Darfur's New Security Reality
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DARFUR’S NEW SECURITY REALITY Africa Report N°134 – 26 November 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 II. EVOLVING CONFLICT DYNAMICS ......................................................................... 2 A. THE RISE IN ARAB-ARAB CONFLICT .......................................................................................2 1. The Targam and the Abbala Rizeigat...........................................................................3 2. The Salamat and the Habaniya .....................................................................................3 3. The Beni Halba...........................................................................................................3 4. The impact on the Arab tribes......................................................................................3 5. The inclusion of Arab tribes in the peace process.........................................................4 B. ARAB AND NON-ARAB RELATIONS.........................................................................................4 1. The Arabs and the Fur/Massaleit .................................................................................4 2. The Arabs and the Zaghawa........................................................................................5 3. Possible outcomes.......................................................................................................6 C. RISING VIOLENCE IN THE IDP CAMPS .....................................................................................6 1. Situation in the camps .................................................................................................6 2. NCP attempts to clear out the camps ...........................................................................7 III. THE CALCULATIONS OF THE PARTIES ................................................................ 8 A. THE NCP STRATEGY..............................................................................................................8 1. Electoral calculations ..................................................................................................8 2. Use of the local security apparatus...............................................................................9 3. Arms dealing.............................................................................................................10 4. Containment of non-Arab tribes ................................................................................10 5. The creation of new localities....................................................................................11 B. THE DPA SIGNATORIES .......................................................................................................11 1. Minni Minawi and the SLA/MM...............................................................................11 2. Other DPA signatories ..............................................................................................12 C. REBEL STRATEGIES AND FRAGMENTATION..............................................................................13 1. SLA factions.............................................................................................................13 2. JEM splits.................................................................................................................13 3. Additional groups......................................................................................................14 4. Rebel strategies.........................................................................................................15 IV. SPILLOVER AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS............................................................ 16 A. NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN KORDOFAN ...............................................................................16 B. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)...................................................................................17 C. THE CHAD-SUDAN DYNAMIC ...............................................................................................17 D. LIBYA .................................................................................................................................19 E. ERITREA..............................................................................................................................19 F. EGYPT .................................................................................................................................20 V. TOWARD A SETTLEMENT....................................................................................... 21 A. EFFORTS AT PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING...................................................................21 1. Peacemaking.............................................................................................................21 2. Peacekeeping ............................................................................................................22 B. THE WAY FORWARD............................................................................................................24 VI. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................. 27 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SUDAN...................................................................................................................28 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................29 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................31 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA ................................32 E. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................34 S Africa Report N°134 26 November 2007 DARFUR’S NEW SECURITY REALITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Darfur conflict has changed radically in the past year fragmented and less representative of constituencies they and not for the better. While there are many fewer deaths claim to speak for. than during the high period of fighting in 2003-2004, it has mutated, the parties have splintered, and the confrontations The IDP camps are increasingly violent, with residents have multiplied. Violence is again increasing, access manipulated by all sides while Khartoum also tries to force for humanitarian agencies is decreasing, international them to return to unsafe areas. Inter-Arab dissension has peacekeeping is not yet effective and a political settlement added new volatility to the situation on the ground. Some remains far off. The strategy the African Union (AU)/UN tribes are trying to solidify land claims before the UN/AU mediation has been following cannot cope with this new hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID) reality and needs to be revised. After a highly publicised arrives. This has led to fighting with other Arab tribes, opening ceremony in Sirte, Libya, on 27 October 2007, which have realised the NCP is not a reliable guarantor of the new peace talks have been put on hold. The mediation their long-term interests and have started to take protection should use this opportunity to reformulate the process, into their own hands. There is now a high risk of an Arab broadening participation and addressing all the conflict’s insurgency, as well as potential for alliances with the root causes. predominantly non-Arab rebel groups. A spillover of the conflict into Kordofan has also started. The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is a failure, too limited in scope and signatories. Those who The new realities emphasise the necessity of broadening signed – the government and a few rebel factions – have participation in the peace talks to include the full range of hurt the peace process. The ruling party in Khartoum, the actors and constituencies involved in the conflict, including National Congress Party (NCP), is pursuing destructive its primary victims, such as women, but also Arab tribes. policies in Darfur, while at the same time resisting key Incorporating broader and more representative voices can provisions in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement help remedy the uneven weight the process now gives the (CPA) that ended the North-South war, thus triggering a NCP and rebel factions. Core issues that drive the conflict, crisis in that process. They are meant to ensure its survival among them land tenure and use, including grazing rights, in 2009 elections, not end the conflict, and they are and the role and reform of local government and jeopardising Sudan’s peacemaking architecture. The NCP administrative structures, were not addressed in the DPA wants Darfur in chaos to limit the room for an opposition but left to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation to emerge, while resettling key allies on cleared land process that was supposed to follow the negotiations. and defying Security Council resolutions by integrating They need to be on the agenda of the new negotiations its Janjaweed irregulars into official security structures if an eventual agreement is to gain the wide support the instead of disarming them. DPA has lacked. Rebel DPA signatories, particularly the Sudan Liberation UNAMID is unlikely to be fully operational until well into Army faction of Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), have been 2008, so it is important