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H /C-F2-.. 04Rj/7~Oa ,',-:, 9/11 Working-level Employee \:::':";;;;::::: . COMMISSION SENSITIVE H /C-f2-.. 04rJ/7~oa ,',-:, -. UNCLASSIFIED '; ...\.....•\........... <:" •• MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD • ' -, , ' :- . , ',", ~ . ~··E~~~t:I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tDulles -. Intel71ati.~n~.1Ai~ort Type: Interview. pre;;~t~dbY:'!prn;R~ldt SpecialAccess Is~(Ie~ :N,,~e> Teams: 7 "..\ Dat·~.:January 1"9, 2004 and Pt¢ruary"lQ, '2'004 \. -. ',',', participts (nont~QmmiSSiOn): ·Phone Interview'[ .. ~~ ....I~~d..~~~ ...ITrip to Dulles. and' '.. ' ..... Participants (Commission): Lisa Sullivan.John RaidL ... Location: The interview was conducted by co~fe.rence call'>Ms. Sullivan and Mr. Raidt hosted the cal1 from the commission's GSA office'.,1 la~'~ ~a1led from their office at Dulles International Airport. '\ The interview was followed by a 2-10-04 site visit to the Dulles west checkpoint to show • Dpictures of the hijackers and to get a visual impression of the door where the confrontation occurred. John Raidt and Lisa Sullivan were joined by Commission staff members John Tamm and Marco Cordero for the trip to Dulles. Background • COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED • Reason for Interview [U] Commission staff contacte4 Ifor an interview based on information he had provided to law enforcement r~garding an incident he witnessed on the evening of 9/1 0/2001 at Dulles. " Incident [U1 lindicated that around 8 p.m. on September 10, he was supervising the west checkpoint in the main terminal of Dulles when he saw four Middle Eastern men trying to enter a side door at the west checkpoint. Use of the door was restricted to Law Enforcement Officers ~LEO's) and government officials. nJ]The uniformed nr~n were wearing green Dulles Airport 10 badges imprinted with an '1A" that designatedpeople who work on the ramps. One of the men swiped his ID card 'and punched in a code to enter the door, which gained him and the other three people /entrance to the "s~¢rile area" (bypassing the security check point). ![Unsaid that/two of the men were dressed like "ramp rats" - in blue pants with !sw~rts and.headphones around their necks. They appeared to be escorting two other ! plain clothed men, also Middle Eastern in appearance. The men weren't carrying : anything with/them. He did not recognize them. He noticed them because ramp rats weren 't allowed to enter through that door~,Dtressed that ramp employees "never" used that d9,or.,D also noted that MW ijA had restricted access to the door to fewer • ~mp]oyee~;J~r' security reasons only a:!-rionthprior to 9-11. !(U] : ~~ressed that the do~,d is talking about is on the west wall of the west , !ch,¢ckp~inr The door requires-that you swipe a card and punch in the cod,~1 ~aid ! ./ t~~t vefy.few employees haveaccess to the door. He didn't have such access on 9·11 and ! ./ he was amanager of the checkpoint security.operation.l Isa~,d,-tfiatyou could use the , : ?oor/t~/by-pass the ma~~r~.t6meter. .' • ' / [uDaid that th~e'e'ofthemen were confused andditl~;t seem to know wherethey ! ./ ./ w¢.r<i going. These-observations and the fact that ramp rats never used that door made ! / /:~(t1{suspicious. .Hestopped them'. lie·told themthat they weren't allowed through the i ,'" ,:' 46:or and that t,h~y had to go throughthe security checkpoint if they wanted to access the i .... / /~4tea.The men-carrying IDs showed themto him. Their behavior was rude and abusive to :' ,::>:,him. ,<.... .,' : .' "'.' . /! / / ...('::::/ [Ul~ade them Y6r;;'~"ba:c(~ut and told them to go through the checkpoint. The men /!,///:,'d~.d~xplain ~hy theywanted access to the door. Even though they had IDs, they : : .' ::: /PI,~,9'itseem to.knowwhere they were going, t!l;;«~~F~~~n~~~~~::~~;e~h:od:airt~.p?h~~Dsa~h~:e~e::~;~;~s~~~sU!~~: 2 ~ '.; <-:" COM~~{~~S~~~TIVE 9/11 Working-level Employee .» <~~~9/11 Working-level Employee cOMMrSS1()l-J:.~~~~~IVE .' ....··UNS.~~S:f..t7'1~O::::'\\'.....,-::,':-:,,\ , e~calators. He doesn't-know wh~.\,~:t~i;',~:6nJf'fr~tn ih~r~"mork~~fut1~,il 11 p.m. and • did not see them.again after th.~.:9,o~fron~,~tl~,fl.if: ':: \\ \.>.. """ [UlDdidnot report th~inci4e'1i~'untilth/nexthay wh~n he came into work arm) d 1 p.m. After hearing abqu~·th¥.:.tiijacki'ng)h¢:re oneQ th~ ~qcident to a' :;~dOn 9illJ,/lE6Id th~F!31 abou iieportj \\FaS interviewed by the FBI, ~t~e~~r[::]{~({ report~:d the sto:~~tJrli;~is interview was.the ..first L....Jhad heard the story;' ::tdid get to/see ~:~)f. suspected hij ackers that was taken o.n''9-1 1. .:' / !!: :,\" \, -. " [u]D~idtha~ ,/ , . witnessed the incidel)t'J ! the 0 Terminal and...is accessible to the Cominjs~io,,). In a fOllQW UinteriewP with Commission staffat Dullesl / . ! Idld not corroborat ' 4 ccount. He concurred he wasworking the evening of the 1o" between the E,as~and the West checkpoints, buthe had no recollection of ~ confrontation betwe~aand four middle easterners trying to by-pass the magnetometer. He Said it may h~ve happened, but he had no recollection of it and might have been preoccupied with other passengers or in a different area at the time/ !' \, [UJDaid that sometime later (not on 9-11), he thinks a few days later, the FBI came • to his home around 9 p.m. and showed him approximately five pictures, He did not remember the agent'S' name. She was a young blonde female agent.c::::Jiid not recognize the individuals in the pictures as any of the men he saw on September loth. Having read the agent's report on the interview withDCommission staff think the pictures shown to him were of employees with access, to the door at Dulles or video stills th of individuals recovered from the ADT security camera used at the terminal on the 10 - NOT photos of,~.hesuspected hijackers. ! [U] A couple of weeks later, he saw color pictures of the hijackers in a news magazine "The National Enquirer" and recognized two of them as the people he saw on the 10th dressed as ramp rats. He said the "Enquirer" story had pictures of all the hijackers but did not associate them by fli ght. He said he did not have time to read the article that accompanied the pictures. One of the rnen was tall with curly hair and the other one was very shory;'balding, and had a large f~irehead. He thought both men looked young. [U]D~aid that none of the picturesithe FBI showed him resembled the pictures of the hijackers he saw in the newspaQer ora magazine. He did not recall any names associated with the pictures he recognized[:Jsaid that if someone showed him the pictures again, he could pick them out. He did not contact the FBI again to inform them of the fact that he recognized a couple of the hijackers . • COMMISSION SENSITIVE 3 UNCLASSIFIED .. 9/11 Personal Privacy ........ COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED [U] D'~:ahg:J~e fol1ow-up~i~'it'TcEJ1!Y Commission staff, John T~m showedDa number of pictures, including photos ofthe·AA -,#.77 hijacker~·Ddid not identify any of the pictures as individuals he .had seen on 9/10. ". ..,:.:' ..- • .~'. ' .. ," ..[_u...l__ ...I~ca;:.;n_b;.;.ereache~:'~~'L:r-'_"'~"~ __ ...I!:'I=====!k:.:··~~· .::.;be·r~~·~~ed:~4 ,...1 ....~an bereached a~ 1 " 1..-------1 / ~OTE: After the int~iew, John Raidt cont.~d~dl lofthe FBI to relay the i information thaDow claims h~:fecog~iied two ofthe hijackers as people he had seen on 9/10),;...... : ' ,// . ",,/ . ,,"" ;' following the site visit; Commission staff plan to review surveillance footage of the.west checkpoint-from the evening of the 10th to look for images of the confrontation in question; ", ' _ Contact EdCo;x:at f\1W AA to-find out who on 9-10 had ID badges and the code to .enter the doorin qu·estion,.''''' ./ _ :/ oet a list ofthose personnel with the aforementioned credentials was on duty on .....' .£>:-10 :,,',., , .:, .: /_ /:'Look fo'~thecopyof the National Enquirer with the pictures of the hijackers that ,..,::/ ca~.e"~~lt'ln theweeks following 9-11. 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy • ,/' .,' ,:',:' ...: J/i.:· 9/11 Working-level Employee • COMMISSION SENSITIVE 4 UNCLASSIFIED "\. , 9/11 Working-level" Employee MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD " '\\,Event: Intervie\~/of1... ___ Jja.~,~:·February 10, 2004 ""specilt¢ccess Issues: none p~~paredb~:, Quinn John Tamm, Jr. TeamNumbe~LIA and 7 (jO,catio,~,: DullesInternational Airport, Herndon, VA '. Par.~icipa"h:ts from theCommission. Lisa Sullivan, John Raidt, Marco A. Cordero, \"Quinn JohnTamm, Jr. \::,\ ... ... \, \, -. \'" '''r--\ldate ofbi~~>""-',---------------., Dulles I~tema~ advised of the 'identities of the professional staffers and the nature of the inv~stigation 'being condu~e? 'b)i the Natio:al Co~ission on ~errori.st Attacks Upon '. the.United States, (the Comnllsslon)~1 Ihad previously been interviewed by \ Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement \ Administration DEA:.. concemin his duties on 09/10/2001. At that tim ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ullesAi~ort. • I Ireported"t9 the FBI and DEA agents that on 09/10/2001 he was assigned to work at the west security.gate in the main terminal of Dulles Airport. Between 8: 10 pm . and 8:45 pm on that date, heobserved five males pass through the "security entrance," contrary to airport procedure.vf'he males were mid-eastern in appearance. On this date, 02110/2004~r-lwas shown and allowed to review a photographic line-up consisting o~raphs of the following individuals: Hani Hanjour Said Bahaji Mounir E-Motassadeq Zakariya Essabar Saud al-Rasheed Majed Moqed Jasim Obaid Mohamed Obaid al-Naqbi Ramzi bin al-Shibbh Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Hazma al-Ghamdi Nawaf al-Hazmi • Salem al-Hazmi Ali Abdul Aziz Ali Mohand al-Shehri AbdeIghani Mzoudi • Abderraouf Jdey , Iwas asked if any of the individuals depicted in the above list, were the mid~.¢astem males who attempted to pass thrysh:he srurity entrance of the West Gate, main terminal, Dulles Airport on 09/10/200~..
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