THE DILEMMA OF THE COMMONERS One of the classic problems in social science is known as ‘the dilemma of the commons’, in which land, water, and other resources held jointly by social or economic segments tend to be depleted sooner and to a greater extent than privately held assets. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many aspects of western European society changed fundamentally, including the abolition of common-property rights, which in itself was related to social, political, and eco- nomic shifts in that same society. This book intends to put the debate on commons, commoners, and the disappearance of both throughout early modern and modern northwestern Europe in a new light, through new approaches and innovative methodologies. Tine De Moor aims to link the historical debate about the long- term evolution of commons to the present-day debates on common-pool resources, as well as touching upon various disciplines within the social sciences that work on commons issues. Tine De Moor is Professor of Institutions for Collective Action in Historical Perspective at Utrecht University. She has published in various top journals on a variety of topics in social and economic history, but most extensively on commons in northwestern Europe. She has won several prizes for her research, including the prize for the best dissertation in the category ‘Medieval and Early Modern Period’ of the International Economic History Association. She is also currently President (2015–2017) of the International Association for the Study of the Commons and the co-founder, former editor-in-chief, and member of the editorial board of the International Journal of the Commons. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS Series Editors Stephen Ansolabehere, Harvard University Jeffry Frieden, Harvard University Founding Editors James E. Alt, Harvard University Douglass C. North, Washington University of St. Louis Other Books in the Series Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie, Southern Paternalism and the Rise of the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions, 1865–1965 James E. Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy Josephine T. Andrews, When Majorities Fail: The Russian Parliament, 1990–1993 Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek, eds., Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, 2nd edition Yoram Barzel, A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power Kelly H. Chang, Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, eds., Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States: An Institutionalist Approach Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral System Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson, The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Jean Ensminger, Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, The Transformation of Property Rights in the Gold Coast: An Empirical Study Applying Rational Choice Theory Clark C. Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa Daniel W. Gingerich, Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America: Stealing for the Team continued after the Index THE DILEMMA OF THE COMMONERS Understanding the Use of Common-Pool Resources in Long-Term Perspective Tine De Moor Utrecht University, The Netherlands 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013–2473, USA Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107022164 © Tine De Moor 2015 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2015 Printed in the United States of America A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Moor, Tine de. The dilemma of the commoners : understanding the use of common-pool resources in long-term perspective / Tine De Moor. pages cm. – (Political economy of institutions and decisions) 1. Cooperation – Europe – History. I. Title. HD3484.A4M56 2015 333.2–dc23 2014048656 ISBN 978-1-107-02216-4 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. For Kaat Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? This question has intrigued people for a long time. And for good reason. We all know that people are not angels, and that they tend to look after themselves and their own first. Yet we also know that cooperation does occur and that our civilization is based upon it. But, in situations where each individual has an incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever develop? (Axelrod 1984, 3) Contents List of Figures and Tables . ......................... page xi Preface . ......................................... xiii Acknowledgments . ..................................xvii Introduction . ................................... 1 1 The emergence of commons and other forms of institutions for collective action in western Europe from the late Middle Ages onwards ....................................... 18 1.1 An institutional revolution in western Europe? ............... 18 1.2 Historical development: the rise of commons and guilds from 1000 to 1300 ..................................... 24 1.3 Distinct institutions for collective action ................... 31 1.4 The design of institutions for collective action ............... 34 1.4.1 Exclusive .................................... 34 1.4.2 Self-governed and relatively democratic governance structure .................................... 38 1.4.3 Protectionist .................................. 40 1.4.4 Local ....................................... 44 1.4.5 Features of the governance model versus features of succesful institutions ................................... 46 1.5 Explaining the origins of institutions for collective action in western Europe .......................................... 48 1.5.1 Motives for collective action: potential advantages of cooperation .................................. 49 1.5.2 Motors of institutions for collective action: stimulating factors to form collectivities ............................ 52 1.5.3 Conditions for collective action: weak family ties, tolerant states, and legal recognition . .................... 55 1.6 Conclusions ...................................... 58 2 Common land and common rights in Flanders . ............ 61 2.1 Description of the area ............................... 61 2.2 The nature of common land ........................... 67 ix Contents 2.2.1 Common waste ................................ 68 2.2.2 Common arable land ............................ 71 2.3 The evolution of the legal basis of common land .............. 73 2.4 Management of common land in Flanders .................. 84 2.4.1 Boundaries of common land ....................... 88 2.4.2 Regulation of the use of common land ................ 91 2.4.3 Managers and monitors of common land .............. 93 2.5 Conclusions ...................................... 97 3 From rules to practice: case description, sources, and methodology . ................................100 3.1 Case study: the common of the Gemene and Loweiden in the villages of Assebroek and Oedelem, Flanders ................ 100 3.1.1 The rights and duties of the aanborgers ................ 103 3.1.2 Historial sources on the case of the Gemene and Loweiden .................................... 107 3.2 Methodological framework: the functioning of a common captured in a three-dimensional approach ......................... 113 4 The choices of the commoners: understanding utility, efficiency, and equity on the commons through the behavior of commoners .....................................121 4.1 The commoners’ changing participation in use and management of the common .................................... 124 4.2 The effect of changing power balances on the management of the common ........................................