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An Analysis of the Narrow Front Plan and the Factors Affecting Its Success

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An Analysis of the Narrow Front Plan and the Factors Affecting Its Success University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 5-1-1973 The narrow front versus the broad front: An analysis of the narrow front plan and the factors affecting its success Bobbie G. Pedigo University of Nebraska at Omaha Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Recommended Citation Pedigo, Bobbie G., "The narrow front versus the broad front: An analysis of the narrow front plan and the factors affecting its success" (1973). Student Work. 373. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/373 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE NARROW FRONT VERSUS THE BROAD FRONT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NARROW FRONT PLAN AND THE FACTORS AFFECTING ITS SUCCESS A Thesis Presented to the Department of History and the Faculty of the Graduate College University of Nebraska at Omaha In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts by Bobbie G. Pedigo May 1973 UMI Number: EP73011 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation: WbiisMng UMI EP73011 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 TlIESI 5 ACCBPTA8QE Accepted for t!i© facility of The Sr&thiate College of the University of Kebra&ka at Qtsa&a, in partial fulfillm ent of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts* Graduate Ccmitto® uooaxtment , Jhf O P # ^ MS* ■ ffgn* \Ui- ACKNOWLEGEMENTS It would be impossible to list all the generous people who have helped in this effort. The Staff and Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas have provided helpful assistance in the form of information, assistance, and encourage­ ment. I am most appreciative for the special considerations extended by the library staff of the Command and General Staff College and for their expenditures in time and effort on my behalf. Their cheerful and willing assistance in obtaining source material contributed immeasur­ ably to my research. I am grateful to Mister William H. Cunliffe at the Modem Mili­ tary History Department, National Archives, Washington, D.C. who pro­ vided copies of innumerable military documents on short notification. His timely responses to urgent requests permitted continuous writing efforts when established deadlines loomed in the immediate future. Finally, there would have been no manuscript but for the efforts of Doctors Harl A. Dalstrom and A. Stanley Trickett of the Department of History, University of Nebraska at Omaha. I am indebted to the first for his guidance and wise counsel, and to the latter for the direction of my academic efforts, for his patience and understanding of the many problems associated with military duty, and for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this thesis. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION........................ ............... 1 CHAPTER I. NORMANDY, TO BELGIUM............................ 5 Preinvasion Planning Montgomery as Land Force Commander Eisenhower as Supreme Commander Command Relationship Between Eisenhower and Montgomery II. THE PERSONALITIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR CONFLICTS............................. 15 Introduction Eisenhower Montgomery Bradley Patton III. THE NARROW FRONT PLAN . ................... 45 Introduction Strategy of the Plan Routes of Advance and Courses of Action Available The Expected German Order of Battle Logistical Support and its Availability IV. THE BROAD FRONT PLAN .........................61 Introduction Strategy of the Plan Routes of Advance and Courses of Action Available Allied Order of Battle to Support the Plan Known German Opposition and its Locations Logistical Support Considerations f V. OPPOSITION TO MONTGOMERYS NARROW FRONT P L A N ........... 75 Introduction The Controversy of Acceptance Continuing Conflicts Operation MARKET/GARDEN Mid-September Conflicts Later Attempts and the Aftermath iii CHAPTER VI. FACTORSAFFECTING THENARROW FRONT ................ 98 Introduction Allied Situation Enemy* Situation A Consideration of Allied Logistical Support Capabilities and Requirements Summary VII. EVALUATIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS ......... 143 The Human Factors Probable Tactical Plan to Secure Berlin Logistical Considerations Conclusions BIBLIOGRAPHY .............. ................. 163 LIST OF TABLES ................................... v LIST OF M A P S ........... ............................. vi iv LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 1. Daily Port Discharge in Tons (August to November)..................... 117 2. Gasoline Consumption Data, XIX Corps, European Theater of Operations, 6 June-1 Dec 1944 . 130 3. Gasoline Consumption Data, 12th Army Group (28 day period) ............ 130 4. First Army Allocation and Receipt ofSupplies (6-12 September 1944)............. 137 5. Combat Zone Maintenance Factors, June-October 1944 ................. 150 v LIST OF MAPS MAP PAGE 1. Central Europe at the Outbreak of War, 3 September 1939 ......... 155 2. The Final OVERLORD Plan ............. 156 3. The Broad and Narrow Fronts . ............. 157 4. Development of the Lodgment: 21 Army Group Forecast of Operations as of 26 February 1944 . 158 5. The Advance To Antwerp .............. 159 6. The Advance Into Belgium and the Development of the Broad Front Policy ..... .......... 160 7. Pursuit to the German Border, 26 August-11 September 1944 . .............. 161 8. Operation MARKET-GARDEN, 17-26 September 1944 . 162 vi INTRODUCTION When the United States entered the Second World War General Bernard L. Montgomery of Great Britain believed the war in Europe could be concluded by the end of 1944. He maintained this view during the ensuing months and in August 1944 recognized an opportunity to end the war in accordance with his timetable. His plan, which called for a narrow front approach to Berlin, was refuted in favor of the previously planned broad front approach of General Dwight D . Eisenhower. The con­ duct of the campaign in northwestern Europe under the broad front ap­ proach versus the narrow front has remained a subject of controversy since that time, During the conduct of the war in Europe events appeared to flow in a coherent and connected pattern under the guiding hand of Eisenhower. One great milestone followed another; first, the unbelieveable success of the landing in June and the capture of Cherbourg. Then, through July and August, the long anxious battle of the bridgehead ending with the the American breakout through St. Lo and the encirclement and destruction of the German Army in the Falaise pocket. Following this were the days of pursuit, the fall of Paris and Brussels, and the line-up with the new American army sweeping up from southern France. The German resistance was crumbling and each day brought talk of ending the war. Each event of the war appeared to follow logically and inevitably, 1 2 but this was not so. Grave divisions of opinion developed in the Allied High Command. Personal jealousies flared up and there were many moments of serious doubts and hesitations. Vain and ridiculous emotional na­ tional rivalries clouded the issues. Prejudices took root through lack of information and the unavoidable confusion of war. Mainly because the Allies were winning, and very largely through the patience and determined tact of Eisenhower, these animosities never reached the point of open revolt. The Command of this war was far more steady, far more complete and unified than the Command in the previous war. Rivalries and minor cross-currents between nationalities erupted, but were subdued by the Supreme Commander or lost in the shock and movement of the fighting. There were British officers in the combined headquarters who favored the American strategy and Americans in the same headquarters who could see the British position with equal clarity. Those were difficult days for all concerned. The most famous and long lasting difference of opinion between Eisenhower and Montgomery was the narrow front versus the broad front approach to Berlin. General George C. Marshall supported Eisenhower's position while General Sir Alan Brooke and Prime Minister Winston Chur­ chill supported Montgomery. Eisenhower, while agreeing with the general axis of advance of the narrow front plan, would not approve its imple­ mentation because of the inherent risks attached. The logistical situ­ ation was such that he believed all other operations in the European Theater of Operations would have to be suspended in order to support Montgomery's plan. The purpose of this work is to determine whether, given all the variables, the narrow front approach could have succeeded. In order to present the situation in clear prespective and as it actually existed at the time of the disagreement, it is necessary to review the overall planning for the cross-channel attack and look at the situation as it de­ veloped. This early planning was to affect directly the personal atti­ tudes
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