The Eisenhower Administration's Policymaking for the Developing World

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2016 Pursuing Postponement: The Eisenhower Administration's Policymaking for the Developing World

Smith, Brenan

Smith, B. (2016). Pursuing Postponement: The Eisenhower Administration's Policymaking for the Developing World (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27486 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3500 doctoral thesis

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Pursuing Postponement: The Eisenhower Administration’s Policymaking for the Developing

World

Brenan R. R. Smith

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

December, 2016

This dissertation examines the Eisenhower administration’s positions and policies towards the developing world. During the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, the complications involved in conducting an increasingly global Cold War presented Eisenhower and his officials with extensive and expanding problems. Nationalism, anti-colonialism, pushes for economic rebalancing, and other forms of self-assertion surged in regions across the globe described in this dissertation as the “Third World.” In Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast

Asia a variety of drives against the status quo confronted the Eisenhower administration, and

Eisenhower in particular, with challenges of immense importance.

The central focus of this dissertation is how Eisenhower chose to meet those challenges, and how officials like John Foster Dulles and Richard Nixon supported and agreed or (more often in Nixon’s case) diverged and disagreed with the President on his choices. This dissertation argues that Eisenhower chose to pursue a policy of postponement toward the Third

World; not necessarily attempting to maintain the status quo, but seeking to delay and otherwise slow the forces of change at work in the Third World. Richard Nixon, by dint of his contentious mentor-protégé relationship with John Foster Dulles, and the fact that he simultaneously served as a crucial tool in, and active critic of Eisenhower’s policies and positions in the Third World, provides a representative example of the many officials in Eisenhower’s administration who perceived and disagreed with the pursuit of postponement. Dulles too, though more often than not a strident supporter of Eisenhower, was intrinsically torn between his duty and his fundamental belief in the necessity of dynamic foreign policies. This study explores the means by which Eisenhower pursued postponement in the Third World, and complications and frustrations which arose during this ultimately doomed pursuit.

ii Acknowledgements

I owe a primary, and staggering, debt to my supervisor, Dr. Stephen Randall. Starting with his minutes-later response to my first email to him in the dead of the night to his ongoing and steadfast provision of wisdom, insight, and kindness, Dr. Randall has never been anything short of dauntingly inspirational. A student’s chief duty is to learn, I thank Dr. Randall, as with him this duty was an honour. Other debts are inevitable over the course of a graduate career. I thank Dr. John Ferris for pushing me to not only think, but for constantly asking me “So what?” I thank Dr. Terry Terriff, not just for the kind education, but also for the entirely necessary reminder about the difference between knowing and understanding. Dr. Paul Chastko, who through no fault of his own has been stuck with me in various fashions since my candidacy exams, I thank for making me a better instructor, a better student, and a better historian. Dr. Elizabeth Jameson immeasurably improved this dissertation, and helped me survive defending it; I thank her gratefully for her support and kindness. I thank too the other members of my examining committee, Dr. James Keeley, Dr. Lucie Laumonier, and Dr. Chester Pach for indulging and enduring my work, for their valuable insights, and for their time. Dr. David Gallant, with whom I shared an office and whom I knew before he was a doctor, I thank for his bottomless enthusiasm, pride in History, and constant optimism. Diane McInnes and Lori Somner kindly took care of me as I stumbled into and through the bureaucratic challenges of grad school, I can’t thank them enough for enduring with smiles the many (accidental) headaches I caused. I also wish to thank some of those rugged rogues that made up my cohort of graduate students. Adam Cahill, Monique Dolak, Fred Glover, and Chris Hyland each helped me get to where I am, they are owed my gratitude and my friendship always. Monique and Chris know well, I take my debts seriously. I will also thank Sam Wainwright for our lengthy conversations on the disintegration of the British Empire, the classics of strategy, and the entire corpus of Star Wars (mostly the latter). My parents, who not only foolishly encouraged me to follow my dreams but also made the disastrous decision to support me in manifold ways when I did, share a good deal of the blame for the person I am today and this dissertation. I thank them for everything, as that is what I owe them.

iii Finally, I must thank my wife, Caroline. There is no limit to the things for which I could thank my wife, but I will, if only here and now, keep it simple. There is an adage that if ever you find that you are the smartest person in the room, you are in the wrong room. So long as Caroline is with me, I am in the right room.

iv Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iii Table of Contents ...... v

Introduction ...... 1 Focus, Framework, and Foundation ...... 7 Layout and Progression ...... 12

Chapter One: Literature Review ...... 18 Mr. Vice President, Nixon before 1960 ...... 19 The Many Roads of John Foster Dulles ...... 31 The Eisenhower Legacy ...... 44

Chapter Two: The Pursuit Begins ...... 77 Treating the Symptom: Imposing Stability ...... 80 The Various Thorns: Looming Challenges ...... 96 The Lowest of the Low Priorities ...... 109 Ending the Year ...... 116

Chapter Three: “If we get our prestige involved anywhere, then we can’t get out” ...... 119 Increasing Irritation with Britain and France ...... 120 The Challenges of Reaching a Destination without a map ...... 139 Growing Frustrations but Bulling Ahead ...... 160

Chapter Four: The Cycle of Frustrations and Failures...... 166 Bandung Blinders: Failing to see the forest-fire for the trees ...... 170 Complacency in Latin America ...... 179 Bogged down by Balance ...... 186 Nasser tugs the Tightrope ...... 196 The Pursuit Continues ...... 205

Chapter Five: Walking the Tightrope ...... 207 Paralysis on the Middle Way ...... 208 Tinkering to the Brink ...... 227 Suez and Eisenhower’s Tightrope ...... 235 Dulles and Nixon on the Offensive, Cracks in the Cabinet ...... 250 A Building Cascade ...... 262

Chapter Six: Thunder in the Distance ...... 264 Denying Degeneration and Delaying Action: Latin America and Southeast Asia .....265 The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Decline of John Foster Dulles ...... 278 Not Quite Done: Dulles and Nixon’s Double Gambits ...... 292 The Oncoming Storm ...... 305

Chapter Seven: The Storm Arrives ...... 310 Nixon gets out: Latin America ...... 310 v Past Solutions, Present Problems ...... 334 Failing and Failed Pursuits ...... 350 The Year of Failures ...... 366

Chapter Eight: “...stupidly pushing ahead…without taking into account the effects” ...369 The Departure of John Foster Dulles ...... 370 The Continuity of Complacency and Covert Intervention ...... 373 Reluctantly into Africa ...... 389 “…by God, it didn’t just happen!” ...... 398

Conclusion ...... 402 Eisenhower and the Great Postponement ...... 405

Bibliography ...... 426

Introduction

If one should ever visit the Dwight Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, that person will invariably be drawn to the looming statue of the eponymous figure which stands in the middle of carefully kept meadow-like grounds. This bronze statue, standing upon a pedestal, features Eisenhower in his familiar Second World War “Eisenhower jacket,” hands on hips, gazing kindly outward. Emblazoned atop the stonework plates on the ground surrounding the statue, bronze letters commend the figure’s career and accomplishments to visitors with the declaration “CHAMPION OF PEACE.” If visitors do nothing more than stroll through the grounds, entering none of the buildings and learning nothing else about the figure, they would leave the tiny Kansas town understanding that Dwight Eisenhower treated peace as his highest priority.1 In many senses, the sobriquet is apt; Eisenhower indisputably played a pivotal role in ending the Second World War, helped end the Korean War, and avoided starting or being dragged in to a Third World War. The complicating factor is that in the Third World,

Eisenhower was not a peacemaker or peacekeeper, but rather, a force of postponement.

From 1953 into 1961, Dwight Eisenhower served as President of the United States; a period which included the acceleration of the disintegration of European colonial empires, the rise of numerous figures with national visions which often conflicted with super and traditional power visions, and what can safely be described as the globalisation of the Cold War.

Eisenhower enlisted and surrounded himself with officials who were some of the most respected and experienced in the United States, such as John Foster Dulles, and who had the greatest

1 This declaration is not meant to relate solely to Eisenhower’s military accomplishments. In fact, the pedestal upon which the statue stands has inscribed quotations spanning Eisenhower’s career from the Second World War and into his presidency. 1

potential to learn and lead the United States into the future, such as Richard Nixon. On the surface, the Eisenhower administration was well-equipped to deal with both immediate and future foreign policy challenges.

Although uncertainty existed on the shape and scope of the challenges the administration would face outside Europe, none disputed the fact that increasing challenges were looming.

However, of all the challenges the administration faced, those in this Third World proved to be the ones with which it was least capable of dealing. In fact, despite agreement and growing evidence of instability, unrest, and self-assertion in the parts of the world which were under the direct control of neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, or which were in various stages of casting out European powers, Eisenhower resisted significant adaptation. The central argument of this dissertation is that in a directionless, reactionary, and irresponsible fashion,

Dwight Eisenhower attempted and stubbornly continued to seek a path of least resistance in order to avoid or delay change in the Third World.

This is not to suggest that the administration assigned no importance to, or had no priorities in the Third World. Africa was indisputably the lowest priority, and accorded the least importance by the Eisenhower administration. Speaking to this low priority, one of the signal achievements of Richard Nixon’s time as Vice President came in 1958, when the continent of

Africa was granted its own bureau in the State Department, and was thus no longer the third priority for the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

Latin America ranked more important than Africa, to be sure, but by dint of the fact that both

Eisenhower and Dulles considered the basic relationship and positions of the administration and

Latin American states to be entirely satisfactory, this meant the region often struggled to gain anything more than lip service outside of crises. The Middle East, and Southeast Asia and the

Pacific region were of the highest priority as far as the Third World. While the Middle East was regularly treated as more important, in large part due to its oil, European reliance and position therein, Soviet proximity, and so on, this did not mean it was always treated as a higher priority.

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson explained this issue fairly succinctly, stating that oftentimes priorities were set “for you” by crises, and administrations and their agencies were unable to deal with important issues when a crisis demanded attention.2 Thus, these areas often split much of the already limited attention given to the Third World.

Despite increasing pressure and criticisms from his advisors and officials as well as from much of the bureaucracy in his administration, Eisenhower adopted positions on the Third World which were short-sighted and problematic. At best dilatory, and at worst vacillating between deceptive delay and spasms of belligerence, Eisenhower sought to postpone significant change both in the Third World and in his administration’s policies therein. John Foster Dulles, Richard

Nixon, and other officials disagreed, often fundamentally, with Eisenhower’s direction and decisions in handling Third World challenges, but typically failed to achieve any substantial changes. Eisenhower’s leadership resulted in delays, sometimes even in beginning the preparation of policies, and regularly resulted in the administration being forced to react to crises rather than anticipating or preventing them. Indeed, examining Eisenhower’s decisions and indecisions points to this being the very point.

Eisenhower actively pursued a course both through his actions and inactions that sought to institute a “Great Postponement” on the Third World, not realising the consequences of his

2 See Walter S. Robertson, The Reminiscences of Walter S. Robertson, Eisenhower Administration Project, Oral History Research Office, (University of Columbia, 1970) 51. 3

pursuit until the end of his administration.3 By including analysis of Richard Nixon, an integral instrument in, and consistent critic of the pursuit of postponement, as well as other high ranking officials, it becomes clear that Eisenhower typically did little or entirely ignored warnings that his policies in the Third World were failing to achieve his basic goals.4 Once Eisenhower finally recognised the state of instability and agitation in the Third World, he worried that neither he nor his officials had been considering the effect of the administration’s policies.5 That this recognition came in mid-1960, and revealed that Eisenhower had neither appreciated nor anticipated the impact of the measures he introduced, maintained, or denied adopting, points to this Great Postponement being pursued by Eisenhower without forethought let alone a grand design.

The variety of measures Eisenhower adopted in order to institute this pursuit of postponement were not the result of an elaborated or grand strategy even if there was a coherence to them. Eisenhower’s typical refusal to do more than pay lip-service or make symbolic signals to Third World issues often took the form of goodwill trips undertaken by officials like Richard Nixon, or Eisenhower’s own vague pronouncements on possible changes.

These types of actions created hope and enthusiasm in the target audience but were almost

3 William V. Shannon first used this term to describe Eisenhower’s record as president up to 1958. See William V. Shannon, “Eisenhower as President: A Critical Appraisal of the Record," Commentary 26, No. 5 (November 1958), 390. 4 The argument on this point will never be a counter-factual bemoaning of “if only” Eisenhower had proceeded differently. The point is not that Nixon’s recommendations were always wise or even coherent, but that doing very little or nothing about the foundation of such recommendations – namely that change was needed – Eisenhower made clear his belief that postponement was his preferred option. 5 This point will be dealt with in much greater detail in the penultimate chapter, but to be brief, during the June 30 meeting of NSC, Eisenhower remarked on the instability of the Third World and commented at length on the possibility that his own policies had contributed to the situation. The President worried that no one had been considering the effect of policies in these areas, and that the result of this blindness was exploding over the Third World. See Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 30, 1960, 4-5, 449th Meeting of the NSC, June 30, 1960, Box 12, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File (Hereafter AWF), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter DDEL). 4

always entirely gilded gestures. In some regions, such as Latin America, John Foster Dulles supported such tactics, whereas in areas such as the Middle East, Eisenhower’s approaches caused the Secretary of State escalating frustration. When delaying was no longer an option,

Eisenhower relied on belligerent interventionism to attempt to simply remove problem-spots or leaders. This resulted in the administration’s numerous planned, attempted, and successful coups against Third World leaders as well its confused and awkward military interventions.

This should not suggest a grand design or plan, for a variety of reasons. A significant factor here is that Eisenhower rarely gave attention to Third World issues if they were not at a crisis point, and was regularly unaware of various regional events and dynamics. This trait is shown most clearly in the sometimes bewildering proposals or tinkering suggestions Eisenhower made. Such proposals varied from region to region, but were rarely well-thought-out, regularly absurd, and sometimes simply dangerous.6 Still, most suggestive of Eisenhower’s active avoidance of a clear design or plan for the Third World was the fact that he dodged providing clarity or direction in his policies or actions, and evaded attempts by his officials to initiate such elements.7

This of course caused no end of frustration for officials at all levels of the administration, though those at the top levels tended to be especially vocal and especially discouraged by such issues. The officials, and the central point of their frustrations also varied by region; Assistant

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom and the President’s brother Milton

6 While all of these claims will of course be dealt with in greater detail in the oncoming chapters, examples include Eisenhower’s suggestion to break up the United Arab Republic and somehow make Syria merge with Iraq, his proposal to supply Taiwan with sufficient amphibious landing craft to invade mainland China, and his offer to supply dissidents in Indonesia with submarines to bolster their defence against government forces. 7 Eisenhower tended to bemoan bureaucracy, yet regularly created untold complication by his use of what is best described as adhocracy. However, unlike other administrations which were able to at least roughly use ad hoc groups or mechanisms to either circumvent or streamline decision-making into action, Eisenhower had the odd tendency to attempt to “plug” his ad hoc groups or advisors into or around existing bureaucratic mechanisms. 5

were two of the more prominent members to voice consistent frustration with Eisenhower’s

Latin American policies, Richard Nixon and Henry Cabot Lodge escalated their interest in Africa over the course of two-terms from ambitious concern to biting criticism, and the Secretary of

State pressed for and eventually dejectedly abandoned his drive for a clearer and more ambitious stance in the Middle East.8 This is not to suggest that only those officials were frustrated solely with Eisenhower’s handling of those particular regions, but simply that they shared a common source and reason for their frustrations. Indeed, all of these officials pushed for, and in fact offered to aid in clearer, more active policies. In each case, Eisenhower dallied, deflected, and otherwise delayed acting until forced to do so.

It is important to recognise that Eisenhower was not bent on maintaining the status quo in the strictest sense. Eisenhower was under no illusion that European colonialism would continue interminably; he simply sought to delay having to deal with the consequences of its end in Asia,

Africa, and the Middle East. In Latin America, Eisenhower resolutely believed in the soundness and satisfactory state of the dynamics between the United States and Latin American states. This meant he avoided, and in fact deceived Latin Americans about the intention for change, but was also open to the idea of developments and changes in Latin America so long as these remained pro-American and cost his administration nothing. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that maintaining the status quo in any region of the Third World would have entailed enormous costs; colonial powers would need significant aid to prop up their ability to preserve or reassert control of their crumbling empires, as would those Latin American dictators or juntas whose power was slipping from them – which would of course necessitate increased aid to their neighbours to

8 A note on Milton Eisenhower: Though effort has been made to always refer to the President’s younger brother by his full name in the initial instances he is brought in to the narrative, or by the label “the President’s younger brother,” at times for the sake of narrative flow he is referred to by solely his first name. This is in no manner meant to diminish Milton Eisenhower’s significance, and is done simply for ease of presentation and reading. 6

address the imbalance – and this too was an expenditure Eisenhower sought to avoid. Instead, as he was wont to do, Eisenhower sought a vague middle course.

Focus, Framework, and Foundation

The scope and mechanics of this work require a brief explanation in order to situate the analysis. First, a note is necessary on the term “Third World” which is utilised to describe the collective states and proto-states in various parts of the world outside Europe and North

America. The term carries with it obvious imprecisions and flaws, but it is used throughout this thesis, and deliberately. “Third World” has been used in an attempt to strike a balance. Other terms, such as the “developing world” (which is used in the title of this thesis), or the “Global

South” are also problematic for the purpose of this thesis. “Developing world” although a suitable description which fairly captures the general movements and self-assertions of the various regions at the time (clearly understood at present, vaguely recognised at the time), nonetheless carries various patronising and presumptive connotations if used improperly. A significant reason it is not used in this thesis is that such a term would ascribe an erroneous perspective to many officials in the Eisenhower administration; many viewed areas such as

Africa and Latin America as populated by primitive and childish people incapable of governing themselves properly and hardly capable of independent development or independent leadership.

“Global South” suffers from inexactitudes as well, both geographically and chronologically.

Finally, if one were to assign the areas dealt with in this thesis an importance or level or priority as allotted by American officials, Third World is also accurate. Thus, the term is used due to its rough accuracy and rough convenience as it relates to officials in the Eisenhower administration and their perspective on the various regions in ordinal priority – not as any presumption development, enlightenment, or present importance.

In that regard, the analytical position of the Third World warrants some explanation as well. This work does not devote substantial analysis or attention to the perspectives of individual states and their leaders, but rather analyses the perspectives, perceptions and positions of

American officials on Third World states, leaders, regions and so forth. This approach is adopted in order to discern similarities and differences, hierarchy of priority, and other information on the Eisenhower administration’s understanding and treatment of general regions.

The utility in such an approach is that it allows for wider conclusions and comparative distinctions.9 To that point, the attention of analysis is focused mainly on three individuals.

The primary figures of focus in this work are Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, and Richard Nixon. Other members and associates of the administration, such as Milton

Eisenhower, Roy Rubottom, Charlie Wilson, and so on are also included in analyses but are not accorded the same level of attention. The basic justification for this focus deserves some explanation. Eisenhower and Dulles were the two figures in the administration in charge of foreign affairs, and Nixon’s interests, ambitions, and passions regarding foreign affairs meant he was constantly working under Eisenhower and Dulles on such matters. Dulles’s and

Eisenhower’s understandings of their positions need to be understood in order to appreciate their treatment of Nixon, and the very fact that Nixon was simultaneously a politician, protégé, and problem-solver for both men meant that Nixon’s input and role reveals significant features of

Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s perspectives on policies in the Third World.

9 This will be pointed to in greater detail in the next chapter, however, if one were to take Kathryn Statler’s convincing arguments that the Eisenhower administration engaged in a neo-colonial enterprise in South Vietnam and compare this with the administration’s confused approach to Egypt or its sporadic and deceptive dealings with Latin America, important and interesting differences appear. Such findings allow for important conclusions to be made about how the Eisenhower administration treated different regions or states based upon a number of factors, and the issue that arose out of such treatment. 8

The dynamics of the three men’s relationships and the administration’s policies in the

Third World are intertwined; thus bringing Nixon into the analysis is pivotal. That Nixon was able to build a mentor-protégé relationship with Dulles which eventually developed into a mutually beneficial if testy friendship cum partnership, and build up the laundry list of resentments against Eisenhower are indicative of the fact that he had extensive and consistent interactions with both men. As a result of his unique position, Nixon served as a kind of focal and vocal point of internal and external criticism of the administration’s Third World policies; though hardly a stalwart voice of opposition, as time progressed the Vice President became more and more critical of the policies Eisenhower and Dulles promulgated and maintained in Third

World nations. Thus, such a focus allows for the establishment of an understanding, not only of what Eisenhower intended to do and not do in the Third World, but also of dissenting and alternate paths as envisioned by high-level officials.

As this thesis focuses almost exclusively on policy, policy-making, and the policy- makers at the highest level of the Eisenhower administration, some elucidation on those points will also be helpful. The Eisenhower administration had a variety of bureaucratic mechanisms concerned with policy, including a Policy-Planning Staff (PPS) operating under the National

Security Council (NSC).10 That staff and their products are not, however, the focus of this work.

As the PPS developed and altered policy at the behest of Eisenhower and the NSC, indeed

10 It is likely important to at least acknowledge that this thesis does not argue that policies did not exist for individual regions, states etc. If that were the case, simply pointing out the entire subseries devoted to policy papers within the NSC series would render this thesis’s points moot. The point here is rather that even the most elaborated policies contained intentionally vague or broad wording to allow for directions, position changes, and so on. Taking a nation not dealt with in this thesis, Japan, and the NSC’s 1955 policy paper, local staff were directed to “promote the development of an effective, moderate conservative government in Japan as basic to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives.” Why this was the case, or how staff were expected to promote such a thing was left unstated. See NSC 5516/1, National Security Council U.S. Policy on Japan, April 9, 1955, 9-10, NSC 5516/1 – Policy Toward Japan (2), Box 15, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, White House Office (Hereafter WHO) Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hereafter OSANSA), DDEL. 9

considerable discussion at NSC meetings had to do with altering certain paragraphs or lines, they are treated in this work more as mechanism. Some attention is given to the arguments and papers of agencies within the State Department, as these agencies and officials had vested interests in either maintaining or altering policy.11 However, most attention and analysis is allotted to top-level officials like Eisenhower, Dulles, Nixon, and other Secretaries and Assistant

Secretaries (State, Defense, and otherwise), along with officials such as CIA Director Allen

Dulles. The reasoning behind such a focus is that such figures were ultimately the ones with the greatest amount of power and influence, and, due to their positions, tended to either have the most access to Eisenhower or be the most immediately subject to his directions. In effect, these were the individuals closest to the figure who made, or did not make, the decisions.

Thus, by analysing their conversations, criticisms, arguments, and so on, it is possible to gain a clearer picture of what the policies were, what they were intended to accomplish, and what such individuals thought of those policies. It is also, of course, important to keep in mind each individual’s interests in such dealings. For example, the Secretary of Defense is typically unlikely to blame his department for problems in executing policy, and so on. This dynamic is what makes the study of comments by officials like Nixon so crucial; while Nixon was certainly attempting to curry Dulles’s favour (and play an influential role generally), he also had to avoid

11 A note here is helpful for those possibly not painfully familiar with the basic bureaucratic makeup of the State Department and its hierarchy in the Eisenhower administration (as opposed to its contemporary state). Note that this is a description of hierarchy from a policy, information, and action standpoint, not succession. During the Eisenhower administration, the top of the State Department was occupied of course by the Secretary of State. Just under him (Dulles or Herter) was the Under Secretary of State (Walter Bedell Smith, Herbert Hoover Jr., Christian Herter, and Douglas Dillon held this post in succession). The Department’s responsibilities were divided into geographic bureaus, with each bureau falling under an individual Assistant Secretary of State (for that specific region/bureau). An individual bureau was divided into “desks,” each headed by a desk officer. Each individual “desk” officer was a trained career foreign service officer in charge of the Department’s activities in a specific state, “one for Korea, one for Burma, one for Indonesia…and so forth.” These desks each had their own staff and specialists with whom they consulted and gave directions. The desks met regularly with and reported directly to their particular Assistant Secretary of State, who in turn reported to the Secretary of State. See Walter S. Robertson, The Reminiscences of Walter S. Robertson, 46-55. 10

making enemies of other secretaries while still pushing positions he considered valid and valuable.

It also warrants stating that the criticisms levelled at Eisenhower are done so with awareness of the fact that long-term policies are not pre-formed, readily waiting programs that need simply be activated and observed from time to time. Certainly it was not the case that

Eisenhower could simply have snapped his fingers and a policy would hop off a shelf and begin functioning. Yet, it is equally problematic to suggest that Eisenhower played the deciding and most driving role in the administration but is somehow blameless or not responsible for failing to express and explain what he wanted long-term policies to contain. No, Eisenhower could not simply pick up a policy off the shelf, but by refusing to acknowledge the shelves were bare and ignoring warnings about the dangers of such things and suggestions about what might be done about them, Eisenhower made choices and is accountable for their consequences.

It is also important to explain the type of sources utilised and the manner in which they were used. The conclusions and arguments of this work are based almost wholly on archival and other primary sources related to policy and policy-making in the Eisenhower administration.

This includes documents from the Eisenhower and Nixon libraries as well as the Dulles collection in the Seeley Mudd Library. The fact that Eisenhower regularly utilized proxies to push his agenda, utilised indirect approaches, and was very clearly aware of the historical significance of official and recorded matters has been accounted for as best possible. So too has the fact that Dulles and Nixon regularly had numerous private conversations and dinners of which no documentation exists. On a fundamental level, the conclusions and arguments of this work are based on analysis of the available documentary record with a specific focus on top- level officials. The inherent trade-offs of such an approach and focus are knowingly made. All

of this has of course been informed by ample use of secondary literature from a wide variety of perspectives.

Layout and Progression

This work progresses in chronological fashion, with each year being allotted a single chapter. The exception to this are the years 1959-1960, which share a single chapter. The justification for this is rather simple: John Foster Dulles resigned, and died, in 1959, and by

1960 Richard Nixon began allotting greater time and attention to his campaign for the presidency. Simply, since two of the three individuals at the heart of the analysis for this work were no longer consistently contributing or active in the administration’s functioning after 1959, it is reasonable to conclude said analysis thereafter.

The first chapter serves the dual purpose of presenting the relevant historiography while establishing the foundation of the understanding of the three principal figures of examination and analysis; Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, and Richard Nixon. A significant portion of this chapter establishes that the traditional understanding of the Eisenhower historiography is problematic in that while the popular portrayal of Eisenhower certainly shifted through time, there was never a moment during or after his presidency when strong evidence of his commanding role in his administration was lacking. In addition, while tracing some of the scholarly lineage on Nixon’s vice presidency and John Foster Dulles’s time as Secretary of State, an emphasis is placed on highlighting significant factors which have either been ignored or under-prioritised by historians. It also stresses the fact that while literature exists which conducts analysis on specific figures, regions, or relationships, none utilizes a focus on Eisenhower,

Dulles, and Nixon as a means to bring better understanding to the administration’s Third World

policies and policy-making generally. Finally, this chapter points out the importance of understanding Eisenhower’s pursuit of postponement. The understanding provided by the pursuit of postponement alters the context in which the administration’s various actions and inactions in the Third World must be viewed, and therefore contributes a novel means of viewing

Eisenhower’s and the administration’s struggles. Indeed, while Eisenhower could explain his actions and inactions in the Third World, the fact that he did not recognise their cumulative effect until the end of his time in office reinforces the argument that these were short-sighted choices made without a plan in mind. Thus, the chapter functions to point out the variety of significant insights this work brings to the historical literature. From there, this thesis proceeds chronologically.

In 1953, the initial challenges the administration faced in the Third World occurred alongside the process through which the basic dynamics between Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon were established. The beginnings of Eisenhower’s spasmodic approach to the Third World also cropped up in 1953. Although it makes sense that the administration would not be able to enact sweeping and total reforms to all of its policies, in 1953, Eisenhower established many of the precedents which typified the rest of his time in office. These include covert interventions being utilised to remove the symptom rather than the sources of friction between the administration and

Third World states, the tendency to avoid action other than during a crisis, and Eisenhower’s tactics of delaying momentum toward change or denying the need for change in the first place.

1954 was the administration’s first full year in power, and it face a variety of challenges and crises in the Third World. In 1954, the increasingly clear tendency of Eisenhower to express goals and objectives, while avoiding articulating or explaining the path towards achieving them began to become a source of frustration for officials. Indeed, issues with Eisenhower’s

leadership and decision-making process were raised by officials, including Nixon, on a variety of topics, ranging from the Guatemalan coup, to the possibility of intervention in Indochina.

Analysis will show that this lack of explanation created and exacerbated frustrations and problems both inside the administration and with allies. In addition, in 1954, the increasingly complicated and contentious relationship between the Eisenhower administration and Britain and

France, which became a kind of repetitive antagonistic cycle, began to be strained. Finally, by late 1954, numerous officials were showing significant concern with the administration’s Third

World policies, labelling them “a bunch of double-talk” and worrying about being called on various “bluffs.”12

In 1955, alongside growing problems in the administration’s dealings with the Third

World, Eisenhower suffered a heart attack. The growing criticisms and consensus among officials was that the administration was failing to deal effectively with the Third World. Indeed, near the end of the year even Dulles, normally a resolute supporter of Eisenhower’s leadership, acknowledged that the administration needed an entirely revamped set of policies for the Middle

East. Nixon and his criticisms that the administration was not only unwilling to formulate viable policies for regions of lower priority, but also unable to adapt and implement sound policies for states and regions (like Indonesia and Egypt) that were considered important, was representative of the general concern among many officials. In fact, in 1955 Nixon began a kind of internal independent campaign to discern what problems and challenges were impeding the administration, and advocated changes as he proceeded. Analysis reveals that by 1955, officials like Nixon, and others in the State Department, were well aware that the administration was

12 Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 6, 1954, 15-16, 216th Meeting of the NSC, October 6, 1954, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 14

perceived as “apathetic” and “bungling” in the Third World, but were unable to move

Eisenhower towards change.13 This cycle of frustrations and failures only grew worse as the pursuit of postponement continued.

The consequences of the administration’s laxity began to erupt during the final year of

Eisenhower’s first term, 1956. Most obvious is the Suez Crisis, which, while certainly not caused by the administration, was hardly prevented by Eisenhower’s middle course. Indeed, a strong theme in the analysis of 1956 is the variety of problems caused by Eisenhower’s middle course and tinkering with the intent of avoiding significant change. Although the lead up to and aftermath of Suez is the clearest example, many others are important and explored.

Eisenhower’s attitude contributed to the increasing entanglement of his and later administration’s in Vietnam, led directly to the deceptive building up of expectations of Latin American states, and failed to inspire confidence in his advisors over his handling of other issues in the Third

World. There was actually a considerable amount of in-fighting in the cabinet over

Eisenhower’s and the administration’s failures in the Third World. And, while no administration is free from such conflict, it is interesting and important to note that in the Eisenhower administration a good deal of such battles centred around the failure to handle Third World challenges. Finally, the internal disputes and arguments of 1956 make clear that while Nixon,

Dulles, the Secretaries of Defense and the Treasury, and other officials disagreed on the best solution to the administration’s problems, they all agreed that the administration was in fact failing in the Third World.

13 Memo, 1-2, October 14, 1955, 1955, October, Box 6, Executive Branch Files, Pre-Presidential Series (hereafter PPS) 325, Richard Nixon Pre-Presidential Materials (Hereafter RNPPM), Richard Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, California (Hereafter RNL). 15

In case any doubt remained, by 1957 it was clear that Eisenhower was the focal point of the resistance to change, adaptation, preparation, or innovation in the administration’s policies in the Third World. The disagreement between John Foster Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower over how the administration should proceed in the Middle East after the Suez Crisis is important to this discussion. Beyond shooting down Dulles’s far more ambitious and clear proposal for the

Middle East, Eisenhower also frustrated Dulles through poorly thought-out ponderings on regional dynamics, failing to appreciate or accommodate complications caused by the administration’s broader national security policy, and continuing to avoid dealing with problems on a specific state-by-state basis. Dulles nonetheless supported Eisenhower’s resistance in most other regions and on most other issues even as other officials in the administration became more critical of such resistance. Nixon was highly critical of the administration upon his return from

Africa in the spring of 1957, attacking issues ranging from the almost total lack of planning for the future in policies, to racist American officials. In Latin America and Asia, warning signs of problems that would become crises the following year were either ignored or treated as lacking sufficient importance to warrant action.

The following year was one of successive crises and embarrassments for the administration in the Third World. Each of the crises, from the Caracas Incident and the gunboat diplomacy which followed, to the initiation, embarrassment, and termination of the Indonesian intervention, to the confused and chaotic Lebanon invasion, and indeed the Second Taiwan

Straits Crisis, were all evidence of problems in Eisenhower’s handling of Third World issues. In the aftermath of each incident, Eisenhower continued to avoid the initiative; in Latin America he deflected any blame and sought an easy-out, in Asia he tinkered dangerously without any clear direction or understanding of the damage he could cause, and in the Middle East his leadership

was lacking to such an extent that Dulles described the entire administration in that year as simply “muddling through” in the vein of the British Empire.14 Shown again in 1958,

Eisenhower’s normal instinct was to do nothing, or failing that, as little as possible. In addition, when Eisenhower did act, it was often belligerently and served only to make matters worse. This caused such significant problems internally that John Foster Dulles increased the attempts he had been making since at least 1956 to resign from his post as Secretary of State.

The final chapter (outside the conclusion) analyses the years 1959 through 1960. These years show the clear continuity in the administration’s positions and policies on the Third World during and after Dulles’s resignation and death. This continuity is shown in a variety of manners. Most notable is the continued utilisation of covert acts, such as the two covert actions

Eisenhower approved in 1959-1960, one to remove Fidel Castro, the other to simply kill Patrice

Lumumba. Of course, this did not mean Eisenhower was giving greater attention to Latin

America or Africa in general. Indeed, by the late summer of 1960, Eisenhower abandoned even the pretense of caring about African affairs when he spoke with African officials. This final chapter shows the last efforts by officials in the administration to push Eisenhower into action, his numerous attempts to restrain and resist such actions, and the significant resentment such resistance had created in his officials by the end of his time in office. Examples of this dynamic range from Eisenhower’s stubborn resistance to a goodwill trip to Latin America, the petulant tit- for-tat he and Nixon engaged in on a variety of issues, and his renewed enthusiasm for dictators in the Third World.

14 As will be shown, this was an even more disillusioned statement than it appears, as Dulles had a variety of reasons for loathing the British Empire. See Discussion at the 352nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, January 22, 1958, 7, 352nd Meeting of the NSC, January 22 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 17

Chapter One

Literature Review

This is, at bottom, a diplomatic history. Three specific actors, President Dwight D.

Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Vice President Richard Nixon, and one broad area, the Third World, are the centre of attention in this work. The background to, benefit of, and the motivation for such a focus warrants some explanation. This chapter first reviews the evolution of the historical literature on the Eisenhower presidency, with the majority of the focus on foreign policy, and then narrows the focus to studies of the Eisenhower administration and the

Third World. Intrinsically connected to the argument that Eisenhower pursued the postponement of significant change in the Third World, this thesis also advances the argument that Richard

Nixon’s role in the administration in relation to the Third World reveals significant elements of this pursuit. The most recent studies of Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Third World, and those studies which include Nixon, tend to be either region-centric or narrowly focused; this has left the untapped opportunity to utilise Nixon to inform our understanding of the Eisenhower administration’s treatment of the Third World. Much time and ink has been spent arguing over

Eisenhower’s handling of foreign affairs, and how and why his administration handled challenges in the Third World as it did. Although most scholars currently agree that Eisenhower and Dulles together mishandled America’s dealings with individual Third World nations, they have yet to appreciate fully the significant contribution to an analysis of the Eisenhower administration and the Third World more generally that the addition of the experiences of Vice

President Nixon provide.

It is useful to revisit the fundamental arguments of this thesis before proceeding through some of the literature which informed such arguments. The argument put forward by this thesis is not simply that Eisenhower and his administration’s policies in the Third World represent a period of great postponement. Indeed, this is not a particularly novel point. At least as early as

1958 with William Shannon, and as recently as 2015 with William Leuchtenburg, the “great postponement” has been put forward to explain the results of the Eisenhower administration more generally.15 While agreeing that such a postponement was the result of Eisenhower’s policies, this thesis argues that Eisenhower actively pursued such postponement in the Third

World without considering its consequences or long term impacts. The necessity of examining

Richard Nixon in this regard is that he was both an integral tool in the implantation of, and consistently critical against, this pursuit of postponement.

Mr. Vice President, Nixon before 1960

It is perhaps an obvious side point, but an important one no less, that most studies of

Richard Nixon tend to focus on his Presidency or have analysed Nixon with an eye towards either his achievements or disgraces as President. An exhaustive look at the literature focused on

Nixon’s presidency is not possible within the confines of this study, as scholars, journalists, and others continue to add to the already voluminous “Nixonography.”16 It is also not necessary to

15 William E. Leuchtenburg, The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 385. 16 Nixonography is at least as complex, but certainly more fraught with emotions than Eisenhower historiography. As a very brief overview of some of the areas of study, keeping in mind C.L. Sulzberger’s claim that until the time nearing Nixon’s death, dislike of the former president had meant a lack of sufficient analysis in historical works. See The World and Richard Nixon (New York: Prentice Hall, 1987), xixiii, 192-194. For some more recent biographies, see Evan Thomas, Being Nixon: A Man Divided (New York: Random House, 2015); Conrad Black, The Invincible Quest: The Life of Richard Milhous Nixon (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007), and Elizabeth Drew, Richard M. Nixon: The American Presidents Series: The 37th President, 1969-1974 (New York: Times 19

do so, since while this study will certainly offer analyses as to formative experiences Nixon had as Vice President which surely influenced his thinking and actions as President, the purpose and focus of this study is not focused on such matters.17 Most of the analyses conducted on Nixon during his time as Eisenhower’s Vice President have been done with an eye to his later ascension to the Presidency, treating his time under Eisenhower either as training or focusing on his eventual loss to John Kennedy in the election of 1960.18 This too is understandable, in that while not without its own spectacles or intrigues, Nixon’s time as Vice President appears tame when compared with his time as Commander in Chief.

Books, 2007). For psycho-personal analyses see Anthony Summers, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon (New York: Viking, 2000), Fawn M. Brodie, Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), and Vamik D. Volkan, Norman Itzkowitz, and Andrew W. Dod, Richard Nixon: A Psychobiography (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 73-74. As to Watergate centred works, please see Ken Hughes, Chasing Shadows: The Nixon Tapes, the Chennault Affair, and the Origins of Watergate (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014); Stanley Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: Knopf, 1990), and Theodore H. White, Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1976). With regard to foreign policy evaluations, see Asaf Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making: The Machinery of Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “‘Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,” Diplomatic History 27, No. 5 (November 2003): 638-645. See also Jeffrey Kimball, “H-Diplo Article Commentary: Kimball on Hanhimäki (historiographical),” http://www.h- net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/Kimball-Hanhimaki.pdf (Accessed September 6, 2015), 12, and his Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), and The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004). On domestic studies see Dean Kotlowski, Nixon’s Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), Frank Kusch, “Nixon’s Loyalists: Inside the War for White House, 1972,” (PhD diss., University of Saskatchewan, 2010); and for Nixon’s impact on and as a reflection of American culture, see Carl Freedman, The Age of Nixon: A Study in Cultural Power (Winchester: Zero Books, 2012), 100. 17 Roham Alvandi, for example, noted that Nixon’s first experiences with Iran and the Shah occurred during his Vice Presidency but Alvandi never explored this or its implications in appreciable depth in an otherwise impressive work. See Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 17-21. 18 Stephen Ambrose’s Education of a Politician is the most recognisable example, see Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913-1962 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). A good deal of literature that deals with Nixon as Vice President focuses on the tumultuous and contentious 1960 election campaign between Nixon and Kennedy rather than Nixon’s vice presidency itself. For some of the more recent works see G. Scott Thomas, A New World to Be Won: John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and the Tumultuous Year of 1960, (Santa Barbara: Praeger Books, 2011); Edmund F. Kallina, Kennedy v. Nixon: The Presidential Election of 1960, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010); Gary A. Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign: Kennedy, Nixon, and the Election of 1960, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007). 20

In order to find studies that focus on Nixon’s Vice Presidency, one must often look to doctoral dissertations, though even there one finds a variety of different foci. Paul Kengor’s thesis focused on the role of the Vice President and the office of the vice presidency in foreign policy through a number of case studies; unfortunately, Kengor too tended to view Nixon in light of his later actions as president.19 Like Kengor, Anthony Maravillas viewed Nixon through a retrospective lens; indeed, he labels the vice presidency an “apprenticeship.”20 Maravillas rarely portrayed Nixon’s actions as of immediate import, but rather only as contributions to the education of a future president.21 Benjamin Goldberg’s dissertation focused on Nixon’s experience as vice president, and came closest to simply analysing Nixon’s development as Vice

President. One of the central themes in Goldberg’s dissertation established and analysed the importance of the complex mentor-protégé relationship between John Foster Dulles and Richard

Nixon.22 Strikingly, none have yet examined Nixon’s place in Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s perspectives and positions on the Third World generally.

It is therefore worth exploring how Nixon has fit in scholars’ narratives that deal with the

Third World during the Eisenhower administration. Sparingly few scholars have added Richard

Nixon to their analyses of the topic.23 This is odd, if only for the facts that Nixon travelled

19 Paul Kengor stated that examining Nixon’s vice presidency makes Nixon’s transformation into a “foreign policy animal” and a president focused on foreign policy “abundantly clear.” See “The Role of the Vice President in Foreign Policy: Lessons Learned and Policy Insights,” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1997), 61. 20 Anthony Rama Maravillas, “Nixon in the Fifties,” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2001), vi. 21 Maravillas argues that Nixon’s foreign missions taught “very important lessons for the would-be president.” See “Nixon in the Fifties,” 202. 22 Benjamin Goldberg, “The Vice Presidency of Richard Nixon: One Man’s Quest for National Respect, an International Reputation, and the Presidency,” (PhD diss., College of William and Mary in Virginia, 1998), 75-76. 23 David L. Anderson succinctly explored the fact that the Eisenhower administration significantly prioritised Containment over anti-colonialism, and thus it makes sense for scholars to have focused on Eisenhower and Dulles since they were the ones ultimately making the choices of priority. See David L. Anderson, “The Devil Is in the Details: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Third World,” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Edited by Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006), 273. 21

extensively to Third World regions as Vice President, constantly spoke up on Third World issues, and made every attempt to play a role in foreign policy.24 Certainly, Nixon pops up from time to time in regional studies, yet here too his role is often contentious or tangential. Stephen

Rabe placed a good deal of importance on the attacks on Nixon in Caracas spurring change in

Eisenhower’s perspective on his policies in Latin America, while Matthew Loayza considered both Nixon’s role and the impact of the attack on policy as “exaggerated.”25 James Meriwether found that Nixon had done a good deal to earn the label of the “father” of Eisenhower’s eventual policies toward Africa, while George White Jr. vehemently disagreed with the label and traced the drive for such policies and the Bureau of African Affairs to other sources.26 Thus, much like most recent studies of Eisenhower’s dealings with Third World nations, Nixon’s presence in studies is equally restricted to a national, regional, or otherwise narrowly focused topic. Indeed, when Nixon is considered in matters pertaining to a Third World region or nation it is almost always in an isolated context, with no eye given to his place regarding the Third World over the course of Eisenhower’s two terms.27 The basic point is this: Richard Nixon’s role, associations, and position in the Eisenhower administration have almost exclusively been analysed and dealt with either in relation to a specific person (with Eisenhower or Dulles), or region, (his role in the

24 Nixon travelled to fifty-four nations over the course of his Vice Presidency, and developed a complicated mentor- protégé relationship with John Foster Dulles, which will be dealt with and displayed throughout this dissertation. 25 The larger point for Rabe was that it took the near-murder of the Vice President, in 1958, before Eisenhower recognised problems in his polices in Latin America. For Loayza’s counter arguments see Matthew Loayza, “An ‘Aladdin’s Lamp for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953-61,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, No. 3 (September 2003), 99. 26 James H. Meriwether, “A Torrent Overrunning Everything: Africa and the Eisenhower Administration,” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds., (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006) 175; George White Jr., “Big Ballin’!?: Vice President Nixon and the Creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in the U.S. Department of State” Passport 41, No. 2 (September 2010). 27 This is not to suggest that even very narrowly focused works cannot be both informative and useful, Elliot Watson’s article on a single stop on Nixon’s 1953 mission to the Far East provides ample proof. See Elliot L. Watson, “America in Asia: Vice President Nixon’s Forgotten Trip to Ceylon,” Foreign Policy Journal (May 1, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/05/01/america-in-asia-vice-president-nixons-forgotten-tripto- ceylon/ (Accessed September 3, 2016). 22

administration’s Latin American or African policies) and typically with an eye to the fact that

Nixon became president. This thesis treats Nixon as an active and ambitious official seeking to make an impact on policy and the Cold War, and analyses his contributions as they pertain to

Eisenhower’s position on the Third World.

In order to appreciate more fully Richard Nixon’s mindset as he took up the Vice

Presidency, one must first understand some of his previous formative experiences. Nixon’s participation in 1947 on the Foreign Aid Committee (more popularly known at the time as the

Herter Committee owing to its chairman, future Secretary of State Christian Herter) was influential in a variety of fashions. Most important, however, was that his experiences on the

Herter Committee and perception of the results of the ensuing aid provided by America created an understanding in Nixon that remained with him throughout much of his career but which certainly revealed itself during his Vice Presidency.28 Nixon came to believe that American aid could work miracles in staving off communist encroachment, however, he also made several other conclusions; these included the belief that American involvement was particularly potent against communism, that where communism existed America was in effect compelled to counter or concede, and that if local nationalisms were not “properly” encouraged they would be taken advantage of by the Soviets.29 Of equal importance is the fact that Nixon rarely if ever considered how foreign aid expenditures would be paid for. He understood there were limits to

America’s resources but viewed the outcome of not providing aid as far worse than the burdens

28 Parmet, American Enigma, 23, 45-48. 29 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Warner Books, 1978), 57-63. 23

inherent to providing it.30 This belief in the potency of American aid and influence merged with another belief Nixon began to espouse more assertively during and after his experiences on the

Herter Committee.

Granted that Nixon held strong anti-communist beliefs well before his participation on the Herter Committee, the mission still had a formative effect on him. Nixon’s experience with a captive Greek communist and other communists he met made him an early adherent to the domino-theory.31 He also developed a rather dangerous belief that in areas where a power vacuum existed, Soviet backed communism would attempt to fill the vacuum, but, since communism was too inflexible and flawed to stand up to “true” resistance, all America needed to do to thwart such attempts was to act.32 Thus, well before he became Vice President, Nixon had begun to believe in the necessity of America confronting communism in effectively any region where the ‘free world’ had interests. This understanding will help explain some of Nixon’s recommendations, positions, and arguments once he became Vice President, but in order to understand others, his path to the cabinet and his relationship with Eisenhower whilst Vice

President must be examined.

Unlike Eisenhower, who was courted and pressured to run for President, and Dulles, who had a lifetime of favours, influence, wealth, and prestige supporting his hopes for Secretary of

State, Nixon built his position through far different means. Nixon certainly used the rising

30 Nixon explained rather simply that he did not believe one could “bluff” the Soviets and thus any claim made to them required being able to support it with actions, the results of such a belief should be clear enough, see Nixon, RN, 63. 31 Irwin Gellman, The Contender: Richard Nixon, the Congress Years, 1946-1952, (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 136-137. This experience also, incidentally, contributed to Nixon’s suspicions of nationalism as he noted that communist propaganda actively avoided any appearance of actually being communist and instead focused on national heroes, see Nixon, RN, 62. 32 Although this appears an incredibly naïve and simplistic endorsement of a reactive version of the containment policy, this was, and in some ways even as it became more elaborate and nuanced, continued to be Nixon’s view of American vs. Soviet influence, see Goldberg, “The Vice Presidency of Richard Nixon,” 19-23. 24

domestic fear of communism and communists to his political advantage, though never as aggressively, theatrically, or drunkenly as Joe McCarthy.33 And although Nixon used the anti- communist credentials he built up over the years, such as his prosecution of Alger Hiss for perjury, for political benefit, it would be erroneous to doubt the sincerity of his anti-communist beliefs.34 While Nixon evinced a more nuanced and pragmatic approach to communism as he progressed through the Vice Presidency, he consistently voiced concern and suspicions of, especially Soviet based, communism; indeed at one of the earliest NSC meetings Nixon warned that the Soviets were likely to increase hostility in the wake of Stalin’s death and that this might even entail a Soviet coup in Iran.35 Much like Dulles, Nixon’s type of anti-communism was an essential part of his worldview, and although Nixon was never so influenced by this as to blind him to opportunities, he was inherently suspicious of communism in all its forms. Indeed, it was due in large part to these anti-communist credentials, as well as his youth and popularity with the

Old Guard Republicans that Nixon became Vice President, but he felt far from secure in the post, and this was in large part due to his relationship with President Eisenhower.

The relationship between Eisenhower and Nixon has recently been the subject of greater attention from scholars and other writers, and as this relationship is of importance to this study, a

33 Unsurprisingly Nixon had numerous explanations and defences for his election tactics in his “fighting, rocking, socking” campaigns. See Nixon, RN, 44-52, 88-90. McCarthy’s escapades during the height of his popularity became legendary if possibly exaggerated, see Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network (New York: The Dial Press, 1978), 309. 34 Roger Morris, for example, argued that Nixon was able to serve as the bridge between the various factions of the Republican Party in large part because he had Joe McCarthy and the Old Guard’s support. While this exaggerates McCarthy’s influence, Nixon’s position as basically acceptable to various factions for differing reasons is correct. See Roger Morris, Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), 737-739. 35 At this meeting, Eisenhower pushed for a resolution to the Anglo-Iranian dispute that would effectively allow the British to save face but result in the U.S. “control of the situation and freedom to act,” and Nixon’s remarks were designed to add a sense of urgency to the President’s suggestion and Dulles’s complaints about the British getting in the way. See Memorandum of Conversation (hereafter Memcon), Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, March 4, 1953, 10-11, 135th Meeting of NSC, March 4, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 25

brief analysis of those works’ strengths and weaknesses will be helpful. Although Jeffrey

Frank’s 2012 book Ike and Dick was not as exhaustively researched as either John Malsberger’s

2013 book The General and the Politician or Irwin Gellman’s long-awaited 2015 book The

President and the Apprentice, Frank’s understanding of the two men’s relationship strikes closest to the heart, despite Gellman’s criticisms.36 While Malsberger presumed the development of a partnership between Eisenhower and Nixon that simply did not exist, he correctly articulated the focal point of the friction and animosity in their relationship: politics. Nixon understood the realities of party politics, campaigning, and the various angles domestic and foreign developments that needed to be considered in any official statement in a more sophisticated and flexible manner than Eisenhower.37 Whereas Frank and Malsberger’s portrayals are guilty of viewing the Nixon-Eisenhower relationship with too great an eye to Nixon’s eventual rise to the

Oval Office, Gellman’s portrayal dangerously ignores or deflects criticisms of Eisenhower.

Gellman’s portrayal of Eisenhower in The President and the Apprentice shrugs off evidence that Eisenhower could, and often did, antagonise Nixon. The central issue with deflecting or ignoring this fact is that one is left with two equal images of Eisenhower as either

36 Gellman rightly championed the necessity of researchers making use of both the Eisenhower Library and Nixon Library’s resources in order to better understand Nixon’s Vice Presidency. See, Gellman “The Richard Nixon Vice Presidency: Research without the Nixon Manuscripts,”. And Gellman rightly criticises Frank’s less than stellar citation method in Ike and Dick, however, his two-fold assertion that Frank did not spend as much time in the archives researching Eisenhower and Nixon’s relationship as is proper and, that Frank’s work simply magnifies erroneous perceptions smacks of pettiness. See Gellman, The President and the Apprentice, 9. Frank acknowledged the strengths and flaws of both men, thus portraying Eisenhower as an astute and shrewd leader who could also be cruel, distant, and stubborn, and Nixon as a clever and insightful politician who also suffered from paranoia, resentment, and a problematic drive to prove himself to certain figures. 37 Malsberger used the 1956 and 1958 campaigns as well as Eisenhower’s mishandling of the public reaction to the launch of Sputnik to compare Nixon and Eisenhower as political animals. Malsberger found that Eisenhower often simply failed to understand the political consequences and implications of his limited campaign efforts and of his stubborn refusal to handle the American public’s reaction to Sputnik in a more reassuring tones. See John W. Malsberger, The General and the Politician: Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and American Politics, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 132-134. 26

being intentionally harsh on Nixon or a politically blind dolt.38 Eisenhower was certainly not a blind dolt, and although some of his antagonisms of Nixon were intentional, others were due far more to his style of leadership and worldview than any true malevolence.39 Nonetheless, each of these scholars recognised that Eisenhower and Nixon’s relationship developed and changed throughout the course of Eisenhower’s two-terms and beyond. To a differing degree, they all agree that Eisenhower relied on Nixon to carry out a variety of tasks, with Malsberger offering the most generous interpretation of the dynamics of that aspect of their relationship. Given such differing interpretations, it is important to explain some of the factors that drove Nixon to distrust

Eisenhower even as he continued to try to impress (or at least establish a strong reputation independent of) him.

It must be acknowledged that while Eisenhower was far from even-handed in his treatment of Nixon, he granted his Vice President more opportunities than many before or since.

Eisenhower had promised that Nixon’s vice presidency would be a special one, markedly different than the typically isolated, figure-head style of position the office had come to represent; indeed, Eisenhower sold Nixon on the position by promising to make him a “member

38 As just one example, (others, like Gellman’s misunderstanding of the complex dynamics of the Eisenhower- Dulles-Nixon relationship at work in the lead up to Nixon’s 1957 mission to Africa, will be dealt with indirectly in this thesis) Gellman sees no real problem with Eisenhower giving Harold Stassen leave to publically campaign against Nixon’s nomination for Vice President in the lead up to the 1956 election, since Eisenhower never openly encouraged Stassen’s mission. The problem is simple enough: Eisenhower allowed a member of his “team” to openly work to undermine another, executive member of his team – he did not immediately tell Stassen to abandon the idea, and rather than simply tell Nixon what he had told others, allowed the farce to continue. Gellman portrays this, and other well-known instances of Eisenhower publically wounding Nixon’s standing, as simple missteps by Eisenhower, of which he somehow never understood the consequences. Eisenhower was keenly aware of the impact and influencing of saying, and not saying certain things at certain times, he celebrated his awareness of it and bemoaned its absence in others. See Gellman, The President and the Apprentice, 566-568; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 478; Eisenhower noted early on that Dulles seemed unaware of the impact of words and manner, see Eisenhower, “May 14, 1953,” Eisenhower Diaries, 237. 39 The basic point here is that Eisenhower certainly did not like Nixon, and acknowledging this point and the fact that the two did irritate one another at times does not detract in any way from the fact they had an effective working relationship. 27

of the team” informed and trained to such an extent that he could “step into the Presidency smoothly” in the event of Eisenhower’s incapacity or death.40 And, in many ways, Eisenhower lived up to this promise: Nixon was entrusted with greater responsibility both domestically and internationally, officially treated as Eisenhower’s second-in-command, and granted elevated ceremonial responsibilities.41 Still, while Eisenhower undoubtedly trusted Nixon to act responsibly and loyally, he never quite accepted or respected him, and since Eisenhower took politics personally, this led to a difficult relationship with Nixon.

Eisenhower trusted Nixon in an official capacity, and made use of his talents, but also never found a way to reconcile the distaste he felt for what Nixon represented and the tasks he had his Vice President undertake. Nixon has been described in various writers’ works as

Eisenhower’s “hatchet man,” meaning that when there was an aggressive public attack to be made, rather than lower himself, Eisenhower deployed Nixon.42 A more appropriate image is that of a plumber.43 Eisenhower had no problem making use of Nixon’s abilities to play to

Republican hardliners, engage in mudslinging campaigning, publically attack critics or opponents, or remind Americans of Eisenhower’s wisdom, but he also was never particularly

40 Ralph de Toledano, Nixon, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956), 151. 41 Elmer Plischke devised a very useful if broad overview of the additions of duties and responsibilities Nixon was given as VP, see Elmer Plischke, “Richard Nixon as Summit Diplomat,” Cold War Patriot and Statesman: Richard M. Nixon, Leon Friedman and William F. Levantrosser eds. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), 215-217. At various times and depending on the circumstance, Sherman Adams or John Foster Dulles were the true second-in- command in the White House. After his heart attack and stroke, Eisenhower wrote what was in effect a series of safeguards for Nixon to take up the Presidency in the event Eisenhower was incapacitated but not dead. The letter granted Nixon a rather staggering power in that while he requested Nixon consult the Secretary of State and others before removing him from office, Eisenhower granted Nixon sole power to make that decision. See Letter, Eisenhower to Nixon, February 5, 1958, 1958, Feb. 5, Box 11, Special Files – Dwight D. Eisenhower 1957-1966, RNPPM, RNL; Nixon, RN, 227-228. 42 Donaldson makes note of the different campaign styles of Nixon and Eisenhower during their two terms together, see, The First Modern Campaign, 102-104; Frank, Ike and Dick, 138-139; Nixon, RN, 244. 43 Presumably, the irony is not lost. 28

proud of Nixon for those abilities.44 In short, when there was a political obstacle or clog that needed to be removed, or some business to be taken care of that Eisenhower thought might leave him tarnished, Eisenhower held his nose, and Nixon took the plunge.45 Eisenhower placed

Nixon in an unenviable position in that he was used as a solution to specific types of problems

Eisenhower was unwilling and unable to deal with personally, yet in doing so, became a reminder of Eisenhower’s failings.46 This contributed to Eisenhower’s taking actions “against”

Nixon which, beyond hurting Nixon’s political standing, reveal the short-sighted and mean- spirited side of Eisenhower.47 Examples of this include when Eisenhower allowed Nixon to endure humiliation in the lead up to the 1956 election, made a wholly uncharacteristic and likely

44 Nixon made note that he and Walter Bedell Smith both felt as though Eisenhower used them in order to avoid getting his own hands dirty, see Nixon, RN, 244-245; Frank has shown that Eisenhower ordered Nixon to make public statements which included flattering Eisenhower, and fear-mongering, see Frank, Ike and Dick, 141-142 45 Greenstein made the point that in the lead up to Nixon’s speech undercutting Joseph McCarthy at Eisenhower’s behest, Eisenhower made sure to have Nixon announce that his speech would reflect his view, the view of the Republican Party, and the view of the President, see Greenstein, Hidden Hand, 196-197. Eisenhower was well aware that Nixon’s support in the Republican Party and his own were rather different wings, hence by having Nixon attack McCarthy, Eisenhower forced the more conservative factions of the Republican party into a weaker position. This attack thus served a dual purpose as Eisenhower attacked a man he loathed in McCarthy, and believed would reduce the strength of internal opposition. Eisenhower claimed such attacks were the only feasible means to reduce McCarthy, see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 324, 329. 46 While in no way objective, Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess pointed out that Eisenhower’s inability to truly unify the Republican party, at least during the first term when McCarthy still held influence, was an easy spot for Democrats to attack, and at least part of Eisenhower’s impetus for using Nixon to attack McCarthy was to distract from this lack of unity. See Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, President Nixon: A Political Portrait, (London: Macdonald and Company, 1967), 135-138. 47 Two examples are pertinent here. Eisenhower made it very clear that whereas he considered Nixon immature, he thought Kennedy was incompetent and Johnson unable to cope with the responsibility of true leadership, yet despite both Nixon’s clear efforts to become and appear more moderate, and the fact that Eisenhower tried and failed to find a Republican more to his liking to even accept the idea of running, Eisenhower gave little more than backhanded support to Nixon’s campaign. While one obviously cannot conclude that but for want of Eisenhower’s active support Nixon would have won in 1960, such active support certainly could not have hurt. See Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign, 62-64, 101-105. Thus, at least in part due to his own short-sightedness, Eisenhower contributed to the ascension of John Kennedy. As for mean-spirited, again returning to the second ‘Dump Nixon” issue, Eisenhower knew full well that he was a lock for the Republican nomination, and yet not only allowed the veritable circus with Harold Stassen to proceed, but as late as August 19, 1956 (the RNC was held on August 20 through August 23) was creating lists of acceptable Vice Presidents other than Nixon, see Newton, Eisenhower, 216- 219. The problem with this attitude, as Nixon, Eisenhower, and others recognised, was that Nixon was not simply the best choice, by not expressing immediate support for him, Eisenhower was antagonising the conservative wing of the Republican Party, Nixon, and hurting Nixon’s political standing, see Richard Nixon, Six Crises, Richard Nixon Centennial Edition (Norwalk: Easton Press, 2012, originally printed 1962), 160-161, 164-167; Garry Willis, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 123-124. 29

intentional bungle with his infamous “if you give me a week” quote during the lead up to the

1960 election, and generally forced Nixon to contend with far more substantial obstacles than were necessary.48

The point here is not that Eisenhower was a cruel and abusive boss, as each example raised here has an explanation, some flimsy others perfectly feasible; rather, the point is that from Nixon’s perspective, Eisenhower was far less trustworthy or supportive, and at times appeared to harm his career intentionally.49 This contributed to a growing defiance that at times expressed itself in Nixon’s simply ignoring Eisenhower’s instructions if he felt a better option was available to him, though typically this only occurred in the second term.50 The simple fact is

48 As Frank has pointed out, neither Eisenhower nor his press secretary Jim Hagerty made any quick response to address what both recognised as the hugely damaging “If you give me a week, I might think of one” remark made by Eisenhower at a press conference when repeatedly asked for a single significant contribution of Nixon’s to foreign affairs. What was meant as a softball question ended up haunting Nixon for years. See Frank, Ike and Dick, 204-206; Wills, Nixon Agonistes, 124-125. Of course, in 1956, a significant factor behind Nixon’s persistence in re- upping as Vice President was the well-founded suspicion that Eisenhower likely would not survive the entirety of his second term; thus, as ever, Nixon was hardly an innocent victim. Eisenhower suffered a significant heart attack in September 1955, and was also hospitalised and required surgery due to his ileitis in June 1956. Compounding these health concerns, he also suffered a stroke on November 27, 1957. Nixon contended that any position other than Vice President, including Secretary of Defense or even Secretary of State, would be a demotion. It is hardly incredulous to question whether Nixon sincerely believed taking over the reins of the State Department was truly a step down from his current position. See Nixon, Six Crises, 161-162 49 See Gellman, The President and the Apprentice, 410-424. It is reasonable to point out that many of the domestic tasks for which Eisenhower enlisted Nixon’s aid, such as Civil Rights, could just as easily be interpreted as Eisenhower both seeking Nixon’s help and attempting to give Nixon the broader experience in domestic matters he so badly needed. Indeed, if one takes as sincere Eisenhower’s propensity to prefer business executives, his drive to engender Nixon with more “maturity” by placing him in charge of a department with budgets and defined responsibilities can be understood in a different light. This thesis in no way questions that there were multiple possible motivations for Eisenhower’s actions, rather the argument is that by never actually articulating his motivations, Eisenhower left Nixon (and historians) guessing. While it may not have been Eisenhower’s intent, Nixon came to view many of his responsibilities as lacking consequence; this drove him both to avoid taking on such duties when he could, and trying to make significant impacts when he could not. For Eisenhower’s predilection for tycoons see Jessica E. Martin, “Corporate Cold Warriors: American Business Leaders and Foreign Relations in the Eisenhower Era” (PhD. diss University of Colorado: 2006). 50 John Malsberger considers Eisenhower’s handling of the second Dump Nixon campaign to have been, in effect, the final straw for Nixon insofar as personal loyalty was concerned. While this may be pushing too far, it is fair to conclude that after the 1956 election Nixon concluded he could not rely on Eisenhower to support him with the same loyalty he knew was expected of him. See Malsberger, The General and the Politician, 108. The most pertinent example of Nixon simply ignoring Eisenhower was the moment Eisenhower instructed Nixon to avoid any substantive talks with Khrushchev during Nixon’s 1959 mission to the Soviet Union, and Nixon confronted the President and told him directly that he would in fact debate and argue with Khrushchev if he felt it necessary; 30

that Eisenhower treated Nixon in an extremely bi-polar manner, at times favourably comparing their relationship to that between himself and his most beloved brother Milton, at others going out of his way to make his personal dislike of Nixon too clear to be ignored.51 While he never publically bemoaned Eisenhower’s treatment of him, Nixon’s writings are peppered with obvious signs of hurt feelings and resentment.52 Of course, it is also important to establish the basic understanding of Nixon’s mentor and Eisenhower’s trusted Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles.

The Many Roads of John Foster Dulles

John Foster Dulles has been misunderstood and misused in many historical analyses. In order to start to understand John Foster Dulles’s actions as Secretary of State, it must always be kept in mind that he acted in a very similar fashion as an attorney advising their client. The simple fact is that Dulles disagreed with Eisenhower on many issues, and occasionally on a fundamental level. That the two almost always appeared to be “on the same page” is more a testament to Dulles’s ability to advocate for and represent his client’s interests than the two always being of similar perspective. On decolonisation, the future of the Middle East, the nuclear aspect of national security and other key aspects of the administration’s foreign policies,

Eisenhower and Dulles were in disagreement.

Eisenhower conceded the point. See Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 22, 1959, 2-5, Box 7, International Trips and Meetings Series, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-1961, DDEL. 51 Eisenhower made the remarks concerning Nixon and his brother at a press conference in the lead up to Nixon’s nomination for a second term as Vice President whilst Stassen was privately pushing his “dump Nixon” campaign and Eisenhower himself was trying to find a way to have Bob Anderson as Vice President. See Letter, Eisenhower to Edward John Bermingham, March 14, 1956, DDEP XVI, 2074; Nixon, RN, 211. Eisenhower snubbed Nixon after his defeat in the 1960 election, leaving him a note that espoused his continuing “official confidence” in Nixon, see Frank, Ike and Dick, 218-219. 52 Nixon of course described his emotional state during the second Dump Nixon campaign to be that of “agony” see Nixon, Six Crises, 160-167; RN, 207-215. 31

John Foster Dulles’s position in foreign policy, in the Eisenhower administration, and, indeed, as an influence on Richard Nixon, therefore require re-evaluation. Dulles and his actions evade explanation by any single framework, whether religious, familial,

Progressive/Wilsonianism, or legalistic; however, Dulles’s time as a lawyer needs to be given at least equal weight in any explanation. An important distinction needs to be made between

Dulles’s understanding of international relations, and how he carried out his duties within them.

Understanding this distinction is integral, since nothing can comfortably separate the amorphous and manifold influences which shaped his positions. However, the lawyer’s duty to carry out their client’s instructions loyally is the best means to understanding how Dulles transitioned from a drive for sweeping foreign policy changes to tenaciously carrying out policies even as he became ever more disillusioned and ill.53 That Dulles and Eisenhower often agreed on foreign policy does not reduce the fact that they also often disagreed on both the form and function of the administration’s foreign policies. And yet, despite disagreements that at least once became so heated that he was forced to leave an NSC meeting, Dulles loyally and effectively carried out

Eisenhower’s decisions. He was, however, still human. As time wore on and his age and cancer worsened, Dulles became disheartened, disenchanted, and frankly, disillusioned as Secretary of

State. Where before becoming Secretary of State Dulles had advocated liberation, dynamism, and an ambitious distinctly American form of foreign policy, by the time of his resignation he

53 This note serves as a reminder to an earlier reference to Dulles’s pre-Secretarial conversation with C.L. Sulzberger, in which Dulles outlined his ideal role of driving foreign policy and leading diplomatic endeavours without political responsibilities. See Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles, 410-411. 32

was so dejected with both Eisenhower and the foreign policy of which he was a part that he endorsed Christian Herter as the ideal short-term Secretary of State.54

John Foster Dulles has, more than Eisenhower or Nixon, been portrayed by scholars in a variety of fashions. The simplest reason for this is that Dulles, however dull his personality may have been, was an incredibly complex character. This has allowed writers to depict Dulles convincingly as a religious zealot, a cold pragmatist, a wily imperialist, and any number of combinations or additions therein.55 The role of religion in Dulles’s life is a contentious issue, but an important one. Analysing the intricacies of Dulles’s faith is not the purpose of this section, indeed as Brian Plummer has noted, very few scholars have actually analysed Dulles’s faith in any appreciable depth, and those that have typically ignored large swathes of his life.56

The goal here is more to point out the fact that Dulles’s faith was a complicated issue that should not be treated as either overriding other aspects of his personality or as something he set aside while Secretary of State. Scholars have struggled to reconcile how a liberal Protestant ecumenist

54 This will be dealt with in much greater depth in the penultimate chapter, but in brief, while Dulles trusted and respected Herter, he considered Herter to be unable to carry out many of duties he had considered crucial to being Secretary of State. 55 Townsend Hoopes saw Dulles’s religious experiences colour both his decisions and attitudes, portraying him as applying a legalist but also an odd Jesuit-Calvinist approach to his work. See Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973) 270-280; Ronald Pruessen depicts Dulles as far more complicated and nuanced, see Pruessen, Road to Power, xi-xiii; Richard Immerman has tended to stress the fact that Dulles’s development meant that each of these traits could be more or less prevalent in any given situation but that Dulles was slightly more narrow-minded than scholars like Pruessen (whom he still credited with writing the best single biography of Dulles to date) admitted, see Immerman, Piety, Pragmatism, and Power, 138-140, 201, and Empire for Liberty, 194; while Stephen Kinzer has portrayed Dulles as much more an imperialistic minded pragmatist, see Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2013) 202-203; finally even Leuchtenburg simplifies Dulles as a religious zealot fighting Communism in a moral struggle, see The American President, 332-333. 56 Brian K. Plummer, “‘For Such a Time as This’: The Intersection of Faith and Americanism in John Foster Dulles” (PhD. Diss., Claremont Graduate University: 2011), 2-10. 33

could come to advocate the doctrine of massive retaliation and treat communists as the embodiment of evil.57

The simplest answer to this quandary is that Dulles himself could not resolve such conflicts. Indeed, Dulles’s highly accomplished and keenly intelligent sister Eleanor saw no contradictions in John Foster’s convictions that America could and should peacefully lead the world through its moral superiority while arguing that a belief in one’s nation’s intrinsic righteousness or justness could lead directly to war.58 Often minimised by scholars are the two connected facts that Dulles’s family, especially his father, had expected him to become a minister rather than a lawyer, and that, whether or not the contention that a significant reason for him choosing his career was because he did not believe he was “good enough” to follow in his father’s footsteps was even partly true, Dulles always worried about living up to the example of his father’s Christianity.59 In keeping with most aspects of his personality and intellect, Dulles’s faith was saturated in an unwavering belief in American exceptionalism.

It needs to be understood that Dulles’s form of American exceptionalism was formed to a significant extent by his experiences in the negotiations with European powers at the ends of the

First and Second World Wars; Dulles came to believe that only the United States possessed the correct moral integrity and dynamic policies after encountering what he perceived to be the same

57 Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of the Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012) 460-461. 58 This moral superiority was grounded in what Dulles believed to be a universally applicable faith in God, and that America had properly combined religion, morals, and patriotism. See Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles: The Last Year (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963), 185-187. 59 Dulles’s father was, especially for his time, a liberal and progressive minister, taking a more lenient stance on divorce and a far more rational than literal stance on doctrine. Indeed, Foster’s father influenced him to such an extent that he defended Harry Emerson Fosdick at a heresy trial in the 1920s, arguing the more modernist interpretation. See Dulles, John Foster Dulles, 127-128; Preston, Sword of the Spirit, 385-386. 34

old squabbles among European states even after two world wars.60 This form of Wilsonianism also fit nicely with his legalistic approach to internationalism, but often complicated his interactions with declining imperial powers or figures for whom he simply held keen dislike.61

Scholars have tried to resolve inconsistencies and seeming contradictions inherent to nebulous concepts like Americanism, Wilsonianism, Bergsonian Dynamism, legalism, realism, liberal Protestantism, and on and on, which all played a part in Dulles’s actions and understandings. Problematically, some scholars have tried to isolate these influences from one another, when in fact all of them and more were working within Dulles all the time.62 It is not insignificant that Dulles’s seeming obsession with the dichotomy of stasis and dynamism, and with his belief in the necessity of active adaptation was also apparent during his career as a lawyer. In fact, in 1939 Dulles wrote an article for the American Bar Association Journal in which he warned the legal community that it could no longer expect to deal “primarily, with the static.”63 Dulles went further, warning of the dire consequences for lawyers if:

60 Immerman, Piety, Pragmatism, and Power, 24-26. 61 Townshend Hoopes notably included the 1953 interaction between Dulles and then Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Anthony Eden, in which Dulles demanded the British supply a copy of an agreement between Great Britain and Egypt which had been abrogated by the Egyptians that the British continued to cite in the meeting with Dulles. Upon receiving a copy of the treaty, Dulles read it over, corrected some of Eden’s interpretations, and concluded that Eden was an uninspired foreign minister. The more important point is that Dulles considered the terms of the treaty to be of overriding importance, more so than clearly agitating and embarrassing the British. See Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, 169-170. 62 Mark Toulouse was cognizant of this fact and attempted, as best he was able, to communicate and compensate for the fact that his 1985 work was an attempt to isolate Dulles’s religious influences while clearly acknowledging that said influences were only one of many. See Mark G. Toulouse, The Transformation of John Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism, (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1985) xxvi-xxvii. 63 John Foster Dulles, “Administrative Law: A Practical Attitude for Lawyers,” American Bar Association Journal 25 (1939), 275. 35

…resentful of the intrusion of innovation, they close their minds to the actual changes which are going on about them and which… must…be accepted and understood if the interests of their clients are to be preserved. It is not only necessary for lawyers to eliminate their own prejudices, but they should also seek to appreciate the point of view of those…with [whom] they have to deal.64

Well over a decade before he reached his lifelong goal of becoming Secretary of State, Dulles was considering, albeit in a broad fashion, the types of issues and the manner in which he would deal with them. Dulles continued to espouse dynamism, taking the initiative, and the moral aspects of foreign policy in the year before he became Secretary of State.65

Dulles was candid about the fact that all of the above listed influences were active in his thinking simultaneously. Indeed, at least as early as 1942 Dulles actually embraced such influences simultaneously, when he wrote an article in Life magazine skimming the frontier thesis, Manifest Destiny, bemoaning the flickering of Wilsonianism, extolling the benefits of

American Christianity in both foreign and domestic contexts, and arguing that, compared with communists and fascists, America’s was the only “righteous” faith.66 The importance of such beliefs should not be ignored, as Dulles very much believed in a personal and national sense of mission which required action; he viewed stasis, or inaction in the face of international ills to be an insulting rejection of the instructions of Jesus Christ.67 In short, Dulles tended to combine and synthesise his beliefs and understandings rather than segment or isolate them.

64 Dulles, “Administrative Law: A Practical Attitude for Lawyers,” 276. 65 John Foster Dulles, “Importance of Initiative in International Affairs," Vital Speeches Of The Day 18, no. 11 (March 15, 1952), 333-336. 66 John Foster Dulles “A Righteous Faith” Life Magazine, (December 28, 1942), 49. 67 Dulles, “Righteous Faith,” 51. He also expanded on this in 1943, see “The American Vision” Address at the opening of the churches’ National Mission on World Order, Cathedral of St. John the Divine, New York City, October 28, 1983 in The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles: Selections from his Articles and Addresses ed. Henry Van Dusen (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 60-62. 36

Another integral aspect to understanding Dulles as Secretary of State are his writings and ponderings on international systems, foreign policy, and so on, which show Dulles both expressing and working out his understanding of foreign affairs. Most scholars detailing

Dulles’s development have noted the importance of these writings, but few have followed through with a thorough analysis of the implications of such things. Both Immerman and Ronald

Pruessen noted Dulles’s tendency to categorise states as either “dynamic” or “static,” with several writers tracing this back to Dulles’s study under French philosopher Henri-Louis

Bergson.68 Dulles added other opposed layers onto this basic dichotomy, one of the more apparent being that of Christian or non-Christian states. This contributed to the complexity of

Dulles’s understanding of global affairs and helps explains many of his positions and actions as

Secretary of State.

Dulles clearly wanted those states he believed to be more progressive or morally upright to prevail, but he was equally clear in his understanding that this was not always the case.

Indeed in War, Peace, and Change Dulles argued quite succinctly that corporations which served only their shareholders, ignoring the social and economic achievements which Dulles perceived to be the true “justification” for a corporation’s existence, were contributing to the limitation of ethical solutions or approaches to international relations.69 More concretely, Dulles argued that although Western Imperialism had caused many grievances to be built up by the colonised peoples, it was at the very least a moral, Christian type of empire. Dulles compared these moral empires to the “materialistic” pagan empires which were destined to fail, and made very clear

68 Pruessen, The Road to Power, 156-158; Immerman, Piety, Pragmatism, and Power, 4-5. This was not a novel observation, as Dulles’s sister Eleanor had made this fact known, along with Dulles’s extensive education in philosophy in general, far earlier. See Dulles, John Foster Dulles, 127, 188. 69 John Foster Dulles, War, Peace, and Change (London: Macmillan Publishing, 1939), 20-25. 37

that he considered the Soviets to be evil, repugnant, and deceitful.70 Thus, there was a strand of moralism woven into Dulles’s understanding of international relations that encompassed economics, religion, and politics. And while this moralistic fibre informed and shaped Dulles’s understanding, it was nonetheless a consideration made in addition to the more important factor of the dynamic versus static nature of any struggle. Having an understanding of international dynamics and acting on it are obviously two different things, but Dulles not only attempted to act on his understanding, he believed he was destined to do so.

Dulles’s sense of destiny likely contributed to his territorial nature as Secretary of State, but several key events prior to his taking up the office instilled him with a drive to exercise and display as much talent, loyalty, and utility to Eisenhower as he could. The most obvious evidence of these factors was Dulles’s uncle Robert Lansing. The experiences and lessons

Dulles gained from his relationship with Lansing, who was a counselor to the State Department before being appointed Secretary of State in 1915 were numerous, but the most influential on

Dulles was certainly the circumstance which led to Lansing’s eventual dismissal. To be staggeringly brief, Lansing fell out of favour not simply for disagreeing with President Wilson on the League of Nations, but because he acted too independently and in a manner Edith and possibly Woodrow Wilson felt was insubordinate after Wilson’s stroke, and Lansing was forced to resign.71 It is integral to keep in mind that Dulles may well have aspired to be Secretary of

State since his grandfather John Watson Foster, Secretary of State in the final months of

President Harrison’s term, took a special interest in showing Dulles the intricacies of

70 John Foster Dulles, War or Peace, (London: George G. Harrap and Company, 1950), 19-21, 87. 71 Frederick W. Marks III, Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles, (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 40; Immerman, Piety, Pragmatism, and Power, 4-10. 38

Washington’s political elite.72 Combining his religious, educational, and familial influences,

Dulles had a very real sense that becoming Secretary of State was his duty, responsibility, and destiny; this created an equally strong sense of anxiety over reaching this goal and then executing his duties well.73

One therefore must consider the fact that by the time he became Secretary of State, John

Foster Dulles was effectively seeking to capitalise on a lifetime of thought and preparation. By

1952 Dulles had already tried, and failed, twice to become Secretary of State.74 That Dulles aspired to the office was hardly a well-kept secret at the time, the well-travelled journalist C.L.

Sulzberger asked Dulles just before Dewey’s shocking fall to Truman in 1948 “point blank” if he would be Secretary of State.75 With Truman’s defeat of Dewey, Dulles saw a golden opportunity slip from his fingers. And although Dulles and most others considered him to be the most likely candidate for the job in 1953, he was neither chosen immediately, nor without some conflict.76

Hence, Dulles was keenly aware of two always-pressing concerns: that, given his age, his time as Eisenhower’s Secretary of State would be his one and only chance to enact the kinds of policies he thought best, and that he carefully needed to balance protecting his influence with maintaining Eisenhower’s confidence. These factors contributed to a sense of insecurity when

72 Kinzer, The Brothers, 11-15. 73 Immerman, Piety, Pragmatism, and Power, 32, 35. 74 Dulles worked closely with and strongly supported Thomas Dewey in 1944 and 1948, and at 64 years of age in 1952, Dulles was cognizant of the fact that he certainly would not be afforded another opportunity at the office. See Kinzer, The Brothers, 11-14; Pruessen, Road to Power, 226-227, 358-359. 75 Although Dulles equivocated and explained that ideally he would take up a position from which he could bring about the greatest international change while avoiding having to deal with the political responsibilities of the office, he confirmed that if such position was impossible he would become Secretary of State, see Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles, 410-411. 76 Mosley detailed how several other candidates, including Dewey were proposed as viable Secretaries of State for Eisenhower. See Mosley, Dulles, 292. 39

Dulles finally ascended to Secretary of State. That sense of insecurity displayed itself in various fashions and could be exacerbated by real or perceived infringement on “his” territory.

This combination of insecurity and a sense of destiny must be understood if one is to appreciate many of Dulles’s actions as Secretary of State. Dulles was fully cognizant of the fact that he had effectively auditioned for and earned the office of Secretary of State, but he was also continuously concerned with either alienating Eisenhower or losing control over foreign policy to anyone other than the President.77 In many ways, Dulles worked assiduously to earn

Eisenhower’s trust and to become a source of advice that Eisenhower both took seriously and often acted upon; Dulles guarded this influence with equal care.78 This also, at least in part, helps explains how Dulles was able to drive himself to continue working at a grueling pace even when his cancer advanced to the stage which made every moment excruciatingly painful.79 Both

Nixon and Eisenhower were aware and sensitive to the fact that Dulles seemed to drive himself far harder and perform with greater stamina than most figures in the administration. Indeed,

Nixon noted a conversation he had with Eisenhower on that very topic, with Eisenhower explaining the primary reason for Dulles’s seemingly tireless nature was that Dulles had “lived all his life for the day he would follow in his grandfather’s footsteps. Every moment…studied in this field. [He is] sustained by this driving force.”80 Nonetheless, as is often the case, when

Dulles attempted to turn theory into practice he encountered considerable challenges.

77 Ronald Pruessen, “John Foster Dulles and the Predicaments of Power” John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War ed. Richard H. Immerman, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 25-28. 78 Immerman, Piety, Pragmatism, and Power, 48. 79 Dulles’s sister Eleanor detailed how, although there appeared to be days in which he experienced little discomfort, for most of the latter part of 1958 and all of 1959 he was in constant, increasing pain. See Dulles, John Foster Dulles, 219-224 80 Handwritten Notes, 1955 March, Box 5, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 40

There were several issues, like decolonisation, where on a conceptual level Dulles took a progressive stance yet on a practical level was problematically conservative. The

“problematically” here refers to the fact that in material and global diplomatic terms Dulles for the most part supported the British and French in maintaining their crumbling empires, but always made a point of criticising and bemoaning those empires to the British and French themselves.81 Indeed, only in the midst of and after the Suez Crisis did Dulles push for policy changes that would have altered the administration’s course to a more active anti-colonialist position.82 Dulles, even more so than Eisenhower, considered decolonisation too dangerous and complicated to be either a priority or truly desirable to occur during their lifetime.83 Dulles saw possible domino effects in almost every potential action, as he made clear in a 1946 article in

Life that while he believed the Soviet Union had designs on colonial states, those states under

French control were a highly complicated matter since France could plausibly swing over to the

Soviet’s side if pressured too rigorously.84 Dulles agreed with what he considered to be Soviet thought, that Western Europe’s colonies were the West’s Achilles’s heel.85

81 To be clear, this thesis in no way contests the flagrant racism, sexism, etc. of any members of the Eisenhower administration. As one example of Dulles’s awkward dealings with colonial powers, in 1955, Dulles complained to the French that their actions in Algeria were becoming so contrary to American desires and advice that further aid would be problematic. See Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, Washington, May 27, 1955, in FRUS 1955-1957: Volume XVIII Africa, John P. Glennon and Stanley Shaloff eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 219. 82 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 1, 1956, 2-8, 302nd Meeting of the NSC, November 1 1956, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 83 Dulles considered fifty years to be a sufficient amount of time for African decolonisation to take place, whereas Eisenhower might have actually supported it continuing indefinitely but believed at least twenty-five years were needed before it could be undertaken if it was to be done properly. In either case, both men would certainly be long dead by Dulles’s time frame, and though neither knew at the time both were also long dead by Eisenhower’s time frame as well. See Egya Sangmuah, “Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956-1960.” Middle East Journal 44, Issue 1 (Winter 1990), 78; Kinzer, The Brothers, 257. This also important in that Eisenhower believed the Cold War itself would end around the 1990s, and thus Eisenhower believed decolonisation would occur before the end of the Cold War, see, Memo, Discussion at the 269th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 8, 1955, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 84 Dulles placed African states in an Outer Zone, relatively safe from direct Soviet takeover but vulnerable to propaganda and influence. The Middle and Far East were in a Middle Zone, while France directly bordered the 41

Yet even in this agreement, Dulles refused to acknowledge that there was any acceptable path towards self-government and independence for colonised states except for the one set out for them by their benevolent Christian colonisers.86 He also considered stable access to Africa’s resources to be integral to Western European revitalisation and unity, and held effectively the same views as concerned East Asian resources and Japan.87 This led to yet another seeming contradiction in Dulles’s beliefs versus his actions, as he dragged his feet not only on decolonisation but on preparing the United States for the period when the resultant decolonised states gained independence; all because he considered such actions the more pragmatic means to advance America’s interests while thwarting those of the communists.88 Dulles attempted to instill this pragmatic anti-communism into Nixon, as he and the Vice President formed a peculiar mentor-protégé relationship during their time in Eisenhower’s cabinet.

Dulles and Nixon developed a relationship as Secretary of State and Vice President that was as complex as one would expect given the collision of such personalities. Although their relationship started and became at least a political friendship before either became members of

Eisenhower’s team, it was as cabinet members that their relationship blossomed.89 The best manner to describe the relationship between Secretary of State Dulles and Vice President Nixon

Soviet’s Inner Zone and thus face multiple pressures in all zones. He also made clear his belief in the necessity of maintaining Western European, especially British and French, unity against the Soviets. See John Foster Dulles, “Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to do About it” Life Magazine, June 3, 1946, 115-118. 85 Dulles, War or Peace, 74-76. 86 Dulles, War or Peace, 86-87. 87 Pruessen, Road to Power, 503-505. 88 Indeed, Dulles stated plainly that while he believed that South African whites sincerely considered their racist views and policies to be beneficial and necessary, that they were “both wrong and obsolete in the world today” and that such policies were enhancing Communism’s opportunities on the continent. See Dulles, War or Peace, 148- 150. 89 Dulles was one of those odd “except you”s in Nixon’s life, an Eastern intellectual who was born into power and influence, and afforded opportunities both political and otherwise that Nixon was denied. Yet, for a variety of reasons, Nixon chose to work to shield Dulles from any embarrassment resulting from his decisive involvement in Alger Hiss’s appointment to President of the Carnegie Endowment. And, the two came to develop a genuine friendship that may have in part have been based on their mutual anti-social personalities. See, Nixon, Six Crises, 21; RN, 64, 69, 86-87; Frank, Ike and Dick, 88; Gellman, The President and the Apprentice, 159-160. 42

at the outset of the administration is that of a contentious mentor-protégé dynamic, as Dulles strove to teach and empower Nixon but was also ever-mindful of his own position, beliefs, and the necessity of keeping himself in a place of influence and utility.90 Nixon considered Dulles a friend and mentor, and warmly acknowledged that Dulles spent much of his closely-guarded

“private time” teaching him about foreign affairs. Nixon described Dulles as one of the greatest diplomats of the era, who kindly granted Nixon the “incomparable opportunity” to learn.91 This did not mean the two functioned as a mutually supportive team regardless of the circumstance, indeed the two strongly disagreed on a number of issues.92 Still, the two formed a solid alliance in which Nixon was relegated to the rebellious junior partner, a role at which he began to chafe in the second term.93

This brought greater strain on their relationship, but the underlying fact remained that they agreed and supported each other on matters more often than not right up until Dulles’s death.94 And while both Nixon and Dulles were made to earn Eisenhower’s trust and respect, the

90 The relationship was not entirely dissimilar from that described in George Lucas’s Star Wars universe amongst the Sith: a master and an apprentice, both working towards a common goal, but also always on guard knowing that the apprentice would eventually attempt to overthrow the master. See Wills, Nixon Agonistes, 135-137, 421; Goldberg, “The Vice Presidency of Richard Nixon,” 64-65. And should the reader be interested in a deeper understanding of the fictional history of the Sith in Star Wars, please see Drew Karpyshyn, Darth Bane: Rule of Two (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008). 91 For the quote and description of their friendship see Nixon, RN, 252. Others have also noted the warm and close relationship between the two, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume I, The Education of a Politician: 1913-1962, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 460-461; Gellman, The President and the Apprentice, 168. 92 Broadly speaking, Nixon and Dulles shared opposing views on the intent and impact of various American policies in the Third World, and while this will be explored in much greater depth in later chapters, a good example is that of Nixon’s mission to Latin America. Nixon returned from the disastrous trip with many on-point criticisms, Dulles complained that Nixon was quite presumptuous to “think he has all the answers” after being in Latin America for “a couple of days.” Dulles also told Nixon that the Vice President’s concerns about nearly blind U.S. support of dictatorships in the region were misplaced since there was a “whole series of gradations of dictators.” See Telephone Conversation with Gov. Herter, May 18, 1958, c. 10 a.m., Box 8, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles, Papers, 1951-1959, DDEL; Telephone Call to the Vice President, Monday, May 19, 1958, 11:25 a.m., Box 8, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles, Papers, 1951-1959, DDEL. 93 Goldberg, “The Vice Presidency of Richard Nixon” 64. 94 Nixon consulted Dulles in 1959 over Nixon’s upcoming meetings with Khrushchev while the elder statesman was four days from dying. See Nixon, RN, 251-252. 43

fact that Dulles strove to secure his position while Nixon endeavoured to establish and expand his meant that the two had multiple areas over which to both bond and come into conflict.95

Hence, whereas Nixon and Dulles formed a relationship which had greater depth than many scholars appreciate, those same scholars generally agree the two respected each other and worked well together.96 Nixon certainly had much to learn from Dulles. With the establishment of the basic perspectives on Nixon and Dulles in the administration, an examination of the progression of the historical body concerned with President Eisenhower will be helpful.

The Eisenhower Legacy

The historical literature on the Eisenhower presidency falls into two rough time periods, before and after the opening of the extensive archival materials in the Eisenhower Presidential

Library in the late 1970s.97 Generally, the literature written without the aid of significant access to these archival materials is referred to as the orthodox position, while that which followed is labelled revisionist. It is more accurate to divide revisionism by first and second (and possibly third) wave, as significant first wave works were completed utilising some archival documents in the late 1960s and early 1970s but before much of the key research materials at the Eisenhower

Presidential Library became available in the latter part of the 1970s and into the 1980s, which led

95 Malsberger notes that for at least the first two years of his administration, Eisenhower kept Nixon and Dulles on a short leash for similar reasons. See, Malsberger, The General and the Politician, 35. 96 Parmet sums this up nicely, see Herbert S. Parmet, Richard M. Nixon: American Enigma (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 49. 97 As a note, a diverse literature exists on Eisenhower as a military commander, and although some of these will be referenced, for the most they do not extend their analysis beyond his military career and hence play a negligible role in the historiography of his presidency. Also, the central archival source at the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, the Ann Whitman File, was opened in two phases, 1975 and 1983. 44

to second wave revisionism. Complicating this picture further, since the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s a post-revisionist approach arose to challenge but not remove revisionism.

The differing interpretations of the Eisenhower administration can be broadly described.

The dominant orthodox position was that Eisenhower was not a strong President: he was uninvolved, frustrated, and manipulated or overwhelmed by advisors and officials like John

Foster Dulles; a common tone in orthodox works was that the Eisenhower years were dull, static, and stagnant. The revisionists argued that Eisenhower was in fact involved, motivated, and more apt to manipulate his advisors than otherwise; they held that the portrayal of Eisenhower’s time as dull was a testament to his wise leadership and guidance, pointing out that such stability did not just happen. In many revisionist accounts, Dulles’s role in the administration was significantly diminished, and Eisenhower was portrayed as dominating his Secretary of State.

The criticisms that post-revisionists tended to raise with revisionist portrayals were focused on areas of study revisionists had ignored, or had exaggerated, such as the extent to which

Eisenhower controlled Dulles and dealt with proceedings. These are of course helpful simplifications rather than rigid absolutes, as a closer examination of each perspective shows

The orthodox perspective itself can be divided fairly into two camps, those praising

Eisenhower and those highly critical of his time in office. Orthodox critics held that Eisenhower was an incompetent president with little control or even involvement in the day-to-day operation of his administration. Typically, these types of criticisms described Eisenhower as overwhelmed by his advisers, disinterested, or frustrated by the challenges he faced, and most of these began to

emerge after Eisenhower had begun his second term.98 Initial adherents to the critical orthodox perspective relied on the outward face of the administration and publically available sources, and in some cases were politically motivated or personally alienated; Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr. is perhaps the most well-known example in this regard.99 Their Eisenhower was criticised for being overeager to delegate authority, disdaining decision making, and was typically portrayed as creating a time that New York Times editor William Shannon in 1958 labelled “the great postponement.”100 In such portrayals, John Foster Dulles ran America’s foreign affairs in all but the most extreme circumstances. Shannon’s description became the dominant portrayal of

Eisenhower throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, that of a “genial, indolent man…fleeing from public policy to bridge, golf, and westerns.”101 And although the critical orthodox position formed the dominant view, the other camp in the orthodox school held a far more positive opinion of Eisenhower that never entirely abated. It is also integral to keep in mind that the critical orthodox position was effectively refuted and removed by revisionism; hence detailed focus on individual works is less integral to broader understanding.

98 See, for example, Marquis Childs, Eisenhower, Captive Hero: A Critical Study of the General and the President (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958); Richard Rovere, Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1956), it should be noted that Rovere was far more critical of Eisenhower’s second term, the decisions therein (labelling his policies “flaccid…static”), and his apparent inability to accomplish anything as President rather than as the war hero Eisenhower, see, Richard H. Rovere, "Eisenhower and the New President," Harper's Magazine 220, No. 1320 (May 1, 1960), 31. 99 Arthur Schlesinger Sr. famously conducted a survey of historians and political scientists with “Democratic coloration” of American presidents in 1962 which rated Eisenhower number 22, below Chester A. Arthur and above Andrew Johnson, see Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr., "Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians," The New York Times Magazine, CXI, July 29, 1962, 12, 40-41. Although he had firsthand, intimate knowledge of the administration, Sherman Adams wrote an assessment of Eisenhower after a prolonged struggle led to his being forced out of Ike’s administration in a corruption scandal. See Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961). 100 William V. Shannon, “Eisenhower as President: A Critical Appraisal of the Record," Commentary 26, No. 5 (November 1958), 390. 101 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. was vexed when he noted the stark change in evaluations of Eisenhower from the time of his father’s survey to the time of his review, attributing at least part of the hatred to Eisenhower’s own negative view of intellectuals. See Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “Review: The Ike Age Revisited” in Reviews in American History 11, No. 1 (March 1983), 2. 46

The other side of the orthodox interpretation might be labelled proto-revisionism, as many of the first-wave revisionists simply expanded upon their arguments and work, but for simplicity’s sake the label “pro-Eisenhower orthodox” will suffice. It might appear puzzling that much of the pro-Eisenhower orthodox literature actually pre-dates the critical orthodox perspective and yet was largely ignored in scholarly memory until the rise of revisionism, but it is worth keeping in mind that discontent with Eisenhower took time to build, and that finding a suitable way to criticise the leadership of a war hero was a significant challenge in itself. Indeed, a significant portion of the initial stock of pro-Eisenhower orthodox literature was rather obviously descended from the same line of pre-presidential literature that simplistically emphasized the positive traits Eisenhower possessed as a war hero or general which would lend themselves to the Presidency.102 These studies tended to trade on a combination of frustration with perceived Democratic failings and Eisenhower’s commanding reputation. However, even putting aside accounts which simply took advantage of Eisenhower’s status and reputation, there still existed a significant body of orthodox literature that found Eisenhower to be a keenly intelligent, active, and strong President. Further, both during and shortly after his presidency, many described Eisenhower as a far more active, assertive, and complicated character than the critical orthodox perspective allowed. As Vincent de Santis later showed, a variety of journalists and newspapers, as well as former officials from Eisenhower’s administration who left on amicable terms described Eisenhower in 1956 as a strong, alert, involved, and enthusiastic

102 W.G. Clugston was one of the loudest voices from Eisenhower’s home state to offer him as the solution to America’s ills, see W.G. Clugston, Eisenhower for President? or, Who Will Get Us Out of the Messes We Are In?, (New York: Exposition Press, 1951); Both Kevin McCann and Allan Taylor presented pictures of Eisenhower, mostly in his own words, which offered ringing endorsements of why Eisenhower should be President. See Kevin McCann, Man from Abilene, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1952); Allan Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952); Finally, John Gunther surmised from Eisenhower’s military career and his own evaluation of the man that Eisenhower had the right morality and personality to lead, see John Gunther, Eisenhower: The Man and The Symbol (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1952), 129-132. 47

leader.103 While critics of Eisenhower became more vocal after his re-election, his supporters continued to offer explanations and analyses which pointed to a shrewd commander-in-chief.

Almost any person with “inside” information argued consistently that, whatever his failings, Eisenhower in no way resembled the caricature presented by many critics. Although he was writing of Eisenhower’s wartime career well after he had ostensibly left public life, Walter

Bedell Smith, Ike’s erstwhile supporter, pointed out that General Eisenhower had managed to deal with some of the most impressive figures of the Second World War without being overwhelmed; the implicit suggestion being that as President, Eisenhower was very unlikely to fold under the pressure of dealing with Foster Dulles, Wilson, Weeks, or Humphrey.104 Robert J.

Donovan, the Washington correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune at the time portrayed

Eisenhower as consciously steering American policies with a middle-of-the-road, stability geared mentality.105 Quite often, journalists who spent a prolonged amount of time covering and interacting with Eisenhower reported an overall positive picture.106 In many ways, the

Eisenhower portrayed by the critical orthodox position required ignoring or discounting the arguments and evidence of those praising Eisenhower, even in a backhanded manner.

103 Vincent P. de Santis cited evidence which included keen insights such as the fact that Eisenhower’s actions in foreign policy meant that his administration had managed to either outmanoeuvre or win over the strong isolationist wing of the Republican party, see “Eisenhower Revisionism,” The Review of Politics 38, No. 2 (April 1976), 192- 194. 104 See Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions: Europe, 1944-1945, (Toronto: Longman, Greens and Company, 1956). The names mentioned above served as Eisenhower’s initial, respectively, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, and Secretary of the Treasury. Again, the critical orthodox position held that these figures were able to overwhelm, frustrate, and otherwise out-manoeuvre Eisenhower. 105 Donovan was also one of the first to chronicle in depth the that Eisenhower was quite conscious of the fact that he essentially left Richard Nixon dangling in the wind by avoiding a decision on Nixon’s suitability to continue as Vice President in the run-up to the 1956 election, see Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishing, 1956) 403-406. 106 A. Merriman Smith (Smitty), the White House correspondent for the United Press from the FDR to Nixon presidencies, was impressed with Eisenhower, see A. Merriman Smith, Meet Mister Eisenhower, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955). 48

Some features of Eisenhower’s personality and leadership which allowed revisionists to strike their most devastating blows against the critical orthodox position were readily available in the 1960s but missed or ignored. In his 1962 memoir Six Crises, then former Vice President

Richard Nixon described both the “hidden-hand” tactics of Eisenhower which pioneering revisionist Fred Greenstein later detailed, explaining that “an Eisenhower characteristic was never to take direct action…where indirect methods could accomplish the same result,” and describing him as “far more complex and devious…than most people realized.”107 Although it is little wonder Nixon was ignored as a source for information on Eisenhower during a decade in which the former sought any means to rebuild his political career while the latter was treated in popular memory more and more as the doddering caricature, the fact remains that the revisionists’ fundamental position was not a new one.108 However, unwittingly, Nixon played a role in the onset of a more positive popular perception of Eisenhower even without the archival materials. While the critical orthodox perspective became dominant in the early 1960s, this dominance began to slip in the latter years of the Johnson administration and the early years of the Nixon presidency as a crop of first-wave revisionist writers, who still lacked access to a great deal of the archival documents, began to put forth arguments similar to those of the pro-

Eisenhower orthodox positions.

107 Nixon made a point to add in the parts about complexity and the addendum compliment that his description was meant in “the best sense of those words.” See Nixon, Six Crises, 160-161. For Nixon altering his description of Eisenhower from simply “devious” to the one that ended up in Six Crises see Jeffrey Frank, Ike and Dick: Portrait of a Strange Political Marriage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 237. 108 Emmet John Hughes was often ignored by Eisenhower during his time as an aide and speechwriter which at least in some ways contributed to his low estimation of Eisenhower, see The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1963); Arthur Larson, a speechwriter for Eisenhower hinted at many traits that would later feature prominently in both first and second-wave revisionism, see Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1968). It should be noted that Larson’s earlier work, A Republican Looks at his Party, was personally endorsed by Eisenhower, who supported and agreed with many of what he considered Larson’s centrist views. See Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at his Party, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956). 49

This first-wave revisionism arose for a number of reasons, but maintained agreement on a particular point concerning Eisenhower and his administration’s place in history. Although there was never a period when debate among scholars, writers, and journalists over criticisms of

Eisenhower abated or was considered resolved, a defining trait of first-wave revisionism and its corollaries was ably expressed by Murray Kempton in a 1967 article in Esquire. Much of what

Kempton argued was by no means novel, indeed the premise of his article was in a very similar vein to Nixon’s 1962 position that Eisenhower was far more complicated than his critics could allow; Kempton even used the “devious” quote from Six Crises to open his piece.109 Kempton compared Eisenhower to Carroll’s Cheshire Cat, an apt description of the portrayal of

Eisenhower by revisionists, as the skillful Eisenhower can appear and disappear at will. Despite the fact that Kempton’s arguments were quite similar to those of a long line of Eisenhower’s supporters, he struck at the right time, as changes in both America and American scholarship drove renewed interest in Eisenhower. The praise that was heaped upon Eisenhower by some of the first crop of first-wave revisionists was often blatantly problematic: Garry Willis famously defended Nixon’s misevaluation of Eisenhower by positing that “Eisenhower was not a political sophisticate; he was a political genius.”110 This is not to suggest that Eisenhower was universally praised as he was re-evaluated by writers who argued he was a more active and intelligent leader than previous understandings allowed.

Adherents to New Left revisionism also denied Eisenhower had been inactive or dull during his presidency, however they were not as ready with praise as others. The New Left

109 Murray Kempton, “The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower,” Esquire College Issue (September 1967), 108. 110 Willis, Nixon Agonistes, 118. It is worth pointing out that Nixon Agonistes was hardly an attempt an unbiased analysis, as Eisenhower is fawned over and Willis notes how in 1960 Nixon lost the election but “made his soul.” See Nixon Agonistes, 147. 50

assigned primary responsibility or blame for the Cold War on America, and various New Left writers included Eisenhower and his administration as actively pursuing and conducting an aggressive Cold War or at least foreign policy. The New Left, broadly, adopted bottom up examination and criticism of the motivations and results of decisions of powerful figures or groups. Inherently critical, or at least suspicious, of Liberalism and questioning “the state,” the

New Left understandably had a variety of off-shoots and overlaps with other areas of historical study.111 It is worth pointing out that the New Left’s interpretive framework, especially the best known works, tended to adopt a long-term focus; hence, Eisenhower and his administration were often part of the analyses but rarely the sole foci. Their economic centred analyses of American foreign policy including Eisenhower started at least as early as 1959 with William Appleman

Williams.112 The treatment of Eisenhower by the New Left writers producing their work during the orthodox and first-wave revisionist periods varied, from Gabriel Kolko’s more mechanistic portrayal to the more strategizing imperialist depicted by Harry Magdoff.113 Putting aside the differing portrayals of the economic motivations different New Left writers saw in Eisenhower’s actions, most New Left writers treated Eisenhower-as-president more like the shrewd and involved leader seen in pro-Eisenhower orthodox or first-wave revisionist writings. Indeed,

111 Linda Gordon’s corpus is likely one of the more famous examples of this, but race and labor histories like Ira Katznelson’s also fit. For examples see Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013); Linda Gordon, “The New Feminist Scholarship on the Welfare State” in Women, the State, and Welfare, Linda Gordon ed. (Madison: University Press of Wisconsin, 2012); Linda Gordon, Woman's body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America (New York: Grossman, 1976). 112 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959). 113 Kolko portrayed Eisenhower as simply an imperial capitalist unable to see the, to Kolko, obvious flaws in his worldview, whereas Magdoff cast Eisenhower as an imperialist eagerly re-arranging Southeast Asia for democracy and capitalism. See Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 106-108. 116; Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 53. It is worth noting that Magdoff’s work tended to paint almost any American economic institution existing abroad as an example of imperialism and often ignored context, see Age of Imperialism, Tables on 74-75. 51

Barton J. Bernstein noted in 1973 that most of the various “Left” writers interpreted the actions of the Eisenhower administration as at the very least the result of the leadership and skills, flawed though they may have been, of Eisenhower himself.114

The changing consensus on Eisenhower was a slow shift that could not be completed until sufficient research materials were available, and yet, if only by comparison, Eisenhower started to be treated with more praise by writers. Richard Rovere, who argued in the 50s and early 60s that Eisenhower’s first term was admirable but that he need not have served a second, backpedalled only slightly in 1971 while asserting that Eisenhower and his cabinet, whom he labelled “a trainload of mediocrities, incompetents, and even pickpockets” were nonetheless preferable given the results of those who followed.115 This is a noteworthy element of first-wave

Eisenhower revisionism, as a significant motivator for many writers was not to heap praise upon

Eisenhower but to argue that Eisenhower’s boring period of apparent stasis was preferable to the variety of problems Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and their administrations both dealt with and caused. Indeed, a consensus existed that the reason for this renewal of interest and admiration for Eisenhower was the very fact that his presidency appeared in retrospect, and in comparison to those who held the office after him, rather dull, peaceful, and uneventful.116 The strife and instability of Kennedy administration, the onset and escalation of the Vietnam War during the

114 Bernstein listed three groups of what he considered to be revisionist scholars, radical leftists like Kolko and Magdoff, and himself), left-liberals, and tactical revisionists (where he also placed himself), this last group is labeled in this study as first-wave revisionists. See Barton J. Bernstein, “Foreign Policy in the Eisenhower Administration,” Foreign Service Journal 50, No. 5 (May, 1973), 17-19. 115 Richard H. Rovere, “Eisenhower Revisited-A Political Genius? A Brilliant Man?” The New York Times Magazine February 7, 1971, 54. 116 Charles Alexander accepted William Shannon’s “Great Postponement” argument, but contended that relative to his successors Eisenhower had done a good deal to avoid the “agonies and excesses” of the administrations to follow. See Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952- 1961 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975) 291-294. See also de Santis, “Eisenhower Revisionism,” 198-199; Schlesinger Jr., “Review: The Ike Age Revisited,” 2. 52

Johnson administration, and the deception and disgrace of the Nixon administration combined to push scholars to investigate the relative stability of the Eisenhower administration, but most admitted a weakness in their arguments.

First-wave revisionist writers and critical orthodox writers were keenly aware that the body of official documents had increased only slightly and had not fundamentally removed the possibility that new documentation might reinforce the old orthodoxy Eisenhower. Even those noting the change in perception were quick to point out that the main difference for Eisenhower was in fact one of appearances.117 Well in to the 1970s, the critical orthodox perspective and first wave revisionists continued to trade blows on similar lines as the 1950s and 1960s with only a slight edge to the revisionists.118 Where Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. might continue to question whether Eisenhower was truly in charge, Herbert Parmet could at least offer more than logic to argue that Eisenhower was running and invested in his administration’s operations.119 Hence, the debate over whether Eisenhower or Dulles ran foreign policy continued to rage, While some archival materials were trickling out at this time, those that provided the most insight had yet to be released, and this weakness showed through in first wave revisionist works.120 As just one

117 In noting the change in Eisenhower’s popular status, Vincent de Santis combined his own praise with an unmistakably intentional tendency to affix “appears” to any new description of Eisenhower, see “Eisenhower Revisionism,” 193, 196, 198, 199, 200. 118 In 1973, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. derided Eisenhower by pointing out that while other Presidents typically overworked themselves while in office, Ike “managed more golf than most corporation officials or college presidents.” See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 384. 119 Schlesinger admitted that although the Eisenhower administration had in fact made savvy moves in turbulent times, it was difficult to resolve whether Eisenhower or Dulles had been the primary mover. Herbert Parmet offered persuasive, if not convincing evidence, such as Eisenhower privately exploding at criticisms of foreign policy moves which had previously and publically been thought to have been Dulles’s decisions. See, respectively, Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency, 160-167; Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), 480-483. 120 Eisenhower contributed to this weakness with his memoirs, which, although they reported the facts with fair accuracy also habitually avoided detailed explanation and conveyed either smug satisfaction or complacency. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Volume 1, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City: 53

example, Peter Lyon asserted correctly that on the issue of Senator Joe McCarthy, the anti- communist thorn in the side of Eisenhower’s administration for much of his first term,

Eisenhower chose to deal with McCarthy behind the scenes rather than in public, but Lyon erred when he argued that Eisenhower actually spent very little time considering how to deal with

“Tail-Gunner Joe.”121 Still, Lyon’s work was one of the first to take advantage of slowly opening archival documents and pointed to the precarious position of the orthodox perspective.

Once a greater number of documents from the Eisenhower Presidential Library were released to the public, the foundation on which much of the critical orthodox position was based was obliterated. The release of documentary evidence removed the possibility of dismissing or criticising Eisenhower as an uninvolved or unassertive leader; although his attentions were divided unequally, Eisenhower was anything but an inactive President. Gary Reichard was cognizant of the approaching change in 1978, when he noted that a new consensus on

Eisenhower was forming, that many of those critical of Eisenhower in the 1970s were simply rehashing or defending old positions, and that it seemed “likely that the revisionist thinking will prevail.”122 Reichard was correct: as writers made use of the more readily available research materials being released by the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the revisionist position prevailed. However, second-wave revisionism went well beyond simply becoming the dominant narrative of Eisenhower’s presidency, as it established a new foundation upon which much of the

Doubleday and Company, 1963); Volume 2, Waging Peace, 1956- 1961 (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1965); also see De Santis, “Eisenhower Revisionism,” 195-196. 121 Lyon’s work was an impressively well-researched and voluminous tome, and Lyon was one of the first to access the partially opened and declassified contents of the Ann Whitman Files. Still, Eisenhower spent a considerable amount of time and energy considering ways to manage McCarthy, which is clear when reviewing files opened in the late 70s and into the 80s. See Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 524-525, 563-565. 122 Gary W. Reichard, “Eisenhower as President: The Changing View,” South Atlantic Quarterly 77, No. 3 (Summer 1978), 278. 54

contemporary understanding of Eisenhower is still based. It is therefore vital to place second- wave revisionism in its proper context.

The initial crop of second-wave revisionists openly moved to undermine the critical orthodox position. The best known work of this period is Fred Greenstein’s The Hidden-Hand

Presidency, in which Greenstein showed through meticulous research the often staggering lengths Eisenhower went to in order to avoid directly confronting, challenging, or ordering others on contentious issues.123 Others, including Eisenhower himself, had presented evidence that there was more going on in the Eisenhower administration than met the eye, indeed as has been mentioned Richard Nixon provided a very basic outline of Eisenhower’s deviousness and his hidden-hand tactics, but Greenstein’s work laid bare the intricate labyrinth Eisenhower constructed in an attempt to create the appearance of the very things for which the critical orthodox positions derided him.124 In another case, Robert Divine’s Eisenhower and the Cold

War, Divine presented persuasive evidence that Eisenhower was never overwhelmed by his advisors or cabinet; Divine put it bluntly: “In essence, Eisenhower used Dulles.”125 This argument in particular gave birth to the so-called “lightning rod thesis” which for a time contributed to a reversal in the treatment of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship, with Eisenhower

123 Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, (New York: Basic Books Incorporated: 1982). 124 Eisenhower actually provided the oft utilised instance and quote of his reassuring White House Press Secretary Jim Hagerty that if the press pushed him with a particular question Hagerty need not worry: “if that question comes up, I’ll just confuse them.” See Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 478. Greenstein outlined how and why Eisenhower constructed his “system” in the first part of Hidden-hand, but argued concisely that creating the public perception of a “guileless folk hero” was simply one more tactic of Eisenhower’s, see Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, 151. 125 Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981) 21. It needs to be pointed out that this particular work relied solely on secondary sources, and as such is representative of both the peak of revisionist thinking without extensive use of continually opening archival documents, but also the limit the position could argue to without greater access to documents. 55

portrayed as craftily manipulating Dulles.126 While both Divine and Greenstein, but especially the latter, helped demolish the critical orthodox position, it was quite clear that such demolition was itself a significant motivator for their work.127 And though Greenstein’s work definitively confirmed Eisenhower’s complexity and active nature as President, it and Divine’s as well as most early second-wave revisionist writing both contained, and created, new problems.

The early second-wave revisionists benefited from previously unavailable resources, but also suffered from some significant weaknesses. There is a common trait in much of the preliminary second-wave literature: a triumphal, almost smug sense of satisfaction at being able to fire shot after ruinous shot at the critical orthodox position. Blanche Wiesen Cook, even as she often criticised Eisenhower’s decisions, made sure to point out both that they were

Eisenhower’s decisions and that Kennedy and Johnson had failed where Eisenhower succeeded;

Cook was quite open that a significant motivator for her was the sense, and sometimes fact, that the realities of the Eisenhower years had been “trivialized…consistently belittled and ignored.128

Indeed, by 1982 Robert Griffith lamented that much of the field was still bogged down in a decades’ old debate, hinting that scholars may have misdirected their efforts in a drive to close off any notion that critical orthodox position might still hold merit.129 The issue was that second- wave revisionists at least appeared to be more focused on displaying the extent to which the

126 Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 21. 127 Divine was quite open about this, admitting that he wrote “with basic sympathy for a badly underrated President…far from being the do-nothing President of legend, Ike was skillful and active…” see Eisenhower and the Cold War, viii. 128 Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy, (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1981), vi-v. In a later chapter Cook portrayed Eisenhower as stern if slightly short-sighted since he had only barely controlled a system which she argued simply overwhelmed Kennedy, see page 300. It is worth noting that while still generally positive, by 1981 Cook had significantly scaled back her evaluation of Eisenhower. 129 Griffith was also quick to make two other important points at the outset, namely that the very label ‘revisionist’ was deeply flawed, and that those scholars placed under the label often differed significantly in a number of important areas. See Robert Griffith, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” The American Historical Review 87, No. 1 (February 1982) 87. 56

arguments of the critical orthodox position were being debunked than analysing the implications of their works’ significant developments.

This is not to suggest that the initial second-wave revisionists avoided criticising

Eisenhower, but often these were couched in terms which did not sufficiently explore the resulting questions. It is important to note that even the pioneering second-wave Eisenhower revisionist scholars such as Robert Divine and Fred Greenstein did not suggest Eisenhower was an infallible leader.130 However, the initial crop of second-wave revisionists were interested in displaying Eisenhower as active and in-charge, and this motivation contributed to the portrayals of Eisenhower as consistently prudent, calculating, and in an almost constant state of at short- term prescience.131 Richard Immerman pointed out that scholars needed to be willing to accept that debunking the critical orthodox position came with benefits and consequences; an important consequence being that Eisenhower became open to possibly more devastating criticisms, since, if he was active and in charge, both blame and credit rested with Eisenhower.132 This included

130 Divine notes, though he does not deeply explore, that Eisenhower was quick to anger when his abilities or decisions were criticised. It is also worth noting that Divine is likely the first historian to recognise Eisenhower’s willingness to avoid consideration of the long-term consequences of his actions, see Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 78-79, 150-151. Greenstein notes two prominent examples of Eisenhower failing whilst utilising his ‘hidden-hand’ tactics, in 1956 when he hoped to rid himself of Richard Nixon as a running-mate, and in 1958 when he wanted White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams to resign, see Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, 63- 65. 131 See, Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency; Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War; and Eisenhower apologist cum plagiarising evidence falsifier Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). For the continuing revelations of Ambrose’s ignominy see Ira Chernus, “Ambrose on Eisenhower: The Impact of a Single Faulty Quotation,” May 16, 2010, History News Network, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/126636 (Accessed September 1, 2015); Lori Clune, “Stephen Ambrose’s Falsifications of the Rosenberg Execution” May 16, 2010, History News Network, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/126527 (Accessed September 1, 2015); and Timothy D. Rives, Ambrose and Eisenhower: A View from the Stacks in Abilene” May 17, 2010, History News Network, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/126705 (Accessed September 2, 2015). I trust that the practise of ignoring Ambrose in the discussion while citing him in the footnotes is a permissible irony. 132 Immerman used the example of the conventional perception of Eisenhower and Dulles being that Eisenhower was conciliatory whereas Dulles was more hardline, and showed the Eisenhower simply often had Dulles take the hardline position for tactical reasons. See Richard H. Immerman, “Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?” Political Psychology 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1979), 26-27. 57

considering the implications of choices and missteps in foreign policy that had previously been blamed on John Foster Dulles’s inflexibility.

Immerman was not alone in expressing concern that revisionists had misplaced priorities and were, in effect, beating the proverbial dead horse. This sentiment was echoed by Mary

McAuliffe in 1981, when she noted that while much of the overturning of the conventional thinking on Eisenhower was already complete and proven, the genuine reassessment of the implications of an active, involved, and shrewd Eisenhower had yet to be explored.133 Indeed, even supporters of the critical orthodox position, like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. had to admit by

1983 that the torrent of evidence and scholarly writing had revealed that in reality, Eisenhower was far from the caricature of their unflattering portrayals.134 Nonetheless it was not until 1985 that the “anti-Eisenhower” orthodox position that the second-wave revisionists railed against was pronounced to have been fully “repudiated.”135 It was also shortly around the time that the critical orthodox position was considered comfortably laid to rest that a series of new developments in the study of Eisenhower and his administration began to pop up.

The reaching of a consensus at long last that Eisenhower had been an active and assertive

President spurred scholars to investigate where and how he had spent his energies while in office. Scholars’ explorations led to several distinct areas of study all closely linked back to the revisionist foundation. Most of these were devoted to foreign policy in some fashion, and these offshoots regularly contained either explicit or implicit criticisms of Eisenhower’s handling of

133 McAuliffe was also one of the few scholars to properly note that the ‘revisionist’ position had existed for much longer than was typically presented. See Mary S. McCauliffe, “Eisenhower, the President,” The Journal of American History 68, No. 3 (December 1981) 625-626, 631-632. 134 Schlesinger Jr. “The Ike Age Revisited,” 6. 135 Antony James Joes argued that labelling the second-wave revisionists as “revisionists” was not accurate not because of their historical lineage but because they had utterly disproven the opposing camp. See “Eisenhower Revisionism: The Tide Comes In,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 15, No. 3, (Summer 1985), 569-570. 58

the area of study. In 1982, Burton Ira Kaufman explored the slow, begrudging development of

Eisenhower’s perspective on the roles of trade controls and foreign aid to nations in need; while

Kaufman praised Eisenhower’s eventual change of heart, his portrayal was nonetheless one of a man ensconced in stubborn certainty for much of his Presidency.136 Stephen G. Rabe viewed

Eisenhower’s policies in Latin America as problematic and short-sighted, and although many of the criticisms he levelled at Eisenhower were communicated more poignantly in his later work, his criticisms in the early and mid-80s nonetheless showed that an active Eisenhower was not necessarily also a skillful one.137

Some of the most pertinent developments in the historiography for the purposes of this study were the sewing of the seeds that eventually became the post-revisionist position. It warrants mentioning that, much like the pro-Eisenhower orthodox writers, many of the more nuanced views of Eisenhower expressed by scholars in the late 70s and into the 1980s could be given a more accurate, albeit clumsier, label. These writers could be considered proto-post- revisionist, but due simply to the fact that most scholars consider the historiographical divisions to be best expressed on the basis of chronological proximity to the release of research materials, many of works which are clearly either examples or forerunners of post-revisionism must be labelled revisionist. Elmo Richardson’s 1979 original The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower for example, was mostly laudatory, but hinted that with further evidence and investigation scholars might discover Eisenhower was actually a far more rigid and stubborn leader than most

136 Kaufman also pointed out that Eisenhower’s record on liberalizing trade was inconsistent, and indicated at times a disconcerting drift towards protectionism, see Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953-1961, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 74-75. 137 Rabe’s first work cited here obviously did not focus solely on Eisenhower, but it did argue convincingly that Eisenhower either could not foresee the consequences of his policies, or did not care so long as communism was not the result. See Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 135; "Eisenhower and Latin America: Arms and Dictators," Peace and Change 11, No. 1 (Spring 1985). 59

revisionists could then allow.138 Although his Inevitable Revolutions was not focused simply on

Eisenhower, Walter LaFeber argued that although not without merits, Eisenhower was simply incapable of fully comprehending the changes occurring in Latin America during his Presidency; in short he was unable to “come to terms with history.”139 For most scholars, however, these criticisms allowed significant room for credit and blame as well as the possibility that

Eisenhower had simply erred in certain situations. They were also lacking an integral attribute present in all true post-revisionist studies.

In a manner central to this thesis, some of the seeds of what became post-revisionism were sown by Robert J. McMahon. In 1986, McMahon levelled one of the first, and sharpest, criticisms at the revisionists that in no way questioned Eisenhower’s position or activities.

McMahon noted that none of the revisionists had yet dealt seriously or in any appreciable depth with Eisenhower’s handling of Third World issues.140 Pushing further, McMahon also pointed out that many revisionists avoided considering the implication of a President whose actions and policies included indecipherable brinksmanship, misunderstandings of indigenous nationalisms, and short-sighted covert interventions.141 McMahon’s criticisms were and continue to be important since the revisionist depiction of Eisenhower came to occupy such a dominant position

138 Richardson was very clear that Eisenhower was in charge, but made equally clear to the reader that Eisenhower had significant difficulty accepting failure and often found it challenging to understand opposing views or criticisms. See Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 170-177. 139 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984), 139-143. 140 Robert J. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,” Political Science Quarterly 101, No. 3 (1986), 456. 141 McMahon broadly detailed issues that some scholars had already exposed in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, at the heart of his argument was a two-pronged reminder that not all was yet known about Eisenhower as many documents remained classified, and that if Eisenhower was as the revisionists portrayed him viz. his predecessors and successors that meant he would have many new criticisms to answer for in coming years, see “A Critique of the Revisionists,” 472-473. McMahon did give reference to studies which dealt also with Eisenhower, such as Walter LaFeber’s work, but his point was concerned with specifically focusing on these areas and Eisenhower. 60

that the new caricature of a prescient, active, and calculating Eisenhower has been used to explain away evidence to the contrary. The early and mid-1980s also marked the point at which the study of Eisenhower and the Eisenhower administration began to branch out significantly, and while these areas are not the focus of this study it nonetheless warrants mentioning that such branching occurred.142

Though the evaluations of Eisenhower varied from scholar to scholar, they all agreed at least on the revisionist portrayal of Eisenhower as an active and involved leader. However, most scholars also acknowledged Eisenhower’s weaknesses even as their narratives relied on a more revisionist understanding. This contributed to Robert Burk’s description of a rather muddled field by 1988, in which Eisenhower seemed to occupy an untenable amount of positions if the revisionist portrayal of Eisenhower as a wise and prescient leader was to remain dominant.143

An additional consequence of the flourishing and expansion of studies on Eisenhower was that scholars began investigating aspects of his foreign policy that McMahon and others noted had been accorded less attention by both the orthodox and initial revisionist positions, namely, the

Third World.

142 Although foreign policy continued and continues to be the most studied aspect of Eisenhower’s presidency, studies focused on other areas began to emerge with greater regularity and depth during the time period in which revisionism came to dominance. This is not to suggest studies focused on Eisenhower and non-foreign policy issues had not been produced previous to this period, for example as early as 1973 Elmo Richardson wrote on ecological and resource development issues involving Eisenhower. See Elmo Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation the Truman-Eisenhower Era (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973). Granting that any domestic act or incident can have foreign policy implications, three general areas became the focus of many studies during the 1980s: Eisenhower’s policies and position on civil rights, his ability as a political leader in the domestic legislative context, and his handling of the initial phases of the space race. 143 Burk either wittingly or unwittingly described how by 1988, the revisionist portrayal of Eisenhower was of a man who both out-manoeuvred his advisers and yet relied upon them for loyalty and insight, but also one whose personal style of leadership meant that he could not have attempted to bring about significant change. See Robert F. Burk, “Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on Eisenhower Scholarship,” The Historian 50, No. 2 (February 1988), 202-203. 61

Revisionist scholars examining Eisenhower’s policies and actions in the various regions of the Third World tended to present Eisenhower in a less positive light than other revisionists, hinting towards the post-revisionist position. It is worth pointing out that these scholars typically chose to focus on a specific event or occurrence rather than the totality of Eisenhower’s perspectives and policies. Bennett Rushkoff’s study of the first Quemoy-Matsu Crisis showed that while Eisenhower was certainly in control of foreign policy, he absolutely did not have as clear and comprehensive an understanding of situations as some revisionists depicted.144

Richard Immerman detailed the Eisenhower administration’s decision to orchestrate a coup in

Guatemala, an event which was long known about but impossible to study in great depth until greater access to research materials was possible; his conclusions were that Eisenhower chose to overthrow a democratically elected government for short-sighted and imperial reasons.145

George Herring along with Richard Immerman offered tempered praise of Eisenhower’s decision to avoid American involvement in the siege of Điện Biên Phủ, arguing that the decision not to intervene was appropriate but that the NSC system Eisenhower implemented was too cumbersome and bulky to be of use during crises.146 Connected to this criticism, even writers who believed Eisenhower handled Third World crises in an admirable manner tacitly admitted that despite its utility, Eisenhower’s NSC system was never quite as efficient or responsive as

144 Bennett C. Rushkoff, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955,” Political Science Quarterly 96, No. 3 (Autumn 1981), 477-480. Rushkoff also took a position similar to Immerman’s as concerns Dulles, arguing that Dulles obeyed orders and followed the President’s directions, but otherwise guided foreign policy as he thought best. 145 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1982). It should be pointed out that Immerman argues strongly that the United Fruit Company played a pivotal role in demanding and supporting the coup, but his evidence here is largely circumstantial. 146 George Herring and Richard Immerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: ‘The Day We Didn’t Go To War’ Revisited,” The Journal of American History 71, No. 2 (September 1984) 363. 62

either Eisenhower hoped or crises demanded.147 Studies of the Middle East for obvious reasons tended to focus on American-Egyptian relations in the lead up to and fallout from the Suez

Crisis, and were divided on Eisenhower’s role but agreed on peace and stability being his top priorities.148 And although some scholars criticised the seemingly obvious results of

Eisenhower’s many attempts to bring stability to Third World regions, it was also in studies of the Third World that, much like McMahon had anticipated, a reaction against revisionism formed that not only criticised the revisionists portrayal of Eisenhower, but began attacking

Eisenhower anew.

Dating the existence of post-revisionism is at least as murky a task as dating revisionism; however, by the mid-to-late 1980s, post-revisionism appeared to be taking form around studies of the Third World. These scholars argued that Eisenhower’s actions were often rather disturbing, and distinct from the keen, far-sighted leader portrayed by the revisionists. Edward

Keefer pointed out that while Eisenhower certainly played a significant role in ending the Korean

War, his quick recourse to contemplate and threaten the use of atomic weapons was evidence more of a desire to win the war than a genuine attempt to end it.149 David L. Anderson argued convincingly that revisionists’ depiction of Eisenhower’s wisdom in “staying out” of Vietnam was a gross oversimplification that ignored the fact that Eisenhower created the commitment

147 Philip Henderson noted that Eisenhower continually sought to improve the NSC, but was forced to rely on ad hoc committees and meetings if he hoped to react properly to the demands of international crises like Quemoy-Matsu. See Philip G. Henderson, Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 118-119 148 Barry Rubin, for example, placed Dulles much more at the forefront of activity and in many senses decision making while stressing Eisenhower’s desire for stability in the area. See Barry Rubin, “America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957,” Political Science Quarterly 97, No. 1 (Spring, 1982), 86-90. Donald Neff attempted to incorporate a multiplicity of perspectives, and while he portrayed Eisenhower as growing ever-more concerned over Nasser and his destabilising of the region, agreed that peace and stability was his top priority. See Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York: The Linden Press, 1981). 149 Edward C. Keefer, “President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War” Diplomatic History 10, No. 3 (Summer 1986) 277. 63

which tied the United States to a project that was effectively doomed from the start.150 Stephen

G. Rabe’s Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism contended that while Eisenhower may have been active in other areas, his Latin American policies were both problematic and simplistic; only slowly changing after Richard Nixon was nearly killed in

Caracas.151 Indeed, almost regardless of the region or Third World issue, scholars began to find many reasons to criticise Eisenhower and the revisionists.

This was true whether one examined regional studies or those which dealt with popular

Third World political movements. David W. Lesch offered a scathing condemnation that the

Eisenhower administration had such a poor understanding of domestic dynamics in Middle

Eastern nations like Syria, that its interventions and actions in the region were failures layered upon failures.152 H.W. Brands contended that while Eisenhower was willing and able to “deal” with Third World neutralist nations on a pragmatic level, he often commanded his administration in such a way that could only confuse and irritate neutralist leaders.153 Renewed analysis of

Dulles’s agency and influence were integral to such conclusions, and these types of arguments contributed to a slight rebalancing in the portrayal of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship, as

150 Anderson perhaps exaggerated the inevitability of the fall of South Vietnam, but correctly pointed out that with the realities and conditions of American support, South Vietnam was severely handicapped in many senses. See David L. Anderson, “J. Lawton Collins, John Foster Dulles, and the Eisenhower Administration's ‘Point of No Return’ in Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 12, No. 2 (April 1988), 146-147. 151 Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 40-41, 106-109. 152 Lesch argues from the outset that the Eisenhower regime proceeded in a heavy-handed manner in the Middle East due to the wrongheaded belief that many left leaning groups were closely tied to the Soviets, and that such heavy- handed treatment was what actually drove such groups to seek Soviet protection. See David W. Lesch, Syria and the United States: Eisenhower’s Cold War in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), xi-xii, 210-214. 153 Brands pointed out that Eisenhower intentionally obscured his administration’s position to neutralist nations through often contradictory statements from himself and Dulles. See H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism” The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 305-308. And to be fair, Brands put forward a much more positive depiction of Eisenhower than most other post- revisionists of the period. See also Brands, The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Rhee, and the "Other" Geneva Conference of 1954” Pacific Historical Review 56, No. 1 (February 1987): 59-85. 64

scholars came to agree that Dulles was hardly as out-manoeuvred by Eisenhower as earlier revisionist works suggested. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, enough scholars were not simply criticising Eisenhower, but questioning the reasoning behind much of the praise he had been receiving from revisionists that a post-revisionist position existed in at least a de facto state.

This feature, of identifying either problematic or questionable actions by Eisenhower, as well as making use of said problems to point out holes in revisionist portrayals, is the easiest means to differentiate revisionists and post-revisionists.154 This is simply a helpful descriptive framework, not a universal truth; Richard Immerman declared himself an Eisenhower revisionist in 1990 despite the fact that he acknowledged and criticised problems in many interpretations as well as some severe failings in Eisenhower’s actions.155 Nonetheless, this framework helps explain how in 1993 Stephen G. Rabe could readily identify pioneering post-revisionists. These were scholars offering distinct arguments in that they recognised flaws in Eisenhower’s actions, as well as the misjudgement in the revisionist portrayal of said flaws.156 And although post- revisionists found Eisenhower’s weak points first in the Third World, their criticisms were soon linked to other areas the revisionists held up as examples of his skill and brilliance as President.

154 Hence why McMahon’s 1986 article, which listed not only weaknesses in Eisenhower’s policies and actions, but also detailed where revisionists had made questionable arguments (as well as pointing out other scholars who had noted similar issues in their own fields) must be considered a pioneering post-revisionist work; if nothing else, his withering remark that revisionism was a “castle built on sand” clearly communicates that his own work should not be considered in the same school. See McMahon, “A Critique of the Revisionists,” 457, 465. 155 Immerman described himself, his work, and studies yet to be completed in a way that suggested a perspective which viewed the historiographical divide in a far more accessible orthodox/revisionist divide than one which rejected post-revisionism, see Richard Immerman, “Confessions of and Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal,” Diplomatic History 14, No. 3 (July 1990), 324-325. And again, while never fawning, Immerman tended to have a more positive view of Eisenhower than post-revisionists. 156 Rabe showed how a variety of scholars effectively re-examined evidence and revisionist narratives and found Eisenhower’s actions to be far more questionable than revisionist accounts on a wide range of topics. See Stephen G. Rabe, “Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship,” Diplomatic History 17, No. 1, (January 1993), 105. It should be noted that Rabe was not arguing for a “post-revisionist” school, but rather was pushing the notion of period studies over presidential, see pages 114-115. 65

Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s treatment of the Third World and the pioneering post- revisionists’ attack on revisionism pushed other scholars to re-examine many of the things which revisionists had extolled as the active Eisenhower’s most positive triumphs. Chester J. Pach Jr., along with Tor Egil Førland were two of the first scholars to actually apply the label

“postrevisionist” [sic] to their work and the work of other scholars.157 Pach, revising and expanding upon the previously mentioned work of Elmo Richardson provided a clear example of post-revisionism. Pach pointed out that whether or not brinksmanship, (a tactic Eisenhower and

Dulles employed which entailed intentionally moving close to the edge of nuclear war, most famously with China and hence the Soviets over offshore islands, with the intent of forcing their opponent to back down and which Robert Divine had praised effusively), was successful was not as important as considering why Eisenhower would allow, encourage, or seek to place the world on the brink of war over issues of questionable importance.158 Though not the first, Pach and

Richardson are poignant examples of post-revisionism if for no other reason than that

Richardson was one of the first scholars to warn revisionists that an involved Eisenhower would have a good deal of mistakes for which to account. And Førland, although his scope was limited, was one of the first to question openly whether the revisionist portrayal of Eisenhower as skillfully manipulating his advisers was as “virtually unassailable” as revisionists had held.159

These first post-revisionists effectively started a ball rolling which spurred others to expand on

157 Chester J. Pach Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, revised edition, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991), xiii; Tor Egil Førland, “’Selling Firearms to the Indians’: Eisenhower's Export Control Policy, 1953–54,” Diplomatic History 15, No. 2 (April 1991), 223 158 This can be considered post-revisionist in that Pach and Richardson were clearly writing in direct response on this topic to Robert Divine. Divine extolled the “beauty” of Eisenhower’s handling of the Quemoy-Matsu for the very fact that no one could be sure then or now what he was going to do, whereas Pach and Richardson questioned how Divine could described such a reckless and indecipherable policy as “beautiful.” See Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 65; Pach and Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 103-104. 159 Førland, was directly quoting McMahon’s 1986 concession to the revisionists. See Førland, “’Selling Firearms to the Indians’,”232. 66

criticising revisionism and its depiction of Eisenhower, and with greater dissemination of both research materials and secondary literature, post-revisionists continued to tug at exposed threads.160 Indeed, criticisms like H.W. Brands’s and Jeff Broadwater’s questioned if an active

Eisenhower had achieved the stability for which his administration was remembered by accident, despite his own failings.161 Nevertheless, this did not mean revisionism was supplanted.

It must be kept in mind that unlike the obliteration of the orthodox position that followed the rise of revisionism, post-revisionism did not remove the revisionist position despite some noticeable weaknesses. This is not to suggest that the revisionist/post-revisionist debate degenerated into a quarrel over whether or not, on the whole, Eisenhower had been a “good”

President. Still, some of the most influential revisionist works of the 1990s, such as Saki

Dockrill’s Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961, skillfully argued that viewing Eisenhower’s entire presidency with an eye to the “big picture” of whether

Eisenhower’s planning and execution of national security had on balance succeeded, continued to result in a positive evaluation.162 Richard Immerman, along with Robert Bowie, maintained a revisionist line in the 1990s as well, albeit with greater attention to the idea that Eisenhower may

160 Two examples are useful here: H.W. Brands dealt a heavy blow to the revisionist picture of a wise and far seeing Eisenhower, convincingly arguing that while he was an active and informed leader, Eisenhower was unable or incapable of truly managing the challenges of national security in a nuclear world, see H.W. Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State,” The American Historical Review 94, No. 4 (October 1989) 963-964, 984. And Jeff Broadwater attacked Greenstein’s hidden-hand thesis through an examination Eisenhower’s leadership style focused on anti-communism; Broadwater convincingly argued that Eisenhower’s style of indirect action and his reliance the “hidden-hand” was not the sign of a master manipulator but the result of a leader who often simply did not know or was unable to deal with problems or issues otherwise, see Jeff Broadwater, Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 155-166. 161 Brands also pointed out how Eisenhower’s willingness to make commitments to “unstable” leaders like Syngman Rhee created a plethora of problems beyond the requirements of helping to supply and defend their respective regions. See H.W. Brands, “The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Rhee, and the ‘Other’ Geneva Conference of 1954,” Pacific Historical Review 56, No. 1 (February 1987) 81-85. 162 Dockrill echoed, acknowledged, and greatly expanded upon John Lewis Gaddis’s interpretation of Eisenhower, namely that for Eisenhower national security encompassed a good deal more than simply defense. Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 189. 67

well have had significant flaws in specific areas.163 In general, the revisionists of the 1990s argued there was still much to be admired in even a flawed Eisenhower.

However, this admiration caused an issue among some revisionist writers which resulted in problematic susceptibility to give Eisenhower more credit than he was sometimes due. This bias is typically expressed when the documentary evidence paints an extremely problematic picture of Eisenhower. A useful example is the evidence and arguments presented by Campbell

Craig, who showed convincingly that Eisenhower viewed nuclear war as an all-or-nothing affair, and dismissed the possibility of a limited nuclear war.164 Craig contended that Eisenhower’s refusal to articulate when nuclear weapons actually would be used in his “all-or-nothing” approach to war with the Soviets was an integral piece of the president’s plan to avoid war altogether.165 In treating Eisenhower as intrinsically calculating, prescient, and wise, revisionist accounts like Craig’s reconcile obvious failings in Eisenhower’s actions with their understanding by relying on interpretations which both smack of credulity and strain plausibility.166 This is no way implies that all Eisenhower revisionists writing after the birth of post-revisionism simply

163 Both maintained that as a long-term strategist and leader Eisenhower was still to be admired. This is not to ignore the, in some places extensive, weaknesses of the book, but their argument is nonetheless fair. See Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3-7. 164 Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). This was by no means a novel point, as others, like Brands, had already shown this to be the case. 165 Craig, Destroying the Village, 66-70. Craig does not avoid criticising Eisenhower, especially when Craig deals with the fact that Eisenhower left the Kennedy administration with no true guidelines and a series of imminent crises, see Craig, Destroying the Village, 116-123. 166 In Craig’s case, Eisenhower is portrayed as either incapable of or completely unwilling to explain to his close advisers the understanding that Craig assigns him, namely that by accepting the concept of limited nuclear war and laying down a written policy as to its activation points Eisenhower believed he would enable others to force him or his successors to initiate a nuclear war that would inevitably become a war of annihilation. This is a fine argument for Eisenhower’s mindset and reasoning, but the evidence Craig presents implicitly shows that Eisenhower therefor must have intentionally avoided numerous opportunities both official and private to explain this reasoning to important officials, including John Foster Dulles; meaning Eisenhower decided it was more important that his closest and most loyal advisers not know his true position and reasoning, and that no policy ever be drafted reflecting that reasoning, than Eisenhower ever be made to back down or contradict himself. And all this is meant to create a positive view of Eisenhower. See, Destroying the Village, 77-78, 84. 68

ignored Eisenhower’s failings. Nonetheless, as Stephen Rabe pointed out, very few scholars continued to veer as close to the levels “triumphal” praise of Immerman and Dockrill’s style of revisionism after the rise of post-revisionism.167 Much of the reason for this was the growing body of evidence that Eisenhower and Dulles had, in fact, bungled their administration’s efforts in the Third World. Even the most famous, and likely influential, revisionist of the 1990s and

2000s specifically acknowledged Eisenhower’s failings in the Third World.

John Lewis Gaddis, though a Cold War historian rather than one focusing on Eisenhower, nonetheless consistently argued a revisionist portrayal of Ike.168 Although never as effusive as many revisionists, Gaddis argued, for over two decades, that Eisenhower’s “New Look” national security policy was a more consistent and coherent policy that had more benefit than cost to it than the policies of his predecessors and his successors.169 Although he admitted significant problems in Eisenhower’s handling of Third World challenges, Gaddis contended that

Eisenhower at least adapted as his time in office proceeded, while also noting regretfully that the

Cold War itself transformed “American leaders into Machiavellians.”170 These “problems” included an inability to understand or appreciate nationalism, the difficulties in balancing the interests of colonial allies with those anti-colonial states and, Gaddis argued, Dulles’s desire to

167 Stephen G. Rabe, “Cold War Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon: The New Scholarly Literature,” America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941, Second Edition, Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 136-137. One could very easily add Craig to the list of problematic triumphalists, see Brian Madison Jones, “Abolishing the Taboo: President Eisenhower and the Permissible Use of Nuclear Weapons for National Security,” (PhD. Diss, Kansas State University, 2008), 10-11 168 It needs to be pointed out that in the framework of Cold War history, Gaddis is considered an adherent to either the orthodox, or neo-orthodox position, meaning that he contends the Soviet Union is the party most responsible for the tensions and conflicts of the Cold War. 169 While he made minor changes to Strategies of Containment over the years, Gaddis never backed away from this admittedly tempered praise of Eisenhower. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security During the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982 and 2005 editions), 196-197 (1982), 195-196 (2005). 170 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 127-129, 165. 69

fill any perceived power vacuum.171 Gaddis was willing to concede that Eisenhower and Dulles for the most part simply did not understand the Third World, and thus regularly erred when dealing with Third World issues; Gaddis went so far as to label Eisenhower’s handling of the

Third World the administration’s “single most significant” failure of vision.172 However, this is a rather vague, broad, and hardly novel concession, and as post-revisionists working in the last decade have shown, it is a far from an adequate one.

Recent scholarship on Eisenhower and the Third World has reached a consensus that

Eisenhower’s handling of Third World challenges was the weakest spot in his foreign policy, and that Eisenhower and Dulles hold most of the blame for this weakness. Chester J. Pach Jr. argued that Eisenhower and many officials in his administration were simply too loaded down with prejudices to be able to treat Third World peoples with a similar kind of respect or consideration accorded to Europeans.173 This criticism of Eisenhower and Dulles, with some alternative wording or context given through examples of other officials with equally problematic understanding, has become much more prevalent since scholars like Robert McMahon pointed out the weakness of the administration in the Third World.174 The general point made by

171 John Lewis Gaddis, We now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 152-183. 172 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, (2005), 175-181 173 Pach also contended that many in the Eisenhower administration, including Eisenhower, viewed Third World peoples as too immature to appreciate and resist the dangers of dealing with communism. See Chester J. Pach Jr. “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds., (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006), xvii. 174 C.D. Jackson, Eisenhower’s one-time Special Assistant for International Affairs, was effectively Eisenhower’s Psy-Ops consultant, and has often been quoted for opining that increases in Soviet aid to Third World nations were tantamount to the Soviet’s “muscling in on Santa Claus.” For two examples of scholars using this quote to add layers to the problematic perspectives of Eisenhower and Dulles see H.W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 43; Paul A. Kowert, Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors? (Albany: State University of New York, 2002), 102. McMahon of course published another volume, broader in scope, in the late 1990s which continued and slightly expanded his criticisms 70

scholars on this theme is that Eisenhower and Dulles simply failed to grasp the importance of implications of local or regional Third World issues. McMahon has consistently argued that

Eisenhower and Dulles “confused nationalism with Communism, sided with European allies in disputes with colonies…and alienated non-aligned states.”175 Hence, on the macro level, scholars concur that Eisenhower and Dulles simply lacked the proper understanding, feared

Soviet influence, and worried that new or unallied nations would simply become Soviet puppets.

This is, however, a fact that scholars are quick to point out applies to conceptual idea of the

Third World; most scholars are equally quick to show that Eisenhower and Dulles were far from oblivious or ignorant when it came to individual nations even if their decisions were foolish.

A steady stream of scholars in the 2000s focusing on Third World issues have agreed that

Eisenhower and Dulles clearly made poor decisions, and those scholars are now beginning to investigate why in greater depth.176 McMahon’s interpretation of Eisenhower’s handling of the general Third World is comparatively restrained when one considers his fiery condemnation of specifics, such as Eisenhower’s astounding mishandling of relations with Indonesia, which

of Eisenhower. See Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 175 Robert J. McMahon, “U.S. National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy,” The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1, Origins, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 301. 176 For some of the more recent examples see, Bevan Sewell, “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953–61.” Intelligence and National Security 26, Numbers 2–3, (April-June 2011): 269-290; Richard J. McAlexander. "Couscous Mussolini: US perceptions of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 1958 intervention in Lebanon and the origins of the US-Israeli special relationship" Cold War History 11, no. 3 (August 2011): 363-385; Pettina Vanni. “The Shadows of Cold War over Latin America: the US reaction to Fidel Castro's Nationalism, 1956–59.” Cold War History 11, No. 3 (August 2011): 317-339; Nancy Burnkopf Tucker. The China Threat: Memories, myths, and realities in the 1950s. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Sarah Ellen Graham. "The Eisenhower Administration and Public Diplomacy in India: An Ambivalent Engagement, 1953–1960." Diplomacy & Statecraft 25, no. 2 (June 2014): 260-284; Ray Takeyh, “What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah,” Foreign Affairs 93:4 (July/August 2014), 2-12; Stephen R. Weissman, “What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu,” Foreign Affairs 93:4 (July/August 2014), 14-24. 71

McMahon labelled an “abject failure” he attributed to Eisenhower’s problematic personality.177

Odd Arne Westad interpreted Eisenhower’s hasty apology to the South African government in

1960 for then Secretary of State Christian Herter’s comment regretting the “tragic loss of life” after the Sharpeville Massacre as an example of Eisenhower weighing foreign and domestic consequences, and choosing to support an abhorrent ally.178 Kathryn Statler and others have convincingly shown that John Foster Dulles understood that Ngô Đình Diệm would never be in a position to both emulate American liberty and be the stable anti-communist force in South

Vietnam that administration believed it needed, and still supported Diệm with that understanding in mind.179

On Vietnam, recent literature has stressed a variety of important perspectives which remove American-centricity. Fredrik Logevall has pointed to the truly global context and painfully long history of Vietnam’s struggle against outside encroachment and the series of

American presidents who were unable or unwilling to do much more than muddle through.180

Pierre Asselin, the doyen of bringing the Vietnamese perspective to the fore of analyses of the

177 Robert J. McMahon, “’The Point of No Return’: The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia, 1953-1960,” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds., (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006), 96. McMahon also described Eisenhower in this circumstance as “less the cautious, shrewd, and restrained statesman…and more the clumsy, misinformed, and foolishly overconfident risk taker.” 178 Westad’s argument in this case was that Eisenhower and Herter certainly did not approve of the South African regime’s actions, but prioritised the regime’s international support. See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 132-133. 179 Kathryn C. Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 158-159, 176; Richard H. Immerman. Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) 188-189. 180 Of course, no portrait is without its warts. Logevall displays a shocking lack of appreciation for the impact, even in the short term, that Roosevelt’s shift to anti-colonialism had on the French position and growing Vietnamese nationalism. Indeed, given the fact Logevall emphasises in his prologue the significant and genuine effect Woodrow Wilson’s talk of self-determination had on Ho Chi Minh, the absence of greater analysis on instances of discontinuity like the Roosevelt position is puzzling. Certainly the overall work remains a strong achievement towards a more global understanding of the conflict, but the sacrifice of analysis for the comfort of flow is unfortunate. See Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam, (New York: Random House, 2012), 3-19, 48-66, 696-710. 72

American periods of the conflict in Vietnam, has decisively shown that North Vietnamese figures were never the passive clients they are sometimes thought as, as well as highlighting the fact that Vietnamese communists put great faith in the 1954 Geneva Accords; only moving towards a more unified militant response when it became clear the United States was not going to abide by the agreement.181

Silvia Borzutzky and David Berger revealed that Eisenhower and Dulles understood that intentionally antagonising and humiliating Egypt’s Nasser would hurt America’s prestige in the

Arab world, but that they did so in the hopes that the Soviet’s anticipated aid would be of such flimsy value as to weaken both Nasser’s position and the Soviet’s reputation in the Middle

East.182 Hence, investigation, argument, and debate are no longer rigidly centered on what

Eisenhower or Dulles did, but are thankfully moving more towards why. Indeed, Pach described the position of most scholars’ perspectives and analyses of Eisenhower when he wrote the debate had finally come to focus on whether Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s policies and actions in the Third

World were “effective or wise.”183 And while this is certainly a welcome development, the focus on specific regions or events leaves open an opportunity.

There is indisputable value in detailed studies of individual states, events, or regions, but such examinations often miss insights only made clear by a broader perspective. In evaluating whether Eisenhower acted effectively or wisely, the typical approach has been to focus closely on one specific region or issue or compile broad anthologies or edited volumes, like that of

181 Pierre Asselin, From Indochina to Vietnam: Revolution and War in a Global Perspective: Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 1-3, 41-43. Asselin too, of course, makes some contentious claims, such as his bold challenge that the French decision to fight at Điện Biên Phủ was not nearly as problematic or wrongheaded as almost all historical works hold. 182 Silvia Borzutzky and David Berger, “Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don’t: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam” The Middle East Journal 64, No. 1, (Winter 2010), 99-102. 183 Pach, “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally” xiv. 73

Statler and Johns or McMahon. Many doctoral dissertations have focused on a specific region and Eisenhower’s policies and actions towards it, with Africa finally being allotted more attention during the rise of the post-revisionists. Here too, however, scholars have tended to focus more on perceived weak spots, such as civil rights, decolonisation, and so on.184 Indeed, most studies of Eisenhower and the Third World composed in the past two decades have tended to be region-specific or otherwise narrowly focused.185 In these cases, much of the focus, rightly rests upon actors in the region, with figures like Eisenhower and Dulles more intermittently analysed.186 Still, none of these studies examine Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s positions on the

184 Some examples include Egya Ndayinase Sangmuah, “The United States and the French Empire in North Africa, 1946-1956: Decolonization in the age of Containment” (PhD. Diss., University of Toronto, 1989); Eric Marquis, “Foreign Policy Considerations and the Eisenhower Administrations Civil Rights Policies: The Case of Africa,” (PhD. Diss., Concordia University, 1992); Albert Blue Kanda Matongo, “United States Policy Toward Zambia and Southern Africa: From Eisenhower to Reagan” (PhD. Diss., University of Minnesota, 1999); Kenneth A. Kresse, “Containing Nationalism and Communism on the ‘Dark Continent’: Eisenhower’s Policy Towards Africa, 1953- 1961” (PhD. Diss., University at Albany, State University of New York, 2003); and Jennifer Anne Medeiros, “The Challenge of Addressing the Congo as Nation-state: American Approaches to Sub-Saharan Africa Policy, 1957— 1961” (PhD. Diss. Saint Louis University, 2009). 185 Some dissertation examples include, Humberto Matthew Loayza, “Dollar Diplomacy with a New-Look: President Eisenhower’s Inter-American Policies, 1953-1961” (PhD. Diss., Purdue University, 1999); Salim Clyde Yaqub, “Containing Arab Nationalism: The United States, the Arab Middle East, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1956-1959” (PhD Diss., Yale University, 1999); Muhammet Faruk Cakir, “Turkey’s Role in the Eisenhower Administration’s Security Policy in Western Europe and the Middle East, 1953-1960” (PhD Diss., University of Leicester, 2000); Daniel Charles Stoll, “Eisenhower’s use of the United Nations in the Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 1953-1956: The Unified Plan and the Suez Crisis” (PhD. Diss., University of Missouri- Kansas City, 2003); David McKinley Walker, “Eisenhower's New Look, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, and Limited War with a Case Study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958,” (PhD. Diss. George Washington University, 2004); and Rian T. Bobal, “Stand Up and be Counted: Race, Religion, and the Eisenhower Administration’s Encounter with Arab Nationalism,” (PhD. Diss. Texas A&M University, 2011). For some non-dissertation works see, James Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War: U.S. Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Sohail H. Hashmi. "‘Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero’: Pakistan, the Baghdad Pact, and the Suez Crisis," International History Review 33, No. 3 (September 2011); Wooseon Choi, “Structural Realism and Dulles's China Policy," Review Of International Studies 38, No. 1 (January 2012); R. Thomas Bobal, "‘A Puppet, Even Though He Probably Doesn't Know So’: Racial Identity and the Eisenhower Administration's Encounter with Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab Nationalist Movement," International History Review 35, No. 5 (October 2013); Phillip E. Catton. "It Would Be a Terrible Thing if We Handed These People over to the Communists": The Eisenhower Administration, Article 14(d), and the Origins of the Refugee Exodus from North Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 39, No. 2 (April 2015). 186 William Rust is a fine example. Rust, who continues his investigations of the Indochinese states, most recently completed a monograph on Cambodia and the Eisenhower administration’s relations. While Rust certainly does not ignore Eisenhower or Dulles, local State and military officials are granted far more attention and analysis alongside their reports of Cambodian responses. See William J. Rust, Eisenhower and Cambodia: Diplomacy, Covert Action, and the Origins of the Second Indochina War, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016). 74

Third World writ large over the entire course of their two terms. Further highlighting this opportunity is the fact that the absence of the Vice President in such analyses means that a valuable critical lens has remained unutilised. It has been rare for scholars to utilise Richard

Nixon in evaluating the effectiveness, motivations, and especially the wisdom of Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s policies and actions in the Third World. And, in the rare circumstances when

Nixon’s part is considered, issues persist.

It bears repeating that Eisenhower, Dulles, Nixon, and the interactions among the three on Third World issues constitutes the focal point of analysis, and the archival documents utilised reflect this focus. Using official documents, some only recently declassified, from the

Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace, in Yorba Linda, California, and the John Foster Dulles Papers from the Seeley Mudd Library in

Princeton, New Jersey, this thesis will bring significant depth and clarifications to our understanding of Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s positions on Third World states while also reinforcing the necessity of considering Nixon’s role in any evaluation of Eisenhower’s Third

World policies. The various collections from these institutions include handwritten notes, memoranda of conversations, policy papers, meeting minutes, inter-departmental communiques, records of telephone conversations, and so on. The available evidence is certainly sufficient to form a clear picture on each man’s positions as they developed, how they influenced one another, and how these dynamics related to policy.187 Irwin Gellman has continually called for a greater focus on Nixon’s role in the Eisenhower administration, made the dual argument that without analysing Nixon’s role, Eisenhower’s foreign policies have “not been adequately

187 Eisenhower held regular “stag dinners” and often made a point of communicating to other officials that he could simply talk to them in person (which resulted in a much thinner official record), whereas Dulles often spoke about issues with friends or associates in his home, so some helpful evidence is simply non-existent. See Nixon, RN, 252. 75

portrayed” and thus analysis of Nixon’s role is a necessary step towards an adequate portrayal.188

This thesis combines such an analysis with a focus on the Third World, providing explanations for a series of contentious and complex issues that continue to vex scholars.

188 Irwin F. Gellman “The Richard Nixon Vice Presidency: Research without the Nixon Manuscripts,” A Companion to Richard Nixon, Melvin Small ed. (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2011); Irwin F. Gellman, The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 231. 76

Chapter Two

The Pursuit Begins (1953)

The Eisenhower administration’s first year in office was as eventful as it was ominous.

The Korean War was halted by armistice, instability in Indochina grew considerably,

Mohammed Mosaddegh’s government was overthrown in Iran, and numerous other opportunities and crises arose which allowed the new President and his team the chance to set the tone for American involvement in various Third World regions. This was also the initial period in which Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon began the process of establishing their roles, or more accurately their positions in the administration. The importance of Europe, in particular the necessity of the support and input of Britain and France, and the perceived restrictions this placed on the administration was a source of constant friction in the administration. Before and just after taking office, both Eisenhower and Dulles had expressed positions on the Third World which, while in no way well elaborated or complete enough to form the basis for policies, suggested that both men recognised the Third World was going to be a source of significant challenges for the administration.189 The administration’s hectic and oftentimes ad hoc

189 As Chester Pach, Jr. points out, Eisenhower had recognised, even if he had not considered the ramifications of, the disjuncture between his and Winston Churchill’s position on the Third World well before taking office. And while Eisenhower acknowledged the continuing growth of the importance of the Third World in the struggle against communism, he was unable to express much beyond hope that Third World states and peoples would align with the “free world.” For his part, Dulles unsurprisingly expressed more specific concerns, such as communist advances in Asia and encroachment on Western holdings. And, only six days after taking up his post as Secretary of State, Dulles gave a speech in which he “travelled the world” and listed the administration’s concerns in the Third World. On Africa, Dulles ignored African concerns and stressed the importance of the area as a resource basin for Europe; he spoke similarly of the Middle East and its oil, warning that the Soviets were attempting to arouse fanatical hatred of Europeans in the Arabs. Respectively, see Chester J. Pach Jr., “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally,” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds., (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006), xi-xii; John Foster Dulles, 77

movement towards formulating policies for Third World regions in 1953 reveals that although

Eisenhower and Dulles held anti-communism and stability as the primary drivers of their actions, they were regularly unsure about exactly what that meant or how best to attempt to achieve it.

Nonetheless, Eisenhower’s tendency to take no action (and sometimes push for no action to be taken) unless convinced of a looming crisis created the appearance of an administration formulating and enacting strategy and policy in fits and starts, almost spasmodically.

The administration’s first forays into each region of the Third World displayed the manifold dynamics at work as policies were, and were not, formulated. Although its first priority was of course to end the Korean War, in the broader Third World the administration faced new and growing challenges. In each region, the administration asserted and tested American power.

While Eisenhower and Dulles began to formulate both their own dynamic and the administration’s position on a variety of issues, Nixon’s role in 1953 was minimal and mostly consisted of parroting or amplifying the arguments of Dulles, until the end of the year, when the

Vice President undertook an extended mission abroad to Asia and parts of the Middle East.

Dividing its efforts between formulating policies and taking actions intended to establish both stability and American strength all while working out the dynamics of its internal operation, the

Eisenhower administration spent much of 1953 experimenting with the Third World.

NSC 162/2, or the “New Look” security policy, expressed the administration’s strategic understanding and objectives, and crystallised thinking on America and the Third World; however, it was not promulgated until late October.190 The New Look’s formulation, stemming

“Enlightened Self-Interest: Encirclement a Deadly Threat to the United States,” Vital Speeches Of The Day 19, no. 9, (January 27, 1953), 264-265. 190 See, NSC 162 was promulgated on September 30, but several issues and paragraphs remained undecided, NSC 162/2 was the updated and clarified paper. Cf. “NSC 162” in FRUS, 1952-1954. Volume II, Part One, National Security Affairs, William Z. Slany, Lisle A. Rose, and Neal H. Petersen eds. (Washington: United States 78

from the three Solarium groups is an interesting but not pivotal element to understanding how the resulting document came to be. The New Look divided the world into three areas, the Free

World, the Communist World, and the Uncommitted areas. Europe and the Soviet Union were unquestionably the central focus of the document as concerns diplomatic issues. The New Look evinced a vast series of anxieties, most pertinent were those concerning Europe, Asia, and the

“uncommitted world.” The chief concern for the Eisenhower administration was that steps that would likely become necessary for world security, namely the resurrection of Japanese and

German military power, would cause increased anxiety and suspicion in other states.191 An integral reason for the types of policies the administration adopted was its characterisation of underdeveloped, uncommitted nations, as not understanding their own national interests, that their resources and manpower needed to be kept from the Soviets, and that their governments were too unreliable and volatile for economic assistance alone to play any real part in altering their postures.192 Hence, in the initial years, the Eisenhower administration was effectively operating under the assumption that the easiest means for denying the Soviet Union access to

Third World resources and manpower was not to win them over to the West but simply to keep

Soviet and communist influence out.193

Government Printing Office, 1984) 489-500;”NSC 162/2” in FRUS, 1952-1954. Volume II, Part One, National Security Affairs, 577-596. 191 France featured prominently in concerns in this respect, with the New Look noting that France’s entire foreign policy and Western alignment could be called into question if it was pressured too greatly. Many Asian nations still harboured fears, resentments, and suspicions of Japan as well, especially Korea. See “NSC 162/2,” FRUS: National Security Affairs, 585-587. 192 The document listed several reasons for the discontent, including the racism of Westerners, anti-colonialism, nationalism, and a demand for social and economic progress. The drafters also stressed the need to understand such factors as the administration sought to build ties with those states. “NSC 162/2,” FRUS: National Security Affairs, 587-588. 193 Although it did advise on the desirability of gaining the friendship of such nations, the New Look stressed far more the need to maintain the confidence and cooperation of existing allies. The implication of course being that it was more important to have the active support of imperial allies than their striving-for-independence colonised states. It is also worth noting that the document stressed regional security, and while essentially shrugging in 79

Treating the Symptom: Imposing Stability

Given that the Korean War was still active, undermining stability in the region, draining the American economy and causing a bevy of other issues, it makes sense that most of the attention given to the Third World by the Eisenhower administration in 1953 was spent on South

Southeast Asia.194 Once the armistice talks began and showed potential, the administration fiercely guarded the perceived stability the cessation of hostilities provided to the region.

However, as was clear to both leaders in the region and many officials in the administration, a desire for stability was not a clear or fleshed out policy or strategy for an entire region.195 Still,

Eisenhower and Dulles expected patience with and adherence to their leadership, and when this was not forthcoming in a manner they deemed appropriate, in states like India and South Korea, they contemplated and took drastic action. In this regard, Nixon’s mission to the area played an important part, as he played various roles of intelligence gatherer, and as Eisenhower’s and

Dulles’s representative, which carried with it complicated responsibilities.

Ending the Korean War was an obvious priority for Eisenhower, even beyond the bold campaign promises he had made, and yet in moving towards the armistice it became clear that while Eisenhower sought a peace which no party would risk undermining, the efforts toward

frustration at the Middle East, endorsed using Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran as counters to any possible Soviet incursions. “NSC 162/2,” FRUS: National Security Affairs, 587-593. 194 At an early April meeting of the NSC, Dulles and Secretary of Defense Wilson both stated unequivocally that while they understood the developing policies on the region were being vigorously pushed for the reason that Eisenhower hoped to develop a sound and conservative budget quickly, they could not go along with the recommendations and positions in “the whole group of reports on Far Eastern policy.” See Discussion at the 139th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, April 8, 1953, 6-7, 139th Meeting of the NSC, April 8, 1953, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. While others agreed that the recommendations were problematic but mostly workable, Dulles refused to be bound by any of them, labelling the various reports “in fact, mere working hypotheses.” 195 In August, for example, the importance of supporting the regime in Thailand, because it was pro-American and anti-communist was stressed in the same sentence which explained that the military dictators would likely give in to communist pressure without such support. What kind of support, the means of offering it, and so on were not mentioned, but the fact that the regime shifting support would cause instability was portrayed as a severe threat. See, Discussion at the 159th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 13, 1953, 2, 159th Meeting of the NSC, August 13, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 80

achieving and protecting that peace created a new set of problems. The seriousness with which

Eisenhower treated the necessity not simply of ending the Korean conflict, but ending it in such a way that severely reduced the possibility of a renewal or a new outbreak of hostilities is best encapsulated by a disturbing exchange in the NSC at the end of March. Eisenhower brought up and justified using atomic weapons to inflict significant losses on the communist forces and gain a greater portion of Korea, while Dulles and Walter Robertson (Assistant Secretary of State for

Far Eastern Affairs) attempted to persuade Eisenhower that an armistice could be put in place and protected without such actions.196 Obviously he did not use atomic weapons to settle the dispute, but clearly, Eisenhower was willing to go to staggering lengths to both end the war, and to ensure it stayed ended.

Further, once the armistice talks showed promise, Eisenhower adopted an almost panicked approach in attempting to ensure nothing disrupted the new stability. This included making perfectly clear to Chiang Kai-Shek that he was not to use American-provided planes to attack China, as well as pushing for a more practical and articulated policy to allow Japan to thrive and avoid requiring trade with Communist China.197 The importance of Japan to the

U.S.’s “objectives in Asia” played a central role in pushing Dulles and Eisenhower to maintain a stable, communist free South Korea.198 The explanation was reasonable enough: if South Korea fell into communist hands, then Japan would immediately come under pressure, and likely either

196 Robertson was decidedly hawkish, and his support of Dulles’s position was equivocal. As soon as the opportunity to express himself freely arose, he did: he argued that the American people would support an “all-out” (atomic) effort if the Communists refused to negotiate in good faith. See Discussion at the Special Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, March 31, 1953, 9-10, DDEL. 197 Discussion at the 139th Meeting of the National Security Council, 5-8. 198 Memo, Allison to Dulles, October 22, 1953, Encrypted Korea 1953, 1, Box 11, John Foster Dulles State Department Declassified Documents (Hereafter JFDSD), John Foster Dulles Papers (Hereafter JFDP), Seeley Mudd Library (Hereafter SML). It is worth noting that John Allison was incredibly sympathetic to Japanese concerns and while this likely coloured his arguments, his basic premise still fell in line with the reasoning of others in the administration. 81

fall as well, or need to modify its foreign stance to accommodate reality to the point it “fell” to communism regardless; in short, the domino theory applied.199 Thus, the challenge was that

South Korea was integral to the administration’s concept of Asia’s security, and yet South

Korea’s leader’s animosity towards the lynch pin of the concept, Japan, along with his desire to reunite his nation threatened to undermine the entire plan. Dulles made this challenge abundantly clear at the August 27 meeting of Eisenhower’s cabinet: Japan’s military strength was essential to American plans for the region, yet Syngman Rhee’s belligerence was driven primarily by fear of the Japanese, not the communists.200 Eisenhower and Dulles were not blind to the possibility that reducing tensions in Asia generally was a viable option both for assuring

Rhee and to signal to the communists their own desire for stability. However, Eisenhower and

Dulles understood they could not control what North Korea, China, or the Soviet Union did, but the two believed they could, or should be able to, control South Korea’s actions.

The result of this belief, and the continually building anxiety over Rhee’s aggressive actions and rhetoric is important, and is also where Nixon becomes integral to understanding the complexity of the situation. Eisenhower concluded that the best means to be sure of continued peace in Korea, and hence the region, was to have Rhee sign an agreement not to renew hostilities, but Eisenhower coming to this conclusion and being able to communicate it clearly to

Rhee was another matter. In this seemingly innocuous decision is revealed some of the ever- present tensions and resistances in the administration: while Dulles clearly worked to advance

Eisenhower’s orders, at times he managed to work within those orders to challenge Eisenhower.

199 Allison argued Japan was of such importance that even if Rhee initiated hostilities the U.S. should still fight to preserve South Korea simply to avoid greater pressure on Japan. Allison of course preferred removing Rhee to war, but argued that Japan needed Korea and thus Korea must not be allowed to fall. See Memo, Allison to Dulles, 1-2, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 200 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, August 27, 1953, 2, Cabinet Meeting of August 27, 1953, Box 2, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 82

The president realised on October 23, that Nixon, (who had commenced his mission to a variety of nations on October 3), had not been informed by Dulles or the State Department that he was to make it abundantly clear to Syngman Rhee that Rhee was not to renew hostilities with the North, and that if he did, America would not assist him. Eisenhower immediately contacted Dulles.

Eisenhower’s memo suggests he suspected Dulles had left this gap in Nixon’s briefings and updates intentionally, as he reiterated the point about there being no disagreement on withholding support from Rhee should he initiate hostilities and informed Dulles that “if there is any question about the matter, I think you and I should have a talk about it soon” before again instructing him to fill Nixon in on the situation.201 The exact reason behind Dulles’s intransigence is unclear, but he complied with the direct order and relayed the instructions to

Nixon before he met Rhee in November.

What was of course not included in Nixon’s instructions was the contingency plan developed by the Department of Defence and the State Department to overthrow Syngman Rhee if he proved too aggressive.202 With South Korea deemed necessary for Japan, Japan deemed vital for Pacific stability, and regional stability now taking the highest priority, the most pragmatic solution offered to Eisenhower was simply to remove Rhee if he could not accept his and South Korea’s role as defined by the U.S. Eisenhower approved “emphatically” on October

29, 1953, during the meeting of the NSC, when Dulles outlined the plan by stating that although not without difficulty, “certain significant elements” were in place to remove Rhee in the event

201 Memo, Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles, October 23, 1953, DDE Diary October 1953 (1), Box 3, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series (Hereafter DDE Diary Series), AWF, DDEL. 202 Nixon was informed of the plan, but obviously was not about to explain to Rhee in detail the plot to overthrow him should he fail to comply. 83

he even appeared about to renew hostilities unilaterally.203 Eisenhower enthusiastically embraced a plan to overthrow another government should its ability to ensure satisfactory stability and loyalty come into question. Nixon’s role then is especially significant in that the result of his conversations with Rhee likely helped avert the coup.

The mentor-protégé relationship between Dulles and Nixon was also integral at this juncture. In providing the new information as to Nixon’s new assignment with Syngman Rhee,

Dulles also took the opportunity to offer advice, impart wisdom, and encourage his young protégé; Dulles advised Nixon on the desirability of private discussions, promised to make the most useful State officials in Korea available to him, and encouraged Nixon by labelling his

“very important mission” to that point as “an outstanding success.”204 Dulles also sent Nixon a memo which clarified the essentials of the steps the administration planned to take. The clarification informed Nixon that his role was to facilitate stability, either through Rhee or by sending signals to the officials who were to overthrow him. Nixon was ordered to inform Rhee and other Republic of Korea (ROK) leaders that the U.S. would not support a unilateral renewal of hostilities; Dulles also informed Nixon that the U.S. planned to begin the overt and covert removal of ROK military offices who would obey an order to renew hostilities unilaterally, and to lay the groundwork for a more loyal transition government to both thwart Rhee’s potential

203 It was Foster, not Allen Dulles, outlining the plan. Indeed, Dulles appeared to be intentionally pushing Eisenhower towards this plan, bemoaning the “worthlessness” of economic aid to Rhee insofar as procuring his compliance. In short, Dulles recognised one of Eisenhower’s “buttons” and pushed it. Memo, Discussion at the 168th Meeting of the NSC, October 29, 1953, 17, 168th Meeting of the NSC, Box 4, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. The removal of Rhee was one of the potentialities considered under the revised plan code named “EVER READY” a copy of which Dulles received the day prior to the NSC Meeting. See Memo for the Secretary from the Under Secretary, Revised Plan EVER READY, October 28, 1953, 1-2, Reel 2 Declassification 2010, Box 10, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 204 Dulles also made a point of reinforcing the hierarchy of the administration by stating that he and Eisenhower were happy Nixon was able to conduct the mission. See Memo, Dulles to Nixon, November 4, 1953, Reel 2 Declassification 2010, Box 10, JFDP, SML. 84

aggression and take his place thereafter.205 The fact that the administration was prepared to take such steps in order to avoid renewed conflict, along with Dulles’s hints that Rhee simply needed to show greater deference helped shape Nixon’s interactions with South Korea’s leader.206 Thus while Nixon’s instructions were fairly clear, how he interacted with Rhee is an important factor.

Rhee argued to Nixon for South Korea’s role on the larger international stage, and this helped inform Nixon’s recommendations to Dulles and Eisenhower. The vast majority of the information Nixon had read, been briefed on, and indeed even the last minute communiqué from

Dulles conveyed the administration’s, though not necessarily Dulles’s, fear that Rhee was a loose cannon willing to renew hostilities regardless of the likely consequences.207 However, when

Nixon sent Dulles a letter from Rhee, the contents of which he hoped the Secretary would share only with the President, Nixon described a far more amenable, if still aggressive, ally. Nixon flatly stated that the best agreement he could wring from Rhee was a pledge to inform

Eisenhower well before taking any unilateral action, with the understanding that he would take such action alone. That being the case, Nixon also underscored that Rhee understood that he

(Rhee) was perceived internationally as a loose cannon; Nixon enthusiastically communicated

205 Memorandum for the Vice President, November 5, 1953, 1-2, Reel 2 Declassification 2010, Box 10, JFDP, SML. 206 Dulles sent Nixon updates on events in the NSC and abroad while he was on his mission, and these often conveyed Dulles’s thinking. A good example is the November 4 memo, which in part dealt with Syngman Rhee’s proposal to send an emissary to discuss the “Communist Menace” with other Asian nations. Dulles liked the idea of an “Asian anti-Communist talking to other Asians” but was cognizant of several related challenges to such an endeavour. See Telegram, Dulles to Nixon, November 4, 1953, 1-3, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Correspondence 1953 October 21 – November 11, Foreign Affairs/National Security 1953, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 207 For example, the CIA’s briefing book for Nixon explains Rhee’s aggressive approach to reunification, his belligerent denial of the legitimacy of North Korea, and both his desire to undermine the armistice and he hope to at least gain U.S. support for a final war if not drag the U.S. in to the fight. See CIA Briefing Book for the Vice President, 28 September, 1953, 31, Box 19, Vice President, Material For the, (1), Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, WHO, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961, DDEL. The briefing also expressed American anxiety that Rhee had increased his ability to exercise “independent action.” 85

Rhee’s willingness to act as the U.S.’s loose cannon, hinting at the benefits of such a proxy.208

Nixon’s letter and his handwritten notes on his conversations with Rhee suggested that Rhee was very unlikely to actually act unilaterally to initiate hostilities, but that he certainly would continue to speak and act as if he might.209 Rhee’s letter, and Nixon’s recommendations were important and timely enough that an NSC meeting was called on the Monday after they were received. At this meeting, Dulles voiced agreement with Nixon’s recommendations and argued that a “new look” at the recently approved measures in regards to Korea was in order.210 Hence, by communicating through Nixon his willingness to follow the U.S.’s lead and a tacit acknowledgement that he was not to further destabilise the region, Rhee avoided a coup attempt.

And while South Korea was considered integral to the stability Eisenhower and Dulles prized, other areas and states had the potential to undermine that stability very quickly, especially given a lack of clarity from the administration. The consideration given to overthrowing Rhee was in no way atypical, as the administration executed a coup in 1953 and Eisenhower approved another for the following year.

The Iranian coup and its aftermath are indicative of the fact that confusion at the highest levels, lack of a policy, and other challenges did not deter Eisenhower from acting if he became convinced of an immediate, destabilising threat. At the same time, the coup also displays the

208 Rhee specifically cited North Korea, India (which he believed to be a Soviet puppet) and other Soviet satellites in his analogy. Importantly, Nixon advised that the administration stop trying to get a written agreement from Rhee, as he believed it would simply result in a new round of haggling that could not truly be enforced in any fashion. The implication here is that Nixon was more skeptical about the legalistic approach espoused by Eisenhower, Dulles, and other old guard Wilsonians. See, Letter, Nixon to Dulles, November 19, 1953, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Joint Statement: RN’s Notes on Meeting with Rhee, Box 1, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 209 Nixon’s draft letter contained a much less equivocal evaluation, with Nixon stating clearing that he did not believe Rhee would attack, and that it was unwise to continue to belabor him by demanding he sign some kind of written proposal. See Handwritten Notes; Draft Letter to Dulles; Letter, Nixon to Dulles, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Joint Statement: RN’s Notes on Meeting with Rhee, Box 1, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL 210 The NSC typically met on Thursday, indeed it had met the previous Thursday (November 19), but before Dulles received Nixon and Rhee’s letters. See Discussion at the 172nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, November 23, 1953, 1-2, 172nd Meeting of the NSC, November 23, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 86

fact that Eisenhower rarely dealt with the root of problems, attacking the symptoms rather than the disease. While the Iranian coup has been studied extensively, it still warrants at least some analysis to place it in the context of the broader Third World policies of the administration. It would be inaccurate to portray the coup as a foregone conclusion, as the March 4 meeting of the

NSC indicated a level of confusion and lack of direction that deserves to be noted: Allen Dulles pointed out that Soviet sponsored propaganda in Iran was attacking Mosaddegh, that a

Mosaddegh dictatorship would be relatively stable but that the Communists would likely assassinate him and take advantage of the ensuing vacuum, and that unless something drastic was done, Iran would eventually fall to the Soviets even if Mosaddegh lived.211 The meeting also focused on a variety of complaints about Britain’s role and actions in Iran, with Eisenhower unwilling to contemplate a break with the British but soliciting views as to how to achieve an independent policy that allowed the British to save face despite their “wrongness” in dealing with states like Iran and Egypt.212 Nixon, apparently convinced by the imperative need for action, and certainly supporting Dulles’s position, argued that the administration needed to make the next move, making the British “see the dangerous potentiality” of a World War III inherent to failing to act.213

The coup is also important for the purpose of this dissertation insofar as it points to the uncompromising posture the administration took towards states or figures it perceived to be or about to be destabilising, non-deferential, and lacking proper anti-communist credentials.

Indeed, while Eisenhower never publically acknowledged his administration’s role in the coup in

211 Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday March 4, 1953, 5-7, 135th Meeting of NSC, March 4, 1953, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 212 Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, 9-10. 213 Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, 10-11. Dulles then used Nixon’s comments to complain that the British and French were constantly slowing up the United States in taking necessary action, and recommended the development of a means to circumvent them in times of perceived crisis. 87

his lifetime, he went out of his way to portray Mosaddegh as a defiant and naïve leader creating instability. Nonetheless, Eisenhower had the devilish wit to leave a note only historians studying him would ever catch: his memoir descriptions, sanitized though they may have been, described

“some observers’ on the spot in Teheran [sic]” reports as sounding “more like a dime store novel than historical fact” while in his eventually declassified diary entry Eisenhower revealed that the

“dime story novel” (he used the exact same term) was actually the report given by Kermit

Roosevelt, the CIA agent who worked “tirelessly” to help the coup along.214 Even privately,

Eisenhower portrayed the coup as restoring the Shah to power, eliminating the threat of

Mosaddegh, and potentially dealing a “serious defeat to Russian…plans in that area.”215 At the

March 11 meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower fixated on Mosaddegh as the central reason for the administration’s difficulty in Iran, complaining that even dealing unilaterally with the Iranian was unlikely to garner an acceptable agreement, and that such an agreement would “not be worth the paper it was written on” in any case.216 That this ignored entirely the issues caused by the

British, issues that he had noted at the previous meeting, is striking, but it is also obviously important that Eisenhower’s characterisation of Mosaddegh suggests his unreliability and weakness as a stabilising anti-communist force. Indeed, once the coup was successful, Dulles informed the NSC on August 27, with Nixon presiding over the meeting, that the administration

214 Even in his memoirs Eisenhower was forced to attempt some rather clumsy logical acrobatics in explaining the coup (without ever hinting at American involvement), and relied mostly on portraying Mosaddegh as a semi-rabid pyjama-clad communist. Cf. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 164; Diary Entry, October 8, 1953, 10, DDE Diary October 1953 (4), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. Eisenhower would have known that particular section of his diary would be classified, indeed it remained so for decades. 215 That Eisenhower plainly admitted the coup was nearly botched, and more importantly that he recognised the coup’s failure or the definitive revelation of American involvement would remove America’s ability to execute “anything of like nature” indicates not only his desire to try similar actions in the future, but that Eisenhower was willing to risk significant damage to his administration. See Diary Entry, October 8, 1953, 10, DDEL. The Shah, and Zahedi were of course viewed as far more deferential and far more aggressive anti-communists. 216 Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, March 11, 1953 15, Box 4, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 88

now had a “’second chance’ in Iran when all hope of avoiding a Communist Iran appeared to have vanished.”217

However, there is evidence that removing Mosaddegh was simply considered to be the prudent, but not only, available route to bringing about a more satisfactory situation in Iran.

Eisenhower and Mosaddegh corresponded on the topic of aid to Iran. Mosaddegh requested and proposed several means for its delivery, but Eisenhower denied the possibility of Iran receiving aid while the oil dispute with the U.K. continued.218 Part of the impetus for Eisenhower’s terse and acrimonious reply was that he had already given the go-ahead for the coup to be plotted and undertaken, and the administration hoped such a dismissive letter could play a part in undermining Mosaddegh’s supporters while emboldening his critics. Following the coup,

Eisenhower made the same type of previously requested aid available to Iran’s new regime.219

On the surface, this appears reasonable; of course Eisenhower would deny aid to a figure he was working to overthrow.

217 Discussion at the 160th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 27, 1953, 13, 160th Meeting of NSC August 27, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. The issue again was not that Mosaddegh was thought to be communist, but that he was too naïve and blind to the threat it posed, while also too stubborn to resolve the oil dispute – which in turn exacerbated the domestic situation in Iran, further fueling communism’s growth. 218 The Anglo-Iranian Oil dispute was a complex issue combining diplomatic, military, and international legal manoeuvring. Losing its appeal to the International Court of Justice was effectively the final push the United Kingdom needed to start plotting what eventually became the Anglo-American coup to overthrow Mosaddegh. For two perspectives see Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2003); Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup in Iran” Journal of Cold War Studies 15, No. 4, (Fall 2013), 4-24. Eisenhower had agreed, before he gave authorisation for the coup, to provide economic and technical assistance to Iran, but only at a level the British deemed acceptable, in order to avoid hurting the British government’s position. See Discussion at the 136th Meeting, 16-17. For one set of correspondence between Eisenhower and Mosaddegh see Telegram, Mosaddegh to Eisenhower, May 28, 1953, 1-5; Eisenhower to Mosaddegh, June 30, 1953, 1-3, Iran 1953 through 59 (9), Box 32, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 219 It is of course worth noting that the refusal of aid was entirely up to Eisenhower, and the reasons for denying aid were arbitrary and far from binding. Dulles had earlier suggested propping up Mosaddegh using means almost exactly the same as the Iranian proposed. See Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, 6- 10. For Eisenhower’s far friendlier message to Zahedi, see Undated Telegram, Eisenhower to Zahedi, Iran 1953 through 59 (8), Box 32, International Series, AWF, DDEL. The telegram references Zahedi’s equally friendly and frank message to Eisenhower on August 26. 89

And yet, on August 18, with the coup at a stage that seemed to indicate Mosaddegh would prevail, Walter Bedell Smith sent Eisenhower an appraisal of the situation on the ground in Iran which advocated an about-face in Mosaddegh’s treatment. Smith’s summary was dire, yet he summed up the next moves for the United States concisely: “We now have to take a whole new look at the Iranian situation and probably have to snuggle up to Mosadeq [sic]…I daresay this means a little added difficulty with the British.”220 While far from a definitive statement on policy, the fact that one of Eisenhower’s most trusted advisors, (and a strong proponent of covert action), felt compelled to advocate such moves indicates that at the very least Mosaddegh’s regime was not actually perceived as irrevocably problematic and that the coup was clearly not considered the only feasible means to deal with the challenges in Iran.221

And yet, Eisenhower and Dulles considered the coup as the most cost-effective and time- efficient means of generating a more stable, anti-communist, and deferential Iran. And when they sent Nixon on his foreign mission, part of his role was to assess progress in that regard.

When Nixon travelled to Iran later in the year, he both reminded those he met of the administration’s expectations, and gathered information. Although Nixon deviated from standing policy, in that he advocated to Iranian labor leaders and businessmen that Iran diversify its economy wherever possible, (while the CIA and State Department argued that oil was the

“only long term hope” for Iran’s economy), he consistently made a point to stress the need for

220 Memorandum for the President, August 18, 1953, Iran 1953 through 59 (8), Box 32, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 221 It is worth noting that many American officials playing a part in the coup, and even the Shah himself, did not believe Mosaddegh was in any fashion a communist sympathiser. Indeed, even as he fled to Iraq, fearing Mosaddegh and labelling him “absolutely mad and insanely jealous” the Shah conceded that Mosaddegh’s plan was to out manoeuver the Tudeh party and consolidate his personal power. The Shah and like-minded Americans simply thought Mosaddegh would fail in this endeavour. See Telegram, U.S. Envoy to Baghdad to Dulles, August 17, 1953, 2, Iran 1953 through 59 (8), Box 32, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 90

vigilance against communism.222 During one meeting, Nixon asked labor leaders their opinions on why communism appeared so prevalent among Iran’s youth. While some of the responses hedged between a lack of work and the influence of the Mosaddegh government, one response, that Iranian students had never shown interest in politics until Mosaddegh had trained them to interfere on behalf of himself and communism, was outlandish enough that the minute taker inserted a clarification, that the remarks were not “entirely accurate…the leniency toward

Communism, under Mosadeq [sic], merely gave the students the ability to work the mischief suggested by Communist agents.”223 Those Nixon spoke with were clearly well prepared to answer his questions: one speaker praised God for the coup, and all assured Nixon that while the oil dispute was still a sore spot, the country was resolutely anti-communist, wished to follow

America’s lead, and was far more stable under Zahedi and the Shah.224 As Eisenhower came to realise much later in his presidency, removing Mosaddegh did not solve the underlying issues in

Iran, and in many ways exacerbated them. In the same month as the Iranian coup, Eisenhower authorised the planning for another covert action to remove a destabilising threat.

As elsewhere, Eisenhower established the precedents for his administration’s dealing with Latin America in 1953, with perceived communism eliciting aggressive responses while economic and political issues were deferred, dismissed, or otherwise ignored. That this hardly provided or instilled clear direction or policies beyond broad anti-communism was not yet

222 CIA Briefing Book for the Vice President, 1, Box 19, DDEL. 223 The minute taker, Robert Parke, also noted that Iranian students actually had a tradition of energetic involvement in politics. Hence, the clarification was clearly more along the lines of the acceptable narrative for post-coup Iran. See A Detailed Account of the Meeting of Vice President Nixon with a group of Iranian businessmen and the Minister of the National Economy, 3, Iran I, Box 2, PPS 366, RNPPM, RNL. Almost regardless of the questions Nixon asked, the response involved praising America, placing responsibility on Iran, and blaming communism in some form. As most of Nixon’s questions centered on Iran’s economy or communism, this gives the account a far more rehearsed appearance than the vast majority of Nixon’s other meetings. 224 A Detailed Account of the Meeting of Vice President Nixon with a group of Iranian businessmen, 1,3,4-5. 91

treated as a significant problem. Still, lacking a clear policy or strategy did not prevent action from being taken. Dulles argued in a public speech six days after becoming Secretary of State that the Truman administration “may have somewhat neglected…and taken it for granted that we could forget about [Latin America] for a time and then go back again and find everything as it was…But actually, such a policy of neglect would lead to growing danger.”225 Meeting on

February 18, the NSC was informed by the CIA Director Allen Dulles that the situation in Latin

America was “deteriorating,” that the Soviet Union “was exploiting this deterioration,” that the situation was comparable to revolutionary movements in the Middle East, and was warned about the “Communist infection in Guatemala.”226

This alarmist view was not, however, cause for immediate or drastic action. At the same meeting, when Eisenhower was told that U.S. economic policies were one of the central reasons for the problems the administration was facing in Latin America, the President wondered aloud if there was a way to avoid increasing costs while still addressing the issues, “such as visits of notable Americans to these countries.”227 While it is certainly worth noting that Allen Dulles characterised the presence of communism as an “infection,” it is just as important that

Eisenhower’s response to these clearly dire warnings was to attempt to avoid any genuine policy alterations while suggesting sending Americans on what would amount to be goodwill tours.228

Eisenhower’s call for more investigation was passed off to Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith,

225 John Foster Dulles, “Enlightened Self-Interest: Encirclement a Deadly Threat to the United States,” 264-265. 226 Dulles also foreshadowed ominously when he stated that the Guatemalan situation was becoming a crisis, while the situation in Iran had already been a crisis for quite some time. Discussion at the 132nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 18, 1953, 1, 132nd Meeting of the NSC, February 18, 1953, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 227 Discussion at the 132nd Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 228 Eisenhower was also informed that there currently was no policy for Latin America at that time, but was satisfied that recommendations for such a policy were being formulated. 92

who by the next month, presented the NSC with a “shotgun approach” to possible policies, causing new complaints to arise and no clear direction.229

The central concern was, and continued to be, the stability of the region. Typically, unless and until a force threatened that perceived stability, little action was deemed necessary. In a report submitted on July 23, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith listed factors indicative of a trend that would plague the administration for years to come, the report noted without much analysis that while funding and staff had been reduced in various economic and diplomatic areas, military aid had been expanded.230 This report and a later version point to some fairly clear problems, such as Smith’s conclusion that the most significant effect of cutting staff and removing attachés was that it made the previous host nation feel less important.231

More importantly, the report mentioned, almost casually, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s coup in

Colombia, recording that the United States “exchanged information with all the other American

Republics, except Guatemala, before proceeding to recognise the new regime.”232 That a coup occurred was noteworthy, but since the new Colombian regime made the correct gestures and promised to maintain its previous international obligations, the situation in Guatemala was far

229 A particular concern was the desire for Latin American economies to become more American in style while cabinet members also stressed the need for such businesses to come up with their own capital to finance such progress. See Discussion at the 137th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, March 18, 1953, 10- 11, 137Th Meeting of the NSC March 18, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 230 It is perhaps worth noting the fact that while the report bemoaned Guatemala’s expropriation of lands belonging to the United Fruit Corporation, it did so with the, clearly intentionally, juxtaposed example of Bolivian nationalisation of tin mines; which the report noted the Bolivian government agreed to an acceptable arrangement to compensate American companies, which would “reassure private investors” and could be taken as a genuine “indication of good faith.” NSC Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State, 7-9. 231 Cf. National Security Council Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the Implementation of United States Objectives and Courses of Actions with Respect to Latin America (NSC 144/1), 4, July 23, 1953, 3, 16-17; National Security Council Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the Implementation of United States Objectives and Courses of Actions with Respect to Latin America (NSC 144/1), November 20, 1953, 2, NSC 144 – Latin America (1), Box 4, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hereafter OSANSA) 232 NSC Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State (NSC 144/1), 4, DDEL. 93

more pressing; Smith’s report argued the state was conducting foreign subversive activities.233

The crux of Smith’s report was that very little change in policy or treatment of Latin American nations had occurred or was necessary. The exception to this was of course the beginnings of the

Guatemalan coup.

The overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz had been an off and on project since the Truman administration, but once the framework though which Eisenhower and Dulles dealt with the

Third World was applied to the Guatemalan, conflict was inevitable. While the coup itself occurred in 1954, and will be dealt with in greater depth in the next chapter, Eisenhower authorised the planning of the plot to overthrow Árbenz on August 12, 1953, after which Bedell

Smith attacked the plan with gusto.234 That Árbenz was, at least through the administration’s lenses, a defiant and subversive communist sympathiser, if not a full blown communist, was more than sufficient reason for his removal. Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that the administration considered Árbenz to be contributing to a state of crisis in Latin America: NSC

144/1 noted that drastic action was needed on the part of Latin American governments to address the “communist conspiracy” and that the United States only utilised the Organization of

American States (OAS) as a means to achieve its aims in eliminating communist infiltration in

233 Parts of the report remain classified, but the growing animosity of Smith and others towards Árbenz’s regime is unmistakable. NSC Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State, 4, 6-10. Guatemala’s purported subversive activities were alarming and required American action, due to the low estimation in which Smith held the anti- subversive abilities of most other Latin American nations, see NSC Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State, 5-6, DDEL. Colombia’s international obligations included troops in Korea. 234 Memorandum for the Record, Informal Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board, August 12, 1953, FRUS: 1952-1954, Guatemala, Susan K. Holly ed. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2003), 86; Smith was consulting and pushing certain ideas to agents and officials within a week as a review of the previous operation, PBFORTUNE, began, see Memorandum for the Record on PBFORTUNE, August 19, 1953, FRUS: 1952-1954, Guatemala, 89; Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 38-39. Given that the Iranian coup had not yet begun, it was impossible for Eisenhower to have been influenced by its success before giving authorization for the Guatemalan coup’s planning to begin, but this is a point in passing directed at various scholarship which suggests otherwise. 94

the region.235

It is obviously an important fact that Eisenhower ordered a coup in large part because he believed Guatemala was a destabilising, likely communist, defiant state under Árbenz’s leadership. An equally important fact is that Eisenhower ordered the coup despite being well aware of the weakness and holes in his administration’s policies, and of the reality that the administration’s understanding of the region was far from nuanced. In fact, when Assistant

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Cabot, (who served in that position for just under one year) met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to discuss how the military could justify the increased “assistance” to be given to Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, Cabot explained that increased military aid was the “first step” in addressing the communist threat in Guatemala; tellingly, Cabot told the JCS that Guatemala was not “Communist yet, but the Communists are infiltrating the government.”236 Cabot and General Lawton Collins both argued that such military assistance programs were useful for a variety of reasons and not only added to the security of the United States but were, in General Collins’s opinion, “money well spent”: particular to Guatemala they served the dual purpose of intimidation and “pointing out to the

Guatemalan army the kind of help they are losing because they…[operate] under a Communist- influence government” while more generally such programs not only allowed great influence in

Latin American militaries but also provided useful sources of intelligence.237 Although the coup

235 National Security Council Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the Implementation of United States Objectives and Courses of Actions with Respect to Latin America (NSC 144/1), November 20, 1953, 5-6, DDEL. 236 Memorandum on Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, May 22, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics, William Z. Slany et al. eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Press, 1983), 150-151. 237 Memorandum on Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, May 22, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics, 151. 95

took place the following year, even in its approval some important commonalities with the other considered and executed coups are apparent.

The two most important commonalities are the focus on stability, and the short-term nature of the solution. In South Korea, Iran, and Guatemala, the fear of instability spreading throughout the respective regions and leading to some kind of conflict with or gain for (or both)

Communism drove Eisenhower’s decisions. In each case, Eisenhower treated the removal of the state’s leader or the fracturing of their power as a sufficient solution to the problem. In South

Korea this made some sense, however, in Iran and Guatemala, Eisenhower knowingly ignored alternatives and the situations and environments which had made leaders like Mosaddegh and

Árbenz popular in the first place. It is difficult to believe Eisenhower entirely failed to consider such things. It is far more likely that Eisenhower believed that removing leaders like Árbenz and

Mosaddegh would at the very least delay the local crises for a period of time, and might perhaps cause the underlying issues to somehow resolve themselves. Thus, removing destabilising leaders was not a means to institute change or halt it altogether, but another mechanism to delay it as part of the pursuit of postponement.

The Various Thorns: Looming Challenges

Other areas in the Third World also posed considerable challenges for the administration, but none elicited significant reactions. Some areas, which were not yet at a crisis point but which were either unstable or economically important, like the Middle East and other areas of

South and Southeast Asia, deeply puzzled Eisenhower and Dulles. In places like India, the neutralist and defiantly independent Nehru was a continual source of confusion, frustration, and suspicion for the President, Secretary of State, and Vice President. In areas with colonial

powers, Eisenhower and Dulles expressed clear agitation with the French and British attitudes and positions. However, while both men also considered colonialism to be a failed venture, this did not mean they believed it wise or preferable for places like the Middle East or Indochina to be rid of the Europeans or their presumed anti-communist stability. These issues combined to create an ever-deteriorating situation in which the administration aggravated and alienated the

Europeans, the emerging states, and officials inside the administration frustrated with such a problematic balance. Compounding such problems was the fact that although the administration was very clear that stability and anti-communism were its two chief priorities, how it planned to achieve and assure these priorities in different regions was vague. This led, in general, to delay.

India, and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru, were points of agreement for Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon in that all three considered the nation and its leader to be irritatingly problematic.

Eisenhower had a difficult time understanding and dealing with India and Nehru, and often vacillated amongst positions due to his shifting perceptions of the Indian. The conventional attitude towards Nehru held that he was naïve, stubborn, and due to his espousal of neutralism, was treated with suspicion. However, while this was the convention, the most apt description of attitudes towards Nehru were confusion and dislike. When Indian officials appeared to be acting in America’s interests on the Neutral Commission, Eisenhower wrote to Dulles of their admirable conduct and questioned whether a statement might be made either to praise them or at least to counteract the damage the administration had done to the America-India relationship by publicly announcing America’s suspicions of India’s likely conduct.238 However, when Nehru

238 Eisenhower concluded not that the administration had erred in voicing suspicions in the first place, but that Nehru had changed his position and his government adopted a “splendid attitude.” The memo closed noting the administration probably could not make any statement for some time lest the Soviet’s latch on to it in order to claim the Indians’ neutrality had been compromised. See Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, October 27, 1953, DDR Diary 97

reacted negatively to reports of America expanding military aid to Pakistan, Eisenhower changed positions again. Eisenhower and Dulles exchanged a series of memos in which both bemoaned what they characterised as the emotion-driven nature of diplomacy and policy between India and

Pakistan; though Dulles contended that it was actually the situation and not simply “the area” of the world which caused the emotional response.239 This should not imply that Dulles took a more understanding perspective on Nehru or his position. Indeed, Dulles was deeply suspicious of Nehru, and went out of his way to influence both Nixon’s understanding and treatment of

India’s Prime Minister.240

Since Dulles’s opinion and evaluation of Nehru clearly influenced Nixon, this meant that the Vice President went into his meetings with Nehru predisposed to treating India’s Prime

Minister in a certain manner. To be sure, Dulles continued to prepare and shape Nixon’s attitude in the lead up to his meetings with Nehru on the Vice President’s mission, including one telegram in which the Secretary informed Nixon that the State Department was looking for ways to remove the misapprehension of Nehru and the Indian public that aid to Pakistan was meant to place pressure on India.241 Dulles viewed Nixon’s mission as an opportunity to send a message to Nehru about the costs of what Dulles and Eisenhower perceived as his defiance, this was made perfectly clear in Dulles’s November 27 communiqué to Nixon. In this telegram, Dulles asked

Nixon to attempt to discern if the advantages of finalising the military pact with Pakistan could

October 1953 (1), DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. The Neutral Commission refers here to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, a body formed to deal with POWs of the Korean War. 239 Dulles argued that the situations around Trieste and Israel were similarly emotional issues wherein one could not help one side without making an enemy of the other. See Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, November 16, 1953; Dulles to Eisenhower, November 16, 1953, Dulles, John F. November 1953, Box 2, DHS, AWF, DDEL 240 Nehru’s staunch neutralism led to American officials being more likely to make decisions which would irritate or worry Indians, such as giving more aid to Pakistan. 241 Telegram, Dulles to Nixon, November 20, 1953, Correspondence – Nov 20 – Dec 3, 1953, Box 1, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 98

be outweighed by the disadvantages of alienating India.242 The advantages Dulles listed reveal much about Dulles’s and the State Department’s view of India. If the pact with Pakistan was successfully finalised, Dulles argued the U.S. could: increase defensive capabilities of pro-

Western Pakistan, overcome neutralist tendencies in parts of the Pakistani government, “pave the way for…defense arrangements [in] Iraq, Iran and Turkey, and eventually other ME [Middle

Eastern] states…as well as eventual U.S. base rights,” and finally demonstrate to Nehru that the

U.S. did not “dance to his tune.”243 And, even at this early point, Dulles respected Nixon’s perspectives and opinions to the extent that he informed the American embassies in Iran,

Pakistan, and India that no decision on military aid to Pakistan would be made until after Nixon returned to America and shared his insights with State Department officials.244 The combination of Dulles’s coaching and the genuine clash of personalities between Nixon and Nehru contributed to a decidedly negative evaluation of the latter by the former.

Nixon viewed Nehru as foolish for not recognising and going along with the strong anti- communist and deferential aspects of Eisenhower’s framework.245 After meeting with Nehru,

Nixon concluded that India’s leader wished to be “the leader of Asia,” this was taken as evidence that Nehru simply did not understand the manner in which the Cold War world operated and

242 Telegram, John Foster Dulles to Richard Nixon, November 27, 1953, RN [Trip File 1953, Far East] Correspondence, November 20-December 3, Box 1, Series 325 Executive Branch File, RNVPC, RNL. 243 Telegram, Dulles to Nixon, November 27, 1953, RNL. 244 Telegram, Dulles to Nixon and Embassies of Iran, Pakistan, and India, December 9, 1953, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Correspondence, Dec., Box 23, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 245 Jacqueline Dix, “The United States and India: The Challenge of Neutralism and Bipolarity,” Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War, ed. Alan P. Dobson, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1999) 160-161. For Nixon’s negative analysis of Nehru, which he conducted both during his visit to India, and whilst in Iran, see Handwritten Note, RN [Trip File 1953, Far East] India, RNVPC, RNL; RN [Trip File 1953, Far East] Iran, Box 2, Series 325 Executive Branch Series, RNVPC, RNL. 99

would not defer to American leadership in the region.246 More simply, Nehru considered his position to be that of a free and independent at least near-equal to the United States, something that simply could not exist in the Eisenhower administration’s framework. This framework was so engrained in Nixon that he, like Eisenhower, struggled to comprehend whether Nehru genuinely believed in such a position.

One point of confusion and acrimony was Nehru’s treatment of American aid. The

Eisenhower administration, and Eisenhower especially, expected that any aid given by America entitled the administration to certain undefined obligations by the recipient. India constantly frustrated American expectations in this regard. The C.I.A. noted that while India had taken some steps against the “Communist menace,” such as accepting U.S. aid, Nehru’s commitment to non-alignment, and India’s actual treatment of American aid were problematic.247 Dulles received complaints from local officials that Indian officials portrayed American aid as “excess capital” that had to be given away; this led to angry recommendations from American officials that Dulles demand the Government of India recognize “that acceptance of US aid involves obligations on the part of India.”248 Perceived Indian ingratitude was not isolated to the embassy in India, as Nixon later confirmed he had encountered not simply ingratitude for American aid, but denial that such aid existed altogether.249

246 Handwritten Note, RN [Trip File 1953, Far East] India, RNVPC, RNL. This is also, of course, clear evidence that Nixon and Nehru were talking past one another, with neither man willing to accept or even acknowledge the veracity of the foundation upon which the other made their statements. 247 CIA Briefing Book for the Vice President, 28 September, 1953, 49, DDEL. 248 Telegram, New Delhi Embassy to Dulles, August 15, 1953, 1, India – Miscellaneous, 1953-1956 (3), Box 28, International Series, AWF, DDEL. It is useful here to remember Eisenhower’s comment on “investments” in Latin America and allegiances in the Cold War. 249 Vice President Nixon’s Report to Department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East, January 8, 1954, 23, Box 69, Operations Coordinating Board Central File Series (Hereafter OCBCF), WHO, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961 (Hereafter NSCSP), DDEL. 100

This was certainly part of a problematic attempt by Nehru to resist being placed within the American sphere. In contrast, Pakistani officials embraced American aid fully equipped with an understanding of how to work within and manipulate Eisenhower’s framework. While in

Pakistan as part of his mission, Nixon asked how the Pakistanis perceived Nehru’s actions.

Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra replied that Nehru was bluffing as part of a ploy to play the West against the East.250 The Pakistanis argued that Nehru was effectively too proud and ambitious for his own good, but those same qualities meant he would never allow himself or

India to become subservient to Communism.251 Both the Prime Minister and the Governor

General portrayed Pakistan as in need of, and grateful for, American military aid, with both taking great pains to explain how such aid would allow Pakistan to resist Communist aggression immediately and in the long term, and greatly enhanced the potential for stability in the region.252

Nixon was impressed enough by the Pakistanis characterisation of Nehru as attempting to play both sides, by their arguments that Nehru could never genuinely fully side with the communists, and with their arguments on the benefits of greater military aid that he sent a message to Dulles asking the NSC to delay any decision on the package until he returned.253 At the very least, the

Pakistanis confirmed suspicions Nixon, Dulles, and Eisenhower already harboured, namely that

250 See Brief Resume of talk between the Honourable Prime Minister and the Vice President of the U.S.A., December 7, 1953, 1-2, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Correspondence Dec 4 -, Box 23, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. Bogra was fairly well acquainted with America’s concerns, as he had served briefly as Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. in 1952-53. 251 Of course, the implicit corollary was that Nehru would equally never bow to the West. See Memcon, December 7, 1953, 1-2, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Correspondence Dec 4 -, Box 23, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 252 The Pakistanis argued that such aid would both give the Soviets pause and eventually allow Pakistan to devote more resources to developing their nation, which, in the long term, would also help resist communism. Bogra, a member of the Muslim League, also made the rather spurious argument that simply by providing aid to one Muslim nation, the U.S. was showing the entire Muslim world that the West cared more about Islam and Muslims than could ever be the case with the atheistic Communists. Memcon, December 7, 1953, 2, RNL. 253 Nixon asked that if the decision could not be delayed, that he be informed so that he could send a lengthy telegram detailing his findings on the matter. See Telegram, Nixon to Dulles, December 9, 1953, Correspondence Dec 4 -, Box 23, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. Dulles responded positively, see Telegram, Dulles to Nixon and Embassies of Iran, Pakistan, and India, RNL. 101

Nehru was fully aware the “true” state of world affairs but was too intractable to act reasonably:

Eisenhower made a point to confirm this precise suspicion with Nixon during the Christmas Eve meeting of the NSC.254 Thus, while Nehru was not perceived as dangerous enough to warrant a coup, by refusing to choose a side in the Cold War he had failed to adhere to the administration’s basic requirement for Third World allies. Such confusion, mutual misunderstanding and suspicion, and other factors created difficulties dealing with India.

In the Middle East, Eisenhower’s attempt to support European allies and build close relationships with Arab states, all while maintaining stability and anti-communism in the region without a cohesive, consistent, or coherent plan proved an impossible balancing act. More so than in many other regions, a significant part of the challenge for Eisenhower and Dulles was finding the means to act pragmatically. Eisenhower hoped that U.S. policy towards Israel would create a spirit of friendship amongst Israel and its neighbours, considering this the only viable manner in which his goal of improving Israel’s political and economic position could be achieved.255 However, Eisenhower was also cognizant of the fact that Israel was far from a stabilising force beyond the fact that the small nation aggravated most Arab nations.256

Eisenhower considered Egypt to be the key to stability in the Middle East, and he began pondering and seeking input from Dulles and his advisors on whether Egypt might be interested in a “package deal” which envisioned Egypt receiving financial support from the U.S. and possibly the United Kingdom for the Aswan Dam project in exchange for Egyptian aid in

254 Eisenhower pointedly asked Nixon if he agreed that there was “very little” the administration could feasibly do to win Nehru over, which Nixon did. See Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 24, 1953, 6, 177th Meeting of NSC December 24, 1953, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 255 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, March 12, 1953, Dulles, John F. March 1953, Box 1 DHS, AWF, DDEL. 256 Iraq’s foreign minister made a point of thanking Eisenhower for the United States’s support “to the Arab countries in their difficulties with the State of Israel.” See Memcon, Call on the President of the Foreign Minister of Iraq, October 27, 1953, 1, DDE Diary October 1953 (1), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 102

resolving Arab discontent with Israel, Middle East defence, and other considerations.257 The goals of peace and stability with a strong anti-communist core drove Eisenhower, and yet he struggled to discern a means to balance interests.

Indeed, Dulles foresaw little good ahead for the administration given its dual commitment to support Europeans and keep out Soviet influence and resources as best it could.

Dulles reported to Eisenhower in May that “bitterness toward [the] West, including United States

[was] such that while Arab goodwill may still be restored, time is short before loss becomes irretrievable.”258 In an even more dire prediction, Dulles warned Eisenhower that if Britain did not resolve its issues with Egypt amicably, the West might find itself facing the open hostility of the Arab world, which might begin seeking and receiving Soviet aid.259 Importantly, Dulles linked Israeli-Arab hostilities, the perception of the U.K. as heavy-handed imperialists, and the administration’s delay in communicating its intentions clearly as coming together and hurting the

U.S.’s standing in the region. Dulles offered no direct advice on actions, but did request that these problems begin to be considered for action immediately. The Iranian coup in August certainly did not resolve, or even address such challenges, but the region otherwise was not yet at a crisis point, which meant Eisenhower believed the administration could afford to delay. In

Southeast Asia, however, crises did appear at hand.

257 Memo, Eisenhower to the Acting Secretary of State, April 23, 1953, Dulles, John F. March 1953, Box 1 DHS, AWF, DDEL. Again, Eisenhower’s understanding of the purpose and accompanying obligations of American “investment” should be kept in mind. 258 Telegram, Secretary of State to the President, May 17, 1953, 1, May 1953, Dulles-Herter Series (Hereafter JFDHS) JFDP, SML. A note to the reader. While this series and the one housed at the Eisenhower Library are largely the same, certain documents have been declassified, or reclassified due to requests at each institute. One presumes that technically there should be no difference, however, likely due to a combination of bureaucratic challenges and the differing archival environments, there is. 259 Secretary of State to the President, May 17, 1953, 1, SML. 103

In Formosa (Taiwan), although it was clear the administration hoped to avoid direct war with Communist China, how it planned to achieve this while also securing its ally Chiang Kai-

Shek remained unclear, and a source of complaint. Nixon’s conversations with Chiang Kai-Shek are representative of the complaints about Eisenhower’s lack of a true or clear policy, and hint at problems the administration faced in later years. Chiang complained to Nixon that despite being the leader of the free world and demanding adherence to its leadership, the United States had no

“purpose or direction” in its policies in Asia, causing frustration for its allies.260 This was not the first time Chiang made such criticisms to American officials, and each time he received a similar response explaining that while the administration would happily listen to input, in the end only two set of options were open to the U.S.: do things as the administration thought best for the nation in question and the free world, or pull out altogether.261 Eisenhower was keenly aware of the impact that the suggestion of such withdrawals had on local states, but as he explained to

Dulles, he considered those same types of withdrawals to be a key ingredient in reducing tensions with the Soviets.262 Hence, Chiang had noticed one symptom representative of the administration’s struggle to balance regional and global interests. Eisenhower tried to communicate to Chiang the struggle he and his administration were enduring in an attempt to find this balance, but essentially conveyed a hope that Chiang might be willing to indulge in the

“wait and see” approach.263

260 Record of the First Interview between President Chiang Kai-Shek and United States Vice President Richard Nixon, November 9, 1953, 2-3, RN [Trip File 1953, Far East] Conversations with Chiang Kai-Shek, November 9- 11, 1953, Box 1, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 261 K.L. Rankin described earlier exchanges amongst Chiang, Admiral Stump, and Senator H. Alexander Smith. See Telegram, American Embassy in Taipei to State Department, November 30, 1953, Formosa [2/4], Box 2, PPS 364, RNPPM, RNL. 262 Memorandum for the Secretary of State, September 8, 1953, DDE Diary, Aug-Sept 1953 (2), DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 263 Letter, Eisenhower to Chiang Kai-Shek, May 5, 1953, Formosa (China) 1952-57 (7), Box 10, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 104

Chiang’s criticism, and the response to it, are also important in that the administration was not simply communicating poorly to its allies, but to its own staffs. Although Chiang was far from a peaceful stabiliser, and granted that his criticism had more than a little bitter self- interest to it, the fact remains that he recognised the nebulous manner in which the Eisenhower administration was going about formulating policy.264 In fact, the administration was in the process of re-evaluating its positions and policies in Asia, and was either not communicating its temporary positions clearly to its own foreign services (let alone allies) or was uncertain enough about what those policies might be that no such communication was possible.265 In part, the lack of clarity and articulation stemmed from a lack of agreement in the administration’s leadership on how best to achieve the goal of stability and adherence to American leadership. Of course,

Taiwan was not the only state on the edge of crisis which threatened the stability of Southeast

Asia.

Indochina and Vietnam also became a focal point of NSC and other cabinet rank meetings. While Eisenhower certainly knew generally what France’s plans for Indochina were, he had Allen Dulles explain those plans to the NSC on May 6, 1953. Dulles’s explanation was accurate and to the point: France was offering the Indochinese states (Laos, Cambodia, and

264 Chiang consistently plotted an invasion of mainland China. Although he was cognizant of the near impossibility of the venture, this did not dampen his aggression. Be that as it may, Chiang had latched on to a point that American officials had difficulty answering, namely what beyond military support were the administration’s policies, and how far could one push their position of preventing Communist aggression? While Chiang was certainly aware of the contentious nature of “supporting China” it is unlikely he knew that he had struck on a point that was the spot of such significant disagreement in Eisenhower’s cabinet. For Chiang’s consistent calls for invasion of mainland China cf. Telegram, The Charge’ in the Republic of China (Jones) to the Department of State, May 27, 1953, FRUS: 1952-1954, Volume XIV, China and Japan, John P. Glennon, et al. eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office 1985), 197; Record of the Third Interview between President Chiang Kai- Shek and United States Vice President Richard Nixon, November 9, 1953, 19-20, RN [Trip File 1953, Far East] Conversations with Chiang Kai-Shek, November 9-11, 1953, Box 1, PPS 321, RNPPM, RNL. 265 Indeed, Dulles sent a telegram to America’s embassies in both the U.K. and France on November 9 after receiving several requests for clarification as to U.S. policies in the region after confusion arose concerning American officials continuing to delay holding discussions on American-British-French trade policies. See Telegram, Secretary of State to Embassy in the United Kingdom, November 9, 1953, FRUS, Volume XIV, China and Japan, 885. 105

Vietnam) “independence” within the French Union, but those states doubted France’s sincerity in even this offer.266 Eisenhower then espoused two points, one of which became a constant throughout his dealings with imperial powers: France needed to make a “firm, official announcement as to the future independence of the Associated State when the internal conflict was over”; and better military leadership was necessary.267 The importance of the second point is that Eisenhower wrote to the French ambassador to push for better leadership in Indochina, setting a precedent Nixon followed after his stop in Vietnam that year. At that same meeting,

Nixon pointed out that as the main concern was “losing” Indochina to communism, it hardly seemed possible to convince Indochinese to fight a strain of communism which argued for national independence, in the name of French colonialism.268 This being the case, fear of another open war continued to influence Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s moves.

Nixon’s handwritten notes reveal a heated discussion between Eisenhower and Dulles on the topic of Indochina at the cabinet meeting on June 5, 1953. Most interesting are two scribbles

Nixon drew, a line towards his note that “E and Dulles” had discussed “Satellite War” and the phrase “more serious than Korea.”269 The official meeting minutes for this discussion note only that Dulles had “outlined the far-reaching implications of any Communist success in Indo-

China” and Eisenhower’s comments on the difficulty of balancing security and democracy.270

Even while still protean then, Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s views on Indochina were in agreement

266 Memo, Discussion at the 143rd Meeting of the NSC, May 6, 1953, 6, 143rd Meeting of the NSC, 6, Box 4, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 267 It should be noted that Eisenhower did not argue for any kind of firm date, and it is rather likely that he would have happily accepted a date far in the future even if the military situation in Indochina stabilised. See Discussion at the 143rd Meeting of the NSC, May 6, 1953, 6. Nonetheless, Eisenhower genuinely believed that such announcements of independence dates were crucial stabilising tools in such cases. 268 Then-Undersecretary of State Walter Beddell Smith soon after Nixon’s remarks noted the “very great possibilities [sic] of losing French Indochina.” See Discussion at the 143rd Meeting of the NSC, May 6, 1953, 6-8. 269 Handwritten Notes, June 5, 1953, 1953 May- June, Executive Branch Files 1953, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 270 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, June 5, 1953, 2, Cabinet Meeting of June 5, 1953, Box 2, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 106

on both the severity of the issue and the fact that they simply could not find a reasonable means of addressing that problem.271 When Nixon travelled to Indochina as part of his mission, he based his criticisms and comments around stability and the presumption that the French ought to listen to American advice.

Nixon was disturbed by what he observed in Indochina, and he attempted to communicate these concerns to every party he considered relevant, including General Henri

Navarre, Commander of the French Forces in Indochina, and Emperor Bảo Đại of Vietnam.

Nixon argued that Navarre needed to institute better training for the troops fighting in Indochina, stating very plainly that what he witnessed in this regard “does not come up to our expectations.”272 Nixon’s advice irritated Navarre,.He responded by questioning Nixon’s understanding of the situation and pointing out that though Nixon was technically correct about the problem, a single solution was unlikely to resolve it.273 Stabilisation was clearly of primary importance, as Nixon’s questions to Emperor Bảo Đại pointed to the American search for the

271 Eisenhower and Dulles often exchanged drafts of speeches with one another in the hopes of insight, maintaining a common line (when that was Eisenhower’s desire), or sending the intended message. Returning a draft of a more than 20-page speech draft to Dulles, Eisenhower noted that Dulles’s original draft did not deal with the Associated States of Indochina clearly enough. Eisenhower’s “clarification” suggests that those states might be best dealt with by “voluntarily” joining the French Union, since, Eisenhower insisted, they could not survive without outside aid. See Memorandum for the Secretary of State, November 16, 1953, DDE Diary November 1953 (2), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 272 The message was conveyed through diplomatic channels. See Telegram, Hong Kong Embassy to Secretary of State, November 5, 1953, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Correspondence 1953 October 21 – November 11, Foreign Affairs/National Security 1953, Box 23, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 273 Navarre complained that Indochina and Korea were very different wars, apparently believing Nixon meant better training for the type of warfare. Nixon meant more integrated, respectful training of the Vietnamese troops, which he noted was sorely lacking and problematic. Navarre also thanked Nixon for his promise to press Eisenhower on the importance the French ascribed to possibly receiving American planes for the conflict. See Telegram, Navarre to Nixon, Saigon to Secretary of State, November 11, 1953, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Correspondence 1953 October 21 – November 11, Foreign Affairs/National Security 1953, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. It is also worth noting, if only in passing, that Dulles would later level a similar criticism at Nixon after Nixon’s return from Latin America, when Nixon began pointing out flaws in the administration’s policies therein. 107

most viable non-communist stabilising force.274 The importance of these exchanges is not simply that Nixon found the military situation in Indochina problematic to such an extent that he felt compelled to make recommendations he had to have known would irritate Bảo Đại and

Navarre. Rather, the importance is that even at this early juncture Nixon understood that

America’s objectives with France’s colonial holdings was not to have the French leave as soon as possible but to seek to guide and lead the French towards acceptable stabilisation of those holdings. Indeed, Nixon’s notes from his conversations with Dulles before departing on his mission indicate that the Secretary of State had stressed the need for France to build “liberty” in the Indochina.275 Implicitly, such building would take time, likely years.

Both men attempted to formulate solutions that emphasised stability but avoided the use of American troops. For Dulles, an American military solution was an absolute last resort, as

Dulles indicated a strong desire to avoid committing American ground forces to the Asian continent well before the French hold on Indochina started to be torn apart in 1954.276 And although Nixon did not submit his official report on his trip to Eisenhower until early the next year, the embassy staff in Vietnam placed their support behind it as they considered Nixon to have furthered American policy objectives in the region and also to have acquired “a sharp and comprehensive grasp of the problems which we face here.”277 Many of Nixon’s solutions were ill-suited to resolve or even help Western interests in Vietnam but all focused on stabilising the

274 Nixon attempted to probe whether Bảo Đại would be willing to take a more active role in the Indochinese armed forces, believing this could contribute to more indigenous stability. See Conversations of Vice President Nixon with Bảo Đại, November 2, 1953, Indochina, Box 2, PPS 366, RNPPM, RNL. 275 Handwritten Note, RN – Notes by Country – Indochina, Box 2 PPS 325 RNPPM, RNL. 276 Indeed, while he showed interest in naval or aerial interventions in Asia, Dulles argued strongly against American ground forces on the continent. See Memorandum for the Record, November 11, 1953, DDE Diary November 1953 (2), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 277 Telegram, Ambassador Heath to Department of State, November 7, 1953,3, Indochina, Box 2, PPS 366, RNPPM, RNL. 108

area. One of Nixon’s solutions, a proposal to begin training anti-Communist agents out of a select group of the Chinese population in Vietnam in order to subvert pro-Communist agents, was beyond impractical, and demonstrated a clear lack of understanding of the situation in

Indochina.278 Nonetheless, Nixon making these recommendations, and the fact they were considered at all, displays the priority the administration placed on stability. However, an emphasis on stability was hardly a strategy, and this was a complaint the administration and

Nixon in particular encountered near the end of 1953.

The Lowest of the Low Priorities

Due to the combination of European reliance upon, instability in, and Soviet or Chinese proximity to areas like Southeast Asia and the Middle East, these regions took priority over others in the Third World. Areas like Latin America, and more so Africa, were relegated to the bottom ranks of Third World priorities. Failing an active or clearly looming crisis with communist implication or involvement, Eisenhower and Dulles deferred, delayed, or ignored entirely dealing with issues in these regions. Indeed, in Latin America, outside the planning of the Guatemalan coup, the administration put off revising its policies for the region until the

President’s brother Milton Eisenhower completed a goodwill and fact-finding mission. In

Africa, the administration was typically content to register mild discontent with European

(mostly French) mishandling of the movement towards decolonisation while hoping and in some cases helping those colonial powers maintain control.279 Important too is the fact that

278 Status, Influence, and Political Potentialities of Chinese in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, Indo-China 3, Box 3, Series 364, RNPPM, RNL. 279 The argument here is in no way meant to suggest that British, Portuguese, or Dutch colonial regimes were not also mishandling their respective holdings. Rather, the point is that most of the administration’s criticism and 109

Eisenhower and Dulles very clearly considered the situations in Latin America and Africa roughly satisfactory for local populations. And since the two also considered the Monroe

Doctrine fully applicable to Latin America, and that Africa was still Europe’s responsibility, this also meant Eisenhower and Dulles believed little to no real change was required so long as communism was kept out.

This being the case, many in the administration displayed an, at best, basic understanding of Latin America, what the administration’s policies were, and what policies had already existed.

During the cabinet meeting on July 3, Eisenhower admitted that the U.S.’s policies towards Latin

America were “generally unsatisfactory,” but chalked this up to the belief that American leaders had simply been devoting more time and attention to European and Asian issues.280 Nixon’s notes on this meeting are revealing in that they display both some of the elementary understandings he held of Latin American issues at the time, and outline the manner in which

Latin America was viewed by much of the cabinet. Nixon felt compelled to define “banana republic” in his notes, under the same heading in which he quoted an unnamed speaker who had said “We can grow wheat, we can’t grow Uranium.”281 The fact that this appears incredibly simple actually reflects reality, as the President noted in the meeting that his brother Milton

Eisenhower was in Bolivia “empty handed” insofar as new information or programs to offer due to a “lack of a policy.”282 However, neither Eisenhower nor many in his cabinet believed that

concerns in Africa centered on France’s handling of North African (Morocco, Tunisia, and especially Algeria) challenges and the impact this had on wider issues. 280 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, July 3, 1953, 2, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 281 Handwritten Notes, July 3, 1953, 1953 July-December, Executive Branch Files 1953, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. Nixon’s notes do not appear to reflect a full understanding of the implications of the term, as he defined it simply as “1 [sic] product countries.” 282 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, July 3, 1953, 2, DDEL. Eisenhower closed this topic by stating a refrain that became painfully commonplace in conversations on Latin America, the need for “Latin American countries to search out private capital.” 110

more than a basic policy was necessary, as they were, with the exception of Guatemala, convinced the region generally met their requirements for Third World regions.

Indeed, Eisenhower’s fundamental understanding of the region was problematic insofar as adaptation and change was concerned: he communicated clearly that he considered any resources spent on the region to be an “investment” only worth the expense if it secured the allegiance of the states in the region.283 Thus, the clear disparity between military and other types of aid points to where Eisenhower believed the best return on investments could be found.284 The basic balance struck for Latin America was to focus the vast majority of resources on military aid and defense support. As a point of comparison between cultural/soft diplomacy and military aid, the administration estimated that between 1954 and 1956 it would spend roughly $17.9 million USD on United States Information Agency activities throughout all of

Latin America, while it estimated that between July and December of 1954 it had delivered

$19.4 million USD worth of spare parts and end-items as part of the Mutual Defense Assistance

Program.285

The treatment accorded to Eisenhower’s brother Milton’s tour and report on the region is indicative of this problem. Milton Eisenhower’s tour was considered so significant that in Bedell

Smith’s reports mentioned above, the Under Secretary admitted that even envisioned policies were hardly enacted before they were put on hold so that the input of Milton Eisenhower’s report

283 Eisenhower noted that “$130 million” seemed a sufficient amount for the entire continent. See Discussion at the Special Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, March 31, 1953, 9-10, Special Meeting of NSC, March 31, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 284 As will be shown in later chapters, this disparity also applied to economic and technical aid. 285 Cf. Report Prepared for the National Security Council, March 2, 1955, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics, 182-183; Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council, January 19, 1955, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics, 89-108. 111

could be considered and acted upon.286 Indeed, as John Cabot told officials from State and

Defense, the purposes of Milton’s mission had been goodwill, for Milton Eisenhower to study the problems in Latin America, and “provide the administration with the essential facts to revitalise our Latin American policy and develop a program for Latin America.”287 Cabot mentioned, though he apparently failed to consider the implications, that the younger Eisenhower had not actually been able to study the various situations in Latin America due to spending most of his time socialising with elites.288 President Eisenhower was effusive about his brother’s findings, describing the report as so insightful that it “ought to be studied by every man, woman, and child in all of North and South America.”289 The President was willing to admit that

“possibly” his brother’s report did not contain anything particularly insightful or novel for the

State Department; however, he also made clear that the report was to be made use of, possibly both internally and for public consumption.290 For Nixon, Milton Eisenhower’s report served as the foundation of his knowledge on both the region and the administration’s policies there. That the report played a significant formative role on Nixon’s perspectives on the region and

286 According to Milton, his brother had asked him to take on the fact finding mission in March, 1953. See Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 187. For Smith’s point see, National Security Council Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the Implementation of United States Objectives and Courses of Actions with Respect to Latin America (NSC 144/1), November 20, 1953, 1-3, DDEL. 287 Minutes of a Meeting Between Representatives of Department of State and Department of Defense, August 12, 1953, Memorandum on Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, May 22, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics, 157-159. 288 Beside the already ignored point that the administration’s Latin America policy needed revitalising and yet was held off so the President’s brother could take a single tour. Minutes of a Meeting Between Representatives of Department of State and Department of Defense, August 12, 1953, Memorandum on Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, May 22, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics, 159. 289 Letter, Dwight Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, October 31, 1953, DDE Diary - October 1953 (1), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 290 While terming the memo passive-aggressive is pushing too far, Eisenhower’s memo to Dulles certainly has an undertone which suggests Milton’s report was important and deserving of attention – hence his “hope” that the State Department was “making a complete analysis” of it. See Memorandum for the Secretary of State, November 3, 1953, DDE Diary – November 1953 (3), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 112

Eisenhower’s policies in the region was not of significant import in 1953, or indeed until

1958.291 Nonetheless, Milton Eisenhower’s report on his mission, and the reaction to it, displays the state of understanding and priorities in the administration in 1953.

The report itself shed significant light on the patronising perspectives and paranoia present among Eisenhower and his cabinet. The report attributed any complaint about unequal treatment, unfair practises by American business, or economic misconduct of any sort to a

“misunderstanding” on the part of the Latin Americans.292 Milton Eisenhower argued that the one area that the U.S. should consider revising was tariff and import control; since so many Latin

American nations had economies based on a single export, price fluctuations exacerbated by protectionist American tariffs should in some way – the report offered no concrete suggestions as to how - be addressed.293 And, perhaps most importantly, Milton’s report made three points which continued to cause problems for the administration: that the political aspects of U.S.-Latin

American relations were proceeding and developing satisfactorily, that Latin American nations had an inconsistent understanding of economics and simply needed to “attract” capital, and that while nationalism was praiseworthy ultra-nationalism was actually a communist ploy.294

However, the report did not completely dismiss or ignore concerns from Latin Americans: a line in Milton’s report provided ominous foreshadowing: “some of our actions have caused leaders in those countries to adopt the mistaken view that we turn our attention to them only in times of

291 Nixon was provided a copy of the report in late December. See Memo John Cabot to Richard Nixon, December 21, 1953, Eisenhower, Milton S. (1/2), Box 238, PPS 320, RNPPM, RNL. 292 “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations”, Officially Submitted November 18, 1953, 10-15, Latin America, Box 16, PPS 299, RNPPM, RNL. 293 Ibid, 31-34. Milton argued that consideration should be given to some kind of policy which would see the U.S. build stockpiles of such materials when prices declined so as to keep those economies from flat lining, but did not go beyond this or into any specifics. 294 The report dealt with the various Latin American dictatorships by arguing that “no matter their degree of democracy” each nation’s power resided in the people. See “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations”, 9-10, 25-26, RNL. 113

crisis.”295 That this was not actually a genuinely mistaken view points to the fact that beyond needing to give attention to real crises elsewhere, Eisenhower typically did not give much attention to Latin American issues since he considered the basic relationships and situations to be satisfactory enough to eliminate the need for significant change. In fact, in the following years,

Eisenhower would execute manoeuvre after manoeuvre to give the appearance of interest and the possibility of change. However, these manoeuvres were little more than empty gestures designed to defer, or delay change.296

It is not surprising then, that Africa, still under the thumb of European powers and still out of reach of significant Soviet influence, fell to the bottom of the administration’s list of priorities. Even before he became Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles had, in 1952, told

Britain’s then Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden that the

U.S., Britain, and France should create and display a united position on colonial issues.297 Given that Dulles was loath to surrender voluntarily any independence, doubly so if this meant supporting the static European powers, this request displays the low level of importance he ascribed to African affairs; so long as Britain and France kept the continent relatively stable and out of Soviet hands, he saw little need to involve or expend American resources. Reports

295 “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 5, RNL. For his part, Dulles typically showed very little interest in Latin America, and was happy to have found a means to gain the President’s favour through effusive praise of the younger Eisenhower’s work. An example of this lack of interest was Dulles’s July 8 response to a concerned letter from Eisenhower requesting a summary of Mexico’s political and economic climate; Dulles responded by agreeing that a slight tilt to the left had occurred in Mexico but nothing of great concern. Dulles apparently anticipated Eisenhower would consider increasing aid to Mexico, but, typical of the Secretary, Dulles argued that although Mexico was then experiencing a drought, it had a healthy enough economy, and that any request for emergency aid that might come from Mexico as a result of the drought should be considered alongside Mexico’s “uncooperative” attitude to a string of American concerns. Dulles also scribbled in a note to Eisenhower after the body of the memo, noting that “of course, all the Latin American countries are hit by raw material situations.” See, Memorandum for the President, July 8, 1953, 1-2, July 1953, JFDHS, JFDP, SML 296 This is of course excepting the Guatemalan coup and the connected Caracas resolution – both of which will again be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter. 297 Ebere Nwaubani and C. Nwaubani, “The United States and the Liquidation of European Colonial Rule in Tropical Africa, 1941-1963,” Cahiers d'Études Africaines 43, Cahier 171 (2003), 526. 114

coming from within the administration close to the end of 1953 admitted a near “vacuum” in

American policy for the continent, but others pointed out that the colonising nations were nowhere near losing their power there.298

Indeed, both Eisenhower and Dulles treated African leaders and African matters with the same level of low regard. Eisenhower typically prepared his own responses to memos and letters from European leaders and then had Dulles or others check them over. In contrast, the President directed Dulles to find “someone in your department” to write up replies to Ethiopia’s Haile

Selassie.299 None of this is to suggest that either entirely ignored Africa, but while complaints about European handling of Africa existed, the continent was simply not important enough to risk damaging that relationship. This understanding was far from a closely guarded secret.

When speaking with India’s Jawaharlal Nehru about Africa, Dulles and India’s Prime Minister were surprisingly candid and in accord.

Dulles was quite open about the U.S. preference that Europeans acknowledge and accommodate the reality on the ground, namely the push amongst indigenous populations for self-government, but could not risk pushing Britain and France towards the Soviets over such preferences. Unsurprisingly, both men agreed that French and British colonial policies were causing problems, and that those policies needed to become more progressive.300 Nehru argued that European colonial powers needed to adopt more liberal policies in their colonies but agreed

298 National Intelligence Estimate – “Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa” December 22, 1953, FRUS, 1952- 1954, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia, Part One, John P. Glennon et al. eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), 71-89. The estimate did point out that mistreatment by the Europeans and a continued drive for self-government by indigenous populations would cause complications that, if improperly handled, could be taken advantage of by the Soviets. See also, Memo, Reckord to Enyart, April 20, 1953, PSB 091.4 Africa, Box 14, Psychological Planning Board Central Files, WHO, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-1961, DDEL. 299 Cf. Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, April 10 1953; Dulles to Eisenhower, April 8, 1953, Dulles, John F. April 1953, Box 1, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 300 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 22, 1953, 2, Dulles, John F. May 1953, Box 1, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 115

with Dulles that the United States could not afford a break with Britain or France over the issue.301 Dulles likely intentionally ignored the implicit understanding Nehru was conveying in his recommendations: that the United States was the only force capable of pushing France and

Britain to adopt policies which could accommodate local nationalisms that would be able to resist communism, and that it ought to make such a push.302 While the administration might offer some weak complaints about European handling of African matters, Africa was still considered by and large to be a European area that needed little American attention. Indeed, a

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released in late 1953 acknowledged the ongoing deterioration of the Western position in Africa, but pointed out that there was not a significant communist presence in Africa and predicted this would continue to be the case for the foreseeable future; the most significant worry expressed by the NIE was that France’s attempts to bolster its control of states like Morocco would create greater problems and more entrenched anti-Western sentiment.303

Ending the Year

The Eisenhower administration’s first year in office witnessed a combination of assessing the various situations in the Third World and experimentation with the assertion of American power to attempt to institute stability. Nixon’s role in 1953 was to feel out his place, solicit and solidify the support of Secretary Dulles, and represent the administration in, and evaluate, various Far and Near Eastern states based on his mentor’s instructions along with the

301 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 22, 1953, 2, DDEL. 302 Nehru pointed out that he understood the Soviets were taking advantage of nationalist rhetoric, and argued that if America did not make certain to support nationalism but with a Western spin, “Communists…would surely win in Africa and Asia.” Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 22, 1953, 2, DDEL. 303 National Intelligence Estimate: Estimate of the World Situation through 1955, FRUS, 1952-1954. Volume II, Part One, National Security Affairs, 561-562. 116

administration’s framework. The states dealt with in this chapter are far from the only ones the administration dealt with in the Third World, indeed as just one other example, Dulles indicated to Nixon while he was on his mission to the Far East that concerned ruminations had begun over

“disquieting” recent developments in Indonesia.304 This region and others experienced greater involvement and interest from the administration in subsequent years.

While attending the Bermuda Conference near the end of 1953, an informal meeting of the heads of the United States, Britain, and France, Eisenhower made an ironic observation on

Winston Churchill’s views on imperialism: although Eisenhower agreed with Churchill that the indigenous peoples were not ready to govern themselves, he believed that ignoring, suppressing, or using force to thwart the movement of these peoples towards independence would only cause

“resentment, unrest, and possibly bitter conflict” that would be more damaging to Western powers than attempting to maintain control of those areas.305 Of course, Eisenhower had, and continued to make decisions which were intended to force Third World nations to abide by the

304 Telegram, Dulles to Nixon, November 12, 1953, Correspondence Nov. 10-18, Box 1, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. Robert McMahon notes the administration’s moves in 1953 in far greater depth than spatial limits allow for here. However, while McMahon rightly points various important pieces of evidence which indicate Indonesia was yet another target of what eventually did become a genuine attempt at some form of coup, (such as Dulles’s briefing of Hugh Cumming stressing the need for more anti-communism and a willingness to effectively smash Indonesia and put it back together as a more anti-communist nation), two points need to be stressed here in relation to McMahon’s arguments. First, while McMahon rightly points out that NSC 171/1 certainly stressed the need to keep Indonesia from falling to communism, it also ordered a reconsideration of trade policies, – specifically, it ordered a consideration of whether relaxing controls on trade with the Soviet Union might actually increase political and economic stability, and hence strengthen the “free world” -, also advocated using “the forces of nationalism and of Islam in opposing Communism” and an admission that some of Indonesia’s economic troubles were due to unhelpful pressure brought by the United States to restrict trade with the Soviets and Communist Chinese. The second point is that nothing McMahon argues conflicts with the framework presented here. See Robert J. McMahon, “’The Point of No Return’: The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia, 1953-1960” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds., (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006), 78-81; NSC 171/1 – A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Courses of Actions with Respect to Indonesia,” November 20, 1953, i, 3, 13, 16-17, NSC 171/1 – Policy on Indonesia, Box 8, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, WHO, OSANSA, DDEL. 305 In these notes, Eisenhower also complained about the nature of the Bermuda Conference, worried that Churchill was becoming too deaf to understand proceedings, and voiced frustration about France’s “inferiority complex.” See Notes December 10, Bermuda Conference, December 4-8, 1953, 10, Bermuda-Pres. Notes 12/53 (2), Box 3, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 117

decisions and interests of foreign power. Eisenhower clarified that while he disagreed with

Churchill’s proposed methods of dealing with resistance from Third World leaders, joint

(American and British) ultimatums, he considered there to be “very great deal of good sense” in the idea of forcing those nations to follow Western direction.306

Although many of Eisenhower’s solutions to the problems which faced his administration in 1953 were short-term, it would hardly be reasonable to expect fully realised and well elaborated long-term answers to the variety of complex challenges he faced in the Third World within the first year of taking office. The problem, however, was that as time progressed,

Eisenhower continued to engage vague, short-term, often short-sighted decision-making. Added to his other traits of delaying or deferring decisions in non-crisis, and the routine vagueness and inconsistencies in some of the administration’s policies, this led to increasing frustration both inside the administration and in foreign officials. Yet, despite growing problems and agitations,

Eisenhower continued to pursue postponement.

306 Eisenhower simply claimed that those nations needed a means to “save face,” but never questioned that they should be made to follow Western interests. See Notes December 10, Bermuda Conference, December 4-8, 1953, 10, DDEL. 118

Chapter Three

“If we get our prestige involved anywhere, then we can’t get out”307 (1954)

1954 was a challenging year for the administration in dealing with the Third World.

While Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon became more comfortable with each other and their respective positions (Eisenhower informed his brother Edgar that Nixon held an influential place in his council of advisers, listing him first amongst his most trusted on international affairs behind only Dulles, whom he described as “the best informed man on international affairs that I believe lives in the world today”) the administration was plagued by a variety of challenges.308

Crises in Indochina, the Taiwan Straits, the Guatemalan coup, and signs of looming challenges and growing instability in a number of Third World areas beset the administration. The struggle to operate in areas alongside the British and French contributed to growing animosity, resentment, and irritation. Compounding this issue was the fact that while Eisenhower and

Dulles clearly communicated the administration’s basic goals, they were often at a loss, and sometimes refused, to explain or articulate exactly how these goals would be achieved. Put more simply, Eisenhower and Dulles had not articulated coherent long-term policies for Third World regions or nations. This lack of articulation led to an increasing amount of frustration and anxiety within Eisenhower’s cabinet, with Nixon taking an especially critical position. In 1954, the Eisenhower administration dealt with a variety of challenges, but a failure on Eisenhower’s

307 Eisenhower made this statement in reference to hoping to avoid constantly reacting to communist subversion or rancor. See Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Sunday, September 12, 1954, 1-5, 214th Meeting of the NSC, September 12, 1954, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL 7, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 308 See Letter, Dwight Eisenhower to Edgar Eisenhower, January 27, 1954, 1-3, DDE Diary – January 1954 (1), Box 5, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. Interestingly, the President decided to send a copy of his response to the two’s younger brother Milton. See also, Nixon, RN, 107-108. 119

and Dulles’s part to recognise or sufficiently deal with looming problems, many of which were pointed out by officials in the administration such as Nixon, meant that Eisenhower was undermining the very stability he sought to achieve.

Increasing Irritation with Britain and France

The complicated relationship between America, Britain, and France meant that while the

Eisenhower administration was constantly pressuring its allies to take certain actions, it feared pushing too hard lest those allies withhold or withdraw their support in the Third World or, more importantly to the administration, Europe. Importantly, while Eisenhower and Dulles complained about the lack of deference and adherence to American leadership shown by Britain and France neither man began planning for or pursuing independent courses in non-crisis spots;

Nixon and others, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford perceived this as a kind of weakness, and began to suggest that the administration’s own reluctance to lead and vague policies were also to blame for their difficulties in the Third

World.309

Eisenhower explained to his friend Swede Hazlett his exasperation with the British and the French, both in the specific case of Vietnam and in the broader sense of expecting the two nations to follow his administration’s lead. Eisenhower expressed frustration with what he considered to be British pusillanimity, telling Hazlett they had a “morbid obsession that any

309 Radford, for example, complained about the vagueness that the administration had allowed to permeate much of the Geneva agreements which ended the French-Indochina War, and that this made not only working with the French difficult, but also created needless obstacles for the administration in all endeavours in Indochina. See Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon, October 1, 1954, in FRUS, 1952- 1954, Volume XIII, Part Two, Indochina, Glennon et al. eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Press, 1982), 2108. 120

positive move on the part of the free world may bring upon us World War III.”310 In

Eisenhower’s analysis, the British were reluctant to aid in any anti-communist military venture lest they face repercussions by the Communist Chinese or Soviets. Concerning France,

Eisenhower bemoaned what he considered to be its outmoded thinking: their stubborn insistence on maintaining the conflict in Indochina as a colonial conflict so as to neither admit their waning power nor give confidence to anti-imperial forces in other colonies, namely Algeria, meant not only that they would certainly lose, but that the free world would be at a disadvantage because of this.311 Eisenhower’s understanding of why his administration faced such significant problems in areas of the Third World where the U.S. needed to work with Britain or France was that the

European powers were too stubborn and timid to accept the fact that working together to give

“the Communists…a good smacking” would be beneficial to both local anti-imperial issues and the global threat of Communist encroachment.312 While not all of his advisers shared such an aggressive perspective, Eisenhower was far from alone in his irritation.

Indeed, the frustration held for the British and French in the Third World was fairly consistent throughout the administration. In March, members of the Operations Coordinating

Board (OCB) were grappling with how to “scare the Ceylonese, Indians, Pakistanis, Burmese, and Indian out of their wits” at the upcoming Colombo Conference with regard to communist advances in Asia without “flaunting” the fact that many of the advances occurred “under the noses” of the French.313 The belief was that the OCB could prepare statements with greater

310 Letter, Eisenhower to Hazlett, April 27, 1954, 3, DDE Diary April 1954 (1), Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 311 Eisenhower to Hazlett, April 27, 1954, 2-3, DDEL. 312 Eisenhower specifically argued that if the British worked with the U.S. and France in Indochina to target the Chinese and Soviet forces he was certain were operating in large numbers there, it would make Hong Kong far safer for a much longer period. See Eisenhower to Hazlett, April 27, 1954, 3, DDEL. 313 The Operations Coordinating Board was a creation of Eisenhower’s in 1953. The Board was responsible integrating and coordinating the implementation of policies whose interest crossed departments and agencies. 121

freedom, (meaning statements more critical of the French), for the Colombo Conference than the

Geneva Conference; the latter required a united allied front, whereas the Colombo Conference was called by the sympathetic state Ceylon and included a variety of positions and attendees.314

And in September, responding to a pro-Anglo-French memo Eisenhower forwarded to him,

Dulles complained that the administration was forced to save Britain from its own “ineptitude” in the Middle East, and pointed out that while the French wished the Eisenhower administration to show more tolerance of colonialism, it was this very attitude and the perception that the administration already tolerated colonialism that was granting to Soviets considerable gains in the Third World.315 Administration officials consistently complained about the complications entailed in dealing with European powers in Third World regions, but the administration’s continued reliance on those powers to maintain stability in their respective regions left little room for alternatives.

The administration’s dealings with France in Africa was especially indicative of this trend. It was also true that the administration was far from well-equipped when it came to

Africa. When Mason Sears, an American representative on the U.N. Trusteeship Council, visited

French Cameroon, his first impression was disappointment, both by the lack of “big game” he encountered on his safari, and by the Frenchmen’s refusal to answer his questions regarding the

President Kennedy abolished the OCB soon after taking office. The memo’s author, Charles Taquey, went on to complain that the French had a “complex of inferiority” but had at least been a part of “the fight” against communism. The balance he was seeking was between scaring those states to take communist subversion seriously while not embarrassing the French. See Memo, Charles Taquey to Mr. W. Irwin, March 18, 1954, 1, OCB 092.3 [International Affairs – Conferences and Boards] (File #1) (4) [January 1954 – April 1955), Box 85, OCBCF, WHO, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961 (hereafter NSCSF), DDEL. 314 Taquey put it more frankly, the Colombo Conference could be used as an outlet for materials and statements which the “tender regards…for French sensitivities” rendered unusable at Geneva. Taquey to Irwin, 1, DDEL. Dulles made a point of reminding Eisenhower that Ceylon’s Prime Minister Kotelawala had provided the administration with a copy of the “secret” minutes of the meetings at Colombo. See Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, December 4, 1954, 1-2, December 1954 [2], Box 3, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 315 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, September 1, 1954, 1-2, White House Correspondence [1], Box 19, Eisenhower Files Relating to John Foster Dulles (hereafter EFJFD), JFDP, SML. 122

steps they were taking to prepare the locals for self-government. Sears only pushed the French so far, and once those officials stressed that Soviet communism would not be an issue as long as they were in charge, Sears relented.316 Indeed, the administration appeared quite content to complain about France’s failure to prepare colonial populations for self-government, almost as an exercise, before being reassured by the French that they were the best option to maintain anti- communist stability. The conversations between the officials in the Office of African Affairs and their counterparts in the Africa Section of the French Foreign Office, who met on May 14,

1954, display that French officials clearly understood this exercise and Eisenhower’s main priority for the continent.317

While American officials complained, it was clear that so long as the French met certain expectations, there was little consequence to the complaints. During the May 14 meeting, Jean

Jurgensen, chief of France’s Africa Section, explained both how the French were a stabilizing force, and the various economic and strategic resource opportunities the West would be afforded with continuing French control of their colonies.318 The American officials pointed out that while the economic opportunities appeared impressive, France needed to address real problems in their colonies if foreign investment was to be forthcoming.319 Interestingly, the Americans also grumbled that in any business dealings in France’s African colonies, no changes could be made without the permission of Paris, but did not appear concerned that this problem might also

316 See Memorandum on Visit to French Equatorial Africa and French Cameroon of Mason B. Sears, U.S. Delegate to U.N. Trusteeship Council, Undated, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia, Part one, 245-247. 317 Memorandum of Conversation, by Jerome R. Lavallee of the Office African Affairs, May 14, 1954, Washington, in in FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia, Part one, 247; Mayall, Africa: The Cold War and After, 87. 318 Memorandum of Conversation, by Jerome R. Lavallee of the Office African Affairs, May 14, 1954, Washington, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia, Part one, 248-249. 319 Included in the issues raised by the Americans was the (correct) perception among Africans and the wider world that Metropolitan France treated its colonies’ resources as reserves for itself rather than for mutual growth. See Memorandum of Conversation, by Jerome R. Lavallee of the Office African Affairs, May 14, 1954, Washington, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia, Part one, 249-250. 123

be a wider source of frustration for the indigenous populations.320 Nonetheless, as was made clear by discussions at NSC meetings, including one presided over by Nixon, while the administration was cognizant of, and willing to indulge to a point the push among Arab and

African peoples for greater self-determination, the policy and position of the administration remained one of encouraging colonised people to work with the French to find a mutually acceptable middle position rather than attempting to push France aside.321

Britain too was the subject of complaints and criticisms by many in the administration, including Eisenhower. Eisenhower wrote to Churchill on July 22 to address what Eisenhower considered to be an important proposal on colonialism.322 The President portrayed his proposal as a pragmatic virtue turned from a necessity, telling Churchill that “colonialism is on the way out…the sole question is one of time and method…we should handle it so as to win adherents to

Western aims.”323 Eisenhower’s arguments as to why Churchill needed to take clear and definitive steps towards decolonisation focused squarely on the fear that the Soviets were taking

320 Memorandum of Conversation, by Jerome R. Lavallee of the Office African Affairs, May 14, 1954, Washington, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia, Part one, 249. Although the exchange was in many ways quite similar to exchanges which had been occurring since the Truman administration, with the Americans arguing for some relatively minor changes which would better equip the Africans for eventual self-rule while the French claimed to understand the problems, there were some changes administration’s slow move away from viewing Africa through mostly political and economic lenses, to placing it more within the Cold War context, see Martin Thomas, “Defending a Lost Cause? France and the United States Vision of Imperial Rule in French North Africa,” Diplomatic History 26, No. 2 (Spring 2002), 216; Martin Thomas, “Innocent Abroad? Decolonisation and US Engagement with French West Africa, 1945–56,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36, No. 1 (March 2008), 66. 321 At the 213th Meeting of the NSC, the NSC was informed (without any objections being raised) that the administration’s position at the U.N. on the issues of Moroccan and Tunisian self-determination would be to allow such items on the agenda for discussion by the General Assembly, but to continue pushing for dialogue with France. See, Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, September 9, 1954, 1-8, 213th Meeting of the NSC, September 9 1954, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 322 Eisenhower awkwardly appealed to Churchill’s desire for a legacy, arguing that he was certain Churchill had “a very deep and understandable desire to do something special…in your remaining period of active service…” and while digressing to voice skepticism that Churchill could wrangle anything meaningful out of planned talks with Georgy Malenkov, eventually turned to the focus of the letter, namely that Churchill should effectively take steps to dismantle the British Empire. See Letter, Eisenhower to Churchill, July 22, 1954, 1-2, Churchill-July-December 1954 (1), Box 19, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 323 Eisenhower to Churchill, July 22, 1954, 2, DDEL. 124

advantage of the growing nationalistic movements in the colonised states, and the perception among those people and much of the rest of the world that the U.S. and its allies were not just unconcerned with, but actively thwarting the colonised peoples’ moves towards independence, only compounded the danger.324 Eisenhower admitted that none of his suggested moves would be anything more than technically beneficial to colonised peoples. He explained that although the potential announcement on a decolonisation program by Churchill would “electrify the world,” the prime minister could be sure that ”not a single one” of the colonised nations would actually seek independence, and that the concomitant anti-Soviet sentiment created by the announcement would both strengthen Western unity and gain the West more support globally.325

The importance of this letter went beyond the revelation that Eisenhower hoped to delay decolonisation until the late 1970s, and viewed the matter mostly of importance due to its potential to disrupt the balance between the Free and Soviet worlds,. Eisenhower treated the letter as all he could do to pressure the British while Churchill was in power.

Near the end of the year, Eisenhower wrote a letter to his friend, then Supreme Allied

Commander in Europe, General Al Gruenther, in part to wax on about the letter he wrote to

Churchill. Expanding on thoughts at which he had hinted in his letter to Churchill, Eisenhower argued to Gruenther the merits of his proposal for ending the colonial problems of nations like

France and England.326 Eisenhower stated colonialism should be “militantly condemned” by the states themselves, while those states should also offer independence to their colonial holdings

324 Eisenhower to Churchill, July 22, 1954, 2-3, DDEL. 325 Eisenhower also added that the U.S. would eagerly argue for the proposed decolonisation program on its own were it not for the fact that it would likely cause the perception of problems between the U.S. and U.K. See Eisenhower to Churchill, July 22, 1954, 3-5, DDEL. 326 Eisenhower was apparently particularly proud of the letter to Churchill, as he noted that he planned to show Gruenther the letter, telling Gruenther that it was “very long, and, of course, persuasive…” See Letter, Eisenhower to Gruenther, November 30, 1954, 1, DDE Diary November 1954 (1), Box 8, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 125

and insist that such proto-states undergo a twenty-five year training period in which their people would gain the “intellectual and economic capacity” to rule themselves.327 Further, Eisenhower argued that since after twenty-five years the “mother country” would no longer shoulder any economic or political burden, the peoples in the colonised nations would behave “much like ours with Puerto Rico,” meaning that those peoples would be too intimidated by the costs and risks of independence and would “insist upon retaining their connections with the mother country.”328 In closing this topic, Eisenhower bemoaned that Churchill had not seen the wisdom of his words, but made no hint of any independent action or additional pressure. Eisenhower was also especially reluctant to push the British too hard in the Middle East.

Eisenhower and Dulles attempted to continue to secure the Middle East in such a way as to keep Soviet influence out, keep leaders not aligned to Western interests from gaining significant influence, and to balance local (Middle Eastern) interests with both international and domestic demands. The issue for Eisenhower was effectively that he attempted to have his cake and eat it too: Eisenhower hoped to create as little long-term direct U.S. commitment to the region as possible and yet was constantly both interfering with and being drawn into issues in the region. Part of this problem stemmed from the Anglo-American relationship. It would be an exaggeration to portray the Anglo-American relationship in the area as a partnership; however, it is fair to describe the first few years of the Eisenhower administration as carrying with them the problematic expectation that the British would (and could) maintain stability and work towards

“Western” goals, as defined by the Americans, in the Middle East. Eisenhower stated plainly

327 Eisenhower to Gruenther, 2, DDEL. 328 Eisenhower to Gruenther, 2, DDEL. 126

that “the British should continue to carry…major responsibility for its stability and security.”329

The key difficulty with this thinking was that the Eisenhower administration continued to take steps which pointed to a near total lack of faith in British leadership of the region but which also failed to move to create or support a viable alternative.

The administration’s policies in the region in this regard suffered both from a lack of focus and a lack of urgency. Addressing the NSC early in the year, Nixon spoke on Iran and complained the British were slowing progress and failing to “get on the team” over the continuing oil dispute.330 The administration had focused much of the attention it paid to Iran on settling the issue of the control, development, and distribution of Iran’s oil, with Dulles, Attorney

General Herbert Brownell, and officials in various departments consulting one another.331 The problem was that the administration was giving little attention to other issues in Iran, such as its economic, military, and governing challenges. Nixon, U.S. Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Henry Byroade had been raising concerns since late 1953 that the administration had no plan in place for the period after emergency aid measures for Iran expired, and that it also lacked solid plans for general economic and military aid in any case; in short, the administration had no plan in place to support post-

329 Eisenhower went on, pointing out his administration’s significant commitments and involvement in South East Asia and Iran. See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 22-23. 330 Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, 17-18, DDEL. 331 For example, in mid-January, Brownell contacted the NSC to inform them that no violation of anti-trust laws would occur if the administration required American companies be included in a proposed international consortium dealing with Iran’s oil. Brownell’s memo is also noteworthy for the fact that Brownell managed to express the above in a legalese morass in a single sentence containing well over 150 words. See Memo, The Attorney General to the National Security Council, January 20, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran 1951-1954, Glennon et al. eds (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 901. For Dulles consulting on the same, see Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, January 21, 1954, FRUS, 1952- 1954, Volume X, Iran 1951-1954, 905. 127

Mosaddegh Iran.332 Indeed, Nixon also argued in the NSC meeting that by taking a leading role in the coup, the administration was now obligated to support Iran, stating that the U.S. needed to take steps to strengthen the Shah and Zahedi’s position; Nixon contended these two would cooperate with U.S. wishes, but, more importantly, pointed out that “This government in Iran is ours.”333 However, Eisenhower felt little more was needed as he considered the coup itself to have provided the kind of stability that rendered minimal the obligation to his administration.

That Eisenhower had ignored the variety of issues which had led to Mosaddegh’s popularity, that he failed to consider the long-term impact of the coup, and that in 1954 he considered the problems in Iran to have been effectively resolved all point to his short-sighted pursuit of postponement. Indeed, Eisenhower wrote proudly near the end of 1954 to his brother that the situation in Iran from the previous year, which had been the greatest threat “that in recent years has overhung the free world” had been “largely, if not totally” resolved, contending that this had created a good deal of stability in the region.334 Eisenhower voiced no concerns over long-term issues, or problems that might cause greater challenges or instability in Iran.

This lack of forethought was also displayed when Dulles spoke to Eisenhower in April about the set of security agreements that coalesced into the Baghdad Pact nations, Arab-Israeli tensions, and increased aid to Iraq in a single short conversation. The main concern between the two was the domestic political ramifications of continuing the “present policy of impartiality” (in the Arab-Israeli conflicts), with both agreeing the administration should not be deterred by

332 Byroade noted in his memo to Dulles that Nixon and Henderson had been raising such concerns, and echoed them. See Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, December 23, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran 1951-1954, 855-856. 333 Nixon also expressed an aggressive hatred for Mosaddegh and his defiance, stating that “what he did to that country is enough to hang him” Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18, DDEL. 334 Letter, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edgar Eisenhower, November 8, 1954, 3, DDE Diary November 1954 (2), Box 8, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 128

“Zionist influence.”335 However, the administration consistently argued that Egypt was the key to Middle East stability, and yet there too Eisenhower and Dulles proceeded in a manner which failed to support fully the British, the Egyptians, or their own objectives.

Despite the importance the administration ascribed to Egypt, the reluctance to push the

British too far combined with a general inability to formulate and enact a well-articulated policy towards Egypt, or the Middle East in general, combined to frustrate Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s goals. For much of 1954, the administration was more comfortable “prodding” the British to treat the Egyptians “fairly” in the hopes of alienating neither, yet also hoped to avoid being seen as associating too much in favour of either party.336 Indeed, Dulles effectively waited for months while intermittently requesting the British sign off on the Eisenhower administration desire to extend aid to Egypt, both before and after Nasser openly took power.337

That such unclear and hesitant manoeuvres were going to cause problems for the administration’s goals was a point of significant concern for officials at lower levels. The lack of direct and clear communication from Eisenhower and Dulles meant that by the time Britain and

Egypt agreed on the future use of the Suez Canal and surrounding area, Egypt and Nasser’s expectations of American aid had been built up to the point that the package of aid actually

335 Turkey and Pakistan announced their mutual cooperation pact on April 2. Dulles made specific reference to the military assistance understanding with Iraq in this memo. Iraq and Turkey signed a military pact the following year, to which Pakistan, Iran, and the United Kingdom became members, forming the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), or, the Baghdad Pact. Memorandum of Conversation with President Eisenhower, Augusta, GA, April 19, 1954, Folder 13, Box 19, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 336 A few examples are indicative of this trend. Bedell Smith reported that the British only made the moves they did concerning Anglo-Egyptian relations at the beginning of the year because of the administration’s “prodding,” see Telegram, Assistant Secretary to Embassy in Cairo, January 21, 1954, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume IX, Part 2, The Near And Middle East, 2205-2206. At several stages in the development of the Anglo-Egyptian settlement, the British attempted to bring the Eisenhower administration in to the dealings, see Memo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, for the Secretary of State, March 19, 1954, in FRUS, The Near And Middle East, 2236-2238. 337 Memo, Secretary of State to the State Department, April 22, 1954, in FRUS, The Near And Middle East, 2263- 2264. 129

offered by the administration fell dismally short of expectations.338 Staff in the area and in

Washington at the Bureau level made the problem very simple for Dulles by the end of the year: if the administration expected Nasser to take up a pro-Western leadership role in the Middle East it had to both understand his position as leader of a post-colonial state, and actually show Nasser that the administration would strengthen his position domestically and regionally.339 Neither

Eisenhower nor Dulles was willing to risk appearing to ignore or push aside Britain, but they also hoped to maintain an American presence in the region, and so the administration waffled.

The administration’s lack of clarity and decisiveness in dealing with European powers in the

Third World was also shown in Indochina.

A significant factor in this vacillation was that most officials had come to the conclusion that France would most likely, but not definitely, be unable to maintain its grip on Indochina.

The most complicating factor was that most in the administration agreed that the United States had a commitment to Vietnam, and yet they were divided and uncertain as to whether that commitment could be fulfilled with or without the French. Dulles considered Nixon, recently returned from his extended mission, and his views and findings stemming from that mission to be insightful and persuasive enough that he gathered the heads of various bureaus and departments within the State Department for Nixon to provide them with a report on various

338 Dulles sent and received a series of telegrams to and from the American embassy in Egypt which indicated the disjuncture would have considerable detrimental effects. See, Telegram, Secretary of State to Embassy in Egypt, July 28, 1954; Telegram, Ambassador in Egypt to Department of State, July 31, 1954, in in FRUS, The Near And Middle East, 2289-2290. 339 Dulles noted that the Middle East continued to be, if not a weak point, a region requiring more attention from the administration, yet he largely failed to heed this advice. C.f. Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, December 21, 1954, 5-6, 229th Meeting of NSC, December 21, 1954, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, for the Secretary of State, December 31, 1954, in FRUS, The Near And Middle East, 2322-2323 130

topics, including Indochina.340 While emphasising the need for a positive public face, Nixon was also under no illusions that there was any realistic hope that the French were going to be able to stabilise Indochina. The vice president made a perceptive, if dire warning about where the situation was heading, arguing that since America would not and could not abandon Indochina it was integral to support the French and Vietnamese so that further American support and involvement did not become a necessity.341

Nixon made several important points on Indochina, and the reaction, or lack thereof, also warrants note. Nixon reported that officials from states bordering and in the vicinity of

Indochina, such as Thailand and Malaya, warned him that should the U.S. permit communist victory in Indochina, their own states would immediately become less stable and might be unable to cope with the oncoming increase in subversive activities.342 Nixon made a concise evaluation of the situation in Vietnam, stating “we have got our money in this pot; we have got to stick with it; we have got to talk optimistically for public consumption.”343 While the gathered heads questioned Nixon on a number of positions he took, not a single question or issue was raised concerning his arguments and findings on Indochina.344 Given Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s

340 Nixon had already presented his findings to the NSC in two different oral reports, thus there is good reason to believe Dulles’s sincerity when he described Nixon’s mission as “far more than just a goodwill mission” and when he labelled Nixon’s observations and judgements “wisdom.” See, Vice President Nixon’s Report to Department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East, January 8, 1954, 1, Box 69, OCBCF, WHO, NSCSF, DDEL. It is also worth noting that the transcript of the report remained classified until 2005, and that, as the cover note on the report makes clear: “special precaution should be taken to prevent it from getting into unauthorized hands.” 341 Vice President Nixon’s Report to Department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East, 10-13, DDEL. 342 Vice President Nixon’s Report to Department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East, 10-11, DDEL. 343 Vice President Nixon’s Report to Department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East, 10, DDEL. 344 Vice President Nixon’s Report to Department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East, 29-39, DDEL. The heads questioned Nixon’s more relaxed position on Indonesia, for example. Nixon held that while Sukarno and all Indonesians were “a bunch of shrewd traders” this should not cause a panic since the U.S. had no practical way of providing the kind of trade to Indonesia that it needed to survive and thrive, and which was available to it through trade with China. Nixon stated plainly that the State Department and administration had to be “a hell of a lot more tolerant” of such things than if other nations opened such trade. 131

comments at an NSC meeting in mid-January, Nixon’s comments about “sticking with it” underestimated the level of commitment the President and Secretary of State believed existed.

Eisenhower and Dulles believed that the administration could and should “solve” the problem in Vietnam, yet their solutions were often half-formed or deeply flawed. Nixon voiced doubts, hinting that their understanding of the entire struggle was flawed. In an odd exchange during an NSC meeting on January 14, Eisenhower showed great enthusiasm for a proposal offered by Dulles: to initiate an American sponsored guerrilla campaign in Vietnam should the

French withdraw and the pro-Western elements collapse. As the battle at Điện Biên Phủ raged on, Dulles argued that since the U.S. was not going to disentangle itself from Vietnam even if the

Vietminh achieved total victory and tossed the French out of the country, it would be wise to begin planning for the “relatively low” costs of funding an anti-Vietminh campaign so that “We can raise hell and the Communists will find it just as expensive to resist as we are now finding it.”345 Eisenhower enthusiastically supported Dulles’s idea, noting that he wished the Truman administration had implemented such an idea in respect to China due to the “very great role”

Russian guerrillas played in defeating the Germans during the Second World War.346 Beyond indicating the level of commitment the two felt existed, the proposal is also important for the issues which were raised by Nixon.

Hoping to avoid embarrassing or antagonising his superiors and his mentor, Nixon delicately attempted to point out the inherent flaw in Dulles’s plan, and the flaw itself is indicative of a larger problem in Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s concept of America and the Third

World. Nixon’s seemingly obvious point was that while Dulles’s point “had merit, he was not

345 Discussion at the 180th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 14, 1954, 10, 180th Meeting of NSC, January 14, 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 346 Discussion at the 180th Meeting of the National Security Council, 10-11, DDEL. 132

clear as to where we would find the guerrillas. ”347 The issue Nixon was speaking to was that the

Vietnamese would not fight a guerrilla war out of any yearning for a return to their treatment under the French, and were highly unlikely to fight such a war against their own countrymen simply because the U.S. thought it would be helpful in the fight against communism.348 And herein lies a clear weakness in Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s concept of America’s abilities, the impact of their interventionist tendencies, and their understanding of the relationship between local conditions in Third World states and the United States’s concept of the Cold War. While the discussion was clearly focused on potential actions, Eisenhower and Dulles both spoke as if in order to accomplish their covert goals, all that was needed was authorisation and resources.

Nixon’s warning made clear that he considered the drive for independence and nationalistic sentiments to be far more powerful motivators in areas like Vietnam than supporting the global struggle against Communism led by the U.S. Nixon recognised the dangerous premise operating behind Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s enthusiasm, that the United States could replace and do better than France simply by dint of functioning with American paradigms.

And yet, Eisenhower and Dulles continued to send mixed signals concerning their willingness to commit to greater support for France. On January 29, Eisenhower ordered the

French be provided with 22 B-26s, 200 maintenance personnel, and other personnel as well while placing clear conditions on further aid and turning down certain materiel requests.349 That

Eisenhower simply wanted the situation to stabilise in an anti-communist fashion is clear, but

Dulles was growing steadily frustrated with having to work with the French. As the year

347 Discussion at the 180th Meeting of the National Security Council, 11, DDEL. 348 Nixon did offer an alternative that proved prescient: if the French were removed but the region not entirely “lost” to communism, the U.S. could begin training and building up native Vietnamese forces to fight both for their nation and against communism. Discussion at the 180th Meeting of the National Security Council, 11, DDEL 349 Memo on Action of High-Level Committee on Indochina at January 29 Meeting, February 2, 1954, Reel 40 Declassification 2010, Box 10, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 133

progressed and the French position steadily deteriorated, Eisenhower and Dulles offered the possibility of larger-scale intervention, but only if France “internationalised” the conflict. This plan, labeled “mutual action” required a variety of factors, including British participation, before

Eisenhower would take the matter before Congress. And while Eisenhower genuinely supported at least taking the mutual action plan to Congress in the event the French, British, and other states met the various requirements he and Dulles set for American involvement in Vietnam, the

Secretary of State evinced a decreasing willingness to cooperate with the French in Vietnam.350

The fact that Dulles was proceeding in an intentionally vague and non-committal manner was not lost on members of the cabinet, including Nixon.

When the NSC met on May 20, Nixon asked Dulles a series of questions which indicated both that those within the administration were struggling with the lack of clarity in the U.S.’s moves towards the situation in Vietnam, and that Dulles was working to keep U.S. troops out of

Vietnam. Inquiring about the pre-conditions of U.S. intervention, Nixon asked Dulles whether the French were presented with the pre-conditions in a list, and then the administration simply waited for a response, or if the American ambassador in France was actually pressing them to meet the conditions.351 Dulles avoided answering the question by instead describing the manner in which discussions were held between the French and Americans; Nixon understood the tactic and the consequence of pushing too far on the topic and changed gears, asking Dulles to explain

350 Eisenhower sent Dulles a supportive memo after the Secretary complained to the President about dealing with the steadily deteriorating French Foreign Minister Bidault, in which Eisenhower pointed out that if only the French had taken the Americans’ earlier offer to support them more fully by asking for internationalisation of the war, and the British had not “shut their eyes” to the problem, the war might have proceeded differently. The point here is that if the offer was merely a gesture neither man intended to be called upon, Eisenhower would not have portrayed it as a genuine offer in a private communication. See Undated Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, 1, Folder 10, Box 5, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 351 Discussion at the 198th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 20, 1954, 12, 198th Meeting of NSC May 20, 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 134

what Premier Laniel would actually need to do in order to ask for U.S. participation, which allowed Dulles to point out that the French government was “so shaky that it could be easily overthrown.”352 The difficulty in working with the regularly changing governments of France only added to Dulles’s desire that the French work with the Americans, not the other way around.

Despite evidence to the contrary, Dulles shaped facts to suit his belief that if the administration was going to be in Vietnam, it would be in a position of leadership. An undated note taken by Nixon on a conversation he had with Dulles and the President suggests Dulles later explained exactly what his thinking on the matter was, and it points to Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s beliefs that only American leadership could save and solve Vietnam. The Secretary explained to

Nixon, that “the French won’t invite us in because they want to get out. We’d better let them get out,” suggesting that while the French would leave, the Americans would stay.353 Dulles also elaborated on this issue more openly during an NSC meeting in June, stating that he often pondered whether it would be better to simply “let the French get out of Indochina entirely and the rebuild from the foundations.”354 Dulles was at least partially shaping facts to fit his preferences. In June, only a week before he made the comment about rebuilding from the foundations, France’s ambassador to the United States attempted to pin down Dulles’s position on exactly what France actually needed to do in order to gain active U.S. military support.

Besides clearly contradicting the narrative Dulles was offering to Nixon and the NSC, the conversation is also important for how Dulles answered the questions posed by the ambassador.

Dulles executed painfully obvious, but effective, legal manoeuvring: the Secretary stated that

352 Discussion at the 198th Meeting of the NSC, 12-13, DDEL. 353 Handwritten Notes, [May-June 1954], Box 4, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 354 Discussion at the 202nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 17th 1954, 12, 202nd Meeting of NSC, June 17, 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 135

any offer of support the administration made was based on the “context of the situation” at the given time, and since the situation in Vietnam had and continued to change, this meant delays, reconsiderations, and so on.355 In short, Dulles equivocated and stalled.

At least some of Dulles’s evasive tactics were due to his belief that France simply would not or could not accept following American leadership in the Third World. This pre-requisite, that French officials acknowledge and adhere to American leadership, was impossible to insist upon before the Geneva Accords were finalised on July 21, but after that point Dulles felt more able to be insistent. The Geneva Accords themselves, or at least those sections of the accords which pertained to the situation in Vietnam, were something of a postponement as well.

Although the United States did not sign on to the Accords, which formalised a ceasefire, partitioned Vietnam at the 17th parallel, and called for a reunification election in July of 1956, the administration acknowledged that free elections should be the mechanism to reunify the nation.

Of course, the man the administration chose to put ever-increasing support behind, Ngô Đình

Diệm was (according to some historians), the figure most against such elections ever occurring.356

In the months before the full outbreak of the so-called “Sects Crisis” of 1955, Dulles and the State Department were locked in a conflict with the French government over the direction of

Vietnam’s new government. In August, irritated by perceived French moves to remove Diệm from power or push him towards a coalition government (which might include Viet Minh or

355 Eyes only Memo for Ambassadors in American Embassies in Saigon, London, and Paris, June 9, 1954, 2, Folder 10, Box 5, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 356 Pierre Asselin has shown, persuasively if not conclusively, that North Vietnam and its forces in the South sought to abide by the terms of the Geneva Accords despite immediate suspicions that the French, Americans, and South Vietnamese government under Diệm would never allow a free election. Indeed, Asselin argues that after the Geneva Accords, the North Vietnamese engaged in a non-militant hearts and minds campaign in the South specifically to gain a greater presence and support in anticipation of elections in 1956. See Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 13- 17. 136

supporters of the Viet Minh), then Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith ordered

American ambassadors in France and Vietnam to make clear that removing Diệm would result both in needless instability and cause America to withdraw any further aid.357 The next month,

Dulles sent a message to those same embassies which announced that the American presence in

Indochina was one of leadership, not bargaining and compromise with other players: Dulles informed the staffs that the French were going to pressure Emperor Bảo Đại to remove Diệm, but the Americans were not to take similar steps since it was beneath them to engage in “competitive bidding for imperial action,” and pointed out that the more prestige accorded to Bảo Đại, the more power and prestige was taken away from Diệm and the United States.358 That the administration had boldly stumbled into a situation it was incapable of handling became apparent almost immediately, but this did not result in reconsideration.

The seeming lack of direction or forethought in dealing with France and Indochina was a spot of considerable concern for many in the administration, especially Nixon. Nixon grappled to come to terms with what Dulles was doing, in large part because, as his notes indicate from the period just after Điện Biên Phủ fell, the Vice President was beginning to believe the administration was deluding its enemies, friends, and itself. Nixon’s concern was centered on the belief that Eisenhower had failed to deal with the situation in Vietnam properly; meaning if the president had targeted American resources on the people of Vietnam, and treated them as revolting for freedom and independence, a wholly more preferable outcome might have

357 Telegram, State Department to American Embassy in Paris and American Embassy in Saigon, August 27, 1954, 1-2, Folder 22, Box 4, JFDSD. JFDP, SML. 358 The telegram has the clear intent of laying out the Secretary’s position to embassy staff while also making clear that the objective of his manoeuvers was to isolate France and Bảo Đại’s influence. See Telegram, State Department to American Embassy in Paris and American Embassy in Saigon, September 15, 1954, 1-2, Folder 22, Box 4, JFDSD. JFDP, SML. 137

resulted.359 Nixon took a variety of notes on the topic, some of which he edited at an unknown later date. The edits were even more critical of Eisenhower and the administration: one note written during the final days of the siege at Điện Biên Phủ described how the battle there

“improved [the] chance for France to win elsewhere” with Nixon later writing over this line

“This Adm[inistration] line was totally unrealistic – Failed to face hard facts…” the importance of this edit is that Eisenhower was the source of the complaint about the French not using Điện

Biên Phủ as an opportunity to win elsewhere.360 Nixon believed that the correct combination and application of American resources and ideals could achieve noble and practical objectives, but he was also displaying frustration with the administration’s refusal to recognise the reality of the situation. Interestingly, Nixon was expressing these frustrations in a manner that strongly suggests the influence of Dulles.

As Nixon attempted to dissect the realities of what he considered America’s failure in

Indochina, he came to several conclusions and formulated several solutions for future problems in a manner which point to a synthesis of Dulles’s thinking and his own. Considering how the

U.S. should answer the challenge of Communist inspired or supported revolutions, after

“dedicated men” Nixon listed “great dynamic ideas” as the next most necessary element.361

Nixon explained what he meant by this, listing strong economies, equality, and respect for freedom as part of these dynamics; however, Nixon went a step further, venting frustrations with

359 See Handwritten Notes, 1954, May, Box 4, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 360 Given that Nixon had consistently held that France would not be able to maintain its position, it seems fair to conclude that the original note on the improved chances was the result of Nixon taking notes on a meeting or briefing on the topic rather than recording his own thoughts. And, given that Eisenhower made reference to France’s failure to capitalise on “opportunities elsewhere” in Vietnam during that April 6 meeting of the NSC, it is fair to conclude that Nixon’s criticisms centered on the President’s line of thinking. Cf. Discussion at the 192nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 6, 1954, 4-5, 192nd Meeting of NSC, April 6 1954, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL; Handwritten Note, 1954, May, PPS 325, RNL. 361 Handwritten Note, 1954, May, PPS 325, RNL. 138

the Eisenhower administration by placing a caveat on these factors that stated “we can’t raise the standards of the world – the world doesn’t expect us to – We can’t expect conformity.”362 Nixon strongly underlined the clause on not expecting conformity. The Vice President went on to list other important features of preserving a pro-American peace that expressed a combination of idealistic, religious, pragmatic, and legalistic drivers.363 Nixon was agitating for a clear, consistent, independent, and well thought-out American foreign policy in the Third World, but he was not the only member of the administration to note that while goals clearly existed, the means to achieve them had yet to be articulated.

The Challenges of Reaching a Destination without a map

Eisenhower and Dulles had difficulty articulating how the administration’s broad goal of a stable, anti-communist Third World would be achieved. Indeed, in many cases Eisenhower refused to provide such articulation. The result of this was that Eisenhower and Dulles tended to equivocate, stall, or in cases where action was taken, act in a vague, confusing (both internally and internationally), or half-measured fashion. While the administration had little trouble criticising European powers for their poor dealings with their colonial holdings, there was a clear reluctance under Eisenhower to even begin formulating American policies for many of Third

World regions.

Africa continued to garner little attention from the administration, to the extent that knowledge and awareness of U.S. policies for the region were almost non-existent above the bureau level. In March, Nixon annoyed the Policy Planning Staff when he voiced concern about

362 Handwritten Note, 1954, May, PPS 325, RNL. 363 For example, Nixon contended that pushing faith in God over atheism, creating situations in which only the most extreme elements felt alienated from their governments, and creating mechanisms to ensure fair allied governments as well as uniting these allies actively against communism were all means to creating a stable, and pro-Western peace. See Handwritten Notes, 1954, May, PPS 325, RNL 139

both the lack of information on “the entire continent” of Africa and the fact that he was unaware of any policy the administration had for the continent or what might be done there.364 Nixon encountered a good deal of reluctance and intransigence when he broached the subject of changes to the nearly non-existent policies; this was due in no small part to the difficulty members of the Eisenhower administration perceived in creating a new policy which would neither alienate their European allies nor further frustrate discontent Africans. The simplest explanation for why the U.S. was doing, and planned to do very little in Africa was encapsulated by Harry Schwartz’s comment that the U.S.’s Africa policy was “good enough until someone produces a better one.”365 In addition, although some within Eisenhower’s staff, such as Robert

Cutler, were concerned with the lack of even clear goals for the administration in Africa, the proposed remedies for these problems often seemed more of a step backwards.366

Eisenhower and Dulles also intermittently discussed Africa, but the concern was sporadic, and more budgetary than diplomatic. In May, Dulles and Eisenhower corresponded briefly in the lead up to Ethiopia’s Emperor’s goodwill visit to the United States. Both Dulles and the briefing he attached for Eisenhower noted that the Ethiopians were likely to request a slight increase to the military aid they were receiving. Dulles argued against such an increase since Ethiopia had already received $5 million worth of such aid, and the briefing pointed out

364 Harry H. Schwartz complained that Nixon had “apparently mentioned” his concerns to General Robert Cutler, and thus an entire session was to be devoted to exploring options. See Memorandum by Harry H. Schwartz of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director, Policy Planning Staff (Bowie), Washington, March 2, 1954, in FRUS, 1952- 1954, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia, Part one, 97. Given that the Supreme Court was deliberating the Brown v. Board of Education case at the time, Nixon’s concern and linkage of domestic racial issues with foreign policy was not coincidental. See James H. Meriwether, “A Torrent Overrunning Everything: Africa and the Eisenhower Administration,” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds., (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006), 180. 365 Harry H. Schwartz of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director, Policy Planning Staff (Bowie), Washington, March 2, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, Part one, 97. 366 Cutler, for example, believed that dividing the administration’s attention in Africa into geographic areas was problematic, however his solution was not to adapt a nation-by-nation approach, but to attempt to address “all of Africa.” See Meriwether, “A Torrent Overrunning Everything,” 180. 140

that while Selassie had offered to join a Middle East defense organization or help the U.S. in almost any way, Ethiopia was already stable and firmly on the U.S.’s side, hence more aid was not necessary.367 A contradiction in Dulles’s logic arose when Eisenhower wrote to him on

November 5 to follow up on an issue which arose during a meeting with other officials in the administration on November 2, a subsidised air route to South Africa.

Eisenhower’s concern was that the State Department had fought to continue the air route, despite its cost of $2 million dollars annually, and demanded Dulles provided the main reasons for the State Department’s position.368 Part of the justification for the route was, unsurprisingly,

South Africa’s uranium, on which both the Department of Commerce (which played a role in raising the initial concern over the route) and the Civil Aeronautics Board agreed with the State

Department, regarding it as a resource to which at the very least Soviet access needed to be denied.369 In his detailed response to Eisenhower’s inquiry, Dulles made several revealing points.

Dulles’s explanation reveals that he was more concerned with the primacy of the State

Department than with African policy points. Dulles provided economic justifications for the air route, which both challenged the Department of Commerce’s numbers and posited that although the subsidy was necessary at that moment, it would become unneeded at an approaching, but

367 Both the memo and the briefing prepared for Eisenhower by General Paul Carroll, hinted that while greater aid to Ethiopia might have benefits, limited resources would be better spent elsewhere. Paul Carroll, who apparently also gave Eisenhower an oral briefing on Ethiopia, felt he had misled the President, and scribbled a note on the briefing noting “officially, there is no slavery in Ethiopia, and Selassie has taken strong steps to eradicate it.” The point here is that while Eisenhower was clearly receiving information, it was obviously neither well-researched nor clearly communicated. See Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 25, 1954, Dulles, John Foster May 1954 (1), Box 3, DHS, AWF, DDEL; Summary of United States-Ethiopian Relations, 1-2, Dulles, John Foster May 1954 (1), Box 3, DHS, AWF, DDEL 368 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, November 5, 1954, Folder 10, Box 3, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 369 Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Commerce, November 4, 1954, Folder 10, 1-3, Box 3, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 141

unnamed, future date: this addressed Eisenhower’s concern about wasting resources.370 Dulles went further, and argued that several nebulous factors, such as the administration’s influence and prestige in Africa had been “materially enhanced” by the continuation of the air route.371 The

Secretary also argued that as American influence, technology, and investment spread via the air route, so too was the continent made more able to thwart “antagonistic pressures,” meaning of course Communism; Dulles argued that cutting funding would have a series of “deleterious effects” in that not only would it reverse the trend of acknowledging the growing importance of

Africa, but it would enable greater Soviet influence.372 And yet, Dulles was not advocating an expansion of funding, new air routes, or more programs for the continent, despite its apparently growing importance. Dulles was simply defending his department’s existing programs. This meant that in South Africa and Ethiopia, Dulles and Eisenhower chose stasis, indicating that

Africa’s priority was still so low that the most the administration was willing to do was stand still.

And while Africa was and continued to be the starkest example of the lack of well thought-out long term planning on the administration’s part, other regions, like Latin America also revealed that a lack of guidance and leadership only exacerbated the challenges of achieving objectives. Indeed, even when attention to other matters was sacrificed, the administration still had difficulty coordinating and communicating clearly both internally and internationally. Many in the administration were fully cognizant of the fact that a good number of Latin Americans and

Latin American governments had genuine concerns about economic issues and American

370 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, November 22, 1954, 1, Folder 10, Box 3, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 371 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, November 22, 1954, 1 SML. 372 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, November 22, 1954, 1, SML. 142

actions, however, Eisenhower and Dulles considered these concerns far less important than the administration’s objectives, namely keeping the region free of communist subversion.

The problem was that Eisenhower and Dulles regularly shifted positions on how, and sometimes if, to address concerns. On January 12, Eisenhower wrote to Dulles explaining that his brother Milton had provided some supplemental information which suggested that “a very small loan…or grant on our part might reap very definite and extensive advantages for us.”373

Dulles dutifully consulted with the Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, and by March

4, a report was presented to the cabinet detailing the suggested alterations to the policy needed to implement changes recommended by Milton Eisenhower. Before this cabinet meeting, however,

President Eisenhower shifted positions.

Dulles actually believed that if addressing economic concerns could garner more support for anti-communism among Latin Americans, then some accommodations should be made.

Speaking at the cabinet meeting on February 26, before departing for the tenth Inter-American

Conference at Caracas (IAC), Dulles commented that he understood the Latin Americans would try to make economic issues the focus of the conference, but that he would insist on securing “a strong anti-Communist resolution” while being as reassuring and non-committal on economic issues as he could manage.374 Still, connected to this, and playing off a comment made by

Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Dulles argued that some action on the

U.S.’s part was necessary; he pointed out that legislation was pending which would make more

373 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, January 12, 1954, January 1954, Box 2, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 374 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, February 26, 1954, 3, Cabinet Meeting of February 26, 1954, Box 3, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 143

loans available to Latin American states and argued the administration should support such legislation as a pro-active anti-communist measure.375

This was a divergence from the basic position the administration had been preparing for the IAC. The administration had planned, at least as early as 1953, to gain an Organization of

American States (OAS) resolution which could be used as a legal justification or even a symbolic call for the administration removing Árbenz. Although failing to procure such a resolution likely would have done little to restrain the administration, Eisenhower and Dulles tended to treat the OAS as a useful tool for bolstering the administration’s position when such bolstering was needed. State Department officials had long warned that the administration was in a precarious position in push for an anti-communist resolution, not only because such a resolution had obvious interventionist underpinnings but also because the administration was unwilling and unable to offer any reform on matters which Latin American states desired.

Indeed, as the U.S. representative on the OAS Council, John Dreier noted, the administration remained “without any new policy in the major field of Latin American interest, namely, economic affairs.”376 Dulles’s attempt to address, however slightly, Latin American states’ economic concerns is thus important as it shows Dulles pushing for a more responsive and active policy.377

375 Lodge had noted that while European states vacillated in their support of American proposals at the U.N., Latin American nations typically followed the U.S.’s lead. Dulles contended that Latin America was in a similar state to China in the 1940s, and that immediate aid could make the difference between a communist or friendly region. See, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, February 26, 1954, 3, DDEL. 376 Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January 4, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, The American Republics, 264-265. 377 Dreier also noted that the types of concerns most highlighted by Latin American officials concerned tariffs and the availability of aid and loans, complaints and concerns that were raised again and again throughout Eisenhower’s time in office. See Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January 4, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics, 265. 144

However, with the spectre of greater expenditures raised, Eisenhower stepped into the fray. In yet another reversal of their positions, when Dulles began hinting at increasing aid,

Eisenhower moved to undercut the Secretary of State by pointing out unresolved issues. While it might be pushing too far to suggest that Eisenhower derailed the conversation, immediately following Dulles’s comment on the desirability and necessity of greater access to loans, the president brought up the subject of Mexican workers illegally entering the U.S., bemoaning spending funds on “detecting atomic bombs, for guarding the Port of New York…when the long

Mexican border lies open.”378 This new line of discussion set Dulles off balance, as he was forced to focus on pointing out that border issues involved the State Department, and that unilateral moves which would alienate Mexican officials, should be avoided.

None of this is to suggest Dulles took a progressive or genuinely multi-lateral approach in his understanding or treatment of Latin American states. In fact, Dulles was quite clear with the

NSC upon his return from the Caracas Conference as to his views on Latin American states and their position. Dulles informed the NSC “the conception of the Monroe Doctrine…” he had had formed “the background for the anti-Communist resolution…”379 Dulles clarified that the anti- communist resolution was “an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to include the concept of outlawing foreign ideologies in the American republics.”380 Dulles noted that Latin American representatives had been reluctant to support the resolution, admitting that states like Uruguay had convincingly argued that dictatorships were a more present threat in Latin America than

378 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, February 26, 1954, 4. 379 Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 18, 1954, 3, 189th Meeting of the NSC, March 18 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL 380 Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the NSC, 3, DDEL. 145

communism, while others had pointed out the obvious; that the resolution “was nothing but a pretext to permit American intervention into the internal affairs of the other republics…”381

Still, the more important point of Dulles’s report was that he considered the anti- communist resolution passed by the OAS to serve not only as an implicit recognition of the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine by the Eisenhower administration, but also as an authorisation to extend that doctrine to control over the political and economic structure of Latin American states. More simply, Dulles considered the administration’s pre-existing presumed power to intervene in Latin American affairs to then include authorisation by Latin American states to intervene against communism. That the administration had pursued such authorisation while consciously avoiding the drive by Latin American officials to address economic concerns points, among other factors, to the position of dominance the administration considered itself to hold over those states. In addition, such attention to details involving the plot to remove Guatemala’s leader while paying decidedly less attention to other concerns was an ongoing feature of the administration.

In May, reporting on the coup in Paraguay that eventually resulted in the ascension of the long-ruling Alfredo Stroessner, Dulles attached the notification of the coup behind a memo detailing the matter of a Guatemalan plane landing in Honduras without authorization.

Eisenhower clearly considered the Guatemalan matter of greater concern, as he scribbled “O.K.” in response to Dulles’s request for permission to recognise the new Paraguayan regime due to the appearance it would continue to support the U.S, and requested further information on the

Guatemalan-Honduras matter.382 Specifically, Eisenhower wanted to know if Dulles could

381 Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the NSC, 3, DDEL. 382 See Memos, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 11, 1954, Dulles, John Foster May 1954 (2), Box 3, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 146

inform other Latin American states of the administration’s plan in the event Guatemala attacked

Honduras; Dulles explained that while technically the administration could respond with whatever military assistance it saw fit if Honduras was attacked, this would create an undesirable precedent to inform other OAS nations of the U.S.’s plan to aid militarily a state, which might embolden or embitter states which had previously requested such a pledge, like Uruguay.383

This should not be taken to suggest that Dulles was showing reluctance toward the coup, only that neither he nor Eisenhower had yet formulated an acceptable next step in dealing with the Guatemalan situation while the coup plot moved forward. There were of course multiple reasons for the administration’s concern over Guatemalan-Honduran tensions. The loss of prestige for the administration that would occur if a communist nation in the Western

Hemisphere attacked an ally would be immeasurable; the loss would be deepened if the administration stood by without a plan for such an attack; and, of course, Honduras was serving as a staging and training area for the purposes of those exiles and mercenaries taking part in the coup’s planning and execution.384 The focus on minute details related to the coup plot was indicative of a key challenge for top officials in Eisenhower’s cabinet in that crises (real, imagined, and constructed) tended to distract from the less urgent issues like formulating long term policies. Thus, coming up with the next step to meet a looming crisis took priority over long term planning.

Dulles came up with the next step for dealing with Guatemala’s President, Jacobo Árbenz

Guzmán before the coup took place, and was able to persuade Eisenhower to support this step

383 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 17, 1954, Dulles, John Foster May 1954 (2), Box 3, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 384 These are neither novel nor contentious points, all having been and continuing to be made by scholars. See Roberto Garcia Ferreira, “The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign” Journal of Third World Studies 25, No. 2 (Fall 2008), 61; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 52-54; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984), 119-121. 147

despite its clearly problematic nature. In a meeting with Eisenhower and other officials on May

22, Dulles argued, and gained approval for the plan which Eisenhower addressed at that week’s

NSC meeting.385 Speaking at the May 27 meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower managed some impressive intellectual contortions in regards to the situation in Guatemala and Dulles’s proposed plan. Eisenhower was able to prod Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. into agreeing that although technically illegal or an act of war, the United States could intercept ships bound for

Guatemala believed to be carrying arms if it was a matter of self-defence or self-preservation.

The result was that the “President…specifically to defend the Panama Canal” authorised the

Navy to conduct such interceptions.386 The next day, NSC 5419/1 was approved, which, in addition to the above, also established as policy that the United States would treat any attack by

Guatemala on another state as an attack on the United States.387 The frenzied nature of tying up loose ends in anticipation of the coup resulted in further slapdash decision making.

In a display of just how little communication and coordination occurred even at the departmental level, and how quickly positions could change, Eisenhower and the NSC were forced to deal with potentially embarrassing developments in the lead up to the coup. Dulles complained at the June 17 meeting of the NSC that the Attorney General and the Justice

Department’s quest to initiate anti-trust cases against American companies operating in

385 The plan itself will be dealt with hereafter, the only point of note is that Eisenhower’s only requested change to the plan Dulles proposed was that friendly nations be notified when the plan was about to become active. See Notes of Conference with the President, 9:15 a.m., May 22. 1954, 3, Folder 13, Box 19, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 386 None, including Eisenhower, offered an explanation as to how Guatemalan armed forces might be able to steamroll through Honduras, or El Salvador and Honduras, and Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, or how Guatemala might launch a successful amphibious assault, but then none of these were ever a genuine concern. See Discussion at the 199th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 27, 1954, 6-8, 199th Meeting of NSC May 27 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 387 While the policy paper recommended that American forces be utilised unilaterally only as a last resort, it also created a system in which Eisenhower merely had to be asked by a Latin American leader for help dealing Guatemalan aggression before the administration could respond with military force. See NSC 5419/1 U.S. Policy in the Event of Guatemalan Aggression in Latin America, May 28, 1954, NSC 5419, Box 11, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, WHO, OSANSA, DDEL. 148

important regions, specifically oil companies in the Middle East and the United Fruit Company in Latin America, had the potential to inflict “terrible repercussions” on the administration’s foreign policy objectives.388 Eisenhower urged the Attorney General to proceed with the suit, both because it appeared United Fruit had violated the law and because, as Brownell reported,

United Fruit refused to accept any compromise.389 Dulles then swung to the other side of the debate, by concluding that it would be beneficial to institute the suit simply to dissuade various

Latin American nations that the “sole objective of the United States [sic] foreign policy was to protect the fruit company.”390 And, as the NSC agreed that United Fruit had, in fact, been acting illegally, Allen Dulles requested that the Justice Department simply delay initiating the case.

The younger Dulles’s reasoning was as pragmatic as his brother’s about-face: if United Fruit was taken to court for acting illegally, this would “support the position which Árbenz had taken” and, he reminded the NSC, that “the situation in Guatemala” would be “clarified” within a month.391 Importantly, Allen Dulles spoke of Latin American states taking action against United

Fruit’s illegal activities in positive terms, arguing that “given a little more time the…states would do Justice’s job for it.”392

There are a variety of reasons this conversation warrants closer attention. The importance of Allen Dulles’s seemingly casual line is that it suggests not only that the CIA and others in the administration recognized the problems which the unfair economic practices of

American businesses like United Fruit caused for the administration, but considered local actions

388 Discussion at the 202nd Meeting NSC, 7, DDEL. 389 Eisenhower’s comments followed Secretary Wilson demanding to know what laws United Fruit had “supposedly” violated and being answered with “several illustrations.” Discussion at the 202nd Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 390 Discussion at the 202nd Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 391 Discussion at the 202nd Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 392 Indeed, the NSC resolved to have the Attorney General wait a month before beginning proceedings. See Discussion at the 202nd Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 149

taking steps against such practices as acceptable so long as those states remained (or in

Guatemala’s case, became) stridently aligned to the U.S. and anti-communism. The Dulles brothers, and everyone else at the meeting, failed to consider that if Latin American nations believed the administration’s policies to be put forward in the interest of United Fruit, and those same nations were angry enough at United Fruit that the company was about to lose enough of its power and resources that an anti-trust case would no longer be necessary, perhaps the timing of an anti-trust case was not the administration’s most significant issue.

The cabinet meeting with Milton Eisenhower on March 4 suggested that officials were aware of problems in the administration’s dealing with Latin America, but that they either did not know how, or did not believe it necessary, to make changes. The younger Eisenhower spoke to the cabinet in a manner likely only permissible to the President’s brother, as he argued that the cabinet needed to “make up its mind that Latin America is important to the United States,” continuing that “timely action was required to prevent communism from spreading seriously beyond Guatemala.”393 Again, a basic goal: anti-communism, but when the discussion turned to how best to achieve it, only marginal headway was made. Nixon and Bedell Smith argued briefly over the construction of the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala, with Nixon arguing for the benefits of advancing construction “despite the political situation there” and Smith insisting that it was “more desirable to make first efforts in countries friendly to the United

States.”394 Broadly, funding to individual programs was increased slightly, and Dulles prepared a statement acknowledging that some potential projects might be necessary for the prosperity of

393 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 5, 1954, 2, Cabinet Meeting March 5, 1954, Cabinet Series, Box 3, AWF, DDEL. 394 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 5, 1954, 2, DDEL. 150

Latin American nations which would never be “suitable for or attractive to private capital.”395

The important twist was that Dulles made certain to word the statement in such a way that created the appearance of loosening the restrictions of the Export-Import Bank and the

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, but allowed the administration to continue to utilise the banks as instruments “of national policy” so that the administration could rigidly define what did, and did not warrant funding.396 While Dulles clearly expected to maintain a strong role in deciding where resources were expended, he was not blind to the need for changes in the way the administration dealt with foreign economic issues. Here too, however, he and Eisenhower were unable to agree on, let along implement long-term planning.

Nevertheless, Dulles understood and shared Eisenhower’s abhorrence of, in their view, giving away money to fight communism when other means were available, but the two could not agree on what constituted a giveaway versus a wise expenditure or investment; and this too retarded policy development. On April 4 Dulles spoke in optimistic terms before the House

Foreign Affairs Committee on Latin American issues. Dulles had just returned from what he considered a heartening sign of unity at the IAC, announced two major developments concerning the region: first, that the resolution declaring the ascension to power of communism in any one state a threat to all states had passed with all but Guatemala’s approval, and second, stressed that the administration would emphasise training and information programs for Latin America while

395 The authors of the report acknowledged that the January 12 memo to Dulles was the impetus for the report and re-evaluation. For the specifics of the proposed funding increases, such as the additional eight million dollars for the Inter-American Highway, or the forty thousand dollars for student exchange programs see Table “Implementation of Milton Eisenhower Report,” Suggested Steps for the Implementation of the Report to the President: U.S.-Latin American Relations, Cabinet Meeting March 5, 1954, Cabinet Series, Box 3, AWF, DDEL. The total amount of increased funding was $17,500,000. See Tentative Agenda for the Cabinet Meeting, March 5, 1954, Cabinet Meeting March 5, 1954, Cabinet Series, Box 3, AWF, DDEL. 396 The precise wording of the statement created ample room for the U.S. to exercise discretion, giving the banks the ability to deny “special category” requests for funds that were insufficiently “in our common interest…economically sound...within the borrowing capacity of the requesting government and within the prudent loaning capacity” of the bank. See Suggested Steps for the Implementation of the Report to the President, 1-Attachment A, DDEL. 151

pushing those states to focus on attracting American “private enterprise” rather than government funds.397 Dulles and Eisenhower shifted positions on foreign economic policy, muddling the issue and making long-term planning next to impossible and far from precise.

Indeed, in comparison to the hectic scramble to deal with the challenges of the

Guatemalan coup, Eisenhower took an almost lackadaisical attitude to non-crisis Latin American issues. Eisenhower tended to rankle against suggestions that his policies were insufficient, or that his perspective was flawed, and this was displayed at the cabinet meeting on December 3.

When Secretary George Magoffin Humphrey commented that Latin American states would become jealous if the Eisenhower administration continued to enter into “lavish” schemes everywhere in the world other than Latin America, Eisenhower angrily demanded Humphrey explain what he meant by “lavish,” and then argued that by protecting America’s interests abroad, his administration was ipso facto protecting Latin American interests.398 Secretary of

Defense Charles Wilson suggested that the situation might be ameliorated if economic aid and military aid were “tied together” as a means to deal both with Latin Americans’ primary concern and to hopefully gain the necessary funding from Congress.399 Eisenhower, undeterred, argued the true solution was not “outright grants” but a series of meetings, at indeterminate dates, with

Latin American leaders to encourage them to take up postures more likely to attract “the flow of private capital.”400 Again and again, unless a matter was one of crisis, Eisenhower described goals and vague objectives but was unable to explain, articulate, or consistently maintain a

397 As he often did, Dulles sent a copy of this speech to Nixon for his protégé’s perusal. See Statement by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 5, 1954, 6, 1954 Mar-Apr, Box 1, John Foster Dulles Speeches etc., PPS 322, RNPPM, RNL. 398 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, December 3, 1954, 4, Cabinet Meeting of December 3, 1954, Box 4, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 399 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, December 3, 1954, 4, DDEL. 400 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, December 3, 1954, 4, DDEL. 152

position on, let alone firmly decide how the administration might achieve them. In private,

Eisenhower explained the basic difference between his treatment of Latin American states and non-Latin American states, and shed light on the rather rudimentary level of his positions and perspectives therein:

In the case of South America, we want to establish a healthy relationship that will be characterised by mutual cooperation…which will permanently endure. This will apply whether or not the Communist menace seems to increase or decrease in intensity. In Asia we are primarily concerned with meeting a crisis, establishing firm and friendly governments, and making certain that…Indochina and the surrounding islands…do not fall into Communist hands. If the Communist menace should recede…we would…still friendly…feel largely relieved of any obligation to help them…401

However, this suggests the administration had a far clearer plan of how it was going to proceed in Asia to strengthen friendly and potentially friendly states than in Latin America; it did not. Indonesia is a helpful example, as the administration had concerns about the nation’s stability and alignment, yet was uncertain of how to proceed, resulting in half-measures and stalling. Eisenhower attempted some measures to engage with Indonesia economically, proposing to purchase tin from Indonesia for the express purpose of stockpiling it, both to help

Indonesia and to control any disruption to the related domestic American industries.402 Still,

Eisenhower was unwilling to do much more despite being convinced more should be done.

Indeed, a reluctance to do more to accommodate allies or alter positions was fairly ubiquitous when dealing with Third World allies. At an emergency meeting called mostly to address the

401 Letter, Dwight Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, December 1, 1954, 1, DDE Diary December 1954 (2), Box 8, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 402 Eisenhower also stated that he was simply a proponent of stockpiling materials like tin as one could never be certain when a need for such things might arise, and given their finite nature, the more the U.S. controlled, the better. Discussion at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 21, 1954, 16-18, 181st Meeting of NSC, January 21, 1954, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 153

looming Taiwan Straits Crisis but coming directly after the signing of the Manila Pact, which brought the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) into being, Dulles stated plainly that other nations had wanted SEATO to have certain qualities and features, but since these “did not fit U.S. policy” he refused such requests and suggestions.403 But, to return to Indonesia, it was clear that despite stark disagreement and obvious concern, the administration was unable to formulate a plan.

Nixon openly stated that he was “not as pessimistic as some newspaper reporters and even some of our State Department people seem to be” on the topic of Indonesia.404 Indeed, while he acknowledged some disquieting elements as regarded communists, Nixon spoke with great confidence in Sukarno’s leadership, and stated that his greatest concerns were that while

Sukarno was solidly “the main card on our side” he had centralised so much power in himself that there were no other viable “strong men” or successors, that there was a distinct need to increase American training programs, and finally that the administration needed to take steps to address problematic trade policies.405 For his part, Dulles closed the year warning that Indonesia was a “serious unsolved problem of our national security policy” in that he considered it part of the administration’s Pacific “defensive arc” yet was concerned with its vulnerability to

403 Dulles also noted resistance among the states to the organization simply being an anti-communist security organization, and reported that he had sidestepped questions about economic aid and dealt delicately balancing colonial powers’ wishes with those of anti-colonial powers. Finally, after being questioned by Nixon, Dulles also reported on conversations with President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines, portraying Magsaysay as deferential, and anti-communist to the extent that “it would make your hair stand on end.” See Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the NSC, 1-5, DDEL. 404 Nixon noted his more optimistic perspective to both the NSC and State Department heads, but did not include the line about State Department officials when speaking to the NSC, likely striving to avoid conflict with Dulles. Cf. Vice President Nixon’s Report to Department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East, 5; Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, 10, DDEL. 405 Vice President Nixon’s Report to Department Officers on his Trip to the Near and Far East, 6-7, DDEL. Many of Nixon’s arguments echoed those of America’s ambassador in Indonesia Hugh Cumming, who consistently argued that Sukarno was an asset and the key to Indonesia’s stability. See McMahon, “’The Point of No Return’: The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia, 1953-1960,” 80-81. 154

Communist influence.406 This should not suggest that the administration was without ideas.

However, those ideas were often poorly informed, and even then often failed to gain much momentum. The issue of Pakistan and Afghanistan is helpful here.

In part owing to its extremely limited understanding of regional concerns, the administration stumbled when experimenting with possible policies. Nixon’s comments on

Pakistan at the beginning of 1954 point to what appeared to be a great warmth for an ally, as he stated before the NSC that “Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for. The people have less complexes than the Indians.”407 Yet, in a discussion near the end of the year focusing on the State Department’s contemplated increase in aid to Afghanistan to $30 million, quite different positions were revealed. Nixon, Eisenhower, and others strongly pushed the idea of

Pakistan and Afghanistan being made to join together in an anti-Soviet federation, with Nixon contending that only a very small element in Afghanistan truly opposed such a federation, and that with increased aid and more visits from Americans, such opposition might wane in the future.408 Allen Dulles, while supporting surreptitiously increasing aid, pointed out that the

Soviets “look on Afghanistan much as the United States did on Guatemala,” hinting that any obvious moves by the administration might result in a violent or overt response from the Soviets.

When Secretary Humphrey complained that increasing aid was problematic given that the

Soviets already provided more than the administration could reasonably match, and that some of the projects U.S. aid went to (such as building irrigation dams) were not useful to the sparsely

406 Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the NSC, 5, DDEL. 407 Nixon was short and to the point: he disliked Nehru, advised against placating or flattering him, and while acknowledging that Nehru and India had a great tradition of freedom and hence would “stay on our side,” that Nehru needed to be deprived of even the appearance of victory when it came to any matters involving the U.S see, Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, 17, DDEL. 408 Admiral Radford first broached the idea of increased visits by Americans, a proposal both Nixon and Eisenhower endorsed. See, Discussion at the 228th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 9, 1954, 10, 228th Meeting of the NSC, December 9, 1954, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 155

populated and in some areas nomadic Afghanis, Eisenhower offered the solution: make the nomads settle in areas the new dams provided with irrigation.409 Eisenhower then went further; when officials at the meeting pointed out that they, and the State Department’s Afghan specialists agreed that Afghanistan and Pakistan not only would not join in a federation, but even if they could, should not do so since it would almost certainly elicit a violent response from the

Soviets, the President stated “he was not so sure that he would be so quick to agree with these conclusions of the specialists.”410 Conversation on how to compel the two nations to join up against the Soviets continued until Foster Dulles stepped in.

Apparently having heard enough, Foster Dulles explained the situation to the President carefully, stating that the Soviets were investing heavily in building up Afghanistan economically and non-violently, but that if the administration attempted to remove Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere and place it within the American sphere by joining it to Pakistan, the

Soviets would be compelled to try to take it back through violence; and, in closing, Dulles reminded Eisenhower that Pakistan was far from a strong nation in its own right, thus “two weak countries don’t become any stronger by being joined together,” after which Eisenhower changed positions and agreed with Dulles.411 Eisenhower did not suggest strengthening Pakistan to the point that such a union might be possible or beneficial. And while this may simply suggest that

Eisenhower and Dulles were unable to formulate long-term policies due to a combination of difficulty and the perceived lack of urgency, they also stumbled when attempting to address immediate crises.

409 228th Meeting of the NSC, 11, DDEL. 410 228th Meeting of the NSC, 11, DDEL. 411 228th Meeting of the NSC, 11-12, DDEL. 156

The onset of the prolonged conflict that was eventually labelled as the First Taiwan

Straits Crisis obviously caused a great deal of concern in the administration, but its handling was also indicative of the stumbling approach the administration took to Third World challenges.

With Eisenhower and Dulles unable to attend the regularly scheduled Thursday meeting of the

NSC on September 9, Nixon presided as various Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries dealt with the beginnings of the crisis. This was an especially heated meeting, with arguments breaking out amongst members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Allen Dulles, and Walter

Beddell Smith. Nixon, Allen Dulles, Secretary Wilson, and Chief of Staff of the United States

Army, General Matthew Ridgway, all argued that defending the offshore islands was neither practical nor necessary in any reasonable estimation.412 Walter Bedell Smith, either naively or knowingly, misrepresented the absent Dulles’s position on the conflict before presenting his

“personal” (not the State Department’s) view on the conflict, supporting the position of

Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford, that the islands needed to be defended, and that failing to do so would be disastrous for both Formosa and the administration’s goals in Asia.413

Although it should be expected that various advisors and officials would not agree on how to deal with a crisis, the situation only worsened when Dulles and Eisenhower joined the fray.

412 Nixon asked Allen Dulles a series of leading questions which all pointed to a far less belligerent position, Dulles argued that the only way to actually deter the Communist Chinese from attacking would be to attack the mainland – which would activate the Sino-Soviet Pact and result in a Third World War – and this was not reasonable, and Ridgway argued that the offshore islands were not necessary for the defense of Formosa or the maintenance of U.S. interests, and thus a defense of the islands which in his opinion would require U.S. ground forces, was ridiculous. For his part, Secretary Wilson argued a line he held to consistently, that given the likely consequences of intervention, if the administration chose not to intervene at Điện Biên Phủ, it made little sense to intervene over the offshore islands. See Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the NSC, 1-8, DDEL. 413 Radford typically took an aggressive position. Bedell Smith’s citation of Dulles’ comments at a press conference as reflective of the Secretary’s true position is problematic for a number of reasons, not least of which being that Smith knew full well Dulles’s, as well as many prominent political figures’ private comments and advice on action were often in stark variance from his public comments. See Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the NSC, 12, DDEL. 157

One of the results of the growing crisis was an emergency meeting of the NSC, on

Sunday, September 12 at the Lowry Air Force Base in Denver, Colorado. Several officials began linking events and regions during the meeting as a means to feel out Eisenhower’s genuine position: Secretary of Defense Wilson argued that defending the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu held far greater risk of causing a general war than American involvement in defending Điện Biên Phủ would have, meaning the administration should not go to war over the islands if it was not willing to do so over Indochina. Eisenhower deflected the criticism by pointing out that Britain and other allies’ reactions had to be considered in Indochina.414

Eisenhower began to retreat to the position of warning his others advisers that some responses they were advocating meant going to war, when Dulles inserted himself in order to aid the

President. The Secretary argued that the Chinese were clearly trying to undermine the precarious stability of the region, and the options open to the U.S. if it was going to take immediate action were: go to war with only Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-Shek’s support; avoid hostilities entirely and undermine the confidence and stability of the region; or, the option which displayed the interworking idealism-Wilsonian-legalism of Dulles’s mind along with his ability to appeal to Eisenhower’s preference to delay decisions, the U.S. could study its options more carefully while appealing to the U.N.415

And while this basic sentiment carried the day, Stassen and Nixon again pointed out that a basic problem, that neither the NSC nor the President knew what the administration was actually going to do, meant that it might get trapped into certain positions or actions if things

414 Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 415 Dulles argued that the United Nations very purpose was to safeguard the peace of the world, and that therefore the NSC was duty-bound to bring the matter before that organization. Thereafter he launched into an explanation as to how appealing to the U.N. opened several avenues for the U.S., how the legal argument could be made, and how the administration could benefit by relying on certain clauses and articles. Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the NSC, 9-10, DDEL. 158

were not clarified. Eisenhower responded to this criticism not with an answer, but by ordering a statement be issued which expressed exactly the kind of vagueness the two worried about.416

The basic issue was effectively the same one that Eisenhower and Dulles faced elsewhere in the

Third World: they knew what they wanted, in this case to avoid war while saving face and maintaining a stable pro-West region, but were uncertain how to achieve it. By October,

Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon had come to the conclusion that if the U.S. was going to attack

China in order to defend the islands, a startlingly little amount of consultation with Congress was required. Owing largely to his belief that such responses needed to be made as quickly as possible, Eisenhower told Dulles that Congress should be informed the day before any attack was launched that “this is what we are going to do, we hope you will support the move.”417 And while the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty clearly indicated that the Quemoy and Matsu islands would not be defended, none within the cabinet believed this would resolve the crisis permanently.418 Of course at the end of the year, Dulles also made his famous statement that the administration would start to treat "atomic weapons as conventional weapons" in a press release near the end of the year.419 While Nixon endorsed “keeping the Communists guessing” he thought the administration was playing a needlessly dangerous game by simultaneously guessing

416 Eisenhower ordered a statement be released containing lines about the U.S. protecting its “vital interests” in the area through “appropriate measures” without defining the area or the measures. See Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the NSC, 12, DDEL. 417 Dulles consulted Nixon on such a position, with Nixon labelling it “dangerous and unnecessary” to consult with Congress any further in advance. See Telephone Call, Dulles to Eisenhower, October 5, 1954, Phone Calls June- Dec 1954 (2), Box 7, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 418 Article VI of the Treaty specifically left the islands out, but technically allowed for the U.S. and Taiwan to add them back in to the area covered by the treaty through mutual agreement. See Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Taiwan, Signed December 2, 1954. Dulles hinted as much when announcing the treaty, see Press Release of Joint Statement, December 1, 1954; Statements by John Foster Dulles and Foreign Minister George K.C. Yeh, December 2, 1954, Folder 1, Box 20, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 419 State Department Press Release, “Strategic Concept”, December 21, 1954, Re: Deterrent Strategy, Box 80, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 159

about its own plan.420 The criticism here is not that Eisenhower and Dulles failed to foresee the crisis, rather the criticism is that even when his closest advisers pushed for clarity and careful planning, Eisenhower chose to move in vague fits-and-starts that left long-term issues and stability unresolved. Cleary, even at the end of its second year, the Eisenhower administration was still uncertain, delaying, and experimenting in dealing with the Third World. This was not simply embarrassing and problematic internationally, as the administration’s failure to formulate and execute coherent Third World policies was also beginning to cause dissent and fracturing in

Eisenhower’s cabinet.

Growing Frustrations but Bulling Ahead

Eisenhower and Dulles were both aware of the fact that the administration’s ability to plan and execute longer-term policies was woefully inadequate. Eisenhower complained to

Dulles that although improved from previous administrations, the ability of the NSC and other bodies to actually undertake high-level long-term planning was lacking, too hurried, and insufficient.421 Eisenhower admitted that such problems were going to cause issues in his cabinet and with the administration’s policies, but felt that whereas unforeseeable crises needed to be dealt with as they arose, other aspects of foreign policy could and should be planned for in advance, and as such he empowered a planning committee to address the issue of foreign economic planning as soon as possible.422 Eisenhower could not imagine that he or Dulles could be at the root of the problem, believing that it had to be a bureaucratic or structural issue. And

420 See Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the NSC, 12, DDEL. 421 Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting with the President at the White House, July 7, 1954, 4:00 p.m., 2, Folder 13, Box 19, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 422 The report and recommendations was completed in late November, but its limited amount of copies were not disseminated to officials until January 1955. See Memo, Joseph M. Dodge to President Eisenhower, November 22, 1954, 1, 1955 Jan 1-10, Box 5, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 160

yet, the criticisms being levelled by secretaries, cabinet members, and even Nixon pointed to indecisive yet impulsive leadership.

The criticisms of the cabinet members pointed to inconsistent leadership and direction on Eisenhower’s part as well as either an inability or an unwillingness to deal with the complexities of Third World issues. At the 204th meeting of the NSC, Harold Stassen, one of

Eisenhower’s Special Assistants (and then Director for Mutual Security and Director for Foreign

Operations), Secretary Wilson, and Nixon all directly challenged the administration’s policies as they had been acted upon by Eisenhower. Stassen argued Eisenhower and the administration had

“failed to carry through on its policies,” Nixon complained that while the Soviets and

Communist Chinese knew their policies and carried them out, the Eisenhower administration

“watched, hesitated and didn’t know which policy to choose,” while Secretary Wilson called several times for an “agonizing” and total “reappraisal of our basic national security policy and position.”423 Dulles agreed with Wilson’s push for a reappraisal but in less dire terms, though

Dulles too pointed out that holes in the existing policies, such as the administration’s lack of non-military means of thwarting Communist advances and the fact that its generally more aggressive approach to dealing with the Soviets and Chinese was shaking allied faith in

American leadership.424 Importantly, when Eisenhower pressed his advisors for examples of where the administration’s policies were problematic or insufficient, Guatemala and Indochina were given in answer.425

423 Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 24, 1954, 11-12, 204th Meeting of NSC, June 24 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 424 Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the NSC, 9-10, DDEL. 425 Stassen and Nixon both pointed to Indochina as an area where the administration appeared to be saying one thing and doing another, Stassen characterised this as a failure to actually follow through the administration’s “tough” policy while Nixon portrayed the administration as lacking direction. Dulles argued that Guatemala was an area in 161

Eisenhower revealed a great deal about his leadership in his responses to these criticisms.

The president first attempted to avoid directly addressing the criticisms of his advisers by appealing to semantic diversions, claiming that the “tough” or “soft” policies his advisers were referencing were relative and could not easily be applied to concrete situations.426 Secretary

Wilson pointedly told Eisenhower that the administration’s policies were weak and failed to recognize the “realities in the world situation” which were causing the U.S. to lose support in the

Third World, Eisenhower responded by ignoring the crux of Wilson’s argument and simply stated that the motivation for nations in the Third World which accepted Communist influence and resources for reasons that were “all too plain,” meaning the Soviets gave support where the administration did not or believed it should not.427 And, when the criticisms of his advisers appeared to point to a reluctance or refusal on Eisenhower’s part to articulate and be bound to specific policies, he retreated again to semantics before warning that if the situation was indeed as dire as his advisers argued “we should perhaps come back to the very grave question: Should the United States now get ready to fight the Soviet Union?”428

In short, when faced with nearly united criticism of aspects of his handling of the Cold

War in the Third World, Eisenhower’s recourse was to offer two ridiculous alternatives: either quibble over semantics, or prepare for war. On one occasion Nixon tried to question this

which the administration’s slow and ill-equipped non-military anti-communist functions had allowed Soviet penetration and subversion to grow rapidly. See Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the NSC, 9-11, DDEL. 426 Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the NSC, 9-12, DDEL. 427 Wilson’s criticisms, especially given his typically more belligerent attitude, are telling and deserve to be quoted at length here simply to show that even the more belligerent members of the cabinet felt there were serious weaknesses and needlessly aggressive simplicities in Eisenhower’s approach. Wilson stated: “In any case, we ought to have a firm policy which clearly recognized the realities in the world situation. We must find out why Communism was being so widely accepted. What was the real motivation of the nations which accepted Communism? Moreover, was it not possible, if we were given time and if we stopped calling the Russians “dirty bastards”, to get through this difficult stage in our history?” See Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the NSC, 9-12, DDEL. 428 Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the NSC, 12, DDEL. 162

dichotomy, but when challenged by Eisenhower to offer a third alternative, he managed to stumble into a semantic argument of his own, drawing the derision of Secretary Wilson and the laughter of the NSC.429 That being the case, into October Wilson still angrily described the administration’s policies in Asia as “nothing but a lot of double-talk,” with Secretary Humphrey in agreement, and Allen Dulles worrying ominously what would occur if any of the administration’s “bluffs” were ever called.430

The fact that equivocation and stalling were built-in aspects of the administration’s plan for dealing with Third World nations was a contentious and disturbing fact for several cabinet members. In September, at a NSC meeting presided over by Nixon and attended mostly by assistant and under-secretaries of various departments, the Vice President and other officials raised several serious concerns with what they perceived as the intentionally plodding course of policy revision towards Latin America. Importantly, none of the officials, including Nixon,

Bedell Smith, Harold Stassen, and others, believed the policies as they stood were sufficient.

Nixon almost immediately expressed disbelief that the administration had given so little attention to education programs in Latin America, and questioned how the administration could justify spending less on Latin America than other areas of the world in, as Stassen put it, both absolute and relative terms.431 In a rather surprising show, Stassen not only supported Nixon but went a step further: stating that the administration’s claim that Latin American nations needed to

429 What Nixon expressed was basically quite similar to the rough idea of what would later be called ‘détente’, but as he explained it in a muddled fashion as a “kind of tough co-existence” that would exploit divisions between the Soviets and Chinese without going to war with either – without explaining how or why it would work – and thus it is only clear what he meant in retrospect since he was unable to articulate it clearly at the time. Secretary Wilson joked that Nixon was trying to make a distinction between cohabitation and coexistence. See, Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the NSC, 9, DDEL. 430 Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 6, 1954, 15-16, 216th Meeting of the NSC, October 6, 1954, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 431 See Discussion at the 212th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, September 2, 1954, 10-12, 212th Meeting of NSC, September 2, 1954, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 163

“create a favorable climate for private investment” was all well and good, but that the only means to actually enable those nations to create such a climate was through “U.S. governmental action,” action, he pointed out that had not and in the foreseeable future would not happen.432

Nixon continued to press for action of some kind, stating the administration should “shake ourselves out of our lethargy and make a bold statement.”433

Clearly, the administration was suffering from a number of issues. The complexity of the

Anglo-American-French relationships confounded Eisenhower and Dulles as they attempted to formulate policies which could actually achieve their goal of stable, Western aligned or at least anti-communist Third World areas without alienating the Europeans or various Third World states. Compounding this issue, both men stumbled when they approached long-term planning, and were unable and sometimes unwilling to articulate clear and consistent directions. These problems, and Eisenhower’s failure to deal with them caused serious and growing criticisms of both the administration and his leadership. Eisenhower admitted changes needed to be made, and a new basic national security policy, NSC 5440/1 was nearly completed by the end of the year. And yet, at the end of the year Dulles still asserted that the administration’s “national security policies were pretty generally adequate, save, perhaps, in Asia and the Middle East.”434

In 1954, Eisenhower maintained his pursuit of postponement, and did so without considering the long-term effects. This problem was not simply one of failing to understand local dynamics or viewing the Third World through a Cold War lens, but that Eisenhower continued to take actions which delayed rather than dealt with challenges. Removing Árbenz had not removed the economic and political concerns of Latin Americans, just as the majority of

432 Discussion at the 212th Meeting of the NSC, 12, DDEL. 433 Discussion at the 212th Meeting of the NSC, 15-16, DDEL. 434 Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council, 5-6, DDEL. 164

Eisenhower’s decisions had not addressed the underlying sources of unease and instability in the

Third World – nor were they meant to do so. The core failure was that Eisenhower did not recognise that by ignoring the underlying issues, he was clamping a lid tighter over a pot whose pressure continued to build.

165

Chapter Four

The Cycle of Frustrations and Failures (1955)

In 1955, a series of challenges in the Third World revealed that the Eisenhower administration was ill-prepared in the event of a significant crisis. While problems it had yet to sufficiently address, in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and with its

European allies grew worse, Eisenhower and Dulles continued to dally where they could, while taking the wrong lessons from events like the Bandung Conference. Between September 23 and

September 24, Eisenhower suffered a heart attack that left him unable to work at his previous capacity for months, and although he left Fitzsimons Army Hospital on November 11, his recovery continued through December; several cabinet and NSC meetings had to be held at

Camp David rather than the White House. In the period between Eisenhower’s heart attack and his resumption of more active duties, Nixon presided over top level meetings, initially with the close and vocal support of his mentor. Eisenhower’s heart attack and gradual return to activity further exposed that his cabinet, his policies, and his approach to non-military crises were dangerously insufficient.435 And while Dulles attempted to manage a variety of steadily

435 Dulles’s comments at the first NSC meeting after the President’s heart attack were important, revealing, and served as both a reminder and a warning to Eisenhower’s cabinet. Dulles revealed some of his deep anxieties over an incapacitated president, quickly pointing out to the NSC that he knew “from personal experience” that during Woodrow Wilson’s “last illness” a number of issues had arisen. The issue Dulles focused on was that his uncle, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, had overstepped his authority and bounds, thus Dulles warned those present not to attempt to either restrict access to the President, as Edith Wilson had done, or to presume to take any steps that even appeared to alter the basic structure and conventions Eisenhower had established. Dulles opened and closed his statement with praise of his protégé, and with gentle but clear warnings to his fellow cabinet members that Nixon was to be listened to in the President’s absence, arguing that Nixon was perfectly suited to run cabinet and NSC meetings, before again reminding those present that “both the President and the country expect, and the Vice President could count on, the complete loyalty of all of us.” Nixon was surprised and delighted by his mentor’s words, and when they spoke after the meeting Nixon thanked him for his “generous” words; Dulles replied that they were “much-deserved.” Discussion at the 259th Meeting of the NSC, Thursday, September 29, 166

worsening situations, Nixon’s frustration with the administration’s handling and treatment of various Third World regions grew to the point that he began challenging and criticising the administration with greater regularity, and started to suspect the administration was simply failing in the Third World.

Expanding on this, the administration was stuck in a cycle of reacting to crises, delaying planning or action on looming problems, and adopting gradualist, insufficient stop-gap measures in the interim. The issue for the administration was that its policies in the Third World were intended to delay change despite near unanimous agreement within the administration that such a delay was unsustainable. This combination of a lack of planning and an inherently reactive position lodged in a refusal to do more than that which was deemed absolutely necessary meant that, far from stability, Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s approach to the Third World at best extended already lit fuses, and at worst tossed fuel on burning flames by their inaction and indifference.

By 1955, this process and some of its pitfalls were becoming apparent to many in the administration.

At the end of 1954, on December 28, the NSC dealt with a new basic national security policy (NSC 5440/1), which admitted the administration had yet to come up with workable long- term policies, and suggested that Nixon was gaining at least some influence. Not approved until

January 7, 1955, NSC 5440/1 stated that “U.S. political policies must be adapted to conditions prevailing in each underdeveloped area,” while advising that the administration attempt to work with or take advantage of, rather than act suspiciously towards or actively against, nationalist and

1955, 3-4, 259th Meeting of the NSC, September 29, 1955, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL; Telephone Conversation, Dulles to Nixon, September 30th 1955, 2:59 pm, Telephone Calls Series, Box 4, Papers of John Foster Dulles, DDEL. 167

reform movements.436 And yet, NSC 5440/1 also revealed that most policies towards accomplishing such goals were not in place, and advised that “the U.S. should develop long-term policies to deal with deep-seated problems such as those involved in the evolution of colonial peoples.”437

At the heart of this issue was the fact that Eisenhower, and thus Dulles, continued to treat

Third World issues and the change inherent to them in a reluctant, reactive manner. Eisenhower failed to push forcefully for long-term planning, and, heart attack aside, had mostly hopped from crisis to crisis, putting out fires as they broke out but doing little in way of preventing them from breaking out in the first place. The President did recognize that there was a problem. Eisenhower complained at the end of 1955 that a lack of long-term planning was at the root of many of the administration’s troubles in the Third World and elsewhere. Still recovering from his heart attack, Eisenhower wrote to Dulles about one particular aspect of foreign policy he believed a particularly prominent weak spot: the lack of long term economic planning.438 Tellingly,

Eisenhower conceptualised the need for such long term planning purely in terms of the Cold

War, arguing that the Soviets were constantly able to move on the offensive whatever their tactics while his administration was forced to take up the defensive: “Thus, while we are busy rescuing Guatemala or assisting Korea and Indochina, they make great inroads in Burma,

Afghanistan, and Egypt.439 The problem was that Eisenhower’s strategy to enable his and successive administrations to anticipate, respond to, and coordinate with allies against Soviet

436 Basic National Security Policy, December 28, 1954, 15, NSC 5440/1 – Basic National Security Policy, Box 14, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, WHO, OSANSA, DDEL. 437 Basic National Security Policy, 15, DDEL. 438 See Letter, Eisenhower to Dulles, December 5, 1955, 1, Folder 1, Box 21, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 439 Eisenhower to Dulles, December 5, 1955, 2, SML. Eisenhower also expressed a combination of embarrassment and frustration that somehow his administration was being pressed in the Third World by “an economy which in its overall productivity is not more than one third as effective as ours.” 168

economic “offensives” was to begin holding a small series of meetings within the administration, then eventually gain Congressional authorization for a new organization within his cabinet that could thereafter begin planning a response to Soviets’ tactics.440 In short, Eisenhower’s plan for the problem of today was to do something the day after tomorrow. In a technical sense, this qualifies as long-term planning, but it was very much long-term planning to fight the last war.

Throughout 1955 the administration continued in a cycle of frustrations and failures owing to the continued pursuit of postponement. The year was bookended by examples of this cycle. While the First Taiwan Straits Crisis understandably took up a good deal of the administration’s time and attention, the crisis was not so much resolved as momentarily put on hiatus, and distracted officials from other looming issues. As the Taiwan Straits Crisis continued, Nixon undertook a fact-finding and goodwill mission to Central America, warning of growing problems with the administration’s policies and voicing frustration with the lack of attention given to such problems. Eisenhower and Dulles, owing to a combination of patronising attitudes and the fact that their attention was still affixed to the Taiwan Straits, gave little consideration to the non-positive results of the Bandung Conference and clear signs of trouble ahead. The attempt to find a balance, or middle way, between supporting colonial powers, pursuing the administration’s perceived interests, and engaging with emerging states bogged the administration down. Seeing no viable better options, Eisenhower and Dulles resisted internal pushes and their own frustrations in working with the British and French, and stumbled on. That this balance, and the pursuit of postponement were unsustainable was made emphatically clear

440 This was not atypical of Eisenhower, as throughout his time in office he tinkered with other possible alterations and additions to the structure of the executive, such as his abandoned attempts to bring in an Office of Executive Management or to create a First Secretary to streamline various functions. Eisenhower to Dulles, December 5, 1955, 2-3, SML. 169

when Nasser’s predictable (in that it was actually predicted) reaction to such actions threw the administration’s top officials into despondency and disarray.

Bandung Blinders: Failing to see the forest-fire for the trees

The Taiwan Straits Crisis continued to create confusion for the administration, and its attempts to bring about a peaceful end resulted in inconsistent and confused behavior. On

February 7, Dulles appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to explain and work to gather support for the mutual security treaty with Taiwan, and in doing so he revealed several important factors. The most obvious was that the administration had, finally, managed to get Chiang Kai-Shek to agree not to take any offensive action without the United

States.441 Dulles defended leaving Quemoy and Matsu out of the scope of the treaty by arguing that the area included in the treaty, in conjunction with SEATO and other treaties in the Western

Pacific, nearly completed the administration’s “security system” for the region. Dulles tacitly acknowledged that certain areas were not covered, and that bilateral agreements like the treaty being presented were not the best option, but he argued that the “theoretically preferable” should not dictate inaction within “the limits of the practical”; thus, while there would likely always be better ideal options, Dulles presented the treaty as a best case possible at the moment, with the potential for additions and changes in the future.442 And yet, as with many of the administration’s plans, doubt and frustrations caused this best case to be seriously questioned almost immediately.

441 As was typical, Nixon requested and kept a copy of Dulles’s speech. See Statement by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, February 7, 1954, 4, Speeches Etc. 1955 Jan-Mar, John Foster Dulles Speeches Etc., PPS 322, RNPPM, RNL. 442 Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, 4, RNL. 170

In late February, many State Department officials came to the conclusion that the administration’s acts of “retreat” over Formosa’s offshore islands had emboldened the

Communist Chinese to the point that a full scale invasion of Taiwan was imminent. Revealing the nebulous and shifting nature of the administration’s information of Communist China’s intention, Dulles wrote that “whereas up to [a] few weeks ago we had believed Chinese

Communists were not seriously intending to take Taiwan by force, we now believe they are intending to do so…we are in a battle for Taiwan.”443 Dulles noted that further retreat was inadvisable, that such retreat would demoralise the Nationalist forces, and cause a deterioration of the American position in all of Asia.444 Connected to this, Dulles was also frustrated with what he saw as further evidence of the British refusal to follow the administration’s lead on the issue.

Despite the fact that Dulles had designed the treaty with Taiwan so that the United States was not required to defend Quemoy or Matsu, he nonetheless continued to believe the administration should keep such a defence open as a possible option. Dulles recorded his annoyance that soon-to-be Prime Minister Anthony Eden stubbornly refused to move from the line that while the British would “go along” with the Eisenhower administration in defending

Taiwan if it was attacked, neither they nor the rest of the world would support defending

Quemoy or Matsu; Eden also pointed out that the Chinese might well be looking to embroil the

U.S. over the islands since they likely knew full well only the U.S. and Chinese Nationalists seemed to view the islands as vital to security.445 At this point Dulles believed that the administration had taken too many steps to conciliate the Communist Chinese, and began to push

443 Telegram, Dulles to State Department, February 25, 1955, 1, Folder 15, Box 3, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 444 Telegram, Dulles to State Department, February 25, 1955, 1-2, DDEL. 445 Telegram, Dulles to State Department, February 25, 1955, 2, DDEL. 171

for a more aggressive and assertive position, meaning threatening to utilise atomic weapons.446

And yet, even into April, confusion amongst officials and allies as to exactly what the administration’s intentions and plans for the situation were continued. Managing a crisis is obviously a more delicate endeavour than preparing for and executing a plan for known factors or events, and yet here too the administration stumbled.

The Bandung Conference offered a possible solution to the Taiwan Straits Crisis, but exposed numerous other problems in the administration towards the Third World. The conference was planned for April, and the administration was concerned with treating the conference appropriately. Of course, much of the interest and effort was focused simply on thwarting possible advances by either Communist China or Nehru. The OCB began preparing possible responses, most of which were focused either on discrediting the “Sino-Soviet” claim to anti-colonialism, or discrediting the entire conference in January.447 An issue the OCB immediately raised was that while its staff was perfectly able to prepare recommendations, due to the fact that the State Department and President had not yet decided the administration’s position on the conference, it was unable to begin formulating such recommendations.448

Generally, the administration viewed the Bandung Conference as a surprising success, but Dulles chose to ignore clear warning signs of problems ahead. Zhou Enlai announced at the

Bandung Conference that China was open to negotiations, and while Dulles and Eisenhower

446 Dulles met with Eisenhower on March 7, and argued that the administration should not allow Quemoy or Matsu to be taken. Both men concluded that atomic weapons would have to be used in order to successfully defend the area, with Eisenhower stressing to Dulles the need to be clear in a related press conference that the atomic weapons to be used would be tactical, not “weapons of mass destruction.” Eisenhower again stressed that conventional and atomic weapons were interchangeable. See Memorandum of Conversation with the President, March 7, 1955, 1-2, March 1955 (5), Box 11, JFD Chronological Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, DDEL. 447 See Memo for the Executive officer of the Operations Coordinating Board, January 21, 1955, 1-2, OCB 092.3, Box 85, OCBCF, WHO, National Security Council Staff Papers NSCSF, DDEL. 448 OCB Minutes, January 31, 1955, OCB 092.3, Box 85, OCBCF, WHO, NSCSF, DDEL. 172

enthusiastically embraced the de-escalation, they made little in way of a concerted push to permanently stabilise the situation.449 Foreign Service officials reported that despite Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s beliefs that they had clarified the administration’s position on Taiwan, significant confusion remained. Writing to Dulles during the Bandung Conference, officials reported both that the Communist Chinese were taking advantage of international opinion and that the lack of clarity on the administration’s part was adding to the difficulty of resolving the

Taiwan Straits Crisis. Reporting on an exchange through interlocutors, in which Pakistani officials spoke with Zhou Enlai, officials noted that Zhou wanted to resolve the tensions peacefully but did not understand fully the administration’s position on matters which, if the

Communist Chinese acted too aggressively, could result in greater conflict.450

State officials reported that even in their attempt to clarify the administration’s position, there was every possibility that confusion could have arisen. The officials’ understanding at least appeared to be attuned to Dulles: they indicated that the administration would not negotiate with the Chinese about ceding any islands to Communist China but, importantly, stressed that the

U.S.’s obligations were to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores but not Quemoy and Matsu.451 The officials understood that while those who knew Dulles’s legalistic thinking could recognize the hint, that the U.S. would not respond militarily if China took Quemoy and Matsu, there could still be a good deal of confusion given the concomitant refusal to negotiate on the islands or

449 In one of the many copies of Dulles’s comments at press conferences that Nixon kept, the Vice President underlined the “de facto ceasefire” line in Dulles’s speech. The monologue featured Dulles admitting that tensions decreased with Zhou’s announcement, and claiming the administration was always open to peaceful resolution, while waffling between stressing openness to negotiation while showing little faith in them: after listing numerous outstanding complaints the administration had with the Communists, Dulles stated “the thing is…whether we must prepare or war…or whether there is likely to be a ceasefire in that area.” See John Foster Dulles Response at Press Conference, July 26, 1955, 1-3, 1955 July-Dec, Box 2, John Foster Dulles Speeches, etc., PPS 322, RNPPM, RNL. 450 Telegram, Cumming to State Department, April 23, 1955, 1-2, Encrypted, Conferences 1955, Box 11, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 451 Cumming to State Department, April 23, 1955, 1-2, SML. 173

anything else unless a ceasefire was agreed upon.452 Still, Zhou’s conciliatory remarks became a spot of focus for Dulles, who viewed them as a victory for the Chinese. Despite conceding this victory to the Chinese, Dulles nonetheless considered the Bandung Conference to have been a surprising success for the administration, which in and of itself was indicative of part of the administration’s problem.

The root of this problem was that Eisenhower neither respected Third World leaders, nor thought the conference important enough to warrant a vigorous response. Although preparation of responses to the conference continued below the top levels of the administration, those at the top stuck to typical roles. Discussing the upcoming conference during the NSC meeting on April

7, Eisenhower and Nixon took markedly different positions. Eisenhower, estimating that the conference required neither drastic nor immediate action facetiously suggested either bribing the delegates attending the conference or any method short of assassination of hostile delegates as a means to avoid criticism of his administration.453 Nixon considered the risk that Zhou or Nehru would dominate the conference and push an anti-U.S. line to be of such great risk that he argued that “the best strategy for the United States would be to ensure the failure of the

Conference…”454 Despite Eisenhower’s comments earlier in the meeting which indicated alarm at the apparent movement towards alignment between Third World nationalism and Soviet interests rather than those of the U.S., the President clearly did not consider the Bandung

Conference to be of such importance that it warranted much concern. Nixon on the other hand considered the risk of the Conference leading to greater anti-U.S. sentiment to be so great that

452 Cumming to State Department, April 23, 1955, 2, SML. 453 The minute taker, Everett Gleason specifically made note that Eisenhower was speaking facetiously on those two points. See Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, April 7, 1955, 16-17, 244th Meeting of the NSC, April 7, 1955, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 454 Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the NSC, 16-17, DDEL. 174

the entire thing should be wrecked.455 Thus, Eisenhower continued to treat Third World issues and Third World leaders as less deserving of attention or concern, permitting ongoing issues to worsen. Indeed, Eisenhower’s desire to avoid sweeping changes to existing policies or positions led him to continue to ponder and tinker.

At least part of the reason for Eisenhower’s apparent waffling was that he was still experimenting with how he wanted to deal with leaders like Nehru. Eisenhower’s back and forth perception of Nehru continued into 1955, as he commented to Dulles in March that he was

“struck by the amount of evidence we have that Nehru seems to be often more swayed by personality than by logical arguments.”456 The intent behind Eisenhower’s musings was to improve relations with India, as he asked Dulles to consider whether it might be beneficial to instruct the new ambassador to go out of his way to be friendly with Nehru while he and Dulles avoided having the ambassador present matters to Nehru that would require a hard

“unsympathetic” line.457 Eisenhower moved away from such sentiment after Nehru’s less-than- positive portrayal of the West at the Bandung Conference.

Clearly sharp disagreement existed not only on the importance of the Bandung

Conference but on the importance of the Third World and the position of Third World leaders.

Nixon advocating wrecking the conference stemmed from the fact that while he disliked Third

World leaders like Zhou and Nehru, he respected their power, influence, and ability to create challenges for the administration. Eisenhower, on the other hand, showed little respect for Third

World leaders: even in jesting about bribing leaders, Eisenhower had only suggested “a few

455 Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the NSC, DDEL. 456 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, March 23, 1955, Folder 4, Box 4, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 457 Eisenhower to Dulles, March 23, 1955, SML. 175

thousand dollars each.”458 The disagreement between Nixon and Eisenhower was indicative of positions the two commonly took on the Third World, with Nixon arguing for action and

Eisenhower either reluctant or unwilling to do so unless a crisis appeared imminent. The

Bandung Conference itself revealed that the administration’s vagueness and hedging on various issues were beginning to have costs.

Dulles focused on positive results and continued to ignore growing evidence of trouble ahead. Dulles noted that Nehru, rather than building himself a position of leadership or power, had suffered “a severe reverse”; likely referencing the fact that the representative of the

Philippines, Carlos Romulo, along with Ceylon’s John Kotelawala, eloquently and forcefully countered Nehru’s attempt to assert himself at every step.459 The administration had anticipated that Romulo would be an effective pro-Western spokesman, but while he and the Philippine’s

President Ramon Magsaysay were the subject of regular praise from the administration, little thought was given to capitalising or rewarding such energetic defence of the West and the administration.460 The issue, of course, was that if Nehru had not made several missteps at

Bandung and antagonised Romulo, he might well have avoided such a reverse. More simply, the administration was lucky, but failed both to recognise this and to take advantage of its luck.

Dulles chose to focus his time and energy solely on a clear and present danger rather than indications of significant looming troubles. Although he pointed out that the Asian nations

458 Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the NSC, 16-17, DDEL. 459 Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, April 29, 1955, 3, Cabinet Meeting of April 29, 1955, Box 5, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 460 One might point to the preferential trade agreement known as the Laurel-Langley Agreement (which updated the Bell Trade Act of 1946), signed in 1955, as evidence of a reward for the loyal and helpful actions of the Filipinos, however, Laurel-Langley was in the works for a good time before it was signed in 1955, and more indicative of the perceived strategic necessity of the time than as a reward. Indeed, if the agreement was in fact a reward, one would expect concomitant agreements for the Pakistanis, Ceylonese, Iranians, or Japanese, who all attended the Conference and spoke positively of the United States. See Astri Suhrke, “US-Philippines: The End of a Special Relationship,” The World Today, 31, No. 2 (February 1975), 80-88. 176

aligned with the West had “put on an amazing performance,” Dulles’s main focus was not on the potential to press the apparent advantages in the Third World created by allies at Bandung, but on Zhou Enlai’s conciliatory tone.461 While Dulles also stated plainly the reality of the administration’s policies, as he explained that the Bandung Conference’s condemnations of colonialism were “in accord with what we feel in our hearts (though we are unable to say them publicly)” and went on to list eight points of the Conference’s Final Communiqué which were consistent with the administration’s foreign policy, he failed to recognise obvious problems.462

Indeed, Dulles entirely ignored the fact that part of the Final Communique had voiced support of the Indonesian position over the West Irian issue, meaning at the very least that the issue between Indonesia and the Netherlands was important enough for Sukarno to press for an international conference to address it.463

The inference of such comments was that if the administration could not say certain things against colonialism it certainly would not take strong action against it either. The fact that a clear and unequivocal anti-colonialist message at Bandung had been something of a unifying element for the otherwise factional Conference was acknowledged, but neither understood nor acted upon by Dulles. Thus, an acknowledgement of the clearly problematic contradiction in the administration’s foreign policy was made, but no move to address the contradiction or bolster the allies who had saved the West from embarrassment at Bandung occurred. And while both Dulles

461 Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, April 29, 1955, 3, DDEL. 462 Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, April 29, 1955, 3, DDEL. 463 The Bandung Conference’s Final Communique targeted colonialism’s ills generally, but also voiced support for Indonesia in the West Irian dispute, and specifically targeted French colonialism in Africa for condemnation. See, Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung (24 April 1955), Asia-Africa speaks from Bandung, (Djakarta: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1955), 161-169. However, as McMahon has shown, Dulles and the administration were likely more confused than anything else, with Sukarno praising the American Revolution at the same time as he pushed for recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over the disputed area. See McMahon, “The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia,” 82-83. 177

and Eisenhower expressed sympathy for the unequivocal anti-colonialist message in the Final

Communique, they both failed to recognize or prepare for the possibility that such a message could be indicative of more than sentiment; it could lead to action and change. And yet, Dulles and Eisenhower continued to attempt to move along a middle path between coloniser and colonised.

Nixon also began diverging slightly from the line his mentor set on certain issues related to Bandung. Indonesia and what exactly to make of Sukarno continued to irritate top officials in the administration. At the NSC meeting on December 22, Allen Dulles reported that Sukarno was continuing to attempt to centralise power in his office, which at that time meant undermining pro-Western elements in Indonesia; the Director of the CIA believed that Sukarno was at the moment lining up with Communist elements, but admitted that in this particular case, Sukarno was something of a special figure as he “obviously had a tremendous hold on the people.”464

Eisenhower accepted that Sukarno was the key to the issue, and, after Nixon characterised

Sukarno as even more conceited than Nehru, Eisenhower floated the idea of inviting Indonesia’s leader for a visit to the United States. Dulles immediately responded negatively, arguing there was no guarantee Sukarno would come if invited, and warning that such a visit “would get us hooked to the Indonesian position…”465 Nixon took a step that on the surface appears benign but in light of the fact that he typically went out of his way to support Dulles, is quite important:

Nixon argued “that it was nevertheless a good idea to invite [Sukarno].”466

Nixon’s growing frustration with the administration’s Third World policies and, from his perspective, inaction, compelled him to begin speaking out and acting more in line with his own

464 Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the NSC, 3, DDEL. 465 Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the NSC, 3, DDEL. 466 Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the NSC, 3, DDEL. 178

thinking rather than that of his mentor. Although seemingly minor, this disagreement was indicative of a subtle change in the mentor-protégé relationship between the men. Nixon continued his practice of close consultation and regular calls with Dulles, in which Dulles was often the object of Nixon’s praise, and both men offered one another advice, but Dulles began more regularly to assert and remind Nixon of their respective positions of power, and Nixon, in turn, began seeking ways to out-manoeuvre such assertions.467 Nonetheless, while hardly a monumental change, Nixon’s continued push for action and change drove him to begin charting a slightly more independent, and critical course.

Complacency in Latin America

Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s condescending perception of the Third World along with their attempts to deal with an immediate crisis caused them to ignore evidence of oncoming problems at the Bandung Conference, but the situation in Latin America was considerably different.

Whereas the Bandung Conference’s anti-colonial message represented a warning which would have been difficult to properly deal with even if the administration had taken it seriously, problems in Latin America were simply not considered important enough to require action.

In fact, Eisenhower continued to consider the situation in Latin American to be satisfactory enough to warrant only token gestures. At the first meeting of the NSC in 1955, a brief argument over economic assistance as part of the administration’s basic national security

467 In various telephone conversations, Nixon sought advice from Dulles on a bevy of topics, such as how he might move away from being Eisenhower’s “hatchet man,” how the Secretary wanted him to address certain subjects, and so on while heaping praise on his mentor. Dulles, for his part, gave Nixon insights, advice, and sought his opinion on matters like the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, while giving his protégé the type of praise which both reassured Nixon and was meant to nudge him towards Dulles’s thinking. See Telephone Conversations, October 15, 17, 1955, 1-2, Telephone Calls Series, Box 4, Papers of John Foster Dulles, DDEL. The slight change in the tone of their conversations going forward into 1956 and onward, such as Dulles presuming to hold power over Nixon’s schedule, will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapters. 179

policy broke out. While budgetary concerns dictated that expenditures on foreign aid be reduced as soon and as rapidly as possible, Eisenhower expressed resistance to blindly slashing aid if the net overall benefit to America’s national security was positive.468 Dulles brought up a point with interesting implications. The Secretary of State pointed out that if the true goal of the administration’s national security policy was the security of America, it made little sense to focus such a great amount of economic aid in Asia and Southeast Asia; Dulles pointed out that as far as “national security,” the situation in Latin America was far more dangerous to the United

States than the situation in Southeast Asia.469 Dulles’s argument was not actually concerned with reallocating resources, but rather a push for more sophisticated policies and programs.

After a short debate, which revealed the extent to which many in the administration viewed Latin America in a thoroughly patronising manner, Dulles explained more clearly what he had meant. The counter argument which was offered to Dulles’s point was that, if a non-

Latin American state fell to Communism the administration would have to invade that state in order to change matters, whereas “any situation” in Latin America could be changed by the administration without needing to resort to war.470 Dulles attempted to refocus by clarifying his argument. The Secretary contended that the administration was focused too greatly on, as

Nelson Rockefeller (then one of the bevvy of Special Assistants to the President, specifically

Foreign Affairs) put it, “money, and money alone” in its dealings with Third World states.471

While this was clearly an exaggeration, Dulles held that the administration ignored revising trade policies, increasing educational exchanges, technical assistance and so forth; which left the basic

468 Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, January 5, 1955, 9, 230th Meeting of the NSC, January 5, 1955, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 469 Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the NSC, 9, DDEL. 470 Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the NSC, 9, DDEL. 471 Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 180

problems of development or diversification in Third World states unaddressed.472 Eisenhower was still not convinced of any pressing need for sweeping change, and instead focused on the fact that Richard Nixon would be traveling to several Central American states both as a gesture of goodwill and to appraise the situation: exactly the kind of measures Eisenhower believed actually necessary to address issues.

Throughout 1955, while Nixon continued to play the roles Eisenhower and Dulles expected of him, he also began to exercise greater independence and voice clearer criticisms of the administration. Nixon’s trip to several Central American nations at the behest of Dulles and

Eisenhower was designed with two basic purposes: to create a sense of goodwill amongst the visited nations, and for Nixon to gather information on the situations in those nations.473 Of course, even in this there was a degree of calculation on Dulles’s part: Dulles and the State

Department considered Nixon a suitably prestigious and important representative, but not so important as to give nations like Mexico the idea that it had done quite enough to satisfy the administration to have earned a visit from Eisenhower.474 As concerns goodwill, the trip was a strong success. Eisenhower relayed to Dulles that he was receiving requests from embassies in the nations Nixon had visited for follow-up visits by other American officials so as to “capitalize on the warm spirit of friendship created by the Vice President’s visit.”475 While staff noted that

“the prestige of the United States has never been as high as it is right now as a result of Mr. and

472 Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 473 White House Statement on Vice President Nixon’s Trip, February 6, 1955, 1, White House Statement on Caribbean Trip, Box 3, PPS 361, RNPPM, RNL. 474 A detailed internal memo within the State Department analysed the prospect of Eisenhower visiting Mexico in 1955 and concluded that while the Mexican government had taken several anti-communist and financially responsible steps, it had not yet gone far enough to warrant a visit from Eisenhower. See Memo for the Secretary of State, January 4, 1955, 1-2, Folder 14, Box 3, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 475 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, March 1, 1955, Folder 1, Box 4, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. For one such memo from embassy staff see, Memo, Robert Hill (American Ambassador to El Salvador) to Dwight Eisenhower, February 23, 1955, Folder 1, Box 4, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 181

Mrs. Nixon’s visit” this served only to reinforce Eisenhower’s belief that goodwill trips and meetings with local leaders were typically sufficient to address concerns or complaints.476

Nixon’s focus on this trip was mainly economic, and the economic health of the nations he visited; however, he also attempted to gauge destabilising influences in the region. His first note on Costa Rica was that President “Figueres and the Fruit Company get along pretty well” before launching into an analysis of Nicaraguan versus Costa Rican leaders, in which Figueres came out well ahead since Nixon seemed to take a liking to Figueres, noting he was clearly not a communist, was “very proud of Democracy, but too vocal,” and had “the common touch” with his people.477 Nixon also appeared amused by the analyses of Figueres offered by other leaders in the region, taking the time to underline comments Panama’s Ricardo Arias made: “He is erratic, he thinks he is too big for Costa Rica – he isn’t big enough for it!”478 Still, Nixon’s frustrations with the administration’s treatment of Latin American nations continued to grow.

Reporting directly to Dulles from Guatemala, Nixon made several forceful recommendations. Harkening back to a recommendation he made before the Árbenz coup,

Nixon argued that the administration needed to provide the funds to complete the Guatemalan portion of the Inter-American Highway.479 While casting some of the blame for the economic problems in Guatemala on Árbenz, Nixon pointedly stated that the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to aid Guatemala were “inadequate” and contributing to instability.480 Nixon’s notes on

Árbenz from his research and conversations in Guatemala displayed a surprising amount of

476 Hill to Eisenhower, February 23, SML. 477 Handwritten Note, Trip File 1955 – Feb 18-23 Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Box 5, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 478 Handwritten Note, Trip File 1955 – Feb 18-23 Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Box 5, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 479 Telegram, Nixon to Dulles, February 15, 1955, 1, Trip File 1955 Feb 12-15 Guatemala, Box 5, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 480 Nixon to Dulles, February 15, 1955, 1, RNL. 182

candor: still whole-heartedly viewing Árbenz negatively, Nixon noted that Guatemala was at least still solvent when Árbenz was its leader, and that while his reforms had little impact in strengthening the nation’s economy, there had been a clear “emotional and social impact” for the people.481 Nixon did not regret the coup that overthrew Árbenz. Rather, Nixon was focused on the fact that the administration was enacting policies which were alienating and aggravating the people of Latin America.

The report Nixon gave to the NSC following his trip displayed a careful balancing act in which he attempted to argue for what he viewed as prudent courses of action while doing so in a manner that would appeal to Eisenhower and thus stand some chance of being acted upon.

Nixon reported that while the Export-Import Bank had been directed to “intensify” its lending within the parameters previously adjusted by the administration, it had not actually begun dispensing more or more significant loans.482 Nixon hedged his bets, knowing Eisenhower’s dislike of grants, and thus argued that grants and gifts were a bad idea but that sound loans could be immensely useful, were far more dignified, and thus the administration should move to make good on its claim that greater aid via loans would be forthcoming.483

Nixon was not able to dance around the fact that he believed the administration had been dealing with Latin America unfairly, and stumbled into a brief argument with Eisenhower.

When Nixon made the point that he vehemently agreed with the administration’s reluctance to

“finance socialism,” meaning giving loans or aid to nationalised industries or those which had

481 Handwritten Note, Trip File 1955 Feb 12-15 Guatemala, Box 5, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 482 Discussion at the 240th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 10, 1955, 15, 240th Meeting of the NSC, March 10 1955, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 483 Nixon cited Rafael Trujillo as evidence that even Latin American leaders held a distaste for grants, while reminding the NSC that the administration had, in fact, promised greater access to more useful loans at the Rio Conference. See Discussion at the 240th Meeting of the NSC, 15, DDEL. 183

expropriated property, Eisenhower interrupted to state that the administration had to deal with the “sad fact” and “reality” of socialist economies, later explaining that if Nixon could offer

“some ammunition against” dealing with socialist features of nations he would satisfy a real need.484 While there is little reason to doubt Nixon’s sincerity in his stance against socialism, his careful reply to Eisenhower’s comment, in which he suggested that if the administration hoped to see more private enterprise industries in Latin America then it should “by all means encourage” such enterprises, displays that he continued to believe the administration’s treatment of Latin American nations was a significant factor in the economic issues therein.485

What Nixon meant by this was that while he agreed with refusing to dole out grants or free money, he failed to see how the administration could expect vibrant, self-reliant, friendly economies in Latin America without increased aid of some type along with immediate revision of trade policies few agreed benefited Latin America. Indeed, in a press release Nixon sent out in early March, he made certain to insert a section which pointed to such beliefs. Although

Nixon was careful to stress the need and advantages of private enterprise, he also acknowledged that many projects which were necessary for Latin American governments to attract and sustain private investment were also economically out of reach for these nations, and that the administration should continue to take steps to help in such projects as “roads, irrigation systems, port works, and many other facilities…”486 Another press release from Nixon on the administration’s trade policies needing revision sent out the next day was even more open.

484 Discussion at the 240th Meeting of the NSC, 15, DDEL. 485 At every stage of his report dealing with the economic issue, Nixon argued for re-evaluation of U.S. trade policies, greater access to loans, and expanded technical and education programs, deeming the first two grossly underfunded and the last two incredibly useful but underutilised. See, Discussion at the 240th Meeting of the NSC, 13-17, DDEL. 486 Press Statement by Vice President Nixon on U.S. Financing Policy Towards Latin America, March 4, 1955, 4, March 4 1955, Box 3, PPS 361, RNPPM, RNL. 184

Nixon argued that U.S. trade policies as they stood were key factors in economic instability in

Latin American states, and in the reluctance of both foreign and domestic investors to expend resources on more than a few select industries, which in turn created a cycle that dragged down both the U.S. and the respective Latin American nation.487

The problem, in Nixon’s mind, was that Eisenhower’s approach to such difficulties was far too grudging to be of significant help. While Nixon portrayed Eisenhower as in agreement with the need for revisions, and indeed placed Eisenhower as leading the charge through

“gradual selective reduction of artificial trade barriers,” the arguments in his statement clearly advocated immediate sweeping reduction of such barriers and not Eisenhower’s gradual approach. In line with Dulles’s argument earlier in the year, Nixon stated that Latin American nations could never be economically self-reliant and strong with trade policies as they were, and that since the administration claimed Latin American economic vitality and strength as one of its foreign policy objectives it needed to facilitate “a vigorous and expanding international trade among American states.”488 Thus, while Nixon continued to adhere broadly to his understanding of basic policy, he also began subtly voicing his own position, and did so before giving

Eisenhower an opportunity to act or not act upon Nixon’s advice. This divergence stemmed from Nixon’s growing belief that while its treatment of Third World regions and issues varied, the administration was consistently mishandling and underestimating the importance of the Third

World. While the administration’s complacency on Latin American issues was source of frustration for State officials and Nixon, this complacency was a matter of choice on

Eisenhower’s part to delay on account of his belief that significant action was simply not

487 Statement by the Vice President on Trade Policy in Western Hemisphere, March 5, 1955, 1-2, March 5, 1955, Box 3, PPS 361, RNPPM, RNL. 488 Statement by the Vice President on Trade Policy in Western Hemisphere, March 5, 1955, 2-3, RNL. 185

necessary. Although still a matter of choice, the administration’s balancing act with the British and the French in colonial areas, which even the State Department described as “schizophrenic,” was a matter of complex and competing priorities under the pursuit of postponement.489

Bogged down by Balance

Working with European powers continued to represent an irritating challenge for officials in the administration. Although typically less critical of the British, the administration still found their allies to be less and less able to understand their place in the Middle East, and expressed heightened concern that British actions were undermining both the West’s position in the Middle

East and the entire region’s stability. Eisenhower and Dulles remained convinced that areas like

Africa were better served through maintenance of European control, yet continued to voice growing frustration with what they perceived to be, especially on the part of France, monumental mishandling of situations like those in Algeria. However, Africa was simply not a priority for the administration, so much so that Eisenhower and Dulles put off preparing for an independent

Africa (to the growing frustration of officials) while supplying the French with helicopters to aid in such a delay. Southeast Asia was a Third World priority. And yet in South Vietnam, where

Dulles was thoroughly convinced that the administration could simply do a better job than the

French, the Secretary focused far more on his frustration with the French than developing or elaborating a plan for South Vietnam; in short, the administration delayed. The underlying issue was that despite growing evidence that its attempts to chart a middle way balancing act between

489 Memorandum Prepared in the Office of African Affairs, Washington, August 4, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 16. 186

coloniser and colonised were simply causing universal aggravation, Eisenhower and Dulles could see no viable alternative, and thus delayed change.

Dulles continued to voice growing disdain for the French and argued that American involvement and leadership were the actual keys to keeping South Vietnam viable. In a rather ironic comment, Dulles complained that “it was probably impossible to get an absolutely clear decision from the French on Vietnam. The difficulty is getting the French to realize if Free

Vietnam is to be saved, the United States will save it.”490 Given that Dulles had gone out of his way to give the French muddled messages and responses, that even at that point he and his officials were still discussing Vietnam’s future and government with France, and were still dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps to maintain security, his statement is revealing.491

This is especially the case given that Dulles made these comments just after the NSC was presented with General Joseph Collins’s report on Vietnam, at the end of which Collins stated plainly that even if all of his recommendations were followed and no significant new challenges arose, there was “at least a 50-50 chance of saving South Vietnam from the Communists.”492

Exacerbating this challenge was the decidedly chaotic situation in South Vietnam and Dulles’s

State Department’s reaction therein.

Distrust of the French, a lack of confidence in Diệm’s leadership, and stark disagreement within the State Department about how best to proceed in South Vietnam compounded the already daunting task of stabilising South Vietnam. In early February, embassy staff in Saigon were reporting to Dulles two unrelated but troubling developments: Diệm was becoming over-

490 Discussion at the 234th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 27, 1955, 16, 234th Meeting of the NSC, January 27, 1955, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 491 While Dulles acknowledged the French forces were needed, here too he expressed suspicions that the French were needlessly causing problems by demanding more money to keep them in Vietnam. See, Discussion at the 234th Meeting of the NSC, 17, DDEL. 492 Discussion at the 234th Meeting of the NSC, 15, DDEL. 187

confident in his position, and American suspicions were building over France’s handling of troop withdrawals. The embassy staff noted that the French were abandoning areas that could be quickly occupied by one of the various sects, and not informing the South Vietnam National

Army, while also under-supplying the National Army; the South Vietnamese aggravated the issue by not “taking seriously” the embassy’s suspicions that the French were doing such things in an effort to undermine both the National Army and Diệm.493 Writing to Dulles from Paris,

Theodore Achilles, Minister at the Embassy, argued that while it was obviously problematic working with a French government whose leaders seemed to be ever changing, the attitude of the

French was unlikely to change unless the Eisenhower administration (and State Department in particular) began communicating its policies and intentions clearly. Achilles argued the administration should both assure and treat the French in such a way as to show that it was not trying to replace France and hoped to share leadership and responsibilities over the region.494

Given that Dulles had made fully clear to Eisenhower, Nixon, and the NSC that he considered the French to be a major stumbling block to satisfactorily stabilising South Vietnam, and his growing suspicion that the French were simply not suited to continue to govern colonial areas, this advice was ignored.495 Dulles noted that relations with France over Vietnam had effectively degenerated into a distrustful tit-for-tat by May, as he described a meeting in which

French officials accused American officials in Vietnam of aiding Diệm in attacking “Binh Xuyen

493 Telegram, Embassy in Saigon to Secretary of State, February 8, 1955, 1-2, Folder 2, Box 7, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 494 Telegram, Achilles to Secretary of State, February 9, 1955, 1, Folder 2, Box 7, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 495 Dulles’s fundamental position was that the United States and the Eisenhower administration understood how such areas ought to be governed, but that since the French refused to embrace American advice and continued to drag their feet on accepting such realities, this left the administration forced to simply “prod the French to live up to their agreements.” Discussion at the 234th Meeting of the NSC, 16, DDEL. 188

and [the] government’s anti-French campaign” while American officials attacked the French for undermining Diệm.496

Reporting to the NSC on May 19, Dulles made a series of comments which shed light both on his perspective on Vietnam and his growing disdain and distrust of the French. Dulles continued his portrayal of France as an overly dramatic and reluctant ally in Vietnam, informing the NSC that Premier Faure had announced that since France did not want to suffer a falling-out with the United States over policy in Vietnam it might be best if France entirely withdrew from the region and handed over all responsibilities to the Americans; Dulles countered by telling

Faure that the administration also wanted to avoid a falling-out and that if such a problem was imminent then the U.S. could more easily withdraw all of its resources from Vietnam.497 Dulles considered this tit-for-tat to have been dramatic posturing on the part of the French, noting that his response had “put an end once and for all to any more such dramatic gestures.”498 Finally,

Dulles noted that he had told the French that if Diệm was the type of man simply to do the

Eisenhower administration’s bidding then “he would not be the kind of man who could do what was required to save the situation in Vietnam.”499 Dulles’s tendency to focus on telling the

French what they were doing wrong, or how they should be proceeding, rather than developing and proposing new policies for the Eisenhower administration was even more prevalent in relation to Africa. This balancing act served only to aggravate effectively every concerned party.

Despite the fact that the administration still lacked a solid or sophisticated position on

Africa, and took deliberate steps to avoid developing one, Dulles’s certainty that the French were

496 Telegram, Dulles to State Department, May 9, 1955, Folder 12, Box 8, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 497 See Discussion at the 249th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 19, 1955, 4, 249th Meeting of the NSC, May 19 1955, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 498 Discussion at the 249th Meeting of the NSC, 4, DDEL. 499 Discussion at the 249th Meeting of the NSC, 5, DDEL. 189

mishandling affairs there led him to lash out. On May 27, Dulles sent a series of biting criticisms concerning France’s actions in Algeria which were to be forwarded to his counterpart in France,

Rene Massigli. Included in Dulles’s criticisms was the point that it was becoming increasingly difficult for the U.S. to support any French action while the French enacted policies centered solely on repressing native Algerians.500 Further, Dulles argued that France’s requests of the

U.S. for greater military aid to put down the rebellion in Algeria, helicopters in particular, and her actions in Algeria were not only ignoring the Eisenhower administration’s advice to enact social, political, and economic reforms in Algeria, they were also weakening NATO.501 And yet, while Dulles and the State Department were quite willing to advise and criticise the French, they were neither willing nor able to formulate a clear policy or position on the area labelled French

North Africa.

The NSC policy paper for French North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria), was developed in late 1954 but not reviewed until 1955. The paper, NSC 5436/1, was a mass of contradictions that the administration convinced itself was actually a fair-minded, compromise policy. NSC 5436/1 simultaneously advocated pressing France to speedily advance the cause of self-government and independence in Tunisia and Morocco, while also arguing the administration should work to continue French responsibility and control of those nations’ armed forces, economies, and foreign affairs.502 The drafters acknowledged the “divergent proposals” within the paper, which admitted the fact that there appeared to be no clear means of successfully pressuring the French on an issue they deemed a matter of national/imperial unity without

500 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, Washington, May 27, 1955, in FRUS 1955- 1957: Volume XVIII Africa, 219. 501 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, Washington, May 27, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957: Volume XVIII Africa, 220. 502 See NSC 5436/1 – U.S. Policy on French North Africa, October 5, 1954, 7-8, NSC 5436—Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Box 13, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, WHO, OSANSA, DDEL. 190

sacrificing either Western unity or creating problematic instability in North Africa. And yet, the paper pushed the feasibility of compromise despite recognizing that the two sides (France on one and Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria on the other) had completely irreconcilable goals.503

Still, well into 1955, the administration continued to follow a policy it nonetheless acknowledged carried an inherent weakness. A report on the progress of NSC 5436/1 was given at an NSC meeting in July. The report argued that the “middle-of-the-road policy” of pressuring the French to be more liberal, and pushing the French and North African nations to compromise was the correct choice, despite causing a growing amount of anti-American sentiment on all sides of the issue and remaining acceptable only because other options “appeared less attractive.”504 The inherent weakness at which Eisenhower first merely hinted before the report was concluded was that despite the middle course being the correct choice, the fact that the administration was working with the French meant they were on the wrong side.505 Immediately following the report, NSC members launched into various attacks on the French, with

Eisenhower acknowledging that France’s continuing hardline military approach would not resolve the issues in Algeria and that the inherent racism of French governments made it unlikely that there would be a peaceful end to what he decided to quote Churchill to describe as the

“tyrannical weakness of the French.”506 Given the unanimous criticism levelled at the French, it might be presumed the administration had a more sophisticated, or more complete and considered set of policies prepared as alternatives. Again, it did not.

503 NSC 5436/1, 29, DDEL. 504 Discussion at the 255th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 14, 1954, 6, 255th Meeting of the NSC, July 14th 1954, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 505 Indeed, Eisenhower appeared to have a theory that might have allowed the administration greater freedom from working with the French, at least in regard to Morocco, as he directed Allen Dulles to check “the Archives [sic]” for possibly extant records of a promise President Roosevelt might have made for post-war North Africa. See Discussion at the 255th Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 506 Discussion at the 255th Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 191

The administration not only lacked adequate policies for Africa south of the Sahara, it continued to avoid even beginning their creation. As late as August, 1955, Dulles was receiving concerned advice from within the State Department that not only did the Eisenhower administration not have a genuine policy for dealing with Africa south of the Sahara in the coming years, but that what was considered the “first step” towards actually formulating such policies had yet to be taken.507 As part of taking this first step, George Allen, the Assistant

Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs argued that the administration needed to “clarify our policy with respect to the various regions within Africa” since “within the next ten years we shall face in Africa…the same acute dilemma of colonialism that were are now facing in Asia.”508 However, despite the pressing need to begin such considerations, Dulles and Eisenhower demurred. In August, Dulles was sent suggestions by

State officials towards taking the first step towards policy formulation. These were presented in a policy paper to Dulles, and included recommendations on implementing triangle diplomacy, taking steps to influence the predicted rise in nationalism and the spread of Islam so as to benefit

America, and expanding and improving the U.S.’s diplomatic presence on the continent.509

Despite the fact that the paper’s drafters made very clear that the paper was designed to serve as

507 George Allen, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, also argued that it would very obviously become necessary to formulate policies which actually dealt with the various regions and nations in Africa rather than simply dividing policy by the Sahara. Allen also pointed out the futility of trying to avoid addressing issues with the colonial powers. See, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to Secretary of State, Washington, August 12, 1955, in FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 12-13. 508 Memo, Allen to Secretary of State, FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 12. 509 Memorandum Prepared in the Office of African Affairs, Washington, August 4, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 13-21. 192

a first-step framework rather than an in-depth, all-encompassing doctrine, the Secretary of State dismissed the paper as “too general” and the administration continued to do without.510

While there are various plausible reasons for this tardiness, a good deal of the blame must be placed on Dulles and Eisenhower and either their inability or unwillingness to chart a course which decisively chose a side in Africa.511 The drafters of the suggested first steps policy paper were fully cognizant of Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s delicate balancing act, but while they acknowledged the “dilemma” of seeking such a balance, they pointed out that the attempt at a middle-road was actually causing problems on all sides. The officials stated in blunt terms that

“right or wrong, this schizophrenia makes for a peculiar combination of uncertainty, guilt complex, and emotionalism on our part when we consider our role in…Africa.”512

Certainly, even those officials hoping to improve the administration’s position admitted that the United States then had an “extremely limited” stake in Africa, but they were not advocating an immediate, revolutionary change in policy; instead, their argument held that the administration simply needed to begin actually considering an independent policy so that the administration was not left empty-handed and scrambling in the event of a crisis.513 By the end of the year, some officials, such as the Consul General at Leopoldville Robert McGregor, expressed frustrations that if even the proposed first steps policy, which the Consul General labelled as far too optimistic, was adopted, Dulles and Eisenhower were deluding themselves if

510 See Memorandum Prepared in the Office of African Affairs, Washington, August 4, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 13-15. 511 White has elsewhere argued that the Eisenhower administration did not view Africans as “truly human,” and due to American cultural constraints were unable to view the problems in Africa as anything other than issues of “ungrateful children.” See George White Jr., Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy toward Africa, 1953-1961 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 38-39. 512 Memorandum Prepared in the Office of African Affairs, Washington, August 4, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 16. 513 Memorandum Prepared in the Office of African Affairs, FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 18, 21. 193

they continued “pretending that time is on our side.”514 Much like the potential policy paper sent in August, these warnings were promptly ignored.

The problematic balancing that contributed to inaction in formulating policies in Africa also played a significant role in the administration’s continued troubles in the Middle East.

Meeting with Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Eisenhower ruminated over the challenges in the region. Eden and Eisenhower agreed that the situation in the Middle East had become so delicate that any statement or action by the Eisenhower administration that came across as pro-

Israel needed to be preceded with a clearly pro-Arab act.515 If such a pro-Israeli statement was released first, Eden worried that much of the “already shaky” Arab support would go to the

Soviets, and thus suggested an increase in military aid to Iraq. Eden’s suggestion was that Iraq, which refused to purchase tanks from the British, be given said tanks, after the United States bought them from the British.516 Eisenhower balked at the idea of paying full price for the tanks, but considered either a discount from the British, or exploring whether Iraq could actually pay a part of the bill (which Eden directly told Eisenhower the Iraqis refused to do), as acceptable solutions since the administration was keenly interested in strengthening the “northern tier” states within the framework of Eisenhower’s concept of “Mutual Security.”517

Thus, a conversation which began by addressing means to balance Israeli-Arab perceptions of the West concluded with consideration of the most economic means of purchasing

British weapons to be given or sold at a discount to Iraq. Neither leader addressed or seemed to

514 Memorandum by the Consul General at Leopoldville, December 28, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 24. 515 Notes dictated by the President regarding his conversation with Sir Anthony Eden, July 17, 1955, 2, DDE Diary July 1955 (1), Box 11, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 516 Notes dictated by the President regarding his conversation with Sir Anthony Eden, 2, DDEL. For a more long- term approach to the study of U.S.-Iraq relations see Peter L. Hahn, Missions Accomplished?: The United States and Iraq since World War I, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 517 Notes dictated by the President regarding his conversation with Sir Anthony Eden, 2, DDEL. 194

consider exactly how or why either nation could maintain a balance so delicate that even a single statement required bargaining and maneuvering which neither were capable of or comfortable undertaking. More simply, Eisenhower and Eden agreed that the Middle East was in such a problematic state that its continuing stability and allegiance was not only highly in question, but on such unstable ground that only ad hoc and contentious quid pro quo actions appeared capable of keeping the region from crumbling.

And, of course, Eisenhower continued to pursue courses that supported the British in the region despite knowing full well that such courses aggravated many Middle Eastern states. Near the end of the year, after the British had pressured Iran into joining the Baghdad Pact, tried to push Jordan to join the organization, and had bested Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi dispute,

Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles, and Eisenhower all agreed with Nixon’s astonishment and disbelief at “such a stupid course of action.”518 Allen Dulles argued the British were trying to regain lost prestige and Foster Dulles simply stated that he had warned Macmillan not to attempt such manoeuvres.519

Of course, the administration was far from flawless in its position in the region. Late in the year, Nixon began quietly investigating what he perceived as the disparities between the administration’s policies and actions, and the Soviets’. Much of the motivation for Nixon’s investigation stemmed from his belief that the Eisenhower administration was hesitant and unsure while the Soviets were bold and certain in dealing with the Third World. Percival

Brundage, then Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, sent Nixon a report prepared by the

518 Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 22, 1955, 2-3, 271st Meeting of the NSC, December 22, 1955, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. The Buraimi dispute was, to be painfully brief, resolved when the British effectively tossed the Saudis out of Al-Buraimi, in order to protect their own claims to potential oil in the region, after becoming fed up with the Saudis attempts to subvert ongoing arbitration at Geneva through bribery. 519 Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the NSC, 2-3, DDEL. 195

Budget Bureau which analysed and explained the current and projected amount of aid to Iran,

Pakistan, Turkey, and Iraq.520 The report noted that without exception, none of the nations had actually received either the aid they had been promised, or were projected to receive such aid within the timeframes the administration set.521 Still, such setbacks, like the failings of the

British, were not cause for significant change. Although Eisenhower concurred with Nixon that

British government officials were likely ignoring sound advice from men like General Gerald

Templer, he made no mention of changing or even adjusting existing policies.522 Indeed,

Eisenhower consistently showed great resistance to altering policy in such a way to actively push the British out of the region despite the growing problems with their presence. Although the administration showed some consistency in its dealings with the British in the Middle East, the same could not be said of its treatment of Egypt. And in this inconsistency, the fact that

Eisenhower’s anti-communist pursuit of postponement had been poorly envisioned and executed was brought into relief.

Nasser tugs the Tightrope

Indeed, despite being well aware of the likely outcome, Eisenhower and Dulles attempted to delay and demur engagement with Nasser. Henry Byroade, then the U.S. ambassador to

Egypt and previously head of the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, corresponded regularly with Dulles, and consistently warned that the administration’s dealings

520 The Bureau of the Budget was part of the Executive Office of the President, akin to the National Security Council but with different prerogatives. 521 The report noted that the “U.S. did not fulfill its commitment to Turkey,” that the aid program to Iran was suffering due to a transition from providing materiel to training and similar programs, that while Pakistan had a sizeable program little had actually been delivered at the time of the report, and was only able to report on what appeared to be occurring with Iraq’s program. See Memo, Percival Brundage to Richard Nixon, November 18, 1955, 1-3, 1955, November, Box 6, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 522 Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the NSC, 3, DDEL. 196

with Nasser and Egypt were going to create problems if even the minimal goal of the administration was to keep Nasser from moving closer to the Soviets. Byroade warned Dulles that for a variety of reasons, not least of which were intense domestic pressures stemming from the ongoing series of border conflicts with Israel, Nasser needed to secure greater access to arms, but pointed out that that the existing mechanism, the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee

(NEACC) would take too long to give Nasser an answer. Byroade thus requested that either

Dulles expedite Nasser’s request or allow him to confirm the lengthy process since Nasser was already under the impression that the Eisenhower administration was “so doubtful [that it] cannot make up its mind.”523 Instead, Dulles stalled.

Byroade reported to Dulles in June that Nasser had requested he speak with an individual named Salah Salem* and that the conversation with this individual had been rather enlightening as concerned Nasser’s goals.524 Byroade refused to engage on any point of concern with Salem, who expressed concerns of encirclement and hinted Nasser simply desired to be a regional leader, and merely sent a request to Dulles that indicated it would be helpful to develop a policy on the Sudan.525 The basic theme of the conversation was that the Egyptians were expressing fear of being surrounded and isolated by the Baghdad Pact nations, Ethiopia, the U.S., Libya, the

U.K. and possibly French influence, and seeking some form of reassurance or accommodation

523 Telegram, Byroade to Secretary of State, July 14, 1954, 1, Folder 1, Box 12, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. * While it seems almost certain that Byroade spoke with Nasser’s Minister of National Guidance, Salah Salem, he made no mention of this office or title, thus leaving a small possibility that Byroade spoke with another man equally as concerned with the Egypt-Sudan union as Nasser’s minister. 524 Memo, Ambassador in Cairo to Secretary of State, July 18, 1955, 1, Reel 44 Declassification, Box 10, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 525 Byroade also that the lack of a policy was also a source of irritation for the British. Memo, Ambassador in Cairo to Secretary of State, July 18, 1955, 2-3, SML. 197

from Byroade that this fear was misplaced; as Byroade could provide neither assurance nor accommodation, he offered polite platitudes.526

These stall tactics, combined with Egypt’s growing anger with the British, French, and

Israelis caused deterioration in an already delicate relationship. The simple fact remained that the administration had not planned to engage Egypt on as large a scale as Nasser hoped, and neither Dulles nor Eisenhower considered the possibility of a similar-scale Soviet manoeuvre.

Even if the administration had been planning sweeping changes to its approach, which it had not,

Eisenhower’s heart attack left top officials scrambling to maintain stability, both within the administration and in the Third World. And when Nasser did exactly as Byroade had predicted he would if faced with stall tactics, Dulles rushed to limit the damage.

In response to Western refusals to supply his nation with arms, Nasser announced in

September that he had secured a deal to procure Soviet weaponry through Czechoslovakia. The

Soviet-Egypt arms deal created a situation in which a clash of strategic understanding occurred between Dulles and both the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. In the aftermath of the arms deal, Dulles warned against and adamantly opposed Iran entering into the Baghdad Pact, especially since the Iranians were requesting an increase in aid.527 This caused a great deal of confusion and disagreement amongst the military members of the NSC, with Secretary Wilson questioning Dulles again and again, eventually expressing “bewilderment” that Iran joining the

Baghdad Pact, which he and Dulles had up to that point agreed was both beneficial and necessary, was now something the Secretary of State stridently opposed.528 Dulles’s defense of his position, though he communicated it in awkward and needlessly vague terms which required

526 Memo, Ambassador in Cairo to Secretary of State, July 18, 1955, 3-4, SML. 527 Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, October 6, 1955, 7, 260th Meeting of the NSC, October 6, 1954, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 528 Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the NSC, 12, DDEL. 198

even Nixon to push for clarification, indicated that Dulles viewed the arms deal as both a still salvageable failure and a more complicated issue than Wilson understood. Wilson considered the debacle a failure whose damage could only be limited.

Far from well-coordinated or even stable, the Eisenhower administration’s policies for the Middle East, which were initiated and maintained with the express purpose of creating and supporting a stable anti-Soviet region, were, according to Dulles, totally upended and compromised by a single Soviet manoeuver. Dulles told the NSC that in the course of “two weeks” the Soviets had opened an entirely new front, and that the various types of aid programs the administration had put forward had never been “programmed” to anticipate such an arms deal.529 Put more plainly, Eisenhower and Dulles had approved a set of policies that could only succeed in keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East if the Soviets made no attempt to enter.530

Indeed, Nixon received a memo from the State Department drafted the next week, October 14, which attributed the Soviet moves and success in the Middle East to two factors: the “bungling” of the Eisenhower administration, and the fact, as a Soviet defector reported in his debriefing, that “mainly because there is no opposition” to Soviet advances due to the West’s inability to address or take advantage of regional issues.531 Although not entirely accurate, the memo given to Nixon at least reflects the perception of officials within the administration, as it argued that

“The main reason for Soviet advances in the Middle East are…Western, especially U.S. apathy.

529 Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 530 Dulles stated plainly that as it stood, the administration had not devoted enough economic or military aid to enable Middle East states to resist Soviet pressure, and obviously the Soviets would succeed in a military invasion. Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the NSC, 8-12, DDEL. 531 Memo, 1-2, October 14, 1955, 1955, October, Box 6, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. It is worth noting that while the generally dire picture painted by the memo places blame on the Eisenhower administration, its predictions included some rather implausible events, such as the Soviets effectively being given free rein to give arms to Israel and its enemies but only to a point of balance in which the Israelis held a slight advantage, after which “Moslem volunteers” from China would come to the aid of the Arabs and declare the “Soviet Democratic Republics of the Middle East. 199

The NSC…has treated the area as one of low priority and no policy guidance has been formulated.”532

Dulles realised that he had erred in dealing with Nasser, but, convinced he could pull the

Egyptians back from a move he was certain would upset any semblance of balance and stability in the Middle East, Dulles hoped to avoid further stirring the hornet’s nest. That Dulles was attempting such a move with the President still recuperating from his heart attack only add to the challenge. Dulles explained that by Iran joining the Baghdad Pact immediately following the arms deal, the Soviets would recognise such a move as acknowledgement that they had exploited a weak spot and the Egyptians would veer even closer to the Soviets due to an increasing perception of being isolated and targeted by Western powers.533 Part of Wilson’s bewilderment with Dulles’s argument likely stemmed from the fact that only one week earlier at the cabinet meeting on September 30, Dulles had told the cabinet, including Wilson, that while he would not go into detail, he could assure the cabinet that plans existed to deal with the arms deal.534

Pointing again to problematic lack of inter-departmental communication, Wilson was rightly caught off guard when Nixon finally asked Dulles if the situation had become so dire that the administration’s entire policy towards the Middle East needed to be re-examined and reconsidered, and Dulles answered in the affirmative.535 Thus, over the course of one week, the

532 Memo, 2, October 14, 1955, RNL. 533 This explanation can be surmised from Dulles’s various arguments and statements during the meeting, as he pointed out that if Iran wanted to join the Baghdad Pact “on its own” without any additional U.S. aid of any kind, that would be acceptable, but any appearance of U.S. pressure or persuasion had to be avoided. Dulles also continually referenced the possibility of bringing Egypt closer to the West. See, Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the NSC, DDEL. 534 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, September 30, 1955, 1, Cabinet Meeting of September 30, 1955, Box 5, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 535 Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the NSC, 12, DDEL. 200

administration went from having vague plans in place to deal with a situation to requiring an entire revision of policy.

The issue here was that Eisenhower genuinely trusted Dulles in most aspects of foreign policy, but the president had designed his administration in such a way as to effectively leash

Dulles when he so chose. An apparently unforeseen result of this design was that in

Eisenhower’s absence, Dulles’s position came into increasing question. This forced Eisenhower to take the odd step of clarifying the hierarchy of his administration in his absence. Eisenhower sent Nixon a message both for the Vice President and the other cabinet members laying out very clearly the hierarchy in the administration in regard to foreign affairs.536 Instructing Nixon to read the letter out loud, Eisenhower admonished Nixon and the cabinet to accept that they must not attempt to speak for the government, as Dulles, who was attending a foreign ministers conference and had voiced worries about being undercut by members of the administration,

“must be the one who both at the Conference [sic] table and before the world speaks with authority for our country.”537 The problem was that despite the vote of confidence from

Eisenhower, rapid developments in the Middle East combined with the administration’s standing polices left Dulles in an untenable position.

Beyond exacerbating already problematic inter-departmental relations, Eisenhower’s absence also created greater challenges for Dulles. The complexity of the challenge facing

Dulles should not be ignored, as he was forced to attempt an alteration to the administration’s position in the Middle East while simultaneously finding the means to portray the Soviets as deceptive aggressors in the region without disturbing European allies, and to do so without

536 The letter was in reference to the foreign ministers conference which was a follow-up of the “Big Four” Summit at Geneva in July. 537 Letter, Eisenhower to Nixon, Denver, Colorado, October 19, 1955, Geneva Conference – II, Special Files: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1952-1955, PPS 324.1, RNPPM, RNL. 201

creating the appearance that he was simply acting as he saw fit rather than in consultation with

Eisenhower. In late October, Dulles cabled Eisenhower to voice concern that the president’s absence was creating such complications. The Secretary noted that he had been forced to request that Harold Macmillan take a strong position at Geneva (the follow-up to the “Big Four”

Conference and the Geneva Summit earlier in the year) over the Soviet-Egypt arms deal since if

Dulles took such a position it would appear that he was undermining the more conciliatory,

“pacific” stance Eisenhower had floated earlier in the year.538 Dulles also made clear that while

Macmillan had agreed with Dulles, both men doubted Prime Minister Eden would allow such a move and that in any case Dulles would be considered to have manoeuvered the aggressive stance.539 Eisenhower sent a message the same day to Dulles stating that Dulles was constantly in his thoughts and that he had Eisenhower’s “complete confidence.”540

Eisenhower knew that such a message would be reassuring but have little effect on the proceedings at the conference, and three days later had another telegram sent to Dulles which reiterated his position in even clearer terms: if Dulles came to a conclusion on a necessary change, position, or manoeuver then “The President will send him direct instructions, unequivocal and in accordance with what he wants.”541 While he came to no such conclusion at the conference, Dulles’s analysis eventually concluded significant change was necessary. The problem insofar as Egypt was concerned was that the administration’s delay tactics had resulted in precisely the alienation both it, and Nasser, had hoped to avoid.

538 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, October 26, 1955, 1, Folder 11, Box 4, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. At the Geneva Summit, Eisenhower had proposed the infamous “Open Skies” program, a propaganda move which simultaneously portrayed Eisenhower as attempting to lower tensions and revealed his disdain for public summitry. 539 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, October 26, 1955, 1, SML. 540 Telegram, Eisenhower to Dulles, October 26, 1955, 1, Folder 11, Box 4, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 541 Memo, October 29, 1955, 1, Folder 11, Box 4, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 202

Indeed. A few weeks later, Nixon received a report from the newly formed International

Cooperation Administration (ICA) which gathered and combined data from the CIA and various

State Department bureaus on Soviet economic penetration in Asia, Africa, and the Middle

East.542 The report came to several conclusions about the seemingly expanding Soviet economic offensive, but two aspects in particular reinforced Nixon’s concerns: the Soviets appeared to be exerting minimal though persistent pressure in areas where Western influence was dominant, such as in Iran, but were also making concerted and clear overtures to areas like Egypt and

Indonesia. These were areas the administration deemed important, yet failed to formulate clear and positive policies toward.543 The report’s points on Egypt were especially concerning, as it indicated that the Egyptians’ search for help, both financial and technical, in constructing the

High Aswan Dam had thus far been resolutely and, as close to openly as possible, anti- communist.544 And although Dulles temporarily shifted positions on the High Aswan Dam project a few weeks later, Nixon’s suspicions that the administration simply was not doing enough to court and support Third World states continued to grow.

By December, Dulles had come to the conclusion that the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal necessitated a grand gesture on the administration’s end in order to keep the Egyptians from becoming a Soviet ally or proxy. At the 268th meeting of the NSC, held at Camp David while

Eisenhower’s recuperation continued, Dulles and Secretary Humphrey engaged in an extended

542 The ICA, under the directorship of John Hollister replaced Harold Stassen’s Foreign Operations Administration. The ICA absorbed the FOA’s powers and responsibility as related to implementation of non-military aspects of international aid, while military aid concerns regressed to the Department of Defense. 543 Report by the ICA: Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Near East and Asia as of November 25, 1955, 1-45, 1955, November, Box 6, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 544 The report noted that Nasser had cancelled contracts with the Soviets for their insistence of Soviet advisors being allowed into Egypt, and that he had also requested both American and European aid in building the dam in order to avoid openly the project to international bidding, which the Soviets would easily win. See Report by the ICA: Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Near East and Asia as of November 25, 1955, 16-20, RNL. 203

debate over the desirability of the administration helping to fund and construct the High Aswan

Dam. Humphrey argued that the administration should not extend aid for the project as it would mean funding socialism, possibly undermine American cotton production, and in all likelihood would cost far more than initial estimates.545 Both Dulles and Eisenhower countered by reminding Humphrey that the owner and operator of sites like the Hoover Dam was the United

States government, while Dulles argued that the cost of not aiding the Egyptians meant that the

Soviets almost certainly would, and that this would result in “losing” Egypt.546

Dulles’s other points focused squarely on the diplomatic-strategic. Dulles argued that if the administration aided Egypt, it could also exercise sufficient influence to calm Egyptian-

Israeli tensions, and, extending the idea of aiding “under-developed nations” in large-scale projects similar to the High Aswan Dam, Dulles contended that the various advantages far outweighed what he considered the pessimistic financial picture; the only worry Dulles voiced was that aid for such projects could not appear hesitant or delayed lest the Soviets swoop in with an ostensibly better offer and the American offer be rejected.547 This about-face on Dulles’s part toward Egypt, while seemingly a sign of adaptation, was a sign of neither greater consistency nor stability in the administration’s policies.548 Dulles’s hasty reaction was actually an attempt to limit the damage or otherwise salvage something from what was a clear failure on the administration’s part. The deterioration of relations with Egypt and the scramble to formulate a response was simply the most visible example in 1955 of the ongoing cycle of failures and

545 Discussion at the 268th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 1, 1955, 4-6, 268th Meeting of the NSC, December 1, 1955, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 546 Discussion at the 268th Meeting of the NSC, 6-7, DDEL. 547 Discussion at the 268th Meeting of the NSC, 4, 7-8, DDEL. Dulles argued that such large projects effective froze out the Soviet Union from a state, since the state could not risk moving towards the Soviets without risking a revolt from the fallout of such a project being terminated. 548 Indeed, by early 1956, Dulles swung back to a position of antagonising Nasser and attempting to isolate him. 204

frustrations brought on by the pursuit of postponement. This cycle continued to worsen as time progressed, as the failures became more apparent and the frustrations became more pronounced.

The Pursuit Continues

The year of Eisenhower’s heart attack revealed that despite growing acknowledgement that the administration had not been dealing with Third World regions skillfully, it was unable to initiate clear changes, and the consequences of this inability began to become apparent. Nixon’s goodwill trip displayed both that some members of the administration were aware of a need for change at least in the economic aspect of its relationship with Latin America, but that disagreement on everything from the breadth to the speed of the changes delayed significant movement. In Africa, despite mounting pressure within the administration to at least begin to prepare for the dawning of a post-colonial Africa, Eisenhower and Dulles stalled. In Asia and the Middle East, Eisenhower and Dulles were at a loss with how to deal with situations in which their actions and inactions appeared constantly under fire and problematic. Certainly,

Eisenhower’s heart attack and subsequent absence from active duty did not help matters, especially as Dulles realised the administration needed a revamped set of policies for the Middle

East. Indeed, although certain events drove home the fact that Third World issues could move quickly, and that the administration was ill-equipped to deal with such events, the administration continued to treat Third World issues as though plenty of time remained for them to be addressed. Nixon interpreted this attitude as irresponsible dawdling, and his frustration with

Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s failure to treat the Third World as seriously as he believed necessary led to growing divergence and criticism from the Vice President.

At bottom, Eisenhower perceived no pressing need for alterations because he failed to

205

discern or misjudged the severity of the consequences his choices. Although the French and the

British continued to cause headaches, they also continued to hold positions of relative strength and stability, and indisputable anti-communism, in their colonial positions. While Latin

Americans might complain about disparity or unfairness, there appeared to be little genuine threat of immediate instability or communist advance. And it was not surprising that a gathering of nations with legitimate grievances against colonial powers would express anti-colonial sentiment. Thus, in all these cases, Eisenhower considered little or no action necessary: the pursuit of postponement continued.

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Chapter Five

Walking the Tightrope (1956)

1956 was a presidential election year in the United States, and beyond the obvious challenge of the Suez Crisis, presented the administration with a variety of hurdles. The frustrations and tensions within Eisenhower’s cabinet reached a breaking-point, as discussions in the NSC more regularly transformed from debates into attacks and finger-pointing. In an ironic twist, Nixon’s discovery the previous year that the administration’s various aid programs were failing to meet their commitments became widely known within the cabinet and served both as a distraction to significant policy revision, and to reinforce Eisenhower’s belief that bureaucratic inefficiency rather than his policies were of primary concern. And while Eisenhower and Dulles independently took steps to delay or thwart entirely changes in policies, they also voiced increasing agitation and certainty that the root of the administration’s issues in the Third World was bureaucratic mishandling of policies on the ground. Nixon, although his role was somewhat diminished due to Eisenhower’s intense dislike for campaigning, which forced the Vice

President to shoulder most of the responsibilities on that end, still managed to contribute to and push for changes to the administration’s approach to the Third World. Among a variety of important points, the administration’s reaction to the Suez Crisis included the startling revelation that if Dulles had been so empowered he might well have already begun a more deliberate and clear break from colonial powers. More simply, Dulles’s reaction to Suez points to Eisenhower’s direction being at the root of the administration’s Janus-like position toward colonialism. If the previous years suggested that there were problems in the very foundation of the Eisenhower administration’s approach to the Third World, 1956 was the year the foundation began to crack.

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Paralysis on the Middle Way

The administration’s struggle to elaborate on foreign policies, beyond the basic anti- communism that took priority, remained a source of confusion and frustration, both to those in the administration and the representatives of other states. Eisenhower’s insistence on adhering to a middle way, a vague term typically applied to his insistence that his domestic policies avoid extremes on either side of the political spectrum but equally representative of Eisenhower’s conception of his foreign policies, created a confusing mire which retarded policy development, bedeviled Third World leaders, and irritated the British and the French.549 Many in the administration questioned the wisdom of such adherence, including Dulles, but all were bound to follow Eisenhower’s instructions. The problems which began to arise as a result of this approach caused increasing internal conflict within the cabinet and State Department, and also exacerbated anxieties over states and leaders charting their own middle way.

The middle way in large part explains the continuation of the deceitful attitude and refusal to initiate significant new policies in Africa. Discussing the worsening situation in

Algeria during an NSC meeting, members of the NSC began to display concerns that attempts at the middle way between supporting France while expressing sympathy and concern for the anti- colonial position and pressuring France to accommodate or compromise had failed. Allen Dulles noted that “since the French had…waited too long to permit a compromise” the only solution from the French perspective was “a major military effort.”550 After acknowledging that the situation was in fact a rebellion, Allen Dulles answered Eisenhower’s question about the size and makeup of the rebels by hinting that the French were attempting to manipulate the administration

549 Jim Newton presented a reasonable explanation and evidence of Eisenhower’s concept of and attempts to adhere to a “middle way.” See Newton, Eisenhower, 160. 550 Discussion at the 278th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 1, 1956, 1-2, 278th Meeting of the NSC, March 1 1956, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 208

into providing more military aid: the Director of the CIA stated that there were about forty thousand rebels, and that while the French claimed the rebels were heavily supported by

“Communist” involvement, he and his officials in the CIA agreed that while some rebels might be communists, the rebellion itself had nothing to do with communism.551 And yet, despite growing consensus that the French were acting in such a way that could only cause further problems for the administration’s goals, little more than head shaking and hand wringing occurred. After the Director and Admiral Radford both made comments indicating their belief that the French not only were incapable of stabilising Algeria but were also seriously beginning to strain NATO due to their colonial bungling, Eisenhower stated simply that “the French had better do anything that was necessary to get this situation cleaned up.”552 Thus, while criticism of the French, and skepticism of their ability to achieve goals mounted, the administration continued to stay the course of unclear, sometimes contradictory positions. Indeed, officials on the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) admitted that while “prolongation of the Algerian dispute adversely affects U.S. interests in North Africa as well as broader U.S. national interests” in view of the administration’s “extremely limited options” the most it could do was to pressure both sides to settle the dispute while keeping the administration’s “public involvement in the dispute to a minimum.”553 Thus, from the top down, officials in the administration were aware of growing problems, but lacked the option to alter course.

551 Discussion at the 278th Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 552 Allen Dulles informed the NSC that the French had requested hundreds of American helicopters and were planning on sending up to fifty thousand new troops to Algeria, while Radford commented that it was naïve for the administration to believe the French would succeed in Algeria when they were repeating both the military and governing errors they had committed in Vietnam. See Discussion at the 278th Meeting of the NSC, 2-3, DDEL. 553 NSC 5614/1 – Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, 6-7, October 3, 1956, NSC 5614/1 – Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria (2), Box 18, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, DDEL. 209

Indeed, despite Foster Dulles’s increasing frustration with France’s handling of the ever- deteriorating situation in Algeria, the adherence to the middle way meant conciliatory gestures were made even as irritation grew. America’s ambassador to France, Douglas Dillon, gave a speech to the Diplomatic Press Association of Paris in which he stressed the Eisenhower administration’s support for France’s liberal programs, apologised for the lack of information given to the American public on the challenges France faced in Algeria, and explained that while

America and the Eisenhower administration were proudly anti-colonialist what that actually meant was the enabling of freedom of choice, and that “such freedom of choice can take many forms.554 Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover responded for Dulles (who was away at the time) to a request from Eisenhower on the desirability of an additional statement on the administration’s position on France’s dealings in Africa, and referenced Dillon’s speech. Hoover stressed that while the State Department agreed “in general” with Dillon’s remarks, “the situation continues to deteriorate seriously in Algeria” and suggested that while Dillon had slightly bolstered French opinion he had also aggravated Muslim opinion in and around Algeria.555

Although it was becoming more and more clear that Dulles and many in the State Department were finding it increasingly challenging to adhere to the middle way, Dulles loyally followed orders.

This meant that Dulles continued to take actions which thwarted even the beginning of movement towards policy revision or creation. Henry Cabot Lodge, then ambassador to the

U.N., wrote to Eisenhower and Dulles in June pleading for an alteration of the public stance of the administration together with prior private notifications of such changes, on the topic of anti-

554 Telegram, Embassy in Paris to Secretary of State, March 20, 1956, 4, Folder 7, Box 5, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 555 Memorandum for the President, March 27, 1956, 1, Folder 7, Box 5, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 210

colonialism. Lodge argued that the administration was falling very far behind, was becoming associated with decrepit and out of date ideas, and was wasting a valuable opportunity by sticking to its middle way.556 Lodge suggested that the administration demand that within ten years colonial powers would announce a timeline for their territories to reach self-government, arguing that such a demand served a variety of purposes including: the fact that “the colonial powers have…nowhere else to go,” and that by going along with the “spirit of Bandung” the administration could shore up support in nations that had attended the Bandung conference while bolstering its support in Latin America.557 Dulles, to whom Lodge had sent a copy of his letter, sent a four line reply that he and Eisenhower had discussed a change in the administration’s public attitude towards anti-colonialism before curtly closing that his (Dulles’s) “feeling has been that conditions are not yet ripe for such a change.”558 Although a number of issues, both foreign and domestic, tied into the administration’s position on colonialism, beyond Dulles’s territorialism and Eisenhower’s preference for a middle way, the fact remained the administration was actually unprepared for a shift such as suggested by Lodge.559

As Nixon’s continued investigations revealed, there is ample evidence that one can isolate the refusal to begin changing its policies to Eisenhower and Dulles rather than reluctance or obstinacy within the State Department. Nixon’s quest to understand and play a role in the administration’s policies in the Third World continued, as the Vice President made a concerted

556 Letter, Lodge to Eisenhower, June 26, 1956, 1-3, Folder 10, Box 5, JFDHS, JFDP, SML 557 Letter, Lodge to Eisenhower, June 26, 1956, 1-3, SML. 558 Memo, Dulles to Lodge, June 29, 1956, Folder 7, Box 5, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 559 The final point will be deal with in the subsequent paragraph. The administration was aware of the problems its stance on colonialism caused. Domestically, the administration believed that race relations were damaged by its position on colonialism, and that the administration’s position on civil rights damaged race relations. Of course, it should be kept in mind that Eisenhower still considered colonial powers as necessary in order to prepare colonised peoples for self-government, and held this consideration with distinctly racist tones. See George White Jr. Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy toward Africa, 1953-1961, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 16-33. 211

push to pin down and understand policies for Africa. Early in the year, Nixon officially requested the State Department prepare materials for him covering the situation and administration policies in Africa. According to Robert Bowie, Director of Policy Planning, agencies and bureaus in the State Department actually had to gather and compile two separate reports in order to “comply” with Nixon’s request.560 The reports painted a dire picture both for

Africa and for the administration’s position therein for the future. The reports displayed that the

State Department was well aware of problems and challenges ahead in Africa, but was unable to chart a course to deal with those issues.561 Despite the continued convention of relying on

European states while pushing them to do more to prepare their colonies for independence, the report noted that economic, social, and political conditions in France’s colonies were actually deteriorating, and that while the British were acting effectively in at least militarily stabilising their colonies (while also granting that the British were the only colonial power that officially aimed to grant its holdings independence in the future), Africa was and would become more unstable as time progressed and as nations demanded and received their independence.562

The unstated argument of the reports given to Nixon was that the middle way was thwarting the ability of the administration to adapt to the reality on the ground. Although the officials writing the report took an exceptionally patronising view of Africans, those same officials were also surprisingly realistic and practical. The report noted that a good deal of the

560 Memo, Robert Bowie to Richard Nixon, February 14, 1956, 1, 1956, February, Box 7, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 561 Although the reports were prepared for the Vice President, the officials who compiled them sent a likely slightly self-interested hint with the cover of the report, which displayed an outline of Africa easily encompassing the continental U.S. and Western Europe. See State Department Report: Africa, a special assessment prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, 1956 February, Box 7, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 562 Africa, a special assessment prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, 3, 10, RNL. For example, the officials noted that the British had by that point nearly completely crushed the Mau Mau Uprising, but pointed out both that the uprising had occurred and needed to be put down through an extended military campaign was indicative that problems would continue. 212

instability of Africa in general was due to the fact that indigenous African populations were the victims of discrimination and oppression almost regardless of the type of political representation or power they tried to exercise, despite having undergone significant “Westernization.”563 And yet, the report admitted that no policies were in place or in development to address these various challenges. Possibly in response to previous failed attempts at policy formulation like the one submitted by George Allen the previous year, the second report given to Nixon pointed out that it was not the drafters’ place to suggest policies, only point out problems as they stood.

Despite disclaiming any suggestion of advocating new policies or policy revisions, the report strongly suggested that the administration needed to take action.564 Of course, the drafters of the report accepted and were providing their criticisms based on the premise that the need for action stemmed not from a drive to spread American influence but to prevent the spread of

Soviet influence.565 In a manner that lined up nicely with Nixon’s predilection to support action, the second report argued that “the world has grown too small either to permit the African colonial problem to be worked out by itself, or to allow us to disregard the international implications of what develops in the African continent,” and further pointed out that domestic pressures in the United States made inaction a costly mistake.566 Indeed, much of the second report was consistent with Nixon’s positions on the Third World. Presenting an argument Nixon fully endorsed, the drafters of the report stated that the best way to prevent Soviet influence from

563 Indeed, the report listed a variety of manners in which indigenous political expression was being frustrated to varying degrees under the French, Belgians, British, Spanish, Portuguese, and white settlers on the continent. See Africa, a special assessment prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, 8, RNL. 564 The second report also contained a thoroughly patronising perspective on Africa and Africans, describing the “ignorance, extreme poverty and…staggering backwardness of much of the African population” as one of the major impediments to a successful set of policies for the region. See State Department Report, Africa: Problems of United States Policy, 2, 1956 February, Box 7, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 565 Africa: Problems of United States Policy, 1, RNL. 566 Indeed, the report considered a kind of cycle to exist, in which racial inequalities in the United States exacerbated relations with Africa, and mistreatment/ignorance of African states exacerbated domestic issues. See, Africa: Problems of United States Policy, 1-2, RNL. 213

gaining a foothold in Africa was for the administration to take an assertive and active leadership role: this included forcing colonial powers to act in accord with U.S. “national interests,” obtaining and securing access to Africa’s most valuable strategic resources, supporting economic, cultural, and social growth on the continent, and generally “do everything possible to assure the evolution of Africa in a manner that is compatible with our national interest.”567 That this was effectively neocolonialism for the Cold War is important. The clear motivation behind these arguments was spreading or promoting pro-Americanism as a proactive means to prevent the spread of communism. However, it is equally important to understand that although economic elements certainly factored into reports and arguments like these, such elements were never the primary concern. Rather, the ideological and strategic elements which accompanied the global existential struggle in which officials like Nixon believed the United States was engaged served as the primary justification or motivating factor for such activities.

The report concluded on a note that seemed almost purpose-built for Nixon’s consumption. Arguing that although significant challenges confronted the administration in

Africa, the drafters of the report argued that if the administration continued drifting along then it would face emergencies and crises which required “desperate expedients” to resolve like it was then facing in other areas.568 Nixon clearly took these reports to heart, as many of their arguments and positions made their way into his own reports after his mission to Africa the next year. However, of greater significance is that well before Nixon’s mission many officials in the

State Department were expressing concerns not only that the administration was headed for problems in Africa if it continued to ignore the bevvy of steadily growing challenges, but that

567 Africa: Problems of United States Policy, 2, RNL. 568 Africa: Problems of United States Policy, 13, RNL. 214

those same officials suspected, as Nixon did, that the middle way was leaving the administration unprepared for the inevitable.

The central issue was that Eisenhower was convinced, despite even his own growing concerns and irritations with the British and French, that the middle way was the only feasible position in matters where they had interests. Eisenhower’s suspicions of the British and French in Africa grew throughout the year, but he was unwilling to take significant action. Eisenhower made a record in his diary of a meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Bourguiba, taking a sympathetic view of Bourguiba’s arguments after noting the deference and gratitude he had displayed for American food aid. The meeting with Bourguiba mostly confirmed Eisenhower’s suspicions that the French were simply avoiding reasonable means to conclude their conflict with

Algeria.569 Eisenhower took special note of the fact that Bourguiba stated that if his administration could convince the French to settle the conflict with Algeria fairly, the United

States would enjoy better relations in all of North Africa, “and indeed with the Arab world.”570

Eisenhower reported that he responded to this request cordially but in a non-committal fashion, stating that the United States had a great “desire” to “deal directly with each one of the Moslem

[sic] countries in order to promote our common interests.”571 It is important, however, to keep in mind that the administration continued to attempt to help France maintain its position in the newly independent states of Morocco and Tunisia. In fact, the administration, while cognizant of suspicions in France that the U.S. was intentionally undermining France’s colonial position, planned to deal with the North African countries on a bilateral basis only as a last resort.572

569 Diary Entry, Wednesday, November 21, 1956, Diary [1955-1956] (1), Box 9, DDE Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 570 Diary Entry, Wednesday, November 21, 1956, DDEL. 571 Diary Entry, Wednesday, November 21, 1956, DDEL. 572 NSC 5614/1 – Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, October 3, 1956, 1-8, DDEL. 215

Eisenhower’s opinion of the British also suffered a severe drop after the Suez Crisis. He instructed Dulles, who was in the hospital at the time, to do everything possible to “keep

Ethiopia and also Sudan as friends of the United States.”573 The reasoning for this was both that the Ethiopians had shown great deference to the American line during the Suez Crisis, and that

Eisenhower feared the British would “make a mess of it” if the administration did not bolster the

Ethiopians.574 Bolstering the Ethiopians did not mean significant divergence from the British or the middle way.

Still, problems created by the middle way were not isolated to Africa, as the administration’s ability to be perfectly clear on anti-communism while engaging in vague and vacillating approaches on other issues irritated and confused allies. Indeed, French Prime

Minister Guy Mollet complained that administration had failed to understand and educate the

American public on the fact that the conflict in Algeria “could not be considered in the same context as other colonial problems but rather as a much more difficult problem of coexistence.”575 Of course, Mollet appeared entirely oblivious to the fact that his stressing the need for the American public to understand France’s desire to “arrive at fair and liberal solutions” was greatly undercut by the fact that he immediately requested American aid in “the rapid procurement of helicopters.”576 The British were at times sympathetic to the Eisenhower administration’s concerns with France’s inability to institute stability, and often agreed to

573 Memcon from the Secretary’s Room at Walter Reed Hospital, November 12, 1956, 2, Folder 12, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 574 Memcon from the Secretary’s Room at Walter Reed Hospital, November 12, 1956, 2, SML. 575 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the State Department, March 20, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume XVIII, Africa, John P. Glennon et al. eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 250-251 576 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the State Department, March 20, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume XVIII, Africa, 250-251. 216

American requests to echo such concerns to French officials.577 The fact remained, however, as the French Ambassador informed State officials, that while European powers understood the administration’s “point of view” it was incredibly frustrating for them to deal with the administration’s seemingly constantly vague and shifting position on which side they actually supported in Africa.578

Anti-communism continued to be the most important and common element of the administration’s Third World policies, yet beyond this the administration’s middle way left it hidebound, with problematic results. Indeed, Dulles undertook a foreign mission to a variety of nations in East and Southeast Asia, as well as some Pacific Islands, and the primary topic of his concern and analysis was the state of anti-communism in each nation; and he was quite open about this fact, as he reported to Eisenhower that Chiang Kai-Shek “seemed reassured that the effect of the trip was to stiffen resistance to Communism in the area.”579 However, it was also perfectly clear that although Dulles was prioritizing what he considered the global imperative of anti-communism he was not ignoring or super-imposing such imperatives over regional concerns.

And yet, even in such conversations, Dulles admitted that the administration still lacked clarity and relied upon vague policies. Dulles reported to Eisenhower that neither he nor Chiang broached the topic of defending Quemoy and Matsu, explaining his own reluctance to bring up the topic as based on a belief that Chiang understood the administration would be “guided wholly by the circumstances of the moment…”580 This lack of clarity further resulted in

577 Memorandum from the Diplomatic Agent at Tangier to the Secretary of State, September 29, 1955, FRUS 1955- 1957, Volume XVIII, Africa, 105-106. 578 Memcon, Department of State, September 21, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume XVIII, Africa, 244-246. 579 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, March 19, 1956, 1, Folder 7, Box 5, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 580 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, March 19, 1956, 1, SML. 217

incredibly simplistic reports, since the administration lacked nuanced priorities. For instance,

Dulles wrote to Eisenhower on conversations he had with the Prime Minister and Governor

General of Ceylon, noting foremost that “They are 100 percent anti-commie [sic]…” before going on to explain to Eisenhower the Ceylonese’s most pressing concern was India and

Nehru.581 Nor was Dulles alone in expressing concern over the lack of clarity in the administration’s policies, as the vice president also raised concerns that the middle way was confusing foreign officials.

Before Nixon was sent on a mission abroad in the summer, he had to be convinced that such a mission was of at least some genuine consequence. Nixon’s increasing irritation with the administration, and his steadily growing sense of resentment at being (he believed) Eisenhower’s messenger boy, were only exacerbated when Dulles contacted him about possibly travelling to the Philippines for the nation’s tenth anniversary of independence. Dulles enquired on May 11 if

Nixon would be interested in such a trip, and while Nixon did not give an outright negative response, he hinted at his suspicion that his missions abroad were inconsequential beyond goodwill, stating “the main thing he was concerned about was that it should be made clear this trip was in the interest of the country…”582 After some bargaining, which included incentives and threats, Nixon agreed to the mission and Dulles thereafter expanded the scope to include other states, including Taiwan, South Vietnam, Pakistan, and Turkey.583 Besides displaying the friction in their mentor-protégé relationship, the conversations also point to Nixon’s belief that he was being used more for publicity and mollifying neighbours than as the genuine foreign

581 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, March 12, 1956, 1, Folder 7, Box 5, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 582 Telephone Call, Dulles to Nixon, May 11, 1956, Memoranda of Tel Conv. General May 1, 1956 to June 29, 1956 (4), Box 5, Telephone Calls Series, Papers of John Foster Dulles, DDEL. 583 Telephone Call to the Vice President, May 24, 1956, Memoranda of Tel Conv. General May 1, 1956 to June 29, 1956 (4), Box 5, Telephone Calls Series, Papers of John Foster Dulles, DDEL. 218

affairs asset he considered himself to be, and that the administration was still fumbling in its dealings with Third World nations. Nixon’s suspicions were confirmed both by his briefings and his conversations with foreign officials.

The briefings Nixon received in preparation for his mission revealed important details about the state of the administration’s policies for the various regions. A “Secret” briefing for

Nixon on the administration’s policies for Taiwan contained several indications of continuing problems in resolving what position the administration planned to take in the event of renewed hostilities.584 The briefing revealed that the administration’s policy for Taiwan was entirely based on the 1955 Mutual Security Treaty, and stated that the administration had still not made clear whether Quemoy and Matsu were to be defended in the event of an attack since this was to be left “to the discretion of the President.”585 Beyond the revelation that the administration continued its vagueness on what, exactly, it planned to do should the islands be attacked, the embassy’s briefing pointed to other problems. While admitting that aid promised to Taiwan was slow in coming, the embassy also suggested Taiwan had been improperly or inefficiently using aid it had already received, pointed out that Taiwan was “completely dependent upon the United

States for continued existence…” and that while “it is important to us that [Taiwan] continue in being…it is likewise important for us to retain some measure of control over developments in and about Taiwan.”586 The challenge, which the embassy admitted and Nixon encountered, was that the administration did not know what to do with such control even if it had it.

584 The briefing, prepared by embassy staff in Taipei, was sensitive enough to be classified only one level below Top Secret. 585 Secret Briefing: Comments on Taiwan for Vice President Nixon, 1, Taipei, Formosa, Box 3, PPS 367, RNPPM, RNL. 586 Secret Briefing, 1, 3, RNL. 219

In discussing a variety of topics with Chiang, Nixon hinted that the administration was struggling to find the means to combat the Soviet-Chinese change of tactics in Asia. Indeed, expressing a frustrations with the middle way, Nixon stated plainly that “all we can do is hold the line,” later vehemently agreeing with Madame Chiang’s insistence that maintaining the status quo did not mean remaining static.587 While Nixon argued that “imaginative ways to combat

Communist Indonesian activities” needed to be found and exploited, he conceded that the administration had not yet initiated planning such things, pointing to education programs in particular as needing greater focus.588 When Nixon reported to the NSC after his mission abroad that the administration was still confusing and disturbing its allies, he noted that the administration’s position on neutralist nations and its vagueness on where exactly the administration stood on a variety of issues were becoming extremely problematic. Nixon argued that the equivocation and unclear messages were causing issues which, if left unresolved, “could have a catastrophic effect on the entire U.S. position” in Asia.589 The problem that Nixon was pointing to was that beyond the fact that its devotion to its anti-communist middle way was confusing foreign officials, it was also leaving the administration unprepared and ill-suited to anticipate and adapt to changes in the Third World. Indeed, this was borne out by Dulles and the administration’s experiences that year with Sukarno and Nehru.

587 Record of the Conversation between the Vice President and President Chiang, July 8, 1956, 12, [Trip File. 1956. Far East], Box 7, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 588 Chiang turned this topic back to China, pointing out that by the time he retook the mainland, an entire generation would have been educated by the communists. See, Record of the Conversation between the Vice President and President Chiang, 8-13, RNL. 589 Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the NSC, 11, DDEL. 220

Dulles met with Sukarno on his way to a SEATO council meeting, and in accord with

Eisenhower’s wish from the previous year, invited him to visit the United States.590 Dulles’s conversation with Sukarno during this meeting was frank on both sides, but the problems caused by the middle way immediately placed Dulles on the defensive. The variety of issues between the two and within Indonesia itself only added to the complications. Roughly, Sukarno’s perspective on Indonesia and Indonesia’s place in the international arena was informed by his sense of nationalism, the importance he placed on religion, and a Marxist economic outlook all shaped and informed by his distinctly Javanese upbringing.591 In addition, Sukarno, not unique amongst Indonesians, was passionately opposed to colonialism and both old and new colonial powers. Perhaps the greatest sticking point for Sukarno and the Eisenhower administration was the West Irian matter.592 The administration supported the Netherlands in their refusal to cede the area (modern Western New Guinea) to Indonesia, which to Sukarno was a clear instance of either supporting or engaging in neo-colonialism; Sukarno fully appreciated that the administration had chosen to support a NATO ally for reasons of strategic priority, but this did not diminish the fact that he found such a choice insulting and to the detriment of Indonesia.593

590 Nixon had also of course advised such an invitation, though it is unlikely this played a definitive role in its being offered. 591 In a very real sense, Sukarno and Dulles shared significant similarities in that the manifold forces and experienced which shaped them into unique and often misunderstood patriots were regularly ignored. For Sukarno’s background and perspectives see Marshall Clark, “Indonesia's Postcolonial Regional Imaginary: From a 'Neutralist' to an 'All-Directions' Foreign Policy” Japanese Journal of Political Science 12, no. 2 (August 2011), 289-292; Baskara T. Wardaya, “Diplomacy and cultural understanding: Learning from US policy toward Indonesia under Sukarno,” International Journal 67, no. 4, Canada after 9/11 (Autumn 2012), 1053-1056. 592 There were obviously other matters which caused friction between the two states. Sukarno was quite open with criticism of the West and was obviously a key figure in the neutralist movement. These factors, along with Sukarno’s pragmatic approach to seeking economic aid – in that Sukarno typically sought American aid or consideration only to be rebuffed, whereupon he would seek it from the Soviets or Chinese – also caused tension. See Clark, “Indonesia's Postcolonial Regional Imaginary” 293-294. 593 Wardaya makes the convincing point that Sukarno considered himself and Indonesia to be the equal of other leaders and other states, thus he saw no need to accept slights, insults, or being ignored by Western powers. Indeed, Wardaya hints that Sukarno was likely especially sensitive to such issues from Western powers due to his anti- 221

Dulles was honest with Sukarno, stating plainly that the administration was bound to its alliances with colonial powers but strove to continue working behind the scenes for

“evolutionary” progress on decolonisation.594 This was a point Dulles, and the administration’s

European allies, genuinely considered to be true, even as Dulles grew evermore cognizant of the fact that it was a position which caused the administration to draw criticisms from both sides.

Near the end of the year, Dulles mentioned to Eisenhower that the administration was suffering from its anti-colonial policies due to its unintentional tendency to slowly push out and replace the European colonial power.595

Interestingly, Dulles hinted that the administration had no true qualms with Sukarno’s neutralist stance and only warned him of the dangers of Communism.596 Sukarno, who was growing increasingly frustrated with his struggle to establish internal stability while also waging an anti-colonial campaign, was direct in his criticisms of Dulles and Eisenhower. Sukarno made clear to Dulles that while he agreed that Communist powers were making promises they might not be able to keep, and that “promises are cheap,” he pointed out that the Soviets’ promises to support nations resist or push out imperial powers were clear and encouraging whereas the

colonial mindset and inherent suspicion of such powers. Wardaya, “Diplomacy and cultural understanding “Diplomacy and cultural understanding” 1055-1057. 594 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Conversation between Secretary of State and President Sukarno, March 14, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia, John P. Glennon and Robert J. McMahon, eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 242 595 Dulles’s point was that while the administration was unrepentantly morally opposed to colonialism, the appearance that it was simply evicting European powers only to take up residence, specifically in Vietnam and the Middle East, created a sense of betrayal amongst the British and French especially. See Memcon, December 3, 1956, 1, Folder 11, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 596 Dulles reported this point as one of the principal achievements of his talk with Sukarno. See Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, March 13, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, 239. Dulles also considered this advice to have been considered and followed by Sukarno, as he reported to the Cabinet on March 23 that a “satisfactory government” had been formed in Indonesia in part due to his invitation to Sukarno to visit the U.S. See Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, March 23, 1956, 1, Cabinet Meeting of March 23, 1956, Box 7, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 222

Eisenhower administration was “not as clear now” on the point of Asian nationalism.597 Indeed, although Dulles displayed awareness of Sukarno’s concerns when in Indonesia, once Sukarno had visited the United States, then later the U.S.S.R. and China, Nixon’s prediction that the middle way was contributing to the administration’s inability to anticipate or deal with changes proved true.

Certainly not every member of the administration was incapable of anticipating or dealing with changes in the Third World, but the sensitivity displayed by the administration to such changes points to the middle way’s stultifying effects. Sukarno’s visit was a goodwill trip in the strictest sense, with no official conversations occurring between himself and Eisenhower or

Dulles, but it was successful in that the administration was for a time convinced Sukarno was at least marginally pro-West. Hugh Cumming, ambassador to Indonesia, recommended the administration work out some kind of aid package to offer to Sukarno, noting that Sukarno would still almost certainly accept Soviet aid, but that an American offer would help remove the appearance of hesitation on the administration’s part.598 Indeed, Cumming and others who appreciated Sukarno’s own middle way understood the balancing acts he attempted. And yet, when Sukarno visited the U.S.S.R. and China later in the year, and praised some of their policies and economics, this caused a great deal of concern within the administration. Still, it warrants noting that most Foreign Service and State notes from this time were not nearly as dire or total as has been suggested by some historians.599

597 Neither individual made reference to specific promises or detailed the type of promises to which they referred. See Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, March 14, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, 240-242. 598 Telegram, Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, May 11, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, 264. 599 McMahon argued that Sukarno’s seeming pro-Communist statements after his trip to the U.S.S.R. and China “dissipated whatever goodwill still lingered”. While there is indisputable evidence many in the administration were 223

Nonetheless, the reaction to Sukarno’s comments points to the blinders the middle way placed on many in the administration. State Department officials voiced concern over Sukarno’s kind words for his Soviet and Chinese hosts and his acceptance of a Soviet aid package, but

Ambassador Cumming took it upon himself to attempt to calm such worries: Cumming pointed out that Sukarno was known to have embraced socialist economics, would obviously be impressed by the apparent unity, stability, and prosperity he was shown in China, and had never hidden the fact that he appreciated both Communist states’ unequivocal anti-colonial stance.600

Cumming obviously knew better than to point out that Sukarno had sought American aid before the Soviet aid was offered, and that the administration had rebuffed the Indonesian.601 The problem was that by adhering so strictly to the middle way, many in the administration focused on the only clear factor in their foreign policy, anti-communism.

This meant that those with more nuanced understandings of local conditions struggled to be heard whenever apparently pro-communist actions were taken by leaders like Sukarno.

Indeed, even Dulles’s daily bulletin, prepared by the State Department as a summary of recently received and analysed communications and events from various offices, presented competing views. Anxieties over communist inroads led to the suggestion that Sukarno was steadily moving towards overt alignment with the Soviets and Chinese, while Cumming argued that at worst, Sukarno’s praise and acceptance of Soviet aid should be taken by the administration as simply “establishing a balance” since Sukarno had also requested several treaties, military aid,

concerned over Sukarno’s remarks, many were also able to examine the comments more rationally. See McMahon, “The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia,” 84. 600 Cumming also pointed out that much of the worry ignored the incredibly positive and friendly things Sukarno had said about America. See Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, October 27, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, 316-319. 601 Ragna Boden, “Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia,” Journal of Cold War Studies 10, No. 3, (Summer 2008), 115. 224

and negotiations on accepting the Fulbright program into Indonesia.602 In this instance, cooler heads advised that Sukarno was actually acting as neutrally as he could.603 While it was highly unlikely the administration would suddenly shift away from the Netherlands to Indonesia on the

West Irian issue, granting Sukarno’s requests for aid or acting quickly on Ambassador

Cumming’s advice to streamline ongoing negotiations on other issues were all viable alternatives to the dallying approach that was adopted.604 Indeed, the marriage of anti-communism and the middle way created a significant conceptual hurdle whenever the administration dealt with neutralist leaders.

While Dulles had tried, and mostly failed, to accommodate Sukarno’s neutralism, this was equally true of Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s interactions with Nehru. Nehru visited the United

States in late December, and both before and after his visit it was clear that neither Eisenhower nor Dulles truly accepted Nehru was neutralist. Although Nehru and Indian officials had nearly completed the basic consolidation of the Indian state by 1956, the process of defining and solidifying the India domestically as well as internationally continued.605 Excepting its regional conflict with Pakistan, Nehru’s India pursued neutralism for both practical and ideological reasons. Ideologically, Nehru abhorred the idea of India struggling free from one domination only to embrace another, while practically, India’s need for economic assistance as well as its

602 Daily Briefing, Far East, October 30, 1956, Folder 7, Box 8, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 603 It is worth noting that much of the sensitivity to Sukarno’s acceptance of Soviet aid simply must be attributed to the administration’s belief that acceptance of Soviet aid had been the key ingredient in destabilising the Middle East and emboldening Nasser against Western interests. 604 Cumming, for example, pointed out that Indonesia’s Foreign Minister had sought him out after Sukarno’s return in order to request continuing and pending negotiations on a number of matters move forward. See, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, October 27, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, 316- 319. 605 Domestically, Nehru was still contending with numerous economic, cultural, and religious divisions and challenges. The basic point is that while Nehru was clearly the most prominent and powerful individual, this did not mean India or even Nehru’s Indian National Congress party had fully consolidated. See Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 225

proximity to the Soviet Union and Communist China (alongside its relative military weakness therein) meant a neutralist stance made the most sense for India.606

That attempting to avoid antagonising either superpower or China while seeking economic ties with both was a sensible strategy for India did not mean the Eisenhower administration considered it acceptable. During one meeting before Nehru’s visit, Dulles made a point of voicing his skepticism of Nehru’s brand of neutralism to Eisenhower, admitting neutrality was “tricky” but denying one could be neutral between the two opposed types of

“world order” being developed by the United States and Soviet Union.607 Indeed, while Dulles had considerable grievances with the middle way, he in no way questioned the priority attached to anti-communism. Eisenhower too found it difficult to accept that Nehru truly hoped to avoid being tied to either the West or the communists but in a more optimistic rather than skeptical self-delusion. In meeting with Nehru, Eisenhower attempted to sell Nehru on the dangers of the

Soviets, but also clearly searched for Nehru’s fundamental security concerns as well as offering the potential of a closer personal relationship; Eisenhower suspected some issue with Pakistan was at the heart of Nehru’s refusal to move closer to the West.608 Eisenhower came away from

606 Boris Niclas-Tölle, The Socialist Opposition in Nehruvian India 1947-1964, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH, 2015); Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy, (London: Macmillan, 2008). I take it as granted that the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict/war sufficiently demonstrated both that India was ill-prepared for a large-scale conflict with either the Soviet Union or Maoist China, and that Nehru’s pacifism was flexible. See John Garver, “China's Decision for War with India in 1962,” New Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy, Robert S. Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 86-90; D. K. Palit, War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962 (New Delhi: Lance International, 1991). 607 Memcon, December 3, 1956, 1, SML. 608 It is worth noting as a point regarding sources that Ann Whitman, the President’s secretary, made specific note in her Top Secret memorandum of the conversation between Eisenhower and Nehru that it was “Practically Impossible to hear the Prime Minister” thus what Nehru said must be cobbled together from the notes as well as Eisenhower’s later conversation with Dulles on the topic. See Memorandum of Conversation, December 19, 1956, Dec. ’56 Diary, Box 20, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. The implication Eisenhower made was rather clear, as he told Nehru he also regularly corresponded with King Saud. In several ways, Eisenhower hinted that Nehru could expect greater aid in various senses if he were willing to move closer to the West. Indeed, Eisenhower had believed that in the 226

the interaction thoroughly convinced that Nehru was at least moderately pro-U.S., and was also encouraged by Nehru’s agreement with the administration’s attempts to hasten the decline of

Communism peacefully.609 Dulles was skeptical both that the talks with Nehru had been a positive as Eisenhower claimed, and that Nehru had actually offered any sound or viable insights.610

Tinkering to the Brink

Eisenhower’s resolute belief in the middle way did not in any way dictate inaction.

However, Eisenhower continued to believe that his middle way and the policies he had already adopted were sufficient to meet the challenges of the Third World. The combined result of these two beliefs was that Eisenhower continually tinkered with policies and the mechanisms related to their activation and continuance. The problem with such an approach was that it worsened the administration’s already troubled ability to institute long-term planning, entrenched the administration in areas it had hoped to avoid, and, in the case of Latin America, led to deceptive and dysfunctional band aid solutions.

By April, Eisenhower began absolving himself of blame for the administration’s continued difficulty instituting long-term planning. In a conference with Admiral Radford (who made the claim that he understood the security position of the administration, military and diplomatic, better than any other single official) Eisenhower made the backhanded statement that since cabinet officials and officers were so busy with day-to-day activities it was a “fallacy” to wake of the Hungarian Crisis, and just prior to Suez, that Nehru might be willing to align more closely with the U.S. See Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, October 29, 1956, 1, Folder 3, Box 6, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 609 Telephone Call, Eisenhower to Dulles, December 19, 1956, 1, Dec. ’56 Phone Calls, Box 20, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL 610 Telephone Call, Eisenhower to Dulles, December 19, 1956, 1-2; Telephone Call, Eisenhower to Dulles, December 18, 1956, Dec. ’56 Phone Calls, Box 20, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL 227

expect that one could rely on them for long-term planning.611 Of course, Eisenhower ignored the fact that he continued to tinker and experiment not just with his cabinet, but with his “ideas” for the Third World. One such idea, the rebalancing of the Middle East around King Saud bin

Abdulaziz Al Saud along with greater cooperation with the British, placing greater pressure on

“perhaps Egypt,” and simultaneously having the United States join the Baghdad Pact while assuring Israel of its security while finding the means to keep it from taking actions which would cause it be attacked, took up a good deal time and resources being considered by various departments.612 And while the administration pondered what to do in the Middle East, it was becoming ever more entrenched in Vietnam.

Both Dulles and Eisenhower took steps which further committed the administration to

Vietnam, neither seeming to recognise the slow escalation of commitments. William Donovan, former ambassador to Thailand from 1953-1954 wartime director of the Office of Strategic

Services,, wrote to Eisenhower on the issue of continuing support for Diệm in Vietnam and his concerns about the looming elections in Vietnam, requesting they be deferred due to the

“imminent danger” facing South Vietnam.613 Eisenhower shared the letter with Dulles, expecting his thoughts, but responded to Donovan reassuringly, stating “As you know, I consider that President Diệm is the most potent force we have in South Viet Nam [sic] to help halt the

611 Radford complained that he often attempted to get Cabinet officers or their superiors interested in what he considered to be looming threats, but that he frequently was unsuccessful. Memorandum of Conference with the President, April 18, 1956, 1, Apr. 56 Goodpaster, Box 15, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 612 Eisenhower closed a meeting with the JCS by discussing this idea, and although Eisenhower was clear that parts of the discussion were simply ponderings, he described building up Saud, working with the British, joining the Baghdad Pact and reassuring while controlling Israel as “necessities.” The quote of “perhaps Egypt” refers to Eisenhower’s almost casual suggestion that testing Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East could best be achieved by attempting to stabilise actions in other areas of the region while ramping up pressure on one area. See Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 30, 1956, 4, Apr. 56 Goodpaster, Box 15, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 613 Letter, William J. Donovan to Dwight Eisenhower, February 5, 1956, 1, Folder 5, Box 5, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 228

arrogant march of Communism. We shall certainly do our best to support him.”614 What this support entailed had undergone an interesting expansion, as in reminding Eisenhower of the administration’s position in South Vietnam, Dulles pointed out a significant change.

Whereas in 1954, Eisenhower had stated unequivocally that the administration’s goal for

Indochina was simply to stabilise and, to the extent possible, fortify it against Communist takeover or subversion, Dulles’s reminder for Eisenhower on the means to achieving those goals showed evidence of tinkering and growing entrenchment. While the first two means for achieving a strong South Vietnam, strengthening Diệm’s position and maintaining stability while working to terminate the Geneva Accords and replace them with something more acceptable, were essentially consistent with the administration’s position in 1954, the third goal pointed to the administration’s tinkering resulting in greater entrenchment in the region.615 Dulles listed

“weakening of North Vietnam by political and psychological warfare” as the administration’s third goal; and given the still hectic situation in South Vietnam, the source of support for this political and psychological warfare hardly needed explaining.616 And, of course, such a change could not have gone ahead without Eisenhower’s approval. The significance of this new objective, beyond the fact that it revealed the growing entrenchment of the United States in

Vietnam, is that it serves as yet another example of Eisenhower believing that with only minor modifications and experimentation, the administration could adequately address mounting problems in the Third World.

This trait also contributed to the administration’s spasmodic responses to issues in Latin

America. Although Eisenhower, more than Dulles, was concerned about the possible

614 Letter, Eisenhower to William J. Donovan, February 7, 1956, Feb ’56 Miscellaneous (5), Box 13, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 615 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, February 10, 1956, 1, Folder 5, Box 5, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 616 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, February 10, 1956, 1, SML. 229

ramifications the Soviet Economic Offensive (SEO) might have in Latin America, this did not lead to significant changes to either the administration’s perspectives or policies toward the region. The SEO, the label given to the Soviet Union’s offer of expanded aid and trade to much of the Third World, which began roughly in 1954 and escalated as Khrushchev solidified his hold on power, was the source of much concern in the administration and Western states in general.617 The SEO was at the time considered a threat to Western interests as the Soviets offered generous and flexible terms to developing resource exporting states, often directly undermining or at least challenging Western positions.618

Early in the year, Dulles had Nixon meet with Brazil’s new president, Juscelino

Kubitschek, and Eisenhower decided to meet with Nixon to get his evaluation of Kubitschek.

While Nixon described Kubitschek as energetic and industrious, Eisenhower quickly dropped the subject when Nixon suggested increasing aid.619 Eisenhower argued that Brazil’s ambassador needed to “make the next move” as regarded getting advice on the best way to attract American capital on a fair basis, but awkwardly changed subject when Nixon stated Brazil’s greatest need was capital, not advice.620 Although interested and concerned, Eisenhower still hoped to avoid

617 Former Director of the Bureau of the Budget Joseph Dodge reported that Soviets were using the offensive to attack the “economic, trade, and political stake of the British and other European allies” in the Third World. See, Memorandum from the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy to the Under Secretary of State, January 16, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume X, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Glennon et al. eds (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 288-289. 618 For example, in early 1957, Willard Thorp analysed the roots of the SEO. Thorp argued a number of points, such as that although the SEO was obviously a threat, it should not have been unexpected that the Soviet Union would exchange manufactured goods for the raw resources of many emerging Third World states since such an exchanged benefited all sides and had the added bonus of undercutting the West while tying those Third World states closer to the Soviets. See Willard L. Thorp, “American Policy and the Soviet Economic Offensive." Foreign Affairs 35, No. 1 (January 01, 1957), 271-275. 619 Diary Entry, Meeting with the Vice President, February 7, 1956, 1, Diary-Copies of DDE personal [1955-56] (2), Box 9, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 620 Diary Entry, Meeting with the Vice President, February 7, 1956, 1, DDEL. Eisenhower spent the remainder, and most, of the meeting complaining about campaigning and not wanting to have to support local Republicans, Nixon pointed out the rising importance of television, and Eisenhower then complained about the splits and factions in the Republican Party. 230

increased costs, especially in an election year. Still, the fact remains that well into the SEO, which had already caused Eisenhower considerable anxiety over how to best counter new, non- military overtures, Eisenhower continued to avoid exploring the possibility of actually expanding foreign aid to include grants and soft loans.621 Indeed, Eisenhower’s insistence on tinkering combined with his belief that his fundamental policies were sound resulted in his adoption of a short-sighted, short-term, public relations manoeuvre.622

Eisenhower’s desire to address growing concerns on Latin America to stem the Soviet’s economic offensive compelled him to delay revising the administration’s policies for Latin

America, arguing the Soviet’s moves necessitated greater study before a sufficient policy review could be made. Of course, Eisenhower was not alone in his skepticism that extensive changes were needed. The State Department clearly had mixed feelings about the need to meet this threat with new policies or actions. This owed in part to the fact that some officials, such as Special

Assistant Spencer King, believed that while moderate increases in trade between the Soviets and states like Brazil were inevitable, a combination of Latin Americans’ basic ideological opposition to communism and the yet-to-materialise increase in Soviet or Communist bloc political interest in Latin America meant that the Eisenhower administration was not facing an

621 This is hardly a novel argument, but it merits restating in this context simply because of the abruptness with which Eisenhower changed topics. For others making a similar argument see Bevan Sewell, “A Perfect (Free- Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America,” Diplomatic History 32, No. 5 (November 2008), 841-843; Michael R. Adamson, “’The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’? The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World,” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds., (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006), 56; Matthew Loayza, “An ‘Aladdin’s Lamp for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953- 61,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, No. 3 (September 2003), 87-88. 622 The Policy Planning Staff argued that more expansive activities were necessary in an April 6 report, in which the staff broadly warned against short or long term “complacency.” See Study Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff: Soviet Economic Penetration, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume X, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, 13-18. 231

imminent crisis.623 Indeed, as Undersecretary Hoover concluded in early May, “there was no great urgency for a review of [the] policy toward Latin America.”624 This coincided nicely with

Eisenhower’s belief that his basic policies were sound, but spurred the search for a minor act which might make them more effective.

The Meeting of the American Presidents in Panama, from July 21 through 22 presented

Eisenhower with an opportunity to experiment with such tinkering. Indeed, Eisenhower admitted that the most he hoped for from the meeting was that it be considered a great public relations success and that each of the presidents he met would consider his attendance as

“practically a personal visit to his particular country.”625 In clearer terms, Eisenhower considered the entire trip a goodwill mission rather than significant from a policy perspective.

Eisenhower and Dulles were convinced that the aid programs already in place were more than sufficient both to meet possible local needs and to vaccinate Latin American states against communist influence; the problem was in properly delivering the aid, and the individual states utilising the aid properly.626 And thus, Eisenhower went to Panama armed with a partially

623 Paper Prepared by the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, May 29, 1956, FRUS 1955- 1957: Volume VII, American Republics: Central and South America, John P. Glennon et al. eds (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 701-702. 624 Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 3rd, 1956, 15, 283rd Meeting of the NSC, May 3 1956, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 625 Diary Entry, July 25, 1956, 1, July ’56 Diary, Box 16, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. It is also worth noting that Eisenhower refused to commit to actually attending the conference without first conferring with Dulles, see Memcon, April 24, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957: Volume VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, John P. Glennon and N. Stephen Kane eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 438- 439. 626 In 1956, the administration estimated its expenditures for Latin America in 1957 would total roughly 138.9 million USD (1956 dollars). Of this amount, 61 million was devoted for defense support and military assistance. In fact, the administration’s combined actual spending in 1954 and 1955 with its estimated spending up to 1959, and military spending and defense support together accounted for slightly less than half total spending; 685.6 million was the total real plus envisioned budget, and 326.1 million was the total real plus envisioned allotment for military and defense. Remaining funds were divided amongst seven other programs (Technical Support, general funding to the OAS, OAS Technical Cooperation, funding for the Inter-American Highway, funding for the Rama Road, Information Services, and Educational Exchanges). Note that these numbers did not include loans by either the Ex- Im Bank or the IBRD Bank, which the NSC considered as separate entities. It is important to recognise that the 232

formed, ill-considered proposal intended both to drum up goodwill and possibly strengthen the

Organization of American States.

Eisenhower’s actions confirmed that he continued to experiment impulsively and tinker in such a way as to delay any significant immediate changes. Eisenhower delivered a speech during the Conference in which he proposed the formation of a committee made up of a single representative from each state in the OAS in order to make “our Organization of American States a more effective instrument…we could look for practical suggestions in the economic, financial, social and technical fields which our Organization might appropriately adopt.”627 The two inherent risks to Eisenhower’s proposal were that it would either fail to garner the interest and goodwill he wanted and thought necessary to at least temporarily stave off interest in Soviet outreaches, or that the proposal would succeed in achieving Eisenhower’s immediate objectives but would fail to accomplish both the goals outlined in his speech and the expectations arising from them. Eisenhower wagered that achieving his immediate objectives in spectacular fashion would create enough time and goodwill to avoid failure in the long-term: he assured his audience at Panama that “So earnestly, my friends, do I believe in the possibilities of such an

NSC’s policies for the region explicitly advised using economic aid and “other measures” to “encourage” Latin American countries to base their economies around private enterprise and to “create a political and economic climate conducive to private investment…” At the time, Argentina and Brazil appeared as the most pressing concerns for the administration, as neither showed acceptable understanding of the need to “properly” develop their oil resources nor were considered to be dealing with “Ultra-Nationalism” strongly enough. See NSC 5613/1 US Policy on Latin America Progress Report, September 11, 1957, 10-19, NSC 5613/1 Policy toward Latin America (2); NSC 5613/1 OCB Report (May 21, 1958), 10, Box 18, WHO OSANSA, Records, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, DDEL.

627 Dwight Eisenhower, Address at the Signing of the Declaration of Principles at the Meeting of Presidents in Panama City, July 22, 1956, The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1956 : containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1956, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 2005), 611. 233

Organization…that in my own case…I shall ask my brother, Milton Eisenhower…to be my

Representative…”628

And yet, despite Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for the idea he proposed, it was immediately clear that the idea itself was the only element to which he and the administration had given any thought. Despite a bevy of factors which should have allowed the State Department to be prepared for reactions to Eisenhower’s proposal, Dulles and the State Department were somehow caught unprepared when Latin American representatives immediately and enthusiastically began pressing for details and clarity on Eisenhower’s proposal.629 Thus, when Dulles had a telegram sent to each of the leaders of nations that had attended the Panama Conference, he reminded

Eisenhower that he was clarifying and solidifying Eisenhower’s proposal, and that the response needed to be sent quickly as neither the State Department nor any other agency was able to comment publically until each respective government had been sent at least some form of explanation and confirmation of the proposal.630

Nor was the administration clear on exactly what Milton’s objectives were or how he would achieve them. And, for an idea that was intended to cut down on bureaucratic dallying and inflation, the result was, from the outset, problematic; by the end of the first meeting held with Milton Eisenhower present on the topic of the administration’s goals for the project, four

628 Eisenhower, Address at the Signing of the Declaration of Principles at the Meeting of Presidents in Panama City, July 22, 1956, The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 611. 629 While it is certainly the case that both Dulles and the State Department initially presumed Eisenhower’s role would be ceremonial at best, indeed a telegram sent to all embassies in the region noted that the entire conference would be “ceremonial and commemorative” without any “substantive discussions” planned, the fact remains that Dulles attended the Conference with Eisenhower, Dulles helped craft Eisenhower’s speech, and Dulles’s Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland formulated Eisenhower’s eventual proposal, thus, each man had full knowledge of the proposal and should have considered its impact. See Circular Telegram from the Secretary of State to all Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics, May 16, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957: Volume VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 441-442. 630 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, August 7 and August 6, FRUS 1955-1957: Volume VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 453. 234

separate sub-committees were established in order to advise the President’s brother on recommendations.631 The problem was that by admitting there were problems in the OAS, and suggesting that solving them would have a vast array of benefits, Eisenhower not only created hope, but an expectation amongst Latin American states and peoples that he and his administration understood that the state of affairs needed to be revised. Further, by appointing

Milton, Eisenhower created the impression that the proposal was a pressing and prestigious matter concerned with strengthening Latin America, not simply fortifying it against communist influence.632 However, as would become clear that year and the years thereafter, the administration had no intention of significantly altering its basic position on aid to Latin

America, and Eisenhower did not actually consider the state of affairs between the United States and Latin America to be problematic.

Suez and Eisenhower’s Tightrope

Although the Suez Crisis was hardly directly related to Eisenhower’s tinkering or his middle way, both of those elements clearly contributed to the issue. While unequivocally anti- colonial in a moral sense, the administration’s vacillation in its treatment of Nasser, its indulgence of France’s heavy handed actions in Algeria, its close partnership with the British in

631 Milton Eisenhower understood his duties to be to strengthen the OAS so as to make UN activities in the region unnecessary, to increase interest and involvement in various states of the OAS in the OAS, and establishing some form of place for the OAS in nuclear development and research. All of this was intended to, as Henry Holland stated at the beginning of the meeting, “make the Organization of American States a more effective instrument in the fields of finance and economy, technical assistance and social welfare.” See Memcon, August 17. 1956, FRUS 1955-1957: Volume VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 456-461. 632 The glib response is that Dulles and Eisenhower considered such things synonymous. Dulles and Eisenhower appeared to have genuinely hoped the proposal would result in changes to the OAS and its functioning, however the objective for such changes was unequivocally anti-communism. Nonetheless, Eisenhower and Dulles were fully cognizant of humanitarian, governmental, and economic problems in Latin America, they simply did not consider them more important that anti-communism. See Circular Telegram from the Secretary of State to all Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics, August 12, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957: Volume VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 454-456. 235

the Middle East, and a variety of other factors which caused both internal and external confusion over what the administration planned to do in the Middle East certainly did not help to avert the crisis. Moreover, while Dulles faithfully carried out Eisenhower’s directions, it became clear not only that the two had misjudged the situation in Egypt, but that Dulles’s frustration with the

British and French empires reached a breaking point. Indeed, before the end of the Suez Crisis,

Dulles’s anti-colonial fervor led to an exchange which revealed that Dulles was in fact willing to begin both planning and action which would lead the administration to take genuine and open steps against colonialism, but also revealed Eisenhower demanding the administration stay the course on the middle way.

Early in the year, Dulles continued to pursue and develop policies which were meant to treat Nasser in a positive vein. Of particular importance is that Dulles began to hint to

Eisenhower that Nasser might be the key to the administration playing a greater role in the

Middle East without the need for consultation with or reliance upon the British. In a startlingly blunt conversation, Dulles laid out a shift that would mean greater U.S. support of Egypt, the slow removal of Britain and France from the region, Israeli isolation but protection, and an arrangement in which Egypt would become a regional hegemon only slightly offset by the hypothetically friendly Baghdad Pact nations.633 Dulles believed that the position of “flexibility” the administration had apparently maintained in the region meant that it could place Nasser in the position as leader of the Arab world, refocus the Baghdad Pact against the Soviet Union, and bring stability to the entire region.634

633 Memorandum of Conversation at the White House, January 11, 1956, 1-2, Folder 9, EFJFP, JFDP, SML. 634 Memorandum of Conversation at the White House, January 11, 1, SML. 236

The Secretary of State understood, and explained exactly what the administration should avoid if it hoped to leave this option open. Dulles admitted that while such an arrangement could be made, the administration should not attempt to use trade goods (such as cotton) or funding for the High Aswan Dam project as means to leverage Nasser, as such ploys would simply aggravate the Egyptian and confirm his suspicions. And, Dulles believed that if the administration and possibly the British contributed funds to resettle Palestinian refugees, the challenges with Israel would be settled since “Israel from now on would have to play the part of a good neighbor…Unless the Israelis realised this, they were doomed.”635 Dulles and Eisenhower continued to try to win Nasser over throughout January and February.

Eisenhower attempted to play a helpful part in bringing Nasser closer to the West through a variety of means, and yet when he was not successful decided to adopt policies that were almost certain to have the opposite effect. Responding to a letter from Nasser in which he had stated clearly (without elaboration) that there were a variety of means through which the anger of the “Arab States” at Israel and Israel’s fears could be resolved “in the interest of peace” which he would support, Eisenhower wrote to Egypt’s leader in friendly and encouraging terms.636

Eisenhower hinted in rapid succession that if Nasser played a leading role in reducing tensions with Israel, his government could expect greater funding, support, and assistance from the United

States.637 Still, Eisenhower stressed the importance of the personal level, informing Nasser that his previous and future conversations with American officials allowed Eisenhower to feel that he

635 Memorandum of Conversation at the White House, January 11, 2-3, SML. 636 Nasser argued he greatly desired peace, and would never initiate a conflict, but that he had to consider the destabilisation Israel had caused in the Middle East and the “injustice” suffered by Arab peoples in Palestine. See Letter, Nasser to Eisenhower, February 2, 1956, 1, Egypt (1), Box 9, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 637 Eisenhower stated that resolution of the current issues would mean the U.S. could give greater attention to helping the Arab people realise their aspirations, and pointed to the High Aswan Dam as a wonderful and peaceful project for Egypt to pursue. See, Letter, Dwight Eisenhower to Gamel Abdel Nasser, February 27, 1956, 1-2, February ’56 Miscellaneous (1), Box 13, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 237

was “becoming better acquainted with you,” pointing out the importance Eisenhower attached to personal diplomacy.638

However, when Eisenhower received a report that Nasser was not being as compliant over tensions with Israel as the president had hoped, and that Nasser was generally not following a clearly pro-Western line, Eisenhower impulsively pivoted. Despite being informed that isolating Egypt would drive Nasser to the Soviets, Eisenhower recorded that “I am certain of one thing. If Egypt finds herself…isolated from the rest of the Arab world, with no ally in sight except Soviet Russia, she would very quickly get sick of that prospect and join us…”639 With that conclusion, Dulles was ordered effectively to abandon the only recently adopted outreach.

Dulles swung back towards antagonising Nasser and Egypt, but now committed fully to a course he knew would not achieve the desired results.

Dulles knew and was told that Nasser feared encirclement, felt disrespected, and generally hoped to be treated as the key leader of the Middle East. In a memorandum he submitted during a meeting with the President on March 28, Dulles argued to Eisenhower that since Nasser refused to “adopt a policy of conciliation toward Israel” and erroneously behaved as if he could continue to “cooperate…with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most- favored-nation treatment from the United States” the administration needed to alter its position toward Nasser.640 Although Dulles claimed his proposals were designed to push Nasser back to a more Western alignment, in reality Dulles was attempting to intimidate and isolate Nasser into submission. As well, despite his consistent complaints about working with the British and his knowledge that such actions only further alienated a region still struggling to escape from British

638 Letter, Eisenhower to Nasser, February 27, 1956, 2, DDEL. 639 Diary Entry, March 8, 1956, 3, March ’56 Diary, Box 13, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 640 Memorandum for the President, March 28, 1956, 1, Folder 3, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 238

influence and control, Dulles informed Eisenhower that “the policies…would in the main be coordinated with the United Kingdom.”641 Indeed, Dulles’s proposals, both individually and together indicate he had either utterly fumbled dealing with Nasser, or he was following

Eisenhower’s order with total commitment despite believing they were doomed to fail.

And, Dulles’s plans suggest the latter as a more likely explanation. Dulles planned to continue denying Egypt American or British arms, to draw out and delay negotiations on the

High Aswan Dam, to delay delivery of various aid packages, delay delivery of trade goods, and to pressure Iraq to allow the administration to construct more powerful radio broadcast facilities in order to “counter Egyptian broadcasts.”642 It would be credulous to believe that Dulles, after admonishing the NSC that delaying or hesitating on aid, and acting in any manner other than upfront and supportive on the High Aswan Dam project, would serve only to drive Nasser closer to the Soviets now thought taking exactly such actions intentionally would create entirely the opposite outcome. And yet, Dulles’s plans for the region doubled down on the idea that Nasser could be intimidated into subservience. Dulles’s plan was built on contradictions that could never have achieved this goal. A key element of Dulles’s proposal was to make Nasser feel as if

Egypt was being encircled and surrounded by strong, pro-Western states. This included devoting resources with the U.K. to keep the Sudan from moving toward Egypt, stabilising Libya, pushing the U.K. to strengthen its ties to Jordan while also searching for the means to bring Saudi Arabia closer to the U.S., dramatically increasing aid to Baghdad Pact nations both in number and quality (Dulles suggested sending higher quality and higher ranked officials to meetings as one

641 Memorandum for the President, March 28, 1956, 1, SML. 642 Memorandum for the President, March 28, 1953, 1-2, SML. 239

example), strengthening Lebanon, increasing military aid to Ethiopia, and looking

“sympathetically” on any Western nation that chose to sell arms to Israel.643

Of course, Dulles also considered some alternatives to this action. The Secretary of State maintained that the administration should continue to push the United Nations for a means of stabilising the entire area, but also closed his arguments with the call for “more drastic action in the event that the above actions do not have the desired effect,” actions which remained classified until recently.644 These more drastic actions included manipulating the price of cotton on the international market in order to damage Egypt’s economy, building more facilities across the Middle East to jam Egyptian broadcasts, and working with the British to overthrow the government in Syria and installing “one more friendly to Iraq and the West.”645 Thus, although it obviously did not occur, the administration was looking favourably on yet another coup in the

Middle East. That Dulles considered a coup might be necessary in order for Eisenhower’s orders to succeed points to just how problematic the Secretary considered the situation.

For his part, Eisenhower both went along with and later claimed some of Dulles’s proposals as his own, but rather than recognizing the problems in the proposal, actually contributed further problems to the final position. During the meeting which led to Dulles’s memorandum, Eisenhower expressed the need to handle the situation delicately, carefully, and in a balanced nature. What he meant by this was unclear, but Eisenhower almost immediately interrupted Dulles to suggest that one means of pressuring Nasser would be to build up an

643 Memorandum for the President, March 28, 1953, 2-3, SML. 644 Memorandum for the President, March 28, 1953, 2-3, SML. 645 The memorandum in the Mudd Library is the still mostly classified version, the Eisenhower Archives contain a copy of the memorandum of which only a brief section on Jordan remains classified. See Memorandum for the President, March 28, 1956, 1-3, Mar ’56 Diary, Box 13, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 240

alternate Arab leader, and the President suggested King Saud as the ideal candidate.646 While

Dulles had apparently hoped to limit working closely with the British to the areas of the proposal which required such a relationship, Eisenhower also instructed him to be certain he consulted with the British about the entire plan. And, despite the clearly negative view Eisenhower and

Dulles had of Israel, they agreed that if Nasser attempted to “liquidate” the nation the United

States would be forced to intervene. Dulles and Admiral Radford posited that the only definitive conclusion to such a defensive war would be to “occupy the entire area, protect the pipelines and the Suez Canal, etc. [sic]” and Eisenhower took this into consideration.647 Indeed, Eisenhower gave a series of instructions on what he considered to be indirect means of strengthening Israel, in order to avoid both such a defensive war, and a clear and direct commitment to the nation.648

Still, Eisenhower’s tinkering and vagueness continued to create problems for the administration in the Middle East in general. The issue here was that Eisenhower had ordered the postponement of the revision and adoption of the administration’s new policies for the

Middle East, until he determined “that evolving conditions in that area make feasible the adoption of a new long-term policy…”649 Although such a postponement certainly made sense

646 Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 28, 1956, 2, Mar ’56 Diary, Box 13, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 647 Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 28, 1956, 2, DDEL. 648 Memo for the President, April 11, 1956, 1-2, Egypt (1), Box 9, International Series, AWF, DDEL. The administration continued to have difficulty deciding on a position concerning Israel, and the Israelis were well aware of this fact. Indeed, officials reported to Eisenhower in April that the French were quite willing to sell the Israelis additional arms but, unsure of the reaction of the Eisenhower administration, had been reluctant to make a decision; the route to approval of additional arms sales included the Israelis asking the Americans to tell the French they had permission to sell more arms to Israel, with the administration begrudgingly “concurring” that the sale could go forward. Eisenhower here too continued to tinker, but Dulles conveniently left out of his final plan were Eisenhower’s suggestion that Israel be sold “some selected type of arms” and that Dulles somehow find “a few top level field agents…” and a “top flight man” to consider and work on the entire plan and its execution in Washington as a separate working group; Dulles stated he would think about the President’s suggestion but that such people were likely already fully committed to other pressing duties. See Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 28, 1956, 2, DDEL. 649 Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 28, 1956, 26, 289th Meeting of the NSC, June 28, 1956, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 241

as a result of the deteriorating stability in the region, Eisenhower’s tendency for vagueness and misdirection created significant confusion within his cabinet since he did not clarify what this meant as concerned existing policies and pending actions. Dulles was forced to explain to the various secretaries assembled at the NSC meeting that this order did not require the suspension, delay, or termination of existing actions, only that Eisenhower meant solely to literally postpone the review of policies as they stood.650 Indeed, confusion as to what exactly the administration planned to do about growing problems with the British and French actions, and how to adapt policies accordingly were summed up by Dulles and Nixon: “Secretary Dulles concluded that while the Middle East was providing us with a lot of headaches, at least – as the Vice President had just pointed out – there was so far no war in the Middle East.”651

Such conversations and directions only worsened confusion and dissent within the administration, to say nothing of external affairs. That relations with Egypt were rapidly deteriorating came as little surprise to either Dulles or embassy staff in Egypt. Indeed, Henry

Byroade, in one of his last acts as ambassador to Egypt before being replaced by the more agreeable Raymond Hare, sent Dulles a scathing telegram pointing out that the Secretary had undertaken policies which ran almost entirely counter to what Byroade had recommended for dealing with Nasser, and that the results of doing so were exactly what Byroade had warned would occur.652 Pointing to the fact that the cabinet was not the only group with stark disagreements, Undersecretary Hoover responded to Byroade at the direction of Dulles, portraying the administration’s actions as consistent, clear, and friendly while Nasser’s actions

650 Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the NSC, 26, DDEL. 651 Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the NSC, 26, DDEL. 652 Telegram, Byroade to Dulles, June 16, 1956, 1-5, Reel 133 Declassification, Box 10, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 242

were inconsistent, deceptive, and destabilising the region.653 And yet, when the Suez Crisis occurred, Dulles placed the blame almost entirely on parties other than Nasser.

The immediate reaction within the administration to the Suez Crisis, the coordinated invasion of the Sinai and areas around the Suez Canal by Israel, France, and Britain, was starkly divided and brought the conflict over the administration’s two-faced position on colonialism to a head. Dulles and Nixon (although Nixon was absent from NSC and cabinet meetings campaigning around the country) were firmly and clearly of the opinion that the Suez Crisis was a breaking point, after which the administration could no longer maintain its middle way position on working with Britain and France in areas of their crumbling empires. In the midst of the crisis, the NSC met on November 1, and Dulles’s anger and frustration at both the situation in the Middle East and the cabinet’s reaction to it erupted several times. Dulles presented an analysis of the situation in Egypt and the administration’s options. Making a point Eisenhower consistently agreed with, Dulles stated that if the administration did not take up a leadership role in resolving the crisis, the Soviet Union would fill that gap immediately.654

However, Dulles went further, as seemingly all of his frustrations with Britain and France brought him to a boiling point. Dulles vented complaints years in the making, pointing out that:

For many years now the United States has been walking a tightrope between…our old and valued relations with our British and French allies…and…trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism…[I]n view of the overwhelming Asian and African pressure upon us, we [can] not walk this tightrope

653 Telegram, Hoover to Byroade, June 23, 1956, 1-6, Reel 133 Declassification, Box 10, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 654 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 1, 1956, 5, 302nd Meeting of the NSC, November 1 1956, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL 243

much longer…In short, the United States would survive or go down on the basis of the fate of colonialism.655

Dulles continued, portraying the British and French action as an intentional and idiotic betrayal, and while affirming that the Europeans and the Americans would continue to work together in the event of a war with the Soviets, contended that the administration, meaning Eisenhower, needed to decide there and now to stick with or break from Britain and France’s course.656

Dulles’s indictment of the middle way met with strong and, to the Secretary, infuriating resistance. Dulles engaged in several heated exchanges with Harold Stassen and Secretary

Humphrey during this meeting. Stassen incessantly argued that an immediate cease-fire which left all parties where they were was the best option, while Dulles described this as “the straight old-fashioned variety of colonialism…”657 While Dulles’s agitation grew, Eisenhower responded with a shrug to the suggestion that if Britain diverted American military aid to the conflict in the Suez, offering the explanation that this would simply “represent another case of

‘perfidious Albion’.”658 As such justifications and excuses for treating the aggressors leniently continued, Dulles took an extraordinary step.659 In a moment of untypical drama, Dulles turned to Stassen and bluntly fumed “We do not approve of murder” and then, clearly growing so agitated that even Eisenhower could no longer ignore it, Dulles left the National Security

Council meeting on the pretext of needing to “go put something down on paper” over the issue.660 For Dulles, the moral aspect of foreign policy was often subsumed by pragmatism, but the actions of the British and French crossed a line. Dulles could not have been clearer about the

655 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 5-6, DDEL. 656 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 657 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 7-12, DDEL. 658 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 7-12, DDEL. 659 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 7-12, DDEL. 660 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 13, DDEL. 244

fact that he considered the administration obligated to chart a far more independent, anti-colonial course. Two issues on this conclusion are of primary importance, the first being that Dulles’s reaction suggests that although he went along with Eisenhower’s middle way, his support was likely continually dwindling because of his increasing discomfort with the actions of the

Europeans, and that Eisenhower shot down the Secretary of State and pressed on with the middle way.

Despite the reaction of his top adviser, and the sentiment of others in his cabinet,

Eisenhower made clear to Dulles and others that while the administration would take the necessary steps to stabilise the region and remove the aggressors from Egypt, the basic foundation of the middle way position of the administration remained unchanged. Indeed, immediately “after the Secretary of State had left the Cabinet Room, the President turned to the other members of the council and said that of course no one in the world really expected us to break off our long alliance with the Great Britain and France.”661 And while the president acknowledged the need to resolve the situation in such a way as to make clear the administration did not approve of the aggression, he nonetheless instructed his advisors to seek a middle way.662

Eisenhower met with Dulles later in the day on November 1, after the heated NSC meeting, and made clear the administration’s position going forward. Eisenhower explained to Dulles that the

United States was now “the West’s only hope” but that the administration could not single out any nation with unilateral actions.663 Eisenhower stressed that while the United States needed to lead in this situation, the administration had to avoid putting itself in an embarrassing position on

661 Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 13, DDEL. 662 Eisenhower stated the “idea was to do what was decent and right, but still not condemn more furiously than we had to.” Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 14, DDEL. 663 Memorandum by the President for the Secretary of State, November 1, 1956, 1, Meetings with the President, Box 4, Papers of John Foster Dulles White House Memoranda Series, DDEL. 245

either side (“either with France and Britain or with all the rest of the world”) and had to prevent the Soviets from taking on a position of leadership.664

Of course, granting that Eisenhower had little intention of significant alteration to basic policy, he was sufficiently frustrated with the British and French to allow Nixon to attack them.

Although on the campaign trail, Nixon continued to consult on events when possible with Dulles.

As the Suez Crisis broke out, Nixon called Dulles both for information on what was occurring and for guidance on the administration’s stance. Nixon was eager to “hit it” in statements against the British, French, and Israelis; while Dulles advised him not to hit the Israelis too hard he stated there was “nothing particularly” problematic with Nixon attacking the British and the

French, so long as he did so in moderation.665 Dulles then stated that from an historical standpoint the event was important in that the administration had shown that “the idea is out that we can be dragged along at the heels of Br[itain] and Fr[ance] in policies that were obsolete.

This is a declaration of independence for the first time that they cannot count upon us to engage in policies of this sort.”666 Pointing both to his desire to contribute to change and having received the go-ahead and a public endorsement from Eisenhower beforehand, on November 2,

Nixon made a nationally televised address.667 Speaking “for the President,” Nixon made a

“declaration of independence” for the United States in its foreign relations with African, Asian,

664 Memorandum by the President for the Secretary of State, November 1, 1956, 1, DDEL. 665 Telephone Call, Nixon to Dulles, October 31, 1956, 1, Memoranda of Tel Conv. General. Oct. 1, 1956 to Dec. 29, 1956 (3), Box 5, Telephone Calls Series, Papers of John Foster Dulles, DDEL. 666 Dulles also noted that he believed the beginning of the slow crumbling of the Soviet empire was taking place, in reference to the other ongoing crisis in Hungary. See Telephone Call, Nixon to Dulles, October 31, 1956, 1, DDEL. 667 The endorsement by Eisenhower stated that Nixon had been his representative around the entire world and that Nixon was well-equipped to bring to the people the significance of the unfolding events. See Carroll Kilpatrick, “Vice President Calls it Declaration of Independence From Colonialism” The Washington Post, November 3, 1956, A1. 246

and Middle East nations, labelling the French and British colonial traditionalists.668 And while this certainly served a purpose from a public relations perspective, and gave Nixon and Dulles a modicum of solace, it was effectively an empty and confusing gesture.

Eisenhower had no intention of initiating a true break from the British or the French, and thus both Nixon and Dulles acted accordingly.669 Before the end of November, Nixon was presiding over NSC meetings in which he made certain that steps were being taken to give Great

Britain private assurances that the administration would come to Britain’s aid to help it overcome the dire financial straits it found itself in after the debacle in Suez.670 Indeed, while the relationship between the Americans and the British and French had been shaken, Dulles described the acrimonious mood at the moment as “essentially a violent family squabble” that would pass with time.671 Nixon presided over a meeting in which a discussion on the proper manner to announce the “continued validity” of their alliance and friendship, the necessity of the administration taking over from Britain and France the responsibility of dealing with Nasser, and

Secretary Wilson’s praising of “how handsomely” the British were behaving now that they understood clearly the administration’s position and their own.672

668 Although Nixon made clear that the administration still “cherished” the friendship of Britain, France, and Israel, the journalist noted that the criticisms and declaration far outweighed any other statements. See Kilpatrick, “Vice President Calls it Declaration of Independence From Colonialism” The Washington Post, November 3, 1956, A1. 669 In a meeting in Walter Reed Hospital, where Dulles stayed after an operation, Dulles again raised the point of how problematic the British and French actions had been, but Eisenhower reminded him “the present thing to remember in this present situation is that ‘the Bear is still the central enemy’.” See Memcon, November 7, 1956, 3, Folder 12, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 670 Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 30th, 1956, 10-11, 305th Meeting of the NSC, November 30th 1956, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 671 Secretary Hoover was quoting Dulles in the latter’s absence from the meeting. See, Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the NSC, 5, DDEL. 672 Indeed, Nixon even pressed cabinet members on whether there was any means for the administration to aid Britain’s Conservative Party, apparently terrified Nye Bevan’s rhetoric might place him in a position of power. See, Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the NSC, 6-10, DDEL. There is little question Eisenhower and Dulles had been clear with Prime Minister Eden about the administration’s opposition to military action against Nasser. In August Dulles, and in September Eisenhower both took time to explain in different fashions why the administration was against militarily removing Nasser. Eisenhower argued that unless the West forced Nasser to back down through a 247

However, while acknowledging Eisenhower’s insistence against breaking from the

Europeans, the State Department’s initial plans for a revised policy for the region maintained that the administration needed to take on a leadership role. In a memo to Eisenhower outlining the

State Department’s position on short and long term plans for the region, Under Secretary of State

Hoover explained the basic objectives were to preserve peace, maintain “Free World” access to oil and passage, protect the integrity of Israel and Arab states, and deny Soviet influence or control in the region.673 The long term plans were staggeringly ambitious, and included proposals for various federations, the isolation of Nasser and Egypt, expansions to all levels of aid, and adjusting the administration’s associations with Britain and France in the region to reflect the reality that France was “no longer able to play a constructive role in the area,” and that

Britain had “seriously prejudiced” its position.674 Secretary Hoover later suggested that the State

Department was, in fact, still preparing possible actions of a more independent type for the

Middle East. And while Hoover noted such plans would not be ready for the cabinet’s consumption until the next year, he stated “we have a great many things in mind to propose when

united, non-military effort he would remain (Eisenhower considered Nasser by that point was) the hero of the Arab world. In addition, Eisenhower warned Eden that beyond the Arab world, British military action against Nasser would also drive a wedge between the United States and the United Kingdom. See, respectively, Memcon, London, August 19, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, John P. Glennon et al. eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 233-235; Memo, President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, September 8, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, 435-438. 673 Memorandum for the President, November 21, 1956, Sections I through III, Folder 5, Box 6, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 674 The State Department suggested a federation of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, with Iraq as the leader, and a federation “From Libya to Morocco” hinting that the State Department wanted to aggressively push France out entirely since such a federation would need to include Algeria. Memorandum for the President, November 21, 1956, 1-9, SML. And of course even this proposal received far from unanimous support within the State Department, however, it was the dominant strain at the time in Dulles’s absence. 248

the time for action is at hand.”675 Indeed, despite Eisenhower’s reluctance to move ambitiously,

Dulles and the State Department pushed bold, if flawed, new ideas.

On December 3 Dulles outlined to the Assistant Secretaries to various regions some of his thinking on what this “independent” position for the administration might look like. Dulles argued that it was both more practical, and realistic to attempt to support and “ride a rising tide of Arab nationalism” than it would be to attempt to cobble together another pact or organization.676 Dulles further explained that his idea was to support Arab states in such a manner as to help them maintain their independence against both “international communism and

Western imperialism.”677 Despite the fact that he was aware of Eisenhower’s drive to continue his middle way, Dulles pushed forward with planning that sought to use Arab nationalism to the administration’s advantage; Dulles considered shutting out both the Soviets and Britain and

France to be to the administration’s advantage.

Thus, while Eisenhower was able to chart a middle way course through the Suez Crisis, he did so knowing that his Secretary of State was adamantly opposed to such a course, and indeed, had argued to abandon the middle way entirely. The contentious stumbling arguments that eventually coalesced into the short-lived Eisenhower Doctrine continued through the end of the year and into 1957. If this had been the only incident or issue in which Eisenhower’s cabinet engaged in acrimonious in-fighting and second guessing, it could simply be chalked up to the stresses of a crisis and Dulles’s illness. However, not only was this far from an isolated incident, but the cabinet and the administration experienced a series of problems directly related to its

675 See, Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 676 Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary’s Office, December 3, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Volume XII, Near East; Iran; Iraq, John P. Glennon and Paul Claussen, eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), 366-367. 677 Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary’s Office, December 3, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Near East; Iran; Iraq, 367. 249

failures in the Third World. It is of no small import that Dulles and Nixon played significant roles in identifying, resolving, and in some cases taking advantage of these problems.

Dulles and Nixon on the Offensive, Cracks in the Cabinet

The collective of problems and challenges of dealing with the Third World placed particular strain on Dulles, Nixon, and Eisenhower’s cabinet. The mentor-protégé relationship between Dulles and Nixon developed into something more combative while remaining close and supportive, with Dulles taking a more assertive role that varied between protective and manipulative. The difficulties facing the administration became so severe that Dulles was forced to save Eisenhower from vicious in-fighting and finger pointing, but the Secretary was also able to exploit the frustration of Eisenhower’s advisers to place himself in a slightly more powerful position, with Nixon playing an integral role in the power play. For the most part, Dulles and

Nixon worked towards a common goal in 1956, namely forcing some manner of changes in the administration’s position and policies towards the Third World, and achieving this common goal meant a variety of surprising actions.678

Dulles and Nixon gauged the extent to which the cabinet had become frustrated and anxious over the administration’s failures in the Third World in July, with a surprising suggestion. Exploring thinking that was so politically dangerous that Nixon warned the NSC

678 One of the more mundane reflections of this working relationship was shown when Nixon raised a concern after his mission abroad about lack of economic integration undermining the stability and confidence of Taiwan. Nixon forcefully suggested that avenues be explored to increase trade amongst Taiwan and its Southeast Asian neighbours. And, in a display of Nixon’s growing influence and the fruits of his relationship with Dulles, the matter was not only explored, but resulted in a variety of actions from the State Department. Herbert Hoover Jr. reported to Nixon on the variety of developments, which included preparing a number of support mechanisms in the result of new trade agreements, aiding in the scheduling of trade group meetings, and pressuring Taiwan to ease restrictions and regulations on trade goods its neighbours would both import and export. See Memo, Hoover Jr. to Vice President Nixon, October 9, 1956, 1-2, 1956 September-October, Box 7, Executive File Branch, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 250

about leaks, requested ultra-Top Secret classification for the discussion, and which Secretary

Humphrey suggested would have a “murderous” effect on the administration if word got out,

Dulles and Nixon floated the idea of supporting nationalist communist movements and nations.679 Although the initial premise of the discussion had been disrupting the links between the Soviet Union and its satellites, Nixon quickly argued that any nationalist communist movement which appeared suitable could be targeted, meaning those in the Third World. All present were unnerved by the discussion, with Dulles noting that what was suggested was a rare

“offensive” action by the administration, as opposed to its defensive approach to the Soviet

Union otherwise, resulting in the proposed policy being placed under a special annex; which meant a restricted number of officials in the administration would be granted access to reading it.680

Although it was unsurprising that Nixon would enthusiastically latch on to a proposal both brought up by his mentor and which indicated positive action on the administration’s part, the fact that Dulles brought the proposal up and allowed Nixon to carry his suggestion further than its original form indicates that the Secretary of State had also become sufficiently frustrated with the administration’s failures in the Third World that he considered changes to be necessary.

Although the proposal was abandoned due to the variety of fears attached to it, such as the fact that aid significant enough to sway such nationalist movements would be larger than the CIA or another agency could keep hidden, the fact that many cabinet members were in favour of such bold actions speaks to the growing anger within the cabinet.

679 Indeed, the document remained heavily redacted until 2011. Also of note was that Eisenhower was absent from this meeting. See Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 680 Secretary Wilson argued emphatically for such a move, as he complained he was unable to stop the Department of Defense from leaking “like a sieve.” See, Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the NSC, 8-9, DDEL. 251

Much of the anger centered on the fact that the administration was failing to achieve what most advisers considered to be fairly modest goals. Clear evidence began to arise that the administration’s bureaucracy and a failure to follow up on issues were causing significant delays even in the recognition of problems. At the 276th meeting of the NSC, on February 9, the issue of aid to Iran was raised. Although Nixon was absent from this meeting, the points made by

Dulles and Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford, were in the same vein as Nixon’s investigation the previous year on aid delivery, namely that aid pledged was being delivered neither in the quantity or timeframe promised.681 The obvious problem was that while Nixon had received the reports indicating the issues in November and December of 1955, Dulles and

Radford were either unaware of, or unconcerned with the problems in delivery for more than a month. Eisenhower took the problem seriously, if only due to the climate at the time, with Egypt receiving regular and sizeable amounts of Soviet arms.682 Dulles revealed he had been aware of the problem, but that both he and Radford were unaware of who was to blame for the delays; however, he noted that Undersecretary Hoover had been placed in charge of a group to unearth who exactly was to blame.683 In a display that obviously irritated the President, the Secretaries of Defense, State, and his own Director of the Bureau of the Budget, took turns blaming one another for the problems in delivery.684 Eisenhower ended the discussion, telling his advisers and officials that he considered the matter needed to be addressed quickly and professionally,

681 Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 9, 1956, 10-11, 276th Meeting of the NSC, February 9, 1956, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 682 Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the NSC, 11, DDEL. 683 Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the NSC, 11, DDEL. 684 The Bureau of the Budget blamed Defence, while Defense blamed Budget for forcing Defense to operate on a year-to-year appropriations basis, but eventually Defense officials admitted they were attempting to address the issue of cross-department problems. Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the NSC, 11-12, DDEL. 252

stating that there was no time to “fool around with this problem.”685 Although acknowledgement of problems in the administration’s policies grew during the year, the tendency of many officials, including Eisenhower, to ignore non-crisis points continued.

Ignoring these problems led to a startling revelation at the NSC meeting on May 3rd, and resulted in a series of arguments which Eisenhower was unable to resolve on his own. The ever- contentious topic of foreign aid to the Third World was brought up during the meeting, and the facts that had been reported to Nixon the previous year, namely that the administration failed to deliver on its promises, became the grounds for Secretary Wilson and Secretary Humphrey to launch significant criticisms. Humphrey levelled a startling criticism wrapped in a revelation, stating that it did not truly matter what the administration decided to do in relation to specific aid for specific states or regions since the “present system of administering foreign assistance simply wasn’t any good…in point of fact…this Government does not even know for certain what its foreign aid commitments really are.”686 The revelation that the administration not only was failing to keep its commitments but was actually unaware of the scope and extent of many of them did not serve as a wake-up call or as the basis for change. Instead, Secretary Wilson offered criticisms to which Eisenhower had no clear answer or direction.

While Secretary Wilson offered advice which might have at least reduced the amount of confusion in the administration, Eisenhower entirely ignored the underlying problem. Wilson argued that one avenue to address the problem was simply to reduce the amount and variety of aid, stating that the administration “must be more selective in its approach to assisting its

685 Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the NSC, 13, DDEL 686 Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the NSC, 14, DDEL. 253

allies.”687 Eisenhower “countered” Wilson’s argument by stating that the real solution was to shift aid from established allies to neutral nations.688 Pointing to the half-formed nature of this suggestion, Eisenhower ignored Humphrey’s interruption that it would be preferable to have a few strong allies rather than “45 weak ones, as at present,” to explain his thinking.689

Eisenhower detailed that supporting neutral nations would make the United States the leader of all neutral nations, provided only that the Soviets attacked one, as this would turn world opinion against the Soviets and permit the United States to intervene without risking its prestige.690

Thus, Eisenhower attempted to retreat to tinkering rather than actually engage the criticisms and problems his advisors were expressing.

Although Eisenhower obviously could not have formulated a solution to the problems his administration had with keeping track of, letting alone keeping its promises on foreign aid, the fact that he was attempting to deflect or distract from the issue at hand was not lost on his advisors. Indeed, Admiral Radford was clearly aware that Eisenhower was, through this line of thinking and others during the meeting, attempting to avoid or tinker with rather than address the larger issue. Radford reminded Eisenhower that his, and other administrations, had made and would continue to make agreements that created long term consequences, and it simply was not a solution to redirect, tinker, and engage in short-term solutions. The fact that at present the administration was having great difficulty, and seemed unable to deal with the consequences of its choices culminated in Radford’s criticism that “if there was any one country in the world which had failed to take a long hard look into the future, it was the United States.”691 This

687 Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the NSC, 14, DDEL. 688 Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the NSC, 14, DDEL. 689 Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the NSC, 14, DDEL 690 Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the NSC, 14, DDEL. 691 Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the NSC, 15, DDEL. 254

comment apparently disheartened the President and the NSC to the point that conversation quickly became wholly negative, and the atmosphere in the meeting became so grim that Lewis

Strauss soon interrupted to implore Eisenhower to “close the meeting on a lighter note,” and proceeded to impart a story about an anti-communist election poster he had seen in Rome; this concluded the meeting.692 Thus, problems confronting the administration, some of them due to

Eisenhower others due to bureaucratic issues, were becoming frustrating enough that

Eisenhower’s advisors openly began to criticise and question his decisions and leadership. Of course, Dulles was absent from the May 3 meeting, and a dramatic shift occurred with his presence the following week.

However, while Dulles’s presence secured Eisenhower, it only further highlighted the fact that Eisenhower’s cabinet was crumbling. With Dulles present, both Eisenhower and the

Secretary of State proceeded to launch attacks on the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury. When the conversation of the meeting moved to the Third World and the administration’s policies therein as well as the various aid programs, Eisenhower and Dulles forcefully, and in the president’s case angrily, moved to thwart a repeat of the previous meeting.

As Secretary Wilson brought up the Soviets’ recent economic outreaches to the Third World,

Dulles and Eisenhower at first tried to avoid conflict, with Dulles admitting the Soviet move was proving difficult to counter and Eisenhower contending that part of the difficulty was that democratically elected administrations like his could not simply change tactics and policies at a whim, whereas dictatorships like the Soviet Union were perfectly able to do so.693 Humphrey

692 Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the NSC, 17, DDEL. 693 Both Dulles and Eisenhower broached the topic gently, each offering anecdotes and Dulles attempting to make light of the situation by mentioning that the Soviet manoeuvre was not some universally effective onslaught, as their aid program had apparently resulted in nations receiving exorbitant quantities of materials for which they neither 255

disagreed with Eisenhower’s description of how the Soviet Union and dictatorships functioned, and then took the step of making an argument that not only belittled Eisenhower’s concern over the Soviet moves but suggested he was wrong to devote so much attention to the matter, stating

“we should not be too worried.”694 This attitude was very similar to the previous meeting and served, apparently, as the dropping of a gauntlet by the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense, and the President and Secretary of State reacted immediately.

Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s assault on Humphrey and Wilson revealed not just that disagreement and laxity on issues relating to the Third World were causing significant internal problems for the administration, but that Eisenhower was convinced that a fundamental problem was that some of his advisors were neither treating these issues seriously nor capable of actually resolving them. Eisenhower responded in such a manner that the minute-taker felt compelled to record that the dressing down was directed specifically at the Secretary of the Treasury; the president told Humphrey there was “one hell of a difference” between normal business and the economic moves of the Soviet Union, which, he felt he needed to remind Humphrey, was engaged in “the great game of international politics.”695 Eisenhower’s polemic continued until he concluded that if officials like Humphrey did not start treating the allegiance of Third World nations seriously, the administration could count on losing nations, like Egypt, to the Soviets.

requested nor had a use. See Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 10, 1956, 5-6, 284th Meeting of the NSC, May 10 1956, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 694 Humphrey went on to compare the Soviet move to American business and state that, like those businesses, the administration should not be concerned until the Soviets started to take “a bite” out of the administration’s market. See Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 695 The minute-taker noted Eisenhower was “speaking forcefully” and was looking at Humphrey throughout his comments. Since such descriptions are almost totally absent from NSC minutes, the minute-taker either felt the details important or that Eisenhower was agitated to the extent that leaving them out would be dishonest. See Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 256

Dulles quickly added the point that the economic aspect was not the only area in which the administration lagged behind the Soviets, since military aid was also failing. Secretary

Wilson stumbled into Dulles’s trap, as Wilson stated that Defense could provide military aid just as quickly as the Soviets if it really wanted to; Eisenhower immediately shot back that “if that was the case…we certainly didn’t seem to want to.”696 Dulles pressed the issue a bit further until

Wilson repeated himself; thereafter Dulles gave Wilson the specific example of military deliveries to Pakistan and asked him why Defense, since Wilson claimed it was able to make deliveries properly, had failed to do so. At best embarrassed and likely slightly humiliated,

Wilson stated that he and the Department of Defense “would live up to the expectations and desires of the Secretary of State,” before admitting that military aid had been “the most poorly organised aspect” of his department.697 Eisenhower, satisfied that Humphrey and Wilson had been sufficiently castigated, concluded the discussion by reminding them to constantly attend to such issues, and, pointing to his growing doubt in their abilities, informed them that it would be

“desirable” for them to bring in “businessmen, educators, and others” to help them solve the problem.698

Beyond displaying the now clear divisions in the administration over both foreign aid and the Third World, this heated exchange showed not only the dramatic change in dynamics made by Dulles’s presence, but that Eisenhower was still convinced that the fundamental challenge facing his administration in the Third World was one of bureaucratic execution and mechanics

696 Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 697 Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 698 Immediately following the conclusion of this discussion, Dulles left the meeting. Although he had made clear he would be leaving the meeting early, the fact that, in a rare change, Dulles’s comments and the aforementioned discussion occurred before Allen Dulles gave his report on World Developments Affecting U.S. Security (which normally opened meetings), leant Foster Dulles’s actions a rather deliberate and calculated appearance. See Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 257

rather than policy; indeed, Eisenhower’s frustration led to him ordering Dulles to personally undertake drafting new policies for certain areas.699 The fact that the President and Secretary of

State had spent much of a National Security Council meeting reprimanding the Secretaries of

Defense and the Treasury indicates severe fracturing in Eisenhower’s cabinet. However, the fact that Eisenhower’s cabinet was growing increasingly fractured over problems in the Third World, did not stop Dulles and Nixon from trying to use that tension to address the problems.

Indeed, further evidence arose, from Nixon of all sources, that bureaucratic issues and inefficiencies were causing significant problems in the administration’s policies in the Third

World. While Nixon’s frustration with the administration’s dealings in the Third World was nothing new, the approach he took in his report to the NSC after his mission abroad on July 19 suggests he and Dulles had hatched a plan to streamline and solidify the Secretary of State’s control over all non-military functions of the administration abroad. The problem, Nixon noted, was that although technically Dulles, the State Department, and local ambassadors had authority over all non-military aid projects in other nations, in many cases this authority was neither exercised by the ambassadors nor recognised by officials representing other departments or agencies.700 Nixon, both as an expression of his own frustration and as a means to capitalise on the frustrations of others, argued that the administration was operating too many programs under too many agencies, creating both significant wastage and difficulty in actually executing policy.

Nixon pointed out that in the many cases he had witnessed, Americans were either neglecting

699 The problem, from Dulles’s perspective, was that his proposals then had to go back through bureaucratic channels for inspection, consideration, and revision, before being sent to the NSC for further inspection, consideration, and revision. See Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 28, 1956, 8, 289th Meeting of the NSC, June 28 1956, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 700 Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 12, 1956, 11-16, 290th Meeting of the NSC, July 12 1956, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL; Discussion at the 291st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 19, 1956, 3, 291st Meeting of the NSC, July 19 1956, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL 258

entirely their duties or refusing to carry out programs as the host nation desired.701 Secretary

Wilson and Secretary Humphrey agreed with Nixon’s argument, with Humphrey stating this problem had been ongoing since Eisenhower came into office, and that while now and again an official claimed to want to do something about the problem, “the Administration…as yet had not done a damn thing about it.”702 In a manoeuvre that can only be explained by unanimous exasperation with the administration’s failures abroad, Nixon was able to garner support from

Wilson, Humphrey, the Attorney General, and other officials not only to increase State

Department staff abroad, but to advance a proposal which would grant Dulles definitive control over a program to initiate “sweeping reforms” of the administration’s non-military operations abroad.703

That Nixon’s recommendation and Dulles’s plan garnered overwhelming support from the NSC and addressed a perceptibly worsening situation did not stop Eisenhower from nearly torpedoing the enterprise. Eisenhower had been absent from the July 19 meeting, but was present the following week; Dulles explained the situation and what was proposed before stating that “the problem…was brought to a head as a result of the recent trip of the Vice President.”704

Eisenhower was initially reluctant, as he ordered Dulles to consult with the heads of all executive agencies, voiced concern that any moves made with staff abroad after such a proposal would create the wrong impression, and felt compelled to reassert control by reminding those present

701 The specific agency Nixon and Dulles brought up was the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), which, though technically under the State Department’s control after the dissolution of Harold Stassen’s FOA in 1955 was still operating mostly independently of State Department control. Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the NSC, 13, DDEL. 702 Humphrey voiced specific criticisms for officials of Ezra Taft Benson’s Department of Agriculture for failing to follow any kind of procedure or policy. See Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the NSC, 14, DDEL. 703 Especially notable was that Percival Brundage, head of the Bureau of the Budget, an executive office also lined up behind the proposal, offering to have his office cut off funding to all programs not explicitly approved by Dulles. See Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the NSC, 14-15, DDEL. 704 Discussion at the 291st Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 259

that if such a proposal were approved “such instructions would go out as his instructions.”705

After Nixon pointed out Dulles’s proposal would save the administration money, and Humphrey,

Brundage, and Admiral Radford reiterated their support for the plan, Eisenhower was asked directly if he would approve Dulles’s recommendations, and the president replied curtly,

“yes.”706 Thus, Nixon’s frustrations with the administration’s continued difficulties in undertaking even its adopted policies resulted in a program designed to allow the Secretary of

State to exercise greater control over all foreign programs, with the clearly stated purpose of reducing waste while increasing the efficacy of existing programs. And although Nixon and

Dulles clearly were effective when working together, their relationship was by no means a source of stability.

Indeed, Eisenhower’s style of leadership heightened tensions in an already contentious relationship for Dulles and Nixon. In February, Dulles’s concerns about his age, health, as well as his protégé resulted in perplexing conversations with Eisenhower. During one late-afternoon conversation with the President, Dulles vigorously supported Eisenhower in running for a second term. However, in that same conversation, Dulles thrice stood up for Nixon: he pointed out that

Eisenhower’s criticisms that Nixon did not poll strongly as a presidential candidate were wrongheaded, since Eisenhower was the most likely candidate and Nixon was not even actively in that field; he argued that if Eisenhower did not run for a second term then Nixon would be the strongest candidate and best suited to hold office; and Dulles stated bluntly that if Eisenhower

705 Discussion at the 292nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 19, 1956, 5, 292nd Meeting of the NSC, July 19 1956, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 706 Discussion at the 292nd Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 260

wanted Nixon to get experience he could make him Secretary of State.707 While the first two defences show just how high Dulles’s esteem for Nixon was, the offer to have Nixon take over as

Secretary of State startled even Eisenhower, who attempted to play off Dulles’s comment as a joke.708 Keeping in mind the variety of forces that drove Dulles to covet the position, and his fundamental belief that he was fighting both for good and against evil in the office, that he even made the suggestion reveals that Dulles considered Nixon capable of continuing what he viewed as his mission. Obviously both men retained their positions in the second administration, and to

Dulles this meant a continuation of defending areas he considered his territory.

With his re-election in hand, Eisenhower began to show greater trust in Nixon’s abilities; however, this ran directly into Dulles’s own relationship with the Vice President and his territorial nature. In a meeting with Dulles that December, Eisenhower broached the topic of putting Nixon in charge of the OCB. A variety of important revelations occurred in this conversation. First, neither man was certain of the actual function of the OCB; Eisenhower perceived it to be capable of functioning as something akin to what he would propose in 1958, the Office of Executive Management. Eisenhower stated that he believed the OCB, under the chairmanship of Nixon, could serve as a policy expediter and inspector general.709 Dulles replied that there “was a great deal of confusion as to what the function of the OCB was…it had originally been designed to be a mechanism for coordinating the work of the various

Departments,” and asked Eisenhower to delay any changes or actions for the time being.710

707 Eisenhower laughingly dismissed the final offer, attempting to slough it off as Dulles facetiously trying to get out of his job. See Memorandum of Conversation with the President at the White House, Monday, February 27, 1956, 4 P.M., Folder 2, Box 28, hereafter EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 708 Memorandum of Conversation with the President at the White House, February 27, SML. 709 Memcon, December 15, 1956, 1-2, Folder 11, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 710 Memcon, December 15, 1956, 2, Folder 11, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 261

Beyond revealing that even the Secretary of State and President had trouble understanding exactly what purpose certain bodies within the administration served, Dulles’s arguments and subsequent action showed that he would not suffer even perceived threats to his position. Dulles’s concern was that Eisenhower appeared to be attempting either to invest in

Nixon a power and responsibility that would technically place him above the Secretary of State, or to create an entirely new position which would accomplish the same goal.711 And, when the two spoke on the topic again, Dulles suggested that Nixon might possibly prefer the type of goodwill trips he was used to taking rather than chairing the OCB, (the same type of trips Nixon had specifically voiced a dislike for to Dulles), and Eisenhower agreed to delay any action.712

Thus, Eisenhower continued to ponder and tinker with internal agencies and bureaucratic mechanisms as a means to accomplish goals, but the limits of Dulles’s patronage and his own territorial nature tripped up changes for the time being.713

A Building Cascade

While Eisenhower’s middle way was intended to avoid extremes and permit the administration to evade the problems Eisenhower believed existed in such extremes, it was also a fundamentally flawed position. Not only did the middle way create resentments in both colonial powers and colonised states, but it caused growing anger within the administration. Although there was obviously no guarantee that the administration would choose the proper action if it did act, the fact Eisenhower chose to delay in the manner he did created cascading problems.

711 Memcon, December 15, 1956, 1-2, Folder 11, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 712 See Memcon, December 20, 1956, 2, Folder 10, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 713 Eisenhower also continuously floated the idea of a First Secretary or a position similar (in his mind) to a Prime Minister, a position which he wanted to various foreign affairs tasks while having three fully fledged Secretaries under him. See Memcon, December 3, 1956, 5, Folder 11, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML; Telephone Call, Eisenhower to Dulles, December 21, 1956, 1, Dec. ’56 Phone Calls, Box 20, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 262

Eisenhower’s engaging in sporadic tinkering with the mechanisms of his administration, vague policy points, and foreign organisations continually allowed him to postpone extensive or substantial policy changes but also served to increase frustrations above and beyond those already created by a sense (both inside and outside the administration) that the administration was failing to achieve its goals and keep its promises. Although Nixon and Dulles both sought to address and take advantage of this fracturing, they too ran in to challenges; Nixon from Dulles’s territorial and defensive nature along with the other responsibilities of his position, and Dulles from a combination of his loyalty to Eisenhower and the necessity (or benefits) of supporting the

President whenever feasible, as well as the reality that ultimately Eisenhower decided what did and did not become policy.

Eisenhower continued to fail to consider the long term consequences of his decisions and indecisions as he pursued postponement. Even as warning signs popped up that the administration’s tendency to react, often slowly, to problems in the Third World were not only aggravating internal and foreign officials but were also revealing the administration’s significant lack of preparation and flexibility, Eisenhower continued to pursue postponement. The administration continued to be caught unprepared or ill-prepared for occurrences in the Third

World, and yet, lacking strong evidence of Soviet expansion beyond the economic sphere,

Eisenhower saw little need for significant action and continued to delay. As only became clear later, Eisenhower was oblivious to the fact that this delaying heightened suspicions, exacerbated resentments, and contributed to the unhappiness and unease that came to typify many Third

World-U.S. relations by the end of his administration.

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Chapter Six

Thunder in the Distance (1957)

1957 was a kind of calm before the storm, although clear signs of many of the troubles ahead were evident. Eisenhower continued to assert control over foreign policy, with a clear focus on anti-communism. In fact, Eisenhower displayed resolute resistance to significant changes towards the Third World unless those changes were clearly anti-communist. This helps explain his significant revisions to Dulles’s draft of what became the Eisenhower Doctrine, his resistance to actions in Southeast Asia and Latin America, as well as his tempered support for plans involving Nixon throughout the year. As Dulles perceived his influence to be waning, his relationship with Nixon became more important; their contentious relationship served as a means for Dulles to maintain influence while also vicariously supporting changes. Nixon, for his part, vigorously pursued independent action focused on change, gambling on criticising Eisenhower and Dulles in the hopes of achieving more influence and genuine changes, especially in the administration’s African policies. Indeed, the administration’s policies in the Third World became something of a battleground in which Dulles and Nixon attempted to exert themselves and bring about significant actions. However, after the dangerous and chaotic year previous,

Eisenhower spent much of 1957 working to resist and avoid significant actions in the Third

World. And while Dulles veered away from Eisenhower for much of the year, following

Eisenhower’s stroke the Secretary of State’s anxieties over the President’s health eventually brought him back to solid, if resigned, support of Eisenhower.

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Denying Degeneration and Delaying Action: Latin America and Southeast Asia

Although there were signs of instability in Southeast Asia, Eisenhower was not willing to take drastic action unless absolutely necessary. While Ngô Đình Diệm displayed a keen understanding of a basic flaw in Eisenhower’s security policies and attempted to exploit it to his benefit, Eisenhower, however awkwardly, employed the same tactics with Diệm as he did with many of his own officials: he insisted on further study. Part of this response stemmed from

Eisenhower’s skepticism about the necessity of increased involvement and increased expenses.

Of course, this reluctance and skepticism were shown in a different form concerning Indonesia.

Indeed, while there clearly were signs of Indonesia’s destabilisation, Eisenhower resisted Allen

Dulles’s push for immediate overt or covert action. However, Eisenhower’s resistance to action also applied to areas where change may have been beneficial, such as in Latin America. In that region, Eisenhower almost casually accepted new dictators, maintained his resistance to increased aid, and denied any significant changes were necessary. The reason for this reluctance, almost universally, was that Eisenhower was not convinced that any such actions would serve the larger purpose of anti-communism in the respective regions.

Conversations held with Ngô Đình Diệm in May revealed both that South Vietnam’s leader was willing and able to exploit flaws in Eisenhower’s security program, and that

Eisenhower was not convinced such flaws, such as the imprecise and uncertain nature of

American aid and the failure and impracticality of deterrence and nuclear attacks, required drastic action. Diệm effectively provided a progress report to Eisenhower and Dulles on the state of South Vietnam, noting that while the state’s armed forces had become more effective, the difficult transition from what was basically an ill-equipped French colonial force into a more

265

modern force styled on the American system was still ongoing.714 When Diệm pushed for greater military assistance for an expansion of his armed forces, Eisenhower demurred by pointing out that his administration had a wide variety of responsibilities and needed to balance the use of its resources, and suggested that larger armed forces often created more political and economic problems than they solved.715 Diệm responded by listing off the general figures of the armed forces of SEATO members in Vietnam’s vicinity, argued that if any large-scale communist offensive occurred this would tie down each state’s forces, and pointedly stated that tactical nuclear weapons would be of very little use in defending Vietnam due to geographic factors and the nature of the Viet Minh attacks being dispersed commando-types.716

Although Diệm was very clearly attempting to garner greater aid, his arguments are important for what they signify as concerns the effectiveness of Eisenhower’s basic policy of deterrence and Eisenhower’s response to such concerns. Diệm had not only dismissed the idea of nuclear deterrence working against a determined opponent, but had moved on to the consequence and argued against the utility of nuclear weapons against the type of enemy he envisioned facing. The fundamental message Diệm expressed was that the enemies of South

Vietnam were already undeterred by the Eisenhower administration’s nuclear option, and that he was unconvinced of the viability of SEATO’s ability to either deter attacks or be of help in the event of one.717 That Eisenhower’s response was to deflect rather than defend the administration’s position is also noteworthy. While one must obviously account for civility, the simple fact remains that rather than contend with Diệm that his state was perfectly safe, argue

714 Memcon, May 9, 1957, 1-6, Folder 5, Box 5, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 715 Memcon, May 9, 1957, 7, Folder 5, Box 5, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 716 Memcon, May 9, 1957, 1-7, Folder 5, Box 5, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 717 It is also worth acknowledging that Diệm likely did not relish the idea of subjecting Vietnam to nuclear war in any scenario. 266

that SEATO would be helpful, or even reply that South Vietnam was not yet internally stable enough to support a larger military force, Eisenhower attempted to explain how his administration had to “study these problems from a global point of view and adopt the best programs for all concerned.”718 Simply, Eisenhower was unconvinced that Diệm needed additional aid or that the existing system was insufficient to resist the communist threat at that moment, and hence he delayed any decision let alone action.

In comparison, Eisenhower’s response to the very real instability in Indonesia was equally measured. News of a military revolt in Indonesia was the first item discussed at the first

NSC meeting of the year, with Allen Dulles acknowledging that the conflict was too new and chaotic to predict an outcome. Still, the Director indicated his belief that the two most likely outcomes were Sukarno prevailing, either by moving decisively towards the communists or by invoking “his idea of ‘directed democracy’ –namely, a form of totalitarian government.”719

Early in the year, the momentum towards covert intervention in Indonesia began to build.

Confusion was a dominant theme in such discussions, as was a mixture of cynicism and skepticism. Allen Dulles cautioned on February 28 that Sukarno was moving toward abandoning

Western-style democracy. The “dramatic turn” in events which had led to the “critical situation” described by the younger Dulles was that Sukarno was moving to replace Indonesia’s government with a new advisory council and new cabinet; the central problem as far as the

718 Memcon, May 9, 1957, 7, Folder 5, Box 5, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson anticipated Diệm would make such requests and recommended that either Eisenhower or Dulles pre-empt Diệm with the type of arguments outlined above. See Memorandum for the Secretary of State, May 8, 1957, 1, Folder 5, Box 5, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 719 Discussion at the 308th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 3, 1957, 1-2, 308th Meeting of the NSC, January 3 1957, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL 267

administration was concerned was that the communists would be represented and were supporting Sukarno’s plan.720

As Allen Dulles continued, Percival Brundage interrupted to question why Sukarno, whom he had understood to be at worst neutral if not actually “on our side,” had experienced such a significant change in attitude. The responses from Allen Dulles and the new

Undersecretary of State Christian Herter were telling: the Director contended that Sukarno had a

“very volatile attitude” to begin with and thus could not be relied upon to be consistent, was increasingly frustrated with the instability and opposition he faced in Indonesia, and, as Herter put it, Sukarno had visited China.721 Where Allen Dulles was willing at least to admit, even if he dismissed, the frustrations and problems Sukarno faced at home, Herter’s comment pushed

Eisenhower to react. Clearly unnerved that Foster Dulles’s new second-in-command offered such a simplistic portrayal, Eisenhower enquired whether Sukarno’s support amongst the Muslim parties constituted a majority position, to which Dulles responded that technically it did, but that the parties were hardly unified and were quite ineffective.722 Indeed, one of these groups, Darul

Islam, a rebel group, was at that time engaged in terrorist and guerrilla tactics attempting to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia; thus Dulles’s critique that the Muslim groups lacked unity, a clear goal, and so on was at least somewhat accurate.723

Eisenhower’s relative restraint continued into March. While Allen Dulles voiced growing concern and expressed an increasing desire for intervention of some sort on the administration’s part, Eisenhower maintained a wait-and-see approach. After explaining the

720 Discussion at the 314th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 28, 1957, 1, 314th Meeting of the NSC, February 28 1957, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 721 Discussion at the 314th Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 722 Discussion at the 314th Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 723 It is worth noting in fact that members of Darul Islam attempted to assassinate Sukarno in 1957. 268

further “disintegration” of Indonesia, the Director detailed that if Sukarno was unable to restore order and the integrity of Indonesia, the administration’s policy was to use both covert and overt armed means to prevent Indonesia “or vital parts thereof” from falling to Communism.724

Dulles’s comments were met with quick and fierce resistance, as it was pointed out that the particular paragraph the CIA Director referenced was inserted into the policy in 1954, when the administration feared Indochina could fall to Communist “influence [which] might spread south and engulf Indonesia”; not for the then, “quite different,” situation.725 Further, officials pointed out that the administration had no forces “earmarked” for use in Indonesia, making an overt intervention difficult. Eisenhower ordered that interested military officials be informed that the problem in Indonesia, while obviously of great concern, was “essentially anti-Communist in inspiration rather than Communist” and while he expressed clear reluctance to deal with several states rather than a unified state in Indonesia, Eisenhower was clearly against Allen Dulles’s implied suggestion.726

Later in the year, Eisenhower and many in his cabinet were still clearly against intervening in Indonesia overtly or covertly. Allen Dulles, and to an extent Christian Herter were convinced not only that the situation in Indonesia required U.S. intervention, but that

Sukarno had gone over to the communist side, which only furthered the case for intervention.

The Director exposed his lack of nuanced understanding by linking several events together in a puzzling manner. Allen Dulles argued that Communist Party gains in a recent election were in part due to Sukarno’s withdrawal of his support for the Nationalist Party and the disunity of the

Muslim parties, that Sukarno’s trip to Communist nations the previous year had convinced him

724 Discussion at the 316th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 14, 1957, 5, 315Th Meeting of the NSC, March 14 1957, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 725 Discussion at the 316th Meeting of the NSC, 5-6, DDEL. 726 Discussion at the 316th Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 269

of the weakness of the parliamentary system, and that therefore Sukarno was “beyond the point of no return” and “would henceforth play the Communist game.”727 Yet again, Eisenhower called for study, and although he indicated that the group conducting the study should also consider what actions could be taken to address the situation in Indonesia, he made no commitment to actually follow those recommendations.728 The drive within most of the cabinet was simply to ensure Indonesia as a whole did not slip under communist control. Indeed, Nixon went so far as to argue that “Sukarno was probably right in believing that a democratic government was not the best kind for Indonesia,” and suggested that the administration simply needed to work with Indonesia’s military organizations in order to successfully oppose the communists, a suggestion Admiral Radford supported and the American ambassador to

Indonesia continued to offer as a solution into the next year.729 And, even as the situation in

Indonesia deteriorated near the end of the year, with expropriation of Dutch assets and an assassination attempt on Sukarno, Eisenhower continued asking questions rather than demanding action.730 The priority of anti-communism allowed Eisenhower to resist Diệm as well as Allen

Dulles’s push for action in Indonesia. It also allowed him to continue delaying changes to the administration’s policies in Latin America.

The administration continued to prioritise anti-communism in Latin America. This was easily justified by the almost systemic belief within the administration that most Latin American states and officials had an erroneous understanding of the administration’s other commitments

727 Discussion at the 333rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 1, 1957, 4, 333rd Meeting of the NSC, August 1 1957, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 728 Even by the end of the discussion, Eisenhower simply reiterated that the group studying the situation should have recommendations for “fast action if necessary,” rather than asking for a plan of action. See, Discussion at the Discussion at the 333rd Meeting of the NSC, 6-7, DDEL. 729 Discussion at the 333rd Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 730 Discussion at the 348th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 12, 1957, 10-11, 348th Meeting of the NSC, December 12, 1957, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 270

and also failed to appreciate the fact that the administration viewed the current relationship as entirely satisfactory. The basic logic followed that since all was essentially well, so long as those states remained anti-communist their concerns could be deferred or deflected. This was true despite clear signs of instability and growing resentment. Dulles wrote to Eisenhower on July 25 to request authorization to recognise the new military junta in Haiti as the official government.

Dulles explained his central reasons for requesting such authorization: the junta was “without

Communist taint and…friendly to the United States.”731 Dulles of course noted that the junta planned to hold elections as soon as practicable, but even had he known those “elections” would give rise to the Duvalier/Doc’ Dynasty, the regime’s loyalty and anti-communism took priority.

The matter was of such little import that Eisenhower simply scribbled “Ok” at the bottom, initialled, and sent it back to Dulles.732 The nonchalant attitude to a coup that placed anti- communists in power contrasted greatly with an event that had only the slightest hint of communist involvement.

The fallout from the assassination of Carlos Castillo Armas, President of Guatemala, was cause for concern for the administration. Dulles and high level State Department officials were initially equally panicked by the prospects that Castillo Armas was assassinated by a “communist fanatic,” and that a band of “extreme rightists” planned to use Castillo Armas’s death to roll back his policies and undermine Guatemala’s Constitution.733 Displaying both the level of desperation and arrogance existing in the administration at that time, on July 31, the State

Department was astonished that Eisenhower’s message of support for interim President Luis

Arturo González López (González) had not put a stop to the “conspiratorial activity” in

731 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, July 25, 1957, 1, Dulles, John Foster, July 1957, Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 732 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, July 25, 1957, 1, DDEL. 733 Department of State Staff Summary Supplement, July 31, 1957, 1 Dulles, John Foster, July 1957, Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 271

Guatemala, and was at a loss to suggest alternative actions.734 By the next day, the CIA had come to the conclusion that while a Communist had, in fact, killed Castillo Armas, the assassination was not part of a Communist coup attempt; going further, Allen Dulles argued that the transfer of authority in Guatemala would likely be concluded in a peaceful, legal, manner despite the most likely candidate being “technically barred” by Guatemalan law from holding said office.735

And while Eisenhower maintained a willingness to accept, support, and even endorse dictators and juntas so long as they remained steadfastly anti-communist, he and the administration also stuck resolutely to the refusal to alter significantly its economic policies toward Latin America. Eisenhower made clear he had quite different perspectives on economic development and aid depending on the region in question. Discussing economic aid to India,

Eisenhower was informed by Secretary Humphrey and other advisers of their significant resistance to extending greater aid due to the socialist tendencies of India’s government.736

Ignoring Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks’s point that the administration treated private enterprise as the key principle for development and progress in parts of the world like Latin

America, Eisenhower argued that “our great enemy” was the Soviet Union, and that since “the fundamental objective of the United States in its foreign assistance programs [was] to provide assistance to non-communist governments to save them from Soviet domination” different economic systems and therefore types of aid were necessary.737 Beyond his claim that his administration’s foreign aid programs were simply and fundamentally anti-communist,

734 Department of State Staff Summary Supplement, July 31, 1957, 1, DDEL. 735 Discussion at the 333rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 1, 1957, 3, 333rd Meeting of the NSC, August 1, 1957, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 736 Discussion at the 308th Meeting of the NSC, 5-6, DDEL. 737 Discussion at the 308th Meeting of the NSC, 6-7, DDEL. 272

Eisenhower’s contention that stressing the need for private enterprise would not work for India, alongside the fact he did not directly address Weeks’s point about Latin America is also important. Eisenhower clearly understood that there were economic elements to his larger anti- communist strategic goal. And yet, in Latin America in particular, he dragged his feet on these economic elements even as they began to impact the goal of anti-communism.738 Eisenhower was simply not convinced that a significant enough Communist threat existed in Latin America to justify substantial changes.

That the administration continued to struggle in elaborating on the means to achieve its goals, and fumbled in adapting to growing problems in its relations in Latin America, was clear enough. While many officials recognised growing resentment and anti-American sentiment, the administration continued to avoid policy alteration and instead blamed the issues on Latin

Americans’ failure to understand either the global picture or the importance of attracting private investment. Internally, parts of Eisenhower’s organization understood the problem to be concentrated around the friction caused by the administration’s tendency to be reactive rather than proactive. In April, the OCB presented a plan which analysed and sought to address generally many of the challenges the administration faced in Latin America. Although the OCB argued that Latin American states regularly misunderstood the administration’s policies, it also admitted that Eisenhower and others in the administration often created expectations of change or increased aid, only to delay such matters while also bolstering programs for disloyal (the OCB cited the U.K.’s actions at Suez followed by new loans being extended) or uncooperative

738 Anti-communism here as understood by the Americans, meaning anything anti-American could be equated with pro-communism. 273

regions.739 And while the new Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy

Rubottom, was also obviously aware of the issue, he adhered to the line of thinking that Latin

Americans were simply misunderstanding the global importance of anti-communism, while also acknowledging that the administration was playing a dangerous game by avoiding altering policy.740 Of course, Latin Americans were hardly ignorant of such perspectives, as the report noted that rising sentiment and resentment among Latin American officials could be summarised with the statement that they felt they “must create a Communist menace in order to get aid.”741

This sentiment was not truly off the mark, as the authors tacitly acknowledged its accuracy, while also pointing out that the administration did not have a viable plan to address this inherent problem. The OCB actually admitted that there was no solution to such sentiment under the administration’s policies, noting that such “attitudes are important and cannot be over- looked since they come into a head-on collision with the basis of current U.S. economic policy with respect to Latin America…”742 In fact, the authors of the report realised that the administration was simply failing to recognise and adapt to the need to adopt genuine and significant changes to its approach to Latin America, noting that “the greatest threat to the achievement of U.S. policy objectives in Latin America lies in the complacency which too often characterizes the U.S. approach to the area…”743

739 The OCB noted that new and expanded assistance to the Middle East was also causing strain and raising questions amongst Latin American officials. See, Outline Plan of Operations for Latin America, April 18, 1957, FRUS: 1955-1957, Volume VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, John P. Glennon, N. Stephen Kane eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 142. 740 Rubottom had been Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs since Henry Holland’s resignation in 1956, but was confirmed in June 1957, see Sewell, “A Perfect (Free-Market) World?”, 864. 741 Outline Plan of Operations for Latin America, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 142. 742 Outline Plan of Operations for Latin America, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 142. 743 Outline Plan of Operations for Latin America, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 141. 274

Eisenhower and Dulles simply refused to accept the argument that such changes were necessary in order to achieve the basic goal of a loyal anti-communist Latin America. In the lead-up to the Buenos Aires Economic Conference (an OAS conference and something of a follow-up to the previous year’s conference commitments), Dulles and the new Secretary of the

Treasury, Robert Anderson, sent a joint letter to Eisenhower establishing the administration’s position for the conference.744 Although meetings and joint conferences had been held within the administration to prepare for the conference, the joint letter made clear that while genuine discussions might be held on relatively minor points, the administration would avoid, delay, and put off constructive negotiation on the major goal of Latin American states at the conference: a treaty called the General Inter-American Economic Agreement (GIAEA).745 Dulles and

Anderson argued that the administration would be happy to stall and negotiate further at a later point, or have a non-binding declaration on the GIAEA issued, but that the administration would avoid movement on the treaty since “an economic treaty is not necessary to further our objectives in Latin America.”746

Thus, Dulles recognised and supported Eisenhower’s position on short-term, and short- sighted, policies on Latin America. Dulles and Eisenhower strongly agreed on the issue of not increasing aid or significantly altering mechanisms for its delivery to Latin American nations. In late August, Secretary Anderson reported that there was a growing feeling of resentment and of being ignored in Latin American states owing to the administration’s seeming non-movement on

744 Anderson was something of a reluctant favorite for Eisenhower, in that Anderson, a dubious if successful lawyer- turned-businessman who dutifully and loyally carried out his responsibilities but showed little political ambition, was viewed by Eisenhower as having very great potential to be President. Anderson had served as Secretary of the Navy from 1953-1954, when he became Deputy Secretary of Defense until 1955 745 Letter, Dulles and Anderson to Eisenhower, August 5, 1957, 1, Folder 4, Box 7, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 746 Letter, Dulles and Anderson to Eisenhower, August 5, 1957, 1, SML. 275

the issues of aid and trade policy.747 Dulles interjected to remind the cabinet that he did not share or support Latin Americans’ desire for an Inter-American bank, stating that “loans and existing mechanisms should be used.”748 Even though both men were aware of the consistent and growing complaints of Latin American officials, Eisenhower and Dulles saw little need to alter the basic approach to Latin America of supporting any relatively stable government so long as it was anti-communist, along with stressing the need for Latin American states to attract private capital and denying the need for significant economic changes. Of course, the combination of complacency, disagreeing with the premise of Latin Americans’ economic complaints, and willingness to work with effectively any anti-communist regime was causing growing problems that some could not ignore.749

By the end of the year, the cycle of building up and then failing to meet the expectations of Latin American officials and peoples had created clear enough strain in relations that Milton

Eisenhower felt compelled to warn State Department officials, but yet again the response was defensive and equivocal. Milton wrote to Rubottom on November 25, and then phoned him roughly two weeks later to follow-up; the younger Eisenhower argued that “our relations in Latin

America are degenerating due to the feeling…that their countries are being neglected in comparison to…the other regions of the world.”750 Interestingly, and problematically, Rubottom did not deny that relations were degenerating except to contend that he “doubted” whether the

747 Minutes of Cabinet Meetings, August 23, 1957, 2, Cabinet Meeting of August 23, 1957, Box 9, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 748 Minutes of Cabinet Meetings, August 23, 1957, 2, DDEL. 749 An NSC progress report compiled in September 1956 provides a window to these concerns. See NSC 5613/1 US Policy on Latin America Progress Report, September 11, 1957, 10-19, NSC 5613/1 Policy toward Latin America (2); NSC 5613/1 OCB Report (May 21, 1958), 10, Box 18, WHO OSANSA, Records, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, DDEL. 750 Rubottom quoted Milton when he wrote back to the President’s brother. See Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Milton S. Eisenhower, December 13, 1957, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 428-429. 276

problem could be worse than at any period in the past decade: he pointed to Milton Eisenhower’s

1953 trip to the region, arguing that Milton had successfully convinced Latin Americans that their resentment over the Marshall Plan had been “unreasonable and invalid.”751

In addition, Rubottom fell into a familiar pattern of denying any culpability on the administration’s part while acknowledging a variety of genuine grievances which he argued the administration simply could not control. Rubottom acknowledged that the administration had, in fact, allotted greater attention and funds to areas like the Middle East, but contended that problems in such areas were “acute and immediate” and thus needed to be dealt with quickly and appropriately.752 In a somewhat odd turn, Rubottom pointed to several alterations to standing policy that the administration was considering, but added that none of the alterations were acceptable as some would likely alienate other allies or further alienate Latin Americans.753

However, Rubottom admitted that Latin Americans had “valid grievance[s]” when it came to the administration’s trade policies, as the administration continued to threaten or implement tariffs on commodities following price drops on the world markets, commodities which were typically integral to specific Latin American economies.754 That being the case, he still insisted that since the administration was working to improve its response time and scope to emergency situations like food aid, a balance existed.755 Thus, while hinting that the administration was aware of significant problems, Rubottom’s response suggests that at best, the administration was unable and unwilling to formulate a solution.

751 Rubottom to Eisenhower, December 13, 1957, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 429. 752 Rubottom to Eisenhower, December 13, 1957, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 429. 753 Rubottom to Eisenhower, December 13, 1957, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 430. 754 Rubottom made specific note of lead, zinc, tuna, “and other products” as well as Mexico and Peru as commodities and states which the administration had dealt poorly with, and in relation to Mexico and Peru, suffered damage in relations accordingly. See Rubottom to Eisenhower, December 13, 1957, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 429. 755 Rubottom to Eisenhower, December 13, 1957, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 428-430. 277

What needs to be kept in mind is both that Rubottom’s response was very much in line with the thinking of Eisenhower and Dulles, and that his spirited defense and explanation of the administration’s position reveal the extent to which Eisenhower and Dulles were wedded to the idea that their policies were entirely reasonable and sufficient. It bears repeating that Rubottom was not making his defence to a dissatisfied Latin American official with a vested interest in gaining better treatment for their nation, but to the president’s brother after he raised concerns that the administration’s treatment of the region was going to result in open fractures and the explosion of anti-Americanism. The basic disjuncture between Milton Eisenhower’s concern and the administration’s position as elucidated by Rubottom was that while both acknowledged that “Latin American fires” were burning, the administration did not consider those fires to be the administration’s fault, their responsibility, or dangerous enough to warrant significant changes.756

The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Decline of John Foster Dulles

While Eisenhower and Dulles remained of similar minds on the administration’s approach to Latin America and Asia, the same was not true of the Middle East and Africa. In formulating the Eisenhower Doctrine, Dulles and Eisenhower took divergent paths. Dulles’s approach was a clear, ambitious, anti-colonial and anti-communist claim staking to the Middle

East while Eisenhower’s was a vague, reactive, and almost solely anti-communist approach.

Combined with the defeat he had suffered the year before after the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower’s

756 Rubottom noted that several actions of the administration had thrown fuel on such fires by creating the appearance of according less importance to Latin America. See, Rubottom to Eisenhower, December 13, 1957, FRUS: 1955-1957, American Republics, 429. 278

revision of Dulles’s approach in the Doctrine led to the Secretary seemingly abandoning his open push for a more active anti-colonial stance from the administration.

On January 5, Eisenhower presented the speech to Congress in which he established the broad outlines of what became the Eisenhower Doctrine.757 The speech was the result of the previous month’s deliberations and debates on what the administration should do to address the situation in the Middle East post-Suez. This situation, the perceived power-vacuum left in the

Middle East after the failure of Britain, France, and Israel to remove Nasser and the consequential fear that either Nasser or some combination of Nasser and the Soviets would fill that vacuum, unnerved the administration. Dulles and the State Department prepared a draft of the speech, and he presented it to Eisenhower on December 22 the previous year.758 Dulles had noted that other than some minor phrasing changes, the President considered the draft as presented to have been a “good paper.”759 While many sections of the draft Dulles presented to

Eisenhower made their way into the one Eisenhower presented to Congress, many sections were left out, and the order was revised by Eisenhower. The issue, or point of interest in such matters, is that what Eisenhower left out or changed dramatically altered the message of the Doctrine.

757 Eisenhower had met with Congressional leaders on January 1, and the speech itself had been revised and re- revised numerous times. Dulles also attended and participated in the meeting, and together the President and Secretary established that what became the Eisenhower Doctrine was a requested program to respond to Soviet incursion or attacks into the Middle East in order to preserve the “friendship” many of the nations had with the United States as well as to protect the region’s oil for European allies. See Memorandum of Meeting, White House, Washington, January 1, 1957, in FRUS: 1955-1957, Near East; Iran; Iraq, 433. 758 Dulles presented this paper to Eisenhower the same day the OCB released an updated progress report on the situation in the Middle East, noting among other issues that the administration likely could not work with Nasser and that both Saudi Arabia and Lebanon had voiced significant concerns with Nasser’s interference in their affairs. The report also linked Arab nationalism to, in part, Soviet encouragement and “Egyptian ambitions and intrigue.: See Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with respect to the Near East, December 22, 1956, in FRUS: 1955-1957, Near East; Iran; Iraq, 420-425. 759 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, December 22, 1956, 1, Folder 10, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 279

Dulles’s draft presented a clearer picture of the intent of the proposal, a more concrete sense of continuity with past actions of the Eisenhower and Truman administrations, and lucid justifications for the entire endeavour. Dulles’s draft made several specific references to the

Truman Doctrine, including quoting Truman during his speech to Congress proposing that doctrine, indicating not only a source of inspiration for the proposal but pointing to Dulles’s hope to bring the Middle East under the protection of the United States as the Truman Doctrine had for Turkey and Greece.760 Dulles made a point of listing a variety of security treaties and programs directed against Soviet and Communist aggression which the United States had with nations, including NATO, SEATO, the Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine and so on. Dulles’s draft transitioned from this point, to arguing that the administration now needed to be equally clear in “covering” the areas of the Middle East not covered by treaties.761 Dulles’s draft proceeded to establish the factors which necessitated such bold action: Soviet aggression (which

Dulles tied to Czarist aggression and covetousness toward the region) would not abate, and

European powers which had once protected the region were now physically and morally incapable of holding the region.762 Only after establishing these factors did Dulles point out that the only force capable of defending the area was the United States, and only after making this point did he make the specific requests for approval that Eisenhower later echoed; however,

Dulles went a step further again in explaining what such authority meant.

Somewhat ironically, Dulles’s closing passage on the importance of clarity was far clearer than the one Eisenhower ended up delivering to Congress. Dulles’s draft stressed the

760 Draft speech to Congress for the President, December 22, 1956, 1-3, Folder 10, Box 22, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 761 Dulles made specific mention of Turkey and Pakistan as being covered. See Draft speech to Congress for the President, December 22, 1956, 2, SML. 762 Dulles in fact devoted a good deal of his speech to castigating the Europeans while linking the administration’s actions during the Suez Crisis to simply an example of how the administration was already standing for the “peace and territorial integrity of the region”. See Draft speech to Congress for the President, December 22, 1956, 7, SML. 280

need to make clear to the Soviets that a power vacuum did not exist in the Middle East with the crumbling of Britain and France’s position; the United States would fill any vacuum and fight to keep the Soviets out.763 The obvious implications of Dulles’s draft were that the Eisenhower administration would be taking a more active and assertive role in the Middle East, that even in the absence of a security organisation the administration would economically and militarily protect the region, and that as much as France and Britain were moving out of the region, the

Eisenhower administration was moving in (albeit with entirely different motivations). Dulles’s arguments were decisive, clear, and ambitious; thus, while it is not surprising that Eisenhower sought to avoid the more ambitious and active elements of Dulles’s proposal, the changes he made resulted in a proposal that advocated a half-baked corollary to the Truman Doctrine. In that regard, Eisenhower’s reasoning for paring down Dulles’s ambitious plan was the very fact that its scale meant that the administration and later administrations would inevitably be drawn in to “internal squabbles” in the area; something Eisenhower specifically hoped to avoid.764

The differences between the proposal Dulles put forward and the one Eisenhower delivered to Congress are important for what they indicate as to divergences between the two men’s perspectives on the administration’s position in the Middle East. In addition to this, such differences also display Eisenhower’s desire to avoid the specificity and clarity of Dulles’s draft.

Eisenhower immediately made clear that his proposal was anti-communist, employing the logic of containment to argue that the Soviet Union need not fear American aggression but that since

763 Draft speech to Congress for the President, December 22, 1956, 14, SML. Eisenhower’s speech inserted several awkward qualifications concerning “power hungry Communists” believing the area to be inadequately defended resulting in an open armed attack which would then draw the United States in. To simplify this section, where Eisenhower’s speech was equivocal and vague, Dulles’s was unequivocal and direct. 764 Indeed, Eisenhower had Dulles make clear to Congressional leaders that the proposed doctrine was simply anti- communist, not an ambitious plan that might drag the administration into the region’s many other issues. See Memorandum of Meeting, White House, Washington, January 1, 1957, in FRUS: 1955-1957, Near East; Iran; Iraq, 433-434. 281

the Soviets had no need to be in the Middle East other than world domination, it was incumbent upon the Eisenhower administration to keep the region “independent.”765 Eisenhower cited various broken promises by the Soviets, listed the necessity of Asia, Africa, and of course

Europe having access to the region’s oil, but also cast his administration as a protector of the faiths from the “atheistic materialism” glorified by the Soviets in a manner similar to Dulles’s draft.766 And, before he had outlined what he proposed Congress empower him to do,

Eisenhower stressed the need to provide “added strength” to Middle Eastern nations protecting their independence, began undermining the United Nations, and openly forgave France and

Britain for their transgressions; Eisenhower argued the UN could not stop Soviet aggression, as shown by the Hungarian Uprising, whereas France and Britain had shown their “decent respect for the opinions of mankind” in adhering to the ceasefire in Egypt.767 The stark difference in treatment accorded to European actions at Suez was neither the only nor the most important change Eisenhower made in his proposal. Despite the fact that he stressed the need for clarity in this policy, what Eisenhower actually proposed still suffered from problematic but intentional vagueness.

While it would have been difficult for Eisenhower to present a fully structured proposal, the vacillation between concrete specificity and flimsy imprecision pointed to Eisenhower’s hand in revising the initial draft.768 The proposal’s “clauses” mirrored Dulles’s, the first on the use of

765 Dwight Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, January 5, 1957, The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1957, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 2005), 9. 766 Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, 9-10. 767 Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, 10. 768 In fact, in the lead up to the speech, both Eisenhower and Dulles acknowledged to multiple sources that the Eisenhower Doctrine had yet to be actually thought out beyond its position as an anti-Soviet program. Indeed, Dulles informed various State officials that he and the President were struggling with the military implications of the Doctrine as they hoped to avoid alienating Saudi Arabia by simply joining the military committee of the Baghdad 282

American armed forces was being clear enough: Congress would authorise Eisenhower to utilise

America’s armed forces to “secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence” of any nation in the area that requested such aid provided the source of aggression was “overt armed aggression” coming from a nation controlled by “International

Communism.”769 The other clauses, of which there were effectively three, were essentially authorisation requests for economic and military aid and assistance. However, Dulles’s explanations on and justifications for the necessity of the administration moving into the Middle

East were absent from Eisenhower’s proposal, as were the allusions to the Truman Doctrine and the clear message that the administration considered the region to be under its immediate and active control; Eisenhower’s attempt to instil flexibility to the proposal resulted in the creation of a reactive rather than proactive policy.770

The Eisenhower Doctrine and the manner it was actually enforced was the result of

Eisenhower’s continued tinkering and pondering over potential shifts in the administration’s policies and position in the Middle East. And, unsurprisingly given that such experimentation made enacting policies far more challenging, to say nothing of the problems created by his constant second-guessing, Eisenhower’s ponderings continued to irritate Dulles.771 Writing to

Dulles on June 27, Eisenhower voiced concern that King Saud’s “stiffness” in resisting the

Pact but also wanted to avoid any domestic pressure to aid Israel. See Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, December 29, 1956, in FRUS: 1955-1957, Near East; Iran; Iraq, 430; Memorandum of Meeting, White House, Washington, January 1, 1957, in FRUS: 1955-1957, Near East; Iran; Iraq, 433-434. 769 Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, 13. 770 Indeed, by February Eisenhower was writing to Dulles requesting the means to respond to Middle Eastern leaders hoping to take advantage of the Doctrine in such a way as to avoid saying anything “specific or say anything that might tie our hands later.” See Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, February 6, 1957, 1, Lebanon (3) Box 7, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 771 The State Department had already concluded that the Baghdad Pact was insufficient, and had considered the utility of a new organisation in the Middle East akin to NATO or SEATO, but Dulles shot ideas for a new “Middle Eastern Grouping” down. See Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Secretary of State, December 5, 1956, FRUS: 1955-1957, Near East; Iran; Iraq, 376- 382. 283

directions of the administration was becoming a significant problem.772 Part of Eisenhower’s concern likely stemmed from the fact that earlier in the year, during a meeting of Arab leaders,

Saud had been “out-manoeuvered” by Nasser, and had not enthusiastically supported the

Eisenhower Doctrine.773 Eisenhower noted that this matter was of such grave importance owing to “the fact that [Saud] seems to have been making so much progress to lead most of the Arab world toward the Western camp.”774 Eisenhower feared that perhaps Saud could not be trusted, and that the administration may have invested resources and prestige empowering the wrong person.775 In fact, he noted he was “truly getting a bit uneasy” over Saud’s resistance and that he and Dulles “better do some very hard thinking on this matter.”776 And although Saud made sufficient gestures to discourage Eisenhower from doing much more than thinking, Eisenhower continued to consider whether it was possible to go back and take the path not taken.777 In this case, such a path meant once again exploring whether Nasser could be recruited to the Western camp.

Eisenhower’s tendency to tinker included his faith in the wisdom of tycoons, and when such men offered him their opinions, he regularly had Dulles follow up on such advice.

Although it is impossible to discern exactly how much (or how little) consideration Eisenhower gave to matters before he shot off memos and instructions to Dulles, it is clear that the President

772 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, June 27, 1957, 1, Folder 1, Box 7, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 773 Discussion at the 314th Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 774 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, June 27, 1957, 1, SML. 775 Eisenhower showed considerable concern over what he viewed as Saud’s backward and simplistic view of economics and military balancing after a private meeting with the king near the end of January. See, Aide Memoire, Conversation between the President and King Saud, January 30, 1957, 1-4, Saudi Arabia (2), Box 46, International Series, DDEL. 776 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, June 27, 1957, 1, SML. 777 Saud took several steps to share what he considered vital intelligence with Eisenhower and Dulles on communist plots in Oman, and reaffirmed his desire to cooperate with the administration to maintain “peace and justice” in the region. See Telegram, Embassy in Jidda (sic) to Secretary of State, July 29, 1957, 1-2, Folder 2, Box 7, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 284

valued advice from industrialists. In October, Eisenhower brought up with Dulles a conversation he had with Peter Jones, the head of Cities Service Company, in which Jones floated the idea that bringing Nasser back towards the West might be possible and would be beneficial.778 Dulles noted that he had directed some officials to re-study the issue, but Eisenhower responded that the best course of action was to have one of Dulles’s officials talk to Jones for advice.779 Dulles was clearly skeptical of the entire idea for a variety of reasons, not the least of which being that the administration had attempted almost the exact same action the previous year, before Eisenhower changed positions and alienated Nasser. This did not mean Eisenhower considered the matter closed. On November 13, Eisenhower sent Dulles a memo, specifically instructing Dulles not to write back, but asking Dulles to consider whether “initiating some drive to attempt to bring

Nasser back to our side” could be achieved.780 Eisenhower wondered if Nasser could be moved toward the West without doing “anything spectacular, or, indeed, anything that would get in the papers” and explained further that he did not actually want to extend any substantial aid or change positions in such a way as to create the impression of “’bootlicking a dictator.’”781

Obviously bewildered that he had to explain such things to Eisenhower, Dulles pointed out the basic results of the administration’s actions in the region. Dulles, noting that there were a variety of challenges, explained one difficulty in moving forward with Eisenhower’s proposal, namely that Eisenhower’s previous drive to build up King Saud as leader of the Arab world would by necessity have to be sacrificed since neither Nasser nor Saud would accept a position subordinate to one another.782 Dulles apparently had to explain to Eisenhower that the

778 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, October 28, 1957, 2, Folder 12, Box 23, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 779 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, October 28, 1957, 2, SML. 780 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, November 13, 1957, Folder 11, Box 23, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 781 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, November 13, 1957, SML. 782 Memorandum for the Record, November 15, 1957, 1, Folder 11, Box 23, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 285

administration enjoyed good relations with Arab states excluding Egypt and Syria, and that undertaking an outreach to Nasser would aggravate those states. After hearing this explanation,

Eisenhower decided that loyalty to Saud was the most important factor in such considerations for the time being.783 Good relations did not, of course, equate to stability, and instability in the region combined with the vagueness of the Eisenhower Doctrine led to new complications.

The signs of instability in Middle Eastern states like Jordan and Lebanon were hinted at throughout the year, as was the likelihood that the Eisenhower administration would be relied upon to help address that instability. Dulles and resentful European officials were not the only ones to have noticed that the Eisenhower administration appeared to be replacing Britain and

France in various Third World areas. For instance, during a press conference in early July,

Dulles was presented with a question from a journalist who pointed out that the Eisenhower administration had started providing Jordan with the same amount of financial aid as the British had previously provided; the question posed was to the point: was the administration “replacing or succeeding the British” in the area?784 Dulles’s answer was skillfully evasive, as he argued that the administration was not providing aid in any way to replace British aid, but, in fact, the administration was providing aid due to the failure of Egypt and Syria to make good on their promised aid to Jordan.785 Dulles’s cunning was shown in that such a response not only portrayed Egypt and Syria as either financially weak or deceptive (or both), but it also subtly

783 Memorandum for the Record, November 15, 1957, 1, SML. 784 Secretary Dulles’s News Conference of July 2, 1957, 6, July, Box 1, PPS 322, RNPPM, RNL. 785 Secretary Dulles’s News Conference of July 2, 1957, 6, RNL. 286

highlighted both the growing distance between Britain and the United States, and the unstated jab that the British were simply no longer able to continue such grants.786

However skillful the answer may have been, it was becoming clear that instability in the

Middle East was increasing, and that it at least appeared as if the administration was moving to replace the British position in the area. The problem was, of course, that the Eisenhower

Doctrine as described and adhered to by Eisenhower was neither designed nor implemented as a long-term policy and was so vague that even those within the administration were unclear as to its intent beyond the broadest sense. And while it might appear that the administration was intent on replacing the British in the region, the reverse was true. In fact, by the end of the year, the State Department had returned to considering and working on the means to pressure the

British to adjust their behaviour and actions in the Middle East so as to maintain their position in the Middle East.787

In addition, the new policy’s failure to create clarity or direction within the administration also contributed to Dulles’s growing resentment of Eisenhower, and the confusion of many as to what the Doctrine was actually intended to accomplish. At the February 7 meeting of the NSC, yet another argument over foreign aid revealed that the Eisenhower Doctrine had not been fitted into the administration’s broader security policy and that the administration attempted to continue on despite the contradictions that resulted. Eisenhower’s broad national security plan advocated a reduction in conventional military forces and a greater reliance on nuclear

786 Indeed, a follow-up question asked whether the $30,000,000 USD in aid was planned as an annual expenditure, and Dulles casually stated that while it was not planned, the administration might extend such aid if it chose to or if the need arose. Secretary Dulles’s News Conference of July 2, 1957, 6-7, RNL. 787 Dulles approved a summary of British and American positions on a variety of issues for Eisenhower’s talks with Prime Minister Macmillan, and the Middle East obviously featured prominently. Indeed, the summary noted that the State Department hoped Britain would be able to renew and reinvigorate its relationship with Saudi Arabia. See Agenda, Macmillan Talks Washington, October 20, 1957, Summary Briefing Paper, 2, Dulles, John Foster, October 1957 (1), Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 287

deterrence, and although regional allies were expected to maintain their own conventional forces it was hoped they too would rely on America’s nuclear deterrence and retaliatory power. Yet, the Eisenhower Doctrine promised aid, not solely nuclear retaliation to allies in the Middle East facing a communist threat. Pointing to exactly how short the thought process had been, the administration failed to anticipate that local states might either accept or exploit the notion of a communist threat and thereafter scramble to gain more conventional military forces and equipment. That such a scramble would also heighten regional tensions was a factor Eisenhower had specifically sought to avoid but had failed to do so.

In effect, the administration warned of a looming Soviet led or inspired threat, and hoped that Middle Eastern states would be content absorbing an attack without significant conventional forces and simply rely on the faith that the United States would visit nuclear annihilation upon the aggressor. Dulles drove home to Eisenhower the wrongheaded nature of this hope, noting that he was having great difficulty persuading Middle Eastern officials, such as those in Iraq and

Iran, that they should reduce or restrain their drives to purchase large quantities of American military equipment and instead rely on “U.S retaliatory capability” while pointing out that if such states did not accept such a dynamic, the administration had lost its “only hope” of cutting down on military assistance spending.788 Eisenhower attempted to evade Dulles’s complaint with one of his own, stating that he had been forced to give King Saud “quite a lecture on the subject of military forces and military equipment,” but to no avail.789 Dulles’s central criticism, that the

Eisenhower Doctrine and the administration’s broader security programs failed to address issues of stability, non-emergency aid, and similar problems was shown to be prescient.

788 Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 7, 1957, 9-10, 312th Meeting of the NSC, February 7 1957, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 789 This was in reference to the conversation he had with Saud in January. See Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the NSC, 11, DDEL. 288

Indeed, the vagueness with which the Eisenhower Doctrine treated the stability of states in the Middle East along with the clarity over anti-communism was taken advantage of by

Middle Eastern officials. Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Malik, explained to

Ambassador Heath, that for Lebanon, Syria’s orientation needed to be pro-Western; Malik explained that if Syria became pro-Communist, or even neutral, this was a “matter of life and death.”790 The fact remained that Eisenhower had clearly not reconciled the basic contradictions in his broad security plan with those he laid out in the Eisenhower Doctrine.791 By continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence to hold back Soviet aggression while also making increased aid and protection reliant upon increased Communist aggression or subversion, Eisenhower all but assured that Middle Eastern leaders would simply claim to be suffering from Communist subversion when demanding aid. Since intra-regional struggles were outside the scope of the

Eisenhower Doctrine, indeed Eisenhower’s proposal clearly affirmed such a position, which resulted in regional leaders simply claiming some sort of Communist subversion in every difficulty they encountered.792 Dulles was painfully aware of this weakness, and of other weaknesses in Eisenhower’s policies. And although he continued supporting Eisenhower, Dulles displayed a greater willingness to criticise the President and his understanding of foreign security.

790 See Telegram, Heath to Dulles, August 28, 1957, 1-2, Folder 3, Box 7, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. Heath’s ambassadorial role in Indochina ended in 1954, after which he was appointed Ambassador to Lebanon. 791 At the previously mentioned NSC meeting, the conversation quickly veered off into an exchange of barbs between Humphrey and Dulles. Dulles argued that the foreign aid and military assistance programs needed to be addressed quickly and in an upfront manner with Middle East states like Iran, while Humphrey countered that as there was not a crisis in Iran at present this meant the administration could delay such action. Dulles immediately responded venomously that he was very glad to hear there was no crisis in Iran, then questioned whether the Secretary of the Treasury actually knew what was occurring in Iran at all. See, Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the NSC, 13, DDEL. 792 Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, 9-11. 289

Eisenhower’s decision to revise the Dulles draft of the Eisenhower Doctrine to an intentionally vague, comparatively modest proposal appeared to be something of a breaking point for Dulles, as he abandoned much of his advocacy for independent action, a position that had typified much of his advice and arguments previously. While Dulles still steadfastly supported the President on most issues, he began to express greater skepticism and criticism of

Eisenhower’s handling of issues, especially in the Third World. In one instance, Eisenhower responded to Dulles’s advice to avoid moving Honest John missiles (a surface-to-surface missile designed to carry a nuclear warhead) into South Korea by complaining “he was extremely weary of the blackmail that seemed constantly to be practiced against the United States…”793

Eisenhower’s complaint centered on the fact that the administration received vigorous objections from nations hosting American military personnel or hardware, or receiving military aid, whenever the administration attempted to cut back such resources. While Dulles took up the description of the relationships as one of “blackmail” he reminded the President that the situation with South Korea was similar to that with Taiwan, and other advisors added other nations to the list (Pakistan and Iran, for example).794 The Secretary of State then pointed out to the President that the problem was actually one of legacy: if the administration cut aid to nations it had taken clear action to save from Communism, and those nations started falling to Communism, there would be serious consequences globally and at home.795

Later in the same meeting, when the discussion expanded to touch on all military assistance to nations in the Middle East and Asia, Dulles took the opportunity to attack other weaknesses in Eisenhower’s basic policy. Proceeding with a carefully worded criticism, Dulles

793 Discussion at the 311th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, January 31, 1957, 4-5, 311th Meeting of the NSC, January 31 1957, Box 8, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 794 Discussion at the 311th Meeting of the NSC, 5, DDEL. 795 Discussion at the 311th Meeting of the NSC, 5, DDEL. 290

attacked both the premise and application of Eisenhower’s basic national security policy. Dulles drew attention to the fact that the discussion in the meeting had ballooned from one about specific aid to a particular nation into a debate on all military assistance, and argued the problem was not, as Secretary Humphrey had suggested, that the administration lacked even “a basic policy,” but something else entirely.796 Dulles reminded the NSC that “four years ago” the basic national security policy that was adopted stressed “our massive retaliatory capability” as the chief deterrent, but that the administration had failed to apply that policy. Going further, Dulles contended that the administration had been attempting to apply general policies over entire regions and areas, and had of course failed. The solution to this was that “instead, we should deal with each country in terms of its merits and the peculiarities of its individual situation.”797

The implication that broad ideas, like Eisenhower’s Middle Way or the reliance on massive retaliation rather than a flexible response, had failed and were hurting America’s position in the

Third World was not lost on Eisenhower. The President rebuffed Dulles’s criticism, reaffirming that it was “essential to apply a general principle to each particular country.”798 The fact that

Dulles was levelling criticisms at both the foundation of Eisenhower’s policies and their implementation hints at the extent to which Dulles had become disillusioned and frustrated with

Eisenhower’s handling of Third World issues.

796 Discussion at the 311th Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 797 Discussion at the 311th Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 798 Discussion at the 311th Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. Dulles again challenged this interpretation by pointing out that it was exceedingly difficulty to convince allies and neutrals that nuclear retaliation was a suitable cure all to deter all manner of Communist aggression. 291

Not Quite Done: Dulles and Nixon’s Double Gambits

Dulles was clearly frustrated with Eisenhower’s refusal to move on anti-colonialism, obviously irritated with his half-formed approach to the Middle East with the Eisenhower

Doctrine and his reactive tinkering. However, Dulles was not without the means to exploit weak points in Eisenhower’s style of leadership and his policies. While he was no doubt reluctant to grant Nixon real power and influence at the risk of his own, Dulles took a series of gambles which both displayed his trust in Nixon’s ability, and granted Nixon opportunities to force through at least some changes. For his part, Nixon worked to capitalise on these opportunities while taking clear risks himself.

Although it remained a source of irritation, Dulles was fully aware that Nixon would continue to assert himself in attempts to expand his prestige and influence in the administration, and that Eisenhower would continue to tinker with the bureaucratic apparatus of the administration in attempts to streamline decision making. With these facts in mind, Dulles made a proposal which would take advantage of Nixon’s skills and insights, technically satisfy Nixon’s ambitions while leaving him under the Secretary’s control, and serve as one feasible outlet for

Eisenhower’s tinkering. Dulles’s proposal was to have Nixon play a significant role in preparing the administration’s legislative program, meaning the programs requiring Congressional approval for resources. Dulles explained to Eisenhower that he was advocating placing Nixon in an “upper strategy level” which would take advantage of Nixon’s position as a member of the

NSC and the senate, as well as utilising Nixon’s legal prowess and foreign experience.799

Although Eisenhower and Nixon expressed some reluctance for the idea, Dulles was able to best both men by exploiting their weaknesses. Dulles used two factors to convince

799 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, September 2, 1957, 1, Folder 13, Box 23, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 292

Eisenhower that his plan was viable: first, he implied that he and Nixon had worked out a means to procure more funds for foreign aid by moving such requests to the Defense budget proposals, and second, he indicated that Attorney General Herbert Brownell not only considered the plan feasible but considered it a “sound idea.”800 Eisenhower was moved from reluctance to enthusiasm, and scheduled a meeting with Nixon, Dulles and General Wilton Persons the next day. Eisenhower prepared a memo for Nixon outlining what he expected Nixon’s responsibilities to be, stressing that the position was not simply an expanded Congressional liaison. Eisenhower managed to expand upon Dulles’s idea while still ensuring Nixon would remain subordinate to the Secretary of State; while Nixon would be entrusted with the planning, timing, study, and programming of the State Department’s legislative proposals, he would also be required to consult and adapt positions so that the administration’s “entire legislative program could be presented in the most advantageous manner.”801

In meeting with Nixon, Eisenhower and Dulles drove home the importance of the position even as they reinforced that he would be working under the Secretary of State.

Eisenhower detailed how the position would require Nixon to coordinate and consult with any department that had national security concerns which had an international dimension, admitting that since such programs and departments also had connections with the budget and taxation the scope of such a position was likely rather extensive.802 Dulles made a point of explaining the parameters of Nixon’s position, taking care to solicit Eisenhower’s agreement, and, when the meeting adjourned and Dulles and Nixon drove to the State Department together, the Secretary

800 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, September 2, 1957, 1, SML. 801 Memo for the Vice President from the President, September 3, 1957, 1-2, Folder 13, Box 23, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 802 Memorandum of Conversation, September 3, 1957, 1, Folder 13, Box 23, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 293

gave Nixon several instructions.803 Dulles informed Nixon that any meetings held on the legislative programs “should normally be held at the State Department,” ordered Nixon not to seek publicity for the new position, and, when Nixon suggested that this new responsibility might require him to “subordinate” goodwill missions abroad, Dulles informed Nixon he could still do both but that more planning would be needed.804 With the Democrats in command of both Houses, Dulles’s move to empower Nixon and streamline the administration’s legislative programs at the very least shows his faith in Nixon. Indeed, Dulles’s manoeuvre was something of a masterstroke had it succeeded as it would have given him added influence while placating

Nixon and ostensibly serving Eisenhower’s drive for greater efficiency.

Nonetheless, the fact that Nixon was recruited to give input and advice on both the structure and timing of Eisenhower’s entire legislative program speaks to several important points. That Nixon’s primary role was concerned with the foreign aspects of the legislative program points to both Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s respect for his abilities and to the fact that the

President and Secretary were increasingly at a loss for means to gain sufficient Congressional support for their programs. In addition, the expectation that Nixon would serve as an advisor in both the preparation and presentation of the State Department’s legislative program proposals suggests that Eisenhower and Dulles considered Nixon’s positions on such issues to be reasonable enough that his participation would be of greater benefit than cost. This was not the only area in which Dulles bolstered the position of his young apprentice, as he also encouraged, indulged, and educated Nixon’s efforts toward the administration’s problematic relations with

Africa.

803 Memorandum of Conversation, September 3, 1957, 1-2, SML. 804 The original memorandum read that such meetings “would normally be held at the State Department,” and Dulles made the specific point of editing the memo to read “should” in place of “would”, see Memorandum of Conversation, September 3, 1957, 2, SML. 294

In fact, both Dulles and Nixon played a risky game in their actions surrounding Nixon’s mission to Africa. As proposed first by Dulles, the trip was limited to having Nixon visit only the Gold Coast (Ghana) for its independence ceremonies.805 At the same time, Dulles suggested that Nixon should visit President William Tubman in Monrovia, Liberia, but did not insist on this.806 In essence, this was to be another goodwill mission, the type of mission Dulles was well aware Nixon had grown to dislike. Dulles noted that both colonial and anti-colonial powers would attend or keenly observe the independence ceremonies.807 Thus, Dulles followed

Eisenhower’s preference for goodwill missions as a means to show support of a nation, state, or cause, without actually committing to any significant programs or policies. However, it is also integral to keep in mind that Dulles knew full well that Nixon had clearly expressed a dislike for goodwill missions, that he had been pushing both for a greater role in foreign policy generally and for significant changes to the administration’s policies in Africa, and that Nixon almost instinctively sought and exploited media attention to bolster his image. In short, Dulles likely anticipated Nixon’s manoeuvring, but considered the potential benefits to outweigh the potential costs.

In fact, Nixon voiced disinterest in Dulles’s original proposal as he claimed it was not actually an important mission. Nixon’s tactical demurral was both an element in his relationship with Dulles, and a ploy to extract greater responsibilities, media attention, and possibly effect

805 Kevin Grimm has traced one line in the origins of the Ghana trip, examining the exchanges between Dulles, Congresswoman Frances Bolton, and Nixon. See Kevin E. Grimm, “Gazing Toward Ghana: African American Agency in the Eisenhower Administration’s Relations with Africa,” Journal of Contemporary History 48, Number 3 (2013), 589-590. For the Dulles-Nixon exchange see Memorandum for the Vice President, Dulles to Nixon, Department of State, January 24, 1957, 1 Africa Trip – 1957, Administration, Box 1, Series 351, Subseries E: 1957 Africa Trip, RNPPM, RNL. 806 Dulles wanted Nixon to visit Tubman due to the Vice President being unable to visit Monrovia the year earlier, see Memorandum for the Vice President, 2, Box 1, Series 351, RNPPM, RNL. 807 Memorandum for the Vice President, Box 1, RNPPM, RNL. 295

change. When Dulles requested Nixon undertake the mission, Nixon responded on January 28, claiming to be uninterested, but also demanding that if Dulles’s proposal was truly important,

Eisenhower should have no problem issuing a presidential mandate stating as much.808 This was not out of the ordinary, as Nixon had already established with Dulles that he disliked such work but was willing to undertake it if Eisenhower made a point of stressing its importance. The next day Eisenhower sent the request and mandate, making note that Nixon need only take the trip if he could find the time given his other responsibilities.809 This was the opportunity Nixon had been waiting for, as he quickly accepted the mission, but also managed to add Uganda, Ethiopia,

Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Italy, and Libya to the list of nations he would visit; he did this in less than month.810

Nixon had thus technically outmanoeuvred Dulles, as it would be pointlessly petty for

Dulles to intervene to thwart such an expansion given his own basic lack of interest in the region, the presidential mandate, and the fact that Nixon had abided by both Dulles’s request and

Eisenhower’s framing of the request in principle. Of course, Dulles could have torpedoed the scheme had he truly wanted; the fact that he did not along with the fact that he tacitly encouraged and aided Nixon’s recommendations after his mission suggests both that Dulles had no problem with Nixon’s ambitions in the area and sympathised with his drive for change.

From the perspectives of African leaders, Nixon’s mission was perceived as a success even before it was over. Some of this perception was due in part to the belief among both the

808 Nixon bluntly told Dulles to have the president ask him to take on the mission. See Telephone Call from the Vice President, Nixon to Dulles, 9:37AM, January 28, 1957, DDEL. 809 Memo, Eisenhower to Nixon, White House, January 29, 1957, Africa Trip – 1957, Administration, Box 1, Series 351, Subseries E: 1957 Africa Trip, RNPPM, RNL. 810 Secret Service Report on African Trip, June 13, 1957, 1, Secret Service Report – Africa Trip, Box 1, Series 351, Subseries E: 1957 Africa Trip, RNPPM, RNL. 296

citizens and leaders of the nations Nixon visited that his interest in their issues was genuine.811

And, while both Nixon and the leaders he met with were fully cognizant of the fact that the vice president was not empowered to make any changes, the mutual understanding that Nixon could at least add a new voice in the Eisenhower administration advocating for changes to the policy helped build trust on both sides.812 Nixon was also careful in attempting to “sell” the

Eisenhower Doctrine to the leaders he spoke with, explaining its benefits and taking the necessary step of openly stating that the program was not intended to allow for American domination.813 Although still officially a goodwill mission, Nixon used the trip as an opportunity to gain first hand knowledge about the situations on the ground in Africa and to gauge what the administration was and was not doing to ensure the region’s pro-American and anti-communist future.814

Nixon’s experience in Ethiopia helped push him to take an independent and almost antagonistic stance on the administration’s lack of interest or movement on developing and following through on its Africa policies. When Nixon spoke with Ethiopian officials, he was told that promised military aid had not appeared, and that which had was coming much slower than had been agreed upon in 1953.815 The Ethiopians were being courted by the Soviet Union, but Nixon wrote that while Ethiopia was well aware of “the danger” of genuinely close relations with the Soviets, arguing that Ethiopian officials would “play them [the Soviets] against us [the

811 Thomas F. Brady, “Nixon goes Barnstorming to Win Over Africa,” The New York Times March 17, 1957, E4. 812 Brady, “Nixon goes Barnstorming to Win Over Africa,” The New York Times March 17, 1957, E4. 813 Nixon was less open with reporters about what specifics he covered regarding the Eisenhower Doctrine but made it known that he had, in fact, addressed it. See John Scali, “Nixon asks Better ties with Africa” The Washington Post and Times Herald April 7, 1957, A1; Brady, “Nixon goes Barnstorming to Win Over Africa,” The New York Times March 17, 1957, E4. 814 The Ugandan portion of Nixon’s mission was limited to roughly twenty-seven hours, and was very much a quick goodwill stopover. See Secret Service Report on African Trip, June 13, 1957, 18-19, RNPPM, RNL 815 Memcon, Bitwodded Makennen Endalkatchew [sic] and Richard Nixon, Addis Ababa, March 12, 1957, 1-3, Africa Trip – 1957, Box 8, Series 325, Executive Branch File, RNPPM, RNL. 297

Americans]” in an attempt to gain better treatment by the Americans, despite never being “taken in” by Soviet overtures.816 Interestingly, when both Nixon and Haile Selassie publically spoke about cooperation between the U.S. and Ethiopia, they did so more in terms of countering

Nasser’s influence and actions in the region rather than in an anti-communist vein, pointing to the regional implications of U.S-Ethiopian friendship.817 While Nixon took many lessons from his mission to Africa, he also treated it as an opportunity to carve out a strong position for himself in both the domestic and foreign sphere.818

This drive to establish his position resulted in something of an independent campaign, as

Nixon took public and private steps to pressure the administration generally, and his mentor and

Eisenhower privately. Nixon understood that the intransigence on military aid to Ethiopia was a problem for both the State and Defense Departments, and thus upon his return he wrote a memo to both Dulles and Charles Wilson explaining the problems caused by their lack of interest.819

More generally, Nixon’s recommendations and criticisms, which he submitted to Eisenhower in two reports, one public one private, mostly echoed criticisms and complaints that had been made for years. While Nixon was careful to couch his report in laudatory terms whenever possible, he also made his criticisms clear, and portrayed failure to act upon them as a boon to the Soviets.

The vice president noted that the worrisome state of diplomatic missions in Africa was a larger problem than the administration believed. Nixon argued that embassies and related diplomatic missions in Africa ought to be, meaning they were not then, staffed by people skilled

816 Handwritten Note, Unmarked Folder, Box 1, Series 351, Subseries E: 1957 Africa Trip, RNPPM, RNL. 817 John Scali, “U.S. Reported Asking Base in Eritrea,” The Washington Post and Times Herald March 13, 1957, A1. 818 Nixon believed that by advocating for greater racial equality in the administration’s policies, and by portraying such inequality as an easily exploitable weakness of which the Soviets would take advantage, he could gain both progress on the international front and score points with African American communities. 819 Memo, Richard Nixon to Charles E. Wilson, March 25, 1957, 1, Ethiopia – Schedules, Speeches, Statements, Box 1, Series 352, Subseries E: 1957 Africa Trip, RNPPM, RNL. 298

enough to explain American policies in such a way that those policies would appear indicative of the “independence, equality, and economic progress” for which Africans admired the U.S.820

The vice president also pointed out that American diplomatic officials allowed racial prejudices to impact international relations negatively.821 Nixon viewed such problems as personality issues, noting that ambassador John Tappin had done a good job in Libya but that his “personal character” was a deficiency which might necessitate his dismissal.822 Nixon’s conclusion led him to risk alienating Dulles and Eisenhower through his criticism and the linkages he made to display the failure of policy. Foreign Service officials tended to treat posts in Africa as a diplomatic backwater, which when combined with the lack of funding allotted for operations there resulted in ineffective policy in the region. Nixon believed that such diplomats were causing significant enough damage to U.S. prestige and influence in Africa that he questioned out loud around a group of reporters “how can we expect to get things done over here [Africa] with cornballs like that?”823

Indeed, the tone of Nixon’s behaviour and reports conveyed his conclusion that the administration had been ignoring, mishandling, and otherwise proceeding improperly towards

African matters. Nixon noted frustration with both Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s gradualist approaches to Africa, complaining that the administration’s insistence that many African states were not ready for independence, and that independence was coming “too soon” simply ignored

820 The Vice President’s Report to the President on trip to Africa, (February 28 – March 21, 1957), 3-4, Box 505, Official File, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Records as President, White House Central Files (hereafter WHCF), 1953- 1961, DDEL. 821 Nixon argued that the three most important factors to consider for Ghana’s ambassador were “merit, experience, and absence of prejudice.” See Report to the President on the Vice President’s Visit to Africa, (February 28 – March 21, 1957), 4, DDEL. 822 Handwritten Notes, Unmarked Folder, Box 1, Series 351, Subseries E: 1957 Africa Trip, RNPPM, RNL. 823 Earl Mazo, “Nixon Seeks to Shake up Africa Staffs” The Washington Post and Times Herald March 17, 1957, A1. 299

the reality that those states were gaining and would continue to gain independence in the near future.824 That Nixon took such risks, along with the fact that his report to Eisenhower was a combination of urgent anti-communism and moralising suggests Nixon’s goal was to gain support for, and bring about, actual change.

And while many of these changes were hardly novel, they were nonetheless forcefully made and pointed to a more active American role in the continent. Some of these recommendations acknowledged the delicate balance the administration sought to strike in the region alongside the clear reality that such a balance was not actually tenable in the long-term.

One such recommendation argued for making it clear to France that while the administration did not seek to supplant them, France’s actions in the continent were putting “the entire West” position in North Africa in “extreme danger.”825 Going further, Nixon also pushed for the administration to take steps, both surreptitious and otherwise, to begin to form solid relations with African states so that the administration could continue to deny access to the Soviets even in the event of a rupture with Europeans.826 It is also worth noting that as concerned nations close to Egypt, such as Libya, Sudan, or Ethiopia, Nixon argued that increasing aid and positive

American presence would allow the administration to help those states resist being dominated by

Nasser.827 Finally, Nixon also pointed out that the administration needed to begin immediately preparing for states which were about to emerge from colonial domination since such

824 Handwritten Notes, RNL. 825 The ICA’s response to Nixon’s recommendations is useful here in that other than agreeing with most of Nixon’s recommendations, they also typically provided either an update on said recommendations or analysed their implications. See Comments and Suggestions on Recommendations in Vice President Nixon’s Report to the President on his visit to Africa, 1-2, Africa – RN Report and other papers, Box 8, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 826 Comments and Suggestions on Recommendations in Vice President Nixon’s Report to the President, 3-4, DDEL. 827 Nixon specifically stated the administration should avoid even the appearance of attempting to isolate Egypt. See Comments and Suggestions on Recommendations in Vice President Nixon’s Report to the President, 5, DDEL. 300

emergences were already occurring and would continue to do so.828 Nixon made other, nation specific recommendations, as well as criticisms of the administration’s seeming inability to deliver aid properly, all toward gaining some form of momentum toward altering the low priority accorded to the continent.

Nixon also linked American domestic racial issues and related Soviet propaganda to some of the administration’s failures in Africa and the Middle East, identifying both domestic and international reasons Eisenhower should act on his recommendations. Nixon argued that while Soviet propaganda on racism in America was not accurate, the Communists were exploiting a real weakness in American society and gaining influence in African and Middle

Eastern nations because of it.829 In his report to Eisenhower, Nixon pointed out the hypocrisy of preaching equality abroad but not practising it at home, and then offered a solution that he claimed was both in the “national interest,” and morally necessary: “the elimination of discrimination in the United States.”830 While none who read this recommendation would have missed that Nixon’s rhetorical flourish came without a single proposal for achieving the lofty goal, it was nonetheless indicative of the fact that Nixon appreciated the diplomatic costs of both domestic and foreign policies which did not sync well with American ideals.831

Nixon’s basic position was that Africa was the administration’s to lose, and his arguments had at least some impact on Eisenhower. Nixon pointed out that most African leaders

828 The ICA almost defensively noted that the State Department had opened consulates in Kampala, Yaounde (Yaoundé), Abidjan, and “Mogadiscio” (Mogadishu). State planned to open further consulates in 1958 in Brazzaville, Kaduna, and Tananarive (Antananarivo), funds permitting. See Comments and Suggestions on Recommendations in Vice President Nixon’s Report to the President, 17, DDEL. 829 Vice President’s Report to the President, (February 28 – March 21, 1957), 4, DDEL. 830 Vice President’s Report to the President, (February 28 – March 21, 1957), 4, DDEL. 831 South Africa serves as a good example of this, with U.S. diplomatic necessity constantly at odds with domestic realities. See Y. G-M. Lulat, United States Relations with South Africa (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), 152. 301

stood against Communist influence, meaning that the Eisenhower administration ought to deal with the problems in domestic and international issues immediately or risk losing Africa.832

Nixon was able to exercise some influence on Eisenhower on specific concerns he had from his mission, as the President wrote to Dulles on July 22, 1957 regarding the need to place experienced ambassadors and diplomats into foreign offices, “especially in the newer countries where routines have not yet been firmly fixed.”833 In addition, Nixon’s points about the domestic failings of America being exploited by the Soviets were echoed very closely by

Eisenhower when he addressed the nation regarding the deployment of federal troops in response to the actions of Governor Faubus in Little Rock, Arkansas, later that year.834 The combination of public criticisms of the administration’s failings, the fact that he had “sold” the Eisenhower

Doctrine, and the seeming anomalous absence of interference from Dulles resulted in

Eisenhower directing that Nixon’s push for action on African policies go ahead.

However, it soon became clear that the administration had extreme difficulty adopting new policies even when effectively all interested parties agreed on them. The basic path Nixon’s recommendations and report took before being incorporated into new policies the next year,

(meaning 1958 was the first year the administration could start moving towards implementing the policy), is important. Nixon’s report was sent from the NSC, with comments and concerns to the ICA; the ICA then commented on Nixon’s report and sent it back to Nixon and the NSC, but not before pointing out that the vast majority of Nixon’s recommendations should actually have

832 Vice President’s Report to the President, (February 28 – March 21, 1957), 7, DDEL. 833 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, July 22, 1957, Dulles, John Foster, 1957, Box 9, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series, DDEL. 834 Eisenhower noted that the Soviets would be pleased, and would use Little Rock as a means to damage America’s reputation abroad. See Newton, Eisenhower: The White House Years, 251. It should be noted that Nixon was hardly unique in making such points, only that he was perhaps one of the figures closest to the President doing so in the context of Africa and African Americans. 302

been considered by the State Department proper.835 The ICA was under the power of the State

Department and was in charge of coordinating foreign assistance and conducting all non-military security programs. In the simplest sense, Nixon’s recommendations bounced around the State

Department’s bureaucracy; however, the policy that eventually resulted from Nixon’s trip and recommendations had Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s support. Much of this was likely due to the fact that the policy paper on Africa still accepted a gradual approach while gently pointing to movement away from Eisenhower’s Middle Way when the situation allowed.

Despite being a compromise policy, many of Nixon’s recommendations were carried over into what was America’s first “comprehensive” policy on Sub-Saharan Africa, NSC 5719/1, which itself contributed to the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs in 1958.836 In fact, the policy itself was something of a compromise between the Eisenhower and Dulles perspectives on anti-colonialism yet fit nicely with both men’s perspectives on Africa. In addition, NSC 5719/1 made clear that even with American aid, problems in African nations would take “a generation or more” to be resolved.837 This policy also stressed that the U.S. should help independent African nations develop in an “orderly manner,” work to solidify

835 Indeed, John Hollister, who resigned as Director of the ICA the next month, pointed as much out, but also voiced his administration’s ability and enthusiasm to get to work on Nixon’s recommendations. See Memo, Hollister to Nixon, August 20, 1957, Africa – RN Report and other papers, Box 8, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 836 The Bureau was effectively broken off from the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs into an independent Bureau. See, “NSC 5719/1,” FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 76-87. For this being the first time the U.S. had a comprehensive policy on Africa South of the Sahara, see Meriwether, “A Torrent Overrunning Everything,” 184. 837 “NSC 5719/1,” FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 76. George White Jr. has argued convincingly that Nixon was far from the first to push for significant changes in the administration’s African policies, and while his points are well made, the fact remains that Nixon’s influence and efforts remained integral to the eventual changes such as they were. See George White, Jr. “Big Ballin’!?: Vice President Nixon and the Creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in the U.S. Department of State” Passport 41, Number 2 (September 2010), 5-6. 303

nationalist governments against Soviet and Egyptian “Islamic” overtures, respectively, and move to maintain and create ties between emerging African nations and Western Europe.838

Other aspects of NSC 5719/1 displayed more of Nixon’s concerns and recommendations for American-African relations. Of note is the section in NSC 5719/1 which focused on the balancing act the United States must perform in regards to nations seeking independence from their European colonisers. The document advised that premature independence would be as detrimental for emerging nations and “our [American] interests” as continuing the rule of the colonial powers, but stressed the need to tailor attitudes to each emerging nation appropriately.839

This was not simply a slight deviation from the Middle Way, as the policy acknowledged that while new African states were actually suffering under European rule, it was incumbent upon the

United States (and therefore the Eisenhower administration) to chart an independent course which dealt with the reality on the ground and protected American interests rather than delaying decisions. Of course, having a policy and acting on a policy are two different things, which

Nixon quickly learned from his mentor even as Dulles worked to educate him on the challenges facing the administration in Africa.

Dulles chose the complexity of the French-Algerian quagmire to bring home to Nixon the difficulties involved in such challenges. Dulles respected Nixon’s opinion on matters relating to

Africa and colonial questions thereof, though he was forced to show Nixon the difficulty in actually enacting the policy for which the Vice President had worked. Dulles considered the

United States to be effectively between a rock and a hard place when it came to France and

838 “NSC 5719/1,” FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 76-78. 839 “NSC 5719/1,” FRUS 1955-1957, Africa, 79. 304

Algeria, as he made clear to Nixon in a series of memos.840 Their exchange is of significant importance for understanding Dulles’s perspective on the Algeria-France situation but also the wider African colonial issue. Dulles made very clear to Nixon that he considered French proposals and foot-dragging to be an understandable, if infuriating, part of the problem exacerbating tensions amongst the administration, African nations, and the French. Whereas in

1956 Dulles appeared prepared to chart aggressively a new course for the administration, by late

1957 he had returned to the position of openly loathing what he perceived as French incompetence and intransigence while begrudgingly accepting that the administration would not push a viable alternative. To that point, Dulles reminded Nixon of the “bigger picture,” meaning that Eisenhower and Dulles considered France’s NATO commitments and participation to be more important than any individual African state’s drive for independence; Dulles admitted that the best the administration could hope for in such scenarios was to avoid having “to make a difficult choice.”841 Thus, while Dulles made clear to Nixon that little significant change would actually occur toward Africa, the fact remains that Nixon’s drive helped the administration finally take the first steps.

The Oncoming Storm

On November 25, Eisenhower suffered a stroke. Along with his heart attack, and the surgery he had undergone to address his ileitis the previous year, this marked the third time

840 Undated Memorandum for the Vice President, John Foster Dulles to Richard Nixon, 1-3, Algeria 1957-1960, Box 1 Vice Presidential Collection (Hereafter VPC) Country Files [Cushman File] PPS 320, RNL. The memo references earlies conversations begun on May 28, 1957 in which Dulles first officially broached recruiting Nixon to offer advice and insight on the Algeria-France situation, and given the memos referencing of the issue of pourparlers, it is reasonable to date the memo to before the 726th plenary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1957, when that matter was addressed. 841 Undated Memo, Dulles to Nixon, 2-3, VPC, RNL. 305

Eisenhower had been incapacitated for medical reasons during his presidency. The stroke left

Eisenhower with a permanent speech impediment and made it more difficult to find the words in certain situations, which together aggravated his already famous temper.842

Nixon met with Eisenhower on December 3 and was confronted with a worrisome and problematic situation. Nixon intended to use the meeting with Eisenhower to encourage the

President both to actually delegate more and to use the public reaction to the launch of Sputnik as a means to gain greater funding from Congress for foreign aid and related programs.843 While

Eisenhower expressed broad agreement with Nixon’s suggestions, he was distracted by complaints he wished to raise: Eisenhower complained to Nixon about advisers and officials not making decisions and failing to act independently, voiced resentment that the cabinet had met and carried on business while he was incapacitated, warned Nixon to avoid appearing as if he were asserting himself or taking advantage of Eisenhower’s illness, and then pondered whether

Nixon could be relieved of his Constitutional duties to the Senate to take up the position he had been ruminating on for some time – that of the pseudo-prime minister.844 The rambling and quick mood changes caused Nixon some concern about Eisenhower’s mind and ability to proceed, but this was doubly true of Dulles.

Dulles showed a great deal of concern and anxiety about Eisenhower’s capacity to continue to lead after his stroke, indeed Dulles’s records of Eisenhower’s actions reveal the chaotic apprehension of the Secretary of State. Despite clearly being debilitated, Eisenhower attempted to reassert himself and resume normal activities within a matter of days of his stroke.

842 In a meeting with Nixon, Eisenhower acknowledged this, voicing concern that such irritations might cause him to have another stroke. See Memcon, Meeting with the President, December 3, 1957, 2-4, RNL. 843 Memcon, Meeting with the President, December 3, 1957, 5-8, RNL. 844 The obvious issue is that in the same conversation as he was castigating Nixon for over stepping bounds, Eisenhower was complaining about advisers consulting with him too much, and proposing avenues to expand Nixon’s responsibilities. Memcon, Meeting with the President, December 3, 1957, 4-9, RNL. 306

This was a source of severe alarm, which Dulles brought up both with the President himself, and most of the cabinet. Dulles held several meetings, made numerous phone calls, and went so far as to enlist Milton Eisenhower in attempts to halt Eisenhower’s activity for the time being and impress upon the President the necessity of recovering fully before returning to work.845 Dulles was convinced Eisenhower was incapable of carrying out his duties, and told no fewer than four officials, including Nixon, that Eisenhower was displaying “bad judgement,” warning about the

“very bad sign[s]” he was noting in Eisenhower’s behaviour, and that the President was not

“thinking right.”846 Dulles’s concern again turned to the situation after Woodrow Wilson’s stroke, as he told Nixon privately that if the situation was “a reproduction of the Wilson problem” then “jealousy and usurpation of power” would result.847 This in large part explains why Dulles swung back to a less critical and more openly loyal position toward Eisenhower in

1958, and why he reasserted firmer control and direction over Nixon’s role in foreign policy.

Still, the year was one of mixed results. Eisenhower’s resistance to change and action restrained the administration from greater involvement in Vietnam and delayed intervention into

Indonesia’s civil strife. However, that same resistance resulted in continued complacency toward Latin American concerns, with even the President’s brother noting trouble ahead.

Although Nixon was able to bring about the administration’s first real steps toward African policies, diplomatic and strategic realities meant minimal genuine changes. The Eisenhower

845 Memcon, November 30, 1957, 1, Folder 11, Box 23, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 846 Dulles voiced such concerns to the following individuals: Richard Nixon, White House Press Secretary James Hagerty, soon-to-be Surgeon General Leonard Heaton (who also treated Dulles, and to whom Dulles confided his anxieties over the ramifications if Eisenhower could not be “controlled medically,”. White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams, Milton Eisenhower, and the man who followed Adams as WHCS in 1958, Wilton Persons. See, Telephone Conversation, Dulles to Heaton, December 1, 1957; Telephone Conversation, Dulles to Hagerty, December 1, 1957; Memcon, November 30, 1957, 1; Telephone Conversation, Nixon to Dulles, December 1, 1957, Folder 11, Box 23, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 847 Telephone Conversation, Nixon to Dulles, December 1, 1957, SML. 307

Doctrine, and Eisenhower’s tinkering, led to confused and problematic stumbling in the Middle

East, as well as the temporary alienation of John Foster Dulles. Such frustrations were hardly limited to Dulles, indeed, by the end of the year, Secretary of Defense Wilson, Secretary of the

Treasury Humphrey, Attorney General Brownell, and Harold Stassen were all out of the administration. And, while Dulles remained loyal to Eisenhower, evidence was mounting that he too, wished to step down. In fact, Dulles plainly stated that while he was willing to stay on as

Secretary of State past the next year’s Congressional elections, he hoped to “give the matter another look” after that point.848 While each Secretary and official had his own reasons for leaving, the frustrations and criticisms they faced with Eisenhower certainly played a role. So too did Eisenhower’s propensity for complaining about his advisors’ lack of independent initiative while also taking deep offense or warning them about overstepping their bounds when they took actions even slightly contrary to Eisenhower’s wishes. Eisenhower’s “hidden-hand” style also strained relations as it often amounted to little more than gossip: Eisenhower made no secret of the fact he considered Wilson unable to make decisions, and was equally open about the flaws he perceived in his other advisers, so long as the object of derision was not present.849

The growing friction, both between Eisenhower, Dulles, Nixon, and that within the administration and the Third World had been mounting for years even as sporadic efforts had held back overly severe fractures. In 1958, a series of crises erupted in the Third World which

848 Eisenhower grasped the gravity of Dulles’s point, as he immediately requested Dulles stay on until his own term was through and proceeded to describe Dulles as irreplaceable. See Memcon, September 2, 1957, 1, Folder 2, Box 26, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 849 Eisenhower told Nixon of a specific instance in which Wilson consulted Eisenhower on budgetary limits for Defense spending, but refused to decide on a number; instead Wilson presented Eisenhower with a range of numbers from between 36 and 40 billion, and Eisenhower stated that “in desperation” he instructed Wilson to use 38 billion as his limit. Memcon, Meeting with the President, December 3, 1957, 2-4, RN Notes and Memo 1954-1959, Box 8, Executive Branch Files, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL 308

signalled the growing animosity amongst Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon but which also exposed some of the inherent failings in Eisenhower’s approach to the Third World.

309

Chapter Seven

The Storm Arrives (1958)

1958 was most certainly the annus horribilis of the Eisenhower administration. In addition to the continuing recession, the administration also began reaping the harvest of its policies in the Third World. The disastrous Indonesian intervention served little more purpose than to cost lives and damage Indonesian-American relations. Richard Nixon was nearly killed by angry mobs in Venezuela, the kingdom of Iraq experienced a coup that ushered in a far less friendly government, which in turn led to Eisenhower ordering armed intervention to prop up the pro-American government in Lebanon, and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis undermined

Eisenhower’s basic nuclear deterrence theory. 1958 was also the year that Dulles appeared to accept that he had failed to achieve the kind of changes and progress he had hoped and felt destined for as Secretary of State.

Nixon gets out: Latin America

Richard Nixon’s ill-fated mission to Latin America has been the source of a good deal of historical debate, with most discussion centered around the extent to which, if at all, the attacks on Nixon in Peru and Venezuela led to changes in the Eisenhower administration’s policies in

Latin America.850 Although arguments over correlation versus causation are inevitable, it is

850 Although a comprehensive list of sources touching on Nixon’s trip is untenable, scholars who have accorded significant analysis to the trip and its impact include the following: Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984); Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Marvin R. Zahniser and W. Michael Weis, “A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixon’s Goodwill Mission to Latin America in 1958,” Diplomatic History 13, No. 2, (April 1989); Michael J. Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations, Second Edition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990); Matthew Loayza, “An ‘Aladdin’s Lamp for Free 310

nonetheless clear that a marked change in the attitudes, positions, and perspectives of

Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon became evident when comparing the periods before and after

Nixon was nearly killed by protesters on the streets of Caracas. The embarrassment Eisenhower and the administration suffered due to the attacks on Nixon and the reaction to the dispatching of military forces, should not be underestimated. Although there were clear pushes for changes to the administration’s Latin American and Third World policies generally since Eisenhower took office, the Caracas Incident and accompanying fallout accomplished what five years of prodding, criticism, and crises had failed to do: it unnerved Eisenhower enough to begin movement towards change. However, the type and extent of change Eisenhower permitted points to the fact that Eisenhower was never going to engage in the kind of progressive, sweeping changes for which Nixon hoped. In fact, once Dulles resigned as Secretary of State, Eisenhower displayed renewed enthusiasm for covert action and goodwill trips in lieu of significant policy revisions.

Nixon’s mission to Latin America came about after Roy Rubottom Jr., Assistant

Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, waged a persistent campaign to convince Dulles and Eisenhower that some action was necessary. Rubottom was able to convince Eisenhower and Dulles that the perceived indifference of the Eisenhower administration to Latin America’s most recent economic and political problems was creating a rift between the U.S. and its Latin

American allies that “the Communists” might fill.851 Rubottom originally approached Dulles about a goodwill trip in late 1957, attempting to portray the situation in Latin America as stable despite describing significant deterioration of the administration’s standing and interests.

Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953-61,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, No. 3 (September 2003); Bevan Sewell, “A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America,” Diplomatic History 32, No. 5 (November 2008); Thomas Tunstall Allcock, “The First Alliance for Progress? Reshaping the Eisenhower Administration’s Policy toward Latin America,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, No. 1 (Winter 2014). 851 Nixon, RN, 228; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 101. 311

Rubottom noted the administration was facing a variety of challenges, that the Soviets were attempting to make headway in several states, and suggested Dulles undertake a goodwill mission to Latin America as a means to strengthen “the reservoir of friendship and good will in

Latin America.”852

Pointing to the low priority and importance to which top officials ascribed Latin America, the trip was treated like a political football. While Dulles was willing to conduct such a mission, he was clearly not enthusiastic about the idea. Dulles forwarded Rubottom’s memo to

Eisenhower, listing the various foreign travels he had already committed to for 1958, acknowledged that he had not travelled to much of Latin America, then noted he had hoped to take a vacation on the only suitable times before taking the rare step of literally asking

Eisenhower for “guidance.”853 Owing to both his belief in the power of goodwill missions and the fact that he was convinced that only such a gesture was necessary, Eisenhower responded enthusiastically. The president scribbled on the memo Dulles sent him that he “urgently believe[d] something should be done!” before asking Dulles “Could we use Dick?”854

Eisenhower was clearly not trying to avoid using Dulles for the mission, as he also floated the idea that Dulles might conduct some of the mission when the climate was better, and then

Eisenhower himself could take up where Dulles left off to “supplement” Dulles’s “journeying”’; the only reluctance Eisenhower displayed was over the possibility of having to conduct the entire

852 Memo, Rubottom to Dulles, December 26, 1957, 1, Dulles, John Foster, December ’57, Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 853 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, December 28, 1957, 1, Dulles, John Foster, December ’57, Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 854 Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, December 31, 1957, 1, Dulles, John Foster, December ’57, Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 312

potential mission himself.855 By early January Dulles had decided to decline the offer to take the mission, and eventually a campaign to recruit Nixon was engaged.856 When Dulles contacted

Nixon regarding the possibility of a mission to Latin America, he attempted to parry a possible repeat of Nixon’s 1957 manoeuvre of expanding the itinerary. Dulles made clear that “we,” hinting at himself and Eisenhower, endorsed the plan, and that he had included an itinerary designed to “extract maximum advantages from a foreign policy standpoint.”857 Dulles went on to explain and justify why Nixon should visit each of the nations proposed.858 Dulles recommended Nixon visit Venezuela “because of the recent revolution…and also because of the special economic and strategic interests we have there.”859 Thus, Dulles was able to avoid taking the trip himself while also believing he had sufficiently restricted the potential for Nixon to gain enough attention or influence to push for significant change.

The “recent revolution” in Venezuela was a topic the NSC had anticipated, and yet the

NSC had utterly failed to consider any of its implications beyond the apparently limited shelf life of dictators. The continuing lack of sophistication in the understanding of many members of the

NSC in this vein was displayed during the January 6 meeting of the NSC, pointing to the complacence various officials had warned was going to lead to problems for the administration.

Allen Dulles reported that Pérez Jiménez had survived uprisings in Venezuela, while acknowledging the uprising had “fairly deep roots” and that Jiménez only survived the uprising

855 Supplemental Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, December 31, 1957, 1, Dulles, John Foster, December ’57, Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 856 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, January 7, 1958, 1, Dulles, John Foster, January ’58 (2), Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 857 Memo, John Foster Dulles to Richard Nixon, March 6, 1958, 1, South American Trip, Box 1, Series 397, RNPPM RNL. 858 Memo, John Foster Dulles to Richard Nixon, March 6, 1958, 1, RNL. 859 Memo, John Foster Dulles to Richard Nixon, March 6, 1958, 1, RNL. 313

because the army had remained loyal.860 When Nixon requested a description of Jiménez’s character and the prospects for his continuation in power, Allen Dulles admitted that he was

“running out of steam” and had been in power “a long time for a Latin American dictator.”861

Finally, when pressed to explain the “character” of those taking part in the uprising and opposition to the dictator, Allen Dulles acknowledged that there was in fact wide support and that the opposition “varied” in character with minimal communist influence.862 Oddly, Secretary

Dulles then immediately argued the revolt was a personal power struggle more than anything else; providing no explanation of which particular people were struggling against Jiménez.863

Still, despite some worries voiced over possible trade disruptions, no significant concerns were raised. In addition, despite all present at the NSC meeting acknowledging the economic importance of Venezuela, not a single member voiced any concerns that the uprisings against

Jiménez might have some economic motivations or ramifications.864 This is not to suggest that every official in the administration was oblivious to growing problems. Though not oblivious,

Nixon had been relatively uninterested in the region, and clearly disinterested in the goodwill mission later suggested by Dulles and Eisenhower.

While Nixon begrudgingly accepted the goodwill mission to Latin America, he attempted make something more of it, by gauging concerns in the region through meetings with labor leaders, students, and other officials. Thus, in Peru, Nixon met with several labor leaders in order to solicit their opinions and beliefs on economic matters. The Peruvians brought up several concerns which found their way into the criticisms and recommendations Nixon eventually

860 Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, January 6, 1958, 2, 350th Meeting of the NSC, January 6 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 861 Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 862 Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 863 Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 864 Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the NSC, 2-3, DDEL. 314

raised upon his return, such as the need for the Eisenhower administration to understand that private investment was not a “panacea” for Latin American issues, and that “the United

States…should give support to true democratic governments as distinguished from dictatorships.”865 In fact, most of the recommendations Nixon made after his trip were either based on or directly echoing the concerns and insights offered by the non-government officials he met during the trip.866 In addition, the State Department felt Nixon’s specific criticisms and recommendations in this regard were important enough, either to the nations in question or to

US-Latin American relations, that it later sent Nixon a memo detailing the success its officials and agencies had in resolving many of them.867 Of course, Nixon’s findings and the resultant recommendations would almost certainly not have had the influence they did were it not for the events in Caracas.

The events which gained the label of the “Caracas Incident” occurred on May 13, 1958, are well known, and while the incident itself is a noteworthy spectacle, the reaction of the

Eisenhower administration requires greater examination.868 That reaction was one of barely

865 Memcon, Meeting of Vice President with Peruvian Labor Leaders, May 7, 1958, 2, Lima, Peru –Reports and Conversations, Box 1, Series 397, RNPPM RNL. 866 As just a few examples, Nixon met with Ecuadorian business leaders and learned of various complaints regarding loans, international banking, tariffs and so on. See Memcon, Meeting of Vice President with Ecuadoran and other business leaders, May 10, 1958, 1-2, Quito, Ecuador – Reports and Conversations, Box 1, Series 397, RNPPM RNL; From Uruguayan business and government officials Nixon was informed about the need to stabilize Argentina’s economy in order to help the region, and problems with countervailing duties and other tariffs. See Memcon, April 28, 1958, 1; Memcon, April 29, 1958, Montevideo, Uruguay – Reports and Conversations, Box 1, Series 397, RNPPM RNL. 867 The undated memo was part of a small package of memos sent to Nixon by Christian Herter the next year. See Undated Department of State Memo, RN Memos, Box 10, PPS 401, RNPPM, RNL. 868 Upon arriving in the capital city, Richard and Pat Nixon were first spat on by protestors at the airport, and then subsequently attacked by a mob of an estimated four thousand Venezuelans as the Nixons’ police escort abandoned their motorcade. As Nixon’s party proceeded, the Venezuelans shouted the same slogans as protestors Nixon had encountered in other Latin American nations, most notably Peru. After nearly having their cars flipped over and set on fire, the vice president and his party narrowly escaped with minor injuries, but further attempts at assassination were planned, and Nixon’s party spent the remainder of their visit in the embassy under tight guard. Nixon, RN, 233- 235; see also, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation among the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in Venezuela (Burrows), the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) in Caracas, and the 315

restrained aggression. On May 13, Admiral Arleigh Burke ordered at least five hundred marines as well as relevant naval transport to be dispatched towards Venezuela.869 The movement of the five hundred marines involved twenty-two C-130 troop carrier planes while an additional ten C-

124 Globemaster planes transported jeeps, helicopters, and “other airborne combat equipment” to the staging base, Ramey Air Force Base, in Puerto Rico. In addition, more troops and the materiel necessary to make them combat operational were on standby at the same base, while other troops were prepped at Guantanamo Bay.870 The fact that the U.S. Air Force was prepared for what could have been either an aggressive show of military force or an actual bombing run on the capital city of a foreign nation displays the extent of power the Eisenhower administration was willing to exercise. The more offensive aircraft included twelve F-100 Super Sabres, on standby “for immediate combat deployment,” and forty-five of the Strategic Air Command’s

(SAC) B-47 bombers, all readied at Myrtle Beach Air Force Base for a “show of-force demonstration or…whatever the need required.”871 And, at least according to Dulles, if the administration’s doubts over Nixon’s safety grew, Marines would have been sent in to save him.872 While the ruling junta was able to secure Caracas sufficiently for Nixon to leave safely,

Deputy Director of the Office of South American Affairs (Sanders) in Washington, May 13, 1958, 2 p.m. in FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, John P. Glennon, Suzanne E. Coffman, and Charles S. Sampson eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office: 1991), 226-227. 869 Memcon, Telephone Conversation Between Captain Kefauver, U.S. Navy, and the Deputy Director of the Office of South American Affairs, Washington, May 13, 1958, 3 p.m., FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 228-229; John Foster Dulles also confirmed such tactics were in play. See Telephone Call from Senator Knowland, Tuesday, May 13, 1958, 4:24 p.m., Box 13, Telephone Calls Series, JFDP, DDEL; Memo, Colonel Glen W. Clark to Major James D. Hughes, September 15, 1958, 1-2, South American Trip, Box 9, Series 325, Executive Branch File, RNPPM, RNL. 870 See Memo, Hughes to Clark, September 15, 1958, 1-2, RNPPM, RNL. For troops being readied at Guantanamo see Memo, General Goodpaster to General Twinning, May 13, 1958, Box 8, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles, Papers, 1951-1959, DDEL. 871 Memo, Clark to Hughes, September 15, 1958, 1-2, RNVPC, RNL. For a brief overview of the F-100’s role as a fighter-bomber see Thomas E. Gardner, F-100 Super Sabre at War (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2007), 98. 872 Telephone Call from Senator Knowland, Tuesday, May 13, 1958, 4:24 p.m.; Even after Dulles learned the situation had improved he and Jim Hagerty agreed the troop movement should continue, because despite the bad press the administration would suffer “it is healthy to have it known we have the will and the capacity.” See 316

the entire incident put on stark display both the gunboat diplomacy and clearly dilapidated state of much of U.S.-Latin American relations.

The movement of troops caused a great deal of strain on U.S.-Latin American relations more broadly. Although every official denied that the administration would have unilaterally intervened with American troops in Caracas, Latin American officials universally condemned what certainly appeared to be a heavy-handed and aggressive response. Indeed, American officials had appeared tone-deaf to the fact that even their public stance amounted to orders given by the administration which required Venezuela’s junta to either crack down on its citizens or declare itself impotent. State staff noted the sophisticated response of Latin Americans in that many “deplored’ the deployment of marines for calling “back memories of Haiti and Nicaragua” or brought up the coup in Guatemala in 1954, while others pointed out that the militaristic action only further embroiled the region in Cold War tensions since Communists would seize on the move as an example of imperialism and anti-communist forces would become even more sensitive.873 The reaction from Latin American diplomatic officials was equally negative. Henry

Cabot Lodge reported that a Chilean representative at the U.N. approached him and labelled the administration’s troop movements as “’absurd’ and ‘crazy’”, and when Lodge attempted to pressure Brazil’s Cyro de Freitas Valle to offer his opinion, the most support the Brazilian could offer was to express that he understood the need to move the troops but pointed out the problems

Telephone Call to General Goodpaster (Hagerty on too), May 13, 1958, 5:14 p.m.; It should also be highlighted that while Eisenhower noted the expectation that Venezuela should request American aid to ensure Nixon’s safety if need be, Dulles was also clearly giving Eisenhower strong directions during the crisis. Cf. Memo to Dulles, May 13, 1958; Telephone Call, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 14 1958, 10:14 a.m., Box 13, Telephone Calls Series, JFDP, DDEL 873 Foreign Service Dispatch from the American Embassy in Guatemala, May 23, 1958, 8, Loose Material (3 of 3), Box 2, PPS 390, RNPPM, RNL. 317

and anxieties caused by the administration publicising the deployment.874 In fact, Venezuelan

officials engaged in “heated” conversations with American embassy staff over the troop

movements, arguing that while the attack on Nixon was embarrassing and stressful, the

Eisenhower administration’s reaction was nonetheless a “mistake.”875

Nixon clearly understood the issues through a Cold War lens, but was unsurprisingly far more assertive in pointing out the administration’s failures and the need for changes. After returning to the United States, Nixon initially argued that Communists had organized and led the protests which attacked him in Caracas. According to Nixon, certain nations were “naïve” to the effects of Communist influence.876 In the vice president’s view, however, the vast majority of the protestors he encountered in Venezuela were not rabid Communists but rather angry citizens with legitimate political and economic grievances with the United States. An argument made by

Nixon well after the mission nicely summarised how he explained the Caracas Incident: “the

Communists spearheaded the attack. But you have to remember they had a lot of willing spearcarriers.”877 Reporting on his trip during a cabinet meeting, Nixon explained that the

Venezuelans would “rather” [emphasis mine] be friends with America than Russia, but that

American policies made this difficult.878 In particular, he emphasised problematic American

874 Telegram, Henry Cabot Lodge to Secretary of State, May 14, 1958, 1-2, Loose Material (3 of 3), Box 2, PPS 390, RNPPM, RNL. 875 Telegram, Ambassador Sparks to Secretary of State, May 19, 1958, 1, Loose Material (3 of 3), Box 2, PPS 390, RNPPM, RNL. 876 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 1958, 2, Cabinet Meeting of May 16, 1958, Box 11, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 877 Richard Nixon, The Challenges We Face (New York: McGraw and Hill Book Company Incorporated, 1960), 92-93. 878 Nixon’s report was something Eisenhower had apparently reluctantly agreed to due to a great amount of interest from cabinet members and his brother to hear Nixon’s conclusions on his trip. Maxwell Rabb, Secretary to the Cabinet, prepared a memo for Eisenhower requesting Nixon speak at the cabinet meeting due to those factors, noting that Milton was “very pleased” to hear Nixon’s perspective. See Memorandum for the President, May 14, 1958, 1, Cabinet Meeting of May 16, 1958, Box 11, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL; Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 1958, 2, DDEL. 318

polices such as the harbouring of “refugee dictators” who had fled Latin America and found a safe haven in the U.S, and American price controls on commodities.879

Nixon contended that problematic political and economic policies on the part of the

Eisenhower administration were more to blame for anti-American sentiment than Communist overtures. The vice president argued that the Eisenhower administration should strive to raise the standard of living of the general populace, or “masses,” of Latin America.880 One of Nixon’s criticisms of Eisenhower’s foreign policies in Latin America focused on the tendency within the administration to ignore the impact of policies, such as import restrictions, which had real and immediate consequences for Latin Americans.881 The vice president took this criticism a step further when he argued that the U.S. ought to take actions which at least did not portray the

Eisenhower administration as focusing American resources on the prosperity of the “privileged” in Latin America.882 Nixon made a point of explaining to Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft

Benson that American businessmen and officials in Latin America did very little to “mingle” with Latin Americans.883 Thus, Nixon was clearly keen on pointing out flaws in American policies in Latin America at the time of his mission.884

And, until Dulles eventually stepped in to rein him in, Nixon made no attempt to keep his

opinions and suggestions private. At one of Eisenhower’s “Stag Dinners” (dinner parties

Eisenhower held regularly with wealthy industrialists and business types), Eisenhower decided

879 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 1958, 1-2, DDEL. 880 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 1958, 2, DDEL. 881 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 1958, 2, DDEL. 882 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 2, DDEL. 883 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 2, DDEL. 884 Nixon had evidence of this from his trip and from his briefing materials in that one of his briefings dealt with the restrictions the Eisenhower administration had placed on Venezuelan crude oil. This briefing argued that American restrictions were not having “any substantial adverse impact” on the Venezuelan petroleum industry despite Venezuelan complaints of the detrimental effect it was having on the nation’s economy. See Position Paper: U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Crude Oil, 1-2, South American Trip – Briefing Book 1 of 3, Box 9, Series 325, Executive Branch File, RNPPM, RNL 319

that the topic of conversation would be “the implications of the Sino-Soviet economic offensive for the U.S. and what we could do to counter it.”885 In something of a rarity, Nixon was both invited and able to attend the dinner. After Eisenhower introduced the topic, followed by Dulles linking the economic offensive to the general Cold War struggle, and then Secretary of

Commerce Sinclair Weeks’s comments on America’s assets and the need for business and government to work together to meet the threat, Nixon derailed the entire conversation.886

Although he linked his diatribe to the Sino-Soviet economic offensive, Nixon argued that in

Latin America and other areas of the Third World, Communism was taking advantage of not just the desire of native populations to place themselves in better economic positions, but of the fact that private “capitalist trade” preyed upon rather than benefited the poor in those countries.887

Nixon reined himself in slightly as he concluded, noting that in some countries such things were only “made to appear true” and imploring such men as the heads of J.P. Morgan, Standard Oil, and the Chairman of Finance of General Electric to “address themselves to this problem.”888

While Eisenhower and Nixon knew there was little chance of Nixon’s comments leaking to the press, the mere fact that he was willing to openly take a critical position in an almost non- sequitur fashion in front of the business elite whose company Eisenhower enjoyed points to the importance Nixon believed the issue held. And, the fact that the conversation abruptly returned tothe vague topic of whatever to do about the Soviets, hints that Nixon’s outburst was politely ignored despite the vice president’s vehemence. Dulles’s concern that Nixon was becoming

885 Memorandum for the Record of discussion at Stag Party of May 15 1958, May 19, 1958, 1, May 1958 Staff Notes (1), Box 32, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 886 Memorandum for the Record of discussion at Stag Party, 1, DDEL. 887 Memorandum for the Record of discussion at Stag Party. 1, DDEL. 888 For the guest list, which included other leaders of industry such as S.C. Allyn of the National Cash Register Company, see Stag Dinner Guest List, Thursday Evening, May 15, 7:30p.m., 1-2, May 1958 Staff Notes (1), Box 32, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 320

overly vocal and overly critical caused the Secretary to remind the Vice President of his place, and in doing so Dulles revealed significant aspects of his position on Latin America.

Secretary Dulles was uncomfortable with the idea that the Eisenhower administration might have to alter its support of dictatorships in Latin America, and clearly irritated with Nixon in particular for his arguments to the contrary. As he had during and after his trip to Africa,

Nixon publically criticised the administration’s handling of matters in and policies towards Latin

America, including the State Department. Nixon echoed many of the criticisms he had made in the cabinet meeting to reporters, enough so that the New York Times ran a page one article on

May 18; the article noted effectively every point Nixon had made in the cabinet, with the added twist that Nixon also blamed the State Department for not realising the extent of the growing issues and for ignoring all but the political and economic elite in Latin America.889 However, whereas Dulles had at least some interest in garnering changes in the administration’s Africa policies, he had no interest as concerned Latin America. Thus, Dulles was quick to move on limiting and thwarting Nixon’s public criticisms of the administration, warning Nixon and others about the political ramifications.890 Dulles’s efforts extended to cabinet and NSC meetings.

When the possibility of withholding support from dictators was raised, John Foster Dulles attempted to bog down policy changes with semantics. The Secretary of State contended that

Nixon’s suggestion that the Eisenhower administration should attempt to support democracy in the lower and middle classes was “complicated.”891 If given enough power, Dulles argued, the

889 Nixon also argued that Latin America in general had simply not been a priority for the administration in any sense, and hoped that his trip might have changed that attitude. See Tad Szulc, “Nixon Sees Need for Shift in Latin American Policies” The New York Times, May 18, 1958, Page 1, Page 6. 890 Telephone Call to the Vice President, May 19, 1958, 1, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles, Papers, 1951- 1959, DDEL. 891 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 1958, 2, DDEL. 321

lower classes “will bring in more of a dictatorship of the masses.”892 On the morning of May 18, the Secretary also stated privately to Under Secretary of State Christian Herter that it was

“presumptuous” of Nixon to “think he has all the answers” after being in Latin America for only a “couple of days.”893

Dulles made the same argument in a meeting with Eisenhower later that same day. In fact, Dulles was on the defensive, as his notes on the meeting with Eisenhower point to the president seemingly agreeing with Nixon’s point-of-view, as Dulles admitted that “while there was merit [to Nixon’s position], it did not explain everything, and it was not possible in a brief trip…to come back with a formula of solution.”894 Although Eisenhower had previously acknowledged there certainly were economic problems in Latin American states, and suggested that the reason for the anger displayed by protestors attacking Nixon was actually a combination of Communist exploitation, and simple jealousy, he was not impressed with Dulles’s arguments.895 Eisenhower questioned Dulles’s handling of the situation surrounding Nixon’s trip, demanding to know why the overthrown dictator Pérez Jiménez had been granted a visa and entrance into the United States.896 Dulles equivocated and evaded Eisenhower’s questioning, denying personal consultation on the Pérez Jiménez matter, and changed the topic of conversation after noting that the State Department had informed the junta in Venezuela that

“they had recourse to extradition procedures.”897 The issues for Dulles were that he feared

Nixon usurping power over the administration’s foreign policies, he did not consider many Latin

892 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16, 1958, 2, DDEL. 893 Telephone Conversation with Gov. Herter, May 18, 1958, c. 10 a.m., Box 8, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles, Papers, 1951-1959, DDEL. 894 Memcon of Meeting with the President, 12:15 pm, May 18, 1958, 1, Folder 12, Box 24, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 895 President Eisenhower’s Press and Radio Conference #135, May 14, 1958, 1-13, Box 1, PPS 323, RNPPM, RNL. 896 Memcon of Meeting with the President, 12:15 pm, May 18, 1958, 1, SML. 897 Memcon of Meeting with the President, 12:15 pm, May 18, 1958, 1, SML. 322

American populations capable of effectively resisting communism, and quite simply, he considered dictators to be of greater use and to be easier to control than dangerous alternatives.

Indeed, Dulles told Nixon directly that there were a “whole series of gradations” of dictators, apparently meaning that some were less problematic for the U.S. to deal with than others.898

Later in the year, Dulles commented that many Latin American and Third World leaders generally were “like children” when it came to the challenge of stable self-government.899 The growing problem for the administration was that such attitudes and the policies reflecting them came with increasing costs.

In fact, Eisenhower received a report outlining that the Soviets and communist nations were focusing on almost the exact same things that Nixon had pointed to as problems in the administration’s policies. The general theme of the Soviet broadcasts on Nixon’s trip argued that the administration’s economic policies and interventionism were at the heart of the riots encountered, and one in particular argued that the protests were not due to dislike of Nixon but

American policy.900 The Soviets were also playing up the fact that “following a direct appeal by the US, tanks were sent into the streets of Caracas…” as well as the troop movements.901 Indeed, this was also apparently the main focus of Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese communist broadcasts.902 The fact that the propaganda attacks were focusing on the administration’s actions and policies in a manner that even the report’s compilers admitted were

“factual accounts” meant that it was becoming increasingly challenging for Eisenhower to deny

898 Telephone Call to the Vice President, Monday, May 19, 1958, 11:25 a.m., Box 8, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles, Papers, 1951-1959, DDEL. 899 Discussion at the 369th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 19, 1958, 13, 369th Meeting of the NSC, June 19, 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 900 Report: Soviet Bloc Propaganda on the Vice President’s Trip, May 15, 1958, 1, Cabinet Meeting of May 16, 1958, Box 11, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 901 Soviet Bloc Propaganda on the Vice President’s Trip, May 15, 1958, 1, DDEL. 902 Soviet Bloc Propaganda on the Vice President’s Trip, May 15, 1958, 1, DDEL. 323

that substantive changes to his policies for the region were necessary.903 Indeed, when

Eisenhower and Dulles discussed the possibility of Milton Eisenhower making a trip to Latin

America, Dulles advised that the younger Eisenhower’s trip was being be planned so as to avoid any “labor and university gatherings,” and later suggested that a great deal more security planning was necessary before any decisions could be made.904 Eisenhower was confronted not simply with the clear disagreement between Nixon and Dulles, but with the fact that Nixon’s consistent warning that the Soviets would take advantage of the administration’s problematic handling of such affairs was coming to fruition.

Indeed, the problems the administration experienced in Latin America were a contentious issue for cabinet members even while all agreed the policies needed to change in some way. At the May 22 meeting of the NSC, Nixon presented his private report on his trip to Latin America.

Broadly, Nixon argued much as he had previously. Nixon contended that the administration’s support of dictators and inflexible economic policies were having a cascade effect of alienating the masses while also making it far more difficult for all pro-U.S. leaders in Latin America to support capitalist policies due to fear of uprisings, and at the same time empowering communist movements that simply needed to support overthrowing dictators and improving the standard of living to gain significant support.905 Although Nixon did not disavow supporting dictators in the region, he argued such support should be treated as a reluctant necessity rather than a preference.

While Nixon remained consistent in his criticisms of effectively every aspect of the administration’s policies in Latin America, he undercut himself, pointing to a détente with

903 Soviet Bloc Propaganda on the Vice President’s Trip, May 15, 1958, 1, DDEL. 904 Dulles and Eisenhower discussed the topic over two separate meetings. See Memcon of meeting with the President, May 22, 1958, 1; Memcon of meeting with the President, May 26, 1958, 1, Folder 12, Box 24, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 905 Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the NSC, 5-7, DDEL. 324

Dulles, hoping to minimise angering or frustrating Eisenhower, and seeking to actually accomplish something: at the end of the report in which he listed a bevy of specific problems,

Nixon concluded by stating the “policies and actions were generally correct, but the problem was more subtle, and hence more difficult to solve.”906

Acknowledging Nixon’s gesture, Dulles somewhat mitigated his resistance to the former’s recommendations, which then led to several heated arguments breaking out over where blame resided and what ought to be done to fix the issues. Allen Dulles lent support to Nixon’s argument that the administration’s military manoeuvre had been ill-advised, reporting that other military leaders in Venezuela had nearly staged a coup over the riots, and had to be “begged” not to do so.907 The elder Dulles brother apparently doubted the Director’s information, as at some point in the discussion, Secretary Dulles labelled Allen Dulles’s “operators in Latin America” as

“rank amateurs,” causing a brief family argument between the two.908

All present agreed that the administration’s policies were insufficient and that Nixon had identified significant issues. In fact, George Allen, head of the USIA argued that Nixon’s trip would only be of value and only serve a good purpose if “it caused us here…to take a very hard look at the situation in Latin America.”909 Going further, Allen pointed out that if the administration hoped to capitalise on Nixon’s suggestion to organise and fund pro-U.S. student groups, it would be a waste of funds unless the administration also planned to enact new and

906 Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 907 The still-classified group or person that did the begging mentioned by Allen Dulles obviously succeeded. For the tenuous hold of the junta’s power during the Caracas Incident see Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 22, 1958, 2, 366th Meeting of the NSC May 22, 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL; Nixon, Six Crises, 185. 908 Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the NSC, 8-10, DDEL. 909 Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 325

better policies: “We need a real program. Otherwise the groups would not stay bought.”910

Eisenhower too showed greater support for arguments like the one Dulles made pushing the importance of non-military aid. At the cabinet meeting on May 23, Eisenhower noted his agreement with Dulles that the administration was simply spending too much money on military build-up and military assistance, and that the real focus of such spending should be on trade reform and revamped aid programs.911 In fact, Eisenhower stated “if we keep on this way, we will not have the money or resources to wage the real [sic] kind of international battle, which the

Secretary of State points to: trade and assistance and so forth.912

This in no way is to suggest Eisenhower had undergone a fundamental change, in fact he still very much preferred the path of least expenditure and the concept of pro-American regional leaders working to both stabilise and lead regions in the administration’s interests. Thus,

Eisenhower recognised a significant opportunity when Brazil’s President Kubitschek reached out in the aftermath of the Caracas Incident. The attack on Nixon was not simply a matter for head- shaking in Latin America. It concerned Kubitschek to such an extent that as early as May 23 he began to spearhead a drive both to clarify the U.S.-Latin America relationships and to improve them to the point of true “continental unity.”913 Thus, even indirectly, Nixon’s experience was a pivotal point for change.

910 Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 911 Of some interest from the perspective of sources, the actual Cabinet Meeting minutes make no mention of Dulles speaking at this point, however a page of rough notes records that Eisenhower’s comments on the need to restrain military spending in order to allot greater resources to trade and aid reform were couched in the President expressing agreement with comments made by Dulles. Cf. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 23, 1958, 2-3; Undated Note “From Rough Notes”, Cabinet Meeting of May 23, 1958, Box 11, Cabinet Series, AWF, DDEL. 912 Undated Note “From Rough Notes”, DDEL. 913 Kubitschek summoned the American ambassador Ellis Briggs on May 23, expressing to Briggs the basic sentiment of his letter to Eisenhower. Briggs interpreted this, erroneously, as a growing concern over “Commie [sic] penetration” see Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, May 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958- 1960, Volume V, American Republics, 676-679. 326

The embarrassment of the Caracas Incident and Kubitschek’s skill in capitalising on it helped Brazil’s leader gain the active, if tenuous, support of Eisenhower and Dulles. On June 5,

Eisenhower received a message from Kubitschek, delivered by the Brazilian ambassador which discussed some of Kubitschek’s ideas on “Pan-Americanism.”914 In his letter, Kubitschek opened with an extended explanation as to why he had written Eisenhower, citing the attacks on

Nixon as his central impetus.915 Kubitschek explained that the attacks on Nixon were obviously the work of a “factious minority” which had made public and allowed for “the tools of anti-

Americanism” to exploit the very real problems in Latin America.916 Kubitschek finally explained his proposal: the launching of a vast review of the problems afflicting “Pan American ideals” with a goal of bringing about a durable defense against such problems as had caused the attacks on Nixon.917 Kubitschek planned to accomplish much of this by “eliminating an entire range of misunderstanding…”918 In effect, Kubitschek had said all the right things by focusing more on misunderstandings than the problems he had with Eisenhower’s policies, and, by taking the initiative in a pro-American context that required little in the way of funding or immediate significant changes, Kubitschek had also engaged Eisenhower’s adherence to gradualism.

After reading the letter’s English translation in front of the ambassador, Eisenhower was so impressed by Kubitschek’s attitude and proposal that he attempted to dive in to a conversation on policies and potential actions in such detail and substance that the ambassador was forced to

914 Memcon, Ambassador Peixote’s Call on President Eisenhower to Deliver Letter from President Kubitschek, June 5, 1958, 1, Brazil (7), Box 4, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 915 Letter, Kubitschek to Eisenhower, May 28, 1958 (Delivered June 8), The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1958: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1958, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 2005), 464. 916 Letter, Kubitschek to Eisenhower, May 28, 1958 (Delivered June 8), 464. 917 Letter, Kubitschek to Eisenhower, May 28, 1958 (Delivered June 8), 464 918 Kubitschek also included a good deal of flattery of Eisenhower as a soldier, statesman, and paragon of truth, see Letter, Kubitschek to Eisenhower, May 28, 1958 (Delivered June 8), 464. 327

point out that he had only been instructed to deliver the letter, not begin involved conversation on ongoing and pending matters.919 Nonetheless, Eisenhower was excited and impressed enough that he almost immediately acted on his promise to reply to Kubitschek after concluding the meeting with the ambassador. In fact, Eisenhower dictated a draft answer to Kubitschek, wrote to Dulles to point out that he was “delighted that he [Kubitschek] had seized the initiative…and I think it provides a favorable portent for the future,” and sent off Dulles’s edited reply on June

5.920 In his response, Eisenhower expressed a great deal of enthusiasm, but reinforced that a significant focus for his administration was a clear commitment to anti-communism.921 Adding prestige to the enthusiasm, Eisenhower directed Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom to deliver the reply personally.922 Furthermore, in early August, Dulles made an official visit specifically to meet with Kubitschek.

The result of that meeting, and Dulles’s estimation of Kubitschek, are integral toward understanding both the administration’s support of Operation Pan-America (OPA), Dulles’s own glowing perception of Kubitschek, and the Secretary’s final shift on aid to Latin America.

Importantly, Kubitschek again acknowledged that it was the attacks on Nixon which drove him to contact Eisenhower about OPA in the first place. Kubitschek pointed to the attacks as a central reason he continued pressing the issue of OPA, while pointing out that “economic problems are overriding everywhere.”923 Dulles was clearly impressed that Kubitschek had not only taken a

919 Memcon, Ambassador Peixote’s Call on President Eisenhower, 2, DDEL. 920 Memcon, Ambassador Peixote’s Call on President Eisenhower, 2, DDEL; Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, June 5, 1958, 1, Folder 5, Box 8, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 921 Specifically, Eisenhower noted his desire for Latin American states to reaffirm their commitment to the 1954 “Declaration of Solidarity.” This was the same declaration the administration had used as justification for the Guatemalan coup. See Letter, Eisenhower to Kubitschek, June 5, 1958, The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1958: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1958, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 2005), 463-464. 922 Memorandum for the President, June 20, 1958, 1, Brazil (7), Box 4, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 923 Memcon, August 5, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 696-697. 328

leadership position, but had also planned out the phases of study, negotiations, and issues to be addressed through OPA. However, Dulles voiced concern that Kubitschek was placing too much emphasis on economic development as a means to thwart communist subversion (the American record goes so far as to point out that Kubitschek’s written proposals contained no reference to communism), yet was clearly impressed when Kubitschek immediately elaborated on a plan to combat communist subversion in the hemisphere that went beyond economic measures.924

The moment that clearly solidified Dulles’s positive evaluation of Kubitschek came when the Brazilian agreed on a philosophical point about political momentum, and then argued that

Brazil should take a leadership role amongst the American republics in association with the

United States. Or, as Dulles interpreted it, Brazil would take a leadership role in the region under the guidance and with the support of the United States.925 In case there were doubts, either in Kubitschek’s or Eisenhower’s mind, that Dulles considered Kubitschek as the most viable figure to usher in a new but still acceptable balance in the U.S.-Latin American relationship,

Dulles took additional steps to remove them. Dulles described Kubitschek as a dynamic force, a factor of utmost importance in Dulles’s conceptualisation of the international arena. In a short letter Dulles wrote to Kubitschek while on a plane back to the United States, Dulles used

“dynamic” and “dynamism” in describing Kubitschek and his proposals no fewer than three times.926 Dulles was not blinded by adoration however, as he requested that in Kubitschek’s final proposal he tone down the criticisms of the Eisenhower administration’s failings. Dulles also actually took the step of offering protective philosophic advice regarding Kubitschek’s

924 Kubitschek agreed to include “repressive measure” against communism, but insisted on economic and educational programs as well. See Memcon, August 5, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 698. 925 Memcon, August 5, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 698-699. 926 Letter from Secretary of State Dulles to President Kubitschek, August 7, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 700. 329

position on “underdevelopment” by arguing that any nation (Dulles included the United States and European nations in this) that considered itself “developed” would become static and thus fall prey to any number of disasters.927

This was clearly an important distinction Dulles felt Kubitschek needed to understand, as the secretary of state was not denying economic changes needed to be made. In fact, while

Dulles pointed out the challenges inherent to such changes, he acknowledged they would be necessary and part of the “new vision” that would enable the “Pan-American Operation,” as

Dulles called it, to succeed.928 Dulles’s missive was not simple flattery designed to placate

Kubitschek, since Dulles made the same points regarding “the dynamism of Kubitschek,” along with the other points about Kubitschek’s willingness and ability to “lead a new development in inter-American relations” to Eisenhower upon his return.929 This is not to suggest Dulles considered all of Kubitschek’s proposals wise or useful. Dulles wrote to Eisenhower while in

Brazil, by this point clearly convinced that certain changes were necessary but equally certain

Eisenhower would resist significant changes. With that in mind, Dulles argued that the administration would need to reorganize its Latin American programs to make them at least

“seem somewhat more regional.”930

This comment tied in to the study Dulles had initiated at the beginning of the year and his continued belief that the administration needed to take a more sophisticated and interested approach to Latin American concerns. Fearing that the administration was once again operating with policies that ignored the reality on the ground, Dulles created an inter-bureau taskforce in

927 Letter from Secretary of State Dulles to President Kubitschek, August 7, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 700 928 Letter from Secretary of State Dulles to President Kubitschek, August 7, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 700. 929 Memcon, August 7, 1958, 1, Folder 9, Box 25, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 930 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, August 6, 1958, 1, Dulles August 1958, Box 10, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 330

January to study policy issues in Latin America. While that taskforce did not recommend any basic policy changes, it agreed with Dulles’s conclusion that there were a series of negative economic factors damaging relations; ironically, their conclusions fell in line with criticisms

Nixon had recently made, namely that the administration’s import restrictions and a lack of access to funds left Latin American economies vulnerable.931 Dulles continued pushing his officials, and after returning from Brazil ramped up his pressure for some kind of regional development bank. On August 12, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Douglas

Dillon announced the administration was studying the possibility of an inter-American development institution intended to provide separated hard and soft loans for Latin American economic development.932 This eventually became the Inter-American Development Bank which was officially established on April 8, 1959; thus, Dulles and his deputies were able to push through some moderate changes despite his ongoing concern that Eisenhower’s perspective was too narrow.

Indeed, returning to Dulles’s enthusiasm for Kubitschek, the Secretary felt the potential of the Brazilian significant enough that he made a backhanded comment on Eisenhower’s approach to changes in foreign policy. Pointing to his frustration with Eisenhower’s stubborn refusal to do more than he thought absolutely necessary, Dulles acknowledged that some of the various changes needed to better relations with Latin American states were unreasonable, but that “life constantly requires getting along with unreasonable people, or at least those who seem

931 The taskforce reported to Dulles in April, whereas Nixon’s criticisms were made in May, casting Dulles’s comments on Nixon’s presumptuousness in a dim light. See FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 220. 932 FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 220-221. 331

to be unreasonable to us.”933 Dulles’s jab aside, both he and Kubitschek were aware that

Eisenhower’s enthusiasm regularly amounted to little by way of action.

Sharing such a concern, Kubitschek wrote to Eisenhower in late August to continue appealing for his support for OPA and did so in clearly anti-communist terms. Kubitschek made the argument that “we must not delay an all-out attack on the misery, the extreme pauperism that ravages so many zones on out continental territory…” but then connected it with the warning that “Every human being who cannot count on the minimum comfort that is compatible with the dignity of our species is not only a negative element, but indeed a natural ally of all the evils which we combat.”934 Kubitschek went on to argue that the Eisenhower administration had already done a great deal for Latin America but that communism was encroaching on Latin

America, and that if the administration or the United States in the future hoped to prevent communist subversion it could not do it alone; the suggestion being that OPA would not only allow Latin American nations to resist communist subversion but eventually aid the United

States in resisting it altogether.935

In fact, Dulles and Eisenhower showed such strong enthusiasm for Kubitschek’s

Operation Pan-America that they began pressuring other states to fall in line with it. Dulles prepared a brief for Eisenhower on Mexico’s Foreign Minister, Padilla Nervo, noting that

Mexico, “virtually in isolation” was strong against OPA; Dulles described such a view as

“narrowly jealous.”936 Going further, Dulles encouraged Eisenhower to attempt to charm the foreign minister to see that Kubitschek’s proposal was an “essentially constructive idea.”937 That

933 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, August 6, 1958, 1, DDEL. 934 Letter, Kubitschek to Eisenhower, August 22, 1958, 3, Brazil (7), Box 4, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 935 Kubitschek to Eisenhower, August 22, 1958, 4-5, DDEL. 936 Memorandum for the President, September 23, 1958, 1, Folder 8, Box 8, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 937 Memorandum for the President, September 23, 1958, 1, SML. 332

Dulles was willing not only to criticise another official for their position, but also willing to push

Eisenhower to attempt to persuade that official to look more favorably on OPA points to a clear and enthusiastic belief on the secretary’s part that Kubitschek and his program had the potential to benefit the region and the administration’s interests greatly. Dulles described Kubitschek in language that indicated he believed the Brazilian was capable of accomplishing significant change, that Kubitschek was a revitalising force in Latin America.

That being the case, the changes brought about by the Caracas Incident and Nixon’s criticisms were not limited to an adjustment in Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s attitudes. Members of the State Department credited Nixon, his mission, and his criticisms with finally jolting the administration into movement, sending Nixon’s office a memorandum listing all the important developments and steps the administration had taken toward improving relations with Latin

America since Nixon’s mission.938 Christian Herter sent Nixon the memo in 1959, telling Nixon he had “taken out the classified material and the baloney, as well as some things that could not be attributed so clearly to your trip.”939 The memo revealed that the State Department had been recording quarterly the developments in the administration’s policies and position in Latin

America – the starting point for the quarterly records was Nixon’s mission. Thus, the over twenty-page booklet Herter sent to Nixon, which listed changes, developments, and other aspects of the administration’s drive to enact changes in its treatment of Latin American concerns were at least considered partially to Nixon’s credit.940 Therefore, whether or not Nixon directly

938 Memorandum for General Robert Cushman: Vice President’s Office, September 22, 1958, 1, RN Memos, Box 10, PPS 401, RNPPM, RNL. 939 Memo, Herter to Nixon, May 15, 1959, 1, RN Memos, Box 10, PPS 401, RNPPM, RNL. 940 The memorandum was split into two parts, the first simply listed developments in Latin America, such as the hostage-taking of Americans by Castro’s forces between June and July. The second part was written in 1959 and listed only positive developments that State officials argued would not have come about if not for Nixon. See Undated Department of State Memo, RN Memos, Box 10, PPS 401, RNPPM, RNL. 333

contributed to a change in the administration’s position and policies towards Latin America, the new Secretary of State and many officials in the State Department considered Nixon’s trip as turning point for the administration. In fact, the section of the memo in which State official reported on developments they considered to be directly in response to Nixon’s recommendations and criticisms, officials listed among other developments, tariff reforms, changes to international banking convention, and the extension of loans to both public and private Latin American industries as owing to Nixon’s recommendations.941 While any mention of the democracy over dictatorship point Nixon had made was absent from the memo, the fact that the State Department kept such close tabs on, and trumpeted, the developments after Nixon’s trip points to at the very least the perception of Nixon’s integral role in the movement toward change. Eisenhower was forced to begin to enact changes in the administration’s treatment of

Latin America, and although he continued to work to limiting such changes to what he considered reasonable, the fact remained that Nixon’s trip forced such a beginning.942

Past Solutions, Present Problems

Beyond the tumultuous events in Latin America, the administration also experienced numerous problems in other areas of the Third World. In Africa, despite the birth of the Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department, the administration continued along with complacent negligence endorsed by Dulles. In the Middle East, the Eisenhower Doctrine was cited as the rationale for temporarily propping up Camille Chamoun in Lebanon after Iraq’s July 14

941 Undated Department of State Memo, RNL. 942 It needs to be kept in mind that much of the progress made on changes to the basic relationship between the administration and Latin America were not the result of Eisenhower, Dulles, or even Nixon directly (though of course Nixon undeniably helped), but rather officials like Rubottom. The point here is that by the end of the administration’s time in power, much of the foundation for what became Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress was already in place, and this foundation was not laid by Eisenhower’s initiative but by his acquiescence in the initiative of others such as Roy Rubottom. For example, see Allcock, “The First Alliance for Progress?”, 85-110. 334

Revolution further proved the region’s instability. That the Eisenhower Doctrine had hardly secured, let alone stabilised, the region was also displayed as Eisenhower flirted again with the idea of working with Nasser, and once more when the NSC noted approvingly that power struggles in Saudi Arabia had undercut the once presumptive leader of the region in King Saud.

With Eisenhower’s assertion that the Eisenhower Doctrine was not an anti-colonial policy, Dulles understood this to be a reaffirmation that the administration would continue to side with Europeans on colonial issues, and began being far more direct when addressing such issues with foreign officials. On his way to a Baghdad Pact meeting early in the year, Dulles met with Moroccan officials and briefly discussed the ongoing issues between Spain and Morocco.

As Morocco pushed its claim on the Spanish Sahara (Western Sahara), Dulles warned Moroccan officials against continuing the military aspect of its claim on the region and advised them to moderate their efforts.943 This was a vague enough piece of advice, but Dulles then proceeded to play out a scenario for the Moroccans. Dulles suggested that if Morocco continued to support the “irregular Moroccan liberation forces” this would likely further destabilise the region, and if the region destabilised further it would draw other African nations to support Morocco while

France would certainly support Spain.944 Dulles concluded by pointing out that if the region became divided thusly, the Soviet Union would likely support the African nations, which would

“put the United States on the other side, and the result would be a great disaster for all.”945

Thus, Dulles greatly simplified and clarified the administration’s basic position on

African decolonisation: the Eisenhower administration would seek to avoid definitive or direct

943 As was typical, Dulles sent updates to Eisenhower on his travels, encounters, and conversations. If the atmosphere was appropriate, Dulles shared personal anecdotes and his messages took on a personal tone, as the first half of his message to Eisenhower from Tehran reporting on previous events reveals. See Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, January 24, 1958, 1, Dulles, John Foster, Jan ’58 (1), Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 944 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, January 24, 1958, 1, DDEL. 945 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, January 24, 1958, 1, DDEL. 335

involvement in the continent’s issues unless the threat of Soviet involvement reared its head.

This was clearly a reactive position, since Dulles made no hint that the administration would take steps to aid the African nations as a means to ward off or insulate the region from Soviet overtures. Dulles was cognizant of the fact that his warnings meant very little and that both

African nations and the Spanish and French were unlikely to change their courses over his remarks.946 This basic trait of voicing concerns or mentioning opportunities but then doing nothing to follow up or pursue them was common at the top levels.

At the May 8th meeting of the NSC, at which neither John Foster Dulles nor Nixon were present, another opportunity for progress in Africa was mentioned and then abandoned. Allen

Dulles noted that Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia had been able to convince Algerian officials to take a slightly more moderate approach to the French; part of this stemmed from the possibility of a North African federation being formed by Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia once

Algeria gained independence.947 The Director noted the fact that as the potential federation was intended by the North Africans to be “Western-oriented and not Nasser-oriented” a “real and wise French leader would capitalize” on this and move decisively to secure most of North Africa as a pro-French and pro-West area.948 However, as the CIA head noted, there was no such

French leader, and thus the likelihood of success was negligible.949

The fact that no mention was made of pressuring the French to move according to this plan, nor did any party even add to Allen Dulles’s complaint that for lack of French compliance

North Africa would remain unstable, points to the U.S. administration’s frustration with

946 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, January 24, 1958, 2, DDEL. 947 Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 8, 1958, 5, 365th Meeting of the NSC, May 8 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 948 Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the NSC, 5, DDEL. 949 Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the NSC, 5, DDEL. 336

European handling of African affairs. In fact, both minor officials in the State Department and

African officials viewed the result of the so-called Tangier Conference as an opportunity for the administration to mediate a mutually satisfactory conclusion to North African tensions.950

Indeed, the Africans made clear that if the administration hoped to play a positive role in ending the conflict between African nations and the French, it “must go forward at once.”951 Thus, the failure to act on such an opportunity, or even mention that the opportunity existed points to the sense of resignation and indifference which typified much of the discussion on African matters.

This indifference was not limited to discussions. The difficulties reported to Nixon the previous year regarding problematic delivery of military aid, and a visible lack of real support from the administration, began to be acknowledged by State Department officials as a genuine problem for the administration’s standing in Africa. As concerned Ethiopia, the ambassador in

Addis Ababa recommended immediate military aid be dispatched “with a modicum of the spectacular” in order to bolster Selassie’s regime.952 The need for such a spectacular show of support for Selassie came about, in the ambassador’s estimation, because the Eisenhower administration had created the appearance that it was indifferent to the needs of its ally by ignoring repeated requests to address its security concerns.953 Indifference and clear reluctance on Dulles’s part retarded momentum toward change.

Despite the fact that Eisenhower and Dulles continued to have growing concerns over

France’s actions in Algeria, as both men considered the situation to have much greater destructive potential for France, NATO, and Europe than Indochina, both were also at a loss as to how to address the problem. Dulles considered Algeria an even greater threat to France than

950 State Department Staff Summary, May 1, 1958, 3, Reel 99, 2012 Declassification, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 951 State Department Staff Summary, May 1, 1958, 3, SML. 952 State Department Report, April 11, 1958, 1, Folder 24, Box 4, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 953 State Department Report, April 11, 1958, 1, SML. 337

Indochina had been, telling a group of Defence and State officials that more so than Vietnam,

Algeria had the potential to cause France to be “engulfed in disaster, and the French nation exhausted.”954 In a meeting with Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General

Norstad, Dulles brought up his and the President’s concerns, requesting Norstad’s opinion after noting that other European leaders shared the Secretary’s anxieties.955 None of the officials had a clear idea how to deal with the Algerian crisis: Dulles recognised the Algerian, French,

Moroccan, and Tunisian concerns as legitimate but could not see a means to satisfy or sufficiently balance each.956 The result of such confusion was that the State Department did little more than continue on as before, and wait for hopeful signs. However, even when such signs appeared, such as when officials reported that French officials were considering loosening the conditions on Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella’s imprisonment, American officials were reluctant to do more than note possible positive developments while making clear their disdain of

French bumbling.957 In this particular instance, State officials simply noted that the French were considering allowing Ben Bella greater contact with National Liberation Front (FLN) officials, in the hope that possible negotiations might go more smoothly. State officials argued that this was

“significant” despite the great number of issues the French would encounter if they actually went ahead with such a change.958 From Dulles’s perspective, since the administration was not going to actively support decolonisation or make a concerted effort to bolster emerging states, it made

954 Memcon, Discussion between the Secretary and General Norstad, March 25, 1958, 2-3, Reel 76 Declassification, Box 10, JFDSP, JFDP, SML. 955 Discussion between the Secretary and General Norstad, March 25, 1958, 2-3, 956 Discussion between the Secretary and General Norstad, March 25, 1958, 3, SML. 957 In this case, the Americans considered the arrest of Ahmed Ben Bella to have been a mistake in the first place, and hinted in their report that the French should not have been surprised that National Liberation Front (FLN) forces were conducting themselves with more aggression and viciousness with Ben Bella and other leaders of moderate positions under arrest. See State Staff Summary, May 2, 1958, 4-5, Reel 99 Declassification 2012, Box 10, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 958 State Staff Summary, May 2, 1958, 5, SML. 338

the most sense to continuing leaving as much as possible of the various problems in Africa up to colonial powers.

Indeed, well into 1958, Dulles continued to attempt to address issues involving Africa almost solely through European leaders. Meeting with Belgian officials in October to discuss the eventual independence of the Congo, Dulles made several points which indicated he had lingering resentment from Nixon’s mission to Latin America and which displayed Dulles’s continued skepticism of native Africans’ ability to govern themselves. Pointing to his continued irritation with Nixon’s questioning of his understanding of civilian populations in Third World nations, Dulles opined that when unprepared masses were given independence or power they became targets for international Communism and “this very often led to a dictatorship of the proletariat.”959 After complaining about France allowing Guinea’s independence (after De

Gaulle’s referendum on the new French Community in September), despite the belief the

Guineans were not prepared for such responsibility, Dulles stated unequivocally that “there was no pressure by the United States to turn colonies into independent states until they were ready for their independence.”960 And, in case the Belgians had any doubts as to what place Dulles envisioned Africa to have in the future as concerned Europe, he clarified further: “The future greatness of Europe depended on…the greater unity of continental Europe and Africa. Africa was the hinterland of Europe.”961 Thus, Dulles’s conception of Africa and Africans meant that even once those nations which were deemed prepared for independence received it, their main role would be to supply Europe with the goods and resources it required.

959 Memcon, October 8, 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, Glenn W. LaFantasie, Harriet Dashiell Schwar, Stanley Shalloff eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 252. 960 Memcon, October 8, 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 252. 961 Memcon, October 8, 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 253. 339

Whereas in Africa the administration failed to put forward significant polices due to a combination of indifference and perceived practicality, in the Middle East, the failures were a result of vacillation, confusion, and the flaws of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The region’s instability and the challenges they presented were almost universally outside the prerogatives of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The fact that the vast majority of the problems the administration encountered in the region were not fundamentally, or even substantially, due to communism left

Dulles and Eisenhower scrambling in the chaos.

In fact, Dulles showed a great deal of disillusionment over the administration’s general handling of the Middle East. Dulles was very clearly disheartened with a wide variety of features of the administration’s foreign policies, and did little to hide this fact or his doubts. In the early months of the year, a symptom of this doubt showed through at an NSC meeting, in which Dulles admitted both that he could not conceive of a solution for the Arab-Israeli situation beyond ones he had offered and had been rejected (by either the concerned parties or

Eisenhower), and that that administration had therefore been “reduced to following the old

British formula of ‘muddling through.’”962 Dulles considered such approaches to be anathema to a dynamic nation, and by bemoaning that the administration had been “reduced” to anything he was clearly not enthusiastic about the administration’s approach; Dulles was doing his duty but losing faith. Indeed, Dulles was utterly pessimistic of the administration’s prospects, noting that while adopting the British approach had granted a “precarious” success, the best that could be said was that “in brief, the situation in the Near East [is] too uncertain to permit us to say that we

962 Discussion at the 352nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, January 22, 1958, 7, 352nd Meeting of the NSC, January 22 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 340

are doomed.”963 Dulles feared uncertainty in the international arena, meaning that if the only bright spot he could see for the administration in the region was that they did not know enough to know if their policies had completely failed, there was a great deal to fear and a significant amount of failure already present. Dulles’s personal crisis aside, events in the Middle East showed Dulles was quite right to be disillusioned and concerned.

With the merging of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR), a great deal of concern arose both among allies and within the administration. Dulles wrote to Eisenhower whilst in Ankara for a Baghdad Pact conference, and noted both the anxiety of allies and the fact that no one was certain whether the UAR had come together as part of a communist plot or due to Nasser’s ambitions.964 Initially, Dulles hoped Iraq could lead some sort of Arab response against the UAR, as he noted to Iraq’s frequent and future prime minister Nuri Al-Said that

Saudi Arabia could not lead such a response but could support it along with Lebanon and Jordan;

Al-Said agreed to go along with the idea so long as Dulles secured the support of Saudi Arabia and Jordan.965 Dulles was obviously in a bit of discomfort and pain from his worsening cancer since he took the rare step of commenting on how “strenuous” the proceedings had been and mentioned to Eisenhower that he would sleep on the plane back to the U.S.966

Other concerns in the Middle East continued to grow as well. At the March 27 meeting of the NSC, Allen Dulles noted that Saudi Arabia’s King Saud had recently been forced by two of his brothers to relinquish some of his powers. Although Allen Dulles claimed to have “good

963 Discussion at the 352nd Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 964 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, January 29, 1958, 1, Folder 12, Box 7, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 965 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, January 29, 1958, 1, SML. 966 What makes Dulles’s complaint about the strain more noteworthy is the fact that Eisenhower had already advised Dulles to be mindful of his health in a recent note. Thus, Dulles noting strain on his health points to the growing concern both men had for Dulles’s ability to continue on as Secretary of State. See, Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, January 27, 1958, 1, Dulles, John Foster, Jan ’58 (1), Box 9, DHS, AWF, DDEL; Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, January 29, 1958, 2, SML. 341

information” insofar as why changes had happened, he seemed quite unaware of why Crown

Prince Faisal felt the need to, and had the support of other high-ranking Saudi officials in his act of taking both financial and foreign decision-making powers away from his brother.967 Whereas

Allen Dulles described Faisal as “not anti-American…definitely anti-Communist,” Eisenhower,

Foster Dulles, and Nixon all described Faisal in glowing terms.968 Eisenhower immediately described his estimation of Faisal’s personality, calling Faisal “extremely pleasant.” Dulles contended that Faisal was not as aggressive in pursuing his goals and had “mellowed,” while

Nixon offered the most enthusiastic appraisal, describing Faisal “as pro-American and smart as hell.”969 While a power struggle at the top level of any Middle Eastern country would usually be cause for concern for the administration, the fact that Saud had been economically foolish, failed to out-manoeuvre Nasser, and that the top three officials both liked and thought well of Faisal meant that the struggle warranted such little concern that the conversation moved on after

Nixon’s glowing remarks.970 Still, the administration was lacking in direction with how to deal with these issues, seemingly confused by the instability and changes that were occurring. The reaction to this continued instability was the attempt to apply the Eisenhower Doctrine to a situation it simply did not fit.

967 Saud’s spending and his perceived ineptitude at handling Nasser caused significant strain and anxiety within Saudi Arabia, and Faisal’s campaign to wrest control from his brother in order to pursue more responsible paths did in fact cause a good deal of problems in the background from 1958 until Faisal’s ascension to the throne in 1964. For Allen Dulles’s comments see Discussion at the 360th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 27, 1958, 13, 360th Meeting of the NSC, March 27 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 968 Discussion at the 360th Meeting of the NSC, 13, DDEL. 969 Discussion at the 360th Meeting of the NSC, 13, DDEL. 970 Eisenhower had noted concerns about Saud’s spending at least as early as 1957. In private notes he shared only with Dulles after a meeting with Saud, Eisenhower pointed out that Saud consistently “put the cart before the horse”; building schools without having trained teachers or developed or adopted a curriculum, building irrigation systems without technical training in proper use of said systems for the users, and so on. Indeed, while Eisenhower’s grasp of economics is arguable, the clear and growing frustration with Saud’s understanding of the topic is obvious in Eisenhower’s notes, as he pointedly recorded Saud “failed to grasp” much of what Eisenhower was explaining. See Aide Memoire, Conversation between the President and King Saud, January 30, 1957, 1-4, Saudi Arabia (2), Box 46, International Series, DDEL. 342

The Eisenhower Doctrine was encountering difficulties which stemmed in large part from

Eisenhower’s propensity to delay and take minimal action rather than risk over investment.

During a May 2 private meeting with Eisenhower, which Christian Herter attended, Dulles brought up the deteriorating situation in Lebanon. Eisenhower responded to Dulles’s prompt by stating the administration should “try in every possible way to do something to help out…” and suggested that some grant aid might also be found for Lebanon.971 Of course, Eisenhower immediately explained how far he was willing to go and exactly what he hoped to achieve, stating that he “thought it was much cheaper to try to hold the situation than to try to retrieve it.”972 Hence, Eisenhower was not hoping to prevent future breakdowns or destabilisation; rather, his objective was to halt the degeneration for the moment at the lowest possible cost.

While the frugal approach could always find some justification, what Eisenhower actually advocated was slightly increased military aid and easier access to food aid which would have resulted in alienating other allies.973 In fact, Eisenhower was far more willing to intervene than

Dulles.

During a May 13 meeting, Eisenhower made some startling suggestions which forced

Dulles to inform and restrain the president. Eisenhower was already considering how to justify armed intervention in Lebanon, suggesting that protecting American lives and property might be a viable explanation, possibly in connection with assisting Lebanon’s military program.974

971 Memcon, May 2, 1958, 1, Folder 13, Box 6, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 972 Memcon, May 2, 1958, 1, Folder 13, Box 6, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 973 Dulles explained to Eisenhower that the means to achieve increased aid would be under Public Law 480, Title II’s food aid clause. Dulles admitted that such a grant would alienate Canada but that the administration would have to “ignore” that issue. Eisenhower went further, arguing that “the Canadians should accept any commercial disadvantage, having regard to the great importance of the political objective.” See Memcon, May 2, 1958, 1, SML. For Public Law 480 and Title II see P.L. 480 - Title II, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/101430.pdf (Accessed April 1, 2016). 974 Memcon, May 13, 1958, 1-2, Folder 12, Box 24, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 343

Dulles immediately argued that “he did not see how we could invoke the provisions of the

Middle East Doctrine [the name Eisenhower insisted advisors use for the Eisenhower Doctrine]” since the manner in which Eisenhower had designed it meant the administration would somehow have to prove both that the UAR had attacked Lebanon and that the UAR was controlled by communism.975 When Eisenhower then suggested reintroducing some corollary to the “gun boat diplomacy…to South America” Dulles flatly stated that this “no longer represented an acceptable practice.”976 In fact, Dulles was skeptical of the entire idea of intervention, but this was not the central problem.977 Eisenhower was therefore stuck searching for justifications for an intervention, and thus, the administration continued to put off Chamoun’s requests. Part of this was Dulles’s belief that Lebanon was not important enough to warrant such an intervention and that Chamoun had created the crisis himself.

Well into June, Dulles was advising local staff to remind Chamoun that much of the instability in Lebanon was his own doing and there was little the administration could do to help.

Dulles hinted that Nasser might be of some use to Chamoun, but continued to distrust him and believed the Egyptian overestimated his own influence. Dulles instructed staff to point out to

Chamoun that Nasser’s offer to use his influence to attempt to end the instability in Lebanon was effectively contingent upon Chamoun backing down from his plan to seek another term as president and offering amnesty to those who had opposed him up to that point.978 This was both

975 Memcon, May 13, 1958, 2, SML. 976 Memcon, May 13, 1958, 2, SML. 977 The problems, which were obvious but unstated, were that Dulles’s version of the Eisenhower Doctrine would have allowed the kind of justification Eisenhower sought, but the one Eisenhower had set down did not provide such justification precisely because Eisenhower had hoped to avoid becoming engaged in internal and regional conflicts exactly like the one the administration was about to enter. 978 Dulles also stressed that Chamoun needed to be reminded that there was no guarantee Nasser would be true to his word or that even if he was it would have the desired effect. See, Telegram, Dulles to American Embassy in Lebanon, June 11, 1958, 1-2, Lebanon (2), Box 37, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 344

a clear reminder that Chamoun had greatly contributed to his problems, and a warning. Added to this, Dulles showed greater concern over avoiding irritation to Nasser than to Chamoun’s request, instructing embassy staff to make clear to Chamoun that he was not to divulge any information publically about Nasser’s offer.979 Finally addressing Chamoun’s insistence on armed intervention, and pointing to the equivocation and reluctance that typified the administration in such situations, Dulles instructed Ambassador McClintock to make note to

Chamoun that the United States would “adhere scrupulously to prior commitments” and that

Chamoun knew of the “grave difficulties” the administration associated with actually moving troops into Lebanon.980 Dulles thus explained that Chamoun should continue to work to preserve

Lebanon’s independence without such a “last resort” as American armed intervention.981

Dulles maintained this basic perspective into the next week, with greater reassurances but continuing to delve even further into equivocation and vague language. Dulles instructed

McClintock to meet with Chamoun and “slowly and carefully” explain the administration’s stance as well as his and Eisenhower’s perspective on the situation.982 Again returning to his reluctance to commit armed forces to aid Lebanon, Dulles argued that such an intervention would in no way actually address the issues at play in Lebanon, and would likely make them worse: Dulles acknowledged that American or UN forces could stabilise Lebanon, but only so

979 Dulles provided a variety of reasons for Chamoun to keep the information confidential, and while most were related to Nasser, one justification included the fact that if the information leaked that the United States was considering Nasser’s offer to help, this would create the appearance that the United States was not fully committed to the tenets of the Eisenhower Doctrine and supporting Lebanon. See Telegram, Dulles to American Embassy in Lebanon, June 11, 1958, 2, DDEL. 980 Telegram, Dulles to American Embassy in Lebanon, June 11, 1958, 2, DDEL. 981 Telegram, Dulles to American Embassy in Lebanon, June 11, 1958, 2, DDEL. 982 Telegram, Dulles to American Embassy in Lebanon, June 19, 1958, 1, Lebanon (2), Box 37, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 345

long as they were present, and once they had departed Lebanon would almost certainly have larger problems due to the internal and regional resentment of Western intervention.983

With the July 14 revolution in Iraq, Eisenhower considered the region to be too unstable to continue to ignore Chamoun’s requests, and the next day American intervention in Lebanon was authorised. Dulles spoke to Nixon on July 15, agreeing with Nixon that “Iraq is the big thing” which had spurred the intervention but also acknowledging Nixon was correct in stating that “the main thing is that we make it work…and we don’t vacillate.”984 In fact, both Dulles and Eisenhower quickly recognised the possibility of an expanding quagmire in Lebanon, and determinedly resisted. A little less than a week after he had authorised American intervention in

Lebanon, Eisenhower was receiving requests from Lebanese officials and recommendations from American military personnel that the type and number of American forces in Lebanon be expanded.985 Dulles, Eisenhower, Robert Murphy (whom Eisenhower had sent as his personal representative during the crisis), and others argued forcefully against expanding the American military presence in Lebanon.

It was at this point that Eisenhower appeared to accept Dulles’s position leading up to intervention, namely that intervening given the circumstances in Lebanon was simply a bad idea.

Eisenhower angrily proceeded from Dulles’s early warnings about the situation in Lebanon, stating “if these people are not capable of doing their business with us protecting their capital and their rear, then there is little more we can do about it.”986 Indeed, Eisenhower appeared frustrated and displeased with the entire operation, and cancelled plans for expansion of military

983 Telegram, Dulles to American Embassy in Lebanon, June 19, 1958, 2-3, DDEL. 984 Telephone Call, Nixon to Dulles, July 15, 1958, Memoranda of Tel Conv - Gen. June 2, 1958 to July 31, 1958 (3), Box 8, Telephone Conversation Series, JFDP, DDEL. 985 Memcon, July 21, 1958, 1, Folder 11, Box 25, EFJFD, JFDP, SML 986 Memcon, July 21, 1958, 1, SML. 346

forces in Lebanon, worrying that if the administration pushed too much it would cause an uncontrollable surge in anti-Americanism in the Arab world.987 For his part, Dulles recommended that American forces remained positioned where they were while both the U.N. and Lebanese officials worked to establish a solution to the instability; in effect, Dulles continued to argue that the only viable solution would be found internally, and not through

American intervention.988 And while the American presence helped stabilise Lebanon sufficiently for a transition of power from Chamoun to Fuad Chehab, it was clear that the

Eisenhower administration had failed to put forward a coherent or energetic Middle East policy.

By the end of July, with the situation in Lebanon at least no longer deteriorating, the NSC took account of some the issues at play in the Middle East along with problems in the

Eisenhower Doctrine. Dulles argued that the Eisenhower Doctrine had been insufficient to address or mollify the security concerns of allies like Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. Dulles noted that members of the crumbling Baghdad Pact felt surrounded by the Soviets to the north and

Arabs to the south, and had strongly requested some measure of protection from the Eisenhower administration.989 According to Dulles, this also meant the administration needed to consider increasing military and economic aid to the Baghdad Pact states, excepting Iraq.990 While Dulles made certain to portray the Eisenhower Doctrine as a “stronger” security statement than the

Baghdad Pact, the clear criticism in his arguments was that the Doctrine had failed to keep out

Soviet influence or bolster the administration’s position in the region. Indeed, Dulles hinted that

987 Memcon, July 21, 1958, 1, SML. 988 Memcon, July 21, 1958, 1, SML. 989 Dulles noted that this was given by his signing, with Eisenhower’s permission, a paper which effectively duplicated the first article of the Baghdad Pact, in that it committed the United States to help “preserve the security” of the concerned states. See Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 31, 1958, 4-5, Box 10, 374th Meeting of the NSC July 31, 1958, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 990 Discussion at the 374th meeting of the NSC, 5, DDEL. 347

the Doctrine itself had been a somewhat specious endeavour, as Dulles stated that one of

“Chamoun’s difficulties was that he went too far in embracing the Eisenhower Doctrine.”991 The fundamental issue for the administration here was not so much failing to understand the various dynamics at play in the region, but failing to adapt policies to those dynamics.

At the same meeting, after an extended conversation on possible alternate routes for oil exports such as via an expanded port in Ethiopia, Nixon interjected to remind the NSC that such considerations ignored the crux of the problem at hand. The Vice President argued that

“emotional” issues, meaning Arab nationalist drives, needed to treated more seriously by the administration and its policies; Nixon argued the administration needed to take account of such factors in its policies because such factors were already having an impact on the region and the administration’s policies therein.992 Nixon again pointed to the delicate position of the administration, arguing “we may have to encourage our friends not to align themselves too openly with the West; we may have to support independent national neutralism.”993

The problem, then, was not a fundamental distrust of Arab nationalism so much as a failure to anticipate and accommodate its consequences.994 The pursuit of postponement had again left the administration scrambling. Eisenhower, clearly somewhat discouraged, proposed supporting internal “self-determination by the Arabs” before explaining “[s]ince we are about to get thrown out of the area, we might as well believe in Arab nationalism.”995 This was more a

991 Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 992 That Nixon meant nationalistic drive is attested to by the fact that George Allen agreed with Nixon during the meeting, and thereafter Eisenhower acknowledged the significance of their points. Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 993 Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 994 This in no way implies the administration was not suspicious of Arab nationalism, Nasser’s in particular – Dulles compared Nasser to Hitler in this meeting as well. 995 This comment does not warrant scrupulous analysis as it was more an off-the-cuff comment than anything else (though one might point out the unlikely nature of somehow controlling a state’s foreign policy while leaving its internal policies untouched). Eisenhower had several such comments during the meeting, including a proposal to 348

voicing of a complaint with the situation than an indication of a new course for the administration, and this meant a continuation of inconsistent and vague attitudes and positions.

Such a continuation contributed to the already significant irritation of officials like Dulles.

Dulles’s frustrations with the administration’s vacillation and lack of consistency resulted in an attitude best described as restrained disdain. During the NSC meeting on October 16,

Dulles took the odd step of disavowing any interest in giving his support to either side of a debate on the administration’s future treatment of Nasser. In fact, Dulles stated that “he would be prepared to accept either…” position put forward by the Department of Defense or the

Department of the Treasury.996 This did not mean Dulles withheld his advice or denied having a position on the potential plan to move forward “doing business with Nasser,” only that he chose not to attempt to assert himself on a matter of obvious importance for the administration’s foreign policies in the Middle East.997 Dulles put forward a more forgiving analysis of Nasser, but argued that shifting policies back toward Nasser would be problematic, especially in the long-term. He contended that Nasser could not maintain his position as a hero figure in the Arab world.998 Still, the fact that Dulles genuinely seemed prepared to accept proposals which impacted areas that were ostensibly under his purview points to his frustration with the jumbled mess that had resulted in the administration’s Middle East policies.

As if to drive home that sentiment, Eisenhower enthusiastically took up with tinkering where Dulles left off. Apparently convinced by Dulles’s arguments, Eisenhower “found himself

somehow convince Arab oil states that they needed to sell their oil far more than the West needed to buy it, thereby pushing such states to take a more compliant and deferential attitude. See Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the NSC, 10-11, DDEL. 996 Discussion at the 383rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 16, 1958, 6, 383rd Meeting of the NSC, October 16 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 997 Discussion at the 383rd Meeting of the NSC, 7, DDEL. 998 Discussion at the 383rd Meeting of the NSC, 7-8, DDEL. 349

in agreement” with Dulles on Nasser, but also floated the idea that the administration could

“somehow bring about a separation of Syria from Egypt and thereafter a union of Syria with

Iraq” and, if such a scheme succeeded it “might prove very useful.”999 Eisenhower’s comment was so unanticipated and awkward that the cabinet appeared to make a point to avoid addressing it. However ludicrous such a scheme might be, it nonetheless points to the obstacles Eisenhower placed in front of Dulles when the Secretary attempted to steer policy away from Eisenhower’s pursuits. Indeed, by September the administration had begun normalisation of relations with the

United Arab Republic and on Dulles’s approval resumed sending small amounts of aid to

Egypt.1000

Failing and Failed Pursuits

Many of Eisenhower’s other pursuits in the Third World began either to show ominous signs of failing, or failed outright. While certain attempts, like the administration’s ever- complicated relationship with Diệm’s Vietnam showed no signs of being in imminent danger of failing, they also showed little sign of genuine success. Two instances in particular exemplified the failed and failing pursuits Eisenhower had undertaken in the past. The Second Taiwan Strait

Crisis, which broke out in August, revealed that the apparent nuclear deterrence that had ended the first crisis was either being tested or, more likely, had not been as effective as had been thought. While the crisis abated, Dulles was both convinced the administration had failed to deter the Chinese Communists and that it had failed to anticipate such an eventuality. Finally,

999 Discussion at the 383rd Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. 1000 Eisenhower Staff Notes, September 11, 1958, Toner Notes – Sept 1958, Box 36, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 350

the utter failure of Eisenhower’s covert intervention into Indonesia revealed that the president’s focus on short-term solution could be mind-bogglingly short-sighted.

Vietnam, however, represented a paradox. The administration hoped to disengage; yet, because of the lack of directions otherwise, it continued on the already apparent spiral towards entrenchment. This was borne out by the administration’s policy for the region in 1958, which in effect argued along the lines of the Domino Theory that the United States was the only force capable of training and empowering Southeast Asian nations to sufficiently resist communist subversion.1001 In the specific context of South Vietnam, the administration was committed to building up South Vietnam’s defense, economic, and governing structure along American lines, and by 1958 had included in its policy a commitment to aid South Vietnam in “political, economic, and psychological warfare against Viet Minh communists.”1002 In other words, by

1958 the administration’s policy made no illusions about a looming exit from South Vietnam.

Despite the clear warning signs within its own policy, the apparent success of Diệm led many officials in the Eisenhower administration to believe that the time was approaching when

South Vietnam would be mostly self-sufficient; in many ways, the administration had become trapped in a confusing set of contradicting circumstances in Vietnam. In one sense, the administration considered the instability, and thus need for significant American involvement, in

South Vietnam to be subsiding. While Diệm proved difficult to control, he and South Vietnam were showing progress, however stuttering, both economically and internationally; Diệm energetically moved to deal with economic issues, and was showing far more success garnering

1001 NSC 5809 U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia, April 2, 1958, 1-4, NSC 5809 US Policy in Southeast Asia (2), Box 25, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, DDEL. 1002 NSC 5809, VI Supplementary Statement on the Special Situation in North Vietnam, DDEL. 351

international sympathy and recognition for South Vietnam than North Vietnam.1003 However, the administration also displayed a confusing lack of clarity, arguing that South Vietnam should be able to cut down on various security expenses, reorganise said security forces along the administration’s guidelines, but also encouraged Diệm to expand those security forces in order to extend his influence to rural villages.1004

This lack of clarity continued at the top level. Dulles continued to support Diệm, but had difficulty countering criticisms and complaints from his government. During a meeting with

South Vietnam’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Vu Van Mau, Dulles stumbled especially hard when Dr. Mau asked for an explanation as to how the Eisenhower administration could expect to build trust in Southeast Asia by supporting a nationalist regime in South Vietnam, yet prop up the French in Laos.1005 Dulles was so unprepared for the question that he moved instead to explain why the administration’s slight reduction in aid to South Vietnam was in no way indicative of a lack of faith in South Vietnam.1006 Nonetheless, it was obvious to Dulles and Dr.

Mau that the administration was in no way proceeding in South Vietnam with a clear plan.

Eisenhower too permitted confusion to undermine any chance of disengaging from South

Vietnam.1007 At times, Eisenhower argued that no real problems existed: in conversation with

1003 Eisenhower wrote to Diệm at the behest of Dulles, praising him on his progress and for his effectiveness as an advocate of “freedom” in Southeast Asia. See Letter, Eisenhower to Diệm, May 23, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume I, Vietnam, John Glenn, Edward Keefer and David Mabon eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), 39. 1004 A variety of communications to and from the State Department bear this out. See Memcon, March 31, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume I, Vietnam, 23-25; Despatch from Durbrow to Department of State, September 30, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume I, Vietnam, 82-84; Telegram, Durbrow to Robertson, December 15, 1958, FRUS: 1958- 1960, Volume I, Vietnam, 105-106. 1005 Memcon, November 11, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume I, Vietnam, 96-99. 1006 Memcon, November 11, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume I, Vietnam, 98. 1007 Kathryn Statler’s volume on the topic still stands as a convincing case in this regard, and is relevant here for her evidence that Eisenhower allowed civilian, State, and Defense officials in Vietnam to effectively ignore one another and thus both undercut their positions and allow Diệm to play them against one another. See Kathryn Statler, 352

British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd and Ambassador Caccia, Eisenhower revealed that he considered Vietnam to be an effectively settled issue that the free world had “got out [of] pretty well.”1008 Despite such claims, it was obvious the administration was unable to move away from

South Vietnam at the moment but was also far from a crisis. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, however, revealed clear failings in Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s diplomacy.

With the outbreak of renewed sustained shelling of Quemoy by the PRC in late August, a relatively minor repetition of the escalating aggression of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred, albeit with reduced threats and greater effectiveness on the part of the Taiwanese.1009 Although the events of the crisis are obviously important so too is the fact that its outbreak further convinced Dulles that the rigidity of Eisenhower’s position on Taiwan had neither cowed the

Communist Chinese nor served as any kind of long-term solution.1010 Although Dulles was at a loss to offer possible viable alternatives, he still considered the fact that the crisis occurred to be evidence of a clear failure in the administration’s foreign policy. Dulles immediately suspected that the administration could not intimidate Communist China, and when this suspicion was confirmed by the British Charge d'affaires in Peking Duncan Wilson, he forwarded Wilson’s conclusions to Eisenhower as “the more significant” British position on the crisis.1011 Wilson

Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 254-255. 1008 Memcon, September 21, 1958, 1-2, Staff Notes – Sept 1958, Box 36, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL DDEL. 1009 Indeed, the NSC was informed on multiple occasions that although the Communist Chinese forces were massing, and carrying out attacks, there was little indication or fear that the attacks were designed or intended to be the pre-cursor to an invasion of Taiwan or even attempts to take Quemoy and Matsu. See, for example Discussion at the 377th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 21, 1958, 6, 377th Meeting of the NSC, August 21 1958; Discussion at the 378th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, August 27, 1958, 6, 378th Meeting of the NSC, August 27 1958 Box 10, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 1010 Allen Dulles had noted the likelihood of some form of attack, though likely not an all-out assault by the Communist Chinese, in the days leading up to the second crisis. See Discussion at the 377th Meeting of the NSC, 6, DDEL. 1011 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, September 12, 1958, 1, Dulles – Sept 1958 (2), Box 10, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 353

argued that Mao was willing to sacrifice “enormous numbers of men in limited military operations” and that this willingness would “enable them to survive a even nuclear war.”1012

This completely undermined Eisenhower’s reliance on massive retaliation and the deterrence therein. And, Dulles believed, this lent credence to his argument that greater flexibility needed to be built in to the military aspects of the administration’s policies.

On September 25, with the crisis dying down, Dulles explained the situation as he saw it, and voiced complaints to Nixon. Nixon was busy campaigning for Republicans around the nation and thus checked in for updates and advice from Dulles when time allowed. Dulles expressed deep frustration over Quemoy and Matsu, noting that “of course we don’t want to fight for them,” but that the Nationalists refused to give them up and the Communists refused to agree to cease their aggression altogether in exchange for the islands.1013 Dulles told Nixon that the administration could not reward aggression, but that the administration would accept “any solution short of retreat or surrender so these islands would cease to be provocations…”1014

What was worse, Dulles, Nixon, and Eisenhower all recognised that the best and most obvious solution to the problem, actually negotiating with the Communist Chinese, was political suicide.1015 Dulles viewed the administration as stuck in a very dangerous situation in which it had no clear options. In short, the Secretary of State, who considered stasis to be a situation that should be avoided at all costs, believed the administration was in just such a situation.

1012 Memo, Dulles to Eisenhower, September 12, 1958, 1, DDEL. 1013 Telephone Call, Dulles to Nixon, September 25, 1958, 1, Memoranda of Tel. Conv. - Gen. August 1, 1958 to October 31, 1958 (3), Box 9, Telephone Conversation Series, JFDP, DDEL. 1014 Telephone Call, Dulles to Nixon, September 25, 1958, 2, DDEL. 1015 Eisenhower noted to Selwyn Lloyd and Harold Caccia that while he agreed that having Dulles and “Chou En-lai [sic]” negotiate was a good idea, that public opinion in the United States would not support it, and Chiang would view it as a clear betrayal. Dulles commented over several conversations that even a basic ceasefire was impossible since the groups involved could not negotiate and the Eisenhower administration was often unaware as to why shelling occurred unless Chiang admitted to some form of provocation. See Memcon, September 21, 1958, 1-2, DDEL; Telephone Call, Dulles to Nixon, September 25, 1958, 2, DDEL 354

Compounding the problem was that he had played a significant role in putting the administration there, and his president seemed set on a short-sighted short-term solution.

Eisenhower stated unequivocally that he agreed with Dulles on the need for change, and was looking for “a way in which a strong country can conciliate” but was unable to do so.1016 Of course, Eisenhower was also enthusiastic about tinkering with the situation, and considered himself to have formulated a viable bargaining chip for Chiang’s cooperation. Eisenhower’s idea to get Chiang to abandon Quemoy and Matsu was short-sighted and dangerous: if ROC forces abandoned the islands, the Eisenhower administration would supply Taiwan with sufficient amphibious transport and defense craft so that ROC forces would be well prepared and supplied if there appeared to be a viable opportunity to invade the mainland.1017 Eisenhower apparently saw only benefits to his proposal, claiming it would solve most of the problems in the crisis, and also give a boost to the administration’s public approval, which had dropped over the new crisis.1018 Eisenhower expected to provide Chiang with enough ships that he could transport

“in one load, fifteen or twenty thousand troops…”1019 Dulles was resolutely against such a proposal.

The only flaw in Eisenhower’s proposal, which Dulles clearly recognised but was lost on the president, was that Chiang might use the ships. One hardly needed to be a veteran military figure to envision the possible problems that could arise if Chiang began increasing raids on the mainland, or actually attempted to invade China in the event of internal disorder. Indeed,

Eisenhower seemed oblivious to the fact that Chiang might feel forced to act more aggressively

1016 Memcon, September 11, 1958, Staff Notes – Sept 1958, Box 36, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. 1017 Eisenhower broached this idea with Dulles multiple times, and at least once brought it up with Taiwan’s ambassador. See Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, October 7, 1958, 1, Dulles – Oct 1958, Box 10, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 1018 See Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, October 7, 1958, 1, DDEL. 1019 See Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, October 7, 1958, 2, DDEL. 355

if he abandoned Quemoy and Matsu while being given the means to undertake large-scale assaults on the mainland. Dulles handled Eisenhower’s idea delicately when he met with Chiang in late October, claiming there had been little time to discuss “immediate military changes” and that he was never sure if his points were actually being translated correctly, which made him reluctant to make “concrete proposals.”1020 Thus, Dulles sidestepped precipitating another, larger crisis in the future as a means to alleviate the crisis of the moment. In fact, Dulles was deeply concerned with the entire crisis and variety of manners in which the administration had simply been caught unaware, and thus ordered State officials to try to find a way to “dispose of this thorny problem.”1021 The State Department began the study, but the simple fact that Dulles considered the administration’s position to be completely unsustainable pointed to his belief that it had failed to deal with the issue properly.

The next failure in the foreign policy plank of the administration was in its covert operations. Throughout the year, the administration escalated its involvement in the civil strife in Indonesia even as various officials seemed to acknowledge the administration’s problematic approach to the entire situation. Early in the year, in a meeting with heads of various bureau heads in the State Department, it became clear that Dulles had lost faith and confidence in

Sukarno. During the meeting, Dulles countered advice that that administration simply needed to support Sukarno and moderate factions in Indonesia in order to both stabilize the area and insulate it from communist influence by pointing out that he considered Sukarno “dangerous and

1020 Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, October 21, 1958 1-2; Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, October 23, 1958, Dulles – Oct 1958, Box 10, DHS, AWF, DDEL. 1021 State Report “Taiwan Straits and Offshore Islands Problem,” June 28, 1960, 1, Meetings with the President 7/30/57 to 1/20/61 (1), Box 21, Christian A. Herter Papers, DDEL. 356

untrustworthy and by character susceptible to the Communist way of thinking.”1022 In fact, the

State Department, CIA, and Defense all agreed with Dulles’s position that the administration would not make “any deals with Sukarno or the present government.”1023 The advice offered by

Ambassador Allison and American military officials actually in Indonesia, that simply supporting Sukarno or any moderate on the West Irian issue would allow Sukarno and the moderates (rather than Communists or Ultraconservatives) to prevail was quickly shot down.1024

And, while remaining vague on whether Sukarno would be acceptable to the administration at all, the group agreed that if a new government came to power in Indonesia “without Communist support or influence” the administration would give that government support.1025 However, given the group’s additional agreement that the administration should proceed carefully to neither appear too pro-Dutch nor to appear to want to “force Sukarno out” as both would strengthen his position, it seems rather obvious that the administration at least preferred

Sukarno’s removal.

This sentiment carried over to the NSC, where some important revelations were made.

At the first NSC meeting of the year, held on January 6, Allen Dulles made a clear effort to convince Eisenhower and the NSC of the need to remove Sukarno. The Director pointed out that

Sukarno was attempting to procure a significant arms deal, admitting that Sukarno was approaching Western European states but focusing his alarmism on the fact that Sukarno also approached Soviet bloc states.1026 Of course, Allen Dulles left out the fact that the government in Indonesia had long sought American military equipment and only recently dropped the issue,

1022 See Meeting in the Secretary’s Office, January 2, 1958, 1-2, Reel 76 Declassification 2010, Box 10, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 1023 Meeting in the Secretary’s Office, January 2, 1958, 1, SML. 1024 Meeting in the Secretary’s Office, January 2, 1958, 3, SML. 1025 Meeting in the Secretary’s Office, January 2, 1958, 1, SML. 1026 Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the NSC, 1, DDEL. 357

if only due to growing suspicion that the Eisenhower administration was already providing such aid to insurgents.1027 Going further, and adding information he was well aware would raise

Eisenhower’s ire, Allen Dulles posited that the Indonesians planned to expropriate Dutch holdings, and do so without compensating the Dutch in any fashion.1028

In February, as the dissident forces in Indonesia made some progress owing in large part to a muted response from Sukarno’s supporters, the Dulles brothers and Eisenhower reacted in significant fashions. On February 7, Dulles met with Dutch officials and, beyond displaying that he continued to view Communism as an evil corrupting form of religion, attempted to pressure the Dutch officials into providing military equipment to support dissidents.1029 Although the

Dutch commented that they hoped to stay out of the internal struggle in Indonesia, Dulles clearly had no such compunction, as he soon issued a statement critical of Sukarno. Indonesian officials responded to the public criticism first by demanding verification that Dulles had actually made the statement while warning that such a statement was clearly interference in Indonesian affairs and could only have the effect of pushing Indonesia to the Soviets.1030 In a scene of diplomatic restraint, when American officials confirmed Dulles’s comments to Indonesian officials, the

Americans were warned that obviously Indonesia would have to respond publically, and, pointing to the fact that neither party was ignorant of the administration’s involvement in the

1027 John Allison, who took over in Jakarta (officially in March), wrote to Dulles to inform him of Prime Minister Djuanda’s suspicions and his lack of request for American military aid. See Telegram, Allison to Dulles, January 7, 1958, in FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, Robert McMahon and Glenn LaFantasie eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), 12. 1028 Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the NSC, 2, DDEL. 1029 Dulles questioned whether Mohammad Hatta’s recent trip to China had drained some of his “sound Moslem [sic] virtues...” as a result. See, Memcon, February 7, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 27-29. 1030 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to State Department, February 12, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 36-37. 358

insurgency, Sukarno’s foreign minister Subandrio noted that “perhaps such tactics [the public criticism] might advance your interests, but I would not be able to judge this.”1031

Despite Dulles’s attitude, and his brother’s confidence, the situation for the administration quickly deteriorated. During subsequent NSC meetings in February, Allen

Dulles’s attitude went from smug to near desperation, while Eisenhower charted a middle way.

At the February 6 meeting of the NSC, Allen Dulles claimed that “if there was to be a climax in

Indonesia, we were on the point of reaching it…” believing that rebel forces were close to moving decisively against Sukarno.1032 Yet by the next week, the CIA’s chief informed the NSC that rebel forces were showing “reluctance” in taking decisive action.”1033 And by the end of the month, Allen Dulles explained how, given the further deterioration of the dissidents, the administration “faced very difficult problems” while warning that if the dissidents failed he was

“fairly certain that Indonesia would go over to the Communists,” with Secretary Dulles in agreement.1034 Although Foster Dulles was as yet undecided as to whether the administration should escalate its intervention, he was well aware that his brother believed it should, and that by supporting his brother, he was effectively supporting such a proposal.

However, while he maintained support for the basic covert level of support the administration was providing, Eisenhower made an important decision via a qualified response to the Dulles brothers. A few days before the NSC met on February 27, Eisenhower received a report which pointed out that the civil conflict in Indonesia was not becoming and did not seem

1031 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to State Department, February 12, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 37. 1032 Discussion at the 354th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 6, 1958, 4, 354th Meeting to the NSC, February 6 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 1033 Discussion at the 355th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 13, 1958, 1, 355th Meeting of the NSC, February 13 1958, 1034 Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 27, 1958, 13, 356th Meeting of the NSC, February 27 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 359

to have the potential to become a Communist versus non-Communist struggle.1035 The report argued that the administration had presumed a greater Communist role in the civil strife than had materialised, and that many officials including former Ambassador to Indonesia Hugh Cumming agreed that the administration should not intervene unless Communist victory (saying nothing of increased involvement) seemed imminent.1036 Eisenhower responded to the Dulles brothers with a statement that was of crucial importance, deciding that “we have to go in if a Communist takeover really threatened. [emphasis mine]”1037 The significance of this should not be ignored:

Eisenhower not only limited expansion of the covert intervention, he placed conditions he knew were highly unlikely to come about on open intervention. Thus, again, Eisenhower found a means to commit to a middle course.

Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for covert action and tinkering increased even as the situation in Indonesia worsened for the dissident forces. By March, an awkwardly desperate Allen Dulles was complaining that Sukarno’s government had informed the administration it planned to bomb

U.S. and U.K. oil facilities in rebel held territory, but had abandoned the plan when asked to do so; Dulles argued that if the facilities had been bombed and personnel killed, then the administration could intervene openly.1038 While Eisenhower made no comment on Allen

Dulles’s rather dark hopes, this did not mean he had abandoned all hope that the covert side of the administration’s intervention might still succeed despite Sukarno’s “unexpected” reassertion

1035 Memorandum for the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 24, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 46-47. 1036 Memorandum for the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 24, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 47. 1037 Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the NSC, 13, DDEL. 1038 Discussion at the 357th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 6, 1958, 5-6, 357th Meeting of the NSC, March 6 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 360

of power.1039 Eisenhower’s predilection for tinkering reared its head, as during the NSC meeting on April 14 he floated the possibility of either loaning or surreptitiously supplying the dissidents with “a submarine or two to deal with the Djakarta Government’s amphibious assault.”1040 And although Allen Dulles clarified that what the dissidents actually needed were aircraft,

Eisenhower was openly and enthusiastically involved in offering up possible avenues that would increase the administration’s involvement.1041

What is striking and important about the entire affair is that Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers persisted in attempting either to fracture Indonesia or defeat Sukarno despite the never more than abysmal chances of success and the near-constant advice from lower-level officials that the administration could actually work with Sukarno.1042 Indeed, Eisenhower appeared to be unaware of the serious weaknesses in the scheme despite the fact that he acknowledged Sukarno would have to suffer a “considerable disaster” before the potential for reversing the course of the rebellion could even arise.1043

In a private meeting on April 15, Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers, Christian Herter, and

Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson met for a discussion of how the administration should proceed in its failing covert intervention in Indonesian affairs. The Secretary of State effectively laid out the topics of discussions, presented options to Eisenhower, gave his opinion

1039 In fact, at the next NSC meeting, Eisenhower asked for clarification as to when, legally, the administration could intervene. Christian Herter explained that so long as Sukarno publically promised to offer compensation, he could seize any American holdings in Indonesia and that basically anything short of a threat to American life would not be grounds for open intervention. See Discussion at the 358th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 13, 1958, 11-13, 358th Meeting of the NSC, March 13 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 1040 Discussion at the 362nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, April 14, 1958, 2-3, 362nd Meeting of the NSC, April 14 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 1041 The concluding remarks on this topic during the discussion remain classified and are thus redacted from the document. See, Discussion at the 362nd Meeting of the NSC, 2-3, DDEL. 1042 Even Sukarno suspected that Dulles was simply ignoring and overriding arguments like those made by Ambassador Allison and local American officials. See Telegram from the Embassy in Djakarta to the Department of State, February 24, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 48. 1043 Discussion at the 362nd Meeting of the NSC, 3, DDEL. 361

on the best option and then left it to Eisenhower to make a decision. This conversation touched on the topic of possibly utilising American mercenaries to aid dissident forces. Dulles carefully described how such mercenaries operated, and this allowed Eisenhower to give directions which exploited legal technicalities.1044 By Eisenhower’s directives, official American forces and personnel could be “detached” from the US government so long as combat against Sukarno was not the sole purpose for such detachment, and Americans not directly employed by the US government could be used for “performing services” for the dissident forces.1045 After this issue was settled, Dulles moved the discussion to the issue of extending recognition to dissident forces.

Although Dulles was quick to offer possible courses of action for the administration, and had invested in viewing the conflict as an ideological one (he described dissident forces as “the

Patriots of Sumatra”), he did not believe the various factions rebelling against Sukarno would prevail or were capable of effectively drawing out the conflict.1046 In fact, Dulles and

Eisenhower showed a good deal less enthusiasm for the entire affair than Allen Dulles or

Robertson. When Dulles listed the possible paths to the administration extending recognition to an independent Sumatran state or one of the rebel factions, which Dulles argued would “might permit of [sic] overt support from U.S. or Asian countries…”, the most extreme type of action

Dulles put forward was an American invasion of Sumatra in order to “protect American life and property on Sumatra, notably the oil fields.”1047 This was the final possibility Dulles listed, and immediately after outlining it, he recommended that President not adopt it; Dulles argued that invading Sumatra “to protect oil interests” would have disastrous effects for the administration

1044 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 15, 1958, 1, Folder 13, Box 24, EFJFD, JFDP, SML 1045 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 15, 1958, 1, SML. 1046 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 15, 1958, 1, SML. 1047 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 15, 1958, 2, SML. 362

on a wide scale.1048 Eisenhower agreed with much of Dulles’s reasoning, disavowing an open invasion and directing that more study be given to the form of recognition that might be extended, noting that such recognition would only be given if the dissident forces began succeeding; the same kind of success Dulles expressed grave doubts about their ability to achieve.1049

The meeting of high-level officials pointed to the fact that the covert operation had failed to become the solution to the challenges the administration faced in Indonesia, but, as

Ambassador Jones began pointing out on the same day as the meeting, the covert operation was also creating problems. Jones sent a message to the State Department on April 15 containing two conclusions of primary importance: the administration should simply focus on building and maintaining pro-American support in Indonesia’s armed forces, and, importantly, its covert operation was straining the existing support in those same forces.1050 Jones argued that the armed forces were the key both to maintaining basic stability in Indonesia and maintaining a strong anti-Communist presence, but that growing belief (and possibly evidence) that the administration was aiding rebels was causing terrible strain on the relationship. Jones went further, and pointed out that effectively no military or top government officials believed the civil strife to be simply Communists versus anti-Communists, and therefore the administration’s aid to rebels was far more damaging to the administration than Eisenhower or Dulles had realised.1051

1048 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 15, 1958, 2, SML. 1049 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 15, 1958, 2, SML. 1050 Telegram from the Embassy in Djakarta to the Department of State, April 15, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 111. 1051 Telegram from the Embassy in Djakarta to the Department of State, April 15, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 111-113. 363

Although the Dulles brothers were reluctant to act on Jones’s advice, the continuing failure of the dissidents and success of Sukarno along with Eisenhower’s steadfast refusal to escalate combined to make Jones’s position the de facto position of the administration. This is not to suggest Jones’s view took hold without any stimulus; indeed, when the State Department began to receive complaints from the Indonesian government about planes from Taiwan which had been taking part in rebel attacks, officials made a point of making clear to Indonesian officials that “we are not prepared to go further than merely relaying this information” to the

Taiwanese government.1052 Jones received direct and impassioned complaints from Subandrio about the attacks, who warned that the administration would fail to break Indonesia in two, but might succeed in driving it to the Communists through supporting such actions.1053 This was apparently enough of an embarrassment that when the NSC met later in the week, Allen Dulles and Eisenhower were advocating and exploring Jones’s suggestion to build and maintain support and influence in Indonesia’s armed forces.1054 And although Allen Dulles did not fully “pull the plug” on covert support in Indonesia until another embarrassment the next week forced his hand, the May 8 meeting of the NSC marks the clearest point at which the top levels of the administration shifted policy to begrudgingly accept Sukarno while simultaneously focusing on building a counterweight to his influence and Communist subversion.1055

Thus, the covert intervention had failed in every sense, succeeding only to prolong the destabilisation of Indonesia and aggravating even sympathetic Indonesian officials. The

1052 Record of Actions, May 5, 1958, 2-3, Reel 99, Declassification 2012, Box 10, JFDSD, JFDP, SML. 1053 Telegram from the Embassy in Djakarta to the Department of State, May 6, 1958, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XVII, Indonesia, 139-141. 1054 Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the NSC, 4, DDEL. 1055 Robert McMahon suggests the April 15 memo to the State Department cited earlier as the starting point of the shift. Although Jones is indisputably the central source of the shift, and May 8 is offered here as a date when the shift was clearly active rather than the origin of the shift, which McMahon admits can fairly only be localised to the spring of 1958. See McMahon, “The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia,” 94-96. 364

resultant shift bore little fruit beyond displaying that the administration had made a pointless error in its intervention. And yet, by November, State officials were reporting positively on the cooperative attitude of Subandrio, noting that Subandrio understood and accepted the administration’s desire to keep aid talks between the U.S. and Indonesia quiet during a NATO conference.1056

The failure of this particular experiment goes beyond even the most scathing criticisms yet made by scholars. Eisenhower’s undertaking of the covert Indonesian intervention has been described as “clumsy, misinformed, and foolishly overconfident;” however, the reality is worse.1057 Certainly Eisenhower was clumsy, his suggestion of submarine support and his odd semi-authorisation of American personnel-cum-mercenaries are proof enough of that. As to misinformed, while Eisenhower indisputably received conflicting opinions and reports, those closest to the scene and still influential enough to be heard, Ambassador Allison, and after his recall, Ambassador Jones, consistently provided viable alternatives to covert intervention.

Frankly, Eisenhower’s approval of and continued support for the covert operation is more representative of the stubborn, hypocritical, and short-sighted quest for stability that typified

Eisenhower’s approach to the Third World. Eisenhower had resisted intervention for some time, but once approved he stuck with the operation despite rare success and mounting evidence that it was failing in more ways than any had imagined. In that regard, the operation had been approved out of a fear of the (real) instability in Indonesia leading to either a partial or total communist takeover, or a partial or total fracturing of the Indonesian state. Eisenhower was unmoved when it became clear that the former simply was not happening, and the latter was only

1056 Minutes from Acting Secretary’s Meeting, November 19, 1958, 3, Reel 248 Declassification 2010, JFDSD, JFDO, SML. 1057 McMahon, The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia,” 96. 365

continuing as a possibility because of his administration’s involvement. Finally, by ordering the operation and then allowing it to suffocate under the failures of the dissidents and the embarrassing evidence of his administration’s involvement, Eisenhower needlessly antagonised and then extended the antagonism of the Sukarno regime; severely limiting its ability to operate in a pro-Western manner and contributing to future conflicts in Indonesia. This was yet another pursuit of postponement. Eisenhower’s attempt to remove Sukarno would not have removed anti-colonial sentiment in Indonesia, but it might have delayed the need to deal with immediately. When Sukarno’s removal became unattainable, Eisenhower invested in a force that could serve to check Sukarno should the need arise; again, not removing the underlying issues but delaying by dealing with their symptoms.

The Year of Failures

Dulles’s experience as Secretary of State and the challenges of the year contributed to his already mounting doubt over whether he should continue in his position at all. Dulles questioned whether it was desirable for him to remain in his position or step aside for a younger man, hinting to Nixon on November 8 that he preferred the latter.1058 Dulles was clear with

Eisenhower that his preferred path was to resign, but Eisenhower also pushed Dulles to remain in

1058 Dulles approached the conversation from a practical standpoint, arguing that if he stepped down and a younger official took his position then the Republicans would be in a good position to continue on with the administration’s foreign policy, and that if he stayed on the result would be that in 1960, a new President and new Secretary of State would be at the helm regardless. That being the case, Dulles was clearly experiencing doubts both regarding his position and his health: he acknowledged that other than diverticulitis, his doctors had given him a clean bill of health, but also noted if his health worsened he would “of course quit” before confiding in Nixon that he hoped to avoid the fate of Franklin Roosevelt’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull, whom Dulles described as “so enfeebled that he went to the hospital almost immediately…and never returned to the State Department.” Nixon’s reply showed both his esteem for Dulles and his continuing resentment of Eisenhower: the Vice President argued that not only was he “very definitely opposed” to Dulles resigning, but he was certain no other person could do the job as well as Dulles, and he was certain Eisenhower could not get along with any one approaching Dulles’s abilities. While Dulles appreciated Nixon’s support, he nonetheless followed-up on the matter with Eisenhower. See, Memcon with the Vice President, November 8, 1958, 1, Folder 2, Box 26, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 366

his post. Eisenhower revealed the extent to which he both genuinely cared about Dulles and had serious concerns about the secretary’s health, admitting to Dulles that he had called the hospital to demand the results of Dulles’s medical exams for himself before the Secretary spoke with him.1059 Dulles made a point of bringing up past conversations with Eisenhower in which he hinted at his desire to resign, then expressed his position that he had stayed on as Secretary of

State through the Congressional election only because Eisenhower had asked it of him.1060

Dulles obviously acquiesced to Eisenhower’s insistence that he stay on, but the importance of such conversations should not be underestimated.1061 Dulles was not simply regularly floating, but pushing the idea that he resign from his position. This points both to the clear concerns he had about his health but also that his frustration and disillusionment had grown to the point that he was continuing in his role solely on the request of the President.1062 Indeed, while Dulles stayed in his position until he was physically unable to continue, his perspective on the role of the Secretary of State had clearly shifted. This shift was hinted at throughout 1958, but became more and more evident as the year drew to a close and Dulles became ever more disillusioned.

1958 then, was a year of failures for the Eisenhower administration. It needs to be kept in mind that these failures happened in rather quick succession. The Indonesian intervention was about to be fully abandoned when Nixon was attacked in Caracas. Even before the fallout from the embarrassment in Caracas had settled, clear indications of Lebanon’s instability reared up.

And little over a month after Marines had landed on Lebanon’s shores, the Second Taiwan Strait

1059 Memcon with the President, November 10, 1958, 1, Folder 2, Box 26, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 1060 Eisenhower expressed reluctance, brought up Robert Anderson as a possible replacement for Dulles (noting that Anderson would be “satisfactory” but not perfect), but then returned to his original position that he wanted to finish his presidency with Dulles as his Secretary of State. Memcon with the President, November 10, 1958, 1, SML. 1061 Memcon with the President, November 10, 1958, 1, SML. 1062 Thus, not because of his own ambition, sense of destiny, or belief that he could institute the kind of morally grounded dynamic prudent foreign policies he had advocated in previous years. 367

Crisis began. Indeed, over four months the administration was handed four clear examples that the Third World far from stabilising. Taken together, the Eisenhower administration suffered crisis after crisis in the Third World in 1958, some of its own making and none handled well.

Eisenhower’s mishandling of Third World challenges was based around his dangerous determination to avoid, postpone, or in his worst case scenario, minimise change. Where Dulles considered change, controlled and carefully directed, to be a beneficial force, Eisenhower treated it as a dangerous menace to be avoided and held back. However, Eisenhower could never restrain his tendency to meddle or tinker in policies, operations, or other related issues, and this rarely benefited the administration. His intervention into Indonesia was an ill-considered and poorly executed debacle hypocritically intended to bring stability. Although he went along with

Foster Dulles’s (who was far from a reluctant supporter of the intervention) arguments that an overt intervention would be unwise, he nonetheless enthusiastically thought and offered possible means to literally fracture the Indonesian state. Eisenhower sent Nixon on a goodwill trip to

Latin America after Dulles refused, thinking such a trip would be sufficient to mollify discontent in the region. When this proved woefully inadequate, he allowed minimal economic changes, hoped that Kubitschek’s OPA would allow him to avoid adopting significant changes, and blamed everyone but himself for the various failures that had occurred. Eisenhower also simply ignored the fact that Dulles had seemingly been validated in his criticism of Eisenhower’s massive retaliation theory, and when the Middle East proved his Eisenhower Doctrine had stabilised nothing, he awkwardly pointed to it as justification for invading Lebanon for the purposes of little more than a transition of power. Nixon and Dulles were aware of, and discussed, many of these failures, and while neither man was a passive non-participant, the decisions and the failures were all ultimately Eisenhower’s.

368

Chapter Eight

“...stupidly pushing ahead…without taking into account the effects”1063 (1959-1960)

The final two years of the Eisenhower administration displayed a considerable amount of continuity in its approach to the Third World, as pressing and worsening matters continued to be put off. After Dulles’s departure from the administration, it became abundantly clear that

Eisenhower had ultimately made foreign policy decisions with Dulles’s (and others’) advice.

However, it was equally clear that Dulles implemented and pursued those decisions while also maintaining order and keeping Eisenhower informed; this internal balance was severely disrupted once Christian Herter took over Dulles’s position. Eisenhower took steps to minimise genuine and significant changes to the administration’s basic foreign policies, and utilised specific tools to delay such changes as part of his pursuit of postponement.

These tools, goodwill missions and covert interventions were used by the administration to delay, and in the latter case prevent, the need for significant or substantial change to foreign policy. The goodwill trips Nixon had taken throughout the administration’s time were mirrored in an abridged fashion by Eisenhower, who travelled to parts of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.1064 Despite engaging in the goodwill missions, and clearly enjoying the attention and receptions he received around the world, Eisenhower, either to insult Nixon, or giving an honest evaluation of such trips (or both), minimised the importance of goodwill missions. Attempts at and plans for covert interventions also increased in 1959-1960, with

1063 As this is a rather bold statement, the full quotation, which comes from Eisenhower at the June 30, 1960, meeting is as follows: “The President wondered whether we were stupidly pushing ahead, carrying out programs without taking into account the effects these programs might be having.” Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 30, 1960, 9, 449th Meeting of the NSC, June 30, 1960, Box 12, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL 1064 Eisenhower also spent a single day each in Libya and Morocco, and a little over one day in the Philippines. 369

Eisenhower authorising planning for the overthrow of Fidel Castro and the assassination of

Patrice Lumumba. Such interventions continued Eisenhower’s and the administration’s tendency, when confronted with what it considered implacable communist leaders or puppets, to simply remove such leaders rather than address the issues which had brought them to power. As always, such interventions attacked symptoms, and were not intended to do anything else. Thus, the Eisenhower administration concluded its time in office much as it began: with goodwill gestures meant to mollify discontent and covert interventions to prevent or turn back perceived communist advances. Eisenhower ended as he started, pursuing postponement.

The Departure of John Foster Dulles

In 1959, John Foster Dulles resigned from his position as Secretary of State and passed away shortly thereafter. Dulles’s influence was evident in his absence. The relationship between

Eisenhower and Nixon, which had never been close but had been carefully managed by Dulles, showed clear signs of rupture and animosity once Dulles resigned. Eisenhower’s relationship with the man Dulles selected as his own replacement, Christian Herter, and indeed Eisenhower’s relationship with much of the State Department, was far less harmonious and complementary without Dulles.1065 As Dulles and Eisenhower had only a few, if significant and in some ways fundamental, disagreements on foreign policy it is perhaps unsurprising that the administration’s

1065 Despite his unquestionable loyalty and dedication, Dulles was clearly disheartened and disillusioned in the time leading up to his resignation. The decline in Dulles’s health contributed to an increase in his willingness to delegate non-crisis Third World issues to subordinates such as Christian Herter. Dulles considered Herter reliable and able, and as Dulles’s cancer worsened depended on him to a greater degree. Dulles told Eisenhower that Herter would attend a SEATO meeting in his place, while another subordinate would attend a Baghdad Pact meeting for him. However, as will also be shown, Dulles’s endorsement of Herter also stemmed from feelings of resentment over Eisenhower’s failure to act on Dulles’s more ambitious goals for the administration. See Memcon, January 20, 1959, 1, Folder 14, Box 25, EFJFD, JFDP, SML. 370

foreign policies and actions showed little significant divergence in the post-Dulles period.1066

However, both inside and outside of the administration, the control, direction, and mediation of competing interests that had clearly been provided by Dulles was noticeably lost. Walter

Robertson likely accurately described Dulles’s resignation as a “catastrophic blow” to

Eisenhower, and fairly compared Herter as Secretary of State to Dulles when he stated “he

[Herter] was surely a good man, but I doubt if there were many…who would say that he was trained as thoroughly for the position as his predecessor.”1067

Of course, Dulles’s endorsement Christian Herter was highly conditional and contained several unspoken but obvious criticisms of Eisenhower. The most obvious tacit criticism was one that clearly disturbed Eisenhower enough to bring it up with Dulles: although Herter was a devout internationalist, skilled politician, and able administrator, he suffered from arthritis severe enough that he spent a great deal of the working day confined to a wheelchair. Eisenhower raised an objection to Herter for this reason, stating “his physical condition to some extent disqualified him from being an active negotiator around the world…”1068 Dulles admitted as much, and pointed out individuals who Eisenhower might promote. This included possibly promoting an additional official to Undersecretary if he needed an able negotiator; however,

Dulles was clearly skeptical that Eisenhower would need such a figure.1069

The somewhat more complex criticism of Eisenhower connects to the conversation

Dulles had with Nixon the previous year. In that conversation, Dulles had expressed a deep desire that the Secretary of State be in a strong position to continue on into the next

1066 Goodpaster Briefing, January 19 and 20, 1959, 2, Goodpaster Briefings – January 1959, Box 38, Diary Series, AWF, DDEL. Of course, by March, 1959, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which subsequently became the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in August of that year. 1067 See Walter S. Robertson, The Reminiscences of Walter S. Robertson, 183-184. 1068 Memcon, April 13, 1959, 1, SML. 1069 Memcon, April 13, 1959, 1, SML. 371

administration in order to skillfully advise whomever was the (presumably Republican) president.1070 For Dulles, this was a matter of continuity, stability, and security. The fact that

Dulles recommended Herter as a short-term solution, indicating both that Herter was unlikely to stay on even if a Republican took office after Eisenhower and that he lacked the qualities Dulles deemed necessary for a long-term Secretary of State, points very clearly to a fundamental disagreement with Eisenhower’s direction. Dulles was not simply resigning the position to which he had aspired to and felt destined toward for, he was also abandoning the hopes and ambitions he had held for the next administration and the foreign policy of the United States.

Recommending Herter was Dulles’s last act of loyalty and defiance in one; Herter could carry out Eisenhower’s directions and policies capably, but given his age and disability he was almost certain not to continue on in the next administration and therefore the next administration would have as much freedom as possible to chart a different course for American foreign policy.

Dulles’s departure also had ramifications for Nixon. Although Dulles’s resignation and death seriously undermined Nixon’s position in the administration as concerned foreign policy, by the time Dulles resigned it was clear Nixon had learned a considerable amount from his mentor. Nixon’s role in foreign affairs was also reduced by his own shifting attention towards securing the Republican nomination, but through his own endeavours and his relationship with

Dulles, he had built a reputation internally as a reliable and insightful source of advice on foreign policy matters, and was regularly consulted by the State Department.1071 Indeed, though the shift can not solely be attributed to Dulles, Nixon clearly became more pragmatic, if still patronising

1070 Memcon with the Vice President, November 8, 1958, 1, SML. 1071 As just one example, Christian Herter contacted Nixon near the end of November in 1959 to get his input and thoughts on the State Department’s proposal for a revised and revamped Organisation for European Economic Co- operation (OEEC). See Memo for the President, November 24, 1959, 3, Foreign Economic Policy, Box 10, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL; Memo, Dillon to Nixon, November 27, 1959, 1, Foreign Economic Policy, Box 10, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 372

in regard to the Third World after his experiences with his mentor. As just one example, during a meeting with Afghanistan’s Prince Naim, Nixon argued that while all nations wanted prosperity and independence, “the Western world must face the fact that…backward peoples” would choose prosperity through aid if need be, even to the extent of sacrificing or forgoing independence; and this should not be a cause for panic in the Western world.1072 That being the case, with or without Dulles, Eisenhower continued to pursue postponement.

The Continuity of Complacency and Covert Intervention

Eisenhower’s refusal to act in non-crisis situations in the Third World continued in the final two years of his administration. On Latin American matters, Eisenhower returned to obstructing progress both internally and externally while working to create the appearance of genuine progress. On a fundamental level, Eisenhower’s policies in for Latin America never wavered from reactive anti-communism. Admittedly, Eisenhower had displayed a greater openness to enacting policies in Latin America which at least attempted to address some of the realities on the ground and had the potential to be proactive rather than reactive. Here too, however, on both large and small scales Eisenhower had to be placed in awkward or embarrassing positions before he even began to move beyond rhetoric and toward action. The exception to this was covert intervention, which Eisenhower readily accepted as a viable and useful tool. The issue of central importance here is that covert interventions like the ones authorised by Eisenhower were short-term, short-sighted, and, when compared to the genuine and significant policy revisions pushed for by officials like Nixon, Rubottom, and others, easy

1072 Nixon’s point was that it was impossible for the West, namely the United States, to give aid to all nations that requested it, and that some nations would be “lost” to Communism by dint of the fact that their acceptance of Communist aid would lead to Communist control. See Memcon, October 14, 1959, 2, RN Conversation with Afghan For’n Min, [sic] Box 12, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. 373

solutions to much larger problems. Such interventions, especially in Eisenhower’s case, point to a painful lack of sophistication in understanding local and regional dynamics in the Third World.

Importantly, this is not simply a matter of viewing the world through a Cold War lens, in that while anti-communism certainly played an integral role in motivating Eisenhower’s decisions on covert intervention, an underlying belligerency also played a strong role. Indeed, with the exception of authorising planning for a coup against Castro, Eisenhower worked to do as little as possible, both personally and on an policy level, to alter the status quo.

On a variety of levels, Fidel Castro exposed weaknesses in Eisenhower’s understanding and treatment of Latin America. The most obvious aspect of this exposure was Castro’s ability to exploit the administration’s simplistic policies and evade conclusive analysis as to his intentions. Nixon’s meeting with Castro in Washington on April 19 displayed the level of confusion and lack of understanding of Castro that tripped up the administration before

Eisenhower authorised planning for a coup. Nixon consulted with John Foster Dulles before his conversation with Castro, and still came away from the encounter uncertain despite Castro’s consistent criticisms of the United States.1073 Nixon’s inability to discern Castro’s motivations and intentions were somewhat puzzling if not atypical of the administration as a whole. In his notes, Nixon admitted numerous times that he felt he “made very little impression, if any” on

Castro regarding a variety of topics, including the dangers of Communism, the need to delegate responsibilities and power, and the importance of personal freedoms and liberties.1074 However, rather than making “very little impression,” each time Nixon made such arguments he elicited a negative, defensive response from Castro: when Nixon mentioned the need for freedoms and

1073 Memcon, April 19, 1-4, Conversation with Castro, Box 10, PPS 325, RNPPM, RNL. For Nixon’s consultation with Dulles prior to the conversation see FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba, John P. Glennon and Ronald Landa eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Press, 1991), 476. 1074 Memcon, April 19, 1-3, RNL. 374

liberties Castro replied that if he could provide all Cubans with “a job, something to eat, a house, and some clothing” all-year-round, that they “didn’t care about whether [they] had freedom to go along with it.”1075 Indeed, despite concluding that Castro very much reminded him of Sukarno in

1953, Nixon failed to come to any definitive conclusion about Castro’s intentions or position in the Cold War.1076 The simple fact was that Castro succeeded in confusing Nixon in much the same way he confused other officials, the American press, and public for much of the early months of 1959.

Thus, Castro was able turn the administration’s policies in Latin America back on it, pointing out and exploiting the weaknesses in those policies to a variety of ends. Nixon, for example, found much to disagree with when he met Castro, but was also surprised that Castro was of a similar mind when it came to improving the U.S.’s standing and influence in Latin

America. Castro made two points during his conversation with Nixon with which the vice president both agreed and found appealing. Castro argued that there was no legitimate reason for the United States to provide arms to Latin American states beyond allowing dictators “to suppress people as Batista used his arms,” since the arms provided to Latin American states would hardly be useful in the event of a world war.1077 Castro then added the point that it would be far more beneficial for the Eisenhower administration, other American administrations, and of course the Latin American states themselves if the resources devoted to military aid were instead put toward investing and building up the economies of those states. Nixon noted that “I…admit that as far as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I could disagree with.”1078

1075 Memcon, April 19, 4, RNL. 1076 Memcon, April 19, 2, RNL. One could likely find other similarities in the transition from confusion to coup plotting as concerns the administration’s reactions to Sukarno and Castro. 1077 Memcon, April 19, 4, RNL. 1078 Memcon, April 19, 4, RNL. 375

Indeed, Castro’s argument in this regard synced nicely with the points Nixon had been making since the previous year. In addition, despite his negative view of the Eisenhower administration’s policies, Castro advocated a shift in emphasis very similar to the type Nixon and

Dulles had been advocating for years.

Nixon was openly in agreement when Castro argued that the Eisenhower administration should shift emphasis from anti-Communism to pro-Americanism, and from reactive policies to pro-active ones. Nixon was slightly surprised by the turn Castro made in the conversation when

Castro spoke at length about the greatest weakness in American foreign policy being its focus on weakness and fear rather than its own strength, stating:

Yours is a great country – the richest, the greatest, the most powerful in the world…But every place I go you seem to be afraid – afraid of Communism…You…should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba, or in some other country in Latin America, Asia, or Africa. You should be talking…about your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other dictatorship.1079

Nixon noted that he made minor corrections to Castro’s interpretation of American actions and attitudes, but that he agreed with Castro that the Eisenhower and later administrations needed to realise that “being against Communism is not enough” and that pro-active positive policies were obviously needed above reactive negative ones.1080 Nixon was clearly charmed with and slightly envious of Castro, closing his notes with the admiring description that Castro had “those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men.”1081

After Castro’s trip to the United States had concluded, Christian Herter admitted that

Castro had not only confused Nixon but many in the administration as well. Herter wrote to

1079 Memcon, April 19, 5, RNL. 1080 Memcon, April 19, 5, RNL. 1081 Memcon, April 19, 6, RNL. 376

Eisenhower to explain that while officials continued to be suspicious, Castro had succeeded in keeping those same officials “uncertain” about his motivations and intentions.1082 Although

Herter asserted that “there is little probability that Castro has altered the essentially radical course of his revolution,” he acknowledged and advised that “Castro remains an enigma, and we should await his decisions on specific matters” before deciding what policies should be adopted concerning Cuba.1083 This state of affairs did not last, as Castro’s continued defiance and perceived anti-American rhetoric drove relations to an exceptionally low point. Another weakness in Eisenhower’s handling of Latin American matters was exposed, in moving toward approving the plot to overthrow Cuba’s leader.

Castro, as a target for overthrow, also indirectly exposed Eisenhower’s ambition to establish a precedent that would significantly loosen the criteria for American interventions in

Latin America. In a meeting on March 17, 1960, Eisenhower not only gave approval for, but was clearly a driving force behind, the plan to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba. The basic plan had been put together by the NSC’s “5412 Committee” under Allen Dulles, and was intended to remove the Castro regime and replace it with one “more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention.”1084 While the plan itself and the fact that yet another leader was targeted for removal is important, the president and Nixon had an exchange of significance as well.

1082 Memo, Herter to Eisenhower, 1-2, Folder 9, Box 9, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 1083 Memo, Herter to Eisenhower, April 24, 2, SML. Thus, Castro had at the very least behaved in such a manner that both the Vice President and the Secretary of State were unable to discern much about the Cuban leader other than he was charming and a “born leader.” 1084 See A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, May 16, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba, 850. The plan also claimed to have the intention that the post-Castro regime would be a government which was “more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people…”. 377

The exchange between the President and Vice President pointed to Eisenhower’s ambition to gain greater international legal leeway for Latin American interventions.

Eisenhower stated that he “knew of no better plan for dealing with this situation [Castro’s regime]” before hammering home the importance of preventing leaks and maintaining plausible deniability for the entire plan.1085 Connected to his queries about the OAS, Eisenhower questioned whether the administration actually needed to couch its program against Castro as anti-Communist, or whether the plan could gain support by targeting Castro for “dictatorship, confiscation, threats to life etc.”1086 The implications of such a shift were obvious, if the administration could gain approval for interventions against regimes which were not in some way linked to communism, this would create a precedent which future administrations could use to justify a greater range of interventions.1087 Nixon suspected Eisenhower’s reasoning, and responded forcefully that the Caracas Resolution, which the administration had originally used to claim OAS approval for action against Árbenz, “was based on the term ‘international communism’” and therefore Eisenhower’s scheme was impractical.1088 If it is granted that

Eisenhower’s question was based on an ulterior motive of establishing a new precedent which would enable the administration to act against a wider range of leaders and states, the question

1085 In fact, Eisenhower wanted there to be no more “three or four” members of government who would have contact with the Cubans carrying out the plot. See Memcon, March 17, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba, 861. 1086 Memcon, March 17, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba, 862. 1087 The argument is not that Eisenhower or subsequent presidents were somehow thwarted from intervening (covert or otherwise) in Latin American affairs for lack of OAS permission. Rather the argument is that such permission likely would have emboldened Eisenhower and subsequent administrations to undertake additional or more ambitious interventions. While Castro’s skillful blurring of lines and initial success in evading a concrete Cold War position certainly contributed to Eisenhower’s drive to open up the criteria allowing for intervention, the slippery slope remains obvious. 1088 Memcon, March 17, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba, 862. 378

still reveals a myopic perspective on Latin America.1089 Taking Eisenhower’s question to its conclusion, the president presumed that, with the implicit knowledge that the Eisenhower and later administrations could therefore intervene more freely, Latin American leaders would support the condemnation of regimes that were or resembled dictatorships, confiscated property, or posed a threat to life “etc.”1090 Thus, Castro also indirectly served as motivating factor which revealed Eisenhower’s attempt at a freer hand in intervening in Latin America.1091

That being the case, Eisenhower was far from ambitious as concerned more challenging and complex issues in U.S.-Latin American relations. While Eisenhower may have been forced to abandon hope of expanding the justifications for intervening in Latin American states, he also stubbornly resisted pressure from various figures seeking to force a more active and progressive approach to those states. Building on Nixon’s disastrous goodwill mission to Latin America,

Milton Eisenhower undertook a fact-finding mission later in 1958, which further convinced the

President’s brother that changes were necessary. One of the eventual results of this fact-finding mission was that President Eisenhower created the National Advisory Committee on inter-

American Affairs (NACIA).

Yet even the creation of the NACIA took a concerted push from Assistant Secretary

Rubottom, who sought to use Milton Eisenhower’s position (not his insights) to achieve genuine progress. Rubottom acknowledged that Milton Eisenhower continued to have a less than

1089 If, on the other hand, Eisenhower genuinely thought he could gain support for a precedent which would effectively “approve” his or any subsequent American administrations to remove dictators or any state which were deemed to have improperly confiscated property, then his understanding of the region was dangerously imbecilic. 1090 Memcon, March 17, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba, 862. 1091 Memcon, March 17, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba, 862. Another alternative, that Eisenhower was so unnerved by Castro’s ability to evade conclusive evaluation that the President thought the administration required such a precedent in order to remove future Castros is also disturbing. While the administration eventually understood Castro’s position, if it had removed Castro while still unsure of how be planned to lead Cuba, the precedent established would have been of even greater danger. 379

sophisticated understanding of Latin American issues, pointing out to several Deputy Directors that the president’s brother’s report from his fact finding mission was “a basic document, broad in its scope and recommendations.”1092 Indeed, Nixon also considered Milton’s grasp of the problems in Latin America to be questionable, if not indicative of a large part of the problems themselves. It should be understood that while Nixon was cordial with Milton Eisenhower, their views diverged considerably on a number of topics, especially Latin America. Nixon considered

Milton guilty of exactly the sins he had argued were at the root of the problems with American-

Latin American business and political relationships, namely that Milton avoided most Latin

Americans and simply associated with American or fervently pro-American locals. Nixon’s staff brought several articles to his attention on Milton Eisenhower’s 1958 trip to Central America which noted these issues. One such article, clearly not written by a strong supporter of President

Eisenhower’s Third World policies generally, noted that Milton Eisenhower avoided speaking to local journalists, labor leaders, and student groups – all things Nixon advocated and attempted.1093

Nonetheless, Rubottom recognised both a potential opportunity and obligation in Milton

Eisenhower’s report and position. Rubottom informed several concerned Deputy Directors that the younger Eisenhower’s report presented the prospect for a form of symbiotic relationship; the

State officials could put forward arguments and reports on progress regarding Milton’s concerns,

Rubottom would present and consult with Milton, and Milton would very likely utilise such consultation and reporting in his pressuring of his brother to move on the State-Milton

1092 Memo, Rubottom to Leggett and Conover, January 12, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 265. 1093 Ray Tucker, “Milton’s Tour Fruitless,” San Jose Mercury, Friday, July 25, 1958, Eisenhower, Milton S., Box 238 General Correspondence, PPS 320, RNPPM, RNL. 380

arguments.1094 Herter considered such a committee to be a useful addition, and Eisenhower believed that since the committee would technically be advising Herter, and not the president, there was little chance of himself being forced to act.1095 Eisenhower’s support for the NACIA was assured by two key factors: his brother’s continued push for changes in the relationship between the U.S. and Latin America, and the fact that even in its foundation the NACIA was limited to “considering problems” in U.S.-Latin American relations and then advising the

Secretary of State on possible solutions.1096 Thus, Eisenhower permitted the creation of yet another committee whose basic purpose was to study and advise rather than formulate or implement policy changes. In short, Eisenhower allowed the NACIA to be created under the impression it, or its members, would not actually be able push him to do anything substantive.

In this vein, one of the NACIA’s first acts was simply to recommend to Eisenhower that the benefits would outweigh the costs if he were to undertake a goodwill trip to a select few

Latin American states.1097 The changes in Eisenhower’s language, given his penchant for both choosing and adhering to his words carefully, when members of the NACIA recommended he undertake a goodwill mission, are significant. When his brother Milton suggested the president undertake a goodwill mission, the president responded politely that he “would like very much” to engage in such a mission, but pointed out that a scheduling conflict made it unlikely. Assistant

Secretary Rubottom stepped in and clarified that the “unfortunate” scheduling conflicts

1094 Memo, Rubottom to Leggett and Conover, January 12, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 265-266. 1095 Memo, Rubottom to Leggett and Conover, January 12, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 266. 1096 While he admitted that Communism was not as influential as might be feared, retarding and preventing further advances was clearly his prime motivation. See Ralph Chapman, “Dr. Eisenhower urges U.S. to help Latins get Loans,” New York Herald Tribune, Friday, October 16, 1959, Eisenhower, Milton S. (1/2), Box 238, PPS 320, RNPPM, RNL; Memcon, December 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 267. 1097 Memcon, December 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 268-269. 381

Eisenhower cited as making such a trip impractical were actually manageable, but offered to take up the matter after Eisenhower returned from the goodwill mission on which he was about to depart.1098 Eisenhower was clearly caught slightly off guard by Rubottom’s persistence, as he began to engage in evasive bargaining.

Eisenhower’s equivocation and non-committal attitude pointed to his reluctance to undertake the mission, skepticism that such a mission was actually useful in the first place, and the continuing low-priority he ascribed to Latin America. The president first attempted to make

Rubottom consider just how important he considered the goodwill trip, stating that perhaps the summit meeting in Paris could be postponed in order for the proposed trip.1099 The reasoning for the argument around the dates was simple enough: Brasilia, the new capital of Brazil, was being inaugurated on April 21. When Rubottom relented slightly by acknowledging the summit was of far greater importance and could not be postponed, Eisenhower pivoted and suggested a duplication of his 1956 trip to Latin America, proposing that he could visit one state and simply have other Latin American leaders meet him there.1100 At the beginning of the meeting

Eisenhower had claimed to be enthusiastic at the prospect of a goodwill trip, but his clear attempt to escape the trip in such a fashion as he proposed was of such poor quality that the meeting’s recorder simply noted “this idea was not pursued” and the meeting moved on.1101 In fact,

Rubottom persisted, and focused on Eisenhower’s apparent wish to avoid much time in Latin

America by promising the president he could devise a goodwill mission that would not take more

1098 Eisenhower was about to depart on a goodwill mission that took him to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and other states – he spent the longest amount of time in India, but otherwise typically spent one day in each nation. As to the meeting with the NACIA, Eisenhower twice expressed regret about the scheduling conflict in such a way that strongly suggested that the conflict was an excuse rather than a reason to avoid the goodwill trip. Memcon, December 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 268-269. 1099 Memcon, December 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 268. 1100 Memcon, December 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 268. 1101 Memcon, December 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 268. 382

than a week. Eisenhower closed the meeting by stating he “would be willing to consider a short trip of six or seven days…”1102 The obvious reluctance Eisenhower displayed as he transitioned from polite disinclination to resigned willingness to consider a goodwill mission again points to the fact that he did not consider Latin American relations to actually be in need of even his typical tool for shoring up sentiment and postponing real change.

Eisenhower reinforced this position near the end of 1959. After returning from his goodwill trip to parts of Asia and the Middle East, Eisenhower met with Douglas Dillon, who continued to pressure Eisenhower to take the goodwill trip to Latin America on behalf of the

State Department. Although Eisenhower yet again displayed a clear desire to spend as little time as possible in Latin America, he expressed a desire to include Colombia and Paraguay as part of the limited venture.1103 Eisenhower did not explain his desire to travel to Colombia, but it appeared to centre around meeting with Colombia’s President, Alberto Lleras Camargo. Dillon told Eisenhower he need not travel to Colombia for two reasons: Bogota’s elevation might cause him health problems, and Lleras Camargo was planning to visit the United States soon after

Eisenhower’s trip; Eisenhower stated he was unaware of Colombia’s altitude but appeared satisfied that Lleras Camargo would soon visit.1104 As to Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner, who had won re-election in Paraguay the previous year (in which Stroessner refused to allow any other candidates onto the ballot) was exactly the type of dictator the Nixon trip had stressed that the administration should begin to at least appear to avoid. Eisenhower’s response to the issues posed by a possible visit to Paraguay underscored his general distrust and disdain for the people of both Latin America and the broader Third World. Dillon was well aware that Eisenhower

1102 Memcon, December 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 269. 1103 Memcon, December 23, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 270. 1104 Memcon, December 23, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 270. 383

knew the type of regime in power in Paraguay, and thus delicately put it to Eisenhower the obvious “problem posed by the dictatorial regime.”1105 In responding to Dillon, Eisenhower made the jarring revelation that he had “been struck in Asia by the growing feeling that a benevolent form of dictatorship is not a bad form of government for newly developing countries that were not prepared for full democracy.”1106

There are several important points to take from Eisenhower’s remarks. The most obvious was Eisenhower’s at best specious claim to have had an epiphany which justified installing and supporting dictators. In fact, Eisenhower’s suggestion that benevolent dictators were not problematic harkened to Dulles’s defense against Nixon’s criticisms that the administration should stop preferring dictators over democracies, namely that there were different gradations of dictators. The point here is two-fold: given the context of Eisenhower’s statement it is fair to conclude he considered his lesson on dictators to be applicable to Latin America, and, from this, that Eisenhower considered Latin Americans under dictatorial regimes to simply be unprepared for full democracy. It is also certainly possible that Eisenhower was testing whether the State

Department might consider it feasible to display more openly approval for dictators such as

Stroessner. In any case, Eisenhower’s comment indicated a significant divergence from Nixon’s perspective and revealed an important distinction between their perspectives. Eisenhower’s divergence is important in that the president was arguing not only for the necessity and prudence of supporting dictators, but that such support was actually morally correct and indeed, something to be proud of given that he suggested visiting Stroessner after being warned of the issues likely

1105 Memcon, December 23, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 270. 1106 Memcon, December 23, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 270. Dillon did not directly respond to the president’s remark, and the meeting quickly concluded. 384

to arise. Eisenhower’s intransigence on dictators was soon matched by a freezing of enthusiasm for Kubitschek’s ambitions.

The administration continued to view Kubitschek with significant esteem and potential.

However, this perspective could also have detrimental effects on U.S.-Latin American relations.

In April of 1959, Nixon and Herter agreed that the Vice President would not attend the Inter-

American Conference at Buenos Aires. The reason for this decision, which the two agreed to make public if the State Department was questioned by reporters, was that Nixon was only ever going to attend the conference if Kubitschek attended, and then only for the portions Kubitschek was present; since Kubitschek would not attend the conference, the Vice President would not be asked to attend.1107 The obvious crux of such a message was that the administration did not consider the conference to be of much importance beyond Kubitschek. The regard for

Kubitschek meant both that other Latin American representatives were treated as less important, and that Kubitschek and OPA gained a considerable amount of the administration’s focus and energy.

However, an economic crisis in Brazil served to trip up progress on the OPA and brought about a cooling of opinion on Kubitschek in the Eisenhower administration, and thus of the potential for more significant progress in U.S.-Latin American relations. Brazil experienced an economic crisis in mid-1959 stemming from a balance-of-payments issue, IMF reluctance to accommodate Kubitschek’s concerns, and other related issues.1108 Adding to the issue was

Kubitschek’s rather bold manoeuvring through reinforcing the importance he ascribed to the

U.S.-Brazil relationship to American officials while also publically complaining that the IMF

1107 State Memo on Contingency Press Guidance Re Vice President’s Trip to Buenos Aires, April 7. 1959, 1, M-Z Official Classified (1), Box 20, Christian A. Herter Papers, DDEL. 1108 Special National Intelligence Estimate: The Financial Crisis in Brazil,” July 21, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 733-739. 385

undermined sovereignty and the Eisenhower administration mistreated Latin American nations.1109 In the immediate aftermath of Kubitschek’s vocal criticism of the IMF and

Eisenhower administration, American embassy staff in Brazil were disturbed enough by their misjudgement of Kubitschek – staff there had contended Kubitschek would seek a compromise and would not risk even the appearance of a break with the U.S., a contention which Kubitschek immediately undermined – that they abruptly dropped their previous position. Embassy staff had claimed there was little they could do to address Kubitschek’s concerns, yet after Kubitschek began mobilising nationalist sentiment against the Eisenhower administration, that same embassy staff abruptly recommended the administration offer to re-schedule Brazil’s debt payments.1110 Kubitschek’s move to criticising the administration caused Eisenhower to re- examine his administration’s support of Brazil, and adopt a far less enthusiastic approach.

Although Kubitschek was accurate in his description of the IMF’s typical conditions on financial aid, and on the fact that the Eisenhower administration took a far less generous approach to Latin American states’ search for financial and technical aid than it did for Middle

Eastern or Asian ones, the fact remained that his boldness had a variety of negative consequences. One of the more detrimental, though neither malevolent nor atypical, responses to

Kubitschek’s criticisms and Brazil’s financial issues was that Eisenhower and Herter, and thus the administration, adopted a spitefully slow approach to Brazilian overtures and proposals.

1109 Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, June 9, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 724-726; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil, (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1991), 296-298. 1110 The offer to re-schedule payments came with a passive-aggressive admonition that the decision had been more difficult to make due to the “public debate which has raged around this issue in Brazil” brought about by Kubitschek’s public criticisms. See Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to Department of State, June 13, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 726-727. 386

This change once again strained internal and international dynamics. Indeed, both

Rubottom and the administration’s new ambassador to Brazil from July, 1959, John Cabot, noted that the administration had taken a far less attentive and energetic approach to Brazil than might have been the case. Rubottom complained to Cabot that many decisions were made by Herter and Eisenhower without ever consulting or checking with the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and resignedly noted that the most that could be hoped for from Eisenhower was the goodwill trip (which Rubottom noted he continued to work towards convincing Eisenhower and was “not giving up” on that front).1111 However, it must be acknowledged that from Eisenhower’s perspective Kubitschek appeared ungrateful and greedy in light of the fact that Kubitschek levelled such criticisms mere months after the Inter-American Development Bank (which had been established after some genuine consultation and compromise with Brazilian officials, among others) came into being.1112 Thus, Eisenhower’s resentment and reluctance to continue to engage with Kubitschek enthusiastically was not without foundation.

Eisenhower’s shift elicited frustrated responses from officials both in the administration and in Brazil. Cabot’s response to the administration’s shift towards a cooler position on Brazil was decidedly negative and critical. Cabot wrote to Rubottom in early December, 1959, both to register his surprise at the lack of pressure for a loan coming from the Brazilians, and his dissatisfaction with the deterioration in relations with Brazil that he considered to be mostly the

Eisenhower administration’s doing.1113 Nonetheless, Eisenhower and Herter had quite effectively moved to dampen the administration’s efforts supporting OPA. Indeed, by March of

1111 Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Ambassador in Brazil, November 27, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 742-744. 1112 FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 219-221. 1113 Letter from the Ambassador in Brazil to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, December 4, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 744. 387

1960, while speaking with Eisenhower, the Brazilian foreign minister was reduced to sneaking in a brief mention of hopes for renewed collaboration with the administration on OPA just after official conversations ended but before photographers entered the room.1114

Though Eisenhower and Herter were unenthusiastic at the prospect of expending more resources for Latin America, the legacy of John Foster Dulles retained some momentum. Dulles had encouraged reconsideration of the administration’s policies in Latin America in 1958, and many of his officials reacted with enthusiasm. After Dulles’s departure, Douglas Dillon, who became Undersecretary of State under Herter, continued to pursue changes. The program which became known as the Social Progress Trust Fund (SPTF) was the result of drives from many quarters, but was most directly a child of the State Department.1115 The SPTF was certainly a late and modest development, it was passed by Congress on September 8, 1960 as Public Law

86-735 and authorised the president to expend funds “not to exceed $500,000,000” to “provide assistance in the development of Latin America…” but is nonetheless noteworthy.1116 While noteworthy, it is important to keep in mind that Eisenhower played little role in its formulation, and effectively acquiesced rather than enthusiastically pursuing it.1117 Indeed, Eisenhower’s basic reason for supporting the SPTF was simple, he believed it would serve as a kind of anti-

Castro and anti-communist buffer.

1114 The meeting’s recorder noted that Horácio Lafer “leaned over to tell the President” regarding the hopes outlined above. See Memcon, March 18, 1960, 2-3, Brazil (3), Box 4, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 1115 This is not to ignore or mitigate the fact that Milton Eisenhower had been pushing for changes for years, or that Nixon encouraged changes as well. However, Dulles’s encouragement of and permission to reconsider aid and funding allowed officials like Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning Gerard C. Smith to prepare ideas and proposals for Dillon, who could then forward them to Eisenhower. 1116 The Act itself allotted five hundred million dollars for the President to use with another one hundred million for Chilean reconstruction. See, An Act to Provide Assistance in the Development of Latin America, and for the reconstruction of Chile, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 86-735, 74 Stat. September 8, 1960. 1117 The editors of FRUS read perhaps too far into things by claiming Eisenhower’s comments at the June 30, 1960 meeting of the NSC as a direct spark for the SPTF, as while Eisenhower certainly expressed dire concerns, they did not approach the level of specificity to claim causation. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics, 219- 221. 388

Reluctantly into Africa

The final years of the administration’s relationship with Africa were as problematic as previous years, but with the advent of greater acknowledgement of this dynamic at top levels.

Efficient stability continued to be the administration’s top-priority, and while that became increasingly challenging given the unabated rise of new states pushing out colonial powers or continuing their struggles against such powers. As more officials came to recognise that the administration was ill-prepared for the variety of new situations facing it across Africa,

Eisenhower continued the convention of delaying, and denying the need for change.

The discussion at an NSC meeting in mid-1960 revealed the clear holes in much of the administration’s Africa policies as well as highlighting weaknesses which still existed from years earlier. Director of the Bureau of the Budget Maurice Stans, and Douglas Dillon pointed out long-term challenges facing the administration in Africa. Stans noted that European powers had done little to prepare African states for independence, and argued that the matter of improving economic vitality and standards of living was an as-of-yet unstudied problem of “so many billions” of dollars that the administration should consider the possibility of working with the

U.S.S.R.1118 That the U.S.S.R. was targeting its funding with the intent of portraying the United

States in a bad light, such as to regions of clear colonial conflict like Algeria, or where the

Eisenhower administration had balked at the cost as in Ghana, meant that the two states were unlikely to find common ground.1119

1118 Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 18, 1960, 10, 456th Meeting of the NSC, August 18, 1960, Box 13, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. Stans’s larger point was that the administration was aware generally of the poverty and economic problems in Africa, but on the level of individual states it lacked even basic information and thus did not yet even have a vague figure of annual aid or investments needed to provide long-term benefit. 1119 Scholars have argued that in the Khrushchev period, Moscow’s overtures to African leaders (excepting Nasser) were mostly of economic and educational nature, pointing to Khrushchev’s admiration of nationalists and his belief 389

Dillon agreed that the administration’s position was not one of strength, but argued for a more global perspective. Dillon explained the general attitude of the administration in coldly pragmatic language, stating: “black Africa should have a relatively low priority [for the administration]” for a variety of reasons.1120 The most prominent reason was Dillon’s contention that other areas of the Third World were more clearly the administration’s “responsibility,” and that the administration’s chances of success in actions in areas like Latin America were much greater than in Africa.1121 Thus, the daunting challenges posed by an increasingly independent

Africa, which of course Nixon and others had warned about for years, were mostly sidestepped with the explanations that more study was needed, and that the challenges were not primarily the administration’s to address.

The premise of continuing to attempt avoiding greater involvement in African matters was criticised by Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates. Gates was one of the only parties present at the meeting to voice concern and discomfort with “the policy of relying upon the

European metropoles” to guide African states to independence properly and defend them from communist infiltration or subversion.1122 The issue of relying on Paris, Brussels, or Lisbon (as

London was in most cases at least not violently opposing African independence), to defend and care for states and peoples who were actively engaged in bloody resistance against said metropoles was rightly viewed by many officials as wrongheaded. Gates made the obvious point that colonial powers were not being thrown out of African states because they were popular or welcome, and that it was also unlikely colonial powers would continue to engage in expensive that supporting true nationalists would set their states on the path to socialism. See, Maxim Matusevich, ‘‘Revisiting the Soviet Moment in Sub-Saharan Africa’’ World Compass (July 2009), 1261-1262; Oye Ogunbadejo, “Soviet Policies in Africa” African Affairs 79, No. 316 (July 1980), 298. 1120 Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL 1121 Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL 1122 Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 8, DDEL. Nixon was campaigning at this time. 390

assistance programs out of a sense of duty or anti-communism; Gates was instantly overruled by

Eisenhower.1123 Eisenhower hinted that despite the obvious animosity and instability which existed between independent former colony and metropole, the administration would attempt to continue deferring to those metropoles as a means to avoid the increasing risks and complexity of African matters. Thus, as best and whenever it was able, the Eisenhower administration attempted to continue simply avoid involvement in Africa.

This meant that Eisenhower and Herter continued to assign African matters the lowest priority in their dealings with Third World nations. In April of 1959, Guinean President Sékou

Toure wrote to Eisenhower, in order to register his unease with what he considered an attempt by

France to “perpetuate the colonial system,” to request the Eisenhower administration’s aid in this regard, and to express his hope that the administration would be friendly towards new African nations and protect them from “colonial re-conquest by European nations.”1124 Pointing to the low priority of such concerns, Herter waited nearly a month to bring the letter to Eisenhower’s attention, and in doing so recommended the response be sent not from Eisenhower or himself, but from the Chargé d'affaires in Guinea.1125 In addition, Herter argued that the response should be polite but entirely sidestep the issues brought up by Toure about France’s treatment of Guinea because Toure had used “language highly critical of the alleged attitude of France…”1126 Thus, the very fact that Toure had criticised France was deemed by Herter to be sufficient justification to avoid addressing such topics. And, as he did with all matters which he considered to be of

1123 Eisenhower immediately stated that Gates was incorrect, and that colonial powers like France and the French Community served both the purposes Gates had voiced concerned over, and served as a kind of diplomatic buffer since those African states were expected to take their concerns to France before bringing them up with the United States or wider world. See Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL 1124 Letter, Sékou Toure to Dwight Eisenhower, April 8, 1959, 1-2, Folder 8, Box 9, JFDHS, JFDP, SML. 1125 Memo, Herter to Eisenhower, April 24, 1, Folder 8, Box 9, JFDHS, JFDP, SML 1126 Memo, Herter to Eisenhower, April 24, 1, SML. 391

either little-to-no importance or which were of little-to-no interest, Eisenhower simply scribbled

“OK” and initialled the memo before sending it back to Herter for action.1127

Although parties other than Eisenhower share responsibility for the administration’s complacent, lazy attitude toward African matters, the president himself was clearly far from invested or interested in improving the situation. Eisenhower met with Sylvanus Olympio, president of Togo, in September of 1960, and displayed an almost comical level of disinterest and condescension. Olympio raised several points which underlined the lack of planning, forethought, and communication the administration had engaged in while preparing for various

African states to gain their independence. In one instance, Olympio questioned why Togo and

Cameroun (Cameroon) shared an ambassador, pointing out that given the distance between the two nations (roughly 1,600 kilometres capital to capital) it took a significant amount of time for the ambassador to arrive when summoned.1128 Eisenhower’s response to the question was to suggest that American ambassadors should “live in simple surroundings,” explaining that he meant that they should begin “living in tents.”1129 While Christian Herter clarified that the basic reason was one of finances, Eisenhower continued on about the “salutary effect” of making the ambassadors live in tents.1130 Olympio was attempting to address a genuine concern, pointing out that regional tensions, such as those between Ghana and Togo, could become worse if a state was unable to consult with the United States, but Eisenhower was apparently well passed caring: the president indicated that any American government would listen sympathetically while

1127 Memo, Herter to Eisenhower, April 24, 1, SML. 1128 Memcon, September 23, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 224. 1129 Memcon, September 23, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 224. 1130 Eisenhower’s picture of African states then, was of backward peoples barely able to manage four walls and a roof. While it might be argued that Eisenhower was being more critical of embassy and diplomatic staff than of the states of Togo, Ghana, and Cameroon, the fact that his solution of having ambassadors live in tents in no way actually addressed the fact that Togo desired its own ambassador was also condescendingly dismissive. See Memcon, September 23, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 224-225. 392

reminding Olympio that “he himself [Eisenhower] [would] not be in his current position long.”1131

The exceptions to Eisenhower’s attitude on African matters actually showed his attempt to reinforce the stasis that typified the administration’s attitude and policies. The Sharpeville

Massacre, which occurred on March 21, 1960, and resulted in South African police killing at least 68 protestors, elicited a nearly unanimous negative reaction from the global community.1132

Part of this negative reaction included the State Department, which issued a statement without

Herter’s knowledge or approval deploring the violence, voicing support for black South Africans to gain peaceful redress of their grievances, and highlighting the fact that the United States did not typically comment on internal affairs of other states but that the incident forced the administration to express regret at the “tragic loss of life.”1133

This statement points to two important issues. The first is that once again the State

Department under Herter proved more out of control than was the case under Dulles, and the second being Eisenhower’s reaction. Herter claimed to be “furious” that the statement had been issued, telling Eisenhower that it had been done without clearance.1134 As to Eisenhower’s reaction, the president both recommended the responsible bureau chief be removed from his position, and immediately instructed Herter to contact the South African ambassador, explain the

1131 Memcon, September 23, 1960, FRUS: 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 225. Although the Presidential elections were fast-approaching, the simple fact remains that Eisenhower had found one excuse or another to avoid significant action since his own inauguration. 1132 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 134, which “deplored” the violence and blamed it on South Africa’s racist policies but did not actually call for sanctions beyond requesting Dag Hammarskjöld to work with South Africa towards upholding the UN Charter. The U.K. and France abstained from voting while the U.S., U.S.S.R., and all other members voted for the Resolution. See Security Council Resolution 134, 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/134(1960) (accessed May 22, 2016). 1133 Editorial Note, FRUS: 1958-1960, Africa, 741. 1134 While it is almost certain Herter considered the possible ramifications of such a statement important enough that he genuinely meant that it should not have been issued without a decision from “the highest level of the Department” he did not actually raise such concerns or begin tracking the source of the statement until after Eisenhower complained. See FRUS: 1958-1960, Volume XIV Africa, 742. 393

situation, and apologise for the incident.1135 Indeed, Eisenhower’s main concerns centred around the possibility that the administration’s statement might encourage indigenous black populations to resist minority white rule more fiercely and further destabilise the continent. Eisenhower’s concern over alienating the South African regime was in no way offset by reports that the statement had increased the administration’s popularity amongst black African states and peoples.1136 And while the situation in South Africa was certainly different in that South Africa represented a fairly stable, if abhorrent, state which was decidedly pro-American, Eisenhower’s actions nonetheless point to a continued pursuit of postponement.

Indeed, postponement was entailed even when Eisenhower acted aggressively in Africa.

Eisenhower’s solution to instability in the Congo was predicated upon interfering in internal matters. With the Congo’s looming independence from Belgium, the various departments and agencies of the Eisenhower administration quickly realised two important facts: the Belgian

Congo was going to be unstable and chaotic in the immediate aftermath of independence, and the administration had almost no idea regarding the situation on the ground.1137 The CIA plainly admitted in a memo that the situation was going to be confused, and further acknowledged that

“We are new on the Congo political scene, and…do not have sufficient information on which to

1135 Eisenhower informed Herter that if the decision were up to him, he would remove the bureau chief responsible for the statement’s release. Herter’s management of the State Department was therefore so questionable in Eisenhower’s mind that the president felt compelled to offer him clear and firm guidance on staffing, and on the exact and particular steps to take to ameliorate the damage of the statement. FRUS: 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 742. 1136 Henry Cabot Lodge reported on the spike in approval at the U.N., see FRUS: 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 742. 1137 It is necessary to point out that much like its volume on the American Republics eventually requiring a specific “retrospective” volume on Guatemala in order to correct imbalances and skewed presentation due to classifications at the time of publication, the FRUS volume on Africa also required an updated volume on the Congo for the periods from just before independence up to the beginning of the Nixon administration. That volume consists largely of still partially classified documents which detail the extensive intervention of CIA, State, and other American officials in the Congo during the relevant period. Despite the awkward title, the volume includes significant correspondence from the Eisenhower period. See, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968, Adam Howard, Nina D. Howland eds. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2013). 394

base a judgement on who will win or who merits support. However, we are not opposed to giving discreet support…to a limited number of candidates if specific justification is provided in each case.”1138 As for Patrice Lumumba, an uncompromising anti-colonialist and the Congo’s soon-to-be elected Prime Minister, the CIA provided no particular warnings or advice.1139

Indeed, the CIA operative responsible for the memo strongly recommended the administration simply continue to observe and at most delicately support sympathetic parties while continuing to consult the Belgian government. The reasoning behind such an approach was two-fold: the situation in the Congo was “so fluid that we [the Eisenhower administration] would be running great risks were we to enter the arena now” and the administration simply did not know enough about various parties, their position and potential and so on, in order to take informed and intelligent action.1140 In brief, the CIA argued that neither it nor the administration knew enough about the Congo, or Patrice Lumumba, to take action.

Complicating the administration’s eventual actions was the fact that stark disagreement existed at the upper-levels over Lumumba’s personality and danger. Henry Cabot Lodge, the

United States’s ambassador to the UN, and soon-to-be running-mate of Richard Nixon, met with

Lumumba in New York on July 26, 1960 in order to discuss Lumumba’s basic position on the situation in the Congo, the UN intervention, and the Cold War. Lumumba voiced a series of complaints regarding Belgium’s pre and post independence treatment of the Congo, stating that the Belgians had stolen the Congo’s treasury, refused to train native Congolese to hold

1138 Memorandum from the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, April 18, 1960, FRUS: 1964-1968, Volume XXIII Congo, 1960–1968, 7-9. 1139 Lumumba’s career was a complex and contentious series of events, with Lumumba being jailed at various times for embezzlement, and inciting a riot. Lumumba was, in fact, released from prison to take part in the Congolese Round Table Conference, as leader of the Congolese National Movement (MNC). 1140 Memorandum from the Africa Division, April 18, 1960, FRUS: 1964-1968, Volume XXIII Congo, 1960–1968, 9. 395

government and technical positions, and had attempted to instill a distrust in the Congolese of both Americans and Soviets.1141 While Lodge was aware that Lumumba was very likely attempting to play Soviet and American competitive drives against one another, he was also convinced of the sincerity of Lumumba’s claim that the Congo was suffering a “desperate” financial crisis as well as his belief that Belgian troops stationed in the Congo were only exacerbating the instability.1142 The fact that Lumumba requested a loan rather than a grant, and what Lodge considered to be clear enthusiasm on Lumumba’s part at the prospect of an official visit to Washington, left Lodge strongly recommending the State Department treat Lumumba with respect and believing the administration could certainly work with the prime minister.1143

In a worst case scenario, Henry Cabot Lodge and Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld insisted that both Lumumba himself and his opposition to UN presence in the Congo enjoyed popular support, which in turn meant that the UN would not be able to continue in its intervention if opposition continued or grew, Eisenhower disagreed on a fundamental level.1144 This problem, which appeared complex and daunting was, to Eisenhower, incredibly simple.

Eisenhower attempted to solve a complicated, long-term challenge, through a short-term and painfully simplified action. Eisenhower’s aggression was based more on indignation and anger at the prospect of a perceived Soviet victory than concern over the Congo’s future.

Eisenhower went so far as to claim both to be willing to ignore the wishes of the Congolese people and to fight a war with the Soviets over the issue of the UN presence in the Congo.

Eisenhower stated his thinking very clearly, explaining to the NSC that “the possibility that the

1141 Telegram, Lodge to Herter, July 27, 1960, 1, Congo—Republic of (Formerly Belgian Congo), Box 8, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 1142 Telegram, Lodge to Herter, July 27, 1960, 1-2, DDEL. 1143 Telegram, Lodge to Herter, July 27, 1960, 2, DDEL. 1144 Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 15, DDEL. 396

UN would be forced out was simply inconceivable. We should keep the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European troops to do it...[E]ven if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight.”1145 The State Department concurred with Eisenhower’s estimation, but offered no advice beyond agreeing enthusiastically with Eisenhower that Lumumba was essentially the core of the problem in the Congo.1146 This led Eisenhower to hint very strongly that Lumumba’s removal would effectively resolve the situation in the Congo.

Lumumba was viewed by Eisenhower as an almost singular force resisting both the

Eisenhower administration and the UN. In fact, Eisenhower stated at the same NSC meeting in which he is alleged to have approved the assassination of Lumumba that “we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by the Soviets. There was no indication…that the Congolese did not want UN support and the maintenance of order.”1147

Thus, Eisenhower decided that the complex situation in the Congo, which included multinational intervention, Soviet-American competition, anti-colonial sentiment, local rivalries, and regional

1145 Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 15, DDEL. 1146 It is worth pointing out that Allen Dulles also floated the idea of having the UN simply seize Congo’s most economically important province, Katanga (in 2015 Katanga was split into four provinces), and force the Soviets to prop up the less economically viable remainder of the Congo, Eisenhower seemed to like this idea but believed the UN would need to recognise Katanga as a sovereign state. See Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 15, DDEL. 1147 There is no debate over the fact that the administration was complicit in the eventual execution of Patrice Lumumba. The debate on the issue centres on whether Eisenhower directly ordered Allen Dulles to have the CIA carry out an assassination attempt or whether Dulles interpreted Eisenhower’s statements at the NSC as a clear enough order. The reason for the debate stems from Robert Johnson’s (Johnson attended the NSC meeting in question and was the note/minute taker) statements to members of the Church Committee in 1975, in which Johnson claimed Eisenhower openly directed Dulles to have Lumumba eliminated. Johnson claimed “stunned silence” followed for a short time before the meeting continued. The veracity of Johnson’s claim is questionable, it hardly seems plausible that the men gathered, many of whom would have known full-well about the administration’s previous interventions, coup attempts, and ongoing planning of the coup against Castro would have been shocked into silence at the prospect of removing an African leader considered to be a “Soviet puppet.” It seems far more likely that Johnson’s admission that he could not remember exact phrases and arguing Eisenhower had said “something to the effect that Lumumba should be eliminated” points to Eisenhower making his desire clear without actually ordering the assassination. Thus, it would not have taken significant guessing on Allen Dulles’s part to come to the conclusion about Eisenhower’s preferred solution to the problems in the Congo. See Editorial Note, FRUS: 1964-1968, Volume XXIII Congo, 1960–1968, 19; Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 15, DDEL. 397

distress, could be simplified literally down to the opposition of a single figure. In fact, on June

30, Eisenhower had been informed that with or without Lumumba, the Congo had such a “grave economic problems” that it would continue to be “susceptible to Sino-Soviet offers of economic assistance.”1148 Eisenhower therefore chose to ignore both clear evidence that the situation in the

Congo could not be addressed simply by removing Lumumba and his own complaint that the administration failed to consider the effects of its policies. The solution Eisenhower came to, then, was entirely in line with others he had made throughout his presidency.

“…by God, it didn’t just happen!”1149

It is worth noting that Eisenhower himself slowly came to recognise the significant problems which had occurred as a result of his leadership, even as he failed to recognise his decisions and actions as a significant part of the problem. On June 30, 1960, near the conclusion of an NSC meeting, Eisenhower made a series of revealing comments of considerable significance. Eisenhower opened by bringing up the “troubling…rash of revolutions” in the past year.1150 The President then lamented that despite having worked “very intensively since 1953 to achieve stability throughout the world” the administration was faced with “unrest and unhappiness.”1151 Eisenhower noted, with some shock, that points which had been made by his brother, Nixon, and others, namely that his administration’s policies in Latin America “merely perpetuate[d] the ruling class and intensifie[d] the tremendous differences between the rich and

1148 Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 4-5, DDEL. 1149 Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero, 851. 1150 The context is not insignificant, Eisenhower was forced to cancel a visit to Japan when anti-American protests broke out in May and continued into June, at one point necessitating a helicopter rescue of Jim Hagerty and others by Marines. Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 9, DDEL. 1151 Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 9, DDEL. 398

the poor” were now being made by “some of our South American friends.”1152 After wondering whether there was anything at all the administration could do, or whether “perhaps we could only stand by and watch a wave of revolution sweeping around the world” Eisenhower permitted

Herter to speak.1153 When Herter had finished Eisenhower made several more revealing comments which pointed to the fact the President was dejectedly recognising his failures while still ignoring his role in them.

These revelations showed that Eisenhower considered such failures to have touched much of the Third World. Eisenhower and Herter engaged in a conversation in which they dealt briefly with the administration’s failures in Third World regions (Africa was tellingly not mentioned), with Herter attempting to defend the administration’s record and actions.

Eisenhower’s next comment revealed that despite recognising the failures, he had clearly not understood many of the reasons for those failures: Eisenhower stated that “the world was getting into a situation from which it could perhaps be saved only by a large nuclear weapon.”1154 Since he did not elaborate, how exactly Eisenhower believed he could halt the various instabilities in the Third World with a big bomb remains unclear. Eisenhower continued on with his complaints. The President voiced frustration and confusion that Iran under the Shah appeared to be in nearly as poor a situation as it had been under Mosaddegh, and complained that his administration was unable to get rid of Fidel Castro or Rafael Trujillo. The complaint about

Trujillo surprised his advisors, Deputy Director of the CIA Charles Cabbell argued that whatever

1152 Eisenhower did not actually acknowledge that these points had been made by his brother, Nixon, or others, but rather brought up the issue as if it would surprise his advisors. Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 9, DDEL. 1153 Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 9, DDEL. 1154 Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 399

else, “Trujillo had provided stability for the Dominican Republic for many years.”1155

Eisenhower responded with the bewildering explanation that not only did he disagree, but that he also did not believe that dictatorships “meant stability,” before topping this off with the claim that he “felt it was necessary to prepare people for free self-government.”1156

This was not, of course, a disavowal of his comments six months previous in which he praised the benefits of dictators. Nor were his subsequent arguments that his administration should be supporting indigenous liberals and preparing “a total program for world peace which would strengthen the free world” the pivot point after which positive and active rather than negative and reactive policies would typify his administration’s dealings with the Third World.

Eisenhower was simply complaining out of embarrassment and anger that his short-sighted actions and inactions were finally catching up to the administration. Any suggestion that

Eisenhower might be moving towards more sophisticated or integrated solutions to the complex problems facing the administration in the Third World was undermined by the fact that

Eisenhower concluded the meeting stating that “the situation might be improved if both Castro and Trujillo were hung from the same gibbet.”1157

The final two years of the Eisenhower administration showed continuity with its previous years. John Foster Dulles’s departure revealed the extent to which he had managed and controlled not just the State Department, but the gamut of internal and international issues related to the administration’s foreign policies and actions. Dulles’s absence was keenly felt, but his influence reverberated throughout the final year of the administration. Nixon’s continued push against much of Eisenhower’s basic direction only waned as his time in the administration

1155 Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 1156 Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 1157 Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the NSC, 10, DDEL. 400

became more intermittent, but many of his criticisms and predictions proved prescient.

Eisenhower’s leadership meant greater complacency and reluctance to act in the Third World, with the obvious exception being covert interventions; which Eisenhower enthusiastically pursued with simplistic disregard for their long-term consequences. The consequences of

Eisenhower’s pursuit of postponement began to catch up to the administration in its final years, and although Eisenhower could not help but recognise the problems, he also could not identify his key role in their creation.

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Conclusion

This thesis has focused squarely on a limited number of top level officials in the

Eisenhower administration. The objective has not been to argue that Eisenhower’s Third World policies were a failure or a success for the administration, but rather to cast light on the players and forces which drove or impeded, prolonged or halted, and otherwise influenced actions taken and not taken by the Eisenhower administration. When Eisenhower did act, it was often aggressively and irresponsibly, deceptively or disingenuously, all with the intent of delaying change or postponing the need for significant alteration to policies or positions. Further, by beginning with the Nixon-Dulles-Eisenhower relationships and branching out from that triumvirate it becomes clear that most of Eisenhower’s advisers and officials pushed for a more active, sophisticated, and ambitious approach to Third World regions than Eisenhower was willing to accept. Of greatest significance is the fact that Eisenhower’s Third World policies were predicated upon a directionless and negligent foundation which sought the path of least resistance toward the avoidance of change. The failures the administration encountered in the

Third World (or as John Prados characterised them, “bunglings”) were not primarily the result of misunderstanding local nationalisms or misapplying deterrence.1158 Rather, the primary reason for the failures was Dwight Eisenhower’s decision to attempt to put off dealing with, or delay, the challenges presented by the Third World for as long as possible.

1158 John Prados, “The Central Intelligence Agency and the Face of Decolonization under the Eisenhower Administration,” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds. (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006) 42. This is in no way to suggest such misunderstandings or misapplications did not occur or were not significant, in fact they were crucial. My point, which will be made below, is that a central reason for these misunderstandings and misapplications was Dwight Eisenhower’s decisions and choices. 402

At bottom, the most significant contribution this thesis has presented is an interpretation of Eisenhower, the Eisenhower administration, and its policies in the Third World which significantly colours both the broader picture of Eisenhower and the established understanding of his dealings with individual Third World states.

This thesis contributes to both existing literature and our understanding of Eisenhower in three key areas. The first is the identification of Eisenhower’s pursuit of postponement for the

Third World. While much of the extant literature correctly points out the often sputtering, confused, and stumbling approach the administration took with a variety of particular Third

World states and regions, explanations for this commonality in approaches have varied. This thesis adds to the discourse by highlighting a common strand uniting the approaches:

Eisenhower’s pursuit of postponement. Though this thesis certainly reaffirms that the administration had different priorities in different regions, the pursuit of postponement nevertheless informs and explains the actions and inactions of Eisenhower and the administration in the Third World. Viewed with the understanding that his goal was to do as little as possible for as long as possible while also delaying the forces seeking to change (read: undermine) a situation he considered satisfactory, Eisenhower’s actions in the Third World take on a new coherency. Directly connected to this coherency is the equally important fact that Eisenhower only recognised the cumulative impact of his pursuit of postponement, indeed he only recognised that this was what he had been doing, near the end of his time in office. Thus, Eisenhower’s dejected evaluation of the result of his Third World policies in June 1960 not only shows that

Eisenhower had not considered the long-term impact of his choices, but that he regretted this fact. This thesis therefore adds a level of context above the other explanations in the existing literature for individual interventions, actions, and inactions.

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The second major contribution is the consequential clarification which is given to the administration’s actions as time passed. A fundamental reason for the administration’s problems in the Third World, and the administration’s approaches therein, was Dwight Eisenhower’s refusal to elaborate clearer positions, his rejection of more ambitious strategies, and his failure to comprehend the long-term consequences of his choices. Such factors meant his administration was forced to proceed with a vague and negative policy wherein only dire, or issues that could be cast as dire, communist threats garnered action.1159 This pursuit of postponement pushed aside or supressed drives for more sophisticated and sensitive policies which might have taken greater account of issues like nationalism, anti-colonialism, and others not directly linked to

Communism or anti-Communism. The result of such a pursuit was not simply that only crises were dealt with, but also that the administration was unprepared and often unable to deal with complex issues in the Third World. Thus, by revealing that Eisenhower sought to institute a

“Great Postponement” on change in the Third World, this thesis identifies an underlying reason the administration fumbled so often in the Third World, reinforces the growing literature which interprets Eisenhower’s decisions on Third World and other issues as irresponsible and short- sighted, and provides ample evidence of some of the dangers of foreign policies predicated upon a vague negative.

The third key contribution is the recasting of Vice President Richard Nixon. This thesis has shown that examining and analysing the roles Nixon played in the Eisenhower administration are crucial toward forming a clearer understanding of Eisenhower’s policies, especially as concerns the Third World. This recasting has shown that examining Nixon, not as the eventual President, but solely as a young member of the Eisenhower administration reveals

1159 Negative here in the sense of working against rather than for developments. 404

significant features of that administration. Utilising Nixon to enhance our understanding of

Eisenhower’s Third World policies does more than simply reinforce the pursuit of postponement thesis, it shows that clear resistance to this pursuit existed and grew within the administration and in foreign officials throughout Eisenhower’s time in office. Nixon is most representative of the drive for a more active, ambitious, and dynamic approach to the Third World from within the administration. By resisting, ignoring, and otherwise refusing to adapt to recommendations and proposals like Nixon and other officials while also instituting none of his own, Eisenhower was implicitly continuing a pursuit of postponement.

Eisenhower and the Great Postponement

At its very core, the Eisenhower administration’s positions on the Third World were the result of the direction and decisions of Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s desultory and short- sighted approach to the Third World stemmed from a combination of prioritization and intention.

The Third World was simply never a top, or even a high priority for Eisenhower. In addition,

Eisenhower did not consider Third World leaders to be of the same moral standing or integrity as other leaders, which only added to his dismissive attitude in that regard.1160 Other concerns, such as America’s military and economic health, Western Europe’s stability and loyalty, and adapting to the post-Stalin Soviet Union all, not unreasonably, took priority over concerns in other areas.

1160 There are multiple examples of this, but the two most colourful are likely Eisenhower’s bemoaning of the emotional nature of Indian foreign policy, and his quip about bribing leaders at the Bandung Conference for a few thousand dollars each. See Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, November 16, 1953, Dulles, John F. November 1953, Box 2, DHS, AWF, DDEL; Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, April 7, 1955, 16-17, 244th Meeting of the NSC, April 7, 1955, Box 6, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. William V. Shannon, “Eisenhower as President: A Critical Appraisal of the Record," Commentary 26, No. 5 (November 1958), 390 405

That being the case, Eisenhower’s approach to both crisis and non-crisis Third World issues, while varied by region, was typically short-sighted, short-term, and predicated upon delaying rather than dealing with challenges. Eisenhower sought to avoid acting whenever possible, and when he considered action necessary, searched for the path of least resistance. This was not an attempt to affix the globe in a state of status quo, but was quite clearly an effort on

Eisenhower’s part to delay and postpone rather than prevent or take advantage of forces of change. This meant covert interventions served as a sensible remedy for problematic leaders, goodwill missions served as a means to create the appearance of interest, and declaring the intention to study, or otherwise sympathetically investigate issues allowed for temporary mollification. Minor, always begrudging and slow to materialise increases in military, and sometimes economic aid, also served such a purpose. Simply then, Eisenhower considered Latin

America, Africa, parts of Asia, and the Middle East to be the Third World in the ordinal sense, and treated them as such. Of course, being engaged in an ideologically charged global contest meant Eisenhower could not express such considerations, and created significant problems for which Eisenhower had few solutions.

The fundamental issue of officials not knowing what policies were and how Eisenhower wanted them carried out was not a passing challenge; in 1954 the Secretary of Defense called for an “agonizing” reappraisal of the administration’s entire national security policy, and in 1955

Dulles called for an entirely new set of policies for the Middle East.1161 Nixon reported in 1956 that the administration’s unwillingness to explain and clarify its stance on issues was threatening the administration’s position in Asia, while in 1957 the vague Eisenhower Doctrine contributed

1161 Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 24, 1954, 11-12, 204th Meeting of NSC, June 24 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL; Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, October 6, 1954, 7, 260th Meeting of the NSC, October 6, 1954, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 406

to the British’s growing suspicion that the administration was trying to force them out of the

Middle East when in fact (and despite Dulles’s clear disdain) the opposite was true.

Eisenhower’s vagueness, and his inability or unwillingness in effect to choose a side was a major problem for the administration.

This major problem owed to Eisenhower’s tendency to attempt a middle way. Hence, in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, rather than fully supporting colonial powers or the local populations seeking to assert some form of independence, the administration sent mixed signals, dallied, and ended up straining its relationship with all sides while weakening its position. Thus, while the administration initially gave some support to the French endeavour in

Vietnam, and Eisenhower resolutely refused to push the British too hard on issues in the Middle

East, both the President and Secretary of State undermined the confidence of those allies through their criticisms and suggestions on how to deal with their respective issues, and denying them total support. The vagueness and lack of direction Eisenhower showed to allies was also a source of consistent frustration for officials within the administration as well, with complaints and criticisms building as time went on. Indeed, Eisenhower’s cabinet suffered from significant in-fighting and factionalism. Although the president was normally able to evade criticisms or could count on an official or adviser to support him in some manner, on the occasions when officials clearly and steadfastly criticised Eisenhower, he equivocated, raged, insulted, or sulked.1162

1162 The best example or many is doubtless Eisenhower’s reaction after Admiral Radford skillfully pointed out that the administration (meaning Eisenhower) had failed to alter the tendency of the United States to engage in diplomatic or military overtures only under urgent or pressing circumstances, only to attempt to avoid obligation and responsibility once a crisis had passed. Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 3rd, 1956, 15, 283rd Meeting of the NSC, May 3 1956, Box 7, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 407

The problems in Eisenhower’s middle way also had clear ramifications on entire regions of the Third World. Many State Department officials, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N, and

Nixon, believed Eisenhower and Dulles were the sources of the administration’s failure to move on African matters. Though Nixon had been pushing for a revamping of the administration’s

Africa policies since he took office, he limited his critiques of the administration until his mission to Africa in 1957. Thereafter, both publically and in private, Nixon ramped up criticisms of the administration’s mishandling of the U.S.’s position in the region. In particular,

Nixon highlighted the variety of issues raised domestically and internationally by the administration claiming to support decolonisation while actually propping up colonial regimes like France’s which violently repressed indigenous populations. Indeed, Nixon and State

Department officials characterised the disjunction between the administration’s rhetoric and its actions in Africa as schizophrenic. Henry Cabot Lodge also stressed the point that the administration’s continued support of colonial powers in colonised regions like France and

Britain in Africa, was causing damage to the administration’s reputation and position internationally. Over the course of his time as Vice President, Nixon consistently pushed for greater attention and interest in Africa from the administration. Nixon and various State

Department officials railed against Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s stubborn refusal to begin even the process of altering and adapting policies to the oncoming reality of increasingly independent

African states, but neither the President nor the Secretary of State believed that an ambitious new set of policies were necessary or viable.

Africa doubtless ranked lowest on the administration’s priorities, yet Eisenhower was unable to manage this low priority skilfully. Eisenhower exacerbated tension from all angles by aggravating European powers, disappointing African peoples and leaders, and vexing officials

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within his administration. First, the fact that Eisenhower and Dulles consistently criticised colonialism and European mishandling of said regions created distrust and suspicion amongst

British and French officials.1163 However, Eisenhower also sent incredibly mixed signals. In fact, he informed Winston Churchill that his administration would be satisfied with merely the announcement of the possibility of the end of colonial holdings at some distant date well after the conclusion of both administration’s time in power; and Eisenhower continued to believe his solution to be the most suitable answer to the problem for years. In addition, the Eisenhower administration, and Eisenhower himself often openly treated Africa as the least important populated region in the world. Whether the administration was promising Ethiopia increased military aid that was rarely delivered, pushing Algerian officials to work with the same French government that continued to escalate the military conflict (with American aid), or walking back criticisms of South African brutality, African officials rightly recognized that the Eisenhower administration’s rhetoric rarely matched its actions in Africa. Coupled with the facts that by

1960 Eisenhower could barely be bothered to feign interest in non-crisis issues in Africa, and had done little to empower the new Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department, African leaders had much to be aggravated about.

The administration’s treatment of Africa was simply the most blatant example of

Eisenhower’s attempting to avoid or delay change, as more sophisticated and devious tactics were utilised in Latin America. Eisenhower attempted to utilise goodwill missions and gestures in order to avoid actually changing American policies or actions. A tactic Eisenhower regularly utilised in Latin America was to enlist his brother Milton, who had a genuine if stilted interest in

1163 South Vietnam looms large in any discussion of pushing out and replacing Europe in the Third World, however here too it was not until the French proved not only incapable of maintaining control but likely to lose control of all of Indochina to communist forces that the Eisenhower administration stepped in and stepped up moves to push out and replace the French presence. 409

the region, into some scheme or another which on the surface appeared to be designed to bring about significant change but was actually little more than a stall-tactic. One such example was

Eisenhower’s appointment of his brother to an ad hoc committee meant to somehow improve the functioning of the OAS and its ability to take in and dispense aid. This gave the appearance of an interested and invested American administration, but lack of forethought, planning, and energy rendered the committee impractical. In truth, Eisenhower was satisfied with the situation and relationship between his administration and most Latin American states, which meant he believed little needed to be done. Eisenhower went so far as to attempt to evade Roy Rubottom’s push to have the president make a brief goodwill visit to the region despite the fact that such a visit was the first recommendation of Milton Eisenhower’s NACIA, another of the president’s creations. And although Eisenhower gradually (and begrudgingly) loosened the purse strings on aid to Latin American states, eventually lending his support to a predecessor of the Alliance for

Progress with the Social Progress Trust Fund, such steps were thumbs in a dam Eisenhower continued to insist had no right to burst. This was generally true of Eisenhower’s perception of much of the Third World, and such a perception contributed to Eisenhower’s already significant reluctance to take action or make changes.

This does not mean Eisenhower did not take action in the Third World, but these actions were also centered around his drive to do as little as possible, in order to delay or postpone change. In fact, when Eisenhower did attempt to solve problems, the solutions tended to be short-term and short-sighted. Understanding the administration’s covert interventions, and

Eisenhower’s disturbingly regular use of them are integral in understanding the short-sighted and short-term nature of Eisenhower’s Third World policies. Eisenhower used covert interventions not as a last resort, but as an affordable and readily available tool for achieving his goals without

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the need for significant change in his administration’s policies. The point here is not to bemoan

Eisenhower for not choosing alternatives, but to emphasise the fact that Eisenhower often chose careless, aggressive, short-term, and poorly thought through actions in order to avoid the challenge of long-term change. Indeed, evidence from both the Iranian and Indonesian interventions indicates that Eisenhower chose covert intervention precisely because it offered an easier answer to the problems the administration faced in each region than other alternatives.

The fact that viable but apparently less attractive alternatives existed is important in that it reinforces the fact that Eisenhower’s short-term and short-sighted use of covert interventions was indicative of a larger weakness in his dealings with the Third World.

It was Eisenhower’s focus on the short-term, and dearth of will or desire to address complex issues which made covert interventions an attractive option. For example, during the stumbling overthrow of Mosaddegh, Eisenhower’s trusted adviser Walter Bedell Smith suggested that if the coup attempt failed, the administration would need to invest significant resources and energies in order to “snuggle up” to Mosaddegh; the only challenge to such a shift that Bedell considered noteworthy was the strain this would cause with the British.1164 Thus,

Mosaddegh’s overthrow was not perceived as an absolute necessity so much as it was more convenient than changing course. Eisenhower’s support for the administration’s disastrous covert intervention in Indonesia also shows irresponsibility and a lack of analysis and forethought.

That the drive for the Indonesian intervention arose out of a real concern for the nation’s stability and over Sukarno’s allegiance does not remove the issues with the intervention itself.

1164 Memorandum for the President, August 18, 1953, Iran 1953 through 59 (8), Box 32, International Series, AWF, DDEL. 411

Beyond the fact that the eventual resolution to the American involvement (simply supporting pro-American elements of the Indonesian armed forces) had been an option from the start,

Eisenhower also made a series of decisions which point to both recklessness and a mind- boggling lack of consideration. Given that the objectives of the intervention were to stabilise

Indonesia or cause it to fracture into smaller, stable pro-American states, and hopefully remove

Sukarno, Eisenhower’s decisions during the intervention point to the larger problem as outlined.

Eisenhower continued to support the intervention even after it became clear the American- supported dissidents were no match for the forces supporting Sukarno, authorised the use of

American mercenaries, and proposed to somehow supply the dissidents with submarines to aid in their defense.1165 Rather than deal with Sukarno or the uncomfortable colonial issues Indonesia raised, Eisenhower sought a short-sighted belligerent response.

Indeed, short-sighted short-term aggressive actions were also utilised to avoid significant changes in Latin America. Granted, the plots to overthrow Jacobo Árbenz and Fidel Castro had strong ideological and economic elements, those elements were perceived as part of the threat to the administration’s hegemony and the region’s perceived stability. The unabashed gunboat diplomacy the administration engaged in after the attacks on Nixon in 1958 in Peru and

Venezuela should not be understood as a helpful rescue mission-upon-request as it was spun by the administration. Rather, the deployment of marines, helicopters, and jeeps, as well as the activation of considerable offensive air assets, was an unmistakable reminder that the administration expected and would ensure the loyalty of Latin American states.1166

1165 Discussion at the 362nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, April 14, 1958, 2-3, 362nd Meeting of the NSC, April 14 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 1166 Indeed, Dulles and Eisenhower agreed that they “expected” the Venezuelan junta to request American aid in putting down the protests in which Nixon had been attacked. Thus, the administration almost reflexively instructed 412

None of these actions were intended to resolve or begin to resolve issues many officials

(including Nixon) considered part of the foundation of the instability in the region, but were instead meant simply to remove immediate symptoms for the time being. This impetus also helps explain Eisenhower’s attempts to find and support pro-American regional leaders, while his tinkering nature and conviction that the state of the Third World was basically satisfactory explains his regular failure in such drives and the resultant support of dictators.

Both Eisenhower and Dulles were anxious to find leaders in each region who might be strong enough to lead their respective regions yet would still be willing to submit to American leadership. However, Eisenhower’s haughtiness resulted in sporadic and spasmodic outreaches followed by a cooling of relations with a variety of leaders. Leaders like India’s Nehru, Egypt’s

Nasser, Saudi Arabia’s Saud, Brazil’s Kubitschek and others were all at times the object of

Eisenhower’s tinkering. When such leaders failed to meet Eisenhower’s expectations, or his attention turned elsewhere, strongmen, dictators, and military regimes were perfectly acceptable substitutes so long as they were effective and did not embarrass him. Indeed, Eisenhower was entirely comfortable supporting dictators, and only raised objections or criticisms when such support cost him politically. Thus, after the Caracas Incident, Eisenhower scathingly criticised

Dulles for the fact Pérez Jiménez, exiled ex-dictator of Venezuela, had been granted a visa and entrance to the United States. The root of Eisenhower’s complaint in that regard was firmly grounded in the appearance and symbolic significance rather than any fundamental disagreement with supporting dictators. Indeed, by the next year Eisenhower was suggesting that any goodwill mission he might take to Latin America should include Paraguay, which was under the

the Venezuelan government to carry out the will of Washington. See Telephone Call, Dulles to Eisenhower, May 14 1958, 10:14 a.m., Box 13, Telephone Calls Series, JFDP, DDEL. 413

dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner at the time.1167 This was not a deviation from or adherence to some grand design for the region or the Third World, as even those closest to Eisenhower considered his actions to have been fundamentally incorrect and directionless.

Although disagreements over foreign policies are inevitable, by 1960, important figures within the Eisenhower administration did not simply disagree with Eisenhower’s Third World policies, they believed those policies were abject failures. Some of Eisenhower’s closest and most influential officials did not believe the president had simply erred on occasion in his handling Third World issues, but that he had so thoroughly mishandled issues that total and fundamental changes were required.1168 Two such officials were Milton Eisenhower and

Richard Nixon. In 1960, the two exchanged letters, each making a point to note President

Eisenhower was not informed of their missives, expressing the belief that Latin America and likely much of the Third World was on the verge of revolution. Going further, both men agreed that what the United States had been doing in these regions was not working and that an entirely new approach was necessary.1169 Keeping in mind that by mid-1960, when neither man could expect to curry favour with Eisenhower or influence significant change in his policies, both expressed utter dissatisfaction with Eisenhower’s policies.

Both Nixon and Milton Eisenhower feared that the perceived inadequacies would lead to a weakening of the American position and increased revolutions in the Third World, while they

1167 Douglas Dillon was forced to gently dissuade Eisenhower from visiting Paraguay for the very reason that such a visit might give the impression that the administration condoned dictatorships. 1168 “Influential” here does not suggest that Nixon had significance influence on Eisenhower’s policies, rather that Nixon held significant influence due to his positions in the cabinet, the Republican Party, and as the eventual Republican nominee for President. 1169 Milton Eisenhower proposed a Department of Peace, and while Nixon agreed that an entirely new approach was necessary and that this might benefit from a new department, he seemed less enthusiastic about this idea. See Letter, Milton Eisenhower to Nixon, June 28, 1960; Letter, Richard Nixon to Milton Eisenhower, July 13, 1960, Eisenhower, Milton S. 1/2, Box 238 General Correspondence, PPS 320, RNPPM, RNL. 414

nonetheless did their best to avoid directly criticising the President.1170 Milton stated that while he believed the administration had done nothing wrong, its policies were failing and needed to be changed.1171 Although Milton Eisenhower could not bring himself to directly blame the brother he idolised, it was clear he believed that the president bore the most responsibility. Nixon agreed, and safely echoed Milton’s and his own past sentiments on the issue, stating, “it seems to me that we simply must have a new approach, both for [the] purposes of the election but more important [sic] for the purpose of mobilising the free world resources effectively in the cause of peace”1172 The indirect criticisms of President Eisenhower’s policies, namely that they were politically unpopular, were hurting the free world’s position against the communist world, and were undermining peace abroad, were consistent with the criticisms Nixon had been levelling at

Eisenhower’s policies in the Third World for years. Rather than bolstering peace in the Third

World, Nixon and Milton believed Dwight Eisenhower had been undermining it.

A fundamental proposition upon which this work has been based is that by employing increased attention and analysis to Richard Nixon in the Eisenhower administration, it is also possible to gain greater insight into important figures like Eisenhower and Dulles as concerns the

Third World, and the administration’s Third World policies in general. Nixon indisputably

1170 Milton Eisenhower struggled through logical gymnastics, stating “I do not mean to say that anything we have done or are doing is wrong, but…we must find new approaches and methods.” One such approach Milton endorsed for achieving such goals was an Agency for Peace. Showing more than a little similarity with his brother, Milton argued that the issue of peace was too complicated and contentious to allow either the State or Defense Department, and that Nixon ought to create an Agency for Peace, which would research and then somehow implement plans for peace around the globe. Unlike his brother, Milton Eisenhower argued that such an agency would required bi- partisan support and government funding, both from a logistical standpoint and due to his suspicion that without government participation there would be little genuine action once research was complete. See, Letter, Milton Eisenhower to Richard Nixon, June 28, 1960, 3, RNL. 1171 Indeed, Milton Eisenhower considered Latin American “on the verge of revolution” and suspected other parts of the Third World were also on such a precipice; the younger Eisenhower argued that “our traditional methods of dealing with the problem” would not “stem the tide.” Letter, Milton Eisenhower to Richard Nixon, June 28, 1960, 3, RNL. 1172 Letter, Richard Nixon to Milton Eisenhower, July 13, 1960, 1, RNL. 415

served an important purpose for Eisenhower and the administration in foreign policy. However, that purpose was not the one Nixon had hoped to fulfill. Rather than playing a meaningful and prominent role in policy formation or change, Nixon’s role was one of symbolic importance and policy execution. This was a result of two main factors: Dulles’s territorialism, and

Eisenhower’s position on the policies themselves. Dulles, while Nixon’s mentor, nonetheless carefully guarded against any perceived, potential, or real encroachment on foreign affairs; this meant that Nixon was required to duel with his mentor, manoeuvring and pushing for missions he wanted (such as Nixon’s expanded African mission), while being boxed into taking missions he knew were of almost no significance beyond the symbolic (such as his 1958 Latin American mission was envisioned). And, when combined with the fact that Eisenhower was actually not simply content, but intent on doing as little as necessary in the Third World regions which Nixon was sent, this meant that Nixon’s presence in and reports on certain states were often entirely sufficient to the president.

Nonetheless, while Nixon’s importance to the administration in its Third World policies was mostly symbolic, or as a critic, his importance in understanding the administration’s Third

World policies is integral. The very fact that Nixon was sent to the nations and regions he was, and the fact that these were typically solely symbolically important, reveals significant details about Eisenhower’s understanding of and position on those regions. In addition, Dulles also engaged in a mentor-protégé relationship with Nixon that, while regularly contentious in its progression, allowed both he and Nixon to support and protect one another. Further to this is the multitude of criticisms of the administration’s handling of these regions which Nixon regularly raised after his foreign missions. Although there is clearly an equally multitudinous number of motivations for Nixon to make such criticisms, and the practicality and utility of some of his

416

criticisms are certainly questionable, why and how Nixon made such criticisms is not of central importance.1173

Instead, the significance of Nixon’s criticisms and recommendations lies in the fact that he raised them at all, and in the reactions (and non-reactions) of officials in the administration.

Nixon had out-manoeuvered his mentor in expanding his mission to Africa into something more than a goodwill mission (and made a point of delivering sharp criticisms and bold recommendations afterward), while the next year he was in turn out-manoeuvred by Dulles and sent on an ill-fated goodwill mission to Latin America. In both cases, Nixon identified specific problems in the administration’s policies and advocated solutions. Broadly, examining Nixon reveals that the Vice President himself and many officials in the administration were consistently dissatisfied, derisive of, and as time passed disillusioned with the administration’s Third World policies. In addition, such examinations point to a lack of guidance, clarity, direction, and leadership from Eisenhower and therefore Dulles.

It is clear that in many respects, Dulles was entirely prepared to adopt a far more active, ambitious, and dynamic position in the Third World than Eisenhower. Dulles struggled throughout his time as Secretary of State to reconcile a variety of competing drives. His quest to play a commanding role in America’s foreign policy combined with his fear of being replaced or pushed out of such a position created a challenging situation for Dulles when he realised that

Eisenhower fully intended to direct the administration’s foreign policies. There can be no question that Eisenhower made, and expected to make, the decisions which formed the

1173 As one example, the most striking solution Nixon offered to challenges the administration faced in Africa was to achieve the “elimination of discrimination in the United States.” While this is certainly a noble goal, how exactly or even broadly it was to be accomplished (let alone how such an accomplishment could then be leveraged to improve relations with African states) was unaddressed. See Report to the President on the Vice President’s Visit to Africa, (February 28 – March 21, 1957), 4, DDEL. 417

administration’s foreign policies. That John Foster Dulles played a leading role in advising, informing, and carrying out Eisenhower’s foreign policies is also clear. However, it is equally clear that Dulles was disappointed and disillusioned with the role he was given, being relegated much more to an adviser, and operator of the State Department. Dulles spent the greater part of his adult life convinced that dynamic forces and states held distinct advantages over the dilapidating static states, but was forced to attempt to impose a kind of stasis, not simply on the administration’s foreign policy, but on the world. To a position like Dulles’s, such a mission was not only hopeless, but an abrogation of the moral responsibilities inherent in the Wilsonian-

American exceptionalist paradigm he considered in direct opposition to communist advance.

Dulles adapted to circumstance by energetically executing Eisenhower’s directions, tenaciously working to assert both the State Department’s dominance and his dominance over the State Department, and by making himself indispensable to Eisenhower. In fact, as Walter S.

Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from April 8, 1953 until June 30,

1959 attested, Dulles had “dedication, and…a selflessness that you don’t find in many people” when it came to running the State Department.1174 Part of this included daily meetings with the

Assistant and Undersecretaries of various departments as well as twice-weekly meetings with expanded groups of “desk officers” in which Dulles expected and demanded debate and participation.1175 While Dulles received, and according to Robertson was well acquainted with,

“all” the communications from local offices and officers, he nonetheless expected his Assistant

1174 Robertson, The Reminiscences of Walter S. Robertson, 46. 1175 As a reminder from the Introduction chapter: An individual “desk” officer was a trained career foreign service officer in charge of the Department’s activities in individual states, “one for Korea, one for Burma, one for Indonesia…and so forth.” These desks each had their own staff and specialists with whom they consulted and gave directions. The desks met regularly with and reported directly to the Assistant Secretary of State for a particular region, who in turn reported to the Secretary of State. Dulles held daily meetings with various policy groups in the department and twice weekly met with all Assistant Secretaries and an expanded number of desks. Robertson, The Reminiscences of Walter S. Robertson, 46-51. 418

Secretaries to present their positions, evaluations of, and recommendations on each day’s communications. In this manner, Dulles both kept himself well-informed and exercised influence over the heads of each regional bureau when he felt it necessary, but typically trusted them to carry out their duties and instructions. Or, as Robertson put it, the idea that Dulles ran

“roughshod” over his subordinates was a “fantastic absurdity.”1176 In fact, Dulles created such trust in both his subordinates and Eisenhower that he was described as a “tower of strength” as far as his role in foreign policy was concerned.1177

Nonetheless, while Dulles and Eisenhower were in agreement on many issues and policies, they also had fundamental disagreements on others; and these disagreements tended to centre on aspects of dealing with the Third World. In the context of Latin America, Dulles and

Eisenhower both treated the region as needing little attention or consideration unless a communist related problem arose. This meant the two proceeded in relative harmony on issues in the region, with Dulles treating allowing Milton Eisenhower to take an active role as a small price to pay for placating the president when the reality of such a role was little more than an extended delaying action. Indeed, Dulles and Eisenhower were of similar minds on most Latin

American issues: both saw little problem in supporting dictators and juntas, both normally believed the region’s various leaders were wrong to call for more aid or flexibility from the administration, and both initially considered Kubitschek to be the most viable prospect to serve as a pro-American regional leader. Although the two of course had minor differences on issues in Latin America, outside of the Americas the problem of the crumbling Third World presence of

Britain and France was a clear divisive force.

1176 Robertson, The Reminiscences of Walter S. Robertson, 47. 1177 Robertson, The Reminiscences of Walter S. Robertson, 183. 419

Dulles and Eisenhower strongly disagreed on the role European colonial powers should play in the Cold War. Dulles consistently advocated for the deliberate if gradual pushing out of imperial powers and their replacement by pro-American indigenous leaders. In fact, Dulles considered colonial states to be more vulnerable to communist subversion and infiltration due to the doubly dangerous combination of European negligence-cum-incompetence and communist exploitation of nationalist sentiment. While Dulles sympathised and supported a population’s drive to throw out imperial overlords, he also distrusted those populations’ ability to resist the evils of communism, or as he often put it, dictatorships of the proletariat. Thus, a post-colonial state with an American supported dictator was still far superior to a colonial state. Dulles was far more anxious to apply this logic to strategically vital regions than to those he considered less important.1178 Still, Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s disagreements over how to handle Asian and

African colonial-cum-post-colonial matters caused relatively minor strain between the two

(though the same could not be said of Nixon and other officials).

The exception to this comparative harmony on Third World issues was the Middle East, where Dulles advocated a far more assertive and active American role than Eisenhower would allow. Even before late 1955, when he pushed for a total revamping of the administration’s

Middle East policies, Dulles displayed growing frustration with Eisenhower’s middle way in the

Middle East. This frustration for Dulles peaked in 1956. Dulles viewed the Suez Crisis as an opportunity for genuine dynamic action by the administration. Dulles was especially angered by the Europeans’ actions, arguing that their invasion constituted a clear act of classic imperialism that required a decisive response. The Secretary of State maintained that this response should be

1178 Africa is the most fitting example here, as even in 1958, Dulles described a future in which Europe continued to dominate Africa, reassuring European officials that he considered Africa the “hinterland” of Europe. See, Memcon, October 8, 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume XIV Africa, 252. 420

a monumental and ambitious policy that was a rough corollary to the Monroe Doctrine for the

Middle East. Eisenhower was also irritated by the brash action of Britain and France, however his response was far more tempered, and his reaction to Dulles’s ambitious new doctrine for the

Middle East was to adopt and promote his own impressively vague Eisenhower Doctrine. Dulles continued to follow Eisenhower’s lead loyally, but showed greater disillusionment due to the president’s choices.

In fact, Dulles displayed growing concern that Eisenhower lacked the consistency and understanding of regional dynamics to handle the region appropriately. Nasser and Saud in particular are clear examples of the fact that Eisenhower failed to consider wider implications or the results of his past actions or inactions. Despite the insistence of Dulles and ambassadors before the Suez Crisis that attempting to string Nasser along and refusing to deal with him in a forthright manner would drive him to seek both economic and military aid from the Soviet

Union, Eisenhower had Dulles engage in just such treatment. And, after precisely the predicted outcome occurred, in 1957, Dulles was forced to remind Eisenhower that, despite the advice of one of the wealthy industrialists from whom the president regularly took advice, the administration had been working to isolate Nasser. Dulles also reminded the president that this isolation, combined with the simultaneous work to build up King Saud as the regional leader of the Middle East meant that moving back to supporting Nasser as Eisenhower envisioned would be worse than counter-productive. Fleeting schemes like this one were the rule rather than exception, and these too caused frustration for Dulles as Eisenhower either abandoned such schemes or tinkered with them again and again.1179 Eisenhower’s lack of dynamism in the

1179 The reasons for the schemes being abandoned varied. Kubitschek discovered the administration cooled on his Operation Pan-America after he criticised the administration, and it became clear the venture would need American 421

Middle East hit Dulles especially hard, as by 1958 he described the administration’s policies in the region in terms that were hardly glowing: the administration was effectively “muddling through” in the region as the British Empire had done previously.1180 Part of this muddling included the 1958 Lebanon intervention, the awkward landing of Marines in response more to perceived instability in Iraq than a genuine and legitimate need for American aid to put down communist moves again Chamoun. Of course, Dulles did eventually, though nearly on his deathbed at the time, resign; and the man he supported to succeed him was indicative of the stark alteration his understanding of the role of the Secretary of State had under Eisenhower.

Although he had complete faith in his successor’s ability to carry out the duties of his office, the man Dulles endorsed as his replacement reveals how marked his disillusionment had become. Christian Herter’s accession to Secretary of State also points to Eisenhower’s desire to do as little as possible. Dulles considered Herter able to carry out the duties of the office, but what the elder statesman now considered those duties to be had shifted fundamentally from

1953. Dulles believed Herter would be unable to conduct extensive travels for negotiating international agreements and was the ideal short-term, not long-term or transitional, Secretary of

State.1181

These two points indicate that Dulles had abandoned yet another aspiration he had held for the administration’s foreign policies. Dulles obviously considered the position of Secretary funding; Saud found the administration less than upset when his brother Faisal stripped him of significant power due in part to Saud’s failure to best Nasser and Faisal’s own skill in reassuring the administration of his basic loyalty. And, at times, Eisenhower simply lost interest in a scheme and moved on to a new one, such as his idea to break up the Egyptian-Syrian union of the UAR and have Syria join Iraq instead. 1180 The historical accuracy of Dulles’s claim is not the focus, but rather the fact that Dulles compared the administration’s policies to an empire and state he believed had crumbled in large part due to the very fact that it had become a static, muddling through-type of state. See Discussion at the 352nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, January 22, 1958, 7, 352nd Meeting of the NSC, January 22 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, AWF, DDEL. 1181 Again, Herter’s severe arthritis was considered to have been so debilitating that he would be unable to undertake extensive travel. 422

of State essential in foreign negotiations and discussions, the fact he undertook his final mission to Europe in in February 1959 whilst in agony is proof enough of that. So too, Dulles confided in Nixon the importance he placed on the benefits and utility of having a Secretary of State capable of continuing on into the next administration, thus, Dulles considered it reasonable that he might resign in 1958 so that another individual could adapt to the position and continue on in the next administration without missing a beat. Thus, the fact that Dulles endorsed an individual whom he considered unable to carry out international negotiations and unsuited for the position in the long-term points to the serious problems he perceived in Eisenhower’s handling of foreign policy. Indeed, while Herter proved to be an able Secretary of State, he and Eisenhower came in to conflict more regularly, and he often rankled at the various means by which Eisenhower inserted and handled himself in foreign affairs. Indeed, despite being in the position for a relatively short time, Herter still experienced considerable irritation with Eisenhower’s strong suggestions of appointments and other aspects of his management and leadership style. And, as has been shown, neither Dulles nor Herter was alone in his frustration.

Simply put, there was no grand design to Eisenhower’s policies in the Third World, in fact he actively sought to avoid such things. Eisenhower barely possessed the vaguely defined regional goals which guided his actions and inactions. In Latin America, Eisenhower considered the relationships and situations to be entirely satisfactory unless and until communist influence became prevalent. In the Middle East, denying as much of the region and its resources as possible to the Soviets while not pushing the British or French to the extent that their friendship was threatened meant the administration engaged in confused and questionable actions and inactions. In Southeast Asia and the Pacific region, the administration floundered cantankerously as Eisenhower was unable to reconcile anti-colonialism, anti-communism, and the drive of

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indigenous leaders for greater independence and control. In Africa, the absence of a clear communist threat meant that despite consistent warning from its own and foreign officials, the administration put off engaging in even the beginnings of formulating policies until near the end of its time in power. Eisenhower himself clearly played the most crucial role in these actions and inactions. These are as much a part of his legacy as the fact that nuclear war did not occur on his watch.

After he had left office, Dwight Eisenhower remarked on the apparent period of peace and stability which had typified his administration, stating, “The United States never lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration…We kept the peace. People asked how it happened – by God, it didn’t just happen!”1182 Except, unless one adopts an exceedingly generous interpretation, it did not actually “happen” at all. Eisenhower removed two leaders from power, attempted to remove another, authorised the planning to remove yet one more, and sanctioned the assassination of yet another. Eisenhower ordered Marines into Lebanon, sent a naval task force to remind a Venezuelan junta of its place, and threatened nuclear war on multiple occasions. Eisenhower refused to believe changes in policies were needed in Latin

America, refused to deviate from his confused middle way on decolonisation and refused to allow John Foster Dulles to institute the kind of dynamic and ambitious policies the elder statesman believed necessary. Eisenhower sent Nixon to Third World regions as a symbolically useful but ultimately impotent messenger who only exercised real influence when dramatic or catastrophic events occurred. Eisenhower indisputably resisted pushes from Nixon, Dulles, and others to do more, spend more, and risk more.

1182 Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero, 851. 424

Rather than accommodate, adapt to, or adopt the forces of change surging during his presidency, Eisenhower stood firmly resistant. Rather than offer a competing vision or rallying his administration, the free world, or the Third World to his cause, Eisenhower did little more than extend already burning fuses, and in some cases shortened them. Eisenhower was pursuing postponement without considering its consequences, and, considering the consistent alternatives and criticisms of the administration’s policies offered by officials like Nixon, did so intentionally. In terms of the truly significant wars Dwight Eisenhower helped end, or the nuclear or global war he avoided, he deserves to be considered a champion of peace. In terms of the instability he ignored, prolonged, and exacerbated in the Third World, Dwight Eisenhower was hardly a contender, far less a champion.

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McMahon, Robert, and Glenn LaFantasie eds. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958- 1960. Volume XVII, Indonesia. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1994.

Slany, William Z. et al. eds. Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics. Washington: United States Government Printing Press, 1983.

---. Lisle A. Rose, and Neal H. Petersen eds. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Volume II, Part One, National Security Affairs. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1984.

Other Government Publications, Laws etc.

Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung (24 April 1955). Asia-Africa speaks from Bandung. Djakarta: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1955.

P.L. 480 - Title II. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/101430.pdf (Accessed November 10, 2016).

An Act to Provide Assistance in the Development of Latin America, and for the reconstruction of Chile, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 86-735, 74 Stat. September 8, 1960

429

Dissertations

Bobal, Rian T. “Stand Up and be Counted: Race, Religion, and the Eisenhower Administration’s Encounter with Arab Nationalism.” PhD. Diss. Texas A&M University, 2011.

Cakir, Muhammet Faruk. “Turkey’s Role in the Eisenhower Administration’s Security Policy in Western Europe and the Middle East, 1953-1960.” PhD Diss., University of Leicester, 2000.

Goldberg, Benjamin. “The Vice Presidency of Richard Nixon: One Man’s Quest for National Respect, an International Reputation, and the Presidency.” PhD diss., College of William and Mary in Virginia, 1998.

Jones, Brian Madison. “Abolishing the Taboo: President Eisenhower and the Permissible Use of Nuclear Weapons for National Security.” PhD. Diss,, Kansas State University, 2008

Kengor, Paul. “The Role of the Vice President in Foreign Policy: Lessons Learned and Policy Insights.” PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1997.

Kresse, Kenneth A. “Containing Nationalism and Communism on the ‘Dark Continent’: Eisenhower’s Policy Towards Africa, 1953-1961.” PhD. Diss., University at Albany, State University of New York, 2003.

Kusch, Frank. “Nixon’s Loyalists: Inside the War for White House, 1972,” PhD diss., University of Saskatchewan, 2010.

Loayza, Humberto Matthew. “Dollar Diplomacy with a New-Look: President Eisenhower’s Inter-American Policies, 1953-1961.” PhD. Diss., Purdue University, 1999.

Maravillas, Anthony Rama. “Nixon in the Fifties.” PhD. Diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2001.

Marquis, Eric. “Foreign Policy Considerations and the Eisenhower Administrations Civil Rights Policies: The Case of Africa.” PhD. Diss., Concordia University, 1992.

Matongo, Albert Blue Kanda. “United States Policy Toward Zambia and Southern Africa: From Eisenhower to Reagan.” PhD. Diss., University of Minnesota, 1999.

Medeiros, Jennifer Anne. “The Challenge of Addressing the Congo as Nation-state: American Approaches to Sub-Saharan Africa Policy, 1957—1961.” PhD. Diss. Saint Louis University, 2009.

Plummer, Brian K. “‘For Such a Time as This’: The Intersection of Faith and Americanism in John Foster Dulles.” PhD. Diss., Claremont Graduate University: 2011.

430

Sangmuah, Egya Ndayinase. “The United States and the French Empire in North Africa, 1946- 1956: Decolonization in the age of Containment.” PhD. Diss., University of Toronto, 1989.

Stoll, Daniel Charles. “Eisenhower’s use of the United Nations in the Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 1953-1956: The Unified Plan and the Suez Crisis.” PhD. Diss., University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2003.

Walker, David McKinley. “Eisenhower's New Look, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, and Limited War with a Case Study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.” PhD. Diss. George Washington University, 2004.

Yaqub, Salim Clyde. “Containing Arab Nationalism: The United States, the Arab Middle East, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1956-1959.” PhD Diss., Yale University, 1999.

Monographs

Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961.

Alexander, Robert. Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1991.

Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower, Volume I, Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect 1890-1952. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

---. Eisenhower: The President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

---. Nixon, Volume I, The Education of a Politician: 1913-1962. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Asselin, Pierre. From Indochina to Vietnam: Revolution and War in a Global Perspective: Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013.

Black, Conrad. The Invincible Quest: The Life of Richard Milhous Nixon. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007.

431

Bowie, Robert R., and Richard H. Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Brands, H.W. The Specter of Neutralism” The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.

---. The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Broadwater, Jeff. Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.

Brodie, Fawn M. Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Burk, Robert F. The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984.

Callanan, James. Covert Action in the Cold War: U.S. Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010.

Childs, Marquis. Eisenhower, Captive Hero: A Critical Study of the General and the President. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958.

Clowse, Barbara Barksdale. Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and the National Defense Education Act of 1958. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981.

Clugston, W.G. Eisenhower for President? or, Who Will Get Us Out of the Messes We Are In. New York: Exposition Press, 1951.

Cook, Blanche Wiesen. The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1981.

Craig, Campbell. Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Cullather, Nick. Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. de Toledano, Ralph. Nixon. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956.

Dockrill, Saki. Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

432

Donaldson, Gary A. The First Modern Campaign: Kennedy, Nixon, and the Election of 1960. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007.

Donovan, Robert J. Eisenhower: The Inside Story. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishing, 1956.

---. Confidential Secretary: Ann Whitman’s 20 Years with Eisenhower and Rockefeller. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1988.

Divine, Robert A. Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Drew, Elizabeth. Richard M. Nixon: The American Presidents Series: The 37th President, 1969- 1974. New York: Times Books, 2007.

Duram, James C. A Moderate Among Extremists: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the School Desegregation Crisis. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981.

Eisenhower, Milton. The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1963.

Frank, Jeffrey. Ike and Dick: Portrait of a Strange Political Marriage. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013.

Freedman, Carl. The Age of Nixon: A Study in Cultural Power. Winchester: Zero Books, 2012.

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security During the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982 and 2005.

---. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

---. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin Books, 2007.

Gardner, Thomas E. F-100 Super Sabre at War. St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2007.

Gellman, Irwin F. The Contender: Richard Nixon, the Congress Years, 1946-1952. New York: The Free Press, 1999.

---. The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.

Gordon, Linda. Woman's body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America. New York: Grossman, 1976.

433

Greenstein, Fred I. The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader. New York: Basic Books Incorporated, 1982.

Grisinger, Joanna L. The Unwieldy American State: Administrative Politics Since the New Deal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Guha, Ramachandra. India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy. London: Macmillan, 2008.

Gunther, John. Eisenhower: The Man and The Symbol. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.

Hahn, Peter L. Missions Accomplished?: The United States and Iraq since World War I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Henderson, Philip G. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.

Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973.

Hughes, Emmet John. The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years. New York: Atheneum, 1963.

Hughes, Ken. Chasing Shadows: The Nixon Tapes, the Chennault Affair, and the Origins of Watergate. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014.

Immerman, Richard H. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1982.

---. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy. Wilmington: SR Books, 1999.

---. Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Kahin, Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin. Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. (New York: The New Press, 1995).

Kallina, Edmund F. Kennedy v. Nixon: The Presidential Election of 1960. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010.

Karpyshyn, Drew. Darth Bane: Rule of Two. New York: Ballantine Books, 2008.

434

Katznelson, Ira. Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time. New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013.

Kaufman, Burton I. Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953-1961. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Kimball, Jeffrey. The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.

---. Nixon’s Vietnam War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.

Kinzer, Stephen. The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2013.

Kolko, Gabriel. The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

Kotlowski, Dean. Nixon’s Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors?. Albany: State University of New York, 2002.

Kryzanek, Michael. U.S.-Latin American Relations. Second Edition, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.

Kutler, Stanley. The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon. New York: Knopf, 1990.

Larson, Arthur. A Republican Looks at his Party. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956.

---. Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew. New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1968.

LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984.

Lesch, David W. Syria and the United States: Eisenhower’s Cold War in the Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Leuchtenburg, William E. The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Logevall, Fredrik. Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam. New York: Random House, 2012.

435

Lulat, Y. G-M. United States Relations with South Africa. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008.

Lyon, Peter. Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974.

Magdoff, Harry. The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.

Malsberger, John W. The General and the Politician: Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and American Politics. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014.

Marks Fredrick W. III. Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles. Westport: Praeger, 1993.

Mazo, Earl and Stephen Hess. President Nixon: A Political Portrait. London: Macdonald and Company, 1967.

McCann, Kevin. Man from Abilene. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952.

McDougall, Walter. The Heavens and the Earth. New York: Basic Books, 1985.

McClenahan William M. Jr., and William H. Becker. Eisenhower and the Cold War Economy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.

Morris, Roger. Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990.

Mosley, Leonard. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network. New York: The Dial Press, 1978.

Neff, Donald. Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East. New York: The Linden Press, 1981.

Newton, Jim. Eisenhower: The White House Years. New York: Doubleday, 2011.

Niclas-Tölle, Boris. The Socialist Opposition in Nehruvian India 1947-1964. Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH, 2015.

Osgood, Kenneth. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.

Pach, Chester J. Jr., and Elmo Richardson. The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Revised Edition, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991.

436

Palit, D. K. War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962. New Delhi: Lance International, 1991.

Parmet, Herbert S. Eisenhower and the American Crusades. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972.

---. Richard M. Nixon: American Enigma. New York: Pearson Longman, 2008.

Preston, Andrew. Sword of the Spirit, Shield of the Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.

Pruessen, Ronald. John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1982.

Rabe, Stephen G. The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.

---. Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.

Richardson, Elmo. The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979.

Reichard, Gary W. The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-Third Congress. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975.

Richardson, Elmo. Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation the Truman-Eisenhower Era. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973.

Rovere, Richard H. Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1956.

Rust, William J. Eisenhower and Cambodia: Diplomacy, Covert Action, and the Origins of the Second Indochina War. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016.

Sander, Alfred Dick. Eisenhower’s Executive Office. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973.

Siniver, Asaf. Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making: The Machinery of Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

437

Statler, Kathryn C. Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007.

Smith, A. Merriman. Meet Mister Eisenhower. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955.

Smith, Walter Bedell. Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions: Europe, 1944-1945. Toronto: Longman, Greens and Company, 1956.

Stuart, Douglas T. Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Sulzberger, C.L. The World and Richard Nixon. New York: Prentice Hall, 1987.

Summers, Anthony. The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon. New York: Viking, 2000.

Takeyh, Ray. The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

Taylor, Allan. What Eisenhower Thinks. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952.

Thomas, Evan. Being Nixon: A Man Divided. New York: Random House, 2015.

Thomas, G. Scott. A New World to Be Won: John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and the Tumultuous Year of 1960. Santa Barbara: Praeger Books, 2011.

Toulouse, Mark G. The Transformation of John Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism. Macon: Mercer University Press, 1985.

Tucker, Nancy Burnkopf. The China Threat: Memories, myths, and realities in the 1950s. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Volkan, Vamik D., Norman Itzkowitz, and Andrew W. Dod. Richard Nixon: A Psychobiography. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

White, George Jr. Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy toward Africa, 1953-1961. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

White, Theodore H. Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon. New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1976.

438

Williams, William Appleman. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959.

Wills, Garry. Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969.

Yaqub, Salim. Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

Articles

Allcock, Thomas Tunstall. “The First Alliance for Progress? Reshaping the Eisenhower Administration’s Policy toward Latin America.” Journal of Cold War Studies Volume 16, Number 1 (Winter 2014): 85-110.

Anderson, David L. “J. Lawton Collins, John Foster Dulles, and the Eisenhower Administration's ‘Point of No Return’ in Vietnam.” Diplomatic History Volume 12, Number 2 (April 1988): 127-148.

Bernstein, Barton J. “Foreign Policy in the Eisenhower Administration.” Foreign Service Journal Volume 50, Number 5 (May, 1973): 17-20, 29-30, 38.

Bobal, R. Thomas. "‘A Puppet, Even Though He Probably Doesn't Know So’: Racial Identity and the Eisenhower Administration's Encounter with Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab Nationalist Movement." International History Review Volume 35, Number 5 (October 2013): 943-974.

Boden, Ragna. “Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia.” Journal of Cold War Studies Volume 10, Number 3, (Summer 2008): 110-128.

Borzutzky, Silvia, and David Berger. “Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don’t: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam.” The Middle East Journal Volume 64, Number 1, (Winter 2010): 84-102.

Brady, Thomas F. “Nixon goes Barnstorming to Win Over Africa.” The New York Times (March 17, 1957): E4.

Brands, H.W. “The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Rhee, and the ‘Other’ Geneva Conference of 1954.” Pacific Historical Review Volume 56, Number 1 (February 1987): 59-85.

439

---. “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State.” The American Historical Review Volume 94, Number 4 (October 1989): 963-989.

Burk, Robert F. “Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on Eisenhower Scholarship.” The Historian Volume 50, Number 2 (February 1988): 196-209.

Catton, Phillip E. "It Would Be a Terrible Thing if We Handed These People over to the Communists": The Eisenhower Administration, Article 14(d), and the Origins of the Refugee Exodus from North Vietnam.” Diplomatic History Volume 39, Number 2 (April 2015): 331-358.

Choi, Wooseon. “Structural Realism and Dulles's China Policy." Review Of International Studies Volume 38, Number 1 (January 2012): 119-140.

Clark, Marshall. “Indonesia's Postcolonial Regional Imaginary: From a 'Neutralist' to an 'All- Directions' Foreign Policy.” Japanese Journal of Political Science Volume 12, Number 2 (August 2011): 287-304.

Cotter, Cornelius P. “Eisenhower as Party Leader,” Political Science Quarterly Volume 98, Number 2 (Summer, 1983): 255-283.

De Santis, Vincent P. “Eisenhower Revisionism,” The Review of Politics Volume 38, Number 2 (April 1976): 190-207.

Dulles, John Foster. “Administrative Law: A Practical Attitude for Lawyers.” American Bar Association Journal Volume 25 (1939): 275-282, 352-353.

---. “A Righteous Faith.” Life Magazine. (December 28, 1942): 49-51.

---. “Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to do About it.” Life Magazine. (June 3, 1946): 112-126.

---. “Importance of Initiative in International Affairs." Vital Speeches Of The Day Volume 18, Number 11 (March 15, 1952): 333-336.

---. “Enlightened Self-Interest: Encirclement a Deadly Threat to the United States.” Vital Speeches Of The Day Volume 19, Number 9, (January 27, 1953): 264-267.

Engelbourg, Saul. “The Council of Economic Advisers and the Recession of 1953-1954.” The Business History Review. Volume 54, Number 2 (Summer, 1980): 192-214.

Ferreira, Roberto Garcia. “The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign.” Journal of Third World Studies Volume 25, Number 2 (Fall 2008): 59-81.

440

Førland, Tor Egil. “’Selling Firearms to the Indians’: Eisenhower's Export Control Policy, 1953–54.” Diplomatic History Volume 15, Number 2 (April 1991): 221-244.

Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup in Iran.” Journal of Cold War Studies Volume 15, Number 4, (Fall 2013): 4-24.

Graham, Sarah Ellen. "The Eisenhower Administration and Public Diplomacy in India: An Ambivalent Engagement, 1953–1960." Diplomacy & Statecraft Volume 25, Number 2 (June 2014): 260-284.

Grimm, Kevin E. “Gazing Toward Ghana: African American Agency in the Eisenhower Administration’s Relations with Africa.” Journal of Contemporary History Volume 48, Number 3 (2013): 578-596.

Griffith, Robert. “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” The American Historical Review Volume 87, Number 1 (February 1982): 87-122.

Hanhimäki, Jussi M. “‘Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting.” Diplomatic History Volume 27, Issue 5 (November 2003): 637-676.

Hashmi, Sohail H. "‘Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero’: Pakistan, the Baghdad Pact, and the Suez Crisis." International History Review Volume 33, Number 3 (September 2011): 525- 544.

Heller, Francis H. “The Eisenhower White House.” Presidential Studies Quarterly Volume 23, Number 3 (Summer 1993): 509-517.

Herring, George, and Richard Immerman. “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: ‘The Day We Didn’t Go To War’ Revisited.” The Journal of American History Volume 71, Number 2 (September 1984): 343-363.

Holland, Max. "Private Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy: William Pawley and the 1954 Coup d'Etat in Guatemala." Journal of Cold War Studies Volume 7, Number 4 (Fall 2005): 36- 73.

Immerman, Richard H. “Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?” Political Psychology Volume 1, Number 2 (Autumn, 1979): 21-38.

---. “Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal.” Diplomatic History Volume 14, Number 3 (July 1990): 319-342.

Joes, Antony James. “Eisenhower Revisionism: The Tide Comes In.” Presidential Studies Quarterly Volume 15, Number 3 (Summer 1985): 561-571.

441

Keefer, Edward C. “President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War.” Diplomatic History Volume 10, Number 3 (Summer 1986): 267-289.

Kempton, Murray. “The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower.” Esquire College Issue (September 1967): 108-109, 156.

Kilpatrick, Carroll. “Vice President Calls it Declaration of Independence From Colonialism” The Washington Post (November 3, 1956): A1.

Loayza, Matthew. “An ‘Aladdin’s Lamp for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953-61.” Diplomacy and Statecraft Volume 14, Number 3, (September 2003): 83-105.

Matusevich, Maxim. “Revisiting the Soviet Moment in Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Compass (July 2009): 1259-1268.

Mazo, Earl. “Nixon Seeks to Shake up Africa Staffs.” The Washington Post and Times Herald (March 17, 1957): A1.

McAlexander, Richard J. "Couscous Mussolini: US perceptions of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 1958 intervention in Lebanon and the origins of the US-Israeli special relationship." Cold War History Volume 11, Number 3 (August 2011): 363-385.

McAuliffe, Mary S. “Eisenhower, the President.” The Journal of American History Volume 68, Number 3 (December 1981): 625-632.

McMahon, Robert J. “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists.” Political Science Quarterly Volume 101, Number 3 (1986): 453-473.

Nwaubani, Ebere, and C. Nwaubani “The United States and the Liquidation of European Colonial Rule in Tropical Africa, 1941-1963.” Cahiers d'Études Africaines Volume 43, Cahier 171 (2003): 505-552.

Ogunbadejo, Oye. “Soviet Policies in Africa.” African Affairs Volume 79, Number 316 (July 1980): 297-325.

Rabe, Stephen G. “Eisenhower and Latin America: Arms and Dictators." Peace and Change Volume 11, Number 1 (Spring 1985): 49-61.

---. “Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship.” Diplomatic History 17, No. 1, (January 1993): 97-116.

Reichard, Gary W. “Eisenhower as President: The Changing View.” South Atlantic Quarterly Volume 77, Number 3 (Summer 1978): 265-281.

442

Rovere, Richard H. "Eisenhower and the New President." Harper's Magazine 220, Number 1320 (May 1, 1960): 31-35.

---. “Eisenhower Revisited-A Political Genius? A Brilliant Man?” The New York Times Magazine (February 7, 1971): 14-15, 54, 58-59, 62.

Rubin, Barry. “America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957.” Political Science Quarterly Volume 97, Number 1 (Spring, 1982): 73-90.

Rushkoff, Bennett C. “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955.” Political Science Quarterly Volume 96, Number 3 (Autumn 1981): 465-488.

Sangmuah, Egya. “Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956-1960.” Middle East Journal Volume 44, Issue 1 (Winter 1990): 76-91.

Scali, John. “U.S. Reported Asking Base in Eritrea.” The Washington Post and Times Herald March 13, 1957): A1.

---. “Nixon asks Better ties with Africa.” The Washington Post and Times Herald (April 7, 1957): A1.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Sr. "Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians." The New York Times Magazine, CXI (July 29, 1962): 12-13, 40-41, 43.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. “Review: The Ike Age Revisited” Reviews in American History Volume 11, Number 1 (March 1983): 1-11.

Sewell, Bevan. “A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America.” Diplomatic History, 32, Number 5, (November 2008): 841-868.

---. “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953–61.” Intelligence and National Security 26, Numbers 2–3, (April-June 2011): 269-290

Shannon, William V. “Eisenhower as President: A Critical Appraisal of the Record." Commentary Volume 26, Number 5 (November 1958): 390-398.

Suhrke, Astri. “US-Philippines: The End of a Special Relationship.” The World Today Volume 31, Number 2 (February 1975): 80-88.

Szulc, Tad. “Nixon Sees Need for Shift in Latin American Policies.” The New York Times (May 18, 1958): Page 1, Page 6.

443

Thomas, Martin. “Defending a Lost Cause? France and the United States Vision of Imperial Rule in French North Africa.” Diplomatic History Volume 26, Number 2 (Spring 2002): 215-247.

---. “Innocent Abroad? Decolonisation and US Engagement with French West Africa, 1945– 56.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History Volume 36, Number 1 (March 2008): 47-73.

Takeyh, Ray. “What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah.” Foreign Affairs Volume 93, Number 4 (July/August 2014): 2- 12.

Thorp, Willard L. “American Policy and the Soviet Economic Offensive." Foreign Affairs 35, Number 1 (January 01, 1957): 271-282.

Vanni, Pettina. “The Shadows of Cold War over Latin America: the US reaction to Fidel Castro's Nationalism, 1956–59.” Cold War History Volume 11, Number 3 (August 2011): 317- 339.

Wardaya, Baskara T. “Diplomacy and cultural understanding: Learning from US policy toward Indonesia under Sukarno.” International Journal Volume 67, Number 4, Canada after 9/11 (Autumn 2012): 1051-1061.

Weissman, Stephen R. “What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu.” Foreign Affairs Volume 93, Number 4 (July/August 2014): 14- 24.

White, George Jr. “Big Ballin’!?: Vice President Nixon and the Creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in the U.S. Department of State.” Passport Volume 41, Number 2 (September 2010): 5-11.

Yeşi̇ lbursa, Behçet K. “The American Concept of the 'Northern Tier' Defence Project and the Signing of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 1953-54.” Middle Eastern Studies Volume 37, Number 3 (July, 2001): 59-110.

Zahniser, Marvin R. and W. Michael Weis. “A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixon’s Goodwill Mission to Latin America in 1958.” Diplomatic History Volume 13, Number 2 (April 1989): 163-190.

Articles/Chapters in Edited Works

444

Adamson, Michael R. “’The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’? The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World.” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006.

Anderson, David L. “The Devil Is in the Details: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Third World.” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, eds. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006.

Dix, Jacqueline. “The United States and India: The Challenge of Neutralism and Bipolarity,” Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War. Alan P. Dobson, ed. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1999.

Garver, John. “China's Decision for War with India in 1962,” New Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy. Robert S. Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.

Gellman, Irwin F. “The Richard Nixon Vice Presidency: Research without the Nixon Manuscripts.” A Companion to Richard Nixon. Melvin Small, ed. Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2011.

Gordon, Linda. “The New Feminist Scholarship on the Welfare State.” Women, the State, and Welfare. Linda Gordon ed. Madison: University Press of Wisconsin, 2012.

McMahon, Robert J. “’The Point of No Return’: The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia, 1953-1960.” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006.

---. “U.S. National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy.” The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume 1, Origins. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

---. “Introduction.” The Cold War in the Third World. Robert J. McMahon ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Meriwether, James H. “A Torrent Overrunning Everything: Africa and the Eisenhower Administration.” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006.

445

Pach, Chester J., Jr. "United States Foreign Relations during the Eisenhower Presidency, 1953- 1961." American Foreign Relations Since 1600: A Guide to the Literature. Volume II, Robert Beisner and Kurt Hanson, eds. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003.

---. “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally.” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006.

Plischke, Elmer. “Richard Nixon as Summit Diplomat.” Cold War Patriot and Statesman: Richard M. Nixon. Leon Friedman and William F. Levantrosser eds. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993.

Prados, John. “The Central Intelligence Agency and the Face of Decolonization under the Eisenhower Administration.” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006.

Pruessen, Ronald. “John Foster Dulles and the Predicaments of Power” John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. Richard H. Immerman ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Rabe, Stephen G. “Cold War Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon: The New Scholarly Literature.” America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941. Second Edition. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan eds. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Saulnier, Raymond J. “The Philosophy Underlying Eisenhower’s Economic Policies.” Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesmen. Joann P. Kreig ed. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987.

Online Sources

Chernus, Ira. “Ambrose on Eisenhower: The Impact of a Single Faulty Quotation,” May 16, 2010, History News Network, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/126636 (Accessed September 1, 2016).

Clune, Lori. “Stephen Ambrose’s Falsifications of the Rosenberg Execution” May 16, 2010, History News Network, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/126527 (Accessed September 1, 2016).

446

Kimball, Jeffrey. H-Diplo Article Commentary: Kimball on Hanhimäki (historiographical). http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/Kimball-Hanhimaki.pdf (Accessed September 8, 2016).

Rives, Timothy D. “Ambrose and Eisenhower: A View from the Stacks in Abilene” May 17, 2010, History News Network, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/126705 (Accessed September 2, 2016).

Watson, Elliot L. “America in Asia: Vice President Nixon’s Forgotten Trip to Ceylon.” Foreign Policy Journal (May 1, 2009). http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/05/01/america-in-asia-vice-president- nixonsforgotten-trip-to-ceylon/ (Accessed September 3, 2016).

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