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Contents March 2012 , volume 6, issue 1 4 Editor’s PoliCy AnAlysis A BluePrint for eu energy seCurity by Mitchell A. Belfer 23 The PolitiCAl eConomy of energy seCurity And nuCleAr energy in JordAn by Imad El-Anis 46 MoldovA’s PolitiCAl self And the energy Conundrum in the Context of the euroPeAn neighBourhood PoliCy by Cătălin Gomboş and Dragoş C. Mateescu 75 Worth the energy? the geoPolitiCs of ArCtiC oil And gAs by Peter Hough 91 The impacts of internAtionAl Aid on the energy seCurity of smAll islAnd develoPing stAtes (sids): A CAse study of tuvAlu by Sarah Hemstock and Roy Smith 113 NAto, disCourse, Community And energy seCurity by Giovanni Ercolani 141 UnCovering north KoreA’s energy seCurity dilemmA: PAst PoliCies, Present ChoiCes, future oPPortunities by Virginie Grzelczyk 164 Controversies of Putin’s energy PoliCy: the ProBlem of foreign investment And long-term develoPment of the russiAn energy seCtor by Olga Khrushcheva 189 PolAnd’s Quiet revolution: shAle gAs exPlorAtion And its disContents in PomerAniA by Edyta Materka 221 BooK revieWs Investing in the United States: Is the US Ready for FDI from China EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 Writing on War Security in a Changing Global Environment: Challenging the Human Security Approach Always more at cejiss.org Frequently updated articles and comments reflecting changes in international relations between our hard copy publications. editor’s PoliCy AnAlysis A BluePrint for eu energy seCurity Introduction In the spirit of this special issue of CEJISS – which addresses a variety of issues and geopolitical questions – on energy security, the following analysis intends to provide insight into the EU’s energy vulnerabilities and then suggest some policy options for the EU to consider. This is because if energy security depended on maintaining control over resources, extraction tools, means of transportation and storage – the four main controls inherent in any energy security (ES) strategy – then the EU appears disadvantaged when compared to others. It lags behind the US, Russia and China in controlling vital resources (notably those in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin, the Arctic, the Middle East, Africa and the South China Sea); it is more import dependent then any of the other great powers while its fractured energy-boards denotes energy competition between the EU’s members. The EU is at internal loggerheads over whether and how to develop an energy strategy that may diminish its more normative preferences in favour of an enhanced geopolitical approach to defend its material security. As the internal debate wages there is a growing tendency among exogenous actors to view the EU as a disjointed international actor which depends on external security provisions. The results of such perceptions have been twofold: the sustained attempts by EU allies (notably the US) to determine the security architecture of the EU without open dialogue, and an increase in explicit challenges to EU interests in its near and more distant ‘neighbourhoods.’ From a geopolitical perspective, there are two broad sets of energy challenges facing the EU: those stemming from its international allies, and its traditional adversaries. Reviewing these with some depth helps clarify the energy situation facing the EU and provide some ways out of the current impasse. Allied Challenges to EU Energy Security While the EU boasts a more progressive approach to its, and international, security it is often hampered by the actions of its allies and its adversaries. This is acute in the area of ES where four main allied challenges seem to undermine the EU’s ability to construct and defend its 4 energy related objectives. This is a largely underwritten area of security in general, and ES in particular, as allies loathe identifying each other as challenges for the fear that doing so would cause alliance disinte- gration. However, the act of identifying an ally as a security challenge should not erode the alliance, rather it should deepen commitments Policy through dialogue and openness as opposed to allowing discord to take Analysis root and increase the potential for misunderstandings over the long- term. The first major energy related allied challenge facing the EU rests on a larger international security challenge: the fear of allied abandonment. This challenge implies that an ally could diminish a state’s ability to achieve its objectives by abandoning it in a time of crisis. In contemporary EU foreign affairs the US is an important vehicle for EU security, and if the US fails to assist the EU achieve its international objectives, the EU’s level of influence would be greatly reduced. Providing ES is one of the prime objectives of the EU and it seems that the US is poised to abandon it especially since the EU has to deal with a reinvigorated Russia as a prerequisite for securing its energy supplies. As the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, the 2009 Russian gas cuts to Ukraine (and 10 EU states), and Russia’s policy regarding the Arctic demonstrate, the US is either unwilling or unable to adequately ensure EU ES. Alarm bells should have been ringing in the halls of EU foreign policy making. Instead, media attention focused on the US’s desire to incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and not on the energy vulnerabilities facing the EU and ways the US could assist in reducing them. Despite the multitude of areas in which the EU and US continue to cooperate, the idea of US neutrality in energy related disputes should be a cause for concern. In the event that the US adopts a policy of neutrality over energy supplies to the EU, it is tantamount to security abandonment, and therefore must be treated as an allied challenge. If allies discriminately select the issues vital to each other they wish to support, collective action is ‘neutralised’ and the EU will have to look elsewhere for its security provisions. Second, challenges may arise from the actions of certain allied states which, when attempting to achieve their own interests may reduce the ability of the EU to fulfil its energy objectives. Although dated, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and subsequent 1974 oil embargo should act as a stark reminder of what may occur when an ally is embroiled in a military or political confrontation with key energy states. While EU states learned valuable lessons from the 1974 oil crisis, and have taken precautionary actions to limit the influence of OPEC and diversify their supply base, 5 many of their allies may still, inadvertently damage EU relations to energy producing states. For instance, the post-Cold War relationship between Georgia, Ukraine and the EU, although not set as a formalised alliance, has severely undermined Russian-EU relations in the area of cejiss energy. 1/2012 It is wrong to assume that Russia’s blockade of gas supplies to 10 gas-dependent EU states in early 2009 was detached from the EU’s open support for Ukrainian and Georgian attempts to join NATO and possibly the EU. While the EU should not be deterred from formu- lating and pursuing an independent set of foreign policy objectives, it should tread cautiously and ensure that its allies do not unneces- sarily – through irresponsible policies – trigger disruptions in energy imports. Balancing between EU ES and its alliance commitments is difficult and risks alienating the EU from genuine allies, of losing EU consensus on deepening alliances, and of exposing additional points of vulnerabilities to the EU project of democratisation. However, it is in the best interest of the EU to ensure that its allies maintain ethical and (internationally) legal approaches to their foreign affairs to avoid, in the first case, unnecessary conflicts and secondly, so that if the EU were to suffer because of the ethically acceptable and legitimate actions of its allies, EU publics would stand behind EU alliance choices instead of seeking to scapegoat. Third and finally, continued competition between EU members, and between the EU and its international allies, for energy supplies, while unfolding on the economic level, also undermines EU ES. This problem is, in part, due to the nature of the EU and in part due to the nature of producing states attempting to ‘divide and conquer’ for political and economic leverage. Russia’s relationship to Italy and Germany are testament to the policy of favouritism Russia has used to undermine a comprehensive EU energy strategy. But this is not Russia’s fault. After all, Russia does not compel Italy and Germany to accept special energy treatment, and it is up to EU members to think about other EU states when they embark on energy supply programmes. Adversarial Challenges to EU Energy Security In addition to energy challenges emanating from EU allies, those posed by its actual and potential adversaries have begun to set the EU up to act as other great powers, in defence of material interests, or find itself at a tremendous socio-economic, political and military disadvan- tage. The main consequence of the former is the diminishment of normative approaches to EU foreign affairs and the heightened potential 6 of armed conflict on European soil, and the latter is likely to result in a steep decline in EU productivity and an increase in its geopolitical and military vulnerabilities. Both options are negative and while the EU must not alter its international behaviour because of hydrocarbon manipulation, it needs to find a middle-ground between normative Mitchell A. and realist approaches to its international engagements. There are Belfer two broad adversarial challenges currently facing the EU: the hostile economic challenge and the geopolitical challenge.

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