topics need to be labeled. Four types of word labels for each topic are available in the package stm. The first type of labeling includes highest probability words associated with the topic. The second type of labeling, FREX, can be regarded as more effective, because “FREX is the weighted harmonic mean of the word’s rank in terms of exclusivity and frequency” (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 12-14). The third labeling type is Lift. “Lift weights words by dividing by their frequency in other topics, therefore giving higher weight to words that appear less frequently in other topics” (Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 14). The fourth available type of labeling is Score.

When applied, FREX and Lift proved to be more applicable compared to highest probability words and score, because they both use weights (meaning the typical words in FREX and Lift for one topic do not appear as often in other topics, as occurs with highest probability words).

As was mentioned above, the model itself presents the typical words for each topic, although the interpretation of the topic based on these words need to be done by researcher. Topics, FREX and Lift labels (in Czech) together with researcher’s provided interpreration of the topics (in English) are presented in the Table 12 below.

Table 12: Topics, keywords and suggested labels. Source: The author

Both approaches mentioned above (inspecting the collections of words and carefully examining the documents containing high proportions of the topics) were used when labeling the topics.

The proportions of topics in the corpus

In order to answer the question regarding the most occurring topics, the most used 26 topics (which represent the first half of the topics) are displayed in the Figure 5.

Figure 5: Most used 26 topics with the expected topic proportions. Source: The author.

As can be seen in the Figure 5, top five most used topics (descending) are The first personal topic from the campaign combined with the requirements of SPD (Topic 4), The fifth mobilizing topic - rising from regularly attached messages at the end of the posts (Topic 27), The third personal topic from the campaign combined with the requirements of SPD (Topic 46), The first mobilizing topic - rising from regularly attached messages at the end of the posts (Topic 1) and The personal topic from the campaign combined with discussions with the people (Topic 47).

It is not suprising that the mobilizing topics were used so often, because they were regularly attached at the end of some Facebook posts. Although, two out of three topics named Peronsal topic from the campaign combined with the requirements of SPD were ranked as first and third most used topics. Moreover, The personal topic from the campaign combined with discussions with the people were ranked as fifth.

This shows that Okamura most often informed about himself during the campaign and combined it with the requirements of his party (topics 4 and 46). He also often demonstrated his closeness to the people and how he talks to them (Topic 47).

When assessing fifth to tenth most used topics, the sixth most used was The second topic referring to migration as invasion - topic rising from regularly attached messages at the end of the posts (Topic 12), seventh The third mobilizing topic - rising from regularly attached messages at the end of the posts (Topic 13), eight The personal topic from the campaign combined with Czech traditions (Topic 10), ninth The second topic about the leader - Tomio

Okamura (Topic 50) and tenth most used is The first topic referring to migration as invasion - topic rising from regularly attached messages at the end of the posts (Topic 11).

Again, the occurrence of mobilizing topic is not suprising, but interestingly, both topics referring to migration as invasion, which were regularly attached at the end of the messages (topics 12 and 11) were ranked in the first ten most used topics. This means that the alarming message informing voters about the migrant conquerors, urging them not to “hide their heads in the sand” and saving their homeland which was “ransomed” with their “ancestor’s blood” (the whole Facebook post using these formulations can be found in the Attachments section) was communicated very frequently during the election year.

The other topics ranked in the first ten most used topics regarded Okamura during the campaign and Czech traditions (Topic 10) and Okamura himself (Topic 50). This confirms the trend in the first five most used topics – Okamura often informed about himself during the campaign, but not only combined the messages with the requirements of SPD or discussing with voters, but also combined it with Czech traditions and feasts.

Other topics (apart from mobilization topics regularly attached to messages) ranked in the first 26 most used topics include (descending) Transnational collaboration (especially with FN) (Topic 49), The weekly statements of SPD (Topic 39), The second personal topic from the campaign combined with the requirements of SPD (Topic 20), The petition against migration (Topic 5), Women, social roles and foreign affairs (Topic 45), Broken promises of the government (mostly regarding not adopting the referendum) (Topic 22), The demand for referendum (Topic 26), The critics towards the government (Topic 23) and The series "Stolen revolution" (Czech "Ukradená revoluce") - the exhibition of SPD (Topic 21), Information about pre-electoral television debates (Topic 8), The first topic about the leader - Tomio Okamura (Topic 42), The main points of the SPD manifesto (Topic 53) and Islam as an ideology (Topic 16).

The expected proportions of the rest of the topics (27 topics) can be found in the Figure 6.

Figure 6: The expected topic proportions of the rest 27 topics. Source: The author.

Topics in the most liked, commented and shared Facebook posts

This section serves as an approach to reveal topics that were not used as often by Okamura, although they generated feedback or were popular among his fans. This is due to the fact that some topics can occur in the most liked/commented/shared posts just due to the Okamura’s frequency of their usage. These topics would be filtered out by this approach. The selected topic’s usage during the campaign period is presented after this section.

To inspect which topics were most prevalent in the most liked, commented and shared Facebook posts the theta value from the topic model was retrieved (theta value “(…) captures the modal estimate of the proportion of word tokens assigned to the topic under the model”) (Roberts et al. 2018: 14).

Theta values were merged with the posts’ likes, comments and shares count. Firstly, topics in the most liked post would be inspected.

The boundary to define the most liked Facebook posts was set to top ten percent of the Facebook posts with most likes (in this case the 60 posts with the highest likes count), while the most liked Okamura’s post gained 12 143 likes and the sixtieth most liked gained 1 812 likes.

The Table 13 below presents the 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most liked Okamura’s posts. Table consists of the number and name of the topic and topic’s share in the analyzed posts.

Table 13: 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most liked Okamura’s posts. Source: The author.

Although, it needs to be stated that the term “like” in this context means all types of reactions on Facebook (“Like”, “Love”, “Haha”, “Sad” and “Angry”). Therefore, the most “liked” post does not necessarily need to be the most popular one.

For this reason, the similar logic was applied to find most prevalent topics in the most commented and most shared Okamura’s posts (with the aim to find intersection). Table 14 below presents the 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most commented Okamura’s posts and Table 15 presents the 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most shared Okamura’s posts.

The most commented Okamura’s post has 5 579 comments and the last analyzed, sixtieth most commented post displays 315 comments.

However, the discussions on a Facebook posts can be moderated by the owners and it is plausible that negative comments were removed in Okamura’s posts.

Table 14: 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most commented Okamura’s posts. Source: The author.

When both number of reactions and comments are taken into account, it could be stated that The main points of the SPD manifesto (Topic 53) were present in topics that generated the most feedback in general.

As far as the other topics that were ranked as the 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most liked or commented Facebook posts are considered, they can be separed into two categories based on their expected topic proportions (Figure 8 and 9).

Topics that were used often by Okamura (Figure 8) and were ranked in both 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most liked or commented Okamura’s posts (apart from mobilizing topics) include (descending): The second topic about the leader - Tomio Okamura (Topic 50), Transnational collaboration (especially with FN) (Topic 49), Women, social roles and foreign affairs (Topic 45), Information about pre-electoral television debates (Topic 8), Islam as an ideology (Topic 16), The first topic about the leader - Tomio Okamura (Topic 42) and The first personal topic from the campaign combined with the requirements of SPD (Topic 4).

These topics could have occured in the most liked or commented Okamura’s posts simply because they were used often (they were all ranked in the first most used half of topics based on expected topic proportion – Figure 6).

Although, topics that were not used that often, therefore ranked in the second half of the topics based on their expected topic proportion (Figure 7), and even though appear in the 10 % of the posts that received most of the reactions could point to the fact that they were either attached to other controversial or popular themes, or they were considered controversial or popular themselves by the Okamura’s fans.

These topics are (apart from mobilizing topics and descending): The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession (Topic 15), The smear campaigns of political competitors and low salaries of domestic workers (Topic 19), The elections, the media and the candidates (Topic 36), Non-profit organizations and education (Topic 35) and The topic regarding elections and voters (Topic 25).

Shares, as the third metric of the popularity of Facebook posts can be viewed as the most reliable one, because it is possible that when a person shares some content, he or she identifies with it or wants to make a statement about it on their accounts page (“The wall”). Both ways can be beneficial for politicians because they further spread their messages.

The most shared Okamura’s Facebook post was shared 5 675 times and the sixtieth most shared displays 1 173 shares.

Table 15: 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most shared Okamura’s posts. Source: The author.

When assessing the topics present in most shared Okamura’s posts, they can be again further separated into two parts based on the frequency of usage by Okamura. The topics both often used by Okamura and prevalent in shared posts by his fans were (apart from mobilizing topics and descending): The second topic referring to migration as invasion - topic rising from regularly attached messages at the end of the posts (Topic 12), Islam as an ideology (Topic 16), Broken promises of the government (mostly regarding not adopting the referendum) (Topic 22), The main points of the SPD manifesto (Topic 53), The first topic referring to migration as invasion - topic rising from regularly attached messages at the end of the posts (Topic 11), The second topic about the leader - Tomio Okamura (Topic 50) and Transnational collaboration (especially with FN) (Topic 49). Again, these posts could have occurred in the most shared Facebook posts by fans simply because they were often communicated by Okamura himself. On the other hand, eight topics (apart from mobilizing topics) that appeared in the second half of topics based on the expected topic proportions, but even though were ranked as the 20

84 most prevalent topics in the 10 % of the most shared posts include (descending): The manipulation of the media or by media themselves (Topic 48), Quota system for migrant distribution and Czech MPs voting for it – Europe (Topic 33), The smear campaigns of political competitors and low salaries of domestic workers (Topic 19), The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession (Topic 15), Non-profit organizations and education (Topic 35), The topic regarding elections and voters (Topic 25), The elections, the media and the candidates (Topic 36) and The social sphere - support towards working families (Topic 37). This points to the fact that these topics were either popular among the Okamura’s fans or attached to other popular themes and therefore shared. If it is one way or another, both situations helped Okamura to further spread his messages among Facebook users.

Selected topics’ prevalence in time

Based on the findings in the previous section, eight topics can be regarded as particulary interesting – those that were not communicated that often by Okamura himself, although they appeared in the most popular posts that were shared by his fans. These topics are the eight topics mentioned above (Topic 48, Topic 33, Topic 19, Topic 15, Topic 35, Topic 25, Topic 36 and Topic 37). Moreover, these eight topics also include four topics mentioned in context of the Table 13 and 14 (topics that were not communicated that often, although they were present in the posts that received the most feedback – namely Topic 15, Topic 19, Topic 36, Topic 35 and Topic 25). This section would investigate the topic prevalence of these eight topics during the election year 2017. Therefore, this section would present eight figures corresponding to topics and the analyzed time-frame. This was performed through a function estimateEffect from stm package, which “(…) performs a regression where topic-proportions are the outcome variable. This allows us to conditional expectation of topic prevalence given document characteristics” (Roberts et al. 2018: 11). In this case, the document characteristic is the date of the Facebook post. The spline function was used (so the regression line is smooth) and the dotted lines correspond to 95 % confidence intervals (Roberts et al. 2018: 12; Roberts and Stewart and Tingley 2018: 21). When possible, the predictive validity was assessed. If a measure has predictive validity, it means that it accurately corresponds with the external events or conditions (Quinn et al. 2010: 216; Weber 1990: 20).

Figure 7: The expected proportion of Topic 48 (The manipulation of the media or by media themselves) in 2017. Source: The author

The usage of the topic The manipulation of the media or by media themselves has approximately flat distribution, with a small rise approximately at the end of September and again at the end of the campaign.

Figure 8: The expected proportion of Topic 33 (Quota system for migrant distribution and Czech MPs voting for it – Europe) in 2017. Source: The author

Regarding the topic Quota system for migrant distribution and Czech MPs voting for it – Europe, it is possible to observe two visible peeks. One occurs approximately at the end of May and the June 2017 and the second at the end of August and the beginning of September 2017. This could both correspond with the time of the medialized Slovak and Hungarian complaint regarding the quota system. In May both Slovakia and Hungary made statements before the Court of Justice of the European Union and the complaint was dismissed in September

(Aktualne.cz 2017; iDNES.cz 2017a). Moreover, the topic’s usage has an increase at the end of the campaign.

Figure 9: The expected proportion of Topic 19 (The smear campaigns of political competitors and low salaries of domestic workers) in 2017. Source: The author

The usage of topic The smear campaigns of political competitors and low salaries of domestic workers was declining at the beginning of the year 2017, but there were four regular increases in the usage. The topic has the biggest increase of the usage at the end of the campaign.

Figure 10: The expected proportion of Topic 15 (The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession) in 2017. Source: The author

When considering the topic The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession, it could be stated that the topic was used consistently with only one increase in

March. Although, the usage of this topic was on a steady increase since September to the end of the campaign. This corresponds to the medialized case with lithium when the former Industry minister Jiří Havlíček signed a memorandum with an Australian company (iDNES.cz 2017b).

Figure 11: The expected proportion of Topic 35 (Non-profit organizations and education) in 2017. Source: The author

The topic Non-profit organizations and education was mostly used at the beginning of 2017. Since June the usage was decreasing, although with an increase at the end of the campaign.

Figure 12: The expected proportion of Topic 25 (The topic regarding elections and voters) in 2017. Source: The author

Topic The topic regarding elections and voters was barely used through the whole year 2017, but the usage increased at the beginning of October. This could represent the approaching election day and the effort to address the voters.

Figure 13: The expected proportion of Topic 36 (The elections, the media and the candidates) in 2017. Source: The author

The usage of the topic The elections, the media and the candidates was most frequent during the October 2017, which is understandable. Although it started to decrease approximately in the middle of the month.

Figure 14: The expected proportion of Topic 37 (The social sphere - support towards working families) in 2017. Source: The author

The topic The social sphere - support towards working families was communicated the most during August 2017. Since September the usage of the topic generally declined, but there was a small increase during October. To conclude, Okamura often informed his fans about himself while combining it with his party’s requirements or Czech traditions. Moreover, the leader of SPD often demonstrated his closeness to the people. Based on the fact that the main points of his party’s manifesto appear to be the most prevalent topic in the Facebook posts generating most of the reactions, it could be stated that he was very successful in articulating the main points of his party’s manifesto. Apart from the topic regarding the SPD manifesto, the most prevalent topics in the most shared Facebook posts by his fans include topics regarding Islam, broken promises of the former government, the manipulation by the media, the quota system for migrant distribution etc. It could be concluded that these topics were present in the most popular Okamura’s Facebook posts, as perceived by his audience. Interestingly, Okamura’s usage of the topic regarding social sphere declined at the end of the campaign, while topics Non-profit organizations and education, The smear campaigns of political competitors and low salaries of domestic workers and The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession achieved their highest frequency of usage at the end of the campaign. The datasets for both types of content analysis can be found in the electronic archive in the Information system, together with an R script regarding the construction of document-term matrix and the topic model.

Conclusion

The aim of the thesis was to investigate Okamura’s communication on social media, specially Facebook, during the campaign period matching the election year 2017. Generally, one of the goals was to find out whether his communication was populistic, to what extent and what dimensions of populism can be identified. Moreover, the thesis also focused on topics in Okamura’s communication, which of these topics were used most frequently and which of them appeared to be present in posts that generated feedback or were considered popular by Okamura’s fans.

The first chapter of the thesis was dedicated to introducing Okamura, while the second represented conceptual overview regarding the populism phenomenon. The third outlined the perspective most suitable for the thesis’s needs, following by chapter focused on the interplay of populism and social media. Following chapter reviewed both domestic and international

90 current state of research and afterwards, the methodology of the thesis was presented. Regarding the analytical part, two types of quantitative content analysis were applied to answer research questions, while each of them served different purposes.

Okamura’s communication on his official Facebook account during the election year can be regarded as having populist characteristics. More specifically, the hand-coded content analysis revealed that almost one fifth of the examined sentences in his Facebook posts can be regarded as populist. This populism was rather conflictive towards the elite than advocative for the people, while the populist dimension Anti-Elitism being the most prevalent.

When it comes to Okamura’s enemies, he mostly populistically criticized and blamed domestic political actors, such as political parties, the state etc., counting for 40.25 % of all criticized actors. The second and third most targeted actors were the media and the EU. Moreover, the leader of the SPD party also blamed the courts or jurisdiction.

Interestingly, most of the Okamura’s content that his Facebook supporters could like, comment or share during the campaign was recycled. More than half of the examined content had duplicates in the dataset, meaning the sentences were repeated on a regular basis. The recycled content had either mobilizing character, were inviting people to support SPD, follow Okamura’s other accounts on different platforms or simply asking fans for help with “preserving their homeland to stay theirs and faithful to the legacy of their ancestors who ransomed it with their blood.”

When it comes to topics that were present in Okamura’s social media communication, the most frequently used topics had either personal character combined with the requirements of SPD, with discussions with the people or with Czech traditions. Moreover, Okamura frequently used mobilizing topics rising from regularly used sentences (as mentioned above) and alarming messages referring to migration as invasion.

The leader of the SPD proved to be very succesful in getting one of his core messages - the main points of his party’s manifesto - into the most liked, commented and shared Facebook posts by his fans, even though he did not use the topic that frequently (it was the 25th most prevalent topic out of 53 topics).

As far as the topics’ prevalence in the most shared Okamura’s posts by his fans is regarded, the top three (except from the mobilizing topics that rose from regularly attached sentences) were Islam as an ideology, Broken promises of the government (mostly regarding not adopting the referendum) and again – The main points of the SPD manifesto. These topics

91 can be regarded as the most prevalent in the most popular Okamura’s posts, as perceived by his audience.

The dynamics of selected topics’ prevalence in time was examined. These selected topics were The manipulation of the media or by media themselves, Quota system for migrant distribution and Czech MPs voting for it – Europe, The smear campaigns of political competitors and low salaries of domestic workers, The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession, Non-profit organizations and education, The topic regarding elections and voters, The elections, the media and the candidates and The social sphere - support towards working families.

Regarding the topics’ usage during the campaign in 2017, even though the topic regarding the social sphere and articulating support towards working families appeared in the 20 most prevalent topics in the most liked or shared Okamura’s posts, Okamura’s frequency of its usage generally decreased since the end of August (with an increase in the October, but then again, the frequency of the usage decreased). On the contrary, the frequency of usage of the topic regarding the smear campaigns of political competitors of SPD and low salaries of domestic workers started to increase at the similar time, as the topic regarding social sphere decreased. Interestingly, the topic regarding smear campaings scored higher in the 20 most prevalent topics in the most liked, commented or shared Okamura’s posts, meaning it was more prevalent in Facebook posts that generated more feedback and were more popular than the topic regarding the social sphere.

The same applies to the topic regarding non-profit organizations and education, the usage of which also increased at the similar time. This topic also scored higher in the 20 most prevalent topics in the most commented or shared Okamura’s posts than the topic regarding social sphere, but it appeared to be present in less liked posts.

One of the possible interpretations could be that the topic regarding social sphere did not generate as much feedback as topics regarding the smear campaigns and non-profit organizations (topic focused on social sphere did not score in the 20 most prevalent topics in the most commented Okamura’s Facebook posts).

The frequency of usage of the topic The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession steadily increased since the beginning of September. This topic also scored relatively high in the 20 most prevalent topics in the most liked, commented or shared

Okamura’s posts – it was prevalent in the Facebook posts that generated both feedback and were popular among the Okamura’s Facebook fans.

Topics Non-profit organizations and education, The smear campaigns of political competitors and low salaries of domestic workers and The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession were articulated the most at the end of the campaign.

To conclude, the thesis successfully answered the research questions and provides a picture of Okamura’s communication on social media platform Facebook during the election year 2017. His communication shows signs of populism which was conflictive and anti-elitistic, while the most frequently communicated topics on his Facebook regarded mostly himself variously combined with SPD requirements, the people, Czech traditions or mobilizing topics including the threat of migrant invasion.

As far as the limitations of the study are concerned, it needs to be stated that the pilot test showed that the nine categories corresponding to nine populist communication strategies in the hand-coded quantitative content analysis had low reliability. This was due to the lack of other coder than the author and to the similiarity of some of the categories. Although, the problem with the reliability was only between the categories (populist strategies) that belonged to the same dimension of populism, therefore this problem was solved when the results were summarized according to their belonging to the three populist dimensions, not to the categories themselves.

The fact that the data were retrieved ex-post could be viewed as the second limitation of the study. The third limitation regards the automated computer-assisted quantitative content analysis and consists of the fact that the topic model could have been constructed differently by a different researcher. Although, the chosen topic model proved to possess predictive validity when assessing the expected proportions of selected topics in time.

Attachments

Attachment 1: The Czech codebook with categories corresponding to nine populist communication strategies with the examples of usage. Source: Ernst et al. (2017b): 1; Wirth et al. (2016): 52

Attachment 2: Three Okamura’s Facebook posts that are dedicated to different topics and that use various populist strategies in one post. Source: Facebook.com (2018b)

Okamura’s Facebook post consisting of video and message from 1st of April 2017 with 1255 likes and 75 comments and 644 times shared:

“NO to accepting unadaptive and Islamic migrants, YES to supporting our decent people – yesterday I collected signatures in Plzeň for our movement SPD’s petition together with our members, because the government is constantly and PERMANENTNLY accepting these migrants in Czech Repubilc and is spending hundreds of millions Czech crowns to their integration (the strategy Excluding the Elite from the People, the author’s note). And we in SPD say clearly: MONEY TO OUR DECENT PEOPLE, NOT TO UNADAPTIVE (strategy Stating a Monolithic People, author’s note). I thank to thousands of people who have already signed the petition. You can also sign the petition and send it to us via post here: http://spd.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Petice-proti- p%C5%99ij%C3%ADm%C3%A1n%C3%AD-neleg%C3%A1ln%C3%ADch- imigrant%C5%AF-na-%C3%BAzem%C3%AD-%C4%8CR.pdf And I ask you for your support in key Parliamentary elections in October. In the video you can see the members of SPD in Plzeň region led by our regional representative Jana Levová. I wish you a nice Saturday and please SHARE.“

(Czech original: “NE přijímání nepřizpůsobivých a islámských migrantů, ANO podpoře našich slušných lidí - včera jsem spolu s našimi členy sbíral v Plzni podpisy pod petici našeho hnutí SPD, jelikož vláda neustále přijímá NATRVALO do České republiky tyto migranty a vynakládá na jejich integraci stamiliony korun. A my v SPD říkáme jasně: PENÍZE NAŠIM SLUŠNÝM LIDEM, NE NEPŘIZPŮSOBIVÝM. Děkuji tisícům lidí, kteří již petici podepsali. I Vy můžete petici podepsat a poslat nám poštou zde: http://spd.cz/wp- content/uploads/2016/09/Petice-proti-p%C5%99ij%C3%ADm%C3%A1n%C3%AD- neleg%C3%A1ln%C3%ADch-imigrant%C5%AF-na-%C3%BAzem%C3%AD- %C4%8CR.pdf A prosím vás o podporu v klíčových říjnových volbách do Sněmovny. Ve videu jsou členové SPD Plzeňského kraje v čele s naší krajskou zastupitelkou Janou Levovou. Přeji hezkou sobotu a prosím SDÍLEJTE.”)

Okamura’s Facebook post consisting of video and message from 30th of August 2017 with 1179 likes, 140 comments and 1456 times shared:

Our movement SPD harshly criticizes the EU dotations for lowering the production of milk. This dotation of EU comes in the time when the price of milk for consumers is breaking the records. It is obvious what is the aim of this dotation policy. Our country has to be deprived of the basic signs of economic sovereignty (the strategy Blaming the Elite, author’s note). We have to be dependent and blackmailable. If Brussels decides, it will threat with a starvation, literally (the strategy Blaming the Elite, author’s note). Our movement SPD would not allow it and we refuse any subsidiary and every other attempt to destroy our country’s sovereignty (the strategy Blaming the Elite, author’s note). Our manifesto counts on providing enough quality Czech food. We would not look back on the EU dictate (the strategy Discrediting the Elite, author’s note). And I ask you for support in the parliamentary elections in October. (the 14 paragraphs following is the part that was regularly attached to messages, although in some posts just a few sentences of this part were used).

What do you think? Text me in the comments section. And if you agree, please share, so the opinions of our movement Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) could be known by as many people as possible.

Please also talk to our older fellow citizens, to seniors, explain them the opinions of our movement SPD, because older people often do not have the Internet and therefore, unfortunately, they believe the lying and manipulated media (the strategy Discrediting the Elite, author’s note)

The number of our transparent account SPD is: 2900839572/2010, we would be thankful for any contribution for our activity. Please always state in the note, in line with the law, your whole name, the address of your permanent residence and the date of birth. In case of company the business name and IČ (identification number, the author’s note). Or write these data of yours to our email address [email protected]. Based on the law, in case of donations over 1 000 Kč the donation contract is required, please print it twice here: http://www.spd.cz/uploads/stranky/6/dokumenty/spd-darovaci-smlouva-vzor-fyzicka- osoba.pdf, fill in your data and send it to our address Hnutí Svoboda a přímá demokracie – SPD, Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR, Sněmovní 1, Praha 1, 118 26. The print with our signature would be send right back to your address. Income and expenses of our transparent account can be found by anyone here https://www.fio.cz/ib2/transparent?a=2900839572

Please also print the enough number of our posters and deliver them to the boxes in your neighbourhood or give them to your friends, because many of the citizens do not know our movement yet, but they do know my name. Poster can be downloaded with one click and

96 printed here http://www.spd.cz/uploads/stranky/6/dokumenty/letak-spd-1-ks-na-jednom- a4.pdf If you want the change, if you want our homeland to stay ours and faithful to the legacy of our ancestors who ransomed it with their blood, help us to preserve it (the strategy Stating a Monolithic People, author’s note). Help us to bring our manifesto (http://spdcz/program/) to each pub in the village, explain to people in your neighborhood that the rejecting of politics as a dirt and all politicians as criminals means to hide our heads in the sand and to hand over our country to the invasion of conquerors that the European commission obtrudes upon us (the strategy Blaming the Elite, author’s note). It is needed to come to the elections and make a step towards the change. Talk with people in your work, in your neighbourhood, at the football game, on parties, just everywhere where it is possible. Deliver the truth in the same way, as it was many years ago (the strategy Stating a Monolithic People and the example of the populist concept of heartland, author’s note). They can limit us, although they can not stop us! Because at the end, all of us would be asking themselves: did I do something for our children to live in their fathers’ land and in line with our traditions (the strategy Stating a Monolithic People, author’s note)? Did I fulfill my responsibility? And if you would like to put your hand to the plough, even a little, become our member, it is over 11 thousand of us and we are one of the five most numerous parties or movements in ČR, electronic document is here http://www.spd.cz/?type=join&title=P%C5%99idejte+se+k+n%C3%A1m&sm=1&do=open Modal We all have to join together and not break forces, because the more of us will be, the bigger power we have to promote our thoughts. Our aim is clear – to be successful in the parliamentary elections in October and directly influence the politics together in the way that we all want. I am looking forward to the cooperation! And we also have the application for mobile phones (for the Android system) – so go on, each SPD content can be comfortably in your hands: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=cz.spd If you agree with our opinions or you just want to follow us, you can register at my Youtube channel, where you can play all my speeches from the Chamber of Deputies anytime, and also my actual videoblogs https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJjGNjN97BAk85Xb_c7shOQ

Also follow and register at my Instagram account: https://www.instagram.com/tomio.cz/

And, of course you can also register at my blog and I would be glad if you also take a look http://okamura.blog.idnes.cz/

Or follow also my webpage www.tomio.cz

Thanks for visiting my profile and I wish you a good luck.”

(Czech original: “Naše hnutí SPD tvrdě kritizuje dotace EU na snížení produkce mléka. Tato dotace EU přichází v době, kdy cena másla pro spotřebitele láme rekordy. Je zřejmé, co je cílem této dotační politiky. Naše země má být zbavena základních znaků ekonomické suverenity. Máme být závislí a vydíratelní. Pokud Brusel rozhodne, tak bude hrozit doslova hladem. Naše hnutí SPD to nedovolí, odmítáme dotační a každý jiný pokus zničit suverenitu naší země. Náš program počítá se zajištěním dostatku kvalitních českých potravin. Nebudeme se ohlížet na diktát EU. A prosím Vás o podporu v říjnových parlamentních volbách

Co si o tom myslíte Vy? Napište mi do komentářů. A jestli se mnou souhlasíte, prosím sdílejte, ať se názory našeho hnutí Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD) dozví co nejvíce lidí.

Mluvte prosím také s našimi staršími spoluobčany, se seniory, vysvětlujte jim názory našeho hnutí SPD, protože starší lidé často nemají internet, a bohužel tak věří prolhaným a zmanipulovaným médiím.

Číslo transparentního účtu SPD: 2900839572/2010, budeme rádi za každý příspěvek na naší činnost. Uveďte prosím vždy v souladu se zákonem do poznámky vaše celé jméno, adresu trvalého bydliště a datum narození. V případě firmy obchodní název a IČ. Nebo uveďte tyto Vaše údaje na náš mail [email protected] . V případě darů přes 1000 Kč je třeba ze zákona darovací smlouva, prosím vytiskněte si dvakrát darovací smlouvu zde http://www.spd.cz/uploads/stranky/6/dokumenty/spd-darovaci-smlouva-vzor-fyzicka- osoba.pdf , vyplňte Vaše údaje, oba výtisky podepište a zašlete nám na adresu Hnutí Svoboda a přímá demokracie – SPD, Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR, Sněmovní 1, Praha 1, 118 26. Námi podepsaný výtisk Vám zašleme následně zpět na Vaši adresu. Příjmy i výdaje našeho transparentního účtu může každý kdykoliv sledovat zde https://www.fio.cz/ib2/transparent?a=2900839572

Vytiskněte si také prosím dostatečné množství našich letáků a rozneste je do schránek ve vašem okolí nebo předejte svým známým, jelikož mnoho občanů naše hnutí ještě nezná,

98 ale moje jméno znají. Leták si jedním kliknutím stáhněte a vytiskněte zde http://www.spd.cz/uploads/stranky/6/dokumenty/letak-spd-1-ks-na-jednom-a4.pdf

Pokud chcete změnu, pokud chcete, aby naše vlast zůstala naše a věrná odkazu našich předků, kteří ji vykoupili svou krví, pomozte nám ji zachovat. Pomozte nám přinést náš program (http://www.spd.cz/program) do každé vesnické hospůdky, vysvětlujte lidem ve svém okolí, že zavrhnout politiku jako špínu a všechny politiky jako zločince znamená strčit hlavu do písku a vydat naši zemi všanc invazi dobyvatelů, které nám vnucuje Evropská komise. Je potřeba přijít k volbám a udělat krok ke změně. Mluvte s lidmi v zaměstnání, ve svém okolí, na fotbale, na večírcích, prostě kde se dá. Předávejte pravdu dál, stejně jako to bylo před mnoha lety. Mohou nás omezit, nemohou zastavit! Protože na konec se každý z nás bude ptát sám sebe: udělal jsem něco pro to, aby mé děti mohly žít v zemi svých otců a podle našich tradic? Dostál jsem své zodpovědnosti?

A jestli byste rádi přiložili přímo alespoň malinko ruku k dílu, staňte se našimi členy, je nás více než 11 tisíc a jsme tak jednou z pěti nejpočetnějších stran či hnutí v ČR, elektronický formulář je na http://www.spd.cz/?type=join&title=P%C5%99idejte+se+k+n%C3%A1m&sm=1&do=open Modal

Musíme se všichni spojit a netříštit síly a čím více nás bude, tím budeme mít větší sílu prosadit naše myšlenky. Náš cíl je jasný - uspět letos v říjnu ve volbách do Poslanecké sněmovny a společně přímo ovlivnit politiku směrem, kterým si my všichni přejeme. Těším se na spolupráci!

A už máme i aplikaci pro mobilní telefony (pro systém Android) - tak do toho, veškerý obsah SPD nyní můžete mít pohodlně po ruce: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=cz.spd

Jestli souhlasíte s našimi názory nebo je chce jen sledovat, můžete se zaregistrovat na mém YouTube kanálu, kde si lze kdykoliv snadno přehrát všechny moje projevy v Poslanecké sněmovně a také všechny moje aktuální videoblogy https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJjGNjN97BAk85Xb_c7shOQ

Sledujte také můj instagramový účet: https://www.instagram.com/tomio.cz/

A sledujte a registrujte se také na mém účtu na Twitteru https://twitter.com/tomio_cz

A samozřejmě se můžete registrovat i na mém blogu a budu rád, když se také podíváte http://okamura.blog.idnes.cz/

Nebo sledujte také moje webové stránky www.tomio.cz

Děkuji, že jste navštívili můj profil a přeji, ať se Vám daří.”)

Okamura’s Facebook post consisting of video and message from 15th of October 2017 (five days before the Parliamentary elections 2017) with 931 likes, 201 comments and 607 times shared:

“’Mainstream media are pro-Brussels, pro-immigration and pro-Islamic – and they are undemocratically influencing the opinions of voters (the strategy Discrediting the Elite, author’s note). They have fascist tendencies, when the opponent is silenced and dishonored,’ I told, apart from other things, in interview for web Czech Media (the strategy Discrediting the Elite, author’s note). Take a look at the video about what suggestions we have on the changes in the media so they would lie less and not manipulate the citizens (the strategy Discrediting the Elite, author’s note). ‘In the last month I have been invited by TV Barrandov in the pre- election broadcasting and immediately the counsels for Radio and Television broadcasting sent a complaint to television Barrandov stating that Okamura is there often. It is interesting that they did not send any complaint to ČT, Prima or Nova (Prima and Nova are Czech commercial television stations, the author’s note) that Okamura is not there at all! Not even to Czech Radio. That bothered no one. Those counsels are elected by the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, so they are only puppets in the hands of ruling politicians (the strategy Discrediting the Elite, author’s note). That needs to change.

The biggest problem that Okamura identifies is the politization of the public service media. ‘They are puppets in the hands of politicians,’ (the strategy Discrediting the Elite, author’s note). He would like to do the depolitization through repealing the concessionary fees and the nationalization of Czech television together with Czech Radio. The supervision should be done by The Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic and he also has a strict opinion on the election of the chief executive officers, ‘We suggest the direct election of the chief executive officer of Czech Television,’ and he specifies, ‘Every spectator should have the opportunity to vote for their chief executive officer and it would not cost even a Czech crown more (the strategy Demanding Power for the People, author’s note). The nationalization would save us a lot of money.’ According to him, the elections would be

100 joined with regional or senate elections and the mandate for chief executive officer would last four years.

What do you think about Czech media? Text me in the comments section. And please share if you agree. Have a nice day.“

(Czech original: “’Mainstreamová média jsou probruselská, proimigrační a proislámská - a nedemokraticky ovlivňují názory voličů. Mají fašizující tendence, kdy oponent je umlčován a dehonestován’, řekl jsem mimo jiné v rozhovoru pro web Česká média. Podívejte se na video, jaké máme návrhy na změny ohledně médií tak, aby méně lhali a nemanipulovali s občany. ‘V posledním měsíci mě párkrát pozvala TV Barrandov do předvolebního vysílání a okamžitě radní pro rozhlasové a televizní vysílání poslali stížnost na televizi Barrandov, že Okamura je tam často. To je zajímavé, že za celé čtyři roky neposlali stížnost třeba na ČT, Primu, nebo Novu, že tam Okamura není vůbec! Ani na Český rozhlas. To nikomu nevadilo. Tito radní jsou totiž voleni vládní většinou ve Sněmovně, takže jsou jen loutkami v rukou vládnoucích politiků. To je nutné změnit.’

Největší problém spatřuje Tomio Okamura v politizaci veřejnoprávních médií, ‘Jsou to loutky v rukách politiků.’ Odpolitizování by chtěl řešit zrušením koncesionářských poplatků a zestátněním České televize, potažmo i Českého rozhlasu. Kontrola hospodaření by měla podléhat Nejvyššímu kontrolnímu úřadu a pevný názor má i na volbu generálních ředitelů, ‘My navrhujeme přímou volbu ředitele České televize,’ a upřesňuje, ‘Každý divák by měl mít možnost si zvolit svého ředitele a nebude to stát ani korunu navíc. Zestátněním ušetříme spoustu peněz.’ Vlastní volbu by spojil třeba s krajskými nebo senátními volbami a mandát ředitele by trval čtyři roky.

Co si o českých médiích myslíte Vy? napište mi do komentářů. A jestli souhlasíte, prosím sdílejte. přeji hezký den”)

101

List of tables

Table 1: Measurement instruments (nine populist communication strategies) …………………….…21

Table 2: Differences between mass media logic and network media logic………………………...….23

Table 3: The interaction between populist communication logic and online opportunity structures… 26

Table 4: The codebook for hand-coded quantitative content analysis………………………...……… 41

Table 5: The English codebook with categories corresponding to nine populist communication strategies with the examples of usage………………………………………………………………….50

Table 6: The results of the hand-coded quantitative content analysis…………………………...…… 60

Table 7: The absolute and relative values of strategies by type…………………………………..….. 61

Table 8: The type of actor criticized in sentences belonging to conflictive strategies……………….. 61

Table 9: The proportion of original, repeated and partly repeated sentences……………………….... 62

Table 10: The 100 most used words in Okamura’s Facebook posts…………………………….…… 66

Table 11: The number of posts based on their type……………………………………………...…… 69

Table 12: Topics, keywords and suggested labels……………………………………………………..73

Table 13: 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most liked Okamura’s posts………………………...… 80

Table 14: 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most commented Okamura’s posts………………….… 81

Table 15: 20 most prevalent topics in the 60 most shared Okamura’s posts………………………..... 83

102

List of figures

Figure 1: The concept of populism as the ideology according to Wirth et al. (2016).………………...19

Figure 2: Heuristic model as introduced by Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017)...... …..26

Figure 3: Methods for text analysis……………………………………………………………….…...44

Figure 4: Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics for topic models with 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 and 58 topics………………………………………………………………………………………….. 71

Figure 5: Most used 26 topics with the expected topic proportions………………………………….. 77

Figure 6: The expected topic proportions of the rest 27 topics………………………………...…….. 79

Figure 7: The expected proportion of Topic 48 (The manipulation of the media or by media themselves) in 2017……………………………………………………………………………...…… 85

Figure 8: The expected proportion of Topic 33 (Quota system for migrant distribution and Czech MPs voting for it – Europe) in 2017……………………………………………………………..………… 85

Figure 9: The expected proportion of Topic 19 (The smear campaigns of political competitors and low salaries of domestic workers) in 2017…………………………………………………………..……. 86

Figure 10: The expected proportion of Topic 15 (The resources and keeping strategic industries in Czech possession) in 2017…………………………………………………………………...……….. 86

Figure 11: The expected proportion of Topic 35 (Non-profit organizations and education) in 2017……………………………………………………………………………………………….….. 87

Figure 12: The expected proportion of Topic 25 (The topic regarding elections and voters) in 2017……………………………………………………………………………………………...…… 87

Figure 13: The expected proportion of Topic 36 (The elections, the media and the candidates) in 2017…………………………………………………………………………………………………... 88

Figure 14: The expected proportion of Topic 37 (The social sphere - support towards working families) in 2017………………………………………………………………………………..…….. 88

103

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