Russia Luke Coffey and Alexis Mrachek ussia remains a formidable threat to the cruisers; 13 destroyers; 15 frigates; and 118 pa- RUnited States and its interests in Europe. trol and coastal combatants. The air force has From the Arctic to the Baltics, Ukraine, and the 1,183 combat-capable aircraft. The IISS counts South Caucasus, and increasingly in the Med- 280,000 members of the army. Russia also has iterranean, Russia continues to foment insta- a total reserve force of 2,000,000 for all armed bility in Europe. Despite economic problems, forces.1 In addition, Russian deep-sea research Russia continues to prioritize the rebuilding vessels include converted ballistic missile sub- of its military and funding for its military oper- marines, which hold smaller auxiliary subma- ations abroad. Russia remains antagonistic to rines that can operate on the ocean floor.2 the United States both militarily and politically, To avoid political blowback from military and its efforts to undermine U.S. institutions deaths abroad, Russia has increasingly de- and the NATO alliance continue without let- ployed paid private volunteer troops trained at up. In Europe, Russia uses its energy position Special Forces bases and often under the com- along with espionage, cyberattacks, and infor- mand of Russian Special Forces. It has used mation warfare to exploit vulnerabilities with such volunteers in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine the goal of dividing the transatlantic alliance because “[t]hey not only provide the Kremlin and undermining people’s faith in government with plausible political deniability but also ap- and societal institutions. parently take casualties the Russian authori- Overall, Russia possesses significant con- ties do not report.”3 In July 2020, for example, ventional and nuclear capabilities and remains Russia deployed 33 Wagner Group mercenar- the principal threat to European security. Its ies to Belarus to create additional political aggressive stance in a number of theaters, turmoil ahead of the August presidential elec- including the Balkans, Georgia, Syria, and tion.4 Russia also prepared a law enforcement Ukraine, continues both to encourage desta- team, likely including military troops, after the bilization and to threaten U.S. interests. election “to help shore up Belarusian leader Military Capabilities. According to the Alexander Lukashenko if protests against him International Institute for Strategic Studies spiral[ed] out of control.”5 In February 2018, at (IISS), among the key weapons in Russia’s Deir al-Zour in eastern Syria, 500 pro-Assad inventory are 340 intercontinental ballistic forces and Russian mercenaries armed with missiles, 2,800 main battle tanks, more than Russian tanks, artillery, and mortars attacked 5,160 armored infantry fighting vehicles, more U.S.-supported Kurdish forces.6 Approximate- than 6,100 armored personnel carriers, and ly 30 U.S. Rangers and Delta Force special op- more than 4,342 pieces of artillery. The navy erators were also at the base.7 U.S. air strikes has one aircraft carrier; 49 submarines (in- helped to repulse the attack, and “three sourc- cluding 10 ballistic missile submarines); four es familiar with the matter” estimated that The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 239 approximately 300 Russian mercenaries were military power to maintain political control, either killed or wounded.8 there is ample reason to maintain spending In January 2019, reports surfaced that 400 on the military in spite of glum economic news. Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group Russia spent $65.1 billion on its military in were in Venezuela to bolster the regime of Nico- 2019, which is 4.5 percent more than it spent in las Maduro.9 Russian propaganda in Venezuela 2018.19 This increase in spending enabled Rus- has supported the regime and stoked fears of sia to rejoin the ranks of the world’s top five American imperialism. In February 2020, Rus- defense spending nations in 2019.20 sian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Much of Russia’s military expenditure goes Venezuela to “counteract U.S. sanctions” and toward modernization of its armed forces. In show support for Maduro.10 During the past January 2018, then-Chairman of the Joint few years, as the crisis has metastasized and Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Marine Corps Gener- protests against the Maduro regime have grown, al Joseph Dunford noted that “[t]here is not a Russia has begun to deploy troops and supplies single aspect of the Russian armed forces that to bolster Maduro’s security forces.11 In Decem- has not received some degree of moderniza- ber 2018, for example, Russia temporarily de- tion over the past decade.”21 From 2010 to 2019, ployed two Tu-160 nuclear-capable bombers to close to 40 percent of Russia’s total military Caracas.12 Russia also exports billions in arms to spending was on arms procurement.22 Tak- Venezuela (and has loaned the regime money ing into account total military expenditure, to purchase Russian arms) along with $70 mil- Russia spent nearly 4 percent of GDP on de- lion–$80 million yearly in nonmilitary goods.13 fense in 2019.23 In July 2016, Russian President Vladimir In early 2018, Russia introduced its new Putin signed a law creating a National Guard State Armament Program 2018–2027, a $306 with a total strength (both civilian and mili- billion investment in new equipment and 14 tary) of 340,000, controlled directly by him. force modernization. However, according to He created his National Guard, which is re- the Royal Institute of International Affairs, sponsible for “enforcing emergency-situation “as inflation has eroded the value of the rouble regimes, combating terrorism, defending Rus- since 2011, the new programme is less ambi- sian territory, and protecting state facilities tious than its predecessor in real terms.”24 and assets,” by amalgamating “interior troops Russia’s nuclear capabilities have been pri- and various law-enforcement agencies.”15 Al- oritized for modernization, and approximate- though Putin could issue a directive to deploy ly 82 percent of its nuclear forces have been this force abroad,16 he is more likely to use it to modernized.25 Russia plans to deploy the RS- stifle domestic dissent. 28 (Satan 2) ICBM by 2021 as a replacement The COVID-19 pandemic has severely af- for the RS-36, which is being phased out in the fected Russia’s economic growth.17 In the first 2020s.26 The missile, which can carry up to 15 quarter of 2020, economic growth in Russia warheads, underwent flight development tests “slowed to 1.6 percent…before sliding into a from April–June 2019.27 According to a March projected contraction in the second quarter 2020 report, Russia upgraded its facilities for caused by lockdowns aimed at curbing the production of the RS-28 missile.28 new coronavirus outbreak.”18 Because of the The armed forces also continue to undergo steep economic downturns from the corona- process modernization, which was begun by virus, Russia will likely have difficulty funding Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in 2008.29 military affairs. However, economic problems Partially because of this modernization, for- at home also can incentivize regimes to pur- mer U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense sue military adventures abroad to distract for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge the public and generate positive news for the Colby stated in January 2018 that the U.S. mil- government. If an autocratic leader relies on itary advantage over Russia is eroding.30 240 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength In April 2020, the Kremlin revealed that consistent delay.41 As of April 2020, Russia’s it had begun state trials for its T-14 Armata Severnoye Design Bureau halted develop- main battle tank in Syria.31 Aside from the T-14 ment of the frigates entirely because of finan- Armata, Russia has resumed upgrades to the cial setbacks.42 T-72B3 and T-80BVM main battle tanks.32 Rus- In November 2018, Russia sold three Admi- sia’s fifth-generation Su-27 fighter fell short ral Grigorovich–class frigates to India. Russia of expectations, particularly with regard to is set to deliver at least two of the frigates to stealth capabilities. In May 2018, the govern- India by 2024.43 The ships had been intended ment cancelled mass production of the Su-27 for the Black Sea Fleet, but Russia found itself because of its high costs and limited capability unable to produce a replacement engine fol- advantages over upgraded fourth-generation lowing Ukraine sanctions. Similar problems fighters.33 Russia lost one of its Su-27 jets near have befallen the long-delayed Admiral Gor- the Crimean coast during a planned mission shkov–class procurements. Of the planned 14 in March 2020.34 frigates, Russia has engines for only two.44 In October 2018, Russia’s sole aircraft Russia’s naval modernization continues to carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was severely prioritize submarines. According to the IISS, damaged when a dry dock sank and a crane fell, “[s]ubmarine building will focus on complet- puncturing a hole in the deck and hull.35 The ing the series of Borey-A ballistic-missile boats carrier is not likely to be salvaged. In May 2019, armed with Bulava missiles and Project 08851 reports surfaced that Russia is seeking to begin Yasen-M multi-role submarines, though from building a new nuclear-powered aircraft car- the early 2020s construction is expected to rier in 2023 for delivery in the late 2030s, but begin on the first Khaski-class successor.”45 the procurement’s financial and technological The Khaski-class submarines