DECIDING ON 'S INTEGRATED TRANSPORT POLICY THE CASE FOR HEAVY RAIL

MARTIN ROGERS DUBLIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

1. B A C K G R O U N D Dublin is in the process of finally deciding the structure of its public transport system, in particular the form of rail-based transport to be employed in the capital. This process has been ongoing since the early nineties when the Dublin Transport Initiative (DTI) was established to put together a transportation plan for the Greater Dublin Area to the year 2011, publishing its final report in 1995 (DTI, 1995). The problem of resolving the public transport needs for the capital city has its basis in the recommendations of this report. This paper examines the data used to formulate the initial Core Strategy of projects contained within the DTI Final Report which dealt with all surface transport (road, rail, , cycling and walking), and examined transport in an integrated sense, inter-relating it with policies such as economic development, employment and the environment. This paper discusses whether the judgements made by the decision-makere within DTI Phase 2 regarding the most appropriate transport strategy for the region were, in retrospect, the correct ones. In particular, this report, in the opinion of the author, did not pick the correct suburban rail option for Dublin as part of its chosen core strategy. It also asks whether any suitable corrective action has been taken in the intervening years as part of the DTI review process to adjust the strategy, where appropriate, and whether the proposed strategy update corrects, to any extent, the original errors committed. For the purposes of compiling the Final Report, the DTI consisted of a study team made up of an appointed consultant working with a group of professionals seconded to them from the relevant road, rail and bus authorities in the Dublin area. They were charged with devising a balanced transport policy that would embrace all transport modes.

2. DUBLIN TRANSPORT - VISION AND OBJECTIVES The study team drafted a vision statement for Dublin setting the guiding principles for the entire process. The purpose of such a statement was to express succinctly the type of city one should aim for, and that transport policy should help create. It formed the framework within which ideas on possible transport strategies could be developed. The vision had four facets for the role of Dublin: • A leading European city, co-operative and competing. • A national capital and a centre of excellence. • A metropolitan region, with a growing and diverse city, town and rural economy. • A living city and region, accessible to all.

81 The vision statement provided the basis for the preparation of a more detailed set of objectives that the transport strategy would be designed to fulfil. The first four flowed directly from the vision statement, with the fifth relating to the ease of implementation of the transport proposals. The 5 objectives can thus be listed as follows: 1. Encouraging employment and the regional economy as a whole. 2. Improving the quality of life for its inhabitants. 3. Improving the city's relevance in a national and international context. 4. Maximising the coherence and consistency between the development of the city and the region. 5. Maximising the efficiency in implementing the strategy.

3. C R I T E R I A FOR T H E M E S E L E C T I O N The objectives listed above were, in effect, converted directly into a set of main criteria of evaluation. A score on each main criterion was measured using a set of sub-criteria, each of which measured some facet of its main criterion. Summed together, they delivered an overall measurement for the criterion in question. The sub-criteria derived are listed as follows:

Objective / Main Criterion Measurable Sub-criteria Employment/regional economy (1) Encourage economic development (1.1) Consolidate existing industry (1.2) Attract new investment (1.3) Improve physical access (1,4) Quality of life (2) Improve comfort and reliability of travel (2.1) Improve traveller security (2.2) Reduce accidents (2.3) Reduce environmental effects of transport (2.4) Improve access to leisure facilities (2.5) International context (3) Increase consistency with national / EU plans (3.1) Improve access to markets (3.2) Improve access to Gtr. Dublin area (3.3) Foster sustainable development (3.4) Development of City and Region (4) Maintain advantage of city centre (4.1) Provide framework for new town development (4.2) Coherence with plans of surrounding counties (4.3) Help conserve heritaqe in the area (4.4) Efficiency in Implementation (5) Maintenance of finance needs at available levels (5.1) Optimise use of existing infrastructure (5,2) Minimise timesca]e for implementation (5.3) Capacity for self enforcement in scheme (5.4) Level of new legislation required (5.5) Contribution to financial health of operators (5.6) Minimise level of disruption during construction (5.7) TABLE 1 - Main criteria and their constituent sub-criteria

4. O P T I O N S / T H E M E S The vision statement also formed the framework within which ideas on possible transport strategies were developed. The relevant transport agencies in the Dublin area were requested to define all feasible schemes, which, in their opinion, should be subject to assessment. All schemes were then organised into 'themes', seen by the study team as suitable vehicles for exploring and comparing different policy options. Because these arose directly

82 from the submissions of transport agencies, they tended to be representative of different sectional mode-based interests within the transport provision sector rather than be seen as separate, coherent and stand-alone strategies. Their purpose, from the perspective of the DTI study team, was to allow the strengths and weaknesses of the different mode/policy options to be assessed. The following eight themes were developed:

Theme Description Theme 1 - The 'do-minimum' situation A benchmark scenario against which all others are measured. Theme 2 - Restraint A set of measures to reduce private car use (road pricing, parking restraint and complimentary management measures) Theme 3 - Making better use of existing A set of low cost schemes to increase use of assets roads and public transport through high and low tech measures (traffic control improvement) Theme 4 - Incremental Road The completion only of major roadways Development which have been started plus some relatively minor road developments Theme 5 - Extended road development A widespread package of major road schemes including an Eastern By-Pass of the city and a cross- city East-West tunnel. Theme 6 - An environmental package A package focussing on pedestrian, cycle and related measures including traffic calming to give priority to pedestrians and cyclists. Theme 7 - Enhanced public transport Development of a quality bus corridors, light investment rail systems and limited extensions to the heavy rail network Theme 8 - Extended public transport Development of a city wide heavy rail investment including an underground section, plus an interchange facility in the city TABLE 2 - Brief description of themes

5. O V E R A L L THEME COSTS The following costs are approximate, and are based on the interpretation of information contained in the 1995 DTI Final Report. The prices are thus at 1995 levels for all work under each theme up until 2011. Theme 1 Theme 1 represents a small number of mainly road schemes already committed to by the Government at the time of the study. Under it, no extra development beyond these is assumed to take place until 2011, the end of the study period. It is thus a benchmark, against which all other themes can be gauged. Given that the costs of all other themes were assumed to be the resources required over and above those already committed by the Government to these road schemes, the cost of Theme 1, for the purposes of the DTI analysis, was taken as zero. Theme 2 No significant cost is attributed to this theme within the DTI Final Report. If implemented, the only expenditure would be on tolling infrastructure and the upgrading of parking restraint mechanisms.

83 Theme 3 Again, no significant cost is attributed to this theme within the DTI Final Report. Expenditure on this theme would be on telematic equipment and the provision of real time information for public transport. The operators themselves could, to a large extent, meet these costs. Theme 4 The total cost for the road development under this theme to 2011 was given in the Final Report as over IR600m. However, the Government had already allocated approximately 90% of these funds prior to the formation of DTI in order to complete the orbital route around the city, with links into the national network. Approximate cost IR£6Om+ Theme 5 The expenditure over an above that listed in Theme 4 would be approximately IR£750m+ Theme 6 The management measures outlined in this package will amount to approximately IR£130+. Theme 7 The 1995 costing for was put at IR£40Om+, rising from an estimate of IR£21Om in the 1992 interim DTI Report, with the bus corridors totalling in excess of IR£100m. The total package amounted to approximately IR£550. Theme 8 The cost of a 3-line Heavy rail system was estimated at IR£595m in 1995 prices.

6. MULTI-CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THEMES 6.1. Introduction Within the overall strategic process, the stated aim of the study approach was to assess the contribution of individual policy options towards meeting the DTI objectives. Because no theme represented a coherent, integrated, 'stand- alone' strategy, there was no question of finding the 'best' theme. The assumption was that projects in the best performing themes would be more likely to feature in the final strategy than those from less well performing ones, on the basis that they contributed in a substantial way to meeting DTI objectives. The appraisal of the themes was carried out within a multi-criteria analysis framework where each theme was considered on the basis of its performance against the criteria set out in Table 1. The performance of each theme on each of the sub-criteria listed above was obtained by utilising combinations of data from the transport demand model for Dublin assembled by the study team and qualitative measures based upon the collective DTI judgement of potential economic, social technical and environmental effects. On the basis of these judgements, each theme was scored against all of the sub-criteria on a uniform seven-point scale indicating the extent to which each theme contributed to the achievement of DTI objectives. The scale used was as follows:

84 Criterion score Symbol Strongly positive impact +++ Positive impact ++ Slightly positive impact + Neutral impact N Slightly negative impact Negative impact Strongly negative impact TABLE 3 - Criterion measurement scale

The scores for all themes on each of the criteria were entered into the Summary Impact Matrix shown below:

Themes Criteria 1 2 4 7 8 1.1 N + + + + + + -- + + + + 1.2 + + + + + + -- + + + + + + 1.3 N + + / + + + + / + + + + / - + + / + + + + + / + + + 1.4 +/- + +/++ ++ N/- +++ +++ 2.1 ++ + + ++ N +++ +++ 2.2 N + N N + ++ ++ ++ 2.3 + N + ++ +++ + ++ 2.4 - - ++ + + ++ N ++ ++ 2.5 - - N N ++ ++ + ++ +++ 3.1 N + +++ ++ N +++/++ + N 3.2 + N N +++ - N/+++ +/++ 3.3 + + + +++ N + ++ 3.4 + + + + + + + + + + 4.1 - - + N N N +++ +++ 4.2 ++ N + ++ N ++ +++ 4.3 + + + + + + + + + + 4.4 + N ++ N N 5.1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 5.2 + + + + + + + 5.3 +÷+ +++ +++ N + + 5.4 + 5.5 N 5.6 +++ ++ N + N + + + I + + + + + + 5.7 I TABLE 4 - Summary Impact Matrix

6.2. R e s u l t s o f M u l t i - c r i t e r i a A s s e s s m e n t The study team analysed the impact matrix in a qualitative manner, analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the various themes. It constituted an attempt to interpret the information from the matrix in quite a subjective manner, given the conflicting results from different criteria on any given theme. Table 5 below summarises the results of their analysis. The study team concluded that while Themes 2, 3 and 6 scored well on their ease of implementation, only Themes 5, 7 and 8 indicated positive effects over a range of objectives, with 7 and 8 interpreted as being the most beneficial for both city and region. Only marginal benefits were seen to accrue from Theme 4 on any of the main objectives.

85 Theme Principal Strengths Principal Weaknesses Low cost, reduces congestion and Negative effects on city centre accidents in city centre Improves the reliability of transport Limited contribution to economic modes development 4 Reduces accidents and improves job Relative decline in access to city access centre Reduces accidents and congestion. High cost, lengthy implementation. Improved accessibility. Benefits Does not help disadvantaged economy. Low cost. Benefits other modes Negative effects on congestion and (cyclists, pedestrians). Benefits accessibility to city centre. environment 7 All round benefits against all Limited benefit to outlying areas obiectives within region. 8 All round benefits against all High cost, lengthy implementation. objectives TABLE 5 - Major Strengths and Weaknesses of Individual Themes

7, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 7.1. Introduction Within the DTI Final Report, the themes were seen as being directly connected to policy areas, with the specific schemes listed in order to give each theme a realistic expression and to enable costs and impacts to be quantified as fully as possible. The process was not used to directly compare, in a quantitative manner, any individual schemes. Where this was deemed necessary, a more detailed decision mechanism, cost benefit analysis, was used in order to resolve choices between individual project options. CBA is a process completely distinct from MCA, where all costs and benefits associated with each scheme under consideration must be quantified in monetary terms. It is more mathematically rigorous but much more narrowly based than MCA. This second tier of decision analysis was, because of its nature, completely decoupled from the first level MCA analysis, and only used to help make choices between two or more specific project alternatives. Within DTI it was used twice, firstly to help choose the best highway option for access and secondly to help decide between the proposed light rail (LRT) and heavy rail (DART) networks. The decision in the first case was relatively straightforward and is not dealt with in this paper. The second is of particular interest, and is discussed immediately below.

7.2. CBA of mutually exclusive public transport options Given the dominance of two public transport options, light rail and heavy rail within the proposed strategy, and given that, in the view of the study team, the multi-criteria analysis had been unsuccessful in separating the two, it was decided to use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the relative economic performance of these two options. The details of the layout of the two rail options was as follows: • A 3-arm network serving suburbs to the north, south and east of the city centre respectively.

86 • An extended heavy rail system again serving suburbs to the north, south and east of the city centre respectively, as well as a line to , situated 10 miles north of Dublin. Both options were assessed against the baseline case of a 'bus-only' public transport system. The present value of the benefits of heavy rail was estimated by the study team at IR£215m, with capital cost put at IR£595. This analysis yielded a benefit/cost ratio of 0.4:1. The present value of the benefits of the light rail proposal was estimated by the study team at IR£457m. The capital costs were originally set at IR£220, yielding a benefit/cost ratio of 1.76:1. The costs were subsequently adjusted within the Final Report to over IR£300m, yielding a benefit/cost ratio much closer to unity (approximately 1.3:1). The Final Report also included two additional light rail lines, including a connection to Dublin Airport, giving a total cost for LRT at IR£410m. No benefit/cost ratio for this final light rail proposal was supplied in the 1995 DTI Report, but its exact value is likely to have been only marginally above unity.

8. RESULTING CHOSEN STRATEGY On the basis of the decision process referred to above, the study team together with the relevant committees agreed a Core Strategy that developed into a detailed plan, termed the Interim Strategy, which integrated all the agreed transport components. Following public consultation and the consideration of matters such as ability to implement the strategy in a reasonable period of time and the necessity for proper enforcement of legislation to ensure compliance, a final DTI strategy was agreed. The details of the strategy are as follows:

Scheme category Cost (% of total funds) Motorway completion + 42% (Theme 4) Other road projects 5% (Theme 4) Traffic Management 11% (Themes 3 and 6) Bus Projects 8% (Theme 7) Light rail transit 32% (Theme 7) Limited Heavy rail 2% (Theme 7) TABLE 6 - Final DTI Strategy

Most of the funds allocated to major national road projects were for schemes that had already started and/or to which funding would have been already committed. Therefore, when these allocations are removed from these estimates, it can be seen that over 50% of the uncommitted funds were directed towards light rail (LRT), with traffic management and bus projects also well funded. Heavy rail was addressed in a very restricted way, with recommendations for limited extensions to the existing heavy rail (DART) lines.

8"7 9. ANALYSING THE STRATEGIC DECISIONS ARRIVED AT WITHIN THE DTI FINAL REPORT 9.1. Introduction The 1995 DTI Final Report stated that the multi-criteria analysis formed the basis for the formation of the Core Strategy. Cost Benefit Analysis was only used where the multi-criteria analysis proved inconclusive and strategy formulation required utilizing some form of mechanism for allowing direct economic comparison between individual schemes. Given the central importance of the results of the multi-criteria analysis to the final choice of constituents for the DTI Transportation Strategy, and the fact that the original analysis of the strategic impact matrix was qualitative, the author employed a multi-criteria decision model to examine more closely exactly what conclusions regarding choice of strategy can be inferred from the information in Table 4. The model analysed, in a quantitatively way, the results of the Summary Impact Matrix, separating out the various themes and ranking them on the basis of their performance on the decision criteria. It helped ascertain whether the assumptions made by the study team regarding general performance of the themes is correct, and whether the results obtained from the data provided within the matrix were consistent with the final chosen strategy.

9.2. Analysis of Summary Impact Matrix The ViSA decision model (Belton and Vickers, 1990) was used to analyse the Summary Impact Matrix in Table 4. It is a simple weighted value function model that requires information on the relative performance of the themes, as given in the above matrix, together with estimates of the relative importance weightings of the criteria involved. The method is well suited for indicating a preference ordering of one option from among a set of options whose relative performances on a set of predetermined criteria are known. In the initial run of the model, it was assumed that the criteria were all equally weighted, with each of the sub-criteria within a given criterion also accorded equal importance. In a subsequent sensitivity analysis, the relative weightings of the main criteria were varied and the effects of these variations were studied. VISA is a relatively simple model which yields results that are readily understood. Given the preliminary nature of the information in Table 4, the author has deemed it an appropriate model to analyse the data involved. Each option receives a score between 0 and 100, with 100 achieved if that option scores 'strongly positive impact' on all sub-criteria, and 0 if all scores are 'strongly negative impact'. For each option, the scores on each main criterion are weighted to reflect the importance of that criterion relative to all others. The overall top-scoring option is ranked in the first position, the second top score is ranked second, and so on. It is particularly important to carry out a sensitivity analysis on the initial results, particularly on the criterion weightings, in order to test the robustness of the initial rankings. A baseline analysis was carried out using the VISA Model on the assumption that the importance levels of the 5 main criteria were broadly equal, with the importance weightings of the sub-criteria within each main criterion grouping also assumed to be approximately the same. The ranking obtained from the initial analysis was as follows:

88 Theme 8 (76%)

Theme 5 (70%)

Theme 3,7 (67%)

Theme 4 (65%) $ Theme 2 (60%)

Theme 6 (58%)

Theme t (22%)

Baseline Ranking Result

A sensitivity analysis was then carried out in which the relative importance of each of the main criteria in turn was emphasised relative to the other four, up to a maximum level of approximately twice the importance of the other main criteria. The relative importances of the sub-criteria in each main grouping were kept equal. The ranking results of the sensitivity testing were as follows:

Theme 8 (80%) Theme 8 (78%) Theme 8 (76%) Theme 8 (77%) Themes 3,8 (69%) $ $ $ Theme 5 (74%) Theme 5 (72%) Theme 5 (72%) Theme 5 (70%) Themes 4,5 (64%) $ $ $ $ $ Themes 3,4 (67%) Theme 7 (70%) Theme 3,7 (68%) Theme 7 (68%) Themes 2,7 (61%) $ $ $ $ Theme 7 (65%) Themes 3,4 (65%) Theme 4 (650%) Themes 3,4 (66%) Theme 6 (58%) $ $ $ $ $ Theme 2 (58%) Theme 2 (62%) Theme 2 (61%) Theme 6 (60%) Theme 1 (20%) $ $ $ $ Theme 6 (51%) Theme 6 (60%) Theme 6 (59%) Theme 2 (58%) $ $ $ Theme 1 (18%) Theme t (21%) Theme 1 (20%) Theme 1 (20%)

...... u i ...... i ...... Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Double the Double the Double the Double the Double the relative relative relative relative relative importance of importance of importance or importance of importance of 'employment' 'Quality of Life' 'international 'development of 'efficiency in context' city/region' implementation'

89 The baseline and sensitivity tests can be summarised as follows:

Baseline Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Theme 8 Rank1 Rank 1 Rank 1 Rank 1 Rank 1 Rank 1 Theme 5 Rank 2 Rank 2 Rank 2 Rank 2 Rank 2 Rank 2 Theme 7 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 3 Rank 3 Rank 3 Rank 3 Theme 3 Rank 3 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 1 Theme 4 Rank 4 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 4 Rank 4 Rank 2 Theme 2 Rank 5 Rank 5 Rank 5 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 3 Theme 6 Rank 6 Rank 6 Rank 6 Rank 6 Rank 6 Rank 4 Theme 1 Rank 7 Rank 7 Rank 7 Rank 7 Rank 7 Rank 5

TABLE 7 - Overall rankings from Baseline Result and Sensitivity Testing

The results of the modelling process indicate clearly that Theme 8 was the outstanding option, followed by Theme 5. Themes 7, 3 and 4 were clustered together a significant distance behind the top two. Theme 6 performed worse than all other six 'live' themes. Theme 1 was included purely as a datum point against which the performance of the seven live themes could be judged. It is quite surprising how relatively poorly those themes that dominated the Core Strategy actually perform when the Summary Impact Matrix is analysed as shown in Table 7. Themes 7, 3, 4 and 6, which constitute 98% of the chosen strategy in financial terms, are ranked third, fourth, fifth and seventh respectively out of the seven live themes examined. Conversely, Themes 5 and 8, which performed best within the MCA form no meaningful part of the Core Strategy as indicated by Table 6.

9.3. Discrepancies between Reported and Actual performance of Core Strategy An Interim Report published by DTI (DTI, 1993) circulated the Study Team's findings prior to the publication of the Final Report in 1995. It contained a figure at its conclusion which gave the performance of the selected Core Strategy against each of the sub-criteria of evaluation listed in Table 1, again using the seven point scale shown in Table 3. These performance scores, detailed below in the second column of Table 8, were used by the Study Team to emphasise the strong performance of the Core Strategy on all the chosen sub-criteria. However, when one examines the scores on the same sub-criteria for the individual Themes (3, 4, 6 and 7) that make up the Core Strategy, certain inconsistencies become obvious. Columns 3 to 6 of Table 8 list the individual criterion scores for Themes 3, 4, 6 and 7 respectively, as listed in the DTI Interim Report. They are identical to those scores given in DTI the Final Report for these Themes:

90 Reported Performance Actual Performance of Constituent Themes of Core Strategy (DTI Interim and Final Report) (DTI Interim Report) Criteria Core Strategy Theme 3 Theme 4 Theme 6 Theme 7 1.1 + - F + + + + -- + 1,2 + + + + -F÷ -- ÷-I--I- 1.3 + + + + +/++ + / - ++/+++ 1.4 + + + + +/++ N / - +++ 2.1 + + + + + N +++ 2.2 + + + N N ++ ++ 2.3 + + N + +++ + 2.4 + + + + N ++ 2.5 + + + N ++ + ++ 3.1 + + +++ ++ +++/++ + 3.2 + + + N N - N/+++ 3.3 + + + + + N + 3.4 + + + + + + + ÷ + 4.1 + + + + N N +++ 4.2 + + N + N ++ 4.3 + + + + + + + + 4.4 + + N ++ N 5.1 + + + + + + + + + - - i 5 . 2 + + + + + + + + ~5.3 + + +++ N ++ - - 5.4 - - - N 5.5 - N - - - 5.6 + + N + ++ 5.7 + + + TABLE 8 -Reported vs. Actual performance of Core Strategy

Table 8 indicates that the reported results of the Core Strategy in the Interim Report of DTI are not consistent with the results from the Strategic Impact Matrix of its constituent themes. It is not possible for a strategy to be awarded a score 'very positive impact' when not one of the major constituent themes obtains that score on the impact in question, with some of the others scoring well below this level. Table 8 illustrates that this is the case for seven of the sub-criteria of evaluation. If those projects included within the Core Strategy were chosen on the basis of the information detailed in the second column of Table 8, it could be concluded that such a decision lacks any firm foundation.

9.4. Use of CBA to Decide Between Individual Rail-Based Schemes The DTI Final Report concluded that, with regard to Themes 7 and 8, the results of the Summary Impact Matrix were inconclusive, and that some additional form of decision process, in this c a s e cost benefit analysis, would be required to separate out light rail and heavy rail scheme options. This assumption is fundamentally flawed. Analysis using the VISA decision model showed that, in overall terms, DART outperformed the LRT theme by between 15% and 20%. Leaving this error to one side, the subsequent Cost Benefit Analysis undertaken by the study team indicated that LRT had preference over DART in economic terms. This economic justification for light rail scheme is, however, quite marginal. Closer examination of the evaluation shows that no account was taken of the negative economic effect of the disruption to city- centre traders caused during the construction phase of LRT, costs that would be avoided by the underground DART system. Inclusion of this cost would further undermine the economic viability of light rail, and cast doubt on the

9 ] basis both forits preference over the proposed heavy rail network and for its inclusion within the strategy. There is no explanation as to why, for two very similar networks in terms of physical extent and coverage, the calculated net benefits for DART were so far below those given for LRT (IR215m as opposed to IR£457m). One can only assume that the baseline assumptions were not the same for the two analyses.

We can therefore conclude two main points from the analysis of the decision information in the DTI Final Report: • The two best performing themes were excluded from the strategy for reasons that should not have led to their complete omission within a transport plan with a time horizon of nearly 20 years. • The study team overstated the performance of the chosen Core Strategy, which was comprised of projects from the less well performing themes. In reality, it did not, as the DTI Interim Report stated, demonstrate strong positive impacts under all main criteria. Its actual performance was, at best, mixed. • The study team justification for introducing cost-benefit analysis for comparing the individual rail-based schemes on the basis of inconclusive findings from the multi-criteria analysis was flawed. The results of the VISA model illustrates that LRT and DART were not indistinguishable. The latter option was clearly preferred. The marginal economic justification for LRT over DART shown within the cost-benefit analysis, together with the omission of important costs, and a lack of transparency in the assumptions underlying the two analyses, makes the case for light rail highly questionable.

9.5. Concluding comments on the DTI decision process The main conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of the DTI decision process is that two of the best performing themes ultimately did not form a meaningful part of the final DTI Strategy. The DTI Final Report gave two explicit reasons why they completely omitted Themes 5 and 8 from the final strategy: • The Study Team saw both themes as being contrary to stated policy objectives, Theme 5 was not considered by the consultants to be in line ~it~ EU ~ l i ~ ~bi~tN~s ~s ~t,~u~ ~ t be ~ be~'~t t~ the ~ e m g ~ e ~ in the study region. Implementation of Theme 8 was judged by the consultants to be contrary to Government policy objectives, though these were not stated specifically. • Both themes were deemed too expensive and could not be financed within projected budget levels.

Let us comment on these two points. With regard to the first objection, while public transport may be judged to be of more benefit to lower income groups than better facilities for private motorists, it would seem an insufficient reason for excluding any major road developments, other than those that have been started, from a strategy that is supposed to run to 2011. Given the rapid growth of the Dublin Region in recent years, total exclusion of any new major road development seems short-sighted. The final strategy did include

92 provision for one such project - the northern leg of the eastern motorway by- pass of the city. This project was justified in relation to the need for proper access to the Dublin Port area, and it has been allocated funding as part of the recently published Update (2000-2006) to the DTI Strategy (DTO, 1999). No other extensive road developments from Theme 5 have been included in this update. The policy reasons for excluding Theme 8 are much less clear. While light rail (LRT) is the rail option preferred by the present Government, development of the heavy rail network in the Dublin area remains an objective for CIE, the holding company for the national bus and rail service providers. Nevertheless, any significant development of the heavy rail network in Dublin (DART) was excluded from the original DTI Strategy. While the DTI 2000-2006 Update (DTO, 1999) allows for a study of heavy rail through the city centre, this study has been funded privately by CIE, in contrast to the extensive Government funding afforded to the study of light rail options. With regard to the funding problem, while this may have been a constraint in 1995 due to limited national economic growth and upper limits on available EU funds, this scenario has changed. The rate of growth within the Irish economy in recent years has outstripped all other Member States of the European Union. While implementation in full of the Theme 5 set of projects would involve significant funding (roughly I R£1000m in 1995 terms), the exclusion of DART in favour of the LRT option, decided upon on the basis primarily of relative cost, raises some questions. Within the 1995 DTI Final Report, the cost of LRT initially estimated at IR£220m, was put at IR£410m with the equivalent DART development, including an underground section in the city centre, priced at IR£595m. This differential was a major factor in excluding the DART option. This differential has been reduced somewhat in the intervening years. The original LRT scheme has been scrapped and the light rail proposal within the 2000-2006 DTI update, which makes provision for an underground section in the city centre, is estimated at IR£415m, excluding the cost of the underground section which at present remains an unknown. Meanwhile, a study commissioned by CIE at present in progress (McDonald, 1999), which examines the most up-to-date techniques for installing a heavy rail underground network in central Dublin, indicates a revised heavy rail network with preliminary valuations in the region of IR£500m. Despite this apparent convergence in costs of LRT and DART, the desire for an underground rail system in the centre of Dublin and the dominance of the heavy rail option within the Multi-Criteria Analysis, extensive heavy rail development continues to be effectively excluded from the ongoing strategic transport plan for Dublin in favour of light rail.

10. THE LACK OF RATIONALITY IN THE DTI DECISION MAKING PROCESS 10.1. Introduction Rational decision-making requires that a number of options be assessed on the basis of a set of common criteria, and that some evaluation process be used to select the preferred option which is then implemented (Rogers et al. 1999). The 1995 DTI Final Report appears at first to conform, in a broad

93 sense, to the rational process. A number of options/themes are assessed on the basis of a set of well thought-out criteria / sub-criteria. An evaluation matrix, along with public consultation and selective economic analysis, allows a preferred strategy to be identified. Upon closer examination, however, flaws in the rationality of the process appear. These deficiencies appear in the following areas: • Low level of linkage between DTI objectives and themes chosen • Exclusion of the best performing theme • Viewing LRT and DART as mutually exclusive rather than complimentary

Let us examine each of these points in some detail.

10.2. Low level of linkage between DTI objectives and themes chosen The DTI Final Report states explicitly that the vision statement and objectives 'formed the framework within which ideas on possible transport strategies were developed'. The transport agencies within the study area defined all feasible scheme proposals that, together with specific policy ideas, were constituted as 8 separate themes. The study team believed that, while no theme constituted an 'embryonic strategy', they were coherent sets of possible schemes and strategies, useful for exploring various policy options. On analysis, the direct connection between objectives and themes seems doubtful. Making a connection between objectives and strategy via the assessment of general themes and specific project options is not straightforward due to the very structure of the themes. The study team envisaged that the themes would allow them to evaluate a wide range of policy options before a detailed strategy was developed. In reality, they were the product of transport agencies/pressura groups putting forward, in the main, mode specific themes, be they road, public transport, traffic management or walking/cycling based. But any theme that flowed directly from DTI objectives would have to have been multi-modal by definition in order to hope to address all necessary criteria. In order to reflect the stated objectives, the themes would have to have been outline strategies. The themes chosen were, in reality, more related to mode-based or issue -based interests, and only tenuously connected to the 5 detailed objectives of DTI. The process was designed to identify policies/schemes that might together form a coherent strategy. The fact that the themes, by their very design, had no hope of scoring consistently well over all objectives/criteria, made this very process of strategy identification far less clear-cut.

10.3. Excluding the Best Theme The authors of the 1995 DTI Final Report stated that the themes were not really independent options, but were a 'useful means by which various policy options could be explored. The report presupposed that no 'winning' theme would be found, and that the process would therefore be used to devise a strategy that extracted the key benefits from a number of themes. The results of the decision model contradict this assertion. A winning theme was found. Theme 8 was clearly the best option. As it transpired, it was subsequently excluded from any meaningful role in the Core Strategy on the basis of its estimated cost and their stated inconsistency with national/EU policy. If it was against fundamental policy objectives, it should have been excluded at an

94 earlier stage in the process, before the Summary Impact Matrix was compiled. It would appear that the scores from Theme 8 were left in the DTI Final Report so that they would reflect favourably on the light rail option. The major upgrading of public transport within the Core Strategy was justified within the Final Report by Themes 7 and 8 'showing strong City Centre benefits' even though Theme 8 had, by this stage, been excluded. The exclusion after the evaluation stage of the best performing option and the rather arbitrary selection of projects from the less well performing themes in order to form a strategy diminished significantly the rationality of the decision process leading to the formation of the Core Strategy. This resulted in a final mix of schemes decidedly sub-optimal, whose actual performance against DTI objectives fell well below their reported performance in the 1993 DTI Interim Report. The exclusion of Theme 8 from the Core Strategy was done primarily on the basis of cost. The estimated cost of the proposed light rail network continues to soar, with no clear indication yet as to what the final expenditure will be. Notwithstanding this, however, the present level of economic prosperity is such that the CIE commissioned Study referred to above believes its proposed city centre underground heavy rail network should be built in tandem with a light rail system bringing commuters into the centre from the suburbs. Given the availability of funds, both light and heavy rail options should be examined on an equal footing, in order to decide in a rational and logical manner whether LRT, DART, or some combination of both systems holds the key to Dublin's ongoing need for a proper rail-based public transport system.

10.4. LRT and DART Analysed as Mutually Exclusive Rather Than Complimentary The direct comparison of the two rail-based schemes, LRT and DART, was carried out on the basis that, while there was some differences in the individual areas served, each were broadly similar in terms of coverage, i.e. a rail network serving the north, south and eastern suburbs of the city alongside a connection to the National Airport. No separate option containing a substantial element of both systems was evaluated against the baseline situation. They were assumed by the study team to be mutually exclusive. The evaluation of a DART-based 'underground' system within the centre of the city connecting into a street-level LRT network serving the north, south and west suburbs of the city could have been evaluated. Such an option could have achieved the twin benefits of being more cost effective than an extensive DART network, while minimising the negative effects to city-centre businesses of the construction of a surface-based LRT system. Given the acknowledged benefits of DART, such an option, within one of the themes, would have given added value to the overall evaluation.

11. CONCLUSIONS AND THE PRESENT SITUATION The complete exclusion of Theme 8 from the Core Strategy of a Transportation study with a 20-year time scale was ill-advised, given its strong performance in the Multi-Criteria Analysis. Heavy rail should have been assessed on the same level and with the same level of commitment as afforded to the evaluation of light rail, rather than letting LRT remain as the

95 one chosen urban rail option. There appears to have been no room in the original DTI evaluation for a theme containing a substantive and complimentary LRT and DART input. If there is validity to an underground network for central Dublin, a view echoed by Whitney and O'Mahony (1999), then both the light and heavy options must be examined and assessed. The current lack of progress in choosing an urban rail system for Dublin gives transport planners an opportunity to assess all existing options rather than putting unwarranted emphasis on one rail-based public transport system in isolation. The Government are at present compiling a comprehensive transport plan for Dublin. No final decision has yet been made but the submissions to Government have been reported within the printed media. The information divulged to the public press would tend to suggest that a plan will be approved which entails both LRT and DART throughout the city, rather than a more modest plan involving a complimentary input from Metro and LRT, with underground heavy rail in the city centre and light rail feeding into it from the suburbs. The problem with such an extensive plan where some suburbs will be served by both Metro and LRT is that it becomes so expensive that any downturn in the economy brings doubt on its viability. It also pushes out the time frame on a problem that is already acute. Approval for a given scheme under consideration does not seem to be based on whether it is a good scheme or not. Evaluation of project worth does not seem to be central to the decision process. Such an overall plan, based on a 'predict and provide' mentality rather than on general economic viability, is flawed, and does nothing to solve the problems created by the mistaken outcomes of the original DTI 1995 Report.

12. REFERENCES BELTON, V. AND VICKERS, S. (1990) 'Use of a Simple Multi-Attribute Value Function Incorporating Visual interactive Sensitive Analysis (VISA) For Multiple Criteria Decision Making'. In Readings in Multiple Criteria Decision Aid (ed. Bana e Costa, C. A., Springer-Verlag DUBLIN TRANSPORT INITIATIVE (1993) Dublin Transport Initiative Phase 2: Summary Interim Report. Stationary Office, Dublin. DUBLIN TRANSPORT INITIATIVE, STEER DAVIES GLEAVE, McHUGH CONSULTANTS (1995) Dublin Transport Initiative: Final Report. Stationary Office, Dublin DUBLIN TRANSPORT OFFICE (1999) Dublin Transportation Blueprint 2000- 2006: A Submission to the National Development Plan, June, DTO. McDONALD, F. (1999) 'A 'metro" for Dublin city centre in Latest Rail Plans'. Irish Times, 4 th October. ROGERS, M.G., BRUEN, M.P. AND MAYSTRE, L.Y. (1999) Electre and Decision Support: Methods and Applications in Engineering and Infrastructure Investment. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, October. WHITNEY, V. J. and O'MAHONY, M. M. (1999) 'Transport Planning in Dublin and Edinburgh'. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Transport, 135, Aug.,pp163-170.

96