Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ISSN: 0096-3402 (Print) 1938-3282 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20 Iran and multinational enrichment in the Middle East Ali Ahmad & Ryan Snyder To cite this article: Ali Ahmad & Ryan Snyder (2016) Iran and multinational enrichment in the Middle East, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:1, 52-57 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1124663 Published online: 14 Jan 2016. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbul20 Download by: [Princeton University], [Ryan Snyder] Date: 14 January 2016, At: 10:02 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2016 VOL. 72, NO. 1, 52–57 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1124663 Iran and multinational enrichment in the Middle East Ali Ahmad and Ryan Snyder ABSTRACT KEYWORDS As implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal begins, five other states in the Middle East are Iran; joint comprehensive moving forward with civilian nuclear power programs. While most of these programs involve plan of action; Middle East; contracts with foreign vendors to provide reactors and the low-enriched uranium to fuel them, nuclear power; nuclear some states may want to follow Iran’s example and develop their own uranium enrichment weapons; proliferation; spent fuel; uranium programs, giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. The authors assess the uranium enrichment enrichment capacity needed to fuel planned nuclear programs in the Middle East and support the idea of using the next decade to convert Iran’s Natanz national enrichment plant to a multi- national one – in partnership with one or more of the international parties to the Iran nuclear deal and some of Iran’s neighbors. Such an arrangement could help maintain the transparency of Iran’s program after restrictions on it expire, thereby easing tensions between Iran and other regional powers. This confidence-building measure could create a political context within which other Middle Eastern states forgo acquiring their own national enrichment programs and begin a worldwide movement away from such programs in favor of more proliferation-resistant multi- national arrangements. The July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement established con- stockpile expire after 15 years. By then, Iran intends straints on Iran’s program for at least 10 years in return to have an enrichment capacity at least sufficient to fuel for lifting international economic sanctions (Joint its Bushehr-1 nuclear power reactor. Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015). Meanwhile, As recently proposed by our Princeton colleagues other countries in the Middle East are advancing their Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank von Hippel, own civilian nuclear power programs, which are pro- one approach to addressing this concern would be to jected to include the construction of new reactors over use the next 10 years to convert Iran’s national enrich- the next decade. While most of these programs are ment plant to a multinational one, with some of Iran’s expected to include contracts to import reactors and neighbors and one or more members of the P5 + 1 reactor fuel, with the take-back of spent fuel, there is included as partners (Glaser, Mian, and von Hippel, concern that some states may decide to acquire their 2015).1 (P5 + 1 refers to the UN Security Council’s five own uranium enrichment capability. The acquisition of permanent members – China, France, Russia, the such technology may raise fears that these states are United Kingdom, and the United States – plus seeking an option of building nuclear weapons, making Germany, which together negotiated the recent agree- the region’s security concerns vastly more challenging ment with Iran.) This could begin a movement toward to manage. phasing out or merging national enrichment programs Downloaded by [Princeton University], [Ryan Snyder] at 10:02 14 January 2016 States in the Middle East could decide to acquire an worldwide – a step toward applying equally to all states enrichment capability for many reasons, but concerns the rules about control of the fuel cycle. about the long-term risks from Iran’s program a factor A multinational arrangement could be designed to in such a decision. The former intelligence chief for add long-term institutionalized transparency to Iran’s Saudi Arabia, Prince Turki bin Faisal, recently stated, enrichment program above and beyond that offered by “Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too” (Sanger International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It 2015). What Iran has by way of enrichment capability could give more clarity should Iran ever attempt to is, however, a moving target. The Joint Comprehensive “breakout” and produce weapons-grade uranium Plan of Action limits Iran’s installed enrichment capa- within its enrichment facility. The added transparency city for 10 years, with the installation of more advanced also could complicate efforts to establish a parallel, centrifuges permitted after this period. Restrictions on clandestine facility, addressing perhaps the most the size and enrichment level of Iran’s uranium important concern related to Iran’s program. More CONTACT Ryan Snyder [email protected] © 2016 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 53 broadly, this arrangement could ease the current poli- to decline (Ahmad 2015; Ahmad and Ramana 2014). tical tensions between Middle Eastern powers. It Theroleofnuclearpowerinresolvingenergysecur- should be viewed a confidence-building step in enhan- ity concerns is also questionable, given the likely cing the region’s security, as weak states and overlap- creation of new technological and human resource ping revolutions are causing existing security structures dependencies. As for the diversification of energy to collapse. sources, one major challenge is that both nuclear power and renewable energy projects are capital- intensive. This limits the possibility for countries in The future of nuclear power in the Middle East the region to invest in both energy options. Resource- There are currently six states in the Middle East (Egypt, rich countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab UAE, however, may find it easier to diversify their Emirates) with planned nuclear power programs. Iran and energy sources given their large sovereign funds, but the UAE have the most advanced programs, with Iran even these have limits, with the International having the only operating reactor in the region (Bushehr- Monetary Fund warning in 2015 that Saudi Arabia 1), and the UAE constructing four. Turkey also has is running an unsustainable fiscal deficit because of advanced plans, having already signed project contracts low oil prices (Feteha 2015). with Rosatom – Russia’s national nuclear corporation – to build four reactors at the Akkuyu site on the south coast of Nuclear fuel cycle needs and proliferation Turkey (Turkish Atomic Energy Authority 2014). concerns Six Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) decided in 2006 to develop As nuclear power expands, so too will the flow of a joint nuclear program, but Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, enriched uranium and plutonium. More centrifuges and Qatar have since walked away from this project in will be needed to enrich uranium to 3–5 percent to the wake of the accident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear fuel new reactors, but these machines could also be plant (Khlopkov 2012). Jordan and Saudi Arabia have connected in cascades to produce weapons material committed plans and are currently developing the legal enriched to 90 percent or more. The reactor-grade and regulatory framework, as well as acquiring the plutonium present in spent fuel is also weapons mate- required infrastructure and human resource capacity. rial if separated by reprocessing (Mark, von Hippel, More recently, in November Egypt and Russia signed and Lyman, 2009). an agreement to construct a reactor at Dabaa in north- The need for enrichment or reprocessing in the ern Egypt (Alsharif et al. 2015). production of weapons material was identified in the Israel, the only nuclear-weapon state in the Middle 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal report, which proposed pla- East, has considered building nuclear power plants in cing these activities under international control (US the northern Negev Desert (Erlanger 2010). The dis- State Department 1946). The concern was that if covery of natural gas then made the need less urgent, these activities remained under the control of states, and the Fukushima accident prompted a reconsidera- competition between them in the nuclear realm would tion of the project. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin eventually make technical monitoring unworkable. Netanyahu stated in a March 2011 interview, “I don’t The risk that a national civilian nuclear fuel cycle think we’re going to pursue civil nuclear energy in the program would be redirected to nuclear weapons pro- Downloaded by [Princeton University], [Ryan Snyder] at 10:02 14 January 2016 coming years” (Rinat and Ravid 2011). duction because of national security concerns, or result The official rationales for nuclear power in the in the transfer of fuel cycle technology or knowledge to Middle East include meeting the rising demand for other states, depends on many factors. These include electricity and desalinated water due to economic and the scale of the operation,