A Roundtable on Grant Madsen, Sovereign Soldiers: How the U.S
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
A Roundtable on Grant Madsen, Sovereign Soldiers: How the U.S. Military Transformed the Global Economy After World War II Laura Hein, Michael J. Hogan, Aaron O’Connell, Carolyn Eisenberg, Curt Cardwell, and Grant Madsen Introduction, Roundtable review of Grant Madsen, Madsen assigned to them. First of all, they don’t work as Sovereign Soldiers: How the U.S. Military Transformed a set. Although all three were U.S. generals, they shared the Global Economy after World War II (Philadelphia: little else in terms of temperament, management style, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018) assumptions about the foreigners under their control, or even priorities regarding U.S. national security after 1945. Laura Hein MacArthur is particularly intractable when it comes to arguing that he shaped Japan’s economy, a subject he found conduct this exercise by concluding that the format of little interest. His own pronouncements tended to stress is a case of “be careful of what you wish for ...” All things like “eliminating feudalism,” which functioned authors want their work to be taken seriously and all more as talking point than as a policy blueprint. Ijournal readers prefer lively, engaged material. You, dear Second, all three men quickly delegated economic readers, will be satisfied on both accounts. On the other planning to their economic advisors, who were not career hand, assembling five very well-informed reviewers to military men. This is what irks Aaron O’Connell, who, after train their full attention—publicly—on a younger scholar’s reading the first 60 pages, expected the book to show how first concerted effort is a lot of muscle. I suspect I am not specific economic ideas or policies were connected to the the only member of the firing squad to be glad that no sly experience of military leadership—of running occupied editor offered me this devil’s bargain of an opportunity territories rather than waging war. I shared O’Connell’s back when my first book appeared. experience of misdirection and his reaction that Madsen’s Grant Madsen started with a really great question: question would have been better answered by looking at How and in what ways did military leadership of American fully military-run governments, such as in Haiti, rather occupation governments affect economic policy? His thesis than the occupations of Germany and Japan, which were was that a coherent economic policy emerged when U.S. staffed at the upper levels largely by men who had joined military governments led by Army generals Dwight D. the war effort after substantial civilian careers. Indeed, Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and Lucius Clay remade Madsen would not have needed to travel far: the Army was the economies of various territories under their command. running its own shows in Korea from 1945 until 1948 and Further, they applied those lessons to the postwar in Okinawa until 1972 with far less civilian input than in American and global economies during the Eisenhower neighboring Japan. Neither episode was known for good administration. But then, his own research suggested economic management, however, suggesting that career that the actual answer was, “it depends on too much else military men, as they repeatedly say in this book, were to attribute over-all economic policy, let alone economic poorly trained for that task.1 I would add that both Madsen outcomes, to these actors.” Good researchers frequently and O’Connell are a bit too quick to assume that Big Men find themselves in this position, and writing one’s way out who stood atop a chain of command had the most effect of it is one of the hardest tasks I know. As his response on outcomes. That may be why Madsen did not reframe to the other four reviewers shows, Madsen’s ideas are still his book by introducing his key civilian actors at the outset evolving, but the book itself reveals a scholar who had not together with his military ones, which would have better fully integrated the implications of the research with the helped his readers understand his true focus. framing argument when it went to press. To cut to the In fact, my own work argues that the key players were chase, this book does a number of interesting things but often not Americans at all but included economists among does not succeed in its main goals. the Germans and Japanese whom they ostensibly governed, Madsen was tripped up by three general problems, all a claim substantiated but not highlighted in the book. There flagged by the four reviewers in different ways: Who are were profound policy disagreements but they usually did the key actors? What is the relationship between economic not line up as Japanese versus American views. Takemae theory and economic policy? What role does politics play Eiji, Mark Metzler, Aiko Ikeo, Scott O’Bryan, Tsuru Shigeto, in this narrative and its reception? and W. Elliott Brownlee join me in pointing out that the The book begins by introducing Eisenhower, Americans interacted with Japanese experts throughout MacArthur, and Clay as the crucial figures around whom their years there and that all of them experienced those the book will be structured. They are famous and powerful engagements as deeply collaborative, although sometimes men, they operated in contexts where their orders were also frustrating.2 Some of these Japanese individuals are frequently obeyed, and they had long and impressive mentioned in Madsen’s tale, as are several German planners, careers. Nonetheless, they just don’t shoulder the task that but only episodically. Madsen is clearly developing Page 10 Passport January 2019 this point when he somewhat aspirationally states in his 2. Laura Hein, Fueling Growth: the Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA, 1990); Hein, Reasonable “Response to Reviewers” that “I claim that a group of non- th Nazi German economists ultimately provided the basic Men, Powerful Words: Political Culture and Expertise in 20 Century blueprint that became that [transnational postwar] policy Japan (Berkeley, CA, 2004); Mark Metzler, Capital as Will and Imagination: Schumpeter’s Guide to the Postwar Japanese Miracle regime.” The book does not do so, but perhaps his future (Ithaca, NY, 2013); Aiko Ikeo, The American Economist Martin work will. Bronfenbrenner (1914–1997) and the Reconstruction of the Japanese I share Curt Cardwell’s pleasure that Madsen and his Economy (1947–1952), CHOPE Working Paper 2011–11 (Durham cohort are returning to the study of political economies. NC: CHOPE, June 2011). Available at: http://hope.econ.duke.edu/ Madsen focuses on currency conversion, inflation control, sites/default/files/Ikeo20110616c-Letter-BronfenbrennerJapan. banking, and taxation, all truly important topics. He sheds pdf, accessed November 4, 2018; Scott O’Bryan, The Growth Idea: his coyness about why in his Response—this is a critique Purpose and Prosperity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu, HI, 2009); of Keynesianism—which answers Carolyn Eisenberg’s Tsuru Shigeto, Japan’s Capitalism: Creative Defeat and Beyond question of why he ignores equally important aspects of (Cambridge, 1993); and Laura Hein and Mark Metzler, “Raising Taxes for Democracy: The Japanese Policy Environment of the the economy, such as industrial relations, decartelization, Shoup Mission,” and W. Elliot Brownlee, “Tax Reform during the and reparations. (The book is most explicit on this in the American Occupation of Japan: Who Killed Shoup” in W. Elliot middle of Chapter 11.) Yet, here too Madsen’s facts don’t Brownlee, Ide Eisaku, and Fukagai Yasunori, eds., The Political really run in parallel with the argument. As Cardwell Economy of Transnational Tax Reform: The Shoup Mission to Japan in explains, Madsen’s actors were operating in a larger context Historical Context (Cambridge, 2013). that was profoundly Keynesian, as the U.S. government poured resources into the Marshall Plan, domestic and international military spending, and highways. Madsen Review of Grant Madsen, Sovereign Soldiers: How the disagrees but incoherently. U.S. Military Transformed the Global Economy After Separately, I think the chief reason that none of us World War II found Madsen’s economic arguments persuasive is that he focused on theory per se when the historical debate was Michael J. Hogan actually about what was happening in the real world—that is, how to apply theory. All economists, including Keynes rant Madsen’s interesting book provides the reader himself, see inflation under most conditions as a problem with several different, though related, stories. He and all of them know that fighting wars encourages begins in the Philippines, with a brief look at the governments to cause excess inflation. (Keynes first made GAmerican occupation after the Spanish-American War his name analyzing the inflationary effect of German through the Organic Act of 1902 and the Jones Act of post-World War I reparations.) The challenge postwar 1916. During this time, the Philippines had no prospect of policymakers faced in Germany, Japan, and the United statehood in the American union; nor did Filipinos have States was not whether inflation was bad in some abstract any hope of American citizenship. They were promised sense but whether the tangle of problems they faced meant eventual independence, to be sure, and came to enjoy that it should be tolerated a little longer to meet other many of the rights, privileges, and protections enjoyed economic goals. Similarly, Keynesian and neo-classical by American citizens under the Constitution. They could economists alike share the theoretical assumption that pass their own laws, for example, and negotiate their own economies grow when firms invest in their workers and treaties. in new technology, they just differ on the policy question The exercise of such rights, however, was subject to of whether tax cuts are the best way to encourage firms to American review and approval, creating what Madsen, make that investment.