Iran and Multinational Enrichment in the Middle East

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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Iran and multinational enrichment in the Middle East

Ali Ahmad & Ryan Snyder

To cite this article: Ali Ahmad & Ryan Snyder (2016) Iran and multinational enrichment in the Middle East, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:1, 52-57

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1124663

Published online: 14 Jan 2016.

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Download by: [Princeton University], [Ryan Snyder] Date: 14 January 2016, At: 10:02 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2016 VOL. 72, NO. 1, 52–57 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1124663

Iran and multinational enrichment in the Middle East

Ali Ahmad and Ryan Snyder

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS As implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal begins, five other states in the Middle East are Iran; joint comprehensive moving forward with civilian nuclear power programs. While most of these programs involve plan of action; Middle East; contracts with foreign vendors to provide reactors and the low-enriched uranium to fuel them, nuclear power; nuclear some states may want to follow Iran’s example and develop their own uranium enrichment weapons; proliferation; spent fuel; uranium programs, giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. The authors assess the uranium enrichment enrichment capacity needed to fuel planned nuclear programs in the Middle East and support the idea of using the next decade to convert Iran’s Natanz national enrichment plant to a multinational one – in partnership with one or more of the international parties to the Iran nuclear deal and some of Iran’s neighbors. Such an arrangement could help maintain the transparency of Iran’s program after restrictions on it expire, thereby easing tensions between Iran and other regional powers. This confidence-building measure could create a political context within which other Middle Eastern states forgo acquiring their own national enrichment programs and begin a worldwide movement away from such programs in favor of more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangements.

The July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement established con- stockpile expire after 15 years. By then, Iran intends straints on Iran’s program for at least 10 years in return to have an enrichment capacity at least sufficient to fuel for lifting international economic sanctions (Joint its Bushehr-1 nuclear power reactor. Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015). Meanwhile, As recently proposed by our Princeton colleagues other countries in the Middle East are advancing their Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank von Hippel, own civilian nuclear power programs, which are pro- one approach to addressing this concern would be to jected to include the construction of new reactors over use the next 10 years to convert Iran’s national enrich- the next decade. While most of these programs are ment plant to a multinational one, with some of Iran’s expected to include contracts to import reactors and neighbors and one or more members of the P5 + 1 reactor fuel, with the take-back of spent fuel, there is included as partners (Glaser, Mian, and von Hippel, concern that some states may decide to acquire their 2015).1 (P5 + 1 refers to the UN Security Council’s five own uranium enrichment capability. The acquisition of permanent members – China, France, Russia, the such technology may raise fears that these states are United Kingdom, and the United States – plus seeking an option of building nuclear weapons, making Germany, which together negotiated the recent agree- the region’s security concerns vastly more challenging ment with Iran.) This could begin a movement toward to manage. phasing out or merging national enrichment programs Downloaded by [Princeton University], [Ryan Snyder] at 10:02 14 January 2016 States in the Middle East could decide to acquire an worldwide – a step toward applying equally to all states enrichment capability for many reasons, but concerns the rules about control of the fuel cycle. about the long-term risks from Iran’s program a factor A multinational arrangement could be designed to in such a decision. The former intelligence chief for add long-term institutionalized transparency to Iran’s Saudi Arabia, Prince Turki bin Faisal, recently stated, enrichment program above and beyond that offered by “Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too” (Sanger International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It 2015). What Iran has by way of enrichment capability could give more clarity should Iran ever attempt to is, however, a moving target. The Joint Comprehensive “breakout” and produce weapons-grade uranium Plan of Action limits Iran’s installed enrichment capa- within its enrichment facility. The added transparency city for 10 years, with the installation of more advanced also could complicate efforts to establish a parallel, centrifuges permitted after this period. Restrictions on clandestine facility, addressing perhaps the most the size and enrichment level of Iran’s uranium important concern related to Iran’s program. More

broadly, this arrangement could ease the current poli- to decline (Ahmad 2015; Ahmad and Ramana 2014). tical tensions between Middle Eastern powers. It Theroleofnuclearpowerinresolvingenergysecur- should be viewed a confidence-building step in enhan- ity concerns is also questionable, given the likely cing the region’s security, as weak states and overlap- creation of new technological and human resource ping revolutions are causing existing security structures dependencies. As for the diversification of energy to collapse. sources, one major challenge is that both nuclear power and renewable energy projects are capital- intensive. This limits the possibility for countries in The future of nuclear power in the Middle East the region to invest in both energy options. Resource- There are currently six states in the Middle East (Egypt, rich countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab UAE, however, may find it easier to diversify their Emirates) with planned nuclear power programs. Iran and energy sources given their large sovereign funds, but the UAE have the most advanced programs, with Iran even these have limits, with the International having the only operating reactor in the region (Bushehr- Monetary Fund warning in 2015 that Saudi Arabia 1), and the UAE constructing four. Turkey also has is running an unsustainable fiscal deficit because of advanced plans, having already signed project contracts low oil prices (Feteha 2015). with Rosatom – Russia’s national nuclear corporation – to build four reactors at the Akkuyu site on the south coast of Nuclear fuel cycle needs and proliferation Turkey (Turkish Atomic Energy Authority 2014). concerns Six Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) decided in 2006 to develop As nuclear power expands, so too will the flow of a joint nuclear program, but Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, enriched uranium and plutonium. More centrifuges and Qatar have since walked away from this project in will be needed to enrich uranium to 3–5 percent to the wake of the accident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear fuel new reactors, but these machines could also be plant (Khlopkov 2012). Jordan and Saudi Arabia have connected in cascades to produce weapons material committed plans and are currently developing the legal enriched to 90 percent or more. The reactor-grade and regulatory framework, as well as acquiring the plutonium present in spent fuel is also weapons mate- required infrastructure and human resource capacity. rial if separated by reprocessing (Mark, von Hippel, More recently, in November Egypt and Russia signed and Lyman, 2009). an agreement to construct a reactor at Dabaa in north- The need for enrichment or reprocessing in the ern Egypt (Alsharif et al. 2015). production of weapons material was identified in the Israel, the only nuclear-weapon state in the Middle 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal report, which proposed pla- East, has considered building nuclear power plants in cing these activities under international control (US the northern Negev Desert (Erlanger 2010). The dis- State Department 1946). The concern was that if covery of natural gas then made the need less urgent, these activities remained under the control of states, and the Fukushima accident prompted a reconsidera- competition between them in the nuclear realm would tion of the project. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin eventually make technical monitoring unworkable. Netanyahu stated in a March 2011 interview, “I don’t The risk that a national civilian nuclear fuel cycle think we’re going to pursue civil nuclear energy in the program would be redirected to nuclear weapons pro- Downloaded by [Princeton University], [Ryan Snyder] at 10:02 14 January 2016 coming years” (Rinat and Ravid 2011). duction because of national security concerns, or result The official rationales for nuclear power in the in the transfer of fuel cycle technology or knowledge to Middle East include meeting the rising demand for other states, depends on many factors. These include electricity and desalinated water due to economic and the scale of the operation, how activities are controlled population growth, addressing energy security con- and monitored, economic and political incentives, and cerns by reducing reliance on imports or diversifying most importantly, whether a state’s leaders decide sources of dependence, and the opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear weapons is in their interest. The using oil and gas to generate electricity instead of for impossibility of decoupling these factors means that export (Kamrava 2012). Nuclear power has also been the problem of ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear advocated as a means to stimulate economic growth technology is not merely of a technical or military and build a highly skilled workforce (Jordan Atomic nature, but also is fundamentally political at both the Energy Commission 2011). domestic and international levels. In the Middle East, Nuclear power makes little economic sense in the these issues of technology acquisition, security politics, Middle East, however, if solar energy costs continue and proliferation have been interlinked at least since 54 A. AHMAD AND R. SNYDER

the 1950s when Israel set out to acquire its nuclear to three different nuclear fuel suppliers (Urenco, head- weapons. quarters in Stoge Poges, UK; Areva, Courbevoie, Paris, A summary of the currently projected nuclear power France; and Tenex, Moscow, Russia) to achieve “long- capacity and uranium enrichment needs of the planned term security of supply, high quality fuel and favorable national nuclear power programs in the Middle East is pricing and commercial terms,” according to Emirates presented in Table 1. The low estimates assume that Nuclear Energy Corporation CEO Mohamed Al not all planned projects will be completed. For exam- Hammadi (ENEC 2012). ple, the low estimates for Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Table 1 displays the contracted or expected fuel suppli- Arabia are zero because there are no signed construc- ers for the region’s programs. All contracts will likely have tion agreements, despite these countries’ plans to build the vendor supplying fuel and taking it back for waste at least one plant.2 The high estimates assume that all storage. In fact, Russia offers a “take-back” option for current plans will be realized. The annual enrichment spent fuel in its business model; this option is currently needs required by each state, and for the region as a in place for Iran’s Bushehr-1 reactor and is part of the whole, can be calculated using the capacity projections agreement with Jordan (Rosatom 2015). The question of (in megawatts of electric power) for each country. whether fuel from the Akkuyu site will remain in Turkey Even under the conservative low estimate, the region has not been settled (World Nuclear Association 2015). would require about 230 metric tons of low-enriched uranium (LEU) annually, and thus 1.2 million separative Multinational enrichment work units (SWU) per year. (An SWU is a measure of enrichment capacity.) This would increase to 4.4 million A Middle Eastern multinational enrichment facility SWUs in the high estimate case (see Table 1). Much of based in Iran needs to address several concerns. First, this enrichment capacity is projected to be required by control of the facility must be structured so that other 2025, the date most restrictions on Iran’s program states in the region have their doubts about the peace- expire. The options for meeting these enrichment needs ful nature of Iran’s program sufficiently addressed. An are enriched uranium fuel imports to meet national additional, but related, concern is the assurance of a needs, domestic uranium enrichment plants with their secure supply of fuel to regional customers. Meeting attendant proliferation risks, or a multinational enrich- these objectives could dissuade states from beginning ment facility, or some combination of these. their own programs by raising the risks of economic The SWU capacity shown in Table 1 could be met and political isolation. Proliferation-sensitive knowl- by fuel contracts offered by nuclear suppliers. Gaining edge and technology also need to be adequately con- fuel supply contracts is a source of profit for reactor trolled and monitored, to reduce the risk of transfers to vendors, with the exact details of fuel supply contracts potential proliferators. Lastly, in addition to satisfying varying by vendor and parent-country. For example, the concerns of P5 + 13 members about Iran’s program Russia – through its national nuclear corporation upon expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Rosatom – is currently the fuel supplier of Iran’s Action restrictions, a structure is needed that earns the power and research reactors, and will continue supply- support of planned fuel suppliers to the region’s pro- ing fuel until Iran is able to enrich and manufacture its grams (see Table 1). own, as allowed under the nuclear deal. A precedent exists for multinational enrichment: In other cases, such as Jordan and Turkey, Russia is Urenco, a company established in the 1970s, combined Downloaded by [Princeton University], [Ryan Snyder] at 10:02 14 January 2016 likely to demand lifetime fuel supply contracts. Another the national enrichment programs of the Netherlands, case is the UAE, which has decided to award fuel contracts Germany, and the United Kingdom. The arrangement

Table 1. The projected capacity, enrichment needs, and fuel suppliers of nuclear power programs in the Middle East. State Initiation date Current capacity (mwe) Projected capacity MWE (YEAR) Million SWU/year (LOW-HIGH) Fuel supplier Egypt 1960s 0 0–4,800 (2030) 0–0.5 Likely Russia Jordan 2006 0 0–2,000 (2026) 0–0.2 Russia Iran 1974 1,000 2,000–3,000 (2030) 0.2–0.3 Russia Saudi Arabia 2006 0 0–17,000 (2040) 0–1.8 Unknown Turkey 1970 0 3,350–9,400 (2030) 0.4–1.0 Russia United Arab Emirates 2006 0 5,600–5,600 (2040) 0.6–0.6 South Korea Total - 1,000 41,800 (2040) 1.2–4.4 - The following assumptions were used to calculate the numbers in Table 1: 22.12 metric tons of low-enriched uranium (LEU) per megawatt of electric power (MWe). Burn-up equals 45,000 megawatt-days per metric ton of heavy metal. Capacity factor equals 90 percent. Thermal efficiency equals 33 percent. Product assay equals 3.5 percent. Feed assay equals 0.71 percent. Tails assay equals 0.25 percent. The initiation dates displayed indicate the start of nuclear power plant construction, rather than the beginning of nuclear activities. BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 55

set up a multinational company with three enrichment Middle Eastern states could find added confidence plants (one in each country) that are jointly managed. intheproperoperationofthefacilityby,forexam- Since each stakeholder already had centrifuge technol- ple, forming their own regional nuclear inspectorate ogy, the arrangement did not create significant new to complement IAEA safeguards, just as Brazil and proliferation risks. Nonetheless, the treaty that estab- Argentina did after abandoning their nuclear weap- lished this collaboration provided rules for workers and onsprograms(ABACC1991). the monitoring of proliferation-sensitive activities and Any breakout attempt by Iran using such a facility information (Treaty of Almelo 1970).4 One goal of this would have to involve removing IAEA inspectors, pos- multinational project was to prevent Germany from sibly regional inspectors, and perhaps workers from the using its uranium enrichment capability to develop a P5 + 1 countries. Even though allowing the IAEA nuclear weapons option. access while removing P5 + 1 states would not violate One step in limiting the long-term risk from Iran’s Iran’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation program could involve multinationalizing the Natanz Treaty, forcibly removing or denying access to workers facility. An invitation by Iran for all states to profit from Russia or other P5 + 1 states would immediately from and manage the project would be an important raise questions about Iran’s intentions. Such an action confidence-building step in establishing its peaceful by Iran might create the political legitimacy for a rapid intentions. The P5 + 1 and regional states could, for international response, perhaps more so than only the instance, purchase shares of the Natanz plant at the removal of IAEA inspectors. These contingencies commercial market cost per unit of enrichment capa- demand careful thinking about how they should be city, with Iran subsidizing the program until it became addressed. economically competitive. The P5 + 1 would not need Finally, the economic advantage to regional states of to supply technology, but could be given full access purchasing fuel from vendors or from a multinational without raising proliferation risks, as all six states facility could outweigh the cost of developing and have centrifuge expertise. Regardless of whether the operating a domestic enrichment plant. The construc- facility ever became profitable, however, the transpar- tion and operation costs of a national facility, plus ency granted should be enough of an incentive that acquiring the materials and technical expertise, would states would pay for access. only be economically attractive if a state had large Among the P5 + 1 states, Russia may be the most commercial markets and a heavy reliance on nuclear obvious partner in a Middle East multinational enrich- power. At today’s current market price of $62 per ment arrangement. It signed a memorandum of under- SWU, a state would need to use well beyond 10 giga- standing (MoU) in 2014 that included possible watts of nuclear-generated electric power for the cost of cooperation with Iran in economic fuel fabrication acquiring its own enrichment plant to make economic (Kayhan International 2014), and Russia may see an sense (Habib et al. 2006).6 advantage in setting up an enrichment plant or supply- By working together on multinational enrichment, ing centrifuge technology to a facility in Iran or Iran and the P5 + 1 could build confidence among the another state in the region.5 By co-locating a Russian region's powers that Iran's program will remain peace- facility with Iran’s Natanz enrichment plant, and ful, thereby lessening the current tensions heightened managing the two together, the enriched uranium pro- by the deteriorating security in the Middle East. Such duced at Natanz and Russia’s plant could then be an arrangement could begin a movement away from Downloaded by [Princeton University], [Ryan Snyder] at 10:02 14 January 2016 combined and sold to regional customers. nationally controlled uranium enrichment facilities and Alternatively, Russia could transfer advanced centri- toward ending the risks from the implicit nuclear fuge technology to Iran, but this is something Iran weapons option such facilities provide. Success in the intends to acquire anyway and so need not be of Middle East may be the first step in acceptance of this undue concern. Collaboration with Iranian scientists norm worldwide. on centrifuge research and operation could, in fact, add some transparency about proliferation-sensitive centrifuge R&D activities. Notes Such a multinational enrichment facility with Middle Eastern regional partners would involve 1. This builds on and makes more explicit the earlier suggestion by Frank N. von Hippel, Seyed Hossein access for states without centrifuge expertise. Mousavian, Emad Kiyaei, Harold A. Feiveson, and Therefore, a structure that protects against the Zia Mian (von Hippel et al. 2013). transfer of proliferation-sensitive knowledge and 2. This analysis was done before Egypt and Russia technology would be critical. Lacking full access, announced an agreement to construct a reactor at 56 A. AHMAD AND R. SNYDER

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