Darfur's New Security Reality

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Darfur's New Security Reality DARFUR’S NEW SECURITY REALITY Africa Report N°134 – 26 November 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 II. EVOLVING CONFLICT DYNAMICS ......................................................................... 2 A. THE RISE IN ARAB-ARAB CONFLICT .......................................................................................2 1. The Targam and the Abbala Rizeigat...........................................................................3 2. The Salamat and the Habaniya .....................................................................................3 3. The Beni Halba...........................................................................................................3 4. The impact on the Arab tribes......................................................................................3 5. The inclusion of Arab tribes in the peace process.........................................................4 B. ARAB AND NON-ARAB RELATIONS.........................................................................................4 1. The Arabs and the Fur/Massaleit .................................................................................4 2. The Arabs and the Zaghawa........................................................................................5 3. Possible outcomes.......................................................................................................6 C. RISING VIOLENCE IN THE IDP CAMPS .....................................................................................6 1. Situation in the camps .................................................................................................6 2. NCP attempts to clear out the camps ...........................................................................7 III. THE CALCULATIONS OF THE PARTIES ................................................................ 8 A. THE NCP STRATEGY..............................................................................................................8 1. Electoral calculations ..................................................................................................8 2. Use of the local security apparatus...............................................................................9 3. Arms dealing.............................................................................................................10 4. Containment of non-Arab tribes ................................................................................10 5. The creation of new localities....................................................................................11 B. THE DPA SIGNATORIES .......................................................................................................11 1. Minni Minawi and the SLA/MM...............................................................................11 2. Other DPA signatories ..............................................................................................12 C. REBEL STRATEGIES AND FRAGMENTATION..............................................................................13 1. SLA factions.............................................................................................................13 2. JEM splits.................................................................................................................13 3. Additional groups......................................................................................................14 4. Rebel strategies.........................................................................................................15 IV. SPILLOVER AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS............................................................ 16 A. NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN KORDOFAN ...............................................................................16 B. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)...................................................................................17 C. THE CHAD-SUDAN DYNAMIC ...............................................................................................17 D. LIBYA .................................................................................................................................19 E. ERITREA..............................................................................................................................19 F. EGYPT .................................................................................................................................20 V. TOWARD A SETTLEMENT....................................................................................... 21 A. EFFORTS AT PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING...................................................................21 1. Peacemaking.............................................................................................................21 2. Peacekeeping ............................................................................................................22 B. THE WAY FORWARD............................................................................................................24 VI. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................. 27 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SUDAN...................................................................................................................28 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................29 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................31 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA ................................32 E. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................34 S Africa Report N°134 26 November 2007 DARFUR’S NEW SECURITY REALITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Darfur conflict has changed radically in the past year fragmented and less representative of constituencies they and not for the better. While there are many fewer deaths claim to speak for. than during the high period of fighting in 2003-2004, it has mutated, the parties have splintered, and the confrontations The IDP camps are increasingly violent, with residents have multiplied. Violence is again increasing, access manipulated by all sides while Khartoum also tries to force for humanitarian agencies is decreasing, international them to return to unsafe areas. Inter-Arab dissension has peacekeeping is not yet effective and a political settlement added new volatility to the situation on the ground. Some remains far off. The strategy the African Union (AU)/UN tribes are trying to solidify land claims before the UN/AU mediation has been following cannot cope with this new hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID) reality and needs to be revised. After a highly publicised arrives. This has led to fighting with other Arab tribes, opening ceremony in Sirte, Libya, on 27 October 2007, which have realised the NCP is not a reliable guarantor of the new peace talks have been put on hold. The mediation their long-term interests and have started to take protection should use this opportunity to reformulate the process, into their own hands. There is now a high risk of an Arab broadening participation and addressing all the conflict’s insurgency, as well as potential for alliances with the root causes. predominantly non-Arab rebel groups. A spillover of the conflict into Kordofan has also started. The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is a failure, too limited in scope and signatories. Those who The new realities emphasise the necessity of broadening signed – the government and a few rebel factions – have participation in the peace talks to include the full range of hurt the peace process. The ruling party in Khartoum, the actors and constituencies involved in the conflict, including National Congress Party (NCP), is pursuing destructive its primary victims, such as women, but also Arab tribes. policies in Darfur, while at the same time resisting key Incorporating broader and more representative voices can provisions in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement help remedy the uneven weight the process now gives the (CPA) that ended the North-South war, thus triggering a NCP and rebel factions. Core issues that drive the conflict, crisis in that process. They are meant to ensure its survival among them land tenure and use, including grazing rights, in 2009 elections, not end the conflict, and they are and the role and reform of local government and jeopardising Sudan’s peacemaking architecture. The NCP administrative structures, were not addressed in the DPA wants Darfur in chaos to limit the room for an opposition but left to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation to emerge, while resettling key allies on cleared land process that was supposed to follow the negotiations. and defying Security Council resolutions by integrating They need to be on the agenda of the new negotiations its Janjaweed irregulars into official security structures if an eventual agreement is to gain the wide support the instead of disarming them. DPA has lacked. Rebel DPA signatories, particularly the Sudan Liberation UNAMID is unlikely to be fully operational until well into Army faction of Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), have been 2008, so it is important
Recommended publications
  • Darfur Genocide
    Darfur genocide Berkeley Model United Nations Welcome Letter Hi everyone! Welcome to the Darfur Historical Crisis committee. My name is Laura Nguyen and I will be your head chair for BMUN 69. This committee will take place from roughly 2006 to 2010. Although we will all be in the same physical chamber, you can imagine that committee is an amalgamation of peace conferences, UN meetings, private Janjaweed or SLM meetings, etc. with the goal of preventing the Darfur Genocide and ending the War in Darfur. To be honest, I was initially wary of choosing the genocide in Darfur as this committee’s topic; people in Darfur. I also understood that in order for this to be educationally stimulating for you all, some characters who committed atrocious war crimes had to be included in debate. That being said, I chose to move on with this topic because I trust you are all responsible and intelligent, and that you will treat Darfur with respect. The War in Darfur and the ensuing genocide are grim reminders of the violence that is easily born from intolerance. Equally regrettable are the in Africa and the Middle East are woefully inadequate for what Darfur truly needs. I hope that understanding those failures and engaging with the ways we could’ve avoided them helps you all grow and become better leaders and thinkers. My best advice for you is to get familiar with the historical processes by which ethnic brave, be creative, and have fun! A little bit about me (she/her) — I’m currently a third-year at Cal majoring in Sociology and minoring in Data Science.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Implement Sudan's New Peace Agreement
    The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement Sudan’s New Peace Agreement Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°168 Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 23 February 2021 What’s new? A peace agreement signed on 3 October 2020 paves the way for armed and unarmed opposition groups in Sudan to join the transitional government, dra- matically expanding representation of the country’s peripheries during the interim period before elections. The two most powerful rebel movements remain outside the accord, however. Why does it matter? Clinching the agreement was necessary for the country’s transition but implementation poses challenges. The agreement risks bloating the military and sets up a prospective political alliance between the rebels and Sudanese security forces, which could further sideline the government’s civilian cabinet and threaten to bury its reform agenda. What should be done? The interim government should negotiate with holdout rebels to bring them into the transition. Sudan’s international partners should press for security sector reform that decreases the size and political dominance of a newly expanded military while funding and supporting the authorities’ spending commit- ments in the peripheries. I. Overview Sudan’s October 2020 peace agreement, involving the interim government and rebel movements in Darfur and the Two Areas, among others, is an important step in the country’s transition after the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The deal allows for representatives from armed groups in the country’s peripheries to take government posts and for significant public money to go to these areas. It is a way to rebalance the Nile Valley elites’ decades-long domination of Sudan’s political system.
    [Show full text]
  • Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum
    Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date Issued: 04 September 2006 Author: Mariam Bibi Jooma1 Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum Sudan’s western region of Darfur has frequently featured in the headlines since Introduction the outbreak of major violence there in 2003. Indeed, it often seemed that international interest would remain focused upon Darfur, given the scale of human suffering and the immensity of the challenges facing the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping operations in that vast area. It was little surprise, then, that the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May this year between the Government of Sudan and the Minni Arkoi Minnawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) was greeted with such relief in the media. Developments since the signing of the DPA, however, suggest that the political commitment to implementing its terms remains extremely weak, and there is a continued polarisation of affected ethnic communities, particularly within displacement camps, sometimes with fatal consequences. This has happened despite the appointment on 7 August of Minni Arkoi Minnawi, as the Special Assistant to the Sudanese President. Moreover, the period between May and July 2006 has seen the highest number of fatalities among aid workers since the beginning of 2003.2 This is quite aside from the continuing killing of Darfurians on a daily basis. In this unpredictable environment, the local population has become increasingly cynical of the potential peacekeeping role of the African Union Mission (AMIS) deployed to observe the implementation of the 2004 ceasefire agreement. A growing number of fatalities suffered by AMIS troops themselves in Darfur suggests that the African Union’s role as mediator and guarantor for the implementation of the DPA is being overtly challenged.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the 'Darfurization' of Chad: Myths and Reality
    12 The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Myths and Reality By Jérôme Tubiana Copyright The Small Arms Survey Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Grad- uate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2008 principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and as a First published in April 2008 resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Belgium, permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. The law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- Survey is also grateful for past and current project-specific support received zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should from Australia, Denmark, and New Zealand. Further funding has been pro- be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. vided by the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Geneva International Academic Net- Small Arms Survey work, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The Graduate Institute of International Studies Small Arms Survey collaborates with research institutes and NGOs in many 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland countries, including Brazil, Canada, Georgia, Germany, India, Israel, Jordan, Copyedited by Emily Walmsley Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • 04-10-06 DPA.Indd
    Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date Issued: 04 September 2006 Author: Mariam Bibi Jooma1 Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum Sudan’s western region of Darfur has frequently featured in the headlines since Introduction the outbreak of major violence there in 2003. Indeed, it often seemed that international interest would remain focused upon Darfur, given the scale of human suffering and the immensity of the challenges facing the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping operations in that vast area. It was little surprise, then, that the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May this year between the Government of Sudan and the Minni Arkoi Minnawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) was greeted with such relief in the media. Developments since the signing of the DPA, however, suggest that the political commitment to implementing its terms remains extremely weak, and there is a continued polarisation of affected ethnic communities, particularly within displacement camps, sometimes with fatal consequences. This has happened despite the appointment on 7 August of Minni Arkoi Minnawi, as the Special Assistant to the Sudanese President. Moreover, the period between May and July 2006 has seen the highest number of fatalities among aid workers since the beginning of 2003.2 This is quite aside from the continuing killing of Darfurians on a daily basis. In this unpredictable environment, the local population has become increasingly cynical of the potential peacekeeping role of the African Union Mission (AMIS) deployed to observe the implementation of the 2004 ceasefire agreement. A growing number of fatalities suffered by AMIS troops themselves in Darfur suggests that the African Union’s role as mediator and guarantor for the implementation of the DPA is being overtly challenged.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan Opposition to the Government, Including
    Country Policy and Information Note Sudan: Opposition to the government, including sur place activity Version 2.0 November 2018 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the basis of claim section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis of COI; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Asessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment on whether, in general: x A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm x A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) x A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory x Claims are likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and x If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. Country of origin information The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict
    OCCASIONAL PAPER NO 67 China in Africa Project September 2010 The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict Gaafar Karrar Ahmed s ir a f f A l a n o ti a rn e nt f I o te tu sti n In rica . th Af hts Sou sig al in Glob African perspectives. About SAIIA The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent, non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace; and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about SAIIA’s work. About the C h INA IN AFRICA PR o J e C t SAIIA’s ‘China in Africa’ research project investigates the emerging relationship between China and Africa; analyses China’s trade and foreign policy towards the continent; and studies the implications of this strategic co-operation in the political, military, economic and diplomatic fields. The project seeks to develop an understanding of the motives, rationale and institutional structures guiding China’s Africa policy, and to study China’s growing power and influence so that they will help rather than hinder development in Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Failing Darfur
    ANONYMOUS/ENOUGH Failing Darfur Omer Ismail and Annette LaRocco August 2012 WWW.ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG Failing Darfur Omer Ismail and Annette LaRocco August 2012 Introduction Another Darfur peace agreement has failed, but the United Nations, or U.N., and some donor governments continue to prop up its implementation. This continued support is actually making matters worse in Darfur. By buttressing a dead peace deal, the interna- tional community is ignoring the ongoing conflict that the agreement did not address, while simultaneously contributing to the divide-and-conquer strategy of the Khartoum government, which seeks to negotiate separately with the various Darfur factions and to insulate the Darfur insurgency from other similar rebellions in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and – potentially – the East. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, or DDPD, was signed in July 2011 by the gov- ernment of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement, or LJM, only one of several Darfuri opposition rebel groups.1 From its inception, the DDPD was deeply flawed. It fails to address the most important security and political issues identified by Darfuris. Not only does it attempt to address the conflict in Darfur without including the three most promi- nent rebels groups in the region, the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, and both factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement, or SLM-Minni Minnawi and SLM-Abdel Wahid, but it also allows Khartoum to continue its divide-and-conquer strategy of dealing with each of the country’s conflict zones in isolation. Nonetheless, the U. N. and key donor countries heralded the DDPD as an important step in ending the decade-long conflict in Sudan’s vast western region.
    [Show full text]
  • Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement
    25 Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement By Jérôme Tubiana Copyright Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2011 First published in March 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Edited by Diana Rodriguez and Emile LeBrun Copy-edited by Alex Potter ([email protected]) Proofread by John Linnegar ([email protected]) Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Richard Jones ([email protected]) Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland ISBN 978-2-940415-48-9 2 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 25 Tubiana Denouncing the Rebels 3 Contents List of abbreviations and acronyms .................................................................................................................................... 5 Executive summary .....................................................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • One Hundred Ninth Congress of the United States of America
    H. R. 3127 One Hundred Ninth Congress of the United States of America AT THE SECOND SESSION Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the third day of January, two thousand and six An Act To impose sanctions against individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, to support measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations, and to support peace efforts in the Darfur region of Sudan, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006’’. (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Definitions. Sec. 3. Findings. Sec. 4. Sense of Congress. Sec. 5. Sanctions in support of peace in Darfur. Sec. 6. Additional authorities to deter and suppress genocide in Darfur. Sec. 7. Continuation of restrictions. Sec. 8. Assistance efforts in Sudan. Sec. 9. Reporting requirements. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) AMIS.—The term ‘‘AMIS’’ means the African Union Mission in Sudan. (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives. (3) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT FOR SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan’’ means the peace agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9, 2005.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan Divided This Page Intentionally Left Blank Sudan Divided Continuing Conflict in a Contested State
    Sudan Divided This page intentionally left blank Sudan Divided Continuing Conflict in a Contested State Edited by G u n n a r M . S ø r b ø a n d Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed SUDAN DIVIDED Copyright © Gunnar M. S ø rb ø and Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, 2013. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 All rights reserved. First published in 2013 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN ® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave ® and Macmillan ® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–1–137–33823–5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: October 2013 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ISBN 978-1-349-46397-8 ISBN 978-1-137-33824-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137338242 Contents A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s vii List of Contributors ix List of Abbreviations xiii Map of Sudan xv Chapter 1 Introduction: Sudan’s Durable Disorder 1 Gunnar M.
    [Show full text]
  • Darfurian Voices
    DARFURIAN VOICES Documenting Darfurian Refugees’ Views on Issues of Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation A Project By 24 Hours For Darfur DARFURIANVOICES.ORG Documenting Darfurian Refugees’ DARFURIAN VOICES Views on Issues of Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation Authors, Jonathan Loeb Contributors, Benjamin Naimark-Rowse and Matthew Bowlby Ethan Siller Field Researchers Chad Hazlett Mohialdin Abdullah Abdelbagy Abushanab Elnour Adam Hissein Idris Adam Basmat Ahmed Abdelkerim Bachar Zuhair Bashar Khamis Hassan Djime Awad Hassan Anders Hastrup Dr. Siddick Adam Issa Aziz Idriss Mahassan Izzadine Abdelrahim Kadok Suad Mansour Munira Mohamed A Project By 24 Hours For Darfur Djafar Abakar Mohamed DARFURIANVOICES.ORG Chama Hassan Mohamed Mahamat Al-Fatih Oumar Collin Raymond Aziza Al Sheikh Zeinab Suleiman Jérôme Tubiana Iridimi Refugee Camp, eastern Chad. Woman and baby prepare for a sandstorm, Gaga Refugee Camp, eastern Chad. Women carrying water from a water point, Djabal Refugee Camp, eastern Chad. Soccer game, Djabal Refugee Camp, eastern Chad. A Project By 24 Hours For Darfur In Collaboration With: Res Publica The Darfur People’s Association of New York The Darfur Rehabilitation Project The Genocide Intervention Network The Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale Law School The information provided and views expressed in this report are those of 24 Hours for Darfur alone and do not necessarily reflect those of its collaborating organizations. darfurianvoices.org 13 Contents Authors, Contributors, and Field Researchers 3 Background Notes Partner
    [Show full text]