Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN AND SECURITY THREATS TO CENTRAL ASIA. RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY IN THE REGION

Ivan A. Safranchuk, Editor-in-Chief of "The Great Game: politics, business, security in Central Asia" journal

Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting

April 14, 2016

Ivan Safranchuk: Well, good morning, everybody. I would also like to thank all of the people of PIR Center, all of the people that are present here today, absent today. And I was connected with PIR Center - I believe this is my second arrival in PIR Center Advisory Board. So, I’m happy to be here. Well, I am really happy to welcome the members of the Trialogue Club International. And this is a closed platform, but it’s quite well known by experts, and I hope that, well, you are all present, so it is well known, but I hope that it is equally useful.

I am going to talk about Afghanistan, about the possible influences of Afghanistan on Central Asia and also about Russian policy in the region, regarding the situation in Afghanistan. We’re not going to catch up on the whole situation in Afghanistan. We are more concerned about the northern provinces, and that’s why we are going to dwell on those. And, well, northeastern Afghanistan and west Afghanistan have been provinces, are neighbors, of the three countries in Central Asia. And what we have seen over the course of the past two years is the increasing number of terrorists in those seven provinces.

In the Badakhshan Province, the situation is more complicated, so it’s a neighbor of what’s essentially part of Tajikistan. This province also has a border with Pakistan through the Wakhan corridor and there is quite an easy passage to the tribal zone from there, and the different military routes and paths –also from Central Asia, from Uzbekistan, from Pakistan, from different countries. They can move from all of these lines. Well, Badakhshan is a real, international multi-power zone, so there are a lot of confections represented there. This is a traditional , different groups and non- traditional Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Islamic party of Hekmatyar and various jamaats - groups that are branches of al-Qaeda. And it’s also like New York City – it’s a real melting pot in action.

And then the province of Takhar, which is also a neighbor of Tajikistan, the situation there is a little bit better, but there are also terrorists from different groups. And the Kunduz province. It’s a northern province but traditionally the laws of Pashtun groups are there, and that’s why it’s also taken a strong social basis with the Taliban. And Hekmatyar in Kunduz has a strong position, certainly, at present. And then on the border of Uzbekistan is the . I’m going to discuss it somewhat later. And three provinces next to Turkmenistan: Badghis, Faryab and Jowzjan. And those three Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016 provinces bordering Turkmenistan used to be quite stable, but two years ago the situation changed. And in the course of the last two years, in these three provinces, we have seen increased numbers of military movements. We have lots of information from those three provinces. It’s quite controversial, it’s quite different, but we can summarize it.

So, in these seven north provinces that border with three Central Asian countries, the situation is as follows: in each of those provinces, at least one or two districts are under the control of lords. They control one or two districts in every province. And in those districts, they are really in power. In those districts, they have military bases. They are really well protected, from a military point of view. And the government forces failed to destroy those military bases. So, in all of those seven provinces, we can say that there are some fortresses—we could call those fortresses—which belong to the warlords. Well, I did mention the Balkh province, which is the neighbor of Uzbekistan, there also are districts there, which are controlled by those war confections. But, in general, that province has been called the oasis of stability. And the government there is really strong and is ethnically Tajik, and like a Mujahid. His name is Atta Muhammad Nur and he has some issues involved with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, with local Uzbeks, and also some discrepancies regarding neighboring General Dostum, but in general he is in control of the situation. In general, there are stable districts that are under control of the warlords.

I would like to mention not just those seven provinces that have borders with Central Asian countries, but also the three provinces that are situated somewhat in the rear: Sar-e Pol, Samangan and Baghlan. And these three provinces, about two or three years ago, the situation was quite stable there, and they were controlled by government troops, but then the situation changed and now they are districts under control of the warlords. They have multiple military bases of the warlords. Also, they have integrated their training centers with young people. So, this is the center for training the personnel. And Sar-e Pol will be the rear of Faryab and Jowzjan, so for the three provinces that have borders with Turkmenistan, Sar-e Pol is the rear zone. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. For the three provinces bordering Tajikistan, Baghlan is the good rear zone where they can go. There are great roads there. Also, they can have some rest there and find new personnel, and so on. And the situation is quite interesting in those districts that are under control of the warlords because the government continues to run the funding for all of the government institutions and all the social programs of those districts. Well, in this school that is funded by the government, there is some kind of balance of official government curriculum and Taliban curriculum. So, official government school programm and Taliban subjects are both in the same school.

And we can sum it up in the following way: the infrastructure of those provinces bordering Central Asian countries and also their rear provinces, like Sar-e Pol and Baghlan—their infrastructure is quite strong, the military structure, and it’s impossible to destroy it right away, so it’s going to be present, then. And what makes their situation more difficult, why the warlords are somewhat weaker, because there are multiple sections—on top of the ten main sections, there are also other groups and some of them semi-criminal groups, ideological groups… also, they change their allegiances. They Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016 come to one party and to another party, but still the infrastructure exists there, and it’s really strong. But before we get to the situation on the border before that, I’d first like to get to the situation in the capital, in Kabul. All that is still there, all in the course of the last two years, all of the government officials, the official power, had to deal with it. And a political crisis was going on in Kabul for two years. And the presidential elections of 2014 were quite problematic, and the result was the emergence of a crisis.

Well, I’d like to remind you that in the second round of President , there were more votes for candidate Ghani and he was ahead of his main rival Dr. Abdullah. Dr. Abdullah disagreed with him and they had a complete audit of the votes of the second round of the elections. And then this basically grew, which was signed on the 21st of September of 2014, and they divided all the power 50/50. And of course, many disagree about what does this mean, “50/50,” which was officially put in effect. Instead of two months, it took them six months to have a government, but by mid-2015, actually, they developed a division of powers, and Dr. Abdullah and Ghani did it. And a lot of people were optimistic because of that, because now they thought the government would start functioning and start some reforms. Economic reforms and also starting putting some order in the security realm. And it didn’t happen, since it was 2015 to 2016, it didn’t happen. And a lot of people believed that the reasons were purely technical, and to some extent it’s a fair assessment. It’s connected to the style of work of President Ghani. And President Ghani has technocratic views and he personally wrote some of the documents and personally wrote some of the contracts and he doesn’t trust anyone, but some of what he wrote is more than several million dollars. And he works with the documents a lot. Every day, he spends all waking hours working with the documents, but he takes his time and he doesn’t control the very important function in Afghanistan, meetings with different important and influential people because you have to meet people in Afghanistan all the time and somehow maintain the balance. And in Kazakhstan he met with people and he met with people in Kabul, as well. People like coming to him because he meets with wise people and he gives each of them a gift of five to ten thousand dollars, bringing suitcases of cash to the meetings, and people love meeting him. People like coming to him and he likes meeting them, and he is aware of the situation in the country because of constant meetings with wise, old people, with government officials, with businessmen.

Ghani has quite a different, more technocratic approach. He works more with the documents than with real people. And from my point of view, it diminishes the efficiency of his work. But the most important points for the crisis are not these technical reasons, well, there are more fundamental reasons for the political crisis. There is a major skeleton in the wardrobe of Afghan politics, after 2014. And nobody is mentioning it; people prefer not to mention it. There is no answer to the question: what are the grounds of Ashraf Ghani becoming president? And is he going to remain the president if the agreement of September 2014 loses its force?

And that is a questionable story because there was an international crisis beginning in July 2014 and international intermediaries had to keep track and deal with this political crisis. So those were the machinations of the UN representatives in Afghanistan and also Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016 representatives from the United States were closely involved. Two tracks were created for the political crisis: political and also legal/technical. The legal/technical approach was just the verification of all of the votes, and making the right conclusion, who is the villain. And that process was called the audit of the results of the elections. The idea was to have a government of national unity, and whoever wins the election to become president…and number two, to have some kind of prime minister. This way, they divide their power.

The international intermediaries, well, they were afraid that these political and legal/technical tracks could negatively affect each other. That’s why they tried to do it really separately, the political and technical work. And the result of this work was as follows: they collected the votes and Ghani was announced as the winner, as the president. The political track led towards the signing of a political agreement and allowed the government to become an international unity. And these two documents were just released on the 21st of September—the same date, but they are not connected in any way. As a result, Ghani believes that he is the president and, as a result of the legal, technical procedure, as the votes were counted, and the results of the election were announced. That’s why, in the political agreement, if it loses its validity for any reason, Ghani continues to be the president because he is the elected president of the country. Abdullah believes that Ghani became the president because there was an agreement, not because he was elected, and if there is no longer an agreement, then Ghani is no longer the president.

The situation could be much calmer if the provisions of the political agreement could be followed, but it became clear that the political agreement is not implemented at all. And the Loya Jirga which had to meet in 2016, and make some constitutional changes, but this Loya Jirga is not ready. The changes of the constitution are not prepared. In 2015, the common elections were abolished—not exactly abolished, but the time frame is going to be announced sometime in the future. A lot of people expected the parliamentary elections in 2016 in Afghanistan. I said that there would be no elections in 2016. The inner political system is unstable to the highest extent because the presidency is question because nobody can understand the grounds under which he became the president. There are no common elections, and the constitution is being violated. The international intermediaries that count on negotiations, they have the position of non-interference. Well, the political agreement was signed not just by Abdullah and Ghani, but also by Jan Kubis the United Nations representative and by Amb. Cunningham, the American Ambassador in Kabul, but they are not signatories. They are specified there as witnesses. That was written in the agreement: witnesses to witness the signature of the agreement. And those witnesses, by mid-2015, said they were not the guarantors of the implementation of the agreement. They helped to prepare the provisions of the agreement, but they don’t guarantee the provisions. That became clear that the elimination of the political agreement was really just the matter of time, and then the question is: how can we live in the conditions of the de facto abolishment of the political agreement?

Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016

Ghani, in September 2015, established as a priority for himself negotiations with the Taliban. And there were a number of meetings, some of them accounted by the mass media, some were not accounted, and they used the intermediaries’ services of the United States and tried to come to a quick agreement with the Taliban. Well, the idea was to have an agreement with the Taliban then you don't need to hold the Loya Jirga political agreements, because now this is a dual political reality. You can say we don’t just have this agreement, but you also have to take under consideration this, with the Taliban, so, Ghani had to represent three parties: Ghani, Abdullah, plus the Taliban. While I cannot say that Ghani was interested in this civilization of the north, where supporters of the law were strong, so it provided certain trump cards for Ghani. And what about the ? They tried to put pressure on Ghani, so he doesn’t dare change the partners in the coalition. So, that he doesn’t dare substitute Mujahideen for the Taliban. But among the Mujahideen, among the major commanders there are certain differences, and it’s difficult for them to reach any kind of a compromise…At the same time, they were sort of energized, they started acting more efficiently, and Sayyaf, although he’s a Pashtun and from the Mujahideen, and he created the Council of Security and Stability. As a result, instead of having this sole coalition of Mujahideen and Ghani, de facto they are going in separate directions and they have not very strong government structure, and not very strong Mujahideen structure.

At the same time, the Taliban who allegedly in 2015 were conducting some negotiations then, their positions became much stronger and they came to the decisive stage of the negotiations, so did Ghani. So, they conducted some good negotiations, but they don’t get to the critical stage of the negotiations. And that’s why, as of today, here Kabul could be strong, and constitutional and legitimate that could deal with different problems in the country; such Kabul is practically non-existent today. Well, imagine that you are a group of Taliban, and I’m president Ghani, or maybe I’m his representative who’s trying to convince you to have an agreement with the president, and one of the conditions is to recognize the constitution of Afghanistan. And I will ask you to become part of the political structure, to recognize the constitution. What is your answer going to be? You answer, “Well, look. You became the president in some strange way, either in accordance with the constitution or not in accordance with the constitution. And you haven’t conducted parliamentary elections in accordance with the constitution. There is no constitutional reform, which is specified in the agreement of 2014. There is no constitution that you respect. Why should we then?”

Well, from the constitutionality point of view, Ghani and the Taliban and the Muhajideen, they are all non-constitutional and equally so. That’s why the negotiating positions of the official government are fundamentally weak. Well, this is going to be negotiations of equal partners. In the beginning, it was supposed to be the meeting of the strong with the weak. So, I’ve tried to show you that there is no real hope in Kabul. All of those forces in the north and somewhat in the center, they could be a threat to Central Asia or a threat to Kabul, and we so far don’t know whether those warlords and those military groups are going to war. In the east of Afghanistan, in the provinces – Nangarhar, Paktika, Paktia and here in the province of Ghazni, in the South of Kabul, and Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016 here in Zabol province – there is also a strong position of the Taliban and very strong positions of the Islamic State.

So, all of those warlords, they can attack Kabul if Kabul doesn’t agree with them, or they can not attack if there is an agreement. If they have priority, Islam Kabul, in this case, we can see a real threat for central Asian countries, and we’ve been observing it for two years already. As a scholar, I am looking at this situation of Kabul and Afghanistan and central Asian countries as just a pure experiment, an experiment that is conducted in rare conditions, without any outside interference. So, three central Asian countries are at war with Afghanistan, choosing for themselves three different models on how to protect themselves from the threat. Well, first, let’s start with Uzbekistan, which has the shortest border, and it’s really well-equipped, so any military attack, any blitz attack is not really possible. It’s well-equipped; there is the river, checkpoints, and even infiltration is not that probable. And, well, infiltration of businessmen, of other groups, it’s nearly impossible because they don’t issue a lot of visas. They issue 2000 visas every year— maybe 3000 maximum. So, they try to protect their border using their national force and also without support of regional organizations, but with some elements of bilateral cooperation, so they protect their border using their national capabilities. The border with Turkmenistan is quite complicated because it’s locked in the mountains. It’s not crossing the plains and you can see the settlements, and you have a concentration of the warlords’ settlements, and then they can move to Turkmenistan quite quickly. This border was considered to be not so bad, but in the last three years, that point of view has changed. Well, unfortunately, since May 2014, there were incidents in Afghanistan between some people there, and there are the warlords that have penetrated Afghanistan, sometimes 100 meters, sometimes several kilometers, and they have clashes with the border guards. So, there are multiple incidents there. And the problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Turkmenistan officials, they have tried to not publicize these problems. There are some cases where there is a clash at the border, and the Turkmenistan officials, they publish a statement that nothing happened. In several hours, the government meets with media representatives to tell them everything: who was in the group, what kind of group participated…And the government is apologizing that they cannot deal with those groups, these real criminal groups, the Taliban and extremists. Well, the Turkmenistan authorities, officially, they say nothing and unofficially, they say if anything happens, these are just smugglers, drug lords, and somehow they have some trouble with their traditional channel of transportation of goods, and these are not terrorists, these are not extremists. These are just criminals. Well, of course these situations fall from Turkmen opposition groups and, from this position, the information is not always reliable, but quite often it’s reliable. They say that a lot of people, for example, are wounded. The soldiers, the officers from the army, they often come back home wounded. The situation is far from perfect. The information that we get is multiple but not 100% reliable. We understand that there is a problem, but we don’t understand the full extent of the problem.

Turkmenistan always believed that it was possible to come to an agreement with everyone, using diplomatic channels. Also, it can always rely on intermediaries from the United Nations, and because the constitution of Turkmenistan says that the neutrality is guaranteed by liberated nations, so they believe that liberations would help. Well, in Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016

Turkmenistan, they have the United Nations’ center for diplomacy where I’m sure they study the border between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan; they study the situation in the Tajik-Afghan border. I’m not sure if the United Nations is going to help or not, but at least Turkmenistan is relying heavily on this potential support from the United Nations. And last year, we had the information that Turkmenistan intensified the bilateral contacts with Turkey and Uzbekistan. I don’t know if this information is reliable or not, how intensive this cooperation is, or if this information is reliable, but at least we have this information. So, Turkmenistan is relying on global institutions and also on elements of bilateral cooperation.

Then the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and usually it’s the border, which is discussed the most often, but I don’t think that this situation is more complicated than the border with Turkmenistan. There are some easier points on the border, and here, with Badakhshan, with the border in Badakhshan, in some places the river is wide, in some it’s narrow, so you can cross it easily, and it’s quite difficult to guard the border because here is the narrow river, and here are some hills. It’s possible to hide somewhere and just cross it. Well, there are lots and lots of incidents on the border. Mostly, those are just the criminal groups, the groups that are smuggling drugs, or conducting kidnapping, for example. The border guards take the batch of drugs. Also, the Afghan groups snatch Tajik military people, and then they negotiate the swap of the batch of drugs for the military person. So, there are lots of problems on that border.

But Tajikistan has chosen a different model of the protection of the border. It’s national needs, but …Tajikistan is relying on the capabilities of CSTO, the regional security organization. And Tajikistan also has lots of volatile cooperation with Russia, in Russian military bases in Tajikistan. What is about CSTO? What will it do with Afghan threat? But it’s responsible for just one border, the Tajikistan/Afghanistan border. Uzbekistan suspended its work with CSTO, that’s why the CSTO is not responsible for anything on the Uzbekistan/Afghanistan border. Turkmenistan never cooperated, so the organization has never been responsible for any part of their border. It’s a complicated zone of responsibility, for it is quite limited. But, unfortunately, over the course of five years have come realizations that sometimes international partners make it more difficult to guard these borders. In 2010, there was an agreement between Russia and Tajikistan, regarding the guarding of the border, and it was discussed that Russian border guards would be sent back to their border. Some international partners were against this. So we see that Russia want to attend to its border, but it could be doing more, but sometimes international partners hinder everything. So, the experiment is: which approach is going to be the best? The Uzbekistan approach: to have this national means to guard the border. The Turkmenistan approach: relying on the UN and diplomacy. And Tajikistan: her reliance on national force and CSTO.

A couple of words on Russian policy on all of these developments in the area: I am not a Russian diplomat though I work at MGIMO, and I cannot express an official point of view. I am not in power to do that. So, I can explain my understanding of the Russian position. My understanding is as follows: Russia is following all of the developments in Afghanistan with great attention. And in recent years, as I understand, it’s not just Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016 followed with attention but readiness to talk to anyone who is ready to talk, and not just shoot. At the same time, Russia doesn’t take any obligations. It’s like a visit to the museum; you look at everything with great attention, but you don’t touch. Some people might say that this is a passive position. Some people might say that there is a lack of responsibility in this position. But I believe that there is a certain logic in this position. After all, what if Afghanistan is …the only way that Afghanistan is going to survive is that order that is going to be established by the Afghans, themselves.

Well, of course, we would like the order that is the most acceptable for Russia, for the United States, for Central Asia, but the more and more we understand that order, this order that they’re going to establish, we’re going to not like a lot of that order, or that disorder. After all, to interfere and then abandon everything halfway, as we can see in practice, is worse than non-interference. For example, I know in a political crisis, I don’t really understand this world of international intermediaries who first help to prepare a political agreement and then they say they are just witnesses, and they don’t guarantee any recommendation. And the Russian position would be like that under an observer who understands everything and doesn’t expect any surprises because of that understanding of the situation, but is not going to touch anything or impose anything, and the Afghans are going to establish something themselves. It would be preferable if they would establish on the basis of the constitution.

Thank you for your attention.

Question: Thank you for your presentation. I have one comment and questions. First of all, what you told us—and it was the right assessment of Turkmenistan approach and also rights and global structures, such as the United Nations. I would like to change the emphasis here because the protection of the borders, after all, this is something that is to be done by the border guards and the United Nations do not protect the borders. But we do rely on the United Nations that would begin with an internal consideration in Afghanistan, and wouldn’t stop halfway because, you said so, we rely on their international effort inside Afghanistan. And then my first question is: so why would be the militants maybe, the ethnic and the ethnic Uzbeks, or the Taliban, the Pashtuns, why should they come inside Turkmenistan? What is their goal? This is not a country for them. There is no support, internally, so why should they get inside the country? And then also, second question: what’s your assessment of the future of the pipeline to Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Pakistan? What’s your position on this?

Ivan Safranchuk: Why should the Taliban work so hard to get to Turkmenistan? Well, these people, the Taliban, they are going to fight. And they are a military organization. They fight. They’re going to fight no matter where. Either they’re going to fight where they’re paid to do it, or where it works better for them. And they are going to try to fight in different directions, and they are going to check where is the weakest link. And the sponsor’s position is extremely important to who is going to direct them, where to find them. Practically, what would they want in Turkmenistan? They could try to get to the gas fields either in the area of Mara, or on the right Bank of Amu Darya where the Chinese are exploring the fields. Well, there are two variants here, and mostly these Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016 radicals are interested in Uzbekistan, and because they’re not capable of crossing the short border between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, they could try to do it across Turkmenistan or Tajikistan. They could go to a north region and then they could walk to Samarkand through Khatlon region or they could get to the south of Kirghizstan and then get to the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley and in Tashkent. So, mostly, they can do it in three ways in Turkmenistan, western Tajikistan, and through the Pamirs and that way, but their ultimate goal in this case is Uzbekistan. Here we also can’t forget about our Sunni Shiite confrontation and we know that Sunnis are warlords. They could move towards Iran, in this case, and make their way through Turkmenistan in this way. They could have better pressure on Iran, but this is territory now…so far it’s just movement through Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. That’s talking about their practical interests. Well, so this persistence of the government of Turkmenistan, for me it’s like the real model how you can save or how you have to save the projects without any prospects. The chances of the commendation of that pipeline are getting better. Two to three years ago, I could say that it’s 20-30% probability. Now, I would say it’s 40%-- well maybe even 50—but no, I would say it’s 40%. From the category of something that’s impossible to making its transition to the category of “maybe,” but we cannot say that it’s going to be 100%. Is TAPI going to change the conservation of Afghanistan and of the Afghanistan/Turkmenistan border. I’m talking about the theory that TAPI is going to be the pipeline of the peace, and instead of having the war, everybody is going to just divide the money paid for protection of TAPI. Well, I don’t believe that theory that much, but if the solution is like the solution proposed a couple of years ago – to bury the pipeline for meter or two in the ground in the territory of Afghanistan, it’s possible to found it. Why not? Well, you know, after all, the USSR sent 80% of lubricants by field pipelines, and special troops that they guarded for those field pipelines from explosions. So yes, it’s possible that this pipeline could function, especially if it’s buried in the ground everywhere or maybe in some regions. For now, but we’re encountering new problems where people are going to see that there is a lot of cash there because there tends to be compilations where the prices of oil are high. There could be, maybe, 800 million, 1 billion dollars, but it’s a lot of money for Afghanistan, and that will generate new problems instead of getting rid of the old ones. Of course, Turkmenistan is going to pay for the safety, the security, but the warlords might want to get the fields because it’s not that hard for them to get to them. The pipeline doesn’t mean peace forever because if there is a pipeline, there is going to be constant trouble around that pipeline, and Turkmenistan will have to guard that pipeline very carefully. Thank you for your questions.

Question: Thank you for the insight that you give us towards the Afghanistan situation. What are the main goals of Russia, and who are the decision makers that exercise Russian policy? What is, specifically, the Russian approach to the Afghanistan scenario? That is my first question, and the second one is: what is your prognosis of what’s going to be in months or years to come in the Afghanistan situation in terms of Russian politics and involvement there? Thank you.

Ivan Safranchuk: In general, in Russia, in the course of five to seven years, there’s this idea that it’s highly important for us to prosper, from an economic point of view, Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016 together, and that’s why the Eurasian economic Union was created on some basis of the Common Economic Space. What are the borders of this political unit, or the zone of the economic policy? Well, Russia, of course, would like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to become members of this union, but Uzbekistan, they say they are not looking into it, and Tajikistan, they are still thinking. They are calculating…And those economic projects, those economic prospects, we don’t want to be threatened by the risks of security. And that is why the threat of infiltration for Afghanistan, those original people who infiltrated radical ideas has some radical inspirations – all those risks, they should disrupt the economic prospects. So, for all of Russia, this origin is economical conditions for social and economic development. We have experts who say that we shouldn’t just look at Tajikistan, we shouldn’t just make Eurasian economic Union at Uzbekistan, but we should do it all the way to the Indian Ocean and get against them in Pakistan, closely involved in our public units. There are such experts. Those experts don’t want to treat Afghanistan as a museum. They want to touch everything and put everything just like they do in their own apartment. They say the Americans are getting weak, and they are removing most of the troops, and now there is vacuum in Afghanistan, and we should fill it. But as I understand it, it’s not what official policy is all about. Russian decision maker for foreign experts is Zamir Kabulov, the special envoy, and he is getting all the points at the UN, he is processing all that into official position. This special envoy has the right to talk on behalf of the president. So, this is the center of decision making for Afghanistan. However, but, there is a whole range of different views studying the point that we shouldn’t even visit this museum and to the extent of making this museum our own apartment. Well, and now we’re getting the prognosis…well, now it’s like people repeat like a mantra that Afghanistan is unpredictable, and this is true. But I believe that there are now social/political forces in Afghanistan…they’re not always official parties or movements, but those social/political forces, they struggle with each other. So, that’s how Pashtun saw our revenge party. It’s not a party, per se, but it’s more of a movement. And it’s a very strong social movement in Afghanistan, which actually led towards Ghani winning the presidential election. So, Pashtun nationalists, they believe that the Tajiks and Hazaras and Uzbeks, they receive too much, and that they should get back to Pashtun bases in Afghanistan, their foundation. And also, Mujahideen movement, people who wanted war with the Soviet Union, and they realize of American allies for 15 years now, they protect the constitution of Afghanistan. Mainly, the Tajiks are the main ethnic group here, but also the Uzbeks, also the Hazara people, and Turkmen warlords, and also the Pashtun. And there is also quite a mighty Salafi movement in Afghanistan. Well, they say there should be no ethnic differences. They don’t like the presence of foreigners in Afghanistan, and they were developing, evolving, in the course of 5-7 years. More and more Salafi mosques are there and young people support this movement. And these three social groups, they are going to remain in Afghanistan, I believe for a long time. There is another group that is quite small, but it influences the situation. This is the group of technocrats - people that were created in those 15 years. They were sent to study abroad. These are the Afghans that look just like you and me. They look like Europeans. And there is a problem within because they also put their families abroad and their friends abroad, and they know where they are going to run if anything happens, and they need just one week to escape from Afghanistan. There are three groups. Some coalitions are going to get those groups, and they’re going to come to some kind of order or agreement, Stenogram of the Trialogue Club International meeting April 14, 2016 and they’re going to get rid of group number 4. So, we’re talking about Pashtun revanchist and Salafis groups, Mujahideen and then to some of the radical Sunnis, none of those groups is going to disappear from Afghanistan in the foreseeable future, and it’s impossible to physically exterminate them. They are going to negotiate, or they are going to fight.

Thank you.

Evgeny Buzhinsky: Well, as for decision-making, you cannot make it that simple and just give all of the powers to Zamir Kabulov. And in the Security Council there is f special mechanism of interagency coordination. And they outline decisions. And Zamir Kabulov, he’s a representative, he’s an official, he writes recommendations, but he is not the main. But then the position is compromised by only one person, the president of the Russian Federation.

Question: I would like to thank you for the very interesting presentation and though Kazakhstan doesn’t have a border with Afghanistan, but still we are affected by the situation. So, could I ask you what part of Afghanistan is controlled by the Taliban, and also what’s the relationship with ISIS? And then, maybe later, are the people from ISIS, are they going to join the other groups?

Ivan Safranchuk: Well, you know there are different assessments. Of course, you read about it, and, the thing is, when you start mentioning those percentages, regarding Taliban-controlled areas, it’s still not clear. It doesn’t look like a real situation. There are some regions, for example, who are regions completely controlled by the Taliban, and in every province, there are at least one or two districts who are completely controlled by the Taliban, which is, like we would say, 70-80% control. Well, for example, Atta Mohammad Noor controls 90% of Badakhshan, and the warlords, they cross the mountains, and they are hiding there, then they start moving, moving towards Mazar-I- Sharif. They used to control 10%. Now it’s 20%, now it’s 25%. So, they are always ready to move, and to move quickly. And, it’s not important, percentage is not important. What’s important is they have their bases, their fortresses, and they can use those as they would. Well, and regarding Taliban, and sometimes they fight, sometimes they cooperate, sometimes they entice some units from each other, and have examples of people who used to be in the Taliban, and they moved to ISIS, a whole unit—or they used to be in ISIS, and they got recruited by the Taliban. I believe that, if the Taliban and ISIS remain in opposition to the central government, in opposition, most probably they’re going cooperate with one point of view. If Ghani comes to some kind of agreement with the Taliban, so there’re Taliban units that disagree, that will go to ISIS and those that agree with Ghani would fight against them.