CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

Published since 2000

Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

CA&CC Press®

1 Volume 14 FOUNDEDIssue 3 2013 AND PUBLISHEDCENTRAL ASIA AND THEBY CAUCASUS INSTITUTE INSTITUTE OF FOR CENTRAL ASIAN AND STRATEGIC STUDIES OF CAUCASIAN STUDIES THE CAUCASUS Registration number: 620720-0459 Registration number: M-770 State Administration for Ministry of Justice of Patents and Registration of Sweden Azerbaijan Republic PUBLISHING HOUSE CA&CC Press®. SWEDEN Registration number: 556699-5964

Journal registration number: 23 614 State Administration for Patents and Registration of Sweden

E d i t o r i a l C o u n c i l

Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council ISMAILOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 497 12 22; E-mail: [email protected] Murad ESENOV Editor-in-Chief Tel./fax: (46) 70 232 16 55; E-mail: [email protected] Jannatkhan Deputy Editor-in-Chief EYVAZOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 596 11 73; E-mail: [email protected] Kalamkas represents the journal in Kazakhstan (Astana) YESSIMOVA Tel./fax: (7 - 701) 7408600; E-mail: [email protected] Ainura represents the journal in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek) ELEBAEVA Tel./fax: (996 - 312) 61 30 36; E-mail: [email protected] Saodat OLIMOVA represents the journal in () Tel.: (992 372) 21 89 95; E-mail: [email protected] Farkhad represents the journal in () TOLIPOV Tel.: (9987 - 1) 125 43 22; E-mail: [email protected] Ziya KENGERLI represents the journal in Azerbaijan (Baku) Tel.: (+994 - 50) 3006694; E-mail: [email protected] David represents the journal in Armenia (Erevan) PETROSYAN Tel.: (374 - 10) 56 88 10; E-mail: [email protected] Kakhaber ERADZE represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) Tel.: (+995 - 95) 45 82 88; E-mail: [email protected] Sun ZHUANGZHI represents the journal in (Beijing) Tel.: (86) 10-64039088; E-mail: [email protected] Konrad SCHÄFFLER represents the journal in (Munich) Tel.: (49 - 89) 3003132; E-mail: [email protected] Vladimir MESAMED represents the journal in the Middle East (Jerusalem) Tel.: (972 - 2) 5882332; E-mail: [email protected] Irina EGOROVA represents the journal in the Russian Federation (Moscow) Tel.: (7 - 495) 3163146; E-mail: [email protected] Robert represents the journal in the U.S. (Buffalo, NY) GUANG TIAN Tel: (716) 880-2104; E-mail: [email protected] Rustem represents the journal in Ukraine (Kiev) ZHANGUZHIN Tel.: (380 - 44) 524-79-13; E-mail: [email protected] 2 CENTRAL ASIA AND THEE DCAUCASUS I T O R I A L B O A R DVolume 14 Issue 3 2013

Giuli ALASANIA Doctor of History, professor, Vice Rector of the International Black Sea University (Georgia) Bülent ARAS Doctor, Chair, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Turkey) Mariam ARUNOVA Doctor of Political Science, leading research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS (Russian Federation) Garnik ASATRIAN Doctor of Philology, professor, head of the Department of Iranian Studies, Erevan State University (Armenia) Bakyt BESHIMOV Doctor of History, professor, Vice President, American University-Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan) Ariel COHEN Doctor, leading analyst, The Heritage Foundation, U.S.A. (U.S.A.) William FIERMAN Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Indiana University (U.S.A.) Paul GOBLE Senior Advisor, Voice of America (U.S.A.) Sergey GRETSKY Doctor, Chair of Central Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State (U.S.A.) Xing GUANGCHENG Doctor of Political Science, professor, Deputy Director of the Institute for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China) Alexander IGNATENKO President, Institute of Religion and Politics, Doctor of Philosophy, specialist in Islamic studies, leading expert of the Institute of Social Systems, Moscow State University, member of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations under the Russian Federation President (Russian Federation) Ashurboi IMOMOV Ph.D. (Law), assistant professor, head of the Department of Constitutional Law, Tajik National University (Tajikistan) Lena JONSON Doctor, senior researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Sweden) Klara KHAFIZOVA Doctor of History, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, professor at the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department, Kainar University (Kazakhstan) Jacob M. LANDAU Professor of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel) S. Neil MACFARLANE Professor, Director, Center for International Studies, The University of Oxford (Great Britain) Alexei MALASHENKO Doctor of History, professor, Scholar-in-Residence, Ethnicity and Nation-Building Program Co-Chair, The Carnegie Moscow Center (Russian Federation) Abbas MALEKI Doctor, Director General, International Institute for Caspian Studies () Akira Doctor, History of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa Peace MATSUNAGA Foundation (Japan) Roger N. McDERMOTT Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen () Vitaly NAUMKIN Doctor of History, professor, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies of RF (Russian Federation) Yerengaip OMAROV Professor, Rector of Kainar University, President of the Academy of Natural Sciences, Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) Vladimer PAPAVA Doctor of Economics, professor, Rector of the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Georgia) S. Frederick STARR Professor, Chairman, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

Editorial Office: CA&CC Press AB Hubertusstigen 9. 97455 Luleå SWEDEN WEB ADDRESS: http://www.ca-c.org

© Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2013 © CA&CC Press®, 2013 3 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

IN THIS ISSUE:

AFGHANISTAN 2014

Murat CENTRAL ASIA: Laumulin. SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-2014 ...... 7

Konstantin PROBLEM-2014 AND Syroezhkin. CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY...... 21

Mohammad Darkhor, Saeed Kafi, Seyed Hadi UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND Sadati. NATIONAL SECURITY ...... 33

Thomas THE ROAD THROUGH QATAR, A DEAD END? Ruttig. Opportunities Promoting and Hurdles Preventing a Political Solution in Afghanistan that Includes the ...... 42

Pulat BORDER SECURITY OF Makkambaev. THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES ON THE EVE OF THE ISAF PULLOUT...... 53

Sergey AFGHANISTAN 2014: Masaulov. UNCERTAINTY AND RISKS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CENTRAL ASIA...... 65 4 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Rakhmatullo Abdulloev. IN AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE...... 74

Kosimsho THE PAKISTANI FACTOR Iskandarov. IN THE AFGHAN CONFLICT...... 83

Guli IRANIAN-AFGHAN RELATIONS ON Yuldasheva. THE THRESHOLD OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN...... 97

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

Kamilla SOME ASPECTS OF Sheriazdanova, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF Karlygash ECONOMIC COOPERATION Kondykerova. IN THE SCO...... 109

Viktor THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION Budkin. IN THE CIS REGION: BETWEEN CRISES?...... 116

Khojimakhmad COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF Umarov. TAJIKISTAN’S TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA...... 128

Ashot Markosian, Boris ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF Avakian, COUNTRIES IN A STATE OF Elianora ARMED CONFLICT: Matevosian. AN ARMENIAN CASE-STUDY...... 138

REGIONAL POLITICS

Mikhail UZBEKISTAN-TURKMENISTAN: Agajanian. A POLE OF MULTIVECTORAL POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA...... 159

Rashid IRANIAN PRESIDENTS AND Abdullo. TAJIK-IRANIAN RELATIONS...... 167

5 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

The Special Feature section in the next three issues will discuss:

 The Ferghana Valley: Conflict Potential and Development Prospects  Central Eurasia: Politics Today  Central Eurasia: Religion in the Sociopolitical Context

Contributors please use the following guidelines: — begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords; — articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes; — footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19; — quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English; — the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion; — the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles.

6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

AFGHANISTAN 2014

CENTRAL ASIA: SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-2014 AFGHANISTAN

Murat LAUMULIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Chief Research Fellow, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the RK (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

ABSTRACT

ts geographic location, domestic politi- country’s immediate neighbors and even cal complications, ethno-confessional whole regions and explains the never weak- I diversity, and involvement in the global ening interest of , India, Iran, the shadow economy keep Afghanistan in the Central Asian Soviet successor-states, Chi- center of the intertwining interests of state na, and Russia in what is going on in this and extra-state forces. This threatens the country.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, Central Asia, security, the Taliban, drug trafficking, ethno-confessional diversity, the Afghan problem, Afghanistan after 2014.

Introduction

In the last two years, the world political scientific community has been actively discussing the possible post-2014 developments in Afghanistan; as the event draws closer, all sorts of think tanks, funds, and institutions have been coming up with more and more scenarios.

7 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The leading Western centers, such as the RAND Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment, the Institute of Central Asia and the Caucasus at Johns Hopkins University, Chatham House of the UK, and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), to name a few, are looking for every possible an- swer to the question: What will happen in Afghanistan after the Western pullout? The Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany set up a network of groups staffed with experts from the Central Asian re- publics, Pakistan, India, Iran, Turkey, China, and Russia to monitor the situation and forecast possible developments inside and outside the country after 2014. Here are some of their scenarios; I would like to point out that under any of them the Central Asian countries will be threatened. In the geopolitical context, the developments in Afghanistan will undermine the security of a much wider region: South Asia, the Middle East, the CIS countries, and China. This explains why the problem remains high on the world agenda and why Pakistan, India, Iran, the post-Soviet Central Asian states, China, and Russia are closely following the developments in this country.

The Afghan Problem in the World Political Context

The United States relies in its Afghan policies on the “” strategy suggested by the RAND Corporation, which comprises two elements. The United States and its allies are deter- mined either to capture or liquidate the most odious members of the anti-Western coalition of the Taliban and other radical, mainly Pashtun, groups, and then they intend to create a new structure of power out of moderate Taliban members (Pashtun fighters) driven by ethnic nationalism rather than religious fundamentalism. In the last few years, the American expert community has been promoting the idea of decentral- ized democracy1 in Afghanistan, which Washington is ready to accept under certain conditions. The centralized state will survive, while the regions will become autonomies with extensive rights and democratic institutions. The center should be strong enough to control the country’s entire territory to prevent any attempts to destabilize Pakistan or attack the United States. A “state of decentralized democracy” is a challenging task:  First, the Taliban, which rejects democracy in principle, will oppose “decentralized democ- racy” as aggressively as it is fighting centralized democracy.  Second, the administrative potential of the Afghan state is limited.  Third, the anti-government and very influential figures in the Afghan provinces will hardly hail this variant. In the past, Chatham House, a British think tank, devised a plan of conflict settlement in Af- ghanistan coordinated with the United States and the other NATO members, which mentioned, among other things, security, administration, development, and regional relations. Under this plan, the numerical strength of Afghanistan’s national army should be brought up to 134 thousand and the size of the police force to 109 thousand to be able to assume control over the country and ensure its security.

1 The government in will remain in control of the country’s foreign policy; it will have the right to declare war and apply anti-drug legislation; it will control customs services and mining, but will have limited rights in supervising trade between provinces.

8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

It was planned to set up an international reintegration fund to support those Taliban fighters who wanted to resume a peaceful life. The third section of the same document envisaged much closer coordination between the Af- ghan forces (including ISAF) and neighboring countries (Pakistan in particular). It was expected that the special international fund would accumulate at least $500 million. It should be said that the Karzai government2 put its own plan of reconciliation with the Taliban on the table, according to which those who moved over to the side of the government would acquire jobs, education, and security, the latter being the main point. Under this plan, those willing to embrace reconciliation could count on protection against their former comrades-in-arms, their past activities forgiven and forgotten. Washington liked the plan on the whole; however, the price ($1 billion) proved forbidding. The Afghans looked to the world community for donations. Turkey, likewise, was interested in what would happen to Afghanistan and the Turkic Central Asian states in particular; it intended to make the problem a regional one in order to stir the neighbor- ing states into more active involvement in its solution. China is worried lest Islamists gain control over the Uyghur separatist movement. This will add vigor to the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan, while the XUAR will become an outpost of terrorist activities in the region. In this event, Beijing will have to move from observation to action, in particular to economic interference in the Afghan conflict to weaken the Taliban. China is also interested in exploiting the country’s mineral resources. India, in turn, wants its own mechanisms of involvement in Afghanistan. However, some ex- perts think that is deliberately maintaining tension in the Pashtun areas in case of another military conflict with India. Russia wants to return to Afghanistan for several reasons; first, it needs security and is driven by geopolitical considerations: the problem of drug production in Afghanistan must be addressed and resolved, while what Washington is doing in this country should be observed at closer range. Second, Russia, as well as all other actors, is guided by economic interests: it needs markets for its military hardware and access to local natural resources. Japan is also involved; it is acting together with the United States while also trying to reconcile Washington’s intention to draw it into America’s military actions and the political realities inside the country. Tokyo, however, is not limiting itself to cooperation with Washington: its diplomacy in Afghanistan has become more independent and more promising in view of the coalition’s pullout and inevitable concentration on postwar rehabilitation.3 Japan is claiming the role of a global leader in dealing with humanitarian, social, and economic problems; its active involvement in postwar rehabilitation in Afghanistan will bring it closer to Cen- tral Asia, ensure its energy security, enrich it with new experience in dealing with global problems, and increase its weight in the eyes of the world.

Main Scenarios

The scenarios are numerous and varied, but none fits the U.S.’s main demands in the security sphere: the de jure and de facto split might become a reality. The Pashtun south may be detached from

2 According to many of the Western experts in Afghanistan, the term “moderate ” used by Kabul is nothing but a myth. The attempts to integrate them into administrative structures are fraught with unpredictable repercussions. 3 See: O.A. Dobrinskaia, “Tokyo: aktsent na nevoennye aspekty uregulirovaniia v Afghanistane,” Azia i Afrika segodnia, No. 11, 2012, pp. 12-17.

9 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the north and the west with their predominantly Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara populations. This will be most probable if a settlement deal with the Taliban gives it a free hand in the south, its historical foothold. It will turn these areas into safe havens of trans-border terrorism and radical movements. In recent years, experts have discussed three (or four) possible scenarios.4 Scenario No. 1 looked ideal, but it was rejected right away: according to it, the coalition should have won relatively easily in a couple of years; it should have set up efficient state institutions, lain a solid foundation for civil society, and left the country. Even if realized, this scenario would not have protected the country against a gradually rekindled conflict with the Taliban. Under Scenario No. 2, the coalition would leave without winning because a military victory (which presupposed control over the provinces, including those where the coalition was stationed) was unattainable, there was not enough money, and the coalition allies were unreliable. On top of this, the Taliban refused to talk to the “occupants” and their puppets. In the absence of positive shifts, Washington would be forced to abandon its plans of pacification and declare the mission complete. In fact, withdrawal would look like a defeat. Scenario No. 3 was more realistic: confrontation with the Taliban would go on and on for an indefinite period of time, while final settlement of the Afghan Question would be indefinitely post- poned; this is what the American Administration is doing. The FOI experts came out with five possible scenarios of the -pullout develop- ments.5 Under Scenario No. 1, “the Talibans get a share of the government of Afghanistan under two conditions “(1) The United States stays committed to Afghanistan, both financially and militarily and “(2) Pakistan supports the Taliban’s decision to negotiate.” Scenario No. 2 presents “Pakistan as Afghanistan’s New Big Brother. If the United States cuts its financial support to the government of Afghanistan, Islamabad could step in to fill the power vacuum.” Scenario No. 3 “War of Proxies:” “The United States stays committed to Afghanistan, both fi- nancially and militarily. Pakistan supports the Taliban in order to keep its strategic depth inside southern Afghanistan.” A “proxy war” between the American forces and the forces supported by Kabul would be a possible scenario. “Thus, if Pakistan decides to continue its policy of supporting the Taliban as a means to gain strategic depth in southern Afghanistan, and the United States decides to cut its aid to Pakistan, the conflict is likely to escalate. Without U.S. financial support, Pakistan has no reason to keep a leash on its proxies inside Afghanistan.” Scenario No. 4 is painfully familiar: it is a full-scale civil war. “The United States cuts its finan- cial support to the government of Afghanistan. Pakistan supports the Taliban in order to keep its strategic depth inside southern Afghanistan.” Scenario No. 5, which the authors called “The American Dream,” envisages that “the United States stays committed to Afghanistan, both financially and militarily. Pakistan breaks with the Tali- ban in order to prioritize its domestic problems.” Afghanistan will be stabilized from the political- military point of view, while the threat of radical Islam will diminish. The United States and the world community will augment their effective aid to Afghanistan to revive its economy.

4 For more details, see: M.T. Laumulin, “Stsenarii razvitiia Afghanistana i pozitsii zainteresovannykh storon,” in: Afghanistan: nastoiashchee i budushchee. Vozdeystvie na stabilnost i bezopasnost Tsentralnoy Azii. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii, FFE, Almaty, 2011, pp. 109-121. 5 See: Afghanistan after 2014: Five Scenarios, FOI, Stockholm, 2012, 100 pp.

10 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

The FOI scenarios expect that Pakistan will be actively (positively or negatively) involved in the developments. In December 2010, the Learned Council of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, met to discuss Central Asia in the Afghan context. An in- ternational conference on the same subject was held in 2012.6 The participants discussed possible scenarios and concluded that the situation in Afghanistan would largely be determined by one of the scenarios realized after (or during) the pullout. Scenario No. 1, pessimistic (the Taliban-2): Afghanistan will be plunged into a civil war be- tween an ethno-territorial Pashtun group, on the one hand, and a “second edition” of the (Tajik-Uzbek-Hazara bloc), on the other. This strife will remove the Karzai government and bring to power the irreconcilable Taliban; this will bring back the situation of 1996-2001 when the country served as a shelter for al-Qa‘eda and international terrorists fighting under its aegis. They threatened Central Asia, Russia, and, in fact, the rest of the world. This will challenge all of Af- ghanistan’s neighbors, particularly the Central Asian states. In view of the extremely weak armies and border guards of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turk- menistan, their CSTO and SCO partners will have to step in, which will increase social and eco- nomic tension in all the member states. Scenario No. 2, optimistic (peaceful Afghanistan): it suits the interests of the people of Af- ghanistan and its neighbors, including the Central Asian countries. This will start the so-called Kabul process, launched in July 2010 at a Kabul Conference on Afghan Settlement. If implemented, the program of national reconciliation and reintegration and structuring of the system of state governance will allow the local administration to maintain stability. A coalition government patterned on the Iraqi model will rely on a consensus between the key political forces to represent, on the whole, the inter- ests of the main political forces—the Pashtun and other ethnic groups. The 2012 conference offered its own scenarios. Scenario No. 1 (pessimistic): fiercer confrontation among ethnic groups up to and including a wide-scale armed struggle; it will be gradually gathering momentum as the main contingents of the United States and ISAF pull out of the country. This may bring irreconcilable Talibans to power, which will revive the situation of 1996-2001 when the country served as a shelter for al-Qa‘eda and international terrorism forces that threatened the world. If implemented, this scenario will create all sorts of risks for the Central Asian states: — The theater of civil war will spread to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as Afghanistan’s closest neighbors; — Internal destabilization might provoke ethnic conflicts in Central Asia; — Refugees from Afghanistan will add to the social tension; — The hot climate and water shortages will make the epidemiological and sanitary situation even worse; — The Islamist underground will regain its vigor in Central Asia (and the Ferghana Valley, in particular); its “dormant cells” will join forces with the “comrades-in-arms” (militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and al-Qa‘eda-type groups based in Afghanistan) to carry out anti-government armed actions aimed at undermining the secular nature of the region’s states.

6 See: I. Labinskaia, “Tsentralnaia Azia v kontekste afghanskoy situatsii,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia (IMEMO RAN), No. 5, 2011, pp. 3-16.

11 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Scenario No. 2 (moderately pessimistic): the pullout of the Western coalition and possible re- tirement of President will be followed by a short period of fierce struggle for power among various political forces. The moderate Talibans will win. In the short-term perspective, Central Asia will remain safe from dramatic repercussions prom- ised by the pessimistic scenario. First, the Taliban will not try to capture territories in Central Asia or set up a Caliphate there; second, the Uzbeks and of Afghanistan, who want to fortify their own positions inside the country, will not seek support outside it among the Uzbeks and Tajiks of Central Asia. We should bear in mind, however, that in the long-term perspective the moderately pessimistic scenario might become pessimistic because of rivalry in Afghanistan or because of worsened rela- tions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This will make security threats to the Central Asian coun- tries very real. Scenario No. 3 (optimistic): if implemented, the programs of national reconciliation and reinte- gration in Afghanistan will create a foundation for a coalition government that will represent the in- terests of all the political forces and peoples of Afghanistan—both Pashtun and non-Pashtun (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, etc.). Much will be done to neutralize or even liquidate Islamist groups connected with the irreconcilable Talibans or al-Qa‘eda. This will deprive the religious extremists in Afghani- stan and Pakistan, as well as in the Central Asian states, of a great share of support. If realized, this scenario will allow the Central Asian countries — To strengthen their political systems in the absence of an outside threat of destabilization; — To preserve the secular development vector and the historically shaped traditions of secular- ism of state power and political regimes; — To develop mutually advantageous relations with Afghanistan in the sphere of energy supply and transportation. There are also several alternative scenarios. (A) The Central Asian states and Afghanistan will develop on the basis of the Eurasian Union. They will form a confederation of sovereign states with a common political, economic, military, and customs space based on the union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as well as several integration structures (EurAsEC, CES, the Customs Union, and CSTO). (B) Implementation of the American mega-projects the Greater Central Asia and the New , which presuppose closer economic and political integration of Central Asia and South Asia based on Western political patterns. (C) Stronger economic and political influence of the “growing powers” (China, India, and Tur- key) in Central Asia mainly based on economic relations. The Central Asian states will remain true to their multivectoral policy and will preserve close contacts with Russia, the EU, and the United States.7

What the Experts Think

According to Robert Blackwill, an expert at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, “Washing- ton should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and east and that

7 See: Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii, IMEMO RAN, Moscow, 2013, 150 pp.

12 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 the price of forestalling that outcome is far too high for the United States to continue paying… The United States and its allies would withdraw ground combat forces over several months from most of Pashtun Afghanistan, including . The ISAF would stop fighting in the mountains, valleys, and urban areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan (although it would continue to provide arms, aid, and intelligence to local tribal leaders there who want to resist). Washington would concentrate its efforts, meanwhile, on defending the areas in the north and west of Afghanistan not dominated by the Pashtuns, including Kabul. Washington would enlist Afghanistan’s Tajiks, Uzbeks, , and supportive Pashtuns in this endeavor—as well as its NATO allies, Afghanistan’s various neighbors, and hopefully the Security Council. “The Afghan Taliban would be offered a modus vivendi in which each side agreed not to seek to enlarge the territory it controlled, so long as the Taliban stopped supporting terrorism. “Accepting a de facto partition of Afghanistan makes sense only if the other options available are worse,” writes Blackwill. “One alternative is to stay the current course in Afghanistan. Another alternative is for the United States to withdraw all its military forces from Afghanistan over the next few years. But this would lead to a probable conquest of the entire country by the Taliban. “A third alternative would be to try to achieve stability in Afghanistan through negotiations with the Taliban. NATO could seek to entice the Afghan Taliban to stop fighting and enter into a coalition government in Kabul.”8 John D. Podesta, chair of the Center for American Progress, has elaborated the main principles of Washington’s future strategy in Afghanistan: “…as the United States prepares to exit Afghanistan, it is focusing too much on security, overlooking the political elements of the transition. To leave behind a stable government in 2014, Washington needs to push harder for electoral reforms, negotia- tions with the Taliban, and a regional settlement involving Pakistan.”9 Experts of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University have offered a wide range of measures designed to stabilize Afghanistan to be implemented in three stages: (1) short-term, from 2012 to 2020; (2) mid-term, from 2010 to 2025, and (3) long-term, which will begin in 2025. As could be expected, the plan follows the logic of the well-known Greater Central Asia concept of Frederick Starr. These, mainly long-term, measures are geared at transportation and energy supply projects.10 According to Chinese experts at the Center of Russian Studies (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences), after 2014 Central Asia will face three real threats and three potential security challenges:  The first threat: “three forces” have been and remain the main enemy of Central Asian se- curity.  The second treat: transborder crime, which greatly violates law and order in Central Asia.

8 R. Blackwill, “Plan ‘B’ in Afghanistan. Why a De Facto Partition is the Least Bad Option,” available at [www. foreignaffairs.com/print/66982 2/6]. 9 [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137696/stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/the-right-way-out-of- afghanistan]. 10 See: S.F. Starr, A.C. Kuchins, The Key to Success in Afghanistan. A Modern Silk Road Strategy, Central Asia- Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program—A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2010, 48 pp.; S.F. Starr, Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program—A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2012, 55 pp.

13 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

 The third threat: external terrorist forces, which penetrate the region and exacerbate the situation.  The first challenge: struggle among the Great Powers in Central Asia complicates the security situation in the region.  The second challenge: the power struggle at the coming elections makes the region’s future vague and the situation unstable.  The third challenge: sharper national contradictions threaten Central Asian stability.11 Experts of the Institute of South and Southeast Asian and Oceania Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations believe that the situation in Afghanistan may follow one of four possible scenarios. (1) A civil war might be inevitable if no peaceful agreement among all the sides is signed (ir- respective of whether the coalition forces pull out or stay put). (2) In the most extreme case, a civil war and foreign interference may cause disintegration after 2014. (3) If disintegration has been avoided, a civil war or political reconciliation may end in self- administration of the provinces. According to Ivan Safranchuk, Deputy Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, RF Foreign Ministry, the future of Afghanistan is not predetermined and still hinges on several variables: (1) a basic compromise between the warlords and the effective government in Kabul survives; (2) if it falls through, this compromise will open the road to regional and ethnic rivalry. In the first case, the balance of power between Kabul and the provinces will be gradually redis- tributed in favor of the latter. “Ultimately, the Afghans should be given the opportunity to build a steady balance of forces at home, and then use these forces as a basis for political compromise. The role of external players, large regional countries, and immediate neighbors should not be obtrusive mediation. The Afghans will have to agree among themselves. The main requirement for all political forces in the country must be as follows: Afghanistan as a threat is not good for the country, which needs to be an integral political and economic part of the region. The external players, the large re- gional countries and closest neighbors should avoid nagging mediation.”12 Experts of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs believe that the West can still win if the following key tasks are addressed and accomplished: (1) an Afghan national police force and should be set up. (2) Afghanistan should acquire an effective state apparatus and carry out an efficient anti-cor- ruption campaign. (3) Afghanistan should achieve national reconciliation. (4) Afghanistan should organize regional cooperation with Pakistan and Iran in particular. (5) Afghanistan should create conditions conducive to economic growth.

11 See: Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii, pp. 84-89. 12 I. Safranchuk, “Afghanistan in Search of Balance,” available at [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/person/p_1260].

14 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

NATO based its Afghan strategy on the hope of achieving progress, at least in some respects, but, so far, nothing has happened.13 Experts from the Institute of the Far East, Russian Academy of Sciences, have reduced all pos- sible post-2014 developments to four scenarios, two of them negative, one moderately negative, and one positive.14 The first scenario is fraught with possible Balkanization, which will become probable in the absence of an obvious victory at the concluding stage of Operation Enduring Freedom and also if the Americans fail to negotiate territorial delimitation with the Taliban and if vast areas escape the control of the Karzai government. The provincial leaders and warlords, many of whom have no real trust in the Kabul authorities today, will gain strength. The country may slip into another version of the Arab Spring with wide-scale criminalization and radicalization of the region’s population and worsened national relations still further aggravated by Islamic extremism. Tajikistan inundated by the Islamist opposition so far stationed in Afghanistan will be plunged into the second wave of a civil war. Secular power in the other Central Asian republics may collapse; this will do nothing for the international energy projects and will intensify the flow of drugs to the region, Russia, and Europe. There is no doubt that all sorts of terrorist groups will use this opportunity to step up their activities along the borders of the Central Asian countries and inside them. Under the second (moderately negative) scenario, the Americans and the Taliban will agree to divide the country: the government armed forces will assume responsibility for the north and the west, while the Taliban will move into the south and the east of the country, something which the local warlords will accept. Under the positive scenario, the United States will remain in Afghanistan; in this case the elite will close ranks around the government in Kabul; agreements with the moderate members of the Taliban will become possible. The Afghan army will fortify its positions across the entire territory, which spells defeat for the irreconcilable part of the Taliban. Social and economic problems will be addressed, while efficient mechanisms of control over drug production and trafficking will be set up. Washington will do its best to alleviate the concerns of Moscow and Beijing about Ameri- ca’s continued presence in Afghanistan. The international community, very much as usual, will side with the United States to persuade Russia and China to join the concerted efforts to rehabili- tate and stabilize Afghanistan for the sake of regional stability. This variant is possible, but the United States, Russia, and China are unlikely to arrive at a consensus on America’s presence in the region. On the whole, if realized, most of the scenarios will negatively affect regional security and the national interests of the Central Asian SCO members and also of China and Russia, two key members, the positions of which are the strongest in the region. Dr. Mariam Arunova of the Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, has pointed out that the Afghan Question might become regionalized after 2014: the regional powers, including those acting within the SCO format, will increase their impact on Afghanistan. The possible SCO role was discussed in 2009-2011 at the meetings among the presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Russia and

13 See: S. Harnisch, Back to the Future: Germany’s Afghanistan Policy after 2014, Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg, 2013, 12 pp. 14 See: Yu. Morozov, “Afghanistan posle 2014 goda: stabilnost dlia gosudarstv ShOS ili novy vitok napriazhennosti v Tsentralno-Aziatskom regione?” Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, No. 2, 2013, pp. 94-114 (Yu. Morozov, “Afghanistan after 2014: Stability for SCO States or New Tensions in Central Asia?” Far Eastern Affairs).

15 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS of representatives of the heads of the executive structures of the SCO, CIS, EurAsEC, and CSTO, as well as at the SCO summit.15 Mahmud, Ph.D. in political science, research fellow, and lecturer at the MGIMO (U), Foreign Ministry of Russia, has pointed out that the Taliban is far from a homogenous movement and that some of its members have already sided with the Kabul leaders. There are at least 400 former Taliban members in President Karzai’s closest circle involved in the administrative pro- cesses; this also accounts for the current relative lull in the southern provinces (Kandahar, Hel- mand, etc.). Shah Mahmud does not rule out post-2014 splits and violent disagreements among the local political forces, including the irreconcilable ones; he has in mind the old guard of the Taliban and the new generation of militants who refuse to accept the regime. Opposition between Pashtuns and non- Pashtuns may flare up to cause a split inside the politically active groups of population. Victor Korgun, who heads the Afghanistan Sector at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies (RAS), has pointed out that the pullout is complicated by a number of factors: the content and nature of the future bodies of power in which the Taliban and its allies will be obviously represented. Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Iran, which have diver- gent interests, will strongly affect the transfer of power and responsibility for the country’s security to Afghanistan. Ruslan Sikoev of the Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, has offered his vision of post-2014 society. He concentrates on the role of the Muslim clergy as one of the most influential social groups flexible enough to be promptly adapted to the changing conditions and find a place in the structures of state power. His analysis led him to an interesting conclusion: the clergy has failed to capitalize on the integration potential of Islam since it is split into regional and ethnic groups. As 2014 draws closer, the non-Pashtun ethnic groups are establishing positions they will re- treat to in the event of war; they are ready to defend the social and political gains of the recent decades. Indian experts are convinced that their country wants stability in Afghanistan, something which will become harder to attain after 2014. New Delhi believes that the involvement of Pakistani sub- state and non-state actors in what is going on in Afghanistan is one of the main factors causing the problems and slowing down normalization of the processes underway in this country. Pakistan, on the other hand, looks at the Afghan problem as a Great Game waged by the great and regional powers. Islamabad fears that China, India, and the United States might fortify their posi- tions in the region, the positions of Iran and India causing the greatest concern. Pakistan looks at the possible role of the Central Asian countries mainly through the prism of big geopolitics, “the pipeline politics” and its own interests.16 Pakistan prefers to initiate and implement a plan of the country’s rehabilitation and stabilization on its own. It suggests that the OIC and Saudi Arabia should also be involved in the process and de- liberately ignores China, Russia, SCO, and the EU, all of them with their own interests in Afghani- stan. Islamabad is convinced that the U.S. should not insist on preservation of the state system for Afghanistan set up within the Bonn Agreements. In an interview given on 21 September, 2012, Zamir Kabulov, Russian presidential envoy to Afghanistan, said that about 68 thousand U.S. military would stay behind in Afghanistan until the end of 2014. The Americans are prepared to pull out all units involved in the fighting; a certain number

15 See: V. Belokrinitskiy, S. Kamenev, “Afghanistan i Pakistan: sostoianie i perspektivy?” Vostok-Oriens, No. 4, 2012, pp. 165-170. 16 See: A. , “Post-NATO Afghanistan: Implications for Regional Security,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4, 2012.

16 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 of American military, however, would stay longer to provide training for the Afghan troops at 5 to 7 training (in fact, American full-scale military) bases. The American pullout is better described as a hasty and sloppy process: Washington was in a hurry to concentrate its might in the APR to balance out China. By the fall of 2012, half of the coun- try had been transferred to the Afghan police and the army; by the end of 2012, they were expected to control 75 percent of the entire territory; by mid-2013, they would assume responsibility for the entire territory.17 According to Mikhail Konarovsky, Deputy SCO Secretary General, Kabul and the external players should seek wider autonomy for the provinces, leaving the center in control of the key spheres such as finances, foreign economic trade and aid, domestic and foreign policies, the defense and se- curity structures, etc. The author is convinced that considerable or even radical shifts in political and ideological landmarks can hardly be avoided.18 Vadim Sergeev, Third Secretary at the Department on Issues of Security and Disarmament, Foreign Ministry of Russia, believes that Afghanistan will remain an Islamic state. “It is very prob- able that, in a few years from now, the Taliban will take Kabul and restore the regime that existed in the 1990s under the name of Islamic … The Taliban movement will soon come to power in Afghanistan once again. The Taliban movement does not pose a bigger threat to Russia than other Afghan armed groups. Cooperation with the Taliban can help attain two important tasks in Afghanistan today: turning the country into a stable and peaceful state and radically reducing illegal drug production.”19 Dr. Dina Malysheva of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS, looks at assistance from other countries and wider responsibilities for the local governments as two reme- dies that might reduce tension inside the country and prevent its spread to the neighboring countries and regions. Wider involvement of the countries of South Asia and Central Asia in the Afghan settlement (together with U.N.) and their regional organizations dealing with politics and the economy, but not military cooperation, might strengthen regional security and open doors to those economic, energy, and transportation projects in which the Central Asian countries, Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and Iran united into SCO, BRICS, and the G-20 will work together with Afghanistan. These projects are unlikely to be implemented and the region will hardly return to normal if the United States/the West deliberately push out some of the countries (Russia, Iran, or China) from some of the projects (TAPI is a possible example).20 Nikita Mendkovich of the Center for the Studies of Contemporary Afghanistan has fore- casted that the 2014 pullout will rekindle the conflict. He has also written that the central govern- ment will probably remain in control even after the U.S. troops have left the country (the case of Iraq is an example). For a long time, however, the country will have to grapple with numerous problems, including the continued influence of warlords, corruption, deficient social and economic development, etc. It will hardly slip back into the year 2001 when it radiated a terrorist threat across the region.21

17 See: Z. Kabulov, “SShA uydut iz Afghanistana, chtoby usilit prisutstvie v ATR,” Indeks bezopanosti (PIR-Tsentr), No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 11-18. 18 See: M. Konarovskiy, “Afghanistan at the Threshold of Changes,” International Affairs, No. 1, 2012. 19 V. Sergeev, “The USA in Afghanistan,” International Affairs, No. 2, 2012. 20 See: D. Malysheva, “Afganskiy endspiel i regionalnaia bezopasnost,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 11, 2012, pp. 16-23. 21 See: N. Mendkovich, “Uroki na budushchee. Voennye itogi afganskoy kampanii NATO”, Rossia v globalnoy politike, No. 2, 2013.

17 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Positions of the Central Asian States

What the Central Asian states think about the future of their region is highly interesting for the simple reason that what is going on in Afghanistan inevitably echoes in Central Asia. Uzbekistan proceeds from two postulates: (1) the use of force will not bring settlement and (2) the economy should play a more prominent role in the conflict settlement and the country’s rehabilitation. Tashkent moves in two interconnected directions: it is involved in economic projects and in diplomatic activities designed to pool together the efforts of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the key external actors (the U.S., Russia, China, and NATO). The Uzbek leaders are guided by the idea that a restored economy will inevitably reduce the conflict potential inside the country and that, therefore, the world community should concentrate on extending purpose-oriented economic aid to this country. Uzbekistan, in turn, is involved in building highways and railways, in the spheres of power production, construction, mining, education, and exchange of experts. Tajikistan believes that its domestic situation depends on what is going on in Afghanistan and has pointed out that: — The problem of Afghanistan cannot be resolved by the use of force; — All interested countries should sign, at the U.N. level, an agreement on a “security belt” around Afghanistan to cut short illegal trade in weapons, ammunition, and technologies and limit, to a certain extent, the transit of military and quasi-military forces across its territory; — The world community should fight drug production in Afghanistan and drug trafficking to the neighboring regions; — Social economic, cultural, and political problems should receive special attention; — Afghanistan should retain its territorial integrity and remain a centralized state. Tajikistan is convinced that the Central Asian countries should arrive at a common and coordi- nated regional position on the Afghan issue. Special attention should be paid to their joint operations in Afghanistan’s energy and foodstuffs market and mutually advantageous use of the infrastructural and transport potential of all countries, including Afghanistan. Dushanbe believes that geopolitical reorientation of the Central Asian countries southward (in a format close to the Greater Central Asia and the New Silk Road concepts) will contribute to the Afghan settlement. Experts of the Tajik Research Center SHARK do not think that a reduced Western military presence in Afghanistan will greatly undermine Central Asian security, Tajikistan being the only exception. At the same time, destabilization in Afghanistan will negatively affect the situation in the Central Asian countries for several reasons: first, their security will cost more; second, many projects (energy and infrastructural, in particular) geared at progress and development will inevitably slow down. The security-related programs Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing are implementing to help the Central Asian countries are not efficient enough and fall short of the announced targets. A reduced Western military presence in post-2014 Afghanistan is not as important as the uncer- tain future of the country’s statehood after the United States and its Western allies have formally transferred their direct security obligations to the Afghan government while remaining in the country and the region. This will make the security sphere less transparent and the tension greater.

18 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

This means that the latest geopolitical changes have created several serious challenges for the Central Asian countries: they must ensure their own security, realize new economic options, and survive in the harsh regional rivalry and ups and downs of the game waged by the big actors—the U.S., Russia, China and EU—and new developing leaders—Iran, Pakistan, and India in Central Asia.22 Kyrgyzstan proceeds from two issues of fundamental importance: (1) Lack of resources and political instability inside the country does not allow it to be involved in economic cooperation with Afghanistan. (2) The U.S. Transit Center at Manas, one of the key elements of the Northern Route opened to support Operation Enduring Freedom, is in its territory. Kazakhstan proceeds from its firm conviction that sustainable economic development of Af- ghanistan is the best guarantee against the threat of international terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and drugs, which are spreading far and wide from Afghan territory. The world community and the U.N. acting in close cooperation with the government of Afghanistan, which strives to consolidate society and build a civilized democratic state, should play an active and, more importantly, effective role in political settlement and rehabilitation of this country. It should become less dependent on foreign aid and more attractive to foreign investors; industrialization as a business project for trans- national companies rather than foreign aid is the best answer. Astana is concentrating on extending purpose-oriented economic aid to Afghanistan through the Kazakhstan-Afghani intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation as one of the instruments. This means financial support, construction of social and industrial objects, development of infrastructure, personnel training, etc. Kazakhstan is involved in multisided cooperation in the NATO-SCO-CSTO format; it is an active member of the Workgroup on Afghanistan at the CSTO Council of Foreign Ministers and the rehabilitation projects of the Contact Group on Cooperation and Coordination of Efforts of the SCO member states. Astana believes that multisided structures should move in the following directions: — Ensure post-conflict settlement in Afghanistan with the U.N. playing the key role; — Help Afghanistan build an independent, neutral, peaceful, and flourishing state free from terrorism and drug-related crimes; — Create a security belt along the country’s borders; — Liquidate the trade barriers, open new routes of transportation of commodities, and set up conditions conducive to investments.

Conclusion

Today, there are two opposite opinions about the ways and means for settling the conflict in Afghanistan. (1) Peace and conflict settlement are possible only after complete pullout of foreign troops from the country, or (2) peace and stabilization are possible only after the Taliban is completely routed.

22 See: Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii, pp. 81-82.

19 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Long-term forecasts about the Afghan developments are practically impossible; in any case this is a thankless task. The Western countries rely on military force to fully control the Afghan army, international assistance, etc. It seems that in the foreseeable future the Taliban will split into a radical and a legal wing, the latter most probably seeking a place in the country’s political system. Today, the political situation inside the country is vague; Kabul (urged by the Western allies eager to present to the world at least their relative successes in “democratization” and “stabilization”) actively promotes its achievements. Afghanistan, a sad example of failed centralized democracy, is moving toward disintegration. The Taliban feels completely at ease in some parts of the country, while the rest remains unstable under the rule of all sorts of leaders whom no one can control. If the Karzai government falls, the country will sink into anarchy and civil war. Centralized dictatorship is another, yet hardly plausible, option. In any case, the United States will try to prevent unwelcome scenarios; this means that it will remain involved in the Afghan conflict. It seems that the military presence of the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan will be gradually di- minished, albeit at a slower pace than happened in Iraq: the United States will have to keep from 30 to 50 thousand troops in the country to prevent its complete destabilization. The Central Asian countries will need safe borders to keep away crowds of terrorists and flows of illegal weapons and drugs. The SCO member states will seek opportunities to be involved in Af- ghan economic rehabilitation and energy projects (provided there are corresponding agreements) and bigger investments if there are fewer security risks. This will call for new bilateral (between Russia and Central Asian countries) and multilateral (CSTO and SCO) agreements on cooperation in anti-terrorist struggle. If the situation in Afghanistan goes from bad to worse, the Central Asian countries will have to spend more on their own security, which will do nothing for the region’s investment climate. Af- ghanistan’s south and east might become a training camp of radical militants. The flow of illegal arms in the Central Asian countries will increase; the leading political actors and international organizations will become even more eager to draw the region’s countries into their spheres of influence, which will stir up even fiercer geopolitical rivalry. This will probably transform the region into a “grey” security zone; today the possibility of this is assessed as fifty-fifty. The CSTO countries, therefore, should close ranks in the face of the looming threats. In the political, military, and economic spheres, the Central Asian states intend to do the following: (1) Preserve stability after the pullout of the main coalition forces; prevent multicultural com- plications burdened with Islamic extremism; and upgrade Central Asian security measures. Everything should be done to prevent the south and east of Afghanistan from turning into a huge training camp of radical militants. (2) Ensure secure pullout of the coalition forces throughout the Northern Distribution Network; strengthen the position of the Afghan army; prevent a civil war; keep radical forces outside the Central Asian republics; cut short illegal arms trafficking; and take control over drug production and drug trafficking. (3) Help Afghanistan restore its economy, attract more foreign investments, and help imple- ment energy and transportation projects. Any of the scenarios discussed above might put an end to the current standstill; this will upset the balance of power in the world and affect all the actors with interests of their own in Afghanistan.

20 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 PROBLEM-2014 AND CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY

Konstantin SYROEZHKIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Chief Research Associate, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the RK (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

ABSTRACT

he author analyzes the outcome of The external threats to regional secu- the 12 years of the counterterrorist rity, their potential exacerbation because of T operation in Afghanistan and the the coalition withdrawal, and their potential problems it has created. He looks at some localization are likewise analyzed. of the political aspects related to the 2014 He also examines the SCO’s possible pullout and the main threats and challenges involvement in settling the Afghan problem to regional security emanating from Afghan- and the fields and spheres in which this or- istan. ganization could apply its potential.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, narco-transit, regional security, Problem-2014, the SCO.

Introduction

Today, the question of how the coalition pullout will affect Central Asia figures prominently on the agenda. The forecasts are numerous and mainly pessimistic: most people agree that Central Asia has accumulated too many problems created by radical Islamism and extremism kept under the lid by the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and that they will inevitably burst out after the pullout. Like many of my colleagues, I am not optimistic about the region’s future, however I disagree with them on some points.  First, I am not absolutely convinced that the coalition shielded Central Asia from the Af- ghan threats more effectively than the Northern Alliance before it. On top of this, the Northern Alliance did not create new threats and never sought destabilization across the entire region.  Second, I do not believe that if the Taliban comes to power in Kabul it will inevitably ex- pand northward. It seems that the Taliban and people in power in Kabul will have too many problems on their hands to look to the north: the pullout will start another stage of the civil war fraught with the country’s partition into ethnic regions. Seen from Central Asia, this situation is not comfortable, but not threatening if fight- ers from Afghanistan are prevented from infiltrating into the region. The transportation- logistics and pipeline projects, on the other hand, will be shelved because of the civil war.

21 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

 Third, there are people who say that the armaments and military equipment the United States plans to leave behind, mainly in Uzbekistan, will change the regional balance of power. Today, Uzbekistan has the strongest and the most combat-worthy army in the re- gion; the status quo will not be changed by deliveries of Russian armaments to Kyrgyzstan or by the huge sum of $300-400 million that will be poured into modernization of Tajiki- stan’s armed forces. I am convinced (or almost convinced) that what some Russian experts are saying about future wars over water resources in Central Asia or for ethnic reasons can be described as science fiction. Local conflicts are possible, but a large-scale war is absolutely impossible.

The Afghan Problem: Today and Tomorrow

In the fall of 2013, it will be 12 years since the United States and NATO launched their counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan; the results of these years leave much to be desired. Indeed, these twelve long years have proven too short for the Western coalition to realize its initial aims. The Taliban is more alive than ever: it is gradually tightening its grip on the situation in the context of Hamid Karzai’s failed government and the coalition’s desire to pull out as quickly as possible. It strengthened its position while the Western coalition poured more and more troops into the country. This means that those who say there is no military solution to the Afghan prob- lem are right. The country’s economy is ruined; a large part of foreign funding goes to foreign NGOs as pay- ment for consultations, the rest is embezzled. Corruption, everyday and political racketeering, arbi- trary rule of the local authorities, etc. have become run of the mill. Afghanistan is still the world’s largest producer of fresh opium (see Diagram 1) and one of the world’s largest producers of heroin (90% of the heroin consumed around the world originates in Afghanistan).1 The area of land under opium cultivation increased from 131 to 154 thousand hectares after the drought of 2012, which predictably increased drug production.2 One cannot but be amazed that the coalition, armed with a complete range of information about the structure of drug industry and drug transit in Afghanistan and personal files on practically all drug barons, has remained passive throughout the twelve years of its presence in the country. According to at least some experts, during the years of the counterterrorist operation in Af- ghanistan, the local “drug dealers set up full-scale production, financial, and banking infrastructures competitive with the leaders of world banking. They organized harvesting of opium poppy and fresh opium, centralized delivery to storage facilities, processing into morphine and heroin, and their de- livery along well-organized routes.”3 We have every reason to suspect that the United States does not

1 According to the RF Federal Service of Drugs Control, the Afghan drug barons produce 94% of the world’s volume of opiates. Head of the Federal Service Victor Ivanov has quoted the following figures: every year Afghanistan produces and sells drugs totaling $65 billion. Every year $17 billion-worth of drugs are moved along the so-called northern route; a large or even the largest share of them is used in the transit countries. Thirty-five percent of narcotics transported from Afghanistan reaches Russia (see: “RF napomnit NATO ob obiazatelstvakh po borbe s Afghanskimi narkotikami,” RIA Novosti, 19 March, 2010, available at [http://www.rian.ru/]. 2 See: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York, May 2013, p. 13. 3 See: I. Khokhlov, “Proizvodstvo opiynykh narkotikov (geroina) v Afghanistane: infrastruktura narkobiznesa,” available at [http://www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00021].

22 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Diagram 1

Dynamics of Drug Production in Afghanistan in 1997-2012, tons

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000 Tons

3,000

2,000

1,000 2,804 2,693 4,565 3,278 185 3,400 3,600 4,200 4,100 5,300 7,400 5,900 4,000 3,600 5,800 3,700

0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

S o u r c e: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York, May 2013, p. 46. want to liquidate drug production in Afghanistan and is even directly involved in it (this is what Zamir Kabulov, Special Presidential Envoy to Afghanistan, thinks).4 The fact that the decision of the Budapest conference of the defense ministers of NATO member countries (held in October 2008) to use the ISAF in fighting illegal drug production was practically ignored cannot but cause concern. It should be said that while in 2008-2010 the areas under opium poppy shrank, in 2011-2012, the opposite trend became very obvious (see Diagram 2). The number of people involved in drug production increased from 2.4 million in 2008 to 3.4 million in 2009 and 3.42 million in 2010.5 In 2009-2010, the areas under opium poppy shrank; in 2010 and 2012 the volume of opium production dropped, however, these facts cannot deceive anyone. “UNODC estimated that at the end

4 There is information that the coalition servicemen buy drugs wholesale at the markets of Kandahar, move them to the airbase in Bagram, then by air to the American base in Incirlik (Turkey), and then to the base in Pristina (or to Rumania, Georgia, Germany, and other countries) (see: I.N. Komissina, “Nezakonnoe proizvodstvo narkotikov v Afghanistane,” Problemy natsionalnoy strategii, No. 1, 2010, pp. 33-34). 5 See: A.A. Kniazev, “O narkokriminalnom komponente sovremennykh politicheskikh protsessov v stranakh Tsentralnoy Azii v kontekste afghanskogo narkoproizvodstva,” Informatsionno-analiticheskiy portal Materik, 24 March, 2010, available at [http://www.materik.ru/]; Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010. Summary Findings, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York, September 2010, p. 1; A.H. Cordesman, The Afghan Narcotics Industry: Extended Summary, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 12 November, 2009, p. 10.

23 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Diagram 2

Areas under Opium Poppy in Afghanistan in 1994-2012, hectares

200,000

175,000

150,000

125,000

100,000 Hectares 75,000

50,000 131,000 104,000 165,000 193,000 157,000 123,000 123,000 131,000 154,000 71,000 54,000 57,000 58,000 64,000 91,000 82,000 74,000 80,000 8,000 25,000

0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

S o u r c e: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York, May 2013, p. 18. of 2009, opium stockpiles in Afghanistan and neighboring countries totaled some 12,000 tons, equiv- alent to 2.5 years of global illicit demand for opiates.”6 The very limited possibilities of the Afghan government to maintain security in the country and make adequate and correct social, economic, and management decisions is another major headache.  First, the Hamid Karzai government does not control the larger part of the country,7 where power belongs to former warlords turned self-appointed governors independent of Kabul and relying on their mini-armies. Many of them are involved in the narco-business; some of them side with the Taliban. It seems that the current haggling between the U.S. representatives and the Taliban is explained by the extremely weak power of President Karzai and his Cabinet.  Second, widescale falsifications at the 2009 presidential and 2010 parliamentary elections cast doubt on the legitimacy of Karzai’s presidency: both campaigns showed that Afghani- stan does not have a strong central government. Both campaigns demonstrated beyond doubt that the final aim of the counterterrorist coalition in Afghanistan as formulated by the United States, viz. a democratic centralized state, was unattain- able for several reasons.

6 International Narcotics Control Board. 2010 Report, New York, January 2011, p. 96. 7 According to information made public in December 2008 at a conference of the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), in the previous 12 months the Taliban spread its permanent presence to 72 percent of Afghanistan, up from 54 percent in November 2007 (see: [http://www.icosgroup.net/2009/media/media-press-releases/eight_ years_after_911/]).

24 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

 First, it contradicts the country’s traditions; as such it stirs up discontent and widens the gap between the elites and among ethnicities.  Second, the last three decades of unrest and radical decentralization have aggravated the problems. This explains why American experts have become champions of the idea of a state of “decen- tralized democracy”8 or the idea of “internal mixed sovereignty”9; all other conditions fulfilled, either could have been acceptable to the United States.10 Experts, who are fully aware that “decentralized democracy” or “internal mixed sovereignty” will create many problems, cannot think of a better political future for Afghanistan.11 The majority of the most influential non-Pashtun politicians are ready to accept the idea of de- centralized governance; they refer to the problems that are rapidly piling up in the relations between the Pashtuns and other ethnicities. They want elected governors and proportional representation in the central power structures.12 They are probably right; however, proportional representation of all ethnicities in the central power structures will hardly resolve the problem created by the relations among the three largest ethnic groups—the Pashtuns, Hazaras, and Tajiks. The country might become less governable. Zamir Kabulov has rightly pointed out that today Afghanistan needs “a strong central government” and that “any attempt to place the stakes on ethnic contradictions is fraught with catastrophic repercussions for Afghan statehood and regional stability.”13

8 The central government retains its responsibility for foreign policy, domestic security and democratic “rules of the game” on a countrywide scale; the regions are becoming more independent, which gives them the opportunity to use the already existing base of legitimacy and identity; the local administration should be elected and should be transparent. 9 Mixed sovereignty is an even more decentralized model. This approach would take many powers that are now held in Kabul and delegate them to the provincial or district level. Mixed sovereignty would grant local authorities the additional power to rule without transparency or elections if they so choose—as long as they do not cross the three “redlines” imposed by the center. The first redline would forbid local authorities from allowing their territories to be used in ways that violate the foreign policy of the state. The second would bar local administrations from infringing on the rights of neighboring provinces or districts. The third would prevent officials from engaging in large-scale theft, narcotics trafficking, or the exploitation of state-owned natural resources. 10 These variants would preserve a central state with autonomous regions and democratic institutions and with the power and incentive to deny the use of Afghan territory for destabilizing Pakistan or planning attacks against the United States and its allies. 11 A decentralized democracy in Afghanistan would face three critical challenges. The first, of course, is the Taliban, who oppose democracy in principle and are likely to resist this approach as aggressively as they now resist centralized democracy. The second challenge is the limited administrative capacity of the Afghan state. Third, the country’s malign power brokers would likely resist such an option. A transparent electoral democracy would threaten their status, authority, and ability to profit from corruption and abuse. The “internal mixed sovereignty” will create even more problems. First, governors would be free to adopt regressive social policies and abuse human rights. Second, corruption would also be prevalent—indeed, for prospective governors, the opportunity for graft would be an essential part of the system’s appeal. Third, the central government would have to strike a bargain with the country’s power brokers, requiring them to refrain from large-scale abuses in exchange for tolerance of moderate local corruption and a share of foreign assistance. Even this kind of bargain, however, would probably be resisted by the country’s strongmen, who have grown used to operating without restraint (see: S. Biddle, C. Fotini, A. Thier, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, No. 4, 2010). 12 Ahmad Wali Massoud, brother of late Ahmad Shah Massoud, spoke about that in June 2011 at a conference on Scenarios for Afghanistan and Regional Security Transformation held in Almaty. He was supported by Aziz Arianfar, Director of the German-based Center for Afghanistan Studies (see: “Afghanistanu nuzhen status neytralnoy strany pod egidoy OON,” RIA Novosti, 11 June, 2011, available at [http://www.rian.ru]; Aziz Arianfar: “Edinstvenny vykhod iz tupika—vernut Afghanistanu neytralitet,” International Information Agency Ferghana, 20 June, 2011, available at [http://www.fergananews. com/]). 13 See: Zamir Kabulov: “Nuzhno idti v Afghanistan s otkrytym serdtsem,” Information portal Afghanistan.Ru, 25 May, 2011, available at [http://www.afghanistan.ru/].

25 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

There is another problem: recently the relations between President Karzai and the political lead- ers of the United States and the NATO member countries have been going from bad to worse. The shifted accents in future state governance are probably explained by the growing mistrust of the Karzai regime, which proved unable (or unwilling) to check outrageous corruption and abuse of power at all levels and the president’s obvious determination to shake off American and NATO patronage. In 2011 this became even more obvious; in March Hamid Karzai demanded that the U.S. and NATO stop the military operation immediately; late in May he accused the American commanders of killing peaceful citizens. He said that if airstrikes on settlements continued, the foreign troops would be declared enemies of the Afghans people. On 18 June, 2011, speaking at an international youth conference in Kabul, Hamid Karzai “be- littled the US-led coalition as unwelcome outsiders who invaded Afghanistan for their own interests and who pollute the country’s environment” and added that he no longer felt grateful to the military coalition. “The occupation troops have already damaged the ecology of Afghanistan beyond repair; we will live with these effects for the next forty to fifty years.” The president said that he doubted the aim of international aid under which the countries in- volved in the coalition were building schools, roads, and hospitals in his country: “They are building these roads not for us but for their huge trucks with huge wheels.” The next day, outgoing U.S. Ambassador in Kabul Lt. General Karl Eikenberry retorted that the American side was prepared to revise its relations with the government of Afghanistan and reminded everyone that the Americans had paid dearly for their help to this country.14 He was indignant: “When we hear ourselves being called occupiers and worse, our pride is offended and we begin to lose our inspiration to carry on.”15 The U.S. Senate arrived at a similar conclusion: the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations said that $18.8 billion had created no efficient state institutions in Afghanistan but “raised expectations and changed incentive structures among Afghans.” It described the impressive increase in funding for civilian programs in Afghanistan (“Congress appropriated approximately $2.8 billion in FY 2009 and $4.2 billion in FY 2010 funds for Afghanistan”) as excessive. The Senate pointed out that the funding should be cut by 22 percent to keep within the planned trimming of the budget deficit. The senators recommended the following:  Set up an efficient mechanism of interdepartmental and intergovernmental coordination of humanitarian activities in Afghanistan;  “We must challenge the assumption that our stabilization programs in their current form necessarily contribute to stability”;  “Our aid projects need to focus more on sustainability so that Afghans can absorb our pro- grams when donor funds recede.”16 “Rather than trying to strengthen the Karzai government, the real strategy is to return to the historical principles of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan: alliance with indigenous forces.”17

14 The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations says that between 2002 and 2010 the United States extended aid totaling $51,803 billion to Afghanistan; $18.78 billion were poured into the economy, the social sphere, and state institutions; $32.89 billion were spent on setting up and training the Afghan national army and the police; $127.5 million, on anti-narcotics efforts (see: Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan. A Majority Staff Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 8 June, 2011, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2011, p. 34). 15 [http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/robert-gates-confirms-us-peace-talks-with-taliban/story- e6frg6so-1226078756876]. 16 Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, pp. 1-2, 5, 29-30. 17 G. Friedman, “The 30-Year War in Afghanistan,” Stratfor (US), 29 June, 2010. In mid-March 2010, a secret meeting was held in the White House to discuss how to proceed with the Afghan Taliban. In recent years the United States has been

26 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

It should be said that today this model, its faults notwithstanding, looks much more adequate than centralized democracy. In mid-June 2011, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates officially confirmed the fact of talks with the Taliban from which the Karzai government was excluded. He also admitted: “My own view is that real reconciliation talks are not likely to be able to make any substantive headway until at least this winter”; he was dead set against a hasty pullout from Afghanistan: “I think the Taliban have to feel themselves under military pressure, and begin to believe they can’t win before they’re willing to have a serious conversation.”18 It seems that Karzai is of the same opinion; contrary to what the United States hopes to achieve, i.e. to split the movement, he is determined to share power with the leaders of the resistance.19 He knows that placing the stakes on the “moderate” Taliban is doomed to failure, therefore he prefers to talk to the leaders, warlords, and respected regional politicians. Leaks in the Western press testify to the fact that the is talking to Mullah Omar, , and Jalaluddin Haqqani. In June 2011, Karzai admitted, “Earlier this year we had several meetings with members of the Taliban. The talks have been launched and are going on smoothly.” He added that he talked to influ- ential warlords and the leaders officially empowered to speak in the name of the movement.20 In 2012 and early 2013, neither the U.S. nor Karzai made any secret of their talks with the Taliban. Karzai, in turn, accused the Americans of “talking to the enemies” and offered to show the right way out. In many respects he is right; aside from the fairly doubtful terminology, it must be admitted that the “moderate” Taliban is driven not so much by ideological, rather than by material considerations. This means that the “moderate” members have no impact on the nature of the armed struggle against the government and cannot affect the movement’s future; therefore, the leaders and influential war- lords are the only valid dialog partners. The dialog itself should be limited to their possible involve- ment in the political process, the results of which are fairly vague. Later, they could very well be offered high posts in state structures. The Taliban is prepared to lay down arms and start talking if:  The Constitution is changed;  The foreign troops are withdrawn;  The Taliban is accepted as part of the country’s political system;  Its offices are opened in the cities of Afghanistan;  The names of its leaders are removed from the “black list” of the UN SC;  All imprisoned members of the Taliban are set free;  Elections are controlled by a neutral interim government. The question is how acceptable is all this to the U.S., NATO, and the Karzai regime? more and more frequently talking about a dialog with those of the Taliban members who were not involved in crimes; who laid down arms and recognized the Constitution, in short “moderate” members. Judging by the leaks in foreign press these talks are underway with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as active brokers. So far there have been no results (see: K. Belianinov, A. Gabuev, “Esli vrag ne sdaetsia, ego ugovarivaiut,” Kommersant, 17 March, 2010; V. Skosyrev, “Obama podderzhal peregovory s ‘Talibanom’,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 17 March, 2010). 18 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13830750]; [http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/robert- gates-confirms-us-peace-talks-with-taliban/story-e6frg6so-1226078756876]. 19 Talking to journalists in his residence in Kabul, Karzai said: “I again call on my brothers, the Taliban, dears, Hizb-i- Islami to take this opportunity and say yes to the call of the people. This is a rare chance.” He addressed those who lived in emigration and who fought in Afghanistan to come back and establish peace for the sake of their country’s prosperity and stability (see: [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/06/04/jirgas-offer-rare-chance-taliban-karzai]; “Karzai pozval bratiev- Talibov na ‘Loya /Bolshoy sovet’,” BaltInfo Agency, 28 November, 2009, available at [http://www.baltinfo.ru/]). 20 See: A. Reutov, “Talibov otdelili ot ‘Al-Qaedy’,” Kommersant, 20 June, 2011.

27 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Some of the demands may be fulfilled in due course, while the main point—the pullout of for- eign troops—is unacceptable. Washington has other strategic designs, while Karzai remains in pow- er thanks to the foreign troops. If the coalition which, in fact, has never achieved its initial aims, de- cides to promptly leave the country, Afghanistan will be left to the mercy of the Taliban with unpre- dictable repercussions.  First, no one knows who the “moderate Taliban” is and what the Taliban’s real face looks like today.  Second, it is impossible to guess whether a dialog with the Taliban will prove effective with respect to the country’s political future.  Third, so far, no one knows how the leaders of the ethnicities in the country’s north and along the Iranian border will respond to the talks. Elbowed out of power, they might start another round of civil war fraught with disintegration into ethnic regions.

The Afghan Factor in the Regional Security System

For many years, the Afghan factor has remained one of the key threats and security challenges. This is explained by the socioeconomic and political development of Afghanistan (especially as the main terrain of drug production and terrorist training) and by the “geopolitical games” in which the country (and, most important, the fighters camping in its territory) hold a special place and have a very special role to play. What external threats and challenges to regional security are real today21 and which ones will become exacerbated after the coalition’s pullout? The main one is the new international security system built by the United States and based on the “dual standards” policy applied in disregard of the U.N. SC. It is growing more and more real, while the list of countries and regimes which fail to fit in is growing longer. In the new system, decision-making is subjective; this means that none of the Central Asian countries can hope to avoid being listed. Today, however, the geopolitical heavyweights do not need destabilization in the Central Asian region. The strategy and tactics the coalition is pursuing in Afghanistan, its pullout plans, and all sorts of geopolitical projects devised in Washington cannot but cause doubts. Indeed, Afghanistan is seen as an American foothold in the region, which makes the Central Asian region vitally important for America.22 Strange as it may seem, Washington is not at all concerned about the interests of Russia, China, India, or the regional states, which means that practical implementation will not go smoothly. The increasingly fierce struggle over natural resources, in which military force is used as the main argument, is another big problem of the contemporary world. More and more often the devel- oped countries rely on military-political means to deal with their internal economic problems. Central Asia is no exception: the power centers are locked in a struggle over access to the re- gion’s resources (oil and gas in particular) and transportation routes. This is the beginning and end of geopolitics in Central Asia today and in the near future.

21 Here I will not discuss the internal threats and challenges to regional security, even though they dominate today; after 2014 the larger part of them will become even more dangerous. At the same time, the internal threats and challenges are only indirectly connected to what is going on in Afghanistan and the future pullout. 22 Here I have in mind the concept which lumps together the Afghan and Pakistani problems in the so-called AfPak and Greater Central Asia strategy.

28 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Nothing is being done to remedy the situation that caused the world financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008. This is the third problem. The mounting budget deficit of the United States, the economic recession in the eurozone, and the rising external debts of the developed countries might create another financial bubble and, therefore, another crisis, probably in late 2013-mid-2014, accord- ing to certain experts. The chaos in the Middle East is the fourth problem, which has already invigorated the radical Islamist movements by supplying them with plenty of weapons, human resources, and money. Their increased pressure on secular regimes will not be limited to North Africa and the Middle East; extrem- ist groups will spread far and wide beyond the region. This means that Central Asia might become one of their targets. Today, the rapid increase in radical, extremist, and religiously motivated extremist acts in practically all the Central Asian coun- tries can be described as a clear warning. Western analytical centers of all sorts have opted for a highly dangerous variant: regime change in the Muslim countries and reliance on political Islam.23 The experiment tested in the Maghreb countries, the social and political parameters of which are very close to those of the Central Asian countries, failed. The threats and challenges emanating from Afghanistan in the context of the coalition’s pullout constitute the fifth problem. I can see three real threats.  First, the national armed forces of Afghanistan will be unable to ensure security inside the country; therefore, a civil war with pronounced ethnic accents cannot be excluded.  Second, small opposition groups (Uzbek, Uyghur, Chechen, Kyrgyz, etc.) from Russia and Central Asia that camp in Afghanistan have been demonstrating much more vigor than before. They will inevitably be pushed out of Afghanistan back to their places of origin; I have in mind the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Aqramiyya, Tablighi Jamaat, the Is- lamic Party of Eastern Turkestan, Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahedeen, and others. Russian expert Dina Malysheva has rightly pointed out that the migration of fighters “might encourage members of the local religious-political movements to join forces with armed fighters from Afghanistan” while “disunited armed clashes might develop into gue- rilla warfare.”24  Third, the problem of transit of Afghan drugs has not been resolved. Narco-transit has brought together criminal groups, some of the members of the defense and security struc- tures, and certain politicians in Russia and Central Asia; the number of drug users is steadi- ly rising in practically all the countries of the region. Neither the regional states nor the international organizations involved in ensuring security can cope with the problem. This means that Afghanistan as a drug producer relies on an influential lobby; the same can be said about Central Asia as one of the transit corridors.

The Afghan Problem and the SCO

The possible involvement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Afghan settlement and related threats and challenges are being actively discussed. The idea is promising and realizable—un-

23 Information about a new structure set up at the U.S. Department of State to deal with religious communities in other countries is highly illustrative in this respect. 24 D. Malysheva, Tsentralnoaziatskiy uzel mirovoy politiki, IMEMO RAN, Moscow, 2010, p. 13.

29 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS der certain conditions. The question is: How can the SCO help Afghanistan; What would be better avoided so as not to mar the Organization’s positive image? Experts suggest the following.  First, funding social and infrastructural projects in Afghanistan; this is possible but hardly realizable today: the SCO still lacks a unified mechanism for funding economic projects and an institution capable of setting such a mechanism in motion. This means that the SCO member countries should set up a corresponding structure and tune up the mechanism for creating and spending its budget.  Second, the SCO should help fight the narco-business in Afghanistan up to and including control along its borders. It should be said that the SCO has no power to fight narco-traffic inside Afghanistan; however, the problem can be resolved up to a certain point. There are several vicious circles. First, it is impossible to seal off the borders of Afghanistan for drug trafficking without cooperation with Pakistan and Iran, while com- prehensive cooperation with them is impossible since they are not full-fledged SCO members. The second circle: the SCO members cannot agree on the level of threats. Some of them (Russia, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan) are worried about drug trafficking from Af- ghanistan; others have other concerns. China, for example, is not troubled by the flow of drugs from Afghanistan. The third circle: there are groups in each of the SCO member countries determined to preserve the status quo by all means; this makes border control practically impossible. The solution is simple enough: supplies of precursors to Afghanistan, from the SCO countries in particular, should be discontinued.25  Third, the SCO may try to organize a dialog inside the country under its aegis, yet practical implementation is hardly possible. For various reasons, the Taliban does not accept Russia (despite the fact that the political leaders of Afghanistan have somewhat readjusted their attitude to it) or China and will never talk to them, partly because the SCO member coun- tries are fighting Islamic extremism, the ideology of the Taliban. Iran and Pakistan (so far outside the SCO) stand a good chance of mediating a dia- logue with the Taliban. The Afghan government is too weak to talk to the Taliban from a position of strength, the only language the Taliban understands. The international coalition would be extremely naive to expect that the sides could find a common language.  Fourth, some experts, General Leonid Ivashev being one of them, suggest that the U.S. military contingent in Afghanistan should be completely or partially (minus the NATO forc- es stationed in the country) replaced by SCO collective forces. This is a good,26 but obvi- ously premature, idea: the SCO is not prepared for military involvement in Afghanistan.  First, the Afghans have learned to look at all foreign military in their territory as oc- cupants who violate the state’s sovereignty and cause a lot of casualties.

25 There is information that precursors come from China, Pakistan, India, Europe, and the Middle East on a regular basis. The Bakiev clan controlled the flow of drug trafficking across Kyrgyzstan, this is one of the most pertinent examples of how top politicians in Central Asia patronized the narco-business (see: K. Fayzullina, “Ekonomika narkotrafika opiatov cherez Tsentralnuiu Aziiu,” Internet portal Islam in CIS, 9 August, 2013, available at [http://wwww.islamsng.com/]. 26 See: “Perspektivy rossiisko-natovskogo sotrudnichestva po ‘afghanskomu voprosu’,” Internet portal Afghanistan.Ru, 10 March, 2008, available at [http://www.afghanistan.ru].

30 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

 Second, Russia has learned its lesson from its own attempt to send troops into Af- ghanistan: the Afghans will never accept foreign military presence in their country and no modern social order can be enforced on them.  Third, the SCO has not acquired a full-fledged military component, while its potential is fairly limited. The SCO cannot replace NATO in Afghanistan; it can join others in the struggle against threats and challenges generated in this country.  And, finally, before drawing the SCO into Afghanistan, its potential involvement should be discussed with the government of Hamid Karzai (or the next president) and the leaders of the United States and NATO. There are several, though purely hypothetical, variants of the SCO’s involvement in Af- ghanistan: (1) An independent mechanism of involvement parallel to NATO, the U.N., the EU, and other Western structures. (2) Cooperation with these structures in the areas where they cannot cope. (3) The same or similar functions (minus the military component) performed by Western struc- tures in the rest of the country. (4) One or several multinational brigades patterned on those already functioning in the country to restore the provinces.  The first variant is absolutely unrealistic for two reasons: the SCO cannot, while the West will not, allow it to do this.  The second is unwelcome: the SCO should not become a stopgap for NATO.  The third and fourth variants are more practicable with the exception of use of force by the SCO. Their practical realization, however, is limited for the reasons described above. To sum up: the SCO’s potential involvement in Afghanistan is fairly limited; so far, it can do much more by keeping to the present scheme of bilateral cooperation between the SCO member countries and Afghanistan. As an organization, the SCO can and should create a favorable foreign policy environment for Afghanistan, discontinue or, at least, cut down the export of drugs from it and import of precursors into it, reduce as far as possible external funding of the opposition inside the country, extend eco- nomic assistance to Kabul, and check the spread of radical Islamist ideas. This does not require the consent of the government of Afghanistan or, more importantly, the ISAF commanders. The political will of the SCO member countries will suffice. To promote economic settlement, the SCO should concentrate on investments and proceed from a specific plan of economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan rather than from the amount of money al- located for this purpose (which is being done today). To overcome the security threats, the SCO member countries should proceed from principles very different from those accepted by the United States and the European Union. They are: (1) Non-use of force. (2) Equal cooperation and partnership in the economic sphere between Afghanistan and the SCO members. (3) Economic contacts designed to deal with the social problems by setting up (restoring) in- frastructure on a commercial basis. 31 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

(4) Humanitarian aid limited to cultural and educational programs and targeted at specific structures. (5) Commercial projects implemented at the level of heads of tribes and territories with support (albeit pretty formal) of the central government. (6) Cooperation of the sides in the economic, cultural, and social sphere should be aimed at establishing a peaceful and efficient economy; this will allow the people and tribal chiefs to abandon drug production for the sake of legal and creative economic activities. To be able to follow these principles, the SCO countries should organize a buffer zone along their borders free from drug production and terrorist training camps.

Conclusion

It would be wrong or even stupid to underestimate the impact of Problem-2014 on the situation in Central Asia and regional security. The coalition’s pullout will create complications inside Af- ghanistan. The situation will become more explosive and less predictable especially if, according to what is being said today, the foreign military contingent pulls out in haste leaving behind half-baked national security forces, whose ability to ensure security looks doubtful, to say the least. From this it follows that the country’s future promises no joy: the Taliban will return to power (to make it even less efficient than today), while squabbles among warlords and ethnic groups will gradually push them toward another round of a civil war with strong ethnic accents and possible disintegration. There is no Northern Alliance to stop the northward progress of any warfare; this means that Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and, possibly, Uzbekistan in particular) will have their share of troubles. The only force that is so far keeping Islamism in check will be pulling out of the region to leave the secular regimes to face the mounting impact of the Islamists. Terrorist groups of radical Islamists from Central Asian countries so far based in Afghanistan might cross the border into their home countries. They constitute the main threat to security and sta- bility. Our information about their numerical strength, structure, and aims is very limited, however the danger their radical Islamist ideology presents to the Central Asian secular political regimes is very real indeed. None of the Central Asian countries can cope with the threat on their own; they should start working on an adequate response today, although what it might look like is anybody’s guess. It is obviously impossible to formulate it without Russia and, possibly, China. Increased drug transit across Central Asia is the second serious threat. It is unrelated to Prob- lem-2014, but the problem is unlikely to disappear along with the foreign troops. Despite the numer- ous programs and newly established structures, nothing has been done so far to address the problem in earnest. This means that the Afghan narco barons are not alone: preserving the status quo suits the organized criminal groups operating in Central Asia and Russia. Problem-2014 is either unrelated or partly related to other security threats. This makes us won- der who is profiting from “demonizing” this date? Why do the media (the Western media in particu- lar) insist that the Western pullout will be followed by an explosion in Central Asia? Indeed, we all know that the pullout will not be complete and final: the United States, which has been fighting in Afghanistan for twelve years and has paid dearly for the war (up to and including lives of its own citizens), is not just going to up and leave the country. The absurdity of this is obvi- ous: complete pullout would spell complete failure of America’s regional strategy.

32 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Two questions suggest one answer: the carefully fanned hysterics are needed to justify Wash- ington’s resolution to preserve its position in Afghanistan and, possibly, in some of the Central Asian countries. Today, Afghanistan is the key springboard for launching a direct or indirect impact on Central Eurasia and China (by definition zones of the U.S.’s vitally important interests). The current “horrors” make this even easier and allow the use of other instruments, Islamism being one of them. Real threats and real challenges are found inside, rather than outside, the region, in each of the Central Asian states. Everyone interested in regional security should concentrate on these threats and challenges—they are not new and are unconnected with Problem-2014—yet they can be described as dominating. I have demonstrated above that the SCO’s potential involvement in the settlement of the Afghan problem is limited by its limited resources; much of what it could have done should have been done long ago, and regardless of Problem-2014. In the meantime, essentially nothing has changed, which suggests that there is no agreement among the SCO member countries on what the threats and chal- lenges really are and that there are strong lobbies in each of them that want to preserve the status quo. A sad conclusion indeed.

UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY

Mohammad DARKHOR Ph.D. (Political Geography), Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University (, Iran)

Saeed KAFI Ph.D. Student, Department of Strategic Management, NDU University (Tehran, Iran)

Seyed Hadi SADATI Post Graduate of Area Studies, Allameh State University (Tehran, Iran)

ABSTRACT

he United States attacked Afghani- years later, on 22 June, 2011, Barack Obama stan in October 2001, beginning the announced that the United States would pull T longest war in American history. Ten American troops out of Afghanistan. While 33 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS there is a failed government with instability new situation in Afghanistan after the with- in Afghanistan, the Taliban will remain pow- drawal of U.S. troops and the impact the erful, carrying out criminal actions against New Obama Strategy will have on Afghani- the Afghan people and coalition forces. stan’s national security. After withdrawal of the American This research adopts a descriptive-an- troops, Afghanistan will pose both challeng- alytic approach. It uses books and scholarly es and opportunities in the region, but this articles published in different scientific jour- will depend on America’s crisis manage- nals, as well as interviews from government ment in the region. This article analyzes the sources and official news agencies.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, new U.S. strategy, national security.

Introduction

Afghanistan occupies a vital geostrategic position near such critical but unstable regions as the Persian Gulf and the Indo-Pakistani border. Indeed, the importance of Afghanistan may grow in com- ing years as Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves, which are estimated to rival those of the North Sea, begin to play a major role in the world energy market. Afghanistan could prove to be a valuable cor- ridor for this energy, as well as for access to markets in Central Asia. Afghanistan could also serve as a trade link between Central and South Asia. Instead, Afghanistan has proven to be an obstacle to this region’s development: Afghanistan’s leading exports to the area are drugs, arms, and Islamic radicalism. Iran’s and Pakistan’s competition over Afghanistan and for regional influence has re- sulted in their involvement on opposite sides in the ongoing struggle in Afghanistan. This involve- ment is a leading reason for the prolongation of the war.1 The terrorist act on 11 September, 2001 in the U.S. led to a global war on terror during the time of the Bush government (2000-2008). The United States asked the Taliban government to hand over Osama bin Laden, leader of the al-Qa‘eda organization, but the Taliban would not concede. The United States, with the support of NATO and some other allied countries, attacked Afghanistan in 2001. The Taliban government was ousted and a new regime was established in Kabul with Hamid Karzai as president. A new constitution was drawn up and passed, and presidential and parliamen- tary elections were held. Therefore, the democratic started with the adoption of presidential democracy. The next U.S. president, Barack Obama, began pursuing a different strategy in Afghanistan in two phases. The first phase was carried out in the early stages of his presidency. President Obama conceded that the U.S.’s Afghan strategy had been allowed to drift and he accepted the fact that more troops were needed to tackle the insurgency. In February 2009, Mr. Obama authorized the deployment of an additional 17,000 combat troops to be based mainly in southern Afghanistan. On 27 March, he presented his new strategy for Afghanistan, which had been revised to include Paki- stan.2

1 [www.web.archive.org]. 2 See: The Stationery Office, Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, Eighth Report of Session 2008-09, Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence, Parliament: House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee, Great Britain, 2009, available at [http://books.google.com/books?id=LEykWNn9-9EC&pg=PA70&dq=Obama+strategy+in+afgha nistan&hl=en&ei=b6IeTt2NOs_GswaB-5D8AQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CFoQ6AEwCQ#v= onepage&q=Obama%20strategy%20in%20afghanistan&f=false].

34 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

In the second phase of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan, the U.S. administration refocused on economic assistance, allotting more than $2.6 billion during 2009 and 2010 to the agricultural sector, on which approximately 80 percent of Afghans rely for their livelihood. In a revamped antidrug policy, the Obama administration emphasized interdiction and alternative livelihood programs aimed at targeting kingpins without angering farmers. The new approach is supported by an increase in the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s personnel, financial, and technical assistance to farmers. Even as these major new commitments were announced, President Obama also pledged that the increased U.S. military commitment would not be open- ended. The United States intended to begin transferring responsibility for security to Afghan forces in July 2011, although how quickly this process would occur would be determined by the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the parties expressed support of President Karzai’s goal for the Afghan National Security Forces “to lead and conduct military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014.”3 At the last stage of this phase in June 2011, President Obama announced withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. He said that: “…We set clear objectives: to refocus on al-Qa‘eda; reverse the Taliban’s momentum; and train Afghan Security Forces to defend their own country. I also made it clear that our commitment would not be open-ended, and that we would begin to drawdown our forces this July… We are meeting our goals. As a result, starting next month, we will be able to re- move 10,000 of our troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year, and we will bring home a total of 33,000 troops by next summer… After this initial reduction, our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan Security forces move into the lead. Our mission will change from combat to support. By 2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be re- sponsible for their own security… This is the beginning— but not the end—of our effort to wind down this war. We will have to do the hard work of keeping the gains that we have made, while we drawdown our forces and transition responsibility for security to the Afghan government.”4 This article focuses on the impact Obama’s strategy will have on Afghanistan’s situation in the future (will it be stable or not?) and the regional or other effective actors’ reaction to the recent de- velopments. Conceptual Framework

There is a misconception about “state-building” and “nation-building.” “Nation-building” re- fers to the creation of a cultural identity that relates to a particular territory of the state. Most theorists agree that a well-functioning state is a requirement of the development of a nation, and therefore most would agree that state-building is a necessary component of nation-building. Several authors argue that while state-building is something that external actors can engage in, the development of a cul- tural nation is inherently something only the emerging society itself can shape.5 As a fragile state, Afghanistan’s political processes, political settlement, and state-society rela- tions are at the heart of state-building. A central place is also held by building administrative and policy-making capacities for the state to perform its functions. State-building needs to be carried out from the national to the local level and legitimacy is crucial.

3 R.L. Armitage, S.R. Berger, D.S. Markey, U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Council on Foreign Relations, 2010. 4 “Text of President Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan,” 22 June, 2011, available at [[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/ world/asia/23obama-afghanistan-speech-text.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]. 5 See: Z. Scott, “Literature Review on State-Building,” University of Birmingham, International Development Department, May 2007, p. 3, available at [www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD528.pdf].

35 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

A donor framework for state-building can be outlined as follows:  Political processes and political settlement. The historically specific balance of power and the mediations between state and society and their institutionalization.  Legitimacy and state legitimacy. Right to rule and acceptance of governance.  Social expectations of the state and state functions. The expectations of diverse groups and the state’s ability to deliver.  Voice and exit. Voice implies the opportunities and incentives for social actors to express their views in the public arena and be heard. Exit implies the opportunities and incentives for social actors to leave public authority and operate in alternative organizational arrange- ments.  Society and civil society. Society refers to people living in communities in a geographical space. Civil society emerges in tandem with a law-bound state and includes, for example, professional, business, and community associations, worker- and gender-based organiza- tions, and cause-oriented organizations. NGOs are only one part of civil society.  Technical assistance and capacity development. Technical assistance, the largest part of donor assistance, is devoted to hiring consultants and experts. Capacity is the outcome of a wide range of processes, including donor intervention, comprising skills, knowledge, sys- tems, and resources required to take action.6

Afghanistan’s Political Processes after U.S. Withdrawal Recent Developments on the Afghan Political Scene

Democratization has been playing an increasingly important role in post-conflict situations, facilitating the reconstruction of a country within a framework of stability and legitimacy. This ap- proach is highlighted in the resurgence of the notion of Kantian democratic peace that formed Wil- sonian idealism at the core of the League of Nations.7 Democracy is the best peace theory and the best way to shape a new order based on tolerance. Democratic institutions are the core and form the links in the democratization process in every country, and without them we cannot be hopeful and optimis- tic about continued stability and peace. Rani Mullen believed that the Bonn Agreement set forth the framework for democratic rebuild- ing of the political institutions in the country, along with a timeframe for accomplishing democratic goals.8 The attempts by Afghan groups and external powers to establish a political authority in the

6 See: OECD, State Building in Fragile Situations—How Can Donors ‘Do No Harm’ and Maximize their Positive Impact? Country Case Study—Rwanda, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Joint Study by the London School of Economics and Price Water House Coopers LLP, July 2009, available at [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/54/45582738.pdf]. 7 See: B. Pouligny, “Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post‐conflict Societies: Giving Diversity a Chance,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, Issue 3, 2000. 8 See: R.D. Mullen, “Democracy-Building at the Precipice in Afghanistan,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 1, July 2008, pp. 56-57.

36 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 new country are definitely positive. However, the Bonn Agreement delegates the task of establishing institutions to a limited group, and the groups participating in the Bonn process would not be suffi- cient to confer legitimacy on the political authority. The current constitution was ratified by the People’s Council and approved by President Karzai on 26 January, 2004. It introduced a bicameral presidency, an Islamic legal system, jurisdiction over legislation by the Supreme Court, a strong central government, and broad language rights for mi- norities. The ultimate objective of the Bonn process was to establish permanent government institu- tions; it was seen as a social contract that would provide the stability the country needed most.9 This is one side of the Afghanistan political scene envisaged on paper, but in reality this country’s condi- tions are different. Governance is the manner in which communities regulate themselves to preserve social order and maintain their security. Government is the action of ruling, the continuous exercise of state au- thority over the population it governs. While governments in the developed world are the unques- tioned suppliers of governance to their local communities, this has not been the case historically in Afghanistan.10 In contrast to strong states, Afghanistan, as a failed state that is not a nation-state, cannot control its borders. The government has lost control over large areas of territory. Often the expression of of- ficial power is limited to the capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. Indeed, one mea- sure of the extent of a state’s failure is how much of the state’s geographical expanse the government genuinely controls.11 Afghanistan’s history espouses the experience of a strong society with a weak state. For many centuries, society in Afghanistan has had traditional elements of power—the people, an independent economy, and territory without foreign control. The government was born from tribal roots, which gave rise to such a phenomenon as warlordism. Warlordism has continued, leading to insecurity and abuse of human rights in most parts of the country. According to Human Rights Watch annual report for 2005, “Political repression, human rights abuses, and criminal activity by warlords are consistently listed as the chief concerns of most Afghans.” Such crimes include rape, murder, illegal detention, forced displacement, and human traf- ficking in women and children. All of this has severely damaged the legitimacy of the Karzai govern- ment and its foreign supporters and contributed to the resurgence of the .12

The Taliban on the New Afghan Political Scene after Withdrawal of the American Troops

There are two branches of the Taliban in this region. The first is the phenomenon of the Pakistan Taliban, referred to as the local Taliban in Pakistan. This is different from the Afghan

9 See: B. Aras, S. Toktas, “Afghanistan’s Security: Political Process, State Building and Narcotics,” Middle East Policy Council, Summer 2007, available at [http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/afghanistans-security- political-process-state-building-and-narcotics]. 10 See: Th. Barfield, N. Nojumi, “Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability,” Middle East Policy Council, Winter 2009, available at [http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/bringing- more-effective-governance-afghanistan-10-pathways-stability]. 11 See: R.I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Summer, 2002, p. 86. 12 See: N. Lafraie, “Resurgence of the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: How and Why?” International Politics (Palgrave Macmillan), Vol. 46, No. 1, 2009, pp.104-105, available at [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ JIRD_ResurgenceOfTaliban_Afghanistan.pdf].

37 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Taliban led by Mullah Omar, who was the supreme leader in Afghanistan from 1994 to 2001. The Pakistan Taliban groups owe their allegiance to Mullah Omar of the Afghan Taliban and act with- in their command structure when fighting in Afghanistan against the International Security Assis- tance Force (ISAF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. The Pakistan Taliban also considers itself to be part of the larger Taliban movement on both sides of the border. But it maintains separate structures vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban. There are differences in strategy and targets between the two Talibans as well. Against the wishes of Mullah Omar, the Pakistan Taliban is involved in attacks against the Pakistani military and security forces inside Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban is very much focused on its fight in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Pakistan Taliban subscribes to al-Qa‘eda’s broader agenda of global jihad.13 Pakistan’s inability to control this region has led to a spread in insurgency against the Afghanistan government and a weakening of Afghan authority. The Taliban resurgence in 2005 in the south and east of Afghanistan triggered a counter- insurgency war that has taken its toll not only among the international forces fighting in the re- gion, but also within the civilian population, damaging the reputation of the central government and its international allies. During 2006, the Taliban managed to establish parallel jurisdictions in certain districts of the southern provinces Helmand and Kandahar. Profiting from the safe haven it enjoys in Pakistan’s border regions, the Taliban has been exploiting the grievances of the rural population who suffer from the rampant lawlessness and poppy eradication policy that threatens their survival.14 The current resurgence of the Taliban is creating the greatest obstacle to consolidation of the central government, and the main future role for the Taliban is probably a negative sub-state actor. It is unlikely that the Taliban will succeed in regaining the control over Afghanistan it enjoyed in the 1990s. But it will be considered the main source of insurgency in Afghanistan, leading to an under- mining of the central government’s legitimacy in Afghan society. Withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan will instill greater confidence in terrorist groups and their criminal activity will most likely increase. But the U.N. and ISAF, as well as other regional actors, such as Iran, Russia, and China, will continue to be interested in helping Karzai and the next government in Afghanistan to oppose the Taliban and fundamentalism. The inability to remove the Taliban has led to increasingly destructive actions against urban people who oppose the Taliban’s ideas and live in big cities in Afghanistan. The marginal impact is decreasing the central government’s legitimacy in cities, while in rural areas the Taliban traditionally has a powerful influence. The hopes of the U.S. and other coalition members to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table were to no avail, since the Taliban’s Idea is the flesh and blood of the fundamentalist mindset. How- ever, the Taliban is not a terrorist group; it is a movement that opposes modernization. The differ- ences between Islamic fundamentalism and Western civilization are deep, making it impossible for the two to coexist peacefully. Therefore, the United States is left with two alternatives. The first is to impose sanctions on the Taliban in order to isolate it and the second is to remove the Taliban, a solu- tion that has already failed. The Taliban can only be removed after Islamic extremism in the region is removed, but this is impossible.

13 See: A. Acharya, S.A.A. Shah Bukhari, S. Sulaiman, “Making Money in the Mayhem: Funding Taliban, Insurrection in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, No. 32, 2009, pp. 96-97. 14 See: F. Kuntzsch, Afghanistan’s Rocky Road to Modernity: Non-State Actors and Socio-Political Entities in the Process of State- and Nation-Building, Programme Paix et sécurité internationales, Institut québécois des hautes études internationales (HEI), July 2008, p. 13, available at [http://www.psi.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/psi/documents/Documents/Travaux_ et_recherches/Afghanistan_s_Rocky_Road_to_Modernity.pdf].

38 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

The Afghan National Army and Withdrawal of the U.S. Troops from Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a new and young national army (ANA) that is faced with many problems. Some proposals suggested increasing the size of the forces to between 195,000 and 208,000 by October 2012.15 The Afghan army was expected to grow by more than 2,800 soldiers a month to meet its October 2011 target of 171,600. The overall figure is expected to keep on increasing before the Af- ghan forces assume combat responsibility in 2014.16 Financial resources are the most important element for reaching these goals. In the U.S., the Congress has budgeted $12.8bn to support the Afghan national security forces in 2012, but U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said that this level cannot be sustained for many years.17 The Afghan economy is unable to allocate this amount of money to the army and security forces, there- fore, without international aid, security in Afghanistan will probably collapse. In his research concerning the security situation in Afghanistan, General Barry R. McCaffrey reported to the faculty at the United States Military Academy in May 2006. In his report he sug- gested that: “The Afghan Army is miserably under-resourced. This is now a major morale factor for their soldiers. Afghan field commanders told me that they try to seize weapons from the Taliban who they believe are much better armed. These ANA units do not have mortars, machine guns, MK19, Kevlar helmets. They have almost no helicopters or fixed wing transport or attack aviation now or planned. They have no armor or blast glasses. This situation cries out for remedy. A well-equipped, disci- plined, multi-ethnic, literate, and trained Afghan National Army is our ticket to be fully out of the country in the year 2020.”18 The Afghan National Army is faced with some problems that must be solved in Afghanistan without the U.S. troops. The first is that immediately after the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan, this country will become a battle ground for the armies of the warlords. The war- lords do not accept instructions or commands from the ANA and do not help the state to maintain stability in the country. Both of them, the state army and the private rogue armies, have been involved in violence in the recent past.19 The next problem is the economic difficulties faced by the soldiers of the national army and the national police. Salaries are currently on a par with the Afghan security forces, starting with a basic wage of about $165 (£102) per month, which rises to roughly $250 to $280 per month when longevity bonuses are taken into account, or extra pay for specialization or serving in the highest risk zones, such as Helmand and Kandahar. However, that salary is still less than what a young recruit could earn by joining a private militia or security company. It is also less than the money

15 See: C.J. Radin, “Afghan National Army Update,” May 2011, The Long War Journal, 9 May, 2011, available at [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/afghan_national_army_4.php]. 16 See: C. Wyatt, “Can Afghan National Army Survive NATO Exit? BBC Website, 9 March, 2011, available at [http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12681599]. 17 See: Ibidem. 18 B.R. McCaffrey, “Academic Report, Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 3 June, 2006, available at [http://www. washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdf/McCaffreyBarry.VisitToAfghanistan.pdf]. 19 See: M.Kh. Jalalzai, “The Unwanted U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” 16 June, 2011, available at [http:// outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=916].

39 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS offered by insurgents, who pay $10 (about £6) a day—assuming a recruit works every day.20 The weak economic situation increases the potential for corruption and can be abused by terrorist groups. The next problem is the lack of commitment in the Afghan army rooted in the weak econ- omy, cultural problems, delegitimization of the government, and so on. A recent report by the U.S. Inspector General for Afghanistan is even more alarming. According to his report, one quarter of the ANA recruits are absent from duty at any given time. They do not want to inform their seniors. This high rate of desertion will be one of the biggest challenges the ANA will face after the U.S. and NATO withdraw from the country.21 The next problem is the unequal distribu- tion of forces. Most of the forces are stationed around Kabul and are responsible for defending security forces.

The U.S.’s Duties Concerning the Afghan Government

Concerned with the growing threat from terrorist groups, the Afghan government joined the Declaration on Strategic Partnership with the U.S., which Presidents Bush and Karzai signed in Washington on 23 May, 2005. This partnership will serve as the basis of the common efforts to co- operate in the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism, promote stability and prosperity in the region, and remain steadfast in supporting Afghanistan’s cam­paign to eradicate poppy cultivation, provide alternative livelihood assistance, and fight the production and trafficking of drugs. The partnership will be anchored in the constitutions of the two countries, and will be guided by the United States and Afghanistan’s respective obliga­tions under the United Nations Charter and other international agreements and conventions.22 In this framework, the main tasks of the United States with regard to Afghanistan in the security sphere are:  To help organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan security forces as Afghanistan develops the capacity to undertake this responsibility.  To consult with respect to taking appropriate measures in the event that Afghanistan per- ceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk.  To assist the Afghan government in security sector reform.  To continue to conduct counter-terrorism operations in cooperation with Afghan forces.  To support Coalition assistance to the Afghan Government’s counter-narcotics programs.  To continue intelligence sharing.  To strengthen Afghanistan’s ties with NATO.  To support border security initiatives.23 Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at his meeting with President Karzai at the presidential palace in Kabul that the U.S. has a long-term commitment to Afghanistan

20 See: C. Wyatt, op. cit. 21 See: M.Kh. Jalalzai, op. cit. 22 See: Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, United States White House Press Office, 23 May, 2005, available at [http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/us-afghan-partnership.html]. 23 See: Ibidem.

40 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 and is trying to support Afghanistan in the transition process, reconciliation, equipping, and reinforc- ing of the Afghan national security forces.24 The United States should be engaged in long-term cooperation with Afghanistan for transfer- ring security responsibility to the Afghan forces, especially with respect to equipping and reinforc- ing the Afghan national police and helping this country to solve problems such as corruption. To- day, there is a deep sense of frustration in Afghanistan that has gradually replaced the initial enthu- siasm and goodwill toward the government. Rampant corruption in the government machinery, especially in the police and judiciary, which affects the everyday life of Afghan citizens, has be- come a major factor in propelling the insurgency that is gaining both momentum and a degree of local support.25

Conclusion

The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan is a historical moment for the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia. America has decided to leave Afghanistan without reaching its set task of removing al-Qa‘eda and the Taliban. Afghanistan is facing a crisis and problems such as anti-democratization of the political , a weak state, non-state building, and the drug mafia. But Afghanistan must not fall back into civil war after withdrawal of the American troops. The U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan will have a considerable effect on Afghani- stan national security. The continued Taliban presence in Afghanistan is a threat to the central govern- ment. The inability to achieve stabilization and peace in this country has led to a high potential for chaos and civil war. After the Taliban, the warlords are the main source of instability, and the hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops could put the central government in jeopardy. The economy and financial problems are another threat to the future of Afghanistan. Corruption is the main source of delegitimi- zation of the central government and prevents the provision of essential welfare services. They are the most dangerous political and security elements that Afghan society will face without the direct assistance of the American troops. After withdrawal of the American forces, Afghanistan will create both challenges and opportu- nities in the South Asia and the Middle East region, but this will depend on America’s crisis manage- ment in the region. There are two necessary ingredients for stability in Afghanistan—international aid and development. Increasing economic growth that would shape a tax system can protect secu- rity forces. The funds spent on security will depend on how much criminal activity there is. An in- crease in terrorist groups and supplying the drug mafia with weapons may threaten the existence of the central government.

24 See: M. Mullen, “USA has Long Term Commitment to Afghanistan,” 23 April, 2011, available at [http://www.gmic. gov.af/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=216:website-journalist&catid=38:news&Itemid=87]. 25 See: R. Sharm, “India & Afghanistan,” IPCS, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, April 2009, p. 3, available at [http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/system/files/Related+Resource+-+SR69-Final.pdf].

41 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS THE ROAD THROUGH QATAR, A DEAD END? Opportunities Promoting and Hurdles Preventing a Political Solution in Afghanistan that Includes the Taliban

Thomas RUTTIG Graduated from Humboldt University Berlin (diploma in Afghan studies), currently (since 2009) a co-director and senior analyst at the Afghanistan Analysts Network, an independent think tank based in Kabul and Berlin (Oranienburg, Germany)

ABSTRACT

hile a military solution in Afghani- ban leadership, a demand formulated be- stan has failed, the search for a po- fore President Karzai’s August 2013 visit to W litical solution that includes the in- Pakistan. surgent Taliban movement has not yielded The current attempts of the Afghan and any significant results, despite initial U.S.- Pakistani governments to relocate, and in Taliban contacts in Qatar in 2011 and 2012 fact dismantle, the Taliban liaison office originally facilitated by Germany. All con- have, however, created an additional hurdle tacts with the Taliban so far have been pre- that will make substantial negotiations even liminary and exploratory and have not yet less likely in the short term. The Taliban reached the “negotiations” stage. No sub- have already made it known that they do not stantial progress has been made so far in want Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—both 2013 either. There are several other obsta- countries suggested by Kabul as a possible cles hindering the start of constructive nego- new location for the Taliban liaison office—to tiations, mainly: the U.S. approach that of- play a central role. A genuine political solu- ten sidelines the Afghan government, the tion requires inclusiveness. As a first prereq- Taliban’s refusal to talk to the Afghan gov- uisite to achieve this, the well-founded reser- ernment and the Afghan government’s lack vations of large sectors of Afghan civil soci- of a clear strategy for such negotiations, as ety, including the organized women’s move- well as the general mistrust between the po- ment, many young Afghans, and much of the tential parties in the negotiations and the political opposition against any talks with the failure of all sides to recognize that talks Taliban and their future role in Afghan poli- with the Taliban constitute only one element tics need to be taken seriously. Their most of a political solution. After a period of ex- valid concern is that their own government tremely strained relations with Pakistan, the and its international allies, who have already Afghan government is hoping for Pakistan’s set the date for the “handover” and with- support to open a direct channel to the Tali- drawal from Afghanistan, might go for a 42 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 quick political power-sharing deal between to the conflict and not addressing the root the Karzai government and the Taliban, causes of the conflicts in Afghanistan, of thereby adding just one more armed faction which insurgency is only one.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, Pakistan, U.S., Qatar, Germany, Taliban, Karzai, negotiations, inclusiveness.

Introduction

A political solution in Afghanistan based on peace negotiations that include the Taliban has never taken off. Before the first substantial talks between representatives of the Taliban and the U.S. government in the Gulf Emirate of Qatar could make headway in early 2012, they were suspended again. This was the result of a mutual misunderstanding about confidence-building measures: The government in Washington indicated that it wanted to exchange the only U.S. soldier held by the Afghan insurgents, Bowe Bergdahl, and might release five Taliban leaders from Guantanamo; when the latter proved impossible in an election year, the Taliban saw it as a breach of confidence and suspended the talks. In 2013, attempts were made to reopen this channel, but it was also unsuccessful due to a num- ber of new hurdles.  First, the long-delayed official opening of the Taliban office in Qatar’s capital Doha took place on 18 June, 2013. But it ran into problems literally within hours. Two Taliban spokes- men, with the old Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan flag behind them and introduced by the deputy foreign minister of Qatar, gave a statement saying that the “Islamic Emirate … never wants to pose harm to other countries from its soil, nor will it allow anyone to cause a threat to the security of countries from the soil of Afghanistan,” reserved “the right to liberate their countries from colonialism and obtain their rights” and added that the office would help them have talks with “countries of the world,” find a peaceful solution to the “occupation … and the establishment of an Islamic system and true security,” and to “hold meetings with Afghans.” The spokesmen did not mention the Afghan government by name nor did they support an “Afghan peace process.” The U.S. government tried to portray the opening of the office as the fruits of an in- digenous, “Afghan-led” process. This was clearly not the case. Just one day later, President Hamid Karzai suspended talks with Washington over the planned post-2014 Bilateral Se- curity and Defense Agreement because of what Kabul called the United States’ “inconsis- tent statements and actions in regard to the peace process.” This was all the more surprising since on 17 July, 2013, after consulting with jihadi leaders and other politicians in the Presidential Palace of Kabul, Karzai had agreed that the office could be opened, providing that the negotiations would soon be transferred to Afghanistan, an end would be put to the violence, and the office would not be misused by foreigners against “national interests.” After the office was opened, the government in Kabul claimed it had been assured that the office was a liaison office for the Taliban movement, not a quasi-governmental body. But this was precisely the impression created when the office was adorned with a sign bearing the inscription “Political Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” the Taliban flag was raised, and the Emirate’s national anthem was played. A statement by the Afghan President’s office said: “The opening of the Taliban office in Qatar, the way it was opened, and the messages it contained contradict the guarantees given by the U.S. to Afghanistan… 43 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

[We] decided … not [to] take part in the Qatar negotiations.” The Qatari government re- moved the plaque and stated that the name agreed upon was “The Taliban Political Office in Doha”; it also removed the flagpole inside the office. The Taliban, in turn, suspended the talks again. Statements about what exactly the agreements among the different parties—the Taliban, Afghan government, U.S., and Qatar—were remained unclear.1  Secondly, President Hamid Karzai attempted to look for alternatives to the Qatar office again after the opening incident. This related to initial requests to the Afghan government from Turkey and Saudi Arabia to host a Taliban liaison office there. Karzai pursued this during his 26-27 August visit to Pakistan, where he met the country’s new Prime Minister Nawaz Shar- if and pushed for direct access to the Taliban leadership through Pakistan, independent of the U.S. A first similar move in 2012, based on the roadmap prepared by Afghanistan’s High Peace Council (HPC—the main government body responsible for the peace efforts), envisag- ing a leading role for Pakistan, turned out to be unrealistically short-term and therefore inef- fective. Also some high-flying hopes that Pakistan would help bolster the peace process after the Chequers Summit hosted by U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron in February 2013 yielded few practical results. This time, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are united in their antagonism toward the Taliban office in Qatar. Kabul’s problem is that the Qatar office pro- vides—or was supposed to provide—a channel for direct U.S.-Taliban talks, from which it was largely excluded, despite Washington’s rhetoric to the contrary. Islamabad, on the other hand, although it was still able to control the movements of those Taliban leaders residing in Pakistan, felt that the Doha office might move the insurgents’ negotiation team beyond its reach, thus minimizing its leverage on the results of the talks. Kabul’s latest turn back toward Pakistan gives its government the opportunity to stop the Taliban from slipping out of its grip. Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, meanwhile, reiterated the position of his movement toward negotiations in his message to the Afghan people on 6 August, 2013: no to “illegitimate com- promise or unlawful deal” with the “nominal rulers” but “an understanding with the Afghans … when the occupation ends” about “an Islamic system based on transparency and commitment, in which all Afghans will see their full participation” and yes to “contacts and talks” with the U.S. “through the Political Office” in Qatar and good and equal relations with all countries, “whether they are world powers or neighbors or any other country of the world.”2 This message makes clear that the Taliban leader presents his movement as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and a constructive actor in the international community.

Looking Back: A Promising Start in Qatar

In 2011, channels to the Taliban leadership that are real3 and promising were opened for the first time, with the potential that they could lead to substantial negotiations about a political solution to

1 For more details, see: B. Osman and K. Clark, “Who Played Havoc with the Qatar Talks? Five Possible Scenarios to Explain the Mess,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 9 July, 2013, available at [http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/who- played-havoc-with-the-qatar-talks-five-possible-scenarios-to-explain-the-mess]. 2 “Message of Felicitation of Amir-ul-Momineen (May Allah Protect Him) on the Occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr,” 6 August, 2013, available at [http://www.shahamat-english.com/index.php/paighamoona/35234-message-of-felicitation-of-amir-ul- momineen-may-allah-protect-him-on-the-occasion-of-eid-ul-fitr], 3 September, 2013. 3 Earlier, there had been some imposters who showed up in Kabul claiming to speak for the shura, fooling both U.S. and British intelligence, as well as the Kabul government. Tragically, the killing of Rabbani itself was such a case (for

44 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 the current insurgency in Afghanistan. This is a new situation because it is the first time, as Michael Semple, an expert on Taliban affairs, implies, that “the Taliban movement, its leadership, have offi- cially committed themselves to engaging in a political process. For the past ten years, we just have not been there. …Few people appreciate how rapidly the debate inside the Taliban has changed over even the past few weeks.”4 The Qatar breakthrough was achieved with the help of German intelligence and the German government, as well as with the help of the government of Qatar, which had been called in on the insistence of the Taliban, who jointly facilitated direct U.S.-Taliban contacts.5 Former Taliban officials residing in Kabul reported in late January 2012 that “four to eight Taliban representatives had already travelled to Qatar from Pakistan to set up a political office.” There was also an unconfirmed report that relatives of the five prominent Taliban detainees in Guantanamo have arrived in Qatar; there have been reports that the U.S. is intending to release five Taliban detain- ees from Guantanamo, based on a demand by the Taliban delegation during earlier talks.6 The Kabul government immediately denied the report and stated that talks are still going on about the modalities under which the office can open (however, it supported the release of the five detainees as a confi- dence-building measure). Beyond the mainstream Taliban, the U.S. also held at least one direct meeting with a leading member of the Haqqani network, Ibrahim Omari, according to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.7 The government in Kabul, meanwhile, has been concentrating more on another channel, with the second-largest insurgents group, Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan.8 more details, see: K. Clark, “Death of Rabbani (5): Where is the Evidence?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 13 October, 2011, available at [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2158], 4 September, 2013). 4 R. Montagne, “Taliban’s New Political Office is a ‘Game-Changer’,” Interview with Michael Semple, National Public Radio, 18 January, 2012, available at [http://www.npr.org/2012/01/18/145384414/exploring-peace-talks-with-the- taliban], 4 September, 2013. 5 The most precise rendering of these events comes from: A. Rashid, “Talks with Taliban Must Be Secret to Be Successful,” The Globe and Mail, 1 July, 2011, available at [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/asia-pacific/talks- with-taliban-must-be-secret-to-be-successful/article2084159/], 4 September, 2013. 6 See: A.J. Rubin, “Former Taliban Officials Say U.S. Talks Started,” New York Times, 16 January, 2013, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/world/asia/taliban-have-begun-talks-with-us-former-taliban-aides-say.html?_ r=1&ref=world], 4 September 2013; Sh. Mutazawey, “Taliban’s Qatar Office Not Yet Officially Opened: Peace Council,” TOLOnews, 18 January, 2012, available at [http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/5163-talibans-qatar-office-not-yet-officially- opened-peace-council], 4 September, 2013. Background about the five Guantanamo detainees here: K. Clark, “Releasing the Guantanamo Five? 1: Biographies of the prisoners,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 21 June, 2013, available at [http://www. afghanistan-analysts.org/releasing-the-guantanamo-five-1-biographies-of-the-prisoners-first-posted-09-03-2012], 4 September, 2013. 7 The Haqqani network considers itself a part of the Taliban movement, recognizes Mulla Omar as its spiritual leader, but acts autonomously at least on the tactical level (see: Th. Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity in the Taliban Universe,” in: Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, ed. by A. Giustozzi, London, 2009). Ibrahim Omari is often called “Ibrahim Haqqani” in the media, but this is a name prescribed to him in the West to indicate that he is related to the network. Secretary Clinton also indicated that these contacts have stopped the latest high- profile commando-style operations in and around Kabul that have been attributed to this group: the attack on 28 June against Hotel Intercontinental, the massive truck bomb on 10 September against a U.S. base in the Wardak Province, and the attack on 13 September against the U.S. Embassy and ISAF headquarters (see: “Clinton Warns Taliban of ‘Continuing assault’,” BBC, 20 October, 2011, available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15379332], 4 September, 2013; “Hillary Clinton: U.S. Held Meeting with Haqqani Network,” BBC, 21 October, 2011, available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- south-asia-15399820], 4 September, 2013. 8 Access is easier for the government to this party: many of Karzai’s most trusted colleagues have been members of Hezb-e Islami at some point. On the Hezb position toward talks, see, for example: B. Osman, “Adding the Ballot to the Bullet? Hezb-e Islami in Transition,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 6 May, 2013, available at [http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/ adding-the-ballot-to-the-bullet-hezb-e-islami-in-transition], 4 September, 2013.

45 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Most of the latest progress toward open channels for talks with the Taliban was again achieved without Kabul’s participation, and often with its resistance.9 The agreement on the Qatar office has even led to a diplomatic crisis between Afghanistan and Qatar. President Karzai recalled his ambas- sador from Qatar, but later gave his consent for the official opening of the Taliban office. All the contacts with the Taliban so far, however, have been preliminary and exploratory, as all the involved sides—including the Taliban—have stressed. They have not yet reached the “negotia- tions” stage. This means that both sides have opted for exploring a political solution as one option while continuing to fight at the same time. As early as the spring of 2011, elements in the Afghan government have been undermining the contacts facilitated by Germany and Qatar, of which they must have got wind. On 20 March, the Kabul-based daily newspaper Weesa, which is known to be close to Karzai’s chef-de-cabinet Ab- dulkarim Khorram, revealed the name of the leader of the Taliban contact team.10 From there, the reports reached the Western media11 and the interlocutor was forced underground—temporarily. The reason for this step was Kabul’s insistence, as repeatedly stated before, on its own lead in any Taliban contacts, an approach to which Western governments had officially subscribed during the interna- tional conference on Afghanistan in London in early 2010, where they endorsed the Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Program, the Kabul government’s political document on negotiations with the different insurgent groups.12

Kabul’s Unclear Interests

This raises another question: whether President Karzai is really interested in negotiations lead- ing to a power-sharing deal with the Taliban that will almost certainly reduce his own power, or whether his “talks about talks” are just a game of procrastination for achieving control over the main channels of contacts (including the U.S. detention facility at the Bagram base where many Taliban commanders are held, which was finally achieved in 2013), as well as for making sure that U.S. fi- nancial support continues. There are many in his entourage and his family who are interested in maintaining privileged access to external resources. And those will only be flowing as long as there is a conflict going on, one that, at least from Kabul’s point of view, still seems manageable.13 Talks (about talks) as a delaying tactic is not a new phenomenon in world history. In the fall of 2011, another blow to the talks came with the assassination of the chairman of the High Peace Council and former Afghan President Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul. Upon closer examination, however, it was mainly opposition politicians and some government members who had

9 There are contradictory statements by President Karzai as to whether he has been briefed about these contacts or not. Ahmed Rashid reports, though, that “Mr. Karzai has been fully briefed after each round and has unstintingly supported the Taliban’s desire to hold separate talks with the Americans” (A. Rashid, op. cit.). 10 His name is Tayeb Agha, a very close confidant of Mullah Omar, also during the Taliban regime when he was Mullah Omar’s ‘head of office’ in Kandahar. For a while, in 1999/2000, he also worked at the Taliban embassy in Islamabad, which might have allowed him to become acquainted not only with the ISI, but also with Western diplomats (see: “Taliban Have Recently Twice Held Talks with Americans under Leadership of Tayeb Agha,” Weesa, Kabul, 20 March, 2011, quoted from BBC Monitoring). 11 See: S. Koelbl, H. Stark, “Germany Mediates Secret U.S.-Taliban Talks,” Spiegel, 24 May, 2011, available at [http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,764323,00.html], 4 September, 2013. 12 For an assessment of the APRP, see: K. Clark, “New Bureaucracies to Welcome ‘Upset Brothers’,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 14 May, 2010, available at [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=751], 4 September, 2013. 13 The resource flow will definitely decrease drastically, though, after 2014 when NATO is planning to have completed the handover of full security and political responsibilities to the Afghan government.

46 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 been against negotiations with the Taliban for a long time who declared the talks with the Taliban dead after the murder. Within the Afghan government, Chairman of the National Security Council and former Foreign Minister declared “[t]he peace process which we began is dead.”14 On the opposition’s side, Dr. , a former presidential candidate, foreign minister, and leader junior to Rabbani of what is known as the former Northern Alliance, reflects the position of the mojahedeen opposition: “This is a lesson for all of us that we shouldn’t fool ourselves that this group [the Taliban], who [sic] has carried out so many crimes against the people of Af- ghanistan, are willing to make peace.”15 But to deduce from the killing that it reflected the Taliban movement’s—in its entirety—unwill- ingness to talk is an over-simplification at best since it is still not clear who committed the crime. It is the experience of other peace processes that progress almost necessarily brings spoilers out of the woodwork. It is possible that the assassination was a “rogue operation” from within the Taliban movement, with backing from (some in) the ISI and possibly with cooperation of non-Afghan jihad- ist groups. It looks rather like a master shot of sabotage.16 This discussion about the murder also often overlooked the question of how effective the HPC has been so far. Here, the verdict is negative. Despite claims to the opposite by some HPC members, among them late Rabbani himself, there is no proof that it has been able to open a single meaningful channel to the insurgents. In contrast, its attempts to do so were unprofessional. Former U.N. and EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan Francesc Vendrell assessed that “President Karzai has established no proper channel to talk to the Taliban. There are multiple channels. And it has not been done in a very professional way. …[I]n a properly conducted negotiation, these would have happened in a third country. And the President would have appointed a particular [single] person who would have some credibility and some support in Afghan society to conduct these talks and preferably that would have been an intermediary.”17 In general, there was not much of a “peace process” going on that needed to be stopped. Despite many statements to the contrary, there has been no general change in Kabul’s “recon- ciliation” policy after Rabbani’s murder, there was only a temporary halt. Karzai’s first public reac- tion to the murder simply addressed those in Afghanistan who were strictly opposed to any talks with the Taliban and mainly the political camp led by Rabbani: the former Northern Alliance moja- hedeen. Karzai wanted to wait for the recommendations of the Traditional called to Kabul from 16 to 19 November, 2011. But this was a hand-picked body, and the renewal of the president’s mandate on his “reconciliation” policy in general was a mere formality.18

14 D. Nissenbaum, M. Abi-Habib, “Afghanistan Halts Taliban Peace Initiative,” Wall Street Journal, 3 October, 2011, available at [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203791904576606921747225488.html], 4 September, 2013. 15 A.J. Rubin, “Assassination Deals Blow to Peace Process in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 20 September, 2011, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/world/asia/Burhanuddin-Rabbani-afghan-peace-council-leader- assassinated.html?pagewanted=all], 4 September, 2013. Dr Abdullah now is the leader of the National Coalition of Afghanistan (see: Th. Ruttig, “National Coalition vs National Front: Two Opposition Alliances Put Jamiat in a Dilemma,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 4 January, 2012, available at http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/national-coalition-vs-national-front-two- opposition-alliances-put-jamiat-in-a-dilemma], 4 September, 2013). 16 The Taliban have neither claimed nor denied responsibility for the killing. In a statement, the Taliban said: “Our position on this issue is that we can’t talk about it and all the media reports that claim responsibility are groundless” (quoted from: J. Boone, “Taliban Stay Quiet on Killing of Former Afghanistan President Rabbani,” The Guardian, 21 September, 2011, available at [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/21/taliban-stays-quiet-rabbani-assassination], 4 September, 2013). 17 Quoted from: K. Clark, “The Death of Rabbani (3): Emerging Details,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 25 September, 2011, available at [http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2098], 4 September, 2013. 18 For more details, see: Th. Ruttig, “The Upcoming Jirga: An Agenda with Possible Backdoors,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 4 November, 2011, available at [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2218] 4 September, 2013.

47 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

One of the ways the Kabul government is now exploring is through the government of Pakistan. It was stated that this would happen immediately after Rabbani’s killing, after the president had con- sulted with Jihadi leaders and his internal circle of advisors: “Now that the Taliban is being used as a tool by Pakistan’s ISI, Afghanistan should consider Pakistan as the other side in the negotiation.”19 Muhammad Omar Daudzai, the then Afghanistan’s ambassador to Pakistan and a former head of the Karzai office, explained: “We want to go through Pakistan for any dialog with the Taliban.”20 The then deputy NSC head Shaida Muhammad Abdali added that “[f]rom now on to us, the main party for peace in Afghanistan is Pakistan, not the Taliban” (italics mine.—Th.R.).21 This approach has been renewed by President Karzai’s latest visit to Pakistan. The agreement on opening a Taliban office in Qatar has also removed the so far powerful argu- ment that the “lack of an address” was a major obstacle to the talks. This, however, was nothing more than a rhetoric figure of speech. The ISI knows exactly where to find the members of the Taliban leadership, the so-called “Quetta shura” (in fact, Rahbari Shura, Leadership Council). During the wave of “arrests” in early 2009, after the capture of the then Mullah Omar-deputy Mulla Baradar, the ISI had no difficulty in rounding up a large number of Taliban leaders within a few weeks to get its message across: “Talks only through us.” It is also well known—and has been described repeatedly— how closely the Taliban commanders are led by ISI members who, among other things, decide wheth- er interlocutors have access to them and in what timeframe. It is known, with Taliban commanders as the source, that ISI people (not necessarily Pakistani citizens, but also Pakistani) sit in the Taliban shuras. The Taliban—as members of other Jihadi outfits—move openly in Quetta and elsewhere. It is known that the insurgents have access to special vehicles or permits that allow them to pass through checkpoints and that the Frontier Corps does not prevent them from crossing the Pakistani-Afghan border.22 The New York Times wrote, with reference to “military and political analysts who follow militant activity in Pakistan” that the Haqqani family “maintains several town houses, including in Islamabad and elsewhere, and they have been known to visit military facilities in Rawalpindi, attend tribal gatherings and even travel abroad on pilgrimage.”23 Ergo, the problem with talking to the Tali- ban is not so much an issue of not knowing where to find them but of access to them, which is con- trolled, restricted and orchestrated by Pakistan. It is a matter of political will, on Pakistan’s part, to allow talks to happen.

19 “Karzai Calls Crucial Meeting on Peace Process, Strategic Partnership with U.S.,” TOLOnews, 28 September, 2011, available at [http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/4045-karzai-calls-crucial-meeting-on-peace-process-strategic-partnership- with-us], 4 September, 2013. 20 J. Partlow, K. Brulliard, “Afghan Government Seeks Pakistan’s Help in Stalled Peace Process,” Washington Post, 8 October, 2011, available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-government-seeks-pakistans-help-in-stalled- peace-process/2011/10/08/gIQAxLo0VL_story.html], 4 September, 2013. 21 D. Nissenbaum, M. Abi-Habib, op. cit. 22 See, for example: Q. Butt, “Kharotabad: A Taliban Safe Haven,” Express Tribune, 17 October, 2011, available at [http://tribune.com.pk/story/275651/kharotabad-a-taliban-safe-haven/], 4 September, 2013; M. Waldman, Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban: The Feasibility and Risks of Negotiations, USIP Special Report 256, October 2010, available at [http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20256%20-%20Dangerous%20Liaisons%20with%20the%20Afghan%20Taliban. pdf], 4 September, 2013; D. Rohde, “Inside the Islamic Emirate,” New York Times, 19 October, 2009, available at [http://www. nytimes.com/2009/10/19/world/asia/19hostage.html?fta=y], 4 September, 2013; R. Moreau, M. Hosenball, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek, 22 September, 2008, available at [http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/12/ pakistan-s-dangerous-double-game.html], 4 September, 2013; I. , Pakistan’s Afghan Policy in Post-Taliban Period, Paper presented at the seminar “Future Trends of Afghanistan,” organized by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, November 2002, manuscript with the author. 23 P. Zubair Shah, C. Gall, “For Pakistan, Deep Ties to Militant Network May Trump U.S. Pressure,” New York Times, 31 October, 2011, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/world/asia/haqqani-militants-act-like-- protected-partners.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=world], 4 September, 2013.

48 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

The office in Qatar also moved the Taliban mediating team24 out of Pakistan’s immediate con- trol. Until now, most leading Taliban members have their families living in Pakistan, where they are de facto hostages for the “good behavior” of those leaders. Of course, the Taliban interlocutors would not have been able to leave Pakistan without the consent of the ISI. A former high-ranking Talib, Mullah Qalamuddin, who was the head of their “morale police,” is quoted as saying that if Pakistan did not approve of the talks, it would have arrested the Taliban delegates to Qatar, just as it did with Mullah Baradar in 2010. According to Arsala Rahmani, the act- ing HPC head, the Taliban interlocutors boarded planes in Pakistan. This would not be possible without ISI consent and it shows that Pakistan is on board the Qatar channel, but, at the same time, it has made sure that it retains some influence on the Taliban.

What Do the Taliban Want?

One major question that has not yet been satisfactorily answered is what do the Taliban want politically. The exploratory talks held by the U.S., Germany, and Qatar were to explore exactly what the political positions and demands of the Taliban were. Indeed, the Taliban have never issued a detailed political program document, neither during their rule (1996-2001), nor during the subsequent insurgency phase. As earlier as 2009, Mullah Agha Jan Mu’tassem, the then head of the Taliban political committee, said that “an Afghan strat- egy” for the future system of the country should be determined “in consultation with all the Afghan groups.”25 The same year, Mullah Omar stated that the Taliban “did not have any agenda to harm other countries, including Europe, nor do we have such agenda today”; this was more or less reiter- ated in his 2013 Eid-al-Fitr statement.26 In January 2010, the Taliban Leadership Council stated that “[t]he Islamic Emirate want[s] to have good and positive relations with the neighboring countries in an atmosphere of mutual respect and take far-reaching steps for bilateral cooperation, economic development and prosperous future.”27 The use of the IEA title itself is a strong indication that the Taliban still see themselves as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, illegally toppled from power by a foreign invasion. The diplomatic tone used in these statements over the past years in-

24 The names mentioned as Qatar office staff, besides Taliban top interlocutor Tayeb Agha, include Sher Abbas Stanekzai, a former Taliban health minister, Shahabuddin Delawar, their former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Hafiz Aziz- ur-Rahman, the Taliban’s third secretary in their Abu Dhabi embassy before 2001, and Sohail Shahin, who worked as an unrecognized Taliban representative in New York and for their official newspaper Shariat in Kabul until 2001. The three Taliban members mentioned first belonged to their Political Commission, their movement’s quasi-foreign office (see also: K. Clark, “The Taliban in Qatar (2): Biographies—Core and Constellation,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 24 June, 2013, available at [http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-Taliban-in-qatar-2-biographies-core-and-constellation-amended-with- more-details], 4 September, 2013). 25 S. Salahuddin, “Taliban Say Want Peace with Afghans, NATO Troops Out,” Reuters, 26 February, 2009, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/Taliban_Say_Want_Peace_With_Afghans_NATO_Troops_Out/1499836.html], 4 September, 2013; “Message of Felicitation of Amir-ul-Momineen (May Allah Protect Him) on the Occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr,” 6 August, 2013. 26 See: Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Occasion of the Eighth Anniversary of the American Attack on Afghanistan, 7 October, 2009, available at [http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaTalib8anniv1009. pdf]. 27 Statement of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan regarding the London Conference, available at [http://theunjustmedia.com/Afghanistan/Statements/Oct09/Statement%20of%20the%20Islamic%20Emirate%20 of%20Afghanistan%20on%20the%20occasion%20of%20the%20Eighth%20Anniversary%20of%20the%20American%20 Attack%20on%20Afghanistan.htm], 4 September, 2013.

49 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS dicates that the Taliban want to be recognized as an official party to the Afghan conflict. 28 More- over, it has almost been forgotten under the impact of the current military escalation that the Tali- ban movement sent signals that they were ready to negotiate immediately after the fall of their regime and again in 2007 and 2008, even expressing that they were realizing that they cannot win against the U.S.-led troops.29 This situation has not changed much since, although Strick/Kuehn30 point out what was detailed in two messages from Mullah Omar on the occasion of Islamic Eid festivals (issued on 8 September, 2010 and 28 August, 2011), who said that this “comes as close to an outline of their domestic policies as we have.” These documents include good governance criteria like “administrative transparency,” government positions distributed “on the basis of merit” and “professional cadres and national busi- ness men [sic; being] encouraged, without any discrimination.” Minority fears are also addressed by stating that “all ethnicities will have participation in the regime.” Although it is stated that “the poli- cy of the Islamic Emirate is not aimed at monopolizing power,” it is also emphasized that the Is- lamic system intended by the Taliban is based on the implementation of “Shari‘a rules.” Importantly, the recent opinion about the talks indicates that the Taliban might not just want to wait out the Western troop withdrawal by the end of 2014 and then try to overthrow the Kabul government and re-establish its pre-9/11 Islamic Emirate. Michael Semple, for example, points out that “responsible elements in the Taliban leadership” have finally realized “that they are doing themselves and their country no favor by … agreeing to host a battlefield for the world’s jihadists and also the United States [and] decided that the prospect of another round of civil war that could easily … drag on another decade, [is] so horrendous that they are prepared to take some risks to avoid it.” Afghans familiar with the talks say that Mullah Omar’s approval of the Qatar office shows that, for the time being at least, the “doves” in the Taliban leadership have regained the up- per hand over the “hawks.”

Conclusion: More Hurdles

Despite all the good news, there is still no guarantee that negotiations will start, let alone lead to an end to the conflict.  First, the Taliban has erected several hurdles. Despite the statements quoted, it is not clear, however, whether the Taliban are ready to accept a pluralistic Afghanistan in which other political groups (including secular ones) can play a role. The same goes for women’s rights and individual rights in general, among them being equal access to education and health. Although there have been clear shifts in their positions on the latter issues,31 it is not clear

28 See their 2009 “Open Letter of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to Shanghai Summit,” 14 October, 2009, available at [http://theunjustmedia.com/Afghanistan/Statements/Oct09/Open%20Letter%20of%20the%20Islamic%20Emirate%20 of%20Afghanistan%20to%20Shanghai%20Summit.htm], 4 September, 2013. 29 See: A. Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” New America Foundation, November 2010, available at [http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/kandahar_0.pdf], 4 September, 2013; letter to an Afghan MP seen by the author in 2005. 30 See: A.S. van Linschoten, F. Kuehn, “Islamic, Independent, Perfect and Strong: Parsing the Taliban’s Strategic Intentions, 2001-2011,” AHRC Public Policy Series, No. 3, January 2012, available at [http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/News-and-Events/ Publications/Documents/Lessons-Learnt-Parsing-the-Taliban%27s-Strategic-Intentions.pdf], 4 September, 2013, pp. 10-11. 31 See, for example: A. Giustozzi, Ch. Reuter, “The Insurgents of the Afghan North: The Rise of the Taliban, the Self-Abandonment of the Afghan Government and the Effects of ISAF’s ‘Capture-and-Kill’ Campaign,” Afghanistan

50 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

whether these shifts are merely tactical and local; there have definitely been no turn-arounds yet. At the same time, they show that the Taliban both react to international criticism and pressure by the local population. If the annual immunization campaigns and the Peace Days organized by U.N. organizations, linked to unofficial temporary ceasefires, can be used as a yardstick, the Taliban have shown that there is a relative high degree of compliance on their side. In January 2012, they also have made it clear that their approval of the talks does not automatically mean that they recognize the current Afghan constitution, still a red line for both the U.S. and the Kabul government: “[T]his understanding does not mean a surrender from Jihad and neither is it connected to an acceptance of the constitution of the stooge Kabul administration.” Less clear is whether they are rejecting any direct contacts with the Karzai government. When the president claimed as much in mid-February, they swiftly rejected this claim: “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan strongly rejects Karzai’s claims and adds that the representatives of Islamic Emirate have not talked with the puppet admin- istration anywhere and have not even yet decided if they want to hold talks with the admin- istration of Kabul.”32  Secondly, the time for posturing, not least between Kabul and Washington, is not over yet. This does not bode well for the sincerity needed for getting substantial talks underway— which would be difficult enough even without the new political sniping.  Third, Pakistan might continue to play its double game if it does not feel satisfied with any of the arrangements concerning the post-2014 regime in Kabul.  Fourth, the U.S. still follows its approach of talking and fighting at the same time, an ap- proach copied by the Taliban. This military-centered strategy has not worked. It is both leading in the wrong direction—escalating mutual violence rather than alleviating it—and deepening the causes of the crisis, not least because its we/good versus they/bad logic helps the Karzai government to block reforms that would improve its own performance and, thereby, take away the motivation from many Afghans who join the Taliban because of alienation and because there is no neutral political middle ground. Whether or not there has been a substantial “degrading” of the Taliban, by killing their “leaders and facilitators,” and whether or not there were fewer insurgent attacks last summer, the Taliban still control, directly or indirectly, large swathes of Afghanistan’s landscape and much of the Afghans’ mindset. Also, there is a growing number of voices in the U.S. that either oppose any talks with the Taliban or claim that they are too fragmented to be able to “deliver” on any agree- ment should one be reached.  Fifth, and most importantly, there are substantial reservations, if not full-fledged rejection, of any talks with and involvement of the Taliban in the future Afghan political landscape. This includes large sectors of civil society, the organized women’s movement, many young

Analysts Network, Thematic Report 04/2011, May 2011, available at [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=1679], 4 September, 2013. 32 “Taliban: Peace Talks don’t Signal End to Hostilities,” CNN, 12 January, 2012, available at [http://articles.cnn. com/2012-01-12/asia/world_asia_afghanistan-taliban-talks_1_zabiullah-mujaheed-peace-talks-islamic-emirate?_ s=PM:ASIA], 4 September, 2013; “The Majority of the Afghan People Support a Strategic Partnership with the U.S. (Interview with Hamid Karzai),” Wall Street Journal, 15 February, 2012, available at [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000 1424052970204059804577225693527935200.html?mod=WSJ_World_MIDDLENewsIntl], 4 September, 2013; “Zabihullah Mujahid: We Strongly Reject Karzai’s Claims,” Shahamat (Taliban website), 16 February, 2012, available at [http://www. shahamat-english.com/index.php/paighamoona/28824-zabihullah-mujahid-we-strongly-reject-karzai%E2%80%99s-claims], 4 September, 2013.

51 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Afghans, much of the political opposition that includes the former mujahedeen and the sympathizers of their current political parties, as well as small pro-democratic groups. The most valid concern is that their own government and its international allies, who have already set a date for the “handover” and withdrawal, might go for a quick political power-sharing deal between the Karzai government and Taliban, thereby adding just one more armed faction to the other armed factions already in power and not addressing the governance problems causing much of the insurgency. Some of those political forces do not want a power-sharing deal with the Taliban because they would lose even more of their influence. There is also a tendency among many of them to give a simplistic (or propagandized) description of the whole Taliban movement as alien to Afghan society and/or nothing more than puppets of Pakistan and/or al-Qa‘eda terrorists. This contro- versy might even sharpen during Afghanistan’s upcoming election campaign; the presi- dential election will be held on 5 April, 2014, although candidate registration began as early as 16 September, 2013. The reply to these arguments might sound simplistic: a military solution has not worked. The Taliban may have been weakened (although there is even doubt about this) but they are far from be- ing beaten. Weakening the Taliban and preventing them from taking over Kabul (or Kandahar) will not be sufficient to end the conflict because they will remain a power factor that will likely continue armed resistance, since there will still be Western soldiers in Afghanistan after 2014.33 There is no other alternative to a political solution. This, however, should not be a narrow po- litical deal, just adding the Taliban, as another armed faction, to the current governing coalition of the Karzai camp and other armed (mojahedeen) factions. Any political settlement needs to be compre- hensive and inclusive, and it will not be viable unless it is supported by the majority of Afghans across the political and social board. And this will only happen if the Afghans begin seeing that the major causes of Afghanistan’s conflicts—from growing social inequality and poverty (which, among other things, block a genuine re-integration of fighters) to predatory government behavior and impunity— are being addressed again. This requires establishing a genuine consensus, first, that a political solu- tion is necessary and, second, what it must entail. At the same time, it has to be made clear that ne- gotiations with the Taliban do not mean capitulation. Searching for a political solution would also necessitate maintaining the current high level of international political attention toward Afghanistan. The international community’s role would be to guarantee that all relevant Afghan political forces—the Karzai camp, the diverse mojahedeen groups, the Taliban, civil society, including women’s and youth organizations and professional associations, and democratic parties—sit together with equal rights and address the basic issues of Afghanistan. No solution, however, should be imposed again from the outside, but nor should it come from the Afghan power holders either. This would also require that the West finally recognize that it has made a significant contribution to the current quagmire in the country. No negotiations can ultimately solve Afghanistan’s problems.34

33 See: K. Clark, “War without Accountability: The CIA, Special Forces and plans for Afghanistan’s Future,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 10 February, 2012, available at [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2502], 4 September, 2013. 34 See: 2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I, Testimony by Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, South Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 3 November, 2011, available at [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/1103_testimony_tellis.pdf], 4 September, 2013.

52 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 BORDER SECURITY OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES ON THE EVE OF THE ISAF PULLOUT

Pulat MAKKAMBAEV Ph.D. (Law), Doctoral Candidate, Tashkent State Institute of Jurisprudence (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

ABSTRACT

or over 30 years now, the conflict in Af- ISAF pullout is causing even more concern. ghanistan has been and remains a The author analyzes the impact of the Afghan F source of international and regional in- conflict on the border security of the Central stability. The crisis developments emerging Asian states and concludes that bilateral and in the territory of this country threaten the multilateral efforts to preserve border security border security of the Central Asian states; should be improved to stave off the threats what will happen in Afghanistan after the that might emanate from Afghanistan.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Central Asian states, the civil war in Tajikistan, the Taliban, the IMU, the U.N., limited contingent of Soviet troops, NATO, ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom, state borders, border security, border guards, threats to border security, border cooperation.

Introduction

In the latter half of the 20th century, mankind lived through cardinal changes in the interna- tional security system accompanied by the collapse of the socialist system, the Warsaw Treaty Orga- nization, and the Soviet Union. Many experts and politicians think that the failure of socialism as a social system was caused by the defeat inflicted by its main geopolitical rival in the course of the Afghan war, which undermined the weak socialist economy.1 The military-political developments in Afghanistan, which followed the defeat, made it clear that this economically backward country, living for many centuries in the midst of social, clan, ethnic, and confessional strife, has become a seat of instability and a threat to regional and international stability.

1 See, for example: Zhao Huasheng, “Afghanistan: upushchennye vozmozhnosti?” Uzbekistan & Central Asia (Tashkent), No. 1, 2012, p. 10.

53 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

This strife was the result of the development of Afghan statehood strongly affected by various internal and external factors, rather than the product of one, no matter how important, historical event. This means that what is going in Afghanistan today is rooted in its social and political past. In the 20th century, Afghanistan, which lived on the outskirts of the world economy and was far removed from the global hubs, was one of the least developed Eurasian countries. Its isolation from the worldwide trends of social and economic progress was caused by the archaic clan and tribal relations that dominated the country’s social structure, made progressive property forms and indus- trialization practically impossible, and widened the gap between Afghanistan and the global com- munication lines.

Soviet Armed Intervention

The 1978 April revolution, which brought to power the People’s Democratic Party of Afghani- stan (PDPA), created the prerequisites for wide-scale social, economic, and political reforms very much needed to resolve the contradictions among social, national, and confessional groups that had been piling up for centuries. The errors of the people at the helm, who mismanaged the process of dealing with political, economic, and social issues, caused a social crisis that engulfed wide circles of society. The limited contingent of Soviet troops, which sided with the new government to fight the armed opposition, added vehemence to the domestic conflict; very soon it became an international conflict that speeded up the country’s disintegration. The Soviet Union was guided by its national interests and geopolitical reasons: its government tried to secure the country’s borders and protect the territory against the military threats created by the accelerating armed conflict in Afghanistan.2 On the other hand, the Soviet Union wanted to preserve its control over the buffer territory of immense geostrategic importance for its own safety and for upholding its interests in the Middle East. The national interests of the Soviet state contradicted the principles of international law: the U.N. GA described what the Soviet Union had done in Afghanistan as “foreign armed intervention.”3 Today, contradictory has made any conflict inside a state or between states a threat to regional security and the national and border security of the adjacent countries. The state power systems and legal regimes responsible for the safety of state borders are inevitably ruined in any country immersed in a domestic conflict; the borders become porous and the threats created by the conflict flow to neighboring countries. The states endangered by the repercussions of the conflict in neighboring countries should act promptly to localize the conflict: they should take all appropriate measures within the international legal system to strengthen their borders in order to ensure their own security. This has been amply confirmed by the conflict in Afghanistan, which has been going on for many years. The government forces, acting together with the limited Soviet contingent, failed to seal off the border with Pakistan, which allowed people from the North-West Frontier Province of Paki- stan to cross the border to join the Afghan ; arms and ammunition were moved across the same border. The training camps and centers of mujahideen (fighters) who fought against the govern-

2 See: M. Gareev, “Afghanskaia problema—tri goda bez sovetskikh voysk”, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, No. 2, 1992, p. 25. 3 Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly 35/37 of 20 November, 1980 The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3 5/37&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION].

54 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 ment of Afghanistan and also among themselves, as well as crowds of Afghans seeking refuge in Pakistan destabilized the border areas and pushed the Islamic factor into the limelight. In January 1980, the Soviet Union moved special units of KGB Border Guards into the northern to protect the Soviet-Afghan border. They were expected to create a “secu- rity belt” about 100 km wide along the border4 to prevent reconnaissance and the subversive activities of the mujahideen. This was done because the opposition acting from third countries and its patrons instructed the warlords to organize subversive activities along the Soviet border to force the Soviet political leaders to draw the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. Soviet troops were brought in on 25 December, 1979; the first fight on the stretch defended by the Khorog border guard unit took place on 13 February, 1980; it was in this skirmish that the first Soviet border guard fighting on the Soviet territory was killed.5 The fact that special units of Border Guards were stationed in the northern provinces of Af- ghanistan and armed intervention of the limited contingent violated the imperative principles of in- ternational law, but they prevented or cut short dozens of subversive acts of the mujahideen on the Soviet-Afghan border.

Border Security of the Adjacent States While the Taliban Remained in Power

The downfall of the PDPA pro-communist regime added vigor to the power struggle in Af- ghanistan: it became an ethnic, rather than ideological and political, confrontation among practically all the Islamic political parties and groups. It was then that the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence ser- vices created a new player in the Afghan conflict—the Taliban,6 which immediately plunged into a war against the mujahideen; it lived and operated on Saudi and UAE money. The Taliban was resolved to seize power to transform Afghanistan into a theocratic state based on the principles of radical Islam. At first, the two camps were locked in an uncompromising and fierce struggle, their ferocity going beyond the fighting units to the ordinary people. After ascending to power, the Taliban became less inclined to take commands from the American and Pakistani spe- cial services. As could be expected, the civil war tilled the soil for undermining the legal principles of Af- ghanistan’s statehood and turning the country into a hub of international terror. The common aim brought the Taliban, al-Qa‘eda, and other international terrorist organizations closer together.7 Once it came to power, the Taliban became a real and serious threat to the neighboring states.

4 For more details, see: P. Makkambaev, “Obespechenie bezopasnosti sovetsko-afghanskoy granitsy spetsialnymi podrazdeleniiami Pogranichnykh voysk, dislotsirovavshimisia na territorii Afghanistana,” in: Voenno-politicheskaia situatsia v Afghanistane i ee vliianie na pogranichnuiu bezopasnost gosudarstv Tsentralnoy Azii, Adolat, Tashkent, 2013, pp. 168-213. 5 See: V. Shevelev, “Tysiacha dney moey zhizni, ili Za zavesoy sekretnosti,” Pogranichnik Sodruzhestva, No. 4, 2004, p. 77. 6 See: E. Nikitenko, E. Golubeva, “Dvizhenie Taliban: proshloe ili budushchee?” Voennaia mysl, No. 4, 2004, p. 76. 7 See: Sh. Kamalov, “Afghanskaia strategiia administratsii SShA na sovremennom etape,” Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia (Tashkent), No. 3, 2010, p. 24.

55 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The Soviet Union’s disintegration made the Tajik-Afghan border practically non-existent; the former Soviet republic was plunged into a civil war between the supporters of the central government and all sorts of groups represented by the United Tajik Opposition, which escalated under the pressure of political tension in Afghanistan, among other things. In June 1992, when Burhaniddin Rabbani was elected president, the Tajik opposition began receiving moral support and considerable military assistance from the leaders of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA) and Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA). It set up an extensive network of train- ing camps in the north of Afghanistan and created corridors by which trained fighters were moved to Tajikistan. The mujahideen, who operated in the border areas, acting on the explicit orders of their com- manders, attacked posts of border guards along the border with Tajikistan and even joined the op- position fighting the government forces in Tajik territory. In the fall of 1994, when relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan started going from bad to worse, President Rabbani turned to Russia for military assistance against the Taliban, which by that time had captured Kandahar and was readying for a march on Kabul. In an effort to achieve a settlement in Tajikistan, Rabbani organized two summits (on 17-19 May, 1995 in Kabul and on 10- 11 December, 1996 in Talukan), which contributed to national reconciliation in Tajikistan. Even after the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, Rabbani went on with his efforts to achieve reconciliation in Tajikistan.8 He helped Tajik refugees who had crossed into Afghanistan in the fall and winter 1992 to return to their homes. Training camps of Tajik fighters in Afghan terri- tory, which were functioning along the border in the strip controlled by the ISA, were gradually liquidated. It should be said that the conflict in Tajikistan created a climate in which the international ter- rorist groups stationed in Tajikistan could organize subversive actions along the Kyrgyz-Tajik and Uzbek-Tajik borders. In August 1999, a unit of about 700 fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uz- bekistan (IMU) crossed the border with Kyrgyzstan, invaded the Batken District, and captured three population centers (Zardoli and Khodzha-Achkan). It took Kyrgyz armed units three months to drive the terrorists back to Tajikistan.9 On 19 October, 1999, Uzbekistan sent a note to the Foreign Ministry of Tajikistan, which said in part that “the Uzbek side hopes that the government of Tajikistan will fulfill its earlier obliga- tions to neutralize the bandit groups that invaded the south of Kyrgyzstan. A large part of them recently retreated, unopposed, to the eastern regions of Tajikistan. The Uzbek side also hopes that the Tajik-Kyrgyz border will be fortified in the interests of continued peace and stability in Central Asia.”10 In November 1999, an armed group of fourteen IMU fighters invaded Uzbekistan at the Pangaz Pass (Akhangaran District, Tashkent Region) and was liquidated in Yangiabad. In July 2000, about twenty IMU fighters invaded the Sariosiyo District, Surkhandarya Region near the village of Zevar to carry out several acts of subversion and terrorism along the Tajik-Uzbek border. In August of the same year, 20 armed IMU fighters crossed the Tajik-Uzbek border near the village of Terakli (Akhangaran District, Tashkent Region); all of them were liquidated by the special units of Uzbekistan in the mountains of Bostanlyk.11

8 See: V. Korgun, “Islamskiy ekstremizm u granits SNG,” Azia i Afrika segodnia, No. 1, 1999, p. 13. 9 See: N. Ziiamov, “O mezhdunarodnom ekstremizme i borbe s terrorizmom,” Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane (Tashkent), No. 11-12, 1999, pp. 58-59. 10 “Kto i chto meshaet mirnomu protsessu v Tadzhikistane?” Pravda Vostoka (Tashkent), 20 October, 1999. 11 See: B. Zhamolov, R. Akbarov, Kh. Mirzaliev, “Prigovor. Imenem Respubliki Uzbekistan,” Narodnoe slovo (Tashkent), 23 November, 2000.

56 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Afghanistan became a hub of international terrorism, leaving the world community no other option but to interfere in the country’s domestic situation. The U.N. SC passed a resolution, saying that the U.N. SC “Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.”12

The NATO Military Operation and the Situation along the Borders with Afghanistan

Operation Enduring Freedom carried out in 2001 can be described as an important military and political measure the international community undertook to stabilize the domestic situation in Af- ghanistan. The specifics of the theater of military actions largely diminished the effects of what the coalition forces had done; however, the operation contributed to the security of Central Asian bor- ders.13 Indeed, the number of subversive acts carried out by international terrorist groups on the borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan dropped noticeably. In Pakistan, on the other hand, the operation echoed in a different way. Shamsudin Mamaev has rightly written that “the rout of the Taliban in Afghanistan started a process of Taliban-ization of Pakistan: the following year, fundamentalist Islamic parties won the elections in the North-West Frontier Province.”14 In fact, NATO repeated the mistake of the Soviet commanders who had, on the whole, ne- glected the factors that figured prominently in the east, south-east, and south of Afghanistan. Very much like the mujahideen before them, the defeated Taliban drew new fighters into their ranks; the movement received arms and ammunition from the North-West Border Province of Pakistan and also used its territory to escape strikes by the counterterrorist coalition. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan should have been closed to deprive the Taliban of its safe haven. On 18 August, 2008, President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf lost his post because he used military force to stabilize the situation in Waziristan (the province where the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans kept their main forces). Pakistan, a key American ally in the region of long standing, gradu- ally moved to the camp of those who opposed the American presence in Afghanistan. This was “prompted by an airstrike NATO helicopters had delivered in the small hours of 26 November, 2011on two Pakistani military outposts in the border zone with Afghanistan that killed twenty-four Pakistani military… The boycott was one of Islamabad’s answers to the incident; it also blocked ground supply routes to NATO forces in Afghanistan.”15 Early in July 2012, that is, seven months later, the two countries resumed talks on the southern ground supply route. It seems that security in Afghanistan depends on the security of its border with Pakistan, which so far remains the main channel between the “communicating vessels” (by which I mean Afghanistan

12 U.N. Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, Adopted by the Security Council at its 437th meeting, 12 September, 2001, S/RES/1368, available at [http:// www.refworld.org/docid/3c4e94557.html]. 13 See: I. Safranchuk, “Afghanistan in Search of Balance,” available at [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/person/p_1260]. 14 Sh. Mamaev, “Odin na odin s Talibami. Perezhivet li NATO krizis v Pakistane?” available at [http://www.politjournal. ru/preview.php?action=Articles&dirid=40&tek=8157&issue=219]. 15 O. Nessar, “Political Crossroads of the Afghan Crisis,” International Affairs, No. 2, 2012.

57 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS and Pakistan) used by the Taliban and international groups of terrorists to carry out their subversive activities.16 Sealed off, this border will make it easier to discontinue the anti-government activities of the Taliban and the in Afghanistan and will create conditions conducive to similar mea- sures in the border areas of Pakistan. We have already learned from previous experience that these tasks in the two territories cannot and should not be addressed until the state borders have been closed. We all know that the good-neighborly relations between these two countries largely depend on settle- ment of the long-standing border line issue. It is for the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to initiate the talks and act as an intermediary. Both states are fully aware that the Taliban and the reactionary Pashtun tribal elders are capitalizing on the unresolved border issue to fan en- mity between the people living on both sides of the border. The international community should help Pakistan to demilitarize the territories along the Af- ghan border once the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan has been completed. For over 30 years now, this area remains dotted with training camps and bases, first, of Afghan mujahideen and later the Taliban. A successful conclusion of the operation in Afghanistan will lead to a dialog between Islamabad and the Pashtun tribal elders about disarmament of the illegal armed groups and putting an end to subversive activities against each other. The government of Pakistan will probably need an interna- tional military contingent to liquidate the al-Qa‘eda camps in the North-West Frontier Province and to disarm the Pashtun armed units.17

Peaceful Settlement and Afghanistan’s Security

The years 2001-2005, when the Bonn Agreements on Afghanistan were implemented, proved to be the first important stage of political settlement in the country up to and including creating new and restoring the old institutions of power with equal representation of political, religious, and ethnic groups achieved through elections. This stage served as a solid political foundation on which the process of national reconciliation could be further developed, even though the problem of security of the local people and their protec- tion against armed anti-government elements remained unresolved. Between 2006 and 2010, the world community, which tried to implement the London Agree- ments on Afghanistan, failed to achieve the declared aims (security, sustainable governance, rule of law, human rights, and economic and social development); it likewise could not defeat drug production for the simple reason that none of the above could be achieved in a country that lacked security.18 In January 2010, the ISAF had over 100 thousand under its command, however, the Afghan national army, expected to become the main antiterrorist force, was still unable to spread its control to nearly a third of the country’s territory.

16 See: R. Makhmudov, “Rasklad afghanskikh sil,” Tsentr ekonomicheskikh issledovaniy. Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie (Tashkent), No. 5, 2012, p. 57. 17 See: A. Davydov, “SShA ostaiutsia v Afghanistane? Joe Biden uzhe ne obeshchaet vyvesti amerikanskie voyska iz Afghanistana v 2014 godu,” available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1295244180]. 18 See: I. Berg, “Prichiny porazheniya NATO v Afghanistane (nemetskiy vzgliad),” available at [http://www.centrasia. ru/newsA. php?st=1270017300].

58 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

On 17 July, 2011, the Afghan government began to spread its responsibility for maintaining security over the entire territory on a stage-by-stage basis (Inteqal). This meant that the Afghan secu- rity forces were determined to cope with the problems created by the subversive activities of anti- government elements. Some think that the Taliban promptly revived after the defeat and even became more active because: — The international community proved unable to deprive it of its shelter in Pakistan19; — It proved impossible to stem the flow of fighters hired outside the country and brought to Afghanistan; — The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan remained uncontrolled. The two countries organized several bilateral and multilateral summits and meetings of the joint Peace Jirga; the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the border signed several non-aggression agreements; however, the situation along the border remained the same. The ISAF trained Afghan border guards to improve the service at the check points, but the entire stretch of border was barely guarded and barely controlled. The pace with which the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police Force were being formed left much to be desired. In the past, when the Soviet Union pulled out its limited con- tingent, the Afghan army was about 400-450 thousand strong20 and could oppose the mujahideen for three years on its own, today, at the beginning of the Inteqal process, it is barely 200 thousand strong. In 2005, the newly formed units of the Afghan army were involved in anti-Taliban operations to- gether with the ISAF; on 30 August, 2008 (seven years after the first stage of Operation Enduring Freedom), the Afghan army assumed responsibility for the country’s capital. Thirty years of the Afghan war have demonstrated that the use of force is not enough to achieve peace and reconciliation. The members of the first U.N. SC mission, who came to Afghanistan in November 2003, pointed out that reconciliation with the opposition was badly needed; the process, however, began in 2010. The delay was probably caused by the fact that by 2010 the pro-government political alliances had not yet divided power among themselves, which meant that the talks would have been senseless. The consultative Peace Jirga convened on 2-4 June, 2010 formulated the organizational and legal conditions for a dialog with the opposition; it also adopted a Program of Peace, Reconciliation, and Reintegration, as well as set up the High Peace Council and its provincial committees. The talks between Hamid Karzai and the leaders of the Taliban and Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the efforts of the local provincial committees to seek reconciliation with the local warlords showed that, in prin- ciple, a mutually acceptable compromise could be achieved. The uncompromising criticism coming from Western experts of the mechanisms (direct talks with members of the Afghan government, reli- ance on intermediary countries, etc.) and instruments used for reconciliation (buying posts in state structures, corruption, etc.) shows that the West knows little, if anything at all, about the specifics of the Afghans’ national psychology and worldviews.21 The London Conference on Afghanistan, which took place on 28 January, 2010, announced that the partnership between the Afghan government and the international community had entered a new

19 See: “NATO na poroge porazheniia v voyne s talibami,” available at [http://www.trud.ru/article/27-07-2010/247163_ za_vojskami_ssha_v_afganistane_prishel_prizrak_sssr.html]. 20 See: A. Korbut, “Afghanskaia avantiura prirastaet stranami SNG,” available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA. php?st= 1261040400]. 21 See: R. Khapalwak, D. Rohde, “U.S. Buying Tribal Loyalties in Afghanistan,” available at [http://afpakwar.com/blog/ archives/3897].

59 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

(transition) phase: the Afghan government would acquire broader powers in security and wider re- sponsibilities for the future of its country, while the international community pledged to help the government of Afghanistan. The traditional Loya Jirga convened in November 2011 supported the government, which in- tended to sign an agreement on strategic partnership with the United States based on full respect for Afghanistan’s statehood. Despite the widely publicized intention of the counterterrorist coalition to complete pullout before 2014, the world community announced at the Bonn Conference held on 5 December, 2011, that it was prepared to help the Afghan government after the pullout, from 2015 to 2024, to develop the economy and consolidate peace and conciliation. The international community is proceeding from the policy of reconciliation of all the opposing military and political groups and transfer of full responsibility for the country’s domestic situation to the Security Forces of Afghanistan. The policy of peace and security in the country fully conforms to the local reality. The National Army of Afghanistan is seen as the main guarantor of success at the present stage of the peacekeeping operation; it should be large enough to control at least the administrative centers and main districts in every province. This will facilitate an agreement with the moderate and radical opposition leaders, who respect force and weapons. This means that the pullout should be coordi- nated with the time the National Army is prepared to assume full responsibility for maintaining peace in the country.22

Security of the Tajik-Afghan Border

Today, the ability of the border guards of Tajikistan to protect the Afghan stretch of the state border 1,387 km long causes a lot of concern in view of the planned ISAF pullout.23 In 1992, the border was guarded by about 5 thousand Russian border guards; later their number was brought up to 18 thousand (that is 13 border guards per 1 km of the border) to cope with the more frequent sub- versive acts. In 2005, the task was transferred to the border guards of Tajikistan; today, the armed forces of Tajikistan number about 20 thousand,24 5 thousand of whom are stationed on the border.25 They are spaced along the entire stretch of the border, which means 3.5 border guards per 1 km. An inadequate number of border guards is not the only problem; there is also the problem of border checkpoints.26 In 2002, the Aga Khan Foundation allocated $1.7 million to build four bridges across the border River Panj (near Teme, Darwaz, Langar, and Ishkashim), which connected these Afghan districts with Tajikistan.27

22 See: V. Kaspruk, “Afghanistan: ukhod mozhet byt prezhdevremennym,” available at [http://www. zn. ua/1000/1600/70224]. 23 See: [http://www.skpw.ru/Tadg.htm]. 24 See: A. Tsyganok, “Rossia i problemy bezopasnosti aziatskikh stran SNG,” Rossia i sovremenny mir, No. 4, 2008, p. 208. 25 See: “Vooruzhennye sily Tadzhikistana,” available at [http://belarmy.by/army-mira/vooruzhyonnye-sily- tadzhikistana]. 26 Until 2002, there was only a river check point Nizhny Panj-Sherkhan Bandar. 27 See: “Regionalnaia deiatelnost po sotrudnichestvu v Tadzhikistane,” available at [http://www.akdn.org/tajikistan_ regional_r.asp].

60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

In June 2007, a motor road bridge 600 m long between Nizhny Panj on the Tajik side and Sherkhan Bandar on the Afghan side built on American money ($37.1 million) was opened.28 The newly built bridges were expected to improve transborder communications, invigorate trade and economic ties, develop transborder trade, and, in general, promote closer cultural and friendly relations between the two countries. The people living on both sides of the border could enjoy a simplified border-crossing regime. The new bridges and simplified regime on the border cannot but cause concern: the Taliban and its allies can use these advantages to organize subversive acts along the borders of the Central Asian countries; this happened in 1999-2000 when the border was entrusted to the Russian border guards. At that time, the Tajik army and the law-enforcement structures ensured law and order inside the country, while the IMU fighters camped in the mountains (Tavildara, Jirgatol, etc.); from time to time they came down to invade the Uzbek and Kyrgyz border areas. These concerns were confirmed in July 2012: an armed operation in Gorno-Badakhshan, where units of the national army beat off 6 to 8 terrorist units (from 60 to 90 fighters in all), cost Major- General Nazarov, Department Head of the State National Security Committee for Nagorno-Badakh- shan, his life.29 In 2012 alone, about 150 potential members of terrorist and religious extremist orga- nizations were arrested in Tajikistan.30

Border Threats in Central Asia

There is no agreement in the expert community on how the 2014 pullout will affect regional security. Some experts fear that it will be undermined; others believe that even negative developments in post-2014 Afghanistan, where the Taliban might regain control of the country, will not threaten the Central Asian borders. These experts refer to the period between 1996 and 2001 when the Taliban controlled the north and north-west of Afghanistan and when there were no serious incidents either on the Turkmen or Uzbek borders with Afghanistan. Vadim Sergeev, Third Secretary of the Department on Issues of Security and Disarmament, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has written: “Important evidence that the Taliban have no inten- tion of invading Central Asia lies in the fact that, in the fall of 1996, they approached the Turkmen border, which was patrolled by Russian troops at that time. Over the next five years, until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, they did not engage in any hostile activities and established peaceful rela- tions with the Turkmen government and Russian soldiers.”31 Indeed, at that time, the Taliban, not strong enough to defeat the Northern Alliance, preferred to steer clear of open intervention against its northern neighbors. At the same time, today as in the past (during the 30 years of civil war in Afghanistan), the power struggle in Afghanistan is fanned by external players rather than kept smoldering by domestic circumstances. This means that in the future, too, much will depend on whether the world commu- nity manages to maintain stability in the country.

28 See: “Prezidenty Tadzhikistana i Afghanistana otkryli most cherez reku Panj,” available at [http://www.easttime.Ru /news/1/1/298.html]. 29 See: “V Gorno-Badakhshanskoy oblasti Tadzhikistana slozhilas napriazhennaia obstanovka,” available at [http://n-idea.am /ru/news.php?id=19468]. 30 See: “Okolo 150 terroristov i ekstremistov zaderzhano v Tadzhikistane v 2012 godu,” available at [http://www.kyrtag. kg /?q=ru/news/34501]. 31 V. Sergeev, “The U.S.A. in Afghanistan,” International Affairs, No. 2, 2012.

61 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

To prevent negative developments in Afghanistan, up to and including subversive activities of anti-government forces on the Central Asian borders, NATO should establish closer cooperation with the regional security structures (SCO, CIS, and CSTO)32 at the stage of the ISAF pullout to coordinate their actions.33 The Central Asian countries, on the other hand, should pool forces to improve bilateral and multilateral cooperation along the borders: they should coordinate their actions to prevent or rebuff the subversive activities of the Taliban and international terrorist structures (similar to those that took place on the Tajik border between 1992 and 1997). To be able to act together to stem the transborder threats emanating from Afghanistan (if the military and political situation in this country develops according to a negative scenario), the Central Asian states need an adequate international legal context. An analysis of what is going on in Afghanistan and the planned pullout of the counterterrorist coalition forces suggest that the Central Asian countries will have to cope with the following threats to their border security: — Wide-scale subversive activities by Afghan armed groups on the state borders; — Armed invasion of the territories of the Central Asian states by groups of international ter- rorists34; — Infiltration of members of religious extremist parties and movements35; — Drug trafficking organized by criminal groups across Central Asian territory36; — Ethnic conflicts deliberately stirred up in the border areas.37 It should be said that these threats are not imagined: they are probable and may become real if the Afghan government loses control over the Northern provinces, or if the war between the north and south is rekindled. During the civil war in Tajikistan, these threats were lurking on the Tajik-Afghan border; today the reactionary and extremist forces in Afghanistan might return to their old subversive tactics. This means “in order to check the spread of terror, extremism, and drugs from Afghanistan, it is absolutely indispensable to close the frontiers and use the latest technology for this purpose. The Central Asian member states of the SCO and CSTO, as well as NATO/EU members, will equally profit from this. In fact, the members of the European Union and the Alliance may extend very much needed aid to the regional countries. It will be useful to discuss the advisability of creating a joint unit based on special SCO and NATO forces to stop the flow of drugs from Afghanistan.”38 The Central Asian countries should not be left alone to face a wide-scale Taliban subversive campaign: the numerical strength of their border guard forces is absolutely inadequate for this. They need national armed forces trained to protect the state borders, which should be equipped with ade-

32 See: “Kakovo budushchee Afghanistana bez NATO?” available at [http://www.islamnews.ru/news-22158.html]. 33 See: B. Seydakhmetova, “Afghanistan segodnia,” available at [http://www.np.kz/index.php?newsid=5924]. 34 See: B. Pulatov, A. Khasanov, “Formy sovershenstvovania mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva v borbe s terrorizmom,” Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 2, 2008, pp. 47-51. 35 See: I. Yakubov, “Islamskiy radikalizm: prichiny aktivizatsii, mery protivodeystviia,” Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 2, 2005, pp. 14-20. 36 See: F. Mukhammedov, “Mezhdunarodniy narkobiznes: poniatie i istoria vozniknovenia,” Filosofia i pravo (Tashkent), No. 2, 2008, pp. 80-82. 37 See: D. Malysheva, “Posle ‘chernogo vtornika:’ islam i terrorizm v Rossii i SNG,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 3, 2002, p. 56. 38 Yu. Morozov, R. McDermott, “Organizations and Alliances in Central Asia: Cooperation Prospects as Seen from Moscow and London,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (54), 2008, p. 33.

62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 quate high tech equipment to ensure coordination and cooperation between the armed units and un- interrupted control over their actions. Direct threats of wide-scale activities on the borders will call for launching regional security mechanisms; so far this is impossible because the regional organizations (CIS, CSTO, and SCO) are still working on their structures and have not yet acquired mechanisms for opposing wide-scale bor- der threats.39 International law related to regional security and prevention of aggression against a member of one of these organizations has not yet acquired clear rules of collective action, the types, forms, and means of such action have not been specified, nor have the methods for arriving at timely decisions to carry out military operations. The Central Asian countries exposed to the threats emanating from Afghanistan and lacking reliable and efficient mechanisms of border security should arrive at a compromise on the key re- gional problems40 so as to be able to initiate collective border security measures and, later, collective decisions related to the safety of their borders. In fact, in 1993 and 1994 the Central Asian countries had experience of concerted efforts on the Tajik-Afghan border when their national armed forces were still at the initial stage of modernization intended to adjust them to the new tasks created by the new geopolitical realities. Today, there is every reason to believe that in the past twenty years the national armed forces have acquired the adequate skills to cope with the regional security problem. Regional stability calls for the active involvement of the Central Asian countries in Afghani- stan’s economic revival. Bahodyr Ergashev, Director of the Center for Economic Research, Uzbekistan, has written: “Uzbekistan has been convinced and is still convinced that the military component of the Afghan settlement should be trimmed to pay more attention to economic revival. This alone will lower the level of military confrontation inside the country.”41

Conclusions

The above suggests the following conclusions.  First, the threats to the border security of the Central Asian countries emanating from the territory of Afghanistan threaten their constitutional order; those who threaten the region’s countries want to replace their secular state order with radical theocratic regimes (this hap- pened in Afghanistan when the Taliban came to power).  Second, the pullout of the military contingent of the counterterrorist coalition will endanger the border security of the Central Asian states (no matter which of the numerous possible scenarios is realized) as long as the positions of the present government of Afghanistan remain shaky. The intensity of these threats will depend on the direction in which the con- flict in Afghanistan develops.

39 See: R. Saifulin, “How Myths are Born. A View from Tashkent on the CSTO and Central Asia,” available at [http:// eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/How-Myths-Are-Born-15693]. 40 See: S. Reva, N. Dosaliev, “Vozmozhnosti stran Tsentralnoy Azii i ikh realizatsia pri sozdanii sistemy regionalnoy bezopasnosti v ramkakh ATTs SNG,” in: Vneshnepoliticheskaia orientatsia stran Tsentralnoy Azii v svete globalnoy transformatsii mirovoy sistemy mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy, ed. by A.A. Kniazev, A.A. Migranian, Bishkek, 2009, pp. 229-231. 41 B. Ergashev, “Prioritetny Afghanistan,” Tsentr ekonomicheskikh issledovaniy. Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie, No. 5-6, 2009, p. 19.

63 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

 Third, in the absence of reliable and efficient regional security mechanisms, the Central Asian countries must work together to stem the transborder threats arising in Afghan ter- ritory.42 The Central Asian countries should concentrate, first and foremost, on arriving at concerted and mutually acceptable border security measures, i.e. preserving the integrity of the state borders and protecting infrastructure along the border strips and in the border zones. These measures do not exclude prevention and localization of the transborder threats by regional organizations. The latter, which rely on the collective efforts of the Central Asian states, should guarantee that the struggle against transborder threats will not develop into full-scale armed conflicts.  Fourth, to ensure their border security, each of the Central Asian states should develop its bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the regional countries in the following key vec- tors: — Improvement of the international laws related to mutual assistance in crisis situations on the borders; — Unification of the system of border control to be able to identify potential terrorists; — Timely exchange of information about the developments on the state borders; — Organization of cooperation and coordination of border guard activities on the state border; — Joint command-post exercises to improve protection of the state borders in crisis situa- tions; — Joint scientific studies of how to ensure border security in the conditions of the emerging military and political situation in the region.  Fifth, to achieve peace and stability in the CA, the regional countries should be actively involved in the efforts to stop the civil war in Afghanistan. This means that the Central Asian countries, acting within the international projects designed to establish national rec- onciliation in Afghanistan and its gradual reintegration into the world community, should use diplomatic instruments to contribute to military and political stability in the country and along its borders. This will diminish transborder threats and will facilitate transfer to good-neighborly relations and mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan. This means that the civil war in Afghanistan has been and remains the main source of threats to regional and international security. The transborder threats taking shape in Afghanistan are spear- headed against the transborder security of the Central Asian states in particular. The Central Asian countries should act together to consolidate regional security and contribute to conflict settlement in Afghanistan, otherwise their security woes will never end.

42 See: A. Durrani, “Post-NATO Afghanistan: Implications for Regional Security,” available at [http://eng.globalaffairs. ru/number/Post-NATO-Afghanistan-Implications-for-Regional-Security-15823].

64 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 AFGHANISTAN 2014: UNCERTAINTY AND RISKS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Sergey MASAULOV Ph.D. (Philos.), Director of the Center for Prospective Research (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

ABSTRACT

he continuing destabilization of public es is not helping to combat the life in Afghanistan and far from always threat of terrorism. successful attempts by the Interna- In recent years, it has become obvious T 1 tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to that the CA states are facing a complex return it to normal are creating fundamental problem manifested in a dramatic deteriora- challenges and threats to regional and glob- tion of the internal situation in Afghanistan al security. and Pakistan; an increase in the fragmen- The following problems can be identified: tary factor; similar situations 1. Higher drug production and circula- in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pak- tion. This is causing a steady rise in istan; and an aggravation of the Pashtun is- both the number of people depen- sue. dent on heroin and opiates coming The problem is that some of the former from Afghanistan and the total num- ideas about what is going on in Afghanistan ber of drug addicts (according to do not correspond to current reality. It is in- experts, 36,000 young people die correct to take the simplified approach and from drugs in Russia every year). reduce the entire problem to the existence of 2. Stronger transnational crime the Taliban movement, under which all groups in Central Asia (CA). Their those drawn into the struggle against the activity is closely related to the ISAF in the wake of various ideas and slo- drug business and movement of gans are lumped. Several Taliban centers drugs from Afghanistan to Russia function in Afghanistan and Pakistan (radi- and Europe through the Central cal, extremist, and moderate). Asian countries. The policy of the CA states should not be limited to endowing the large nations with 3. Continued presence of armed U.S. the right to resolve the Afghan-Pakistani and NATO forces in Afghanistan problems. States with interests in the coun- and its neighboring states in the try that are capable of having an impact on form of their network of super bas- the development of the situation must also be engaged to untie the “Afghan knot”; the 1 At present, the ISAF comprises armed force units matter primarily concerns Russia, China, from 50 countries of the world. Iran, and the CA countries. 65 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

KEYWORDS: Central Asia, Afghanistan, South Asia, regional security, ISAF.

Introduction

At the beginning of February 2010, a conference was held in London to determine Afghani- stan’s future, at which the representatives of 35 foreign ministries of different states and Afghan President Hamid Karzai made statements. The heads of the Russian, American, British, French, Chinese, and German foreign ministries expressed their support of the idea to gradually transfer re- sponsibility for the situation in the country to Afghan structures. However, each of the countries has a different understanding of what “responsibility for the situation” means. One thing has become clear—the military campaign can no longer be supported by the previous aims; the changes ear- marked in Afghan life have dictated the appearance of new trends.

First Trend

Despite the onset of the gradual pullout of the Western coalition forces from Afghanistan, the Americans still maintain their presence in this country at 3-5 military bases. As the then U.S. Sec- retary of State Hillary Clinton said at a conference in London, the United States cannot just leave the country, it must give the regime that remains after 2014 military-technical, economic, and po- litical support. “It’s not an exit strategy, it’s about assisting the Afghans” in taking responsibility for their own security, she explained. It is important to keep in mind, however, that it could be some Taliban regime that comes to replace Hamid Karzai.2 The mentioned assistance also presumes an attempt to deal a significant blow to the radical part of the Taliban by drawing moderate members (one of whom the Americans consider to be mullah Omar) to the Americans’ side, including by means of bribery.3 Afghan and Tajik observers4 claim that American military units are being withdrawn from the southern and central provinces of Afghanistan. However, three military air bases with a growing combat potential have been determined; they are situated in Shindand, Kandahar, and Bagram.

Second Trend

Attention is drawn to the actions of the Western coalition associated with allowing certain bands of radical Islamists, religious extremists, and polyethnic terrorist groups to reach the north of the country. They are composed not only of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, and Chechens, but also of

2 [http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/01/28/uk.afghanistan/index.html]. 3 According to information widely spread by the media, intensive talks are being held between the Americans and the Taliban members of Mullah Omar. 4 Based on information obtained at personal meetings with Aziz Arianfar (Head of the Center for the Study of Afghanistan, Germany) and Professor Abdunabi Sattorzod (Center of Strategic Research under the President of Tajikistan) at the conference on Regional Security in the Context of Afghan Uncertainty, Almaty, 9-10 April, 2012.

66 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Pashtuns; they are gaining a foothold in the country’s north—near Imam-Sakhib (the Kunduz Prov- ince), Zebake (Badakhshan), several districts in Baglan, Samangan, Fariab, Batgiz, as well as in and Takhor. It should be noted that these areas and districts are not regions of compact Pashtun residence. What is more, these bands have advanced into areas close to the passes of Gorny Badakh- shan (Tajikistan).

Third Trend

During the current military campaign, the U.S. leadership has been trying to enlarge the zone of security around Kabul and the military air base of Bagram. According to several experts, this means that regardless of how the situation develops in Afghanistan, the Americans intend to retain their control over the country’s government. The Western coalition is essentially closing its eyes to the separatist strivings of certain groups of the Afghan population, primarily the Tajiks operating in the north of the country. According to observers, the Islamists in the province of Badakhshan are the most determined and could possibly draw the Islamists of Tajikistan’s Gorny Badakhshan into their games.

Anticipated Consequences

The Tajik political circles are determined to rebuff any attempts to turn Afghanistan into a Pashtun country. Hamid Karzai has drawn up a draft that recognizes the as the de facto border; however, he is not releasing it since he is worried about completely losing the Pashtuns’ sup- port. The Tajik leaders of the north of Afghanistan are worried about the Tribal Area becoming joined to the Pashtun territories in Afghanistan (if this happens, the number of Pashtuns in the country will double).5 The struggle between regional and ethnic groups is intensifying. Observers are also taking heed of the forthright statement by Governor of the regarding his intention to become the president of Afghanistan. They have no doubts that Doctor Abdullah Abdullah will be another surefire candidate, whom even the Governor of Balkh will not object to. At the moment, Atta Muhammad Nur is the leader of the Tajiks of Afghanistan (ex-president Burhanuddin Rabbani and General Mohammad Daud were killed the year before last); he enjoys much greater prestige than politically passive Yunus Kanuni, Ahmad Zie Masud, and Marshal Fahim. The strong position of the Governor of Balkh, who controls the railroad from Khairaton to Mazar-i- Sharif and access to Uzbekistan in general, is compelling U.S. and NATO representatives to support him. The forces of the former Northern Alliance could be consolidated around Atta Muhammad Nur and Doctor Abdullah Abdullah, who have managed to retain significant military potential. At the same time, due to the corrupted relations that have developed over the transit deliveries through Khairaton-Termez, Atta Muhammad Nur is supported by the key figures of Uzbekistan, particularly Chairman of the National Security Service of Uzbekistan Rustam Inoiatov.

5 See: A. Kniazev, “Razdel Afganistana vyzovet ‘effect domino’ dlia vsei Srednei Azii,” available at [http://www. regnum.ru/news/polit/1525282.html#ixzz2XDwJOOWX], 13 June, 2013.

67 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In turn, the ethnic component in Tajikistan is based on recognizing the authority of the Governor of Balkh. The Tajik press has repeatedly expressed the idea of creating either an independent state (a multiethnic federation under the auspices of the Tajiks), or a broad autonomy with its center in Mazar- i-Sharif with minimum ties with the government in Kabul. Informed observers think that if an autonomy is established, Governor of Balkh Atta Muham- mad Nur will continue to be the key figure in it. However, if the scenario that envisages establishing the independence of North Afghanistan takes the upper hand, Abdullah Abdullah may be promoted to the main political role, whose international renown and authority among the Tajiks of other regions of the country (as well as abroad) is much higher than Atta Muhammad Nur’s, whereby the latter may become prime minister. Moreover, U.S. political circles, which have long maintained ties with Abdul- lah Abdullah, think that this politician’s policy is more predictable. Another separatist project was voiced by leader of the Afghan National Congress Party Abdul Latif Pedram6 (deputy from the Badakhshan Province). At the peak of the conflict in Gorny Badakh- shan (July 2012), he said that the Americans and British were planning to unite the Pakistani regions of Gilgit and Chitral, as well as the Afghan and Tajik parts of Badakhshan, with the aim of forming a new state with a predominant Ismailite population. It should be noted that this federalist idea was supported earlier (in 2003) during discussion of the new constitution. It was also supported by Gen- eral and Turan Muhammad Ismail-khan. The Uzbek factor has become an important element of the U.S. separatist scenario. As early as April 2012, General Abdul Rashid Dostum returned from Turkey to Afghanistan, after which there were several “test” combat clashes between Uzbek fighters and the units of the governor of Balkh. They were provoked by attempts to divvy up the spheres of control over several economic facilities. General Dostum took up residence in Shibergan and essentially established control over the local governor and the provinces of Jawzjan and Sari Pul (partially). The northern Pashtun factor is the most prominent in the entire context of Afghan Tajik and Uzbek activation. The regions were Pashtuns live are bastions for the Taliban and international ter- rorist groups (as defined by the international coalition forces) associated with them. Both the local Pashtuns and those who come from the south and center of the country are set on countering any at- tempts to implement separatist or autonomist scenarios. Several of these groups are under the control of the Pakistani special services, as well as of the military, political, and religious circles of this country. They can be sent indirectly through Pakistanis by the Chinese special services, so in Af- ghanistan they are called the Chinese Taliban. If attempts are made to establish non-Pashtun autonomies, support of the above-mentioned groups from Pakistan and China could be increased. Pakistan sees them as traditional supporters of Pakistani interests in the regions of Afghanistan. China, in turn, is not interested in the fragmentation of Afghanistan; it is trying to establish the level of stability necessary for implementing its own eco- nomic and communication projects. So an increase in separatist tendencies will only lead to further military opposition on ethnic grounds. This also applies to southern Afghanistan and particularly to those parts of it where there are relatively large enclaves of Tajiks, Hazaras, and other non-Pashtun ethnicities (for example, Balochi). If Afghanistan becomes fragmented, the non-Pashtun political forces could receive the main American and Western support. It is possible that the Americans will succeed in coming to terms with some of the Taliban groups by giving them control over the southern provinces in exchange for con- tinued U.S. presence in such strategically important places as Shindand, Kandahar, and Bagram. In

6 In 2004, Abdul Latif Pedram, as presidential candidate, made the idea of federalizing Afghanistan one of his election campaign platforms.

68 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 so doing, the Americans will fully retain (or even increase) their presence in the north of the country (Mazar-i-Sharif). This kind of scenario might have the side effect of destabilizing the CA republics due to the creation of problem zones in regions of Tajikistan (Pamir and Darvaz-Tavildar) and Kyrgyzstan (Osh and Batken). If this happens, Kazakhstan will most likely be next in line. As for Uzbekistan, its local elite believes7 that the republic has been saved from this fate in the mid term by withdrawing its membership from the CSTO. The growing activity of fighters in northern Afghanistan (particularly in Kunduz and Badakh- shan) and the instability observed since June 2012 in Gorny Badakhshan suggest that the spring and fall of 2014 will see an aggravation of the ethnic situation; this will give the Americans an opportu- nity to support the separatist trends.

A View from Central Asia

The CA countries are particularly concerned about the situation developing in Afghanistan, especially in light of the withdrawal of the international forces in 2014. It is being examined in three contexts—national, regional, and global. The national context. Afghanistan can be considered a failed state; there are several arguments to back this assertion.  First, there is proof that 1.3 million votes were falsified at the 2009 elections, which means that the Afghans do not trust the current power system in the country.  Second, the efficiency of the administrative system leaves much to be desired. There are 25 ministries in the country, while its army amounts to between 300,000 and 400,000 sol- diers. However, no significant achievements have been reached in ensuring security, orga- nizing intelligent administration, or acquiring new development prospects.  Third, the Afghan government does not have enough income to cover spending, which is greatly hindering the country’s development and making it dependent on unstable external investments.  Fourth, the production and dissemination of opiates has never been an Afghan project; it was launched in the 1980s by the CIA, which did not have the funds at the time to finance the mujahideen used in the fight against the Soviet troops. This makes it very difficult for the Afghan people and government to put a halt to growing opium and producing narcotics.  Fifth, despite the fact that Afghanistan has relatively appreciable mineral resources,8 the projects related to their exploitation cannot be implemented in 1-2 years. So there is no point in expecting any revenue from natural resources any time soon; at present, 36% of the Afghan population is still living below the poverty level.9 The regional context. Pakistan is playing an active role in the Afghan situation. A total of 20,000 madrasahs have been built in the north of Waziristan, which form a support base for the orga- nized armed groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

7 For more details, see: “The Taliban will not Look for New Targets in Central Asia after Withdrawal of NATO Forces from Afghanistan,” available in Russian at [http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/22465.html], 13 June, 2013. 8 See, for example: J. Risen, “U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan,”The New York Times, 13 June, 2010, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0], 13 June, 2013. 9 See: “Afghanistan,” available at [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html], 13 June, 2013.

69 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

There is the opinion in Afghanistan that the war in the country is fortifying and strengthening the Taliban and over time it will become a threat to India, the east of China, and CA, whereby there are already several radical groups in the latter. Next on the Taliban’s list is Russia, which could be made vulnerable by the establishment of ties between Pakistani and Afghan radical Islamists and Chechnia. Russia could establish strategic cooperation with Pakistan, Iran, and China, which, in particular, will make it possible to discuss with Pakistan the possibility of taking steps to put a halt to the support of radical movements. This will be much easier than reinforcing the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbeki- stan, and Turkmenistan to prevent the penetration of radical groups into the region. The global aspect.  First, the world media is painting an unambiguously negative picture of Afghanistan.  Second, there are 54 ethnic groups living in Afghanistan that speak 53 languages and rep- resent different . It would be incorrect to say that the Central Asian states are show- ing a heightened interest in establishing close ties with the Uzbeks and Tajiks living in Afghanistan. Here it would be appropriate to recall that Pakistan has already attempted to promote the idea of establishing a Greater Afghanistan (Pashtun), but it proved unfeasible; the same can be said of the concept of a Greater Khorasan. These models are unlikely to work in Afghanistan, since they are incommensurable with the country’s peaceful life; the example of the Kurd problem in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey can be given as a direct analogue.  Third, the Central Asian countries must perceive all the citizens of Afghanistan as a united nation, otherwise, it will be impossible to establish long-term cooperation with this country.  Fourth, it must be kept in mind that the American troops will not be completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. I would also like to remind you that large deposits of iron, copper, cobalt, and gold have been found in Afghanistan, as well as deposits of several industrial metals, such as lithium needed for producing batteries and niobium used for manufacturing superconductors. The Ainak copper deposit close to Kabul is considered the largest in Eurasia (according to 2006 estimates, its supplies amount to around 240 million tons of ore with a 2.3% copper content), while the Hajigak iron-ore field lo- cated in the same place with supplies of around 428 million tons of ore at 62 to 68% content is the largest in the South Asia region.10 The Pentagon Report for 2010 estimates the cost of the minerals discovered at $1 trillion; naturally this information cannot leave the main players, particularly China, indifferent.

After Withdrawal of the International Forces: Abstractions Popular in the CA Countries

There is still no conception/strategy for withdrawing the international coalition forces from Afghanistan; there is only a rough outline of the tentative route of departure drawn on the political

10 See: “Strany islama. Afganistan,” available at [http://www.jam-dc.ru/articles/1021-strany-islama-afganistan.html], 15 June, 2013.

70 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 map. Moreover, there is not even an approximate model of how Afghanistan and CA will look in the future. Different ideas are in the offing about Afghanistan’s future after the withdrawal of the interna- tional contingent of troops. 1. Hopes are often expressed that Afghanistan is no longer in the focus of geopolitical atten- tion. The year 2014 is considered a deadline heralding the advent of new development in the region. At the same time, Afghanistan will continue to play a sufficiently important role in the projects being developed in the region. It is thought that control over Afghanistan is an important factor of geopolitics for such world players as the U.S., the leading countries of Europe, China, and Russia. Russia is not claiming a domineering role in this region today. However, just like China, it is interested in keeping Afghanistan under control. Both Russia and China have had to reconcile themselves to the fact that the U.S. and NATO are playing the main role in this, however, on the other hand, they are sighing with a certain amount of relief. For Rus- sia the Afghan question is largely tied to the problem of drug trafficking and control of CA. China, on the other hand, is more concerned about gaining access to Afghanistan’s mineral reserves and limiting export of Uighur separatism from this country’s territory. 2. The territory Afghanistan and several of its adjacent countries are located on is at the cross- roads of three large regions—CA, South Asia (SA), and the Middle East (which has given rise to the idea of a Greater Central Asia). However, it would help to examine the situation and the region’s problem in a broader historical context. Throughout history, Afghanistan has played an important role in world politics and international relations. It has never disappeared from the major players’ sight, being now a dividing, now a unifying element in their common interrelations system. The multi-century ties between Iran and India can also be associated with Afghanistan, as well as the clash of the British and Russian empires and the Soviet Union’s struggle with the West. The growing influence of the leading external players often caused an increase in the centrifugal forces within Afghanistan. This is why the history of the Afghan state is one clash or war after another, which always dealt an enormous blow to the country’s sover- eignty and independence. However, we need to keep in mind Afghanistan’s exclusive position as a keystone or arch in the security system of CA and SA. A strong and integrated Afghanistan ruled by emirs or kings has always been recognized by all the ethnic groups and tribes and has been a country dividing empires and preventing their clashes. As soon as Afghanistan became dependent on an empire, the entire security system in the region collapsed. So Afghanistan is historically earmarked to be a strong and integrated country; only then can peace be at- tained in the region.11 3. The Taliban has rallied its ranks due to the presence of an external enemy; the same can be said of the mujahideen, whose active operations unfolded during the years of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. However, no matter how high the level of unity of this movement, it will ultimately collapse, since inveterate, unending intertribal and interclan strife will continue to gain momentum. There are around 100 conflicting tribes of Pashtuns living in Afghanistan

11 For more details, see: A.A. Garritskiy, Istoria Afghanistana, Dushanbe, 2007, pp. 66-76; “Razdelenie Afghanistana ili sozdanie seti voennykh ob’ektov v Srednei Azii? available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1630212.html#ixzz2XEJQsdA9], 15 June, 2013.

71 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

alone. When making forecasts about the establishment of a Pashtun state, for instance, it is worth knowing the reasons for tribal rivalry, which of the tribes have kinship relations and which are engaged in blood feuds, and where the roots of potential conflict among them lie. The relations among the nationalities living in northern Afghanistan (Tajiks and Uzbeks) are just as complicated. Afghanistan has always been a country with a decentralized administration system, even dur- ing the time of the emirate (1834-1926) and kingdom (1929-1973). In so doing, quite a strong var- iegated government existed that relied on group and tribe leaders; Afghanistan was never ideally centralized. Afghanistan is an important participant in the regional processes going on in South and Central Asia, which include drug trafficking, Islamic resistance (radical groups), and the claims of neighbor- ing states to control over Afghan ethnic territories. The presence of foreign forces has nothing to do with this; all of the above-mentioned facts have become firmly rooted in Afghanistan’s public life, and so will continue after 2014 too. The area in which Pashtun tribes live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, as well as the contradictions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan related to the struggle for control over the north of Afghanistan are being actively used by nations to increase their regional influence. Afghanistan’s natural resources (particularly rare earth metals) are also important, as well as the drug trafficking existing in its territory. Supporters of the idea of global conspiracies are giving Afghanistan a significant role in American foreign policy. It is viewed as a vitally important strategic platform for controlling Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and China, as well as for putting forceful pressure on these countries. The U.S. thinks it important to maintain a military infrastructure in the country, but in reality it is crystal clear that the nature, format, and scope of American-Pakistani cooperation will not be able to re- solve this task. The concept of Greater Central Asia has already outlived itself; the region is leaving the orbit of U.S. attention and in the near future interest in it (just as the amount of resources sent there) will drop. It stands to reason that the U.S. will continue to keep its fingers on the pulse of regional pro- cesses, but its influence here will decrease. The U.S. will occupy a very unusual position: as the Chinese say, it will “sit on the hill and watch the tigers fight”—Russia and China. Moreover, it will try to a certain extent to delegate certain problems to both countries, while also helping them to re- solve them. The Americans are adhering to the following political scenario: China must be prompted to act against Russian influence in the region, while Russia must be convinced of the necessity of retraining China’s penetration into CA.

Conclusions and Forecasts

There is no need to expect a complete withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan; this is a long process and the foreign military presence in the country will be retained in the foreseeable future. No cardinal changes in Afghanistan are predicted during this time: a situa- tion similar to the current one will continue. It is very possible that the withdrawal of the international forces from Afghanistan will signifi- cantly change the situation in CA; in particular, there will be an increased threat to the Central Asian regimes from armed groups uncontrolled by the government in Kabul. Nevertheless, in the short and mid term, the political situation in CA will largely be related to other processes, particularly those ensuing from the relations of the external power centers around the 72 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 region (the U.S.-China-Russia), as well as the anticipated change in power in Uzbekistan and Kazakh- stan. The main uncertainties of the current situation in CA related to the processes going on in and around Afghanistan are as follows:  development of the situation in the CA countries (social, socioeconomic, and political) in the short and mid term (possible attempts to change power along the lines of the Orange or Arab revolutions or transformation of the situation in the event of a change in the political leader);  strategic and tactical characteristics, as well as the format of the proposed withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan;  possible political and military-political agreements between the NATO countries (primar- ily the U.S.) and CA countries relating to the withdrawal of the international troops from Afghanistan. The policy of the CA countries in regulating the situation in Afghanistan will most likely pre- sume the following: 1. Stepping up efforts to establish a political dialog with Afghanistan (with all the political forces inside the country), as well as with the neighboring countries and leading power centers interested in retaining its statehood; 2. Rendering assistance to resolve Afghanistan’s socioeconomic problems and supporting projects aimed at forming the country’s efficient and viable economy. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will most likely increase their cooperation in the bilateral format, while Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan will put the emphasis on the multilateral structures involved into the Afghan settlement process. As we know, the CA countries have several diverging views on the situation in Afghanistan. A comparative analysis of their interests related to this country makes it possible to identify several common viewpoints on some issues regarding the economy (the use of Afghanistan’s transit potential with access to SA), spheres of security (reducing the threats relating to religious fundamentalism and the export of drugs coming from Afghanistan), and the social sector (implementing joint programs in education, training, and advanced training of personnel). The CA countries have common interests in Afghanistan. For example, Kazakhstan and Uz- bekistan are paying particular attention to implementing infrastructural projects, as well as investing in industrial facilities. The strivings of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are re- lated to retaining Afghanistan’s integrity and strengthening its stability. It stands to reason that these common interests and strivings must and should become the foun- dation of the CA countries’ joint efforts to help normalize the situation around Afghanistan. As for the CSTO, it will assist in reinforcing the Afghan-Tajik border and fighting drug traffick- ing. However, Russia will not make any supreme efforts to activate this organization as a military- political bloc.

73 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS PASHTUNS IN AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Rakhmatullo ABDULLOEV Research Fellow at the Institute of Language, Literature, Oriental Studies and Written Heritage of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

ABSTRACT

or the past fifty years, academics and political elite ruled the country as emirs and politicians have been discussing the kings; Pashtuns resided at the very top of F problem of Pashtun domination in the the pyramid of power. They owed their ex- political life and state structures of Afghani- alted position to the prevailing opinion that stan. From the very beginning (the Afghan Pashtuns created the state of Ahmad Shah state appeared in 1747), supreme power Durrani. belonged to members of several Pashtun This is true: the main Pashtun tribal clans, not counting the two brief periods groups and unions set up the Afghan state when ethnic Tajiks filled the highest post: and remained the pillar of its rulers; their Kalakani in 1929 and fighting force and military skills were the Burhanuddin Rabbani in 1992-2002. main factors that added strength to the pow- Until 1973, when Afghanistan ceased er of the emir (king) and the key elements of to be a monarchy, members of the Pashtun the armed forces of Afghanistan.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, Pashtuns, the political system, mojahedeen, the Taliban, the Afghan conflict.

Introduction

In the 1930s, the nationalist chauvinist ideology of the rulers of Afghanistan made the political hegemony of the Pashtuns one of the country’s cornerstones. Academics spared no effort to prove that the Pashtuns had every reason to dominate the country’s politics and every other sphere of life; they refused to take into account that there were other peoples and ethnicities in the country.1 Igor Reysner, who dedicated his life to Afghan studies, wrote that “the Afghan chauvinists tried to expand the space of the Afghans’ historical homeland … at the expense of lands which belonged to other, non-Afghan, tribes and justify the ‘historical rights’ of the Afghans to capture these territories and subjugate their populations.”2

1 The fairly complicated history of Afghanistan explains why many of those who live in Afghanistan or write about this country used and still use the term Afghan as an ethnonym applied solely to the Pashtun. 2 I. Reysner, “K voprosu o skladyvanii afghanskoy natsii,” Voprosy istorii, No. 7, 1949, p. 82.

74 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

For many centuries, the monarchy kept Pashtuns at the very top of the country’s political ladder, while Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and other ethnic minorities (who constituted the majority of the country’s population) had no say in the state of affairs. Tajik scholar Sharofiddin Imomov has pointed to this outstanding feature of Afghan politics: “Throughout the entire life of the Afghan state all peoples, with the exception of Afghans, were purposefully and deliberately ignored. This policy was rooted in the traditional values and customs of only one people—‘the main and the greatest;’ these values and these customs were at a fairly low moral, cultural and social development level, while the dominating role of the Afghans and their rule limited or even damaged the country’s his- torical and cultural import.”3 Non-Afghan peoples (Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Balochis, Nuristanis, and other ethnic minorities) came to the country before the Afghans and long before they set up their state and should, therefore, have enjoyed the same rights as the newcomers. , who fought, cruelly and uncompromisingly, those who sided with (and even more vehemently against Habibullah Khan Kalakani) and who did not hesitate to suppress the Tajik revolts in Kuhistan and Kuhdoman in the early 1930s, triggered a mer- ciless war against the non-Afghan peoples. Igor Reysner wrote at one time: “Nadir Shah was deter- mined to suppress all nascent national movements of the non-Afghan peoples; ‘struggle against the inner enemy’ became the beginning and end of his regime.”4 Determined to finally suppress all shoots of the national-liberation struggle of the non-Afghan peoples, Nadir Shah confiscated the lands and property of the large feudal lords (accused of siding with the Kalakani regime during the civil war of 1928-1929) in the country’s center, north, and west. His government revived the policy started by Emir of moving Pashtun tribes to these regions, thus causing a lot of discontent among the local people. The government used the Pashtun military forces to suppress the scattered revolts, which widened the gap of mistrust and even increased the enmity among the peoples of Afghanistan. In 1936, the language became the country’s official language, which further consoli- dated domination of the Pashtuns in the social and political landscape; this can be described as a historically justified step toward a single Afghan nation. Pashto was imposed on the non-Pashtun peoples with the help of the army and the police; all other ethnicities could no longer develop their ancient national cultures. The ethnonym “Afghans” was imposed on them by force; they lost the right to remain Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen.5 Pashto-speakers could count on privileged positions in education, civil service, and the econo- my; this was a long-term policy which, according to Mir Muhammad Siddiq Farhang, outstanding historian and politician, did nothing to draw the people closer together. Instead, this policy erected high obstacles on the road toward economic, political, and cultural community and, on the whole, toward a single nation6 and fanned national strife among the peoples of Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the government, with the ruling crust’s enthusiastic support, spread nationalist ideology far and wide. Very much like the Nazi theory, this ideology spoke of the Afghans as a “pure and holy race” and the Pashto language as purely Arian. The ideas of national and racial superiority were in great demand; Afghan scholars were forced to invent a “correct” history of their country, while writers were expected to laud the Arian race. Back in the 1940s, Igor Reysner revealed the true meaning of nationalist ideology as an apol- ogy for national suppression of the non-Afghan peoples of Afghanistan: the fact of their existence

3 Sh. Imomov, “Exploring for Historical and Cultural Values of Afghanistan,” Fonus, No. 7, 2003, p. 29 (in Tajik). 4 I.M. Reysner, “Reaktsionnye idei v sovremennoy istorii Afghanistana,” Vestnik AN SSSR, No. 5, 1948, p. 109. 5 See: I. Reysner, “K voprosu o skladyvanii afghanskoy natsii…,” p. 77. 6 See: M.S. Farhang, Afghanistan in the Last Five Centuries, Tehran, 2001, p, 635 (in Persian).

75 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS was denied and their right to self-determination suppressed. In short, national contradictions became more acute, while national suppression became crueler.7 In the 1960s, another argument appeared in favor of Pashtun domination: it was alleged that they were the numerically largest nation inside the country. This argument hardly holds water for the simple reason that no population censuses were organized in the past; this means that the ethnic com- position and size of individual ethnicities remain unknown. Before 1979, not a single general popula- tion census (the only reliable source of information about the country’s population) that included all ethnic and social groups was conducted. The 1979 population census organized amid a military and political crisis was inevitably lim- ited to a small part of the country’s (mainly urban) population. This means that no matter what experts and academics of all hues write about the country’s population, their conclusions should be treated as assessments far removed from the country’s real demographic and ethnic landscape.

Tribal Policy in Afghanistan

Pashtun domination in the country’s political life is based on a system of privileges; the loyalty of Pashtun tribes is bought with all sorts of favors: they are exempt from conscription and labor du- ties; they pay no taxes, customs dues, etc. The Durrani tribes, especially the clan, which gave the country its first rulers, enjoyed even more privileges. Its members, exempt from legal pros- ecution, were liable to prosecution by tribal courts. The male part received annual subsidies; the fe- male part could count on a dowry of 100 rupees paid from the state treasury. Sardars, minor nobility, the social group which gave the country several khans, occupied the top levels of the feudal pyramid; they filled the highest military and civilian posts in the key prov- inces where they ruled in the name of the emir or the king. According to Khaknazar Nazarov, the sardars de facto “owned the Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat provinces, which they treated as their inher- ited possessions and where they stirred up unrest, enmity, and feudal strife.”8 When they dropped their centrifugal intentions, the sardars became the main pillar of central power. Throughout the entire history of the Afghan state, the Pashtun tribes guarded the border with Pakistan along which they lived. In one of his articles, Victor Plastun pointed to an exceptionally important role the Pashtun tribes played in the country’s politics: “It is especially important that until 1978 political stability in the country was maintained through a precarious balance between central power and its armed forces and the loyalty of the Pashtun tribal chiefs.”9 From time to time, the upset balance between central power and the tribal chiefs caused po- litical earthquakes. Under Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, for example, the Ghilzai, traditional rivals of the Durrani, were placed in practically all the top party, state, and military posts. It was decided to consolidate central power in the east and south of the country which largely in- fringed on the power of the local khans and tribal chiefs. In an effort to protect their privileges, they allied with the leaders of the military-political groups, whom they helped fight the pro-Communist government.

7 See: I. Reysner, “K voprosu o skladyvanii afghanskoy natsii…,” p. 82. 8 Kh. Nazarov, K istorii proiskhozhdeniia i rasseleniia plemen i narodov Tsentralnoy Azii, Irfon, Dushanbe, 2004, p. 86. 9 V. Plastun, “Pushtuny i ikh rol v politicheskoy zhizni,” Azia i Afrika segodnia, No. 10, 1995, p. 49.

76 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

The tribal chiefs had two trump cards—their relative independence and strong and well-armed volunteers—in their far from simple relations with central power; not infrequently, their disagree- ments caused a lot of tension. Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, the founder of the centralized Afghan state, and all rulers who came after him, could not destroy the traditional system of tribal relations. It should be said in all justice that Abdur Rahman Khan undermined it to a certain extent and smoothed over feudal strife and tribal disagreements. “This circumstance,” he wrote later, “convinced me that we should liquidate the feudal system and put an end to tribal strife to introduce one law across the country and a unified system of power.”10 From time to time, the relations between the tribes and central power, which limited or even annulled tribal privileges, worsened to the point of unrest. Here is an example. Early in the 1920s, Emir Amanullah Khan exempted the tribes , Ahmadzai, Zadran, Chamkani, and some others from tax. After 1924, “when the state, badly hit by economic problems, decided to annul all privi- leges so that the tribes started paying taxes like all other peoples of Afghanistan and to extend two- year conscription to their young men, the insulted tribes rebelled.”11 The Pashtun figured prominently in the country’s politics. The Afghan state developed in the unique social and economic conditions shaped by the specifics of the Pashtun traditional tribal structure, the tribes’ settlement geography, the deeply rooted traditions of the liberation struggle, and the specifics of their social, psychological, and mass consciousness. Taken together, these factors were responsible for the complicated and contradictory nature of the nomads’ political role. They took an active part in all three wars against the British (the colonial wars of 1838-1842, 1878-1880, and 1919). The nomadic tribes, which constituted a considerable part of the population, also enjoyed cer- tain privileges: they were free to roam across the country and use pastures free of charge. They were entitled to state subsidies and easy bank loans; they could count on support in cattle breeding and sale of their products, in improving their standards of living and cultural level through easier access to secondary and higher education, etc. The Ministry of Frontiers, Nations, and Tribal Affairs coordi- nated these efforts together with special commissions in other ministries. The state tried in vain to settle the nomadic tribes. They have preserved their clan system. To- day, there are over 2.5 million nomads and semi-nomads in Afghanistan.12 According to Sultan Akimbekov, prominent Kazakh scholar, the nomads and semi-nomads (there is a fairly large number of them in Afghanistan) did not abandon their lifestyle because the state redistributed the country’s resources in their favor, thus paying for their continued existence and, most importantly, their social status, which was and is much higher than those of the rest of the population, the ethnic minorities in particular.13 Khaknazar Nazarov, a well-known Tajik student of the history of Afghanistan, has pointed out that “it was the self-contained nature of the tribes and clans, one of the greatest contradictions of Afghan society of the last two centuries, independence of the tribal chiefs, and their privileged posi- tion and permissiveness that did not allow the former Afghan rulers to strengthen the position of central power.”14

10 Avtobiografiia Abdurakhman-khana emira Afghanistana. Izdano Sultanom Magometkhanom, in 2 vols., Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1901, p. 233. 11 Kh.N. Nazarov, Tajiks in the History of Afghanistan, Donish, Dushanbe, 1998, p. 350 (in Tajik). 12 See: Afghanistan, Handbook, Vostochnaia literatura Publishers, Moscow, 2000, p. 29 (in Russian). 13 See: S.M. Akimbekov, Afghanskiy uzel i problemy bezopasnosti Tsentralnoy Azii, 2nd revised edition, Almaty, 2003, p. 23. 14 Kh.N. Nazarov, Tajiks in the History of Afghanistan, p. 353.

77 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

As a result, the Tribal Area has preserved its traditions and autonomy intact. Today, it is the least economically developed and most politically conservative part of the country. At all times, it remained on the side of reactionary and anti-government forces. In the past, it served as a safe haven for persecuted religious figures and rebellious feudal lords. In the country’s recent history, the Pashtun tribes of the eastern and southern areas (some of which later became part of Pakistan) invariably sided with the political opposition. This happened under King Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah, the last king of Afghanistan, at the time when the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was in power, and also under the Taliban, etc.

The Administrative-Territorial Division of Afghanistan: “Divide and Rule”

The Pashtuns dominate all spheres of life in Afghanistan; this can be described as its main spe- cifics. The administrative-territorial division inherited from the past has not yet been adjusted to the ethnic, lingual, and religious composition of the Afghan population. The feudal spread first to the territories of the largest Pashtun tribes; later vast areas of non-Afghan peoples were likewise captured after long and bloody wars. Under Ahmad Shah, the Durrani state was divided into provinces (vilaets); at first there were about 30 of them; later the descendants of Ahmad Shah cut down their number. The vilaets were divided into three groups: (1) the Pashtun-populated areas; (2) the areas with predominantly non-Afghan populations (Herat, Farah, , Kabul, Ba- myan, Jelalabad, , Kashmir, Balkh, etc.) under the shah’s direct rule; (3) the vassal principalities of Khorasan, Balochistan, Seistan, Sindh, and others ruled by dy- nasties.15 Bit by bit, the Afghan state acquired its multiethnic and multicultural nature. Today there are 34 administrative units (provinces) in Afghanistan, practically all of them (with the exception of Bamyan and Nuristan) are multiethnic. At the same time, ethnic territories, as a rule, belong to several provinces. (a moun- tainous region in the center of Afghanistan), for example, the historic homeland of the Hazaras, is divided among the provinces of Bamyan, Sar-e Pol, Samangan, Baghlan, Urozgan, and Ghazni. This administrative-territorial division was inherited from the monarchy. At all times, the kings preferred to see the vast territories of the non-Pashtun ethnicities divided to keep people in check and the local elites disunited. Today, the non-Pashtun peoples survive as a huge number of small regional groups with their own dialects and traditions, although they have common ethnic identities. The organizations that defend the interests of the non-Afghan peoples, such as the Afghan La- bor Revolutionary Organization, Organization of Toilers’ Fedayan of Afghanistan, Islamic Unity of Afghanistan, and the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, as well as at least some of the po- litical figures and academics, insist on a revision of the country’s administrative-territorial division.

15 See: Iu.V. Gankovskiy, Imperia Durrani, Vostochnaia literatura, Moscow, 1958, p. 75.

78 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

During transfer to a peaceful life inside the country, this might fan confrontation and enmity among the peoples. In principle, administrative units with predominant ethnicities can be set up; this can be done for the Hazaras, Turkmen, Balochis, Nuristanis, Pashais, and some others and cannot be done for Pashtuns and Tajiks scattered across the entire territory of Afghanistan. Today, if changed, the ad- ministrative-territorial division will create the problem of distributing hundreds of thousands of peo- ple of different ethnic groups among the new administrative units; this will undoubtedly threaten Afghanistan’s continued existence as an independent state. Throughout the history of Afghanistan, its central power was weak and undeveloped; no matter how hard it tried, it failed to control the country’s outskirts. People in the center had to use bribes to keep the belligerent Pashtun tribes in check. With strong armed forces, the tribes remained relatively independent; the state, in turn, bought their loyalty with significant preferences and privileges. Nothing has changed so far in Afghanistan or the Tribal Area (in the north-west of Pakistan). The army of Pakistan, one of the largest in the east and one of the best equipped, can hardy oppose the armed tribal forces on the other side of the Durand Line. State policy regarding the Pashtun tribes failed. Together with other factors, it “became the main cause of conservation of Afghanistan in the widest sense.”16 The state had to retreat; its involvement in tribal affairs became minimal, which allowed the Pashtuns to preserve their political domination countrywide together with their tribal consciousness and structure.

The System in Crisis

In 1978, the advent to power of the PDPA weakened the political system of Afghanistan rooted in the Pashtuns’ political, military, and economic domination; it finally ended in the spring of 1992 when the mojahedeen captured Kabul and removed Najibullah. From that time on, the military-political mojahedeen groups gradually added national-ethnic hues to their regime. This gave rise to a new, obviously ethnic, dimension of confrontation between the Pashtuns (in the south and east of the country) and the non-Pashtun peoples (Tajiks in the north- east, center, and the west, Uzbeks in the north, and Hazaras in the central mountainous areas). In the mid-1990s, Anwar ul-Haq Ahady, leader of the Afghan Mellat Party (which wanted to restore the Pashtuns to their former dominance), pointed to the main factors behind the collapse of the old political system: “The collapse of the Najibullah regime in Kabul in April 1992 not only ended the communist era in Afghanistan but also heralded the end of the Pashtun domination.”17 According to Ahady, this happened for the following reasons:  By April 1992, the political elite and the leaders of the non-Pashtun peoples had come to the fore in national politics;  The leaders of Peshawar Seven (six of them were Pashtuns) could not agree among them- selves;  The Pashtun population refused to support the leaders of the military-political groups;  The West, the U.S. in particular, was negatively disposed toward Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, while the regional powers and the neighboring

16 S.M. Akimbekov, op. cit. 17 Anwar ul-Haq Ahady, “The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan,” Asian Survey, No. 7, July 1995, p. 621.

79 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

countries (Iran, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan) carried a lot of weight with the ethnic groups inside the country. These factors warped the political system, but did not bury it. It crumbled under the weight of the country’s development in the 20th century when the non-Afghan peoples became aware of their ethnicity and their national interests, which it became vitally important to defend. On the other hand, the communist government not only declared, but also strove to establish equality among all the ethnic groups, which stirred up political awareness among the non-Afghan peoples. The military-political organizations that defended the non-Afghan peoples, as well as the na- tional and religious minorities, fortified their position during the war the mojahedeen groups waged against the pro-Communist regime in Kabul and Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The Islamic Society of Afghanistan headed by Prof. Rabbani held a special place in the Peshawar Seven and was promi- nent on the domestic political scene. The Shi‘a Hizb-e Wahdat (the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) relied on the Hazaras and, therefore, was popular in the mountainous Hazarajat area. Not involved in the hostilities against the communist regime, it preferred the wait and see policy. The communist leaders (especially when Babrak Karmal was president) viewed the Pashtuns as their irreconcilable enemies. The PDPA strengthened its ties with national minorities and drew them into political activities, which loosened the Pashtuns’ grip on local politics.

Domination of the Pashtuns and the Taliban

The Taliban, which gradually occupied the country’s political scene, revived the idea of Pashtun domination. Its leaders supported the Pashtun nationalist movements and were dead set against any administrative-territorial units based on religious or ethnic principles. On the other hand, the Taliban, a radical Islamic movement, was steadily pushing the country toward a unitary Muslim Pashtun- dominated state. The pro-Taliban Tulu-ye-Afghan (Afghan Sunrise) newspaper published in Kandahar insisted: “Since any Islamic state is based on ideological, rather than national-geographic, unity languages, races, genders, etc. can serve as the frameworks of such states.”18 The Taliban considered the Caliph- ate, an ideal theocratic state, to be the best possible form of Islamic statehood. The state newspaper Anis familiarized its readers with the basic principles of an Islamic state:  An elected head of the community (state);  A government formed by the head of state;  An elected Shura (parliament), which remains a consultative structure;  A state ruled by the Shari‘a, the only guarantor of human rights and freedoms.19 The Taliban insisted that any other type of state contradicts the spirit of Islam; the elected parlia- ment should remain a consultative structure because every Muslim has “the eternal and unchangeable laws” of Allah, criteria going back to the times of the Prophet and the “righteous caliphs” as the guid-

18 R. Sikoev, “Afghanistan. Shariatskoe zakonodateltvo v deystvii,” Azia i Afrika segodnia, No. 3, 2000, p. 27. 19 See: Ibidem.

80 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 ing light. Politics and religion were indivisible: this postulate, one of the key ones in the political philosophy of the Taliban, moved the clergy to the central point of state governance. The Taliban, having failed to draw the traditional Pashtun elite to its side and left alone to deal with the strong resistance of the non-Pashtun peoples, had no choice but to restore the country’s unity to seize control over its entire territory. Continued fragmentation suggested that the country should be reunited and that the Pashtuns should regain their political domination. According to Sultan Akimbekov, the Taliban relied on the ethnic factor to deal with two main problems: first, to lure to its side those Pashtuns who remained loyal to its opponents and, second, to neutralize those military-political organizations that sided with the national and religious minorities.20 No matter how hard they tried, the Taliban could not draw any considerable number of non- Pashtuns to its side. The veneer of “pure Islam” was too thin to tempt the non-Afghan peoples to betray their ethnic solidarity and side with the Pashtun nationalists: the non-Afghan peoples remained firm in their opposition to the Taliban. After the 1998 Taliban offensive in the north, most of the Pashtun warlords finally moved away from their neutrality or even relative loyalty to the Northern Alliance. In the northwest, north, and northeast of Afghanistan, the Taliban was confronted with the hostility of the local people and the mounting anti-Pashtun feelings exacerbated by the fact that the newly appointed governors and military commanders were all Pashtuns. No matter how hard the Taliban tried to pass for an Islamic movement of all ethnic groups, it failed to win the trust of the non-Pashtuns, the young people and intelligentsia in particular.

New Confrontation

The Taliban was removed from the political scene of Afghanistan, but the idea of Pashtun domination remained on the agenda. The nationalist Afghan Mellat Party (the leaders of which emi- grated to the West during the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan) was present at the Bonn Con- ference and figured prominently in the follow-up talks on a coalition government. In the interim government of Hamid Karzai, its leaders Ahmadzai and Anwar ul-Haq served as fi- nance minister and head of the Central Bank of Afghanistan. There were enough political parties and movements resolved to prevent restored Pashtun dom- ination in the country and defend the rights of the non-Pashtun ethnicities. In December 2003-January 2004, when the future Constitution was discussed, the delegates who represented the non-Pashtun ethnicities in the Lloya Jirga insisted on a parliamentary form of governance. The Pashtuns, in turn, wanted the presidential form to be introduced and registered in the Fundamental Law. The non-Pashtun peoples were fully aware of the dangers of restored Pashtun domination that would come along with a presidential republic and a Pashtun president with wide constitutional powers. Today, when the country is gradually restoring peace and order—a process in which all eth- nicities are involved—those political leaders who would like to see Pashtun domination restored prefer to keep a low profile; indeed, if pushed forward, the idea might damage the still precarious progress toward an extremely important goal: the country’s unity. The Pashtuns are working hard to fortify their position in the new government; in the future, however, the talks of revived Pashtun domination might add to political tension. The first signs of

20 See: S. Akimbekov, op. cit.

81 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS unwelcome developments can be observed today. Some of the Oxford analysts are convinced that “political life in Afghanistan … will be determined in the future, very much as before, by the struggle between representatives of different ethnic and regional groups.”21 This means that restoration of Pashtun dominance will depend on Afghanistan’s unity and in- tegrity. Prominent experts, including American analysts, do not exclude the possibility of the coun- try’s partition. Robert D. Blackwill, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and assistant to Henry Kissinger, has pointed out that if worst comes to worst and if the Taliban restores its might and power, the country might fall apart. He has also written: “The time has come, therefore, to switch to the least bad alternative—ac- ceptance of a de facto partition of the country” and further: “At the same time, however, Washington should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and east and that the price of forestalling that outcome is far too high for the United States to continue paying. To be sure, the administration should not invite the Taliban to dominate the Afghan Pashtun homeland, nor ex- plicitly seek to break up Afghanistan. Rather, the United States and its partners should simply stop dying in the south and the east and let the local ‘correlation of forces’ there take its course—while deploying U.S. air power and Special Forces for the foreseeable future in support of the Afghan army and the government in Kabul, to ensure that the north and west of Afghanistan do not succumb to the Taliban as well.”22 The situation in Afghanistan has changed radically: today restoration of Pashtun dominance is not only being countered by the extremely negative position of the non-Pashtun people, but also by international circumstances. It has become absolutely clear that the stronger position of one nationality to the detriment of the interests of the other ethnicities (without which peace and harmony in Afghanistan are impossible) cannot be tolerated.

Conclusion

The history of the state of Afghanistan, which developed as a community of tribes, predeter- mined the great roles of the tribes in the country’s politics, on the one hand, their more or less absolute autonomy from central power and the strong position of the tribal chiefs and khans in their territories, on the other. The traditionally weak central power relied on tribes (or unions of tribes), the leaders of which invariably filled all high posts in the country. This allowed the Pashtuns to monopolize all the high political posts and remain on top until 1978 when the Afghan Communists radically changed the country’s political landscape. The PDPA leaders were resolved to strengthen central power and draw all the ethnic groups into political and other activities. They tipped the traditional balance of power between the center and the tribal top crust; the resultant political instability, and certain other domestic and external factors, led to a civil war, which destroyed the state and made the Pashtun tribes (which derived their strength from their military component and which concentrated on defending their ethnic territories) practi- cally independent. Determined to restore the Pashtuns to their former domination, the Ghilzai Talibans started another round of struggle, which caused a deep-cutting political and ethnic crisis.

21 Sergey Andreev, Andreev Sergey, “Afghanskoe déjà vu,” Ekspert, No. 13, 2003, p. 68. 22 R.D. Blackwill, “Plan B in Afghanistan. Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs, January/ February 2011.

82 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

After 2001, the country acquired all sorts of parties and movements that declared and, most importantly, defended the rights and interests of all ethnic groups. Candidates from eighteen politi- cal parties and movements and also non-party and independent candidates joined the first presiden- tial race. In the course of the presidential election and in the process of drafting and adopting the new Constitution by the Lloya Jirga, it became clear that the idea of Pashtun domination was very much alive in Afghanistan. Indeed, the new anthem is performed in Pashto even though a large number of deputies of other nations tried, in vain, to adopt its text in Dari. During the presidential and parliamentary elections, the election law was warped so as to favor certain categories of voters in the country’s east and south, that is, the Pashtun tribal areas, to bring more Pashtun deputies to the parliament. Present, and possibly future, attempts to restore the political domination of the Pashtuns are fraught with stubborn resistance of the non-Afghan peoples, which might add vehemence to the al- ready fierce armed confrontation among the country’s ethnic groups.

THE PAKISTANI FACTOR IN THE AFGHAN CONFLICT

Kosimsho ISKANDAROV D.Sc. (Hist.), Head of the Department of Iran and Afghanistan, the Rudaki Institute of Language, Literature, Oriental Studies, and Manuscript Heritage, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

ABSTRACT

n 1947, when Pakistan was established ernment independent from the center or to as an independent country, Afghanistan join Afghanistan: as Afghans they should be I ceased to recognize the Durand Line, free to decide whether they wanted to be- the border between India and Afghanistan long to any state or would prefer indepen- drawn in 1893 under an agreement between dence; deep at heart, however, the Afghan Foreign Secretary of British India Sir Mor- rulers expected that the British withdrawal timer Durand and Afghan Amir Abdur Rah- from India would render the Durand Line man Khan, and raised the question of the agreement null and void. The relations be- Pashtuns who found themselves in the new- tween Afghanistan and Pakistan are bur- ly established state. The Afghans demand- dened by countless problems; this explains ed that the British either grant the Pashtuns why Pakistan keeps on interfering in its and Balochi the right to elect their own gov- neighbor’s domestic affairs.

83 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

KEYWORDS: Pakistan, Afghanistan, , the Durand Line, conflict, the Tribal Areas, the right to self-determination.

Introduction

For nearly four decades now, Afghanistan has been living in an armed conflict started by the military coup of 17 July, 1973 when, in King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah’s absence (who was in Eu- rope at the time), Mohammad Daoud, his cousin, displaced him and declared a republic. Five years later, however, on 27 April, 1978, another military coup brought to power Nur Muhammad Taraki, leader of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. His rule was a short one: on 14 September, 1979 he was replaced with Hafizulla Amin and assassinated. In December 1979, the Soviet Union moved its military contingent into the country; President Hafizulla Amin was killed; and Babrak Karmal came to power. Over the next forty years regimes replaced one another in quick succession, but none of the rulers managed to set up a sustainable central government, unify Afghanistan, and end the war that had engulfed millions of lives, drove Afghans into immigration, and destroyed the country’s infra- structure. In the 2000s, NATO members and several other countries (forty in all) formed a counterterror- ist coalition to bring peace into the country and squash terror. Today, twelve years later, the war is still going on, while external interference became a negative factor that worsened the situation in the country. Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs has been for many years and remains one of the ongoing factors in the conflict.

Contradictions between Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Sources

The contradictions are rooted in 1947 when Pakistan became an independent state. Great Britain pulled out of India leaving behind numerous potentially conflicting situations that have been defying a solution for over 60 years now. Pashtunistan, which the British colonialists divided into two parts, is one of the most stubborn problems. It had not disappeared when the British made India independent and set up Pakistan for the simple reason that the Pashtuns found themselves divided by the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The problem was created by an agreement between Afghanistan and British India signed on 12 November, 1893 in Kabul by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and Foreign Secretary of British India Sir Mortimer Durand on a border stretch 2,640 km long (later it became known as the Durand Line). Late in 1946, Prime Minister of Afghanistan Sardar Shah Mahmud, cousin of Zahir Shah (ear- lier that year Shah Mahmud replaced his brother Hashim Shah as prime minister) sent a letter to the British powers with a description of what was happening on the other side of the Durand Line and asked the prime minister of Great Britain to pay attention to the sad fate that would befall the Pashtuns after the division of the country.

84 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

On 13 June, 1947, the prime minister of Afghanistan, guided by the generally accepted opinion that the Pashtuns and Balochi were Afghans and should, therefore, be given the right either to join one of the two states or form an independent state, sent a memorandum to the British embassy in Kabul, which said in part: “The Pashtuns and Balochi should be given a chance either to elect their own government or join Afghanistan.”1 The U.K. referred to the 1921 treaty to ask Afghanistan to keep away from the delimitation process going on in the northwest.2 On the eve of the division of India, the Afghans remained convinced that the British pullout of India would devalue the Durand Line agreement and that Afghanistan would acquire the rights to a big chunk of Pakistan’s territory. On 21 June, Shah Mahmud sent one more letter to the British to point out that Pakistan should realize that Afghanistan also needed access to the sea and that its rights to the transit territory between Khyber and should be observed. The Afghans were obviously using every opportunity to build up more influence down south and acquire access to the Arabian Sea. Early in 1941, Abdul Majid, Minister of National Economics of Afghanistan, started talking to Nazi diplomats in Berlin in an effort to secure a large part of India for his country. He spoke about a new border along the Indus River, the port of Karachi and part of Soviet Turkmenistan.3 It should be said that the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan never sided with the idea of joining the Pashtun areas to Afghanistan. On 2 July, 1947, Doctor Khan, brother of ,4 sent a letter to Jawaharlal Ne- hru, in which he wrote in part: “Let me assure you that we had no intention to join Afghanistan. We have just learned that the government of Afghanistan sent an official letter to the British. The Afghans may try to capitalize on our situation.”5 The future of the Pashtuns was entrusted to a referendum: people had to choose between India and Pakistan. It was in vain that Abdul Ghaffar Khan, leader of the (“Servants of God”) movement (also called “Surkh Posh” or “Red Shirts” because of their red uniforms) insisted that the people should be offered a chance to vote for independent Pashtunistan, as the third option. The British refused. The referendum took place on 16-17 July, 1947; 289,224 people living in the frontier territories voted for Pakistan; India looked attractive to a small group of 2,874. Only 50.99 percent of the votes cast were accepted as valid. Yu. Panichkin from Russia writes that Pakistan was chosen by a negli- gible majority of 50.49 percent.6 Afghanistan refused to retreat: on 30 September, 1947, when the U.N. discussed membership of Pakistan, H. Azizi, who represented Afghanistan, objected to Pakistan’s membership in the U.N. be- cause it had denied the Pashtuns the right to vote for independent Pashtunistan. Later, on 20 October, he retreated from this position: “I have to inform you that the discussion with regard to the North-West Frontier is being continued through diplomatic channels between the Governments concerned and there is hope that an agreement will be reached. In this hope the delegation of Afghanistan wishes to withdraw the negative vote which it cast at the meeting of the General Assembly on 30 September.”7

1 M.I. Andeshmand, We and Pakistan, Kabul, 2007, available at [www.ariaye.com] (in Dari). 2 See: M.I. Varsaji, Jihad of Afghanistan and the Cold War of the Superpowers, Vol. 1, Peshawar, 2002, p. 181 (in Dari). 3 See: Yu.N. Panichkin, F.A. Musaev, “Krizis v pakistano-afghanskikh otnosheniiakh posle obrazovaniia Pakistana: nachalo konflikta (1947-1950 gg.),”Fundamentalnye issledovaniia, No. 1 (Part 3), 2013, pp. 615-618, available at [www.rae.ru]. 4 Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother Khan Sahib were two prominent figures of the Pashtun and Indian national movement; they favored the idea of “self-determination of Pashtunistan”. 5 M.I. Varsaji, op. cit. 6 See: Yu.N. Panichkin, Obrazovanie Pakistana i Pashtunsky vopros, Moscow, 2005, p. 180. 7 [http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff44.pdf].

85 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The talks on the Durand Line began in November 1947 in Karachi. The Afghan delegation was headed by Najibullah Khan, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Zahir Shah. The very fact that talks had begun meant that Afghanistan refused to admit that Pakistan had power over the Pash- tuns living in Afghanistan. According to Afghan researcher Muhammad Iqrom Andeshmand, the king’s personal representative spoke about the right of autonomy for the Pashtuns of the North-West Frontier Province; about the need to develop this region, and about a new name for the province to reflect the ethnic identity of those who lived in it.8 What the Afghan scholar has written about the talks suggests that when they started the Afghan side had no clear ideas either about the Durand Line or about the fate of the Pashtuns on the other side of the border. In any case, during the talks Afghanistan did not formulate any territorial claims, it merely supported the idea of self-determination very popular among the Pashtuns. According to Sayyid Qasim Rishtiya, Head of the Press Department in the government of , an extended meeting held in Kabul in 1947 discussed the Durand Line issue and concluded that it was too late to formulate territorial claims against Pakistan and that the world com- munity would object to any changes, which would inevitably cause a total revision of the region’s borders. It was decided to demand the right of self-determination for the Pashtuns of Pakistan. The de- partment head said that this meeting suggested that from that time on the term Pashtunistan should be used; over time it gained wide currency in the media.9 In 1949, however, relations between the two countries began going from bad to worse. In Feb- ruary 1948, Abdul Gaffar Khan attended the first session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and vowed loyalty to the state; this was when he met Muhammad Ali Jinnah and invited him to the North- West Frontier Province. He never abandoned his efforts to set up Pashtunistan as part of Pakistan. Arrested on 15 June, 1948 on an accusation of plotting with Faqir of Ipi, who waged guerilla warfare in Northern Waziristan against the British in colonial times and then against the government of Pakistan, Abdul Gaffar Khan was sent to prison for three years. His brother Khan Sahib and many of his followers were also arrested.10 Some analysts think that these arrests were provoked by sharp statements from intellectuals and Pashtun nationalists who accused the government of inaction. The arrests rearranged the position of Afghanistan to a certain extent. In 1949, the National Council (parliament) denounced all treaties and agreements between Afghanistan and the U.K. related to the Durand Line and announced that it was no longer accepted as a state border between the two countries. On 31 August, 1949, the so-called “declaration of independence of Pashtunistan” took place in Tirakh (a settlement in Northern Waziristan in the northwest of Pakistan); the Afghan government made this date the Day of Pashtunistan to be marked every year.11 The relations between the two countries deteriorated to the extent that in August 1950 Af- ghanistan raised the flag of Pashtunistan; on 30 September, Afghan troops attacked one of the border outposts beyond the Durand Line. Pakistan responded as could be expected by closing the transit routes for Afghan cargoes, which proved a very painful blow for landlocked Afghanistan. This was a handy instrument to be used every time Afghanistan started talking about Pashtunistan. Not discouraged, Kabul continued to insist that:

8 See: M.I. Andeshmand, op. cit. 9 See: Ibidem. 10 See: Yu.N. Panichkin, F.A. Musaev, op. cit. 11 See: Ibidem.

86 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

(1) the peoples on the other side of the Durand Line had been ruled by Afghanistan until the Brits took this region from Afghanistan by force; (2) legally, the Durand Line agreement was signed by Afghanistan and the U.K., but not with Pakistan, which did not exist at that time; (3) the people on the other side of the Durand Line were ethnic Pashtuns related by blood and ethnic origin, as well as culturally with the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and should, therefore, be united with them.12 Mohammad Daoud Khan, appointed prime minister of Afghanistan in 1953, was one of the most zealous fighters for the rights of the Pashtuns of Pakistan. This was when, not surprisingly, ten- sion between the two countries increased; his ten years in office (1953-1963) were marked by never ending conflicts with Pakistan without any visible gains for Kabul. The two countries finally severed their relations; it required concerted efforts by , Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey to restore them. The West strongly disapproved of Daoud Khan’s policy on the Pashtunistan issue to the extent that the Afghan ruler had to turn to the Soviet Union for latest weaponry to modernize the army and develop infrastructure. In 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown and Mohammed Daoud became President of Afghanistan, Pashtunistan was moved to the frontline of the relations between the two neighbors. As president of Afghanistan, Mohammed Daoud started talking about his determination to fight for the rights of the Pashtuns and Balochi living on the other side of the Durand Line. In November 1973, in a letter to the UN Secretary General, he accused Pakistan of “failure to observe the rights of Pashtuns and Balochi.”13 In view of the unyielding position of President Mohammad Daoud on Pashtunistan and the Durand Line, the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto extended its support to the Afghan Islamists liv- ing in emigration in Pakistan and fighting against the republican regime. It was revealed later that forty Afghan Islamists trained in one of the military camps in Peshawar had undertaken a failed armed uprising against Daoud in several regions of Afghanistan.

Pakistan and Afghanistan after the April 1978 Coup in Kabul

Taraki, Amin, and Karmal, who ruled the country one after another when M. Daoud was de- posed and assassinated, refused to recognize the Durand Line and continued to support the idea of Pashtunistan. Under Taraki and Amin, became even more pronounced, while the country’s leaders moved toward the idea of Greater Afghanistan; it retained its prominence under Babrak Karmal and . According to Afghan researcher Sangshikan, President of Afghanistan Najibullah lost his life because of the Durand Line disagreements. “When units of the Taliban entered Kabul several Paki- stanis burst into the building of the U.N. mission which had sheltered Najibullah since 1992. They tried to force him to sign several documents. He refused.” The author writes that the papers contained an agreement which extended the Durand Line for 100 years more; Najibullah paid with his life for his refusal to comply.14

12 See: M.I. Varsaji, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 13 M.I. Andeshmand, op. cit. 14 See: Sangshikan, “Pakistan, Pashtuns and the Taliban,” available at [www.ariaye.com] (in Dari).

87 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Pakistan skillfully used the situation created by the April coup of 1978 and complicated still further by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to consolidate its position in this country. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought the special services of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia closer together; it was on Pakistan’s request that Saudi Arabia did not grudge money for the mojahe- deen of Afghanistan; the larger part of the money transferred through the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Saudi Arabia paid for the training camps along the Afghan-Pak border where instructors from the elite units of the Pakistan army trained mojahedeen. “By the end of the war against the Soviet invaders, the ISI camps had trained at least 80,000 to 90,000 Afghans in ten-day or three-month courses.”15 The ISI was working hard inside the largest Islamic political parties; secret agents placed their stakes on the leaders expected to promote the interests of Pakistan in Afghanistan. Gulbuddin Hek- matyar, leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, was one of the hopefuls. According to numerous sources, in 1973 he was moved to Pakistan where he cooperated with the Pakistani secret services in an effort to depose Daoud. He received the lion’s share of the money the ISI gave to the Islamic military-political groups. According to a report by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, in 1986 the ISI hired deserters and refugees to put together a so-called Free Army of Afghanistan. The report said in part: “The ISI strives to use the army to fight other mojahedeen units operating in different regions of Afghanistan, secure a victory for Hekmatyar, or channel the course of political settlement of the Af- ghan problem in the interests of Islamabad.”16 The so-called Afghan Army was controlled by the ISI; the report contained information that the officers, either Pakistanis or Afghans, worked for the ISI. Pakistan used the mojahedeen victory to bring Hekmatyar to power; the ISI analysts were con- vinced that a non-Pashtun government in Afghanistan did not suit the interests of Pakistan. By 1994, the situation had changed: Pakistan placed its stakes on the Taliban as an alternative to Hekmatyar who had irretrievably lost his post of prime minister. The changes were brought about by the resignation of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Shar- if in 1993. Moreover, it is an open secret that Islamabad supported and continues to support the Taliban. The ISI was purged by the Army: the generals removed ISI Chief Lieutenant General Javed Nasir and dozens of officers who sided with Islamic parties in Afghanistan. Retired general Naseerul- lah Khan Babar, Minister of Internal Affairs in the Bhutto Cabinet (1988-1990), and Maulana Fazal ur-Rehman, leader of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (it is no accident that the general was known as the god father of this movement), took the initiative to form the Taliban. This made the ISI relatively passive, but did not remove it from the scene altogether. The army and the intelligence service, in which Pashtuns figure prominently, play an important, if not decisive, role in the country’s Afghan policies. The fighting part of the Taliban relied on students of religious schools in Pakistan: Islamabad, which encouraged their conscription, also dispatched hundreds of Taliban militants, as well as special units of the national army to Afghanistan. Pakistan assumed financial obligations as well: in 1996, for example, about $6 million in budget money was spent on wages for the movement’s administration. Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist,

15 B. Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2012, p. 24. 16 H.B.A. Ansari, Afghanistan in Petrol Fire (The Truth which had Never been Said), 2nd edition, Maiwand, Kabul, 1382 (2003), pp. 59-60 (in Dari).

88 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 wrote: “In 1997/8 Pakistan provided the Taliban with an estimated US$30 million in aid.”17 Its mem- bers were encouraged to buy weapons in Ukraine and East European countries. At first the Pakistani leaders had been carefully avoiding any association with the Taliban until former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto dotted the “i’s”: in an interview with the BBC, she acknowledged that the Taliban training colleges were “paid for by Saudi Arabia, the United States and Britain.”18 To balance out the crushing defeats of the Taliban in the north of Afghanistan, Islamabad stepped up its conscription activities and started sending more and more regular troops to fight Ah- mad Shah Massoud. According to an Australian researcher, Andrew Davies, in August 1999, about 6 thousand foreigners fought together with the Taliban and captured Taloqan; 400 to 500 of them were officers of the Pakistani army.19 Some of the participants on the other side of the front think that the Pakistan military was much larger: two battalions of the G-9 division20 (a mountain rifle division billeted in Charot, North-West Frontier Province).

Pakistan and Afghanistan after 9/11

The 9/11 terrorist acts pushed Pervez Musharraf and his government into a tight corner: through- out the Taliban’s history, Islamabad remained its loyal ally and, in fact, its representative on the in- ternational arena. The attack of 9/11 forced Pakistan to side with the West and to disrupt its official ties with the Taliban while remaining its patron. Practically all Taliban agencies in Pakistan were closed; the last of them in Quetta, on 19 November, 2001. According to Vadim Sergeev, it was the United States that forced Islamabad to sever relations with the Taliban; however, Pakistan continued helping the movement’s remnants on the sly.21 In short, Pakistan continued fighting Afghanistan after 9/11. Operation Enduring Freedom cut short Pakistan’s frantic effort to save the regime by removing the most odious figures from the movement’s top crust. The regime refused to be saved: the talks with Taliban leaders did not produce a government of so-called moderate Taliban members. The Ameri- cans and British, meanwhile, having talked to the ISI, dispatched Abdul Haq22 to Afghanistan; be- trayed by the ISI, he was captured by the Taliban and executed in Logar. The failed attempt to set up a moderate Taliban government and the counterterrorist operation of NATO in Afghanistan forced President Musharraf to ask Prime Minister Blair and Secretary of State Powell to move in the forces of Northern Alliance to save the lives of the Pakistani military stationed in Kunduz. The Americans complied: under the pretext of negotiating with the Taliban its surrender in Mazar-i Sharif, they stopped bombing the positions of Taliban militants in Kunduz. It took Pakistan several nights to evacuate hundreds of its military by helicopters.23

17 A. Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, London, New York, 2002, p. 183. 18 Quoted from: A. Dubnov, “Stolknovenie tsivilizatsiy? Net,—interesov,” Tsentralnaia Azia, No. 7, 1997, p. 74. 19 Quoted from: M.I. Andeshmand, op. cit. 20 Ibidem. 21 See: V. Sergeev, “Afghano-Pakistanskie sviazi posle padeniia rezhima talibov,” available at [www.iran.ru], 25 October, 2005. 22 Abdul Haq, one of the prominent warlords of the Islamic party of Afghanistan headed by Yunus Hales; lived in Pakistan for a long time; negotiated arms deliveries to mojahedeen with President Reagan; joined the Rome group of Zahir Shah. 23 See: M.I. Andeshmand, op. cit.

89 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In 2001, the Americans bombed the main bases of al-Qae‘da in Afghanistan, which forced its main forces to retreat to their bases in Pakistan under the wing of the ISI and the military. Islamabad, fearing the Northern Alliance, which was strong enough to capture Kabul, de- manded that NATO should interfere; the issue was discussed with prominent military command- er Mohammed Qasim Fahim; this, however, did not help: the Northern Alliance entered the capital. Pakistan, which had failed to save the Taliban regime, tried a different approach. Muham- mad Amin Furutan, for example, writes that the protests against the Bonn Conference followed by its boycott by former governor of Nangarhar Abdul Qadir under the pretext of discrimination of the rights of the Pashtuns at the conference was organized by the ambassador of Pakistan to Germany.24 The United States and the U.N. returned Abdul Qadir to the conference table; the Bonn Confer- ence set up an Afghan Interim Administration, which left Islamabad no choice. It had to recognize the new government and promise to help the country in post-Taliban reconstruction. Pakistan did not like either the presence of the American and NATO troops in Afghanistan, or the new government put together in Bonn. So at the turn of 2004, the ISI tried even harder to revive the Taliban. According to Riedel, who in 2010 spoke to the warlords, from 2004 through 2006, the ISI had been actively campaigning in favor of the Taliban; it later organized training in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan. One of the warlords told Riedel that “some ISI camps had 2,000- 4,000 recruits at a time, and one commander estimated that 80 percent of his fighters had attended such a camp.”25 The international conference held in Kabul on 5 December, 2006 pointed out that Taliban fight- ers were mainly trained in Pakistan. Everyone agreed that the ISI, which sided with the Taliban se- cretly or even openly, added to the rising destabilization in the neighboring country. The participants went even further: it was established that the ISI supplied the Taliban with information, that it trained fighters in numerous training camps and supplied them with weapons and money. Everyone knows that Mullah Omar resides in Quetta, the city in which the Taliban’s supreme council, the Quetta Shura, is situated (another supreme council is the Peshawar Shura). Jalaluddin Haqqani, another leader of the Taliban, who operates more or less independently, set up his headquar- ters in Waziristan, from which he leads all military operations. The leaders of Pakistan reject all accusations coming from all sides: official and unofficial cir- cles of the United States and Europe insist that the ISI resurrected the Taliban. On 28 September, 2006, in an interview to TV BBC Pervez Musharraf pointed out: “Breaking the back of al-Qa‘eda would not have been possible if ISI was not doing an excellent job” and “remember my words: if the ISI is not with you and Pakistan is not with you, you will lose in Afghanistan.”26 Facts, however, point to the opposite. It is hard to believe that the ISI never knew that terrorist No. 1 Osama bin Laden had settled next to the Kokul military academy. Since 1 May, 2011, the day Osama bin Laden was located and liquidated, relations between Pakistan and the United States have been going from bad to worse. In September, the Taliban attacked the American embassy in Kabul; the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army accused the ISI. “In November [of the same year] a fire fight on the Afghan-Pakistan border led to two dozen Pakistani soldiers losing their lives in NATO airstrikes.”27

24 See: M.I. Andeshmand, op. cit. 25 B. Riedel, op. cit., p. 81. 26 [http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/sep/29/alqaida.politics], [http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/ asian-studies/566.html]. 27 B. Riedel, op. cit., p. xiv.

90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

There is a more or less commonly accepted opinion that the key to a peace settlement in Af- ghanistan is found in Pakistan: if this country and its intelligence service, in particular, decide to keep away from the peace process, the road to stability in Afghanistan will be very long indeed. Early in 2013, the density of terrorist and extremist groups camping in Pakistan became a threat to the country’s security and stability. This breeds hope that Pakistan will show more enthusiasm about the Afghan settlement. After the tripartite meeting that took place in London early in 2013, Islamabad agreed to support the Peace Process Roadmap to 2015 chartered by the Afghan High Peace Council and promised to draw the Taliban into peace talks with Kabul within the next six months. It also agreed to help organize a meeting of representatives of the high clergy of Afghanistan and Pakistan expected to discuss how to reach peace and what to do about suicide bombers. This meeting never took place. Instead, Chief of the Pakistan Ulema Council Allama Tahir Ashrafi issued a fatwa which justified jihad and suicide bombers in Afghanistan. This meant that Pakistan had not withdrawn its religious and political support from the Taliban. Kabul is convinced that Islamabad is demonstratively unwilling to help the peace process in Afghanistan. One of the top diplomats of Pakistan said that Hamid Karzai was the main ob- stacle on the road to peace in Afghanistan. The press secretary of the president of Afghanistan retorted that by insisting on impossible conditions Pakistan is merely interfering with the peace efforts. , Deputy Foreign Minister, spoke in Senate: “Pakistan has constantly played a double game against Afghanistan … our neighbor is the greatest source of security threat to Afghanistan.”28 This means that throughout the 12-year-long post-Taliban period, Pakistan has been interfering in its neighbor’s internal affairs both secretly and openly. Islamabad closed the transit routes for Afghan cargoes across its territory and organized terrorist acts on important economic facilities in Afghanistan. It was involved in setting up a military front together with al-Qa‘eda, the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the IPA, and others. Pakistan is not alien to a secret warfare against its neighbor using aggressive information cam- paigns, Islamic slogans, and mudslinging as its instruments and keeping the Afghan government under pressure; Islamabad buys top bureaucrats to gather information; it has become much more active on the international scene, in the Islamic countries and the Arab world in particular.29 From the strategic point of view Pakistan is fighting on three fronts: military, diplomatic, and humanitarian. On the military front, it directly supports international terror, extremist groups, and insurgents operating in Afghanistan. There is also a diplomatic front: Pakistan not only fans the fire of warfare in Afghanistan, but also keeps the diplomatic channels open to capitalize as much as possible on the international support the world community extends to Afghanistan. Through diplomatic channels, Islamabad is working hard to undermine the Kabul regime and also the influence of the Americans in the region. In the humanitarian sphere, Islamabad has mastered the skill of actively using Afghan refugees and other people who found themselves for different reasons in Pakistan. There are also students from Afghanistan, Burma, Nepal, Bangladesh, Yemen, Kuwait, Chech- nia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and other countries who come to Pakistan to study at ma- drassahs where they are thoroughly brainwashed and undergo military training. The fittest are sent to Afghanistan to join the troops. It should be said that the Pakistani authorities are either unable or unwilling to establish stricter control over these schools: in the past it was the state that funded the madrassahs and could, therefore,

28 [http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=7195]. 29 See: S.S. Sodot, “Fifty-Year War between Afghanistan and Pakistan,” available at [www.8am.af] (in Dari).

91 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS control them, today they are set up by private individuals and mainly remain unregistered. The num- ber of such schools in Afghanistan skyrocketed after the downfall of the Taliban regime, 9/11, and NATO’s counterterrorist operation; according to M. Atrofi, there are over 40 thousand of them in the country.30 Pakistan does not hesitate to use the two million Afghan refugees still living in the country for its own purposes under the threat of deportation. In short, the conflict in the neighboring country has allowed Pakistan to meddle in the Afghan affairs in an effort to change the situation up to and including the use of force. Why does Pakistan interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state with which it has so much in common? The answer is: (1) The pending problem of the Durand Line. I have already written that since 1947, the year when Pakistan was established, none of the governments of Afghanistan (including the current Cabinet) recognized it as the border line; this causes concern in Islamabad. (2) The pending problem of Pashtunistan caused by the fact that the border issues remain unsettled. The Pashtuns straddle the border between the two countries; from time to time, heated up by the idea of Greater Pashtunistan and instigated by Kabul, they become more active. To prevent discontent among the Pashtuns, the Pakistani authorities have assumed the role of “protectors” of their rights and interests at the international level. Starting with the Bonn Conference of 2011, Pakistan has been talking about a wider Pashtun represen- tation in the corridors of power in Kabul to make the government ethnically balanced. Islamabad also insisted that “the moderate Taliban” should have their say in the govern- ment. In June 2003, during a visit to Washington, President Musharraf said that “the Afghan gov- ernment had little control outside the capital and was not representative of the country’s ethnic mix” and that “the Afghan president’s writ did not extend beyond Kabul.” Early in July 2003, President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai could not conceal his irritation: “Mr. Musharraf has made some comments regarding Afghanistan which have become a matter of sadness and regret for me. Afghanistan does not interfere in anyone’s affairs and neither does it want others’ interference in its affairs.”31 In November 2006, Minister of Information of Balochistan said to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid that only the Taliban could transform Afghanistan into a real state. The official meant that this state should be a product of concerted efforts by several Pashtun groups connected with Pakistan. Translated into common language, this means that Pakistan, rather than seeking stabilization in Af- ghanistan, is working toward a Pashtun state. President Musharraf and his government refused to recognize Hamid Karzai as a Pashtun; the same applies to the government of Afghanistan. In April 2007, in Ankara at a meeting of the two presidents, Musharraf said in the presence of the prime minister of Turkey that Karzai had no influ- ence among the Pashtuns. President of Pakistan was obviously vexed when his Afghan colleague addressed him as “brother.” He explained to the prime minister of Turkey, who hosted the meeting, that the Taliban rather than Karzai had the Pashtuns on its side and added that Karzai, whose govern- ment was dominated by Panjshir people, could not be regarded as a representative of his own people, by which he meant Pashtuns.32

30 See: M.A. Atrofi, “The Entanglement of the Continued War in Afghanistan,” available at [www.ariaye.com] (in Dari). 31 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3050672.stm]. 32 See: M.I. Andeshmand, op. cit.

92 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

On the other hand, the government of Pakistan does not take the Tajiks (the number of whom is negligible, according to its own statistics) into account and bases its policy on the idea of the Pash- tuns’ ethnic domination. In 2007, at one of the press conferences in Washington, the president of Pakistan said that the Tajiks constituted 5 percent of the total population of Afghanistan,33 a figure probably supplied by the Pashtuns of the ISI. This is a dangerous approach or, rather, a provocation that fans national enmity. Ahmed Rashid has written that Pakistan’s obvious intention to Taliban-ize the Pashtuns in the south of Afghanistan may split the country and divide its people into Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. This will plunge the country into uncontrolled violence and never-ending wars.34 Aware of the possible catastrophic repercussions, Pakistan prefers to avoid this alternative; however, on the eve of the NATO pullout scheduled for 2014 the idea of the Greater Pashtunistan in the southeast of Afghanistan and the Tribal Areas in the northwest of Pakistan was suddenly revived. On 29-30 May, 2012, Afzal Khan Lala, the 81-year-old nationalist leader who had firmly op- posed the Taliban in Swat, convened a two-day Pashtun jirga in Peshawar, supported by the leaders of the (ANP), Pakistan People’s Party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Pak- htunkhwa Milli Awami Party, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. The Qaami Jirga was unanimous in its conclusion that the 30-year war in Afghanistan should be ended, otherwise the Pashtun issue would remain unresolved; the participants pointed to the nega- tive role the Taliban has played and continues to play in the Afghan developments and denied it any role in setting up Pashtunistan. The Jirga spoke about the reunification of the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line to set up Greater Pashtunistan35; the idea caused a lot of concern in Islamabad. The economic factor figures prominently in the relations between the two countries. Pakistan, the developing industry of which badly needs cheap raw materials (fuel in particular) and consumer markets, is looking to the Central Asian countries. However, it seems that because of the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan may be too late: other countries are locked in stiff and uncompromising ri- valry over Central Asian energy resources and markets. Vladimir Moskalenko of the Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, has offered the following: “So far, numerous agreements on railways, highways, oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan have not been realized. Iran and Turkey, Pakistan’s main rivals, capitalize on this to push forward their own alternative routes. In fact, the unregulated Afghan problem may cost Pakistan its direct access to Central Asia.”36 The demographic situation and water shortage figure prominently in Pakistan’s Afghan poli- cy. In 1947, the population of Western Pakistan was 39 million, by 2009, its population had risen to 180.8 million. Today, Pakistan holds sixth place among the states with the largest populations. Some experts believe that “if fertility rates remain constant, the population will reach 460 million by 2050.”37 This means that by 2050 Pakistan will push aside Indonesia, currently the most densely populated Muslim state. Water shortage is an old headache with no signs of alleviating. Between 1951 and 2007, the norm of per capita water consumption dropped from 5,000 to 1,100 cu m. “By 2025 water availability will drop to less than 700 cubic meters per capita.”38 According to the Pakistan

33 See: Ibidem. 34 See: Ibidem. 35 See: “Taliby vozvrashchaiutsia ili budet sozdan ‘Velikiy Pashtunistan’?” available at [www.didgah.de]. 36 V.N. Moskalenko, “Afghanistan i Pakistan,” in: Afghanistan: voyna i problemy mira, Moscow, 1998, p. 68. 37 B. Riedel, op. cit., p. 120. 38 Ibidem.

93 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), by 2025 most reservoirs will deteriorate be- cause of sedimentary rocks brought by mountain rivers. A critical (16 percent) drop in water inflow in Pakistan is also predicted if Afghanistan starts building water reservoirs in its territory. According to the Chairman of the Pakistan Water Council, in the spring and fall of 2004 Punjab needed 60 per- cent more irrigation water. There is a strong conviction in Islamabad that New Delhi created the threat of depriving Paki- stan of water from the Afghan rivers of the Indus basin. In 2003, India announced that it was prepared to extend its involvement in the projects underway in Helmand (the Salma reservoir) and Kunduz (the Hanabad canal) by shouldering the construction of water reservoirs in the . The same year, the first stones of the foundation of dams on the Kunar River to channel its waters to River Kabul at Jelalabad were laid. Seen from Islamabad this looks like India’s intention to undermine Pakistan’s economy. India also plans to build several hydro-technical facilities to change the course of the rivers Beas, Ravi, and Satulej (3 out of 5 main rivers of the Indus system). In March 2010, Hafez Saeed, the founder and leader of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, accused India of stealing water from Pakistan in Kashmir, insisting, “if India continuous with her water terrorism, Pakistan must keep open the option of using force.”39 The geopolitical factor was pushed to the fore by the growing demands in hydrocarbon re- sources all over the world and their rich deposits in Central Asia. The regional powers are locked in stiff rivalry over the routes by which energy resources can be moved out of the post-Soviet Central Asian republics. Its advantageous geographic location allows Islamabad to insist on the Turkmeni- stan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. In this way, Pakistan will not only put an end to the natural gas deficit, but also will consolidate its geopolitical position.40 America’s continued presence in Afghanistan, very much contrary to the geopolitical interests of Pakistan and its neighbors, explains Pakistan’s support of the Taliban. Barnett Rubin, American advisor to President Karzai, argued that Pakistan remained on the side of the Taliban because it and several other countries regard Afghanistan’s dependence on the United States, which preaches preemptive defensive war, as a threat to their security in a long-term perspective. Islamabad is concerned about the increasing rapprochement between the United States and In- dia and their wider cooperation in the nuclear sphere, hence the Taliban’s continued presence in the southwest and southeast of Afghanistan and its control over the Tribal Areas, and the terrorist training camps in Balochistan, Peshawar, and elsewhere in Pakistani territory. Islamabad encourages extrem- ist and subversive activities to keep instability in Afghanistan at a high level to demonstrate that it, rather than Delhi or Kabul, is in the driver’s seat. The Jammu and Kashmir conflict is one of Pakistan’s old headaches. For over 60 years now, India and Pakistan have been unable to arrive at an agreement over the territory that used to be part of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. Permanent tension and regular border conflicts do noth- ing for the relations between the two countries. Pakistan needs Afghanistan on its side as “strategic depth,” otherwise it will find itself jammed between two hostile states. This explains Pakistan’s negative attitude toward the developing relations between Afghanistan and India. One tends to agree with President Musharraf that peace and stability in Afghanistan suited Pakistan’s vital interests, but Islamabad pinned its hopes on the puppet regime in Kabul.

39 B. Riedel, op. cit., p. 121. 40 See: “Osnovnye problemy afghano-pakistanskikh otnosheniy posle teraktov 11 sentiabria 2001 goda,” available at [http://knowledge.allbest.ru/international/2c0a65625a2ac78b5d53b89421316c37.html].

94 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Muhammad Iqrom Andeshmand is convinced that Islamabad does not want a strong and inde- pendent Afghanistan for a neighbor; for different reasons (political, economic, military, and social) it wants to set up a puppet “Pashtun state” in Afghanistan. Pakistan is pursuing the following aims: (1) keeping the 35-million strong Pashtun population of Pakistan satisfied so that it will not brood on the absence of its own state; (2) dealing with the Durand Line problem once and for all; (3) playing on the religious feelings of the Pashtuns when settling the Jammu and Kashmir conflict; (4) placing the Afghan economy under its control to make the country a market for its goods and a corridor leading to the Central Asian countries.41 Late in the 1980s, Islamabad devised a plan to set up a Confederation of Pakistan and Afghan- istan; it was first suggested by Head of the ISI General Hamid Gul in a secret report to Pakistan’s military dictator General Zia ul-Haq. The report entitled “Our Expectations in Afghanistan” said in part: “the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will create a vacuum which we should fill in. This chance is too good to be wasted. We need fresh, earlier impossible, initiatives. We should help the mojahedeen to achieve complete vic- tory. We should also extend military and political support to Peshawar Seven, the group of Hekma- tyar, a trusted and respected leader, in particular. “Today, we should set up an Islamic and friendly government in Afghanistan eager to set up an alliance or a confederation between Pakistan and Afghanistan in which Pakistan will play the first fiddle. There will be no borders inside it; the new confederation will function as a single economic space that will give us access to the uranium resources of Afghanistan. In this way, we will no longer need foreigners for our nuclear program.”42 This dots the “i’s” and crosses the “t’s”; this makes it clear that Pakistan can and will defend its interests in Afghanistan. At no time Kabul contemplated talks with Islamabad on the Pashtun issue and the Durand Line; it was never prepared to discuss these issues without emotions or to reach an agreement through concessions. A simple suggestion that the Durand Line might be recognized is treated in Afghanistan as high treason. It seems that Afghanistan, which has lost the battle, should readjust its approaches to both fairly sensitive issues. In Pakistan, the Pashtuns enjoy a full range of political rights: four of its ten presidents were Pashtuns.43 Practically all the ISI heads responsible for the country’s foreign policy (especially in Afghanistan) were Pashtuns. Since the 1960s, Pakistan has been and remains a federative state; unlike the neighboring prov- inces of Afghanistan, (formerly called the North-West Frontier Province) has developed infrastructure, stable water and power supply, schools, etc. It should be said that at no time have the Pashtuns of Pakistan wanted to join Afghanistan. Some experts think that the Pashtun prov- inces of Afghanistan may join Pakistan. Those who think so proceed from certain historical and geographic facts which say that the bulk of the territory of historic Afghanistan is found on the other side of the Durand Line. M. Mahdi from Afghanistan has revealed what he calls “three historical truths:”

41 See: M.I. Andeshmand, op. cit. 42 M.A. Atrofi, op. cit. 43 See: M. Muslim, “The End of the Durand Line,” Bokhtaron, No. 1, 2012, p. 21 (in Dari).

95 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

(1) the Sulaiman Mountains in Pakistan are the historical home of the Afghan tribe; (2) Afghanistan as a geographic name was first applied to the Afghan-populated territory that now belongs to Pakistan; (3) there are three times more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.44 Notorious retired General Naseerullah Khan Babar, who in the 1970s was governor of the North-West Frontier Province, once said that “we can beat the drum better than Daoud Khan”45 (the reference is to a popular Afghan song). The idea of joining the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan to Pakistan was first formulated on 7 March, 1960 when Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir suggested that since two-thirds of all the Pash- tuns lived in Pakistan and only one-third in Afghanistan, it would be more appropriate for the minor- ity to join the majority rather than the other way round.46 Earlier, he had suggested an opinion poll on both sides of the border to find out what the Pashtuns really wanted. He seemed to be absolutely sure of the results.

Conclusion

The above suggests that peace in Afghanistan largely depends on Islamabad. Afghanistan and many other countries attached great importance to the results of the parliamentary elections of 11 May, 2013 in Pakistan that made Nawaz Sharif prime minister for the third time. He previously served as prime minister for two non-consecutive terms from November 1990 to July 1993 and from February 1997 to October 1999. This was when Pakistan was actively involved in the internal affairs of Afghanistan: Islamabad extended direct military aid to the Taliban fighting Afghanistan up to and including dispatching units of the regular army. Nawaz Sharif was always close to the military and the ISI, the role of which in the country’s foreign policy cannot be overestimated. The military and the ISI have monopolized the decision- making related to the Afghan conflict; this means that the prime minister will hardly be able to play a positive role. It remains to be seen whether the three-time prime minister will readjust his ideas about the Afghan problem and its solution and shift the military from its present position. One thing is clear: the talks between the two countries are not a one-way street. Those members of the Afghan political establishment who are encroaching on Pakistan’s territorial integrity will have to think twice. The international community and Afghanistan in particular should pay more attention to Paki- stan’s concerns. Until the two countries achieve mutual confidence and partially resolve at least some of the problems, the peace process in Afghanistan will continue to stall.

44 See: M. Mahdi, “Settlement of Ethnic Relationships,” Perazi, No. 5, 6 August, 2013 (in Dari). 45 Ibidem. 46 [http://www.ukdissertations.com/dissertations/history/durand-line.php].

96 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 IRANIAN-AFGHAN RELATIONS ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN

Guli YULDASHEVA D.Sc. (Political Science), Independent Researcher (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

ABSTRACT

his article analyzes the state of Irani- between the U.S. and Iran, as the main vari- an-Afghan relations on the threshold able influencing the situation in Afghanistan T of the withdrawal of the main contin- and its relations with Iran. According to the gent of American troops from Afghanistan author, these geopolitical contradictions and planned for 2014 in the context of the cur- the challenges and threats to regional stabil- rent geopolitical processes going on in Cen- ity ensuing from them are creating political tral Asia. It examines the similarities and dif- and economic problems that are complicat- ferences in the strivings of the various ac- ing the development of Iranian-Afghan rela- tors, the situation in Afghanistan that has tions. This is making rehabilitation of Af- arisen as a result of their clash, as well as ghanistan more difficult, including in the vi- the regional threats and challenges to Iran’s tally important economic sphere, resulting in interests. It points to the geopolitical contra- destabilization of the situation within the dictions among regional players, primarily country and around it.

KEYWORDS: Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the U.S., geopolitics.

Introduction

At present, the ambiguous relations between the West and Iran are having a particularly nega- tive effect on the situation in Afghanistan. This ambiguity is based on the extremely politicized problem of Iran’s nuclear potential. Iran’s foreign policy, which is distinguished by significant con- servatism, and the tougher sanctions being imposed on the country by the West are leading to a certain increase in tension in its relations with the Hamid Karzai government. It looks as though the situation has reached the point where Afghanistan will undergo further destabilization if the world community puts off its talks with Iran any longer. Such destabilization is not anything the U.S. and its Western allies are interested in, particularly on the threshold of the withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces in 2014. So Washington will most likely keep a window of opportunity open for Iran by not entirely ruling out the likelihood of success in the upcoming round of nuclear talks.

97 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Common Interests

Afghanistan is one of Iran’s closest neighbors with a common border of 936 km in length. The territorial, ethnoreligious, and historical-cultural closeness of the two countries, as well as the presence of an influential Shi‘ite diaspora in Afghanistan have helped it to become part of Iran’s zone of vitally important geopolitical interests and traditional influence. Also, the fact that Af- ghanistan neighbors on the post-Soviet Central Asian states and plays an important role in ensuring transit and forming their transportation routes and energy grids is making the country Iran’s poten- tial doorway into the region. So Tehran is interested in Afghanistan’s complete independence from any foreign influence that might destabilize the already precarious ethnopolitical situation in the region. Iran’s position is stable and unwavering with respect to promoting the idea of a united Afghanistan, achieving peace and stability, and creating a coalition government in the country with equal participation of members of all the ethnic groups, confessions, and movements in it (while giving the Shi‘ite community specific freedoms). This pragmatism on Iran’s part is pri- marily aimed at establishing a stable, predictable, and friendly country that will not create inter- nal or external problems for it and, if possible, will promote the implementation of its geo-eco- nomic plans. This position largely corresponds to the interests of Afghanistan itself. However, we should also keep in mind that Iran is an important supplier of products and fuel to the region, sponsors Afghan projects in infrastructure, energy, and transport, and occupies (even in conditions of instability) 5% of the country’s foreign economic export and 9.1% of its import.1 The annual goods turnover between Afghanistan and Iran amounts to $2 billion.2 Moreover, in the past eight years, Iran has spent more than $50 million annually to help Afghanistan in its fight against drug trafficking.3 Iran and Afghanistan also have in common the fact that the U.S. plays a significant role in their current development; both countries are participants in America’s New Silk Road (NSR) strategy, the success of which depends entirely on implementing transport-transit routes designed to link the CA region with South and Southeast Asia and extending them on to Europe. The common interests and similar fates of the two countries are motivating them to engage in close mutual cooperation.

Challenges and Threats to Iran from Afghanistan

Given current globalization and geopolitical competition, the situation today around Afghani- stan (drug trafficking, refugees, water supply problems, cultural and religious discrepancies, and terrorism) is preventing the realization of the above-mentioned interests, the main bone of contention being the geopolitical disagreements among the players concerned. It is these disagreements that are preventing resolution of most of the regional problems associated with Afghanistan. Let us take a look at the main contradictions existing in the tandems given below.

1 See: “Afghanistan Economy 2013,” available at [http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/afghanistan/afghanistan_ economy.html], 24 June, 2013. 2 [www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1658472.html], 14 May, 2013. 3 See: “Iran-Afghanistan Bilateral Ties Unaffected by Western Sanctions — Official,” available at [http://en.trend.az/ regions/iran/2119355.html], 14 February, 2013.

98 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

 Iran-U.S. As we know, Iran’s foreign policy is aimed at establishing a multipolar world order under the U.N. aegis, in which it and other Islamic countries will form one of the poles of power. It stands to reason that this does not suit U.S. policy, which is aimed at world leadership and restructuring the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia in a way that ensures Iran’s isolation from them. Tehran thinks that the attempts to manipulate the con- tradictions between Sunnis and Shi‘ites are another of the West’s conspiracies in this re- spect, which is interested in implementing the “divide and rule” tactic in order to prevent unification of the Muslim world.4  U.S.-Russia. The U.S.’s striving toward unipolarity and world leadership contradicts the Russian concept of multipolarity under the U.N. aegis. The idea of establishing a Eurasian Union of States does not fit America’s strategy of global domination aimed at limiting the influence of Russia, Iran, and China in the new system of international relations. In this respect, most Russian experts are sure that the NSR strategy is aimed at joining the markets and transport corridors in Central Asia and South Asia in a way that will subsequently isolate Russia.  U.S.-China. China, like Russia, is interested in a multipolar world order and all-embracing partnership with the CA countries and Afghanistan. However, Beijing’s rapid growth and extremely active geo-economic strategy in CA and Afghanistan, as well as its clear striving for global domination, contradict Washington’s interests.  U.S.-Pakistan. The Washington-Islamabad partnership is complicated by a whole slew of factors (the Afghan-Pakistani border and ethnoreligious contradictions, the difficult ethnoreligious and domestic political situation in Pakistan that is boosting the activity of terrorist groups in the region, and Pakistan’s striving for regional leadership, etc.) that are contributing to a delay in the practical implementation of the U.S.’s new Afghan strategy.  India-Pakistan. At the beginning of the 1990s, rivalry to gain influence in CA was added to the territorial and ethno-religious disagreements between India and Pakistan. In addition to official rhetoric, this influence is geared at assisting each of the sides to accede to unions of states that oppose each other.  Iran-Saudi Arabia. As we know, Iran and Saudi Arabia are vying with each other to gain influence in CA and the Middle East. The U.S. is taking advantage of the historical-cultur- al kinship between the Central Asian region and Saudi Arabia, the financial superiority of the latter over Iran, and the existence of religious discrepancies between them to advance its interests in the Islamic world, including Afghanistan. It is obvious that geopolitical contradictions among strategic partners are primarily reflected in choosing appropriate methods, means, and ways to implement the Afghan strategy. They are prevent- ing stability from being achieved in the region and are delaying Afghanistan’s reconstruction and modernization, whereby playing into the hands of various radical-Islamic and other illegal groups. This is providing fertile soil for cultivating various regional and global challenges and threats, to which the following apply: 1. Drug trafficking. The ongoing flow of drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the CA countries, Europe, and the Persian Gulf poses a threat both to Iran and the entire region. According to the U.N., there are 1.2 million drug users in Iran (according to other esti-

4 See: S.-U. Soraya, “Shi‘ite Revival or Majority Resistance?” available at [http://www.payvand.com], 9 June, 2006.

99 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

mates there are more than one million), while Tehran spends $1 billion every year on fighting this evil. According to experts, “Afghanistan’s opium production is expected to increase from 75 percent of global production to 90 percent, and the Afghan government will increas- ingly rely on and participate in drug flows to counterbalance the decrease of foreign funding and the diminished U.S. and NATO presence monitoring the issue.”5 2. Refugees. According to the official viewpoint, there are around 3 million illegalized Afghan refugees in Iran at present, which is placing a heavy burden on the country. Based on a bilateral agreement reached with the assistance of the U.N. High Commissioner Office for Refugees, a special Program on Repatriation of Afghan Citizens was drawn up in Iran; the date of its final completion was 20 April, 2010. However, on the threshold of withdrawal of the peacekeeping troops from Afghani- stan, the flow of refugees continues to grow, which is forcing Tehran to repatriate them every year. According to U.N. estimates, in the first half of 2012, Iran deported 711 Afghan refu- gees at day,6 whereby arousing Kabul’s discontent. What is more, the matter is going as far as shooting illegal Afghan migrants who try to cross the border (in particular on 11 May, 2013), due to the increase in military-political cooperation between the Hamid Karzai gov- ernment and the White House. 3. Water supply. The anti-Iranian sanctions and Kabul’s potential distancing from Tehran have led to the appearance of a new challenge to national security: the problem of joint use of the water resources of the Helmand River that originates in the mountains of Central Afghanistan. According to experts, the general agreement that was signed in 1973 between the countries situated on the banks of the Helmand River is not reducing the tension in this issue. The Kamal Khan dam, which regulates the water flow to the Iranian province of Sistan and Balochistan, is a source of animosity on both sides.7 4. Cultural-religious disagreements. Iran, faced with international isolation, is forced to sup- port the Shi‘ites living in Afghanistan (by financing their cultural and religious activity, as well as with the help of the media). It stands to reason that this creates additional imbalance in the ethnocultural situation in Afghanistan. 5. Terrorism. Until the situation in Afghanistan returns to normal, threats (which are rela- tively weak today) will potentially continue to come from different terrorist groups (al- Qa‘eda, Jundullah, etc.) close to the border with Iran, the activity of which might intensify in a situation where there is no consent among the regional actors.

Iranian-Afghan Relations in the Light of Current Geopolitical Reality

Iran’s policy in the Afghan vector entirely depends on its relations with the U.S. These relations are one of the key factors in the development of the entire Afghan settlement process. At present,

5 “The Significance of the Tajik-Afghan Border,” Stratfor.com, 22 May, 2013, available at [http://www.stratfor.com/ analysis/significance-tajik-afghan-border], 12 June, 2013. 6 See: O. Samad, “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan after U.S. Pullout,” 17 January, 2013, available at [http://iranprimer. usip.org/blog/2013/jan/17/iran%E2%80%99s-influence-afghanistan-after-us-pullout], 24 June, 2013. 7 See: Ibidem.

100 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 overcoming Iranian-American contradictions depends on two interdependent factors. The matter con- cerns settling Iran’s nuclear problem and interaction between the two countries in dealing with the current situation in Afghanistan. Settlement of the extremely politicized nuclear problem (aggravation of which is associated with the current Iranian-American contradictions) will not in itself remove the deep-rooted ideologi- cal contradictions between the U.S. and Iran reflected in their geopolitical vision of the development prospects of Iran, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Reaching a consensus on international security, the gravest problem today, will make it possible to reach some balance in the coexistence of the two systems represented by the Shi‘ite-Sunni autocra- cies and Western democracies. Washington is hardly interested in prolonging the current situation, which could lead to destabilization of Afghanistan and its adjacent regions. This might lead to chaos, which, if it spirals out of control, will deal a serious blow both to the security and geopolitical interests of the U.S., as well as to the projects it is planning. In this sense, the idea of controllable chaos would be suicidal for the U.S., since not only the Middle East, CA, and SA would be inundated by a poten- tial wave of terrorism; at best, America’s plans for global domination would be brought to a halt. Talking about Washington’s failures, it is enough to recall the 2001 terrorist acts, as well as the con- sequences of the events in Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Afghanistan, which stimulated the development of the idea of multipolarity. The most mutually beneficial approach would be one based on a balance of interests in the re- gion. Within the framework of such regional partnership, reaching a compromise with Iran would allow Washington to save face on the threshold of troop withdrawal and ensure American companies access to the region’s oil and gas resources on acceptable terms in the future. However, the endless disputes between the pro-Israeli and pro-Iranian U.S. elites are serving to retain the dualism of Washington’s strategy. On the one hand, the U.S. has a pessimistic attitude to- ward the prospects for developing relations with Iran8 and does not exclude the possibility of carrying out a preventive strike on the country. The most Washington is prepared to do is continue its restrain- ing tactics, increase further confrontation, and toughen up sanctions with the aim of accelerating changes in Iran that meet the West’s interests. On the other hand, Washington appears to be well aware that delaying resolution of the Iranian dilemma with its Afghan and Syrian components may, in addition to destabilizing the vast region, turn into a geopolitical defeat for the U.S. in the face of Russia, China, and Iran. This is prompting the U.S. to try and establish mutually acceptable partnership by continuing its political bargaining with Tehran (including secret talks). Tehran, in turn, is resolutely against the U.S.’s military presence in CA, which could go on forever. In this event, Iran would find itself in the grips of a military-political blockade, while its re- gional activity would be significantly limited. Meanwhile, the negative influence of the sanctions on the country’s economy and foreign policy is forcing Tehran to hold a dialog with the U.S. in order to break the viscous circle that has formed and reach a compromise solution to the nuclear problem. One of Iran’s strategic interests is to restore its role in CA, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the world community as a whole, as well as in global economic relations with Western Europe and the Asia Pacific Region. In order to achieve their goals, both countries are making use of bilateral and multilateral for- mats of interstate relations and international institutions (primarily the U.N.). In particular, in addition to developing bilateral relations with all the CA states, Tehran is actively cooperating with the world

8 See, for example: G. Bryan, A.H. Cordesman, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition. Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control and Regime Change,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,” available at [130625_iransanctions_pdf, June 26, 2013], 26 June, 2013.

101 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS community to stabilize Afghanistan and participating in all the international conferences on this problem (for example, Istanbul, November 2011; Bonn, December 2011; Kabul, The Heart of Asia Conference, June 2012). Carrying out diplomatic measures and continuing the dialog, Iran and the U.S., however, are actively using what has customarily become aggressive rhetoric in their tactical arsenal, not to mention the sanction regime being applied by the White House. The clash between the U.S. and Iranian approaches in the Afghan process will most likely force Washington to seriously consider using the Pakistani-Saudi tandem to implement American strategy. For example, the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan have been attempting today, not without obvious American interference, to establish constructive cooperation with Pakistan. It is expected that when Nawaz Sharif (who is friendly with the Saudis) is elected to the post of prime minister, Saudi Arabia will gain a lever of influence over Pakistan’s security and foreign policy, which will help to successfully complete the talks with the Taliban before withdrawal of troops in 2014. However, the rivalry between the two leading parties of Pakistan—Nawaz’s Pakistani Mus- lim League and Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf party—should be kept in mind; according to ex- perts, this could strengthen the Taliban, which will not fail to take advantage of this situation in its interests. Iranian experts have foreseen the possible rapprochement between the Pakistani leadership and Washington. As early as 2002, they indicated that if the American-Pakistani initiatives to settle the Afghan crisis were successful, Iran’s position would significantly weaken. Afghanistan will become a new strategic rival for Tehran and the latter will not be able to withdraw CA out of its geopolitical isolation.9 So it is not at all surprising that there were reports in the press about a delegation of high- ranking representatives of the Taliban movement arriving in Iran (on the invitation of the country’s authorities) to discuss cooperation after the international forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan. According to Afghan experts,10 the movement’s representatives are trying to establish relations with Iran without involving Pakistan. Incidentally, the historical differences that have become quite obvious between the Shi‘ite branch of Islam professed in Tehran and the religious views of al-Qa‘eda and the Taliban will make it difficult to establish a long-term partnership between the sides. In this respect, it appears very plau- sible that the actual sources of this disinformation could be the Wahhabis (Salafis) supported by the Saudis and Qatars. Meanwhile, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has refuted the reports that a delegation of the Afghan Taliban has arrived in Tehran and assured that they are incorrect.11 The Afghan leadership itself is clearly not interested in making the domestic situation in the country any worse than it already is, repeatedly expressing its desire to assist in removing the tension between Iran and the U.S. Moreover, the fact that the Hamid Karzai administration will most likely continue to cooperate with the U.S. after 2014 has caused a split in Afghan society, a large part of which is against America’s military presence in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in the interests of the country’s security, President Hamid Karzai gave permission on 9 May of this year for nine American bases to remain in Afghan territory. In so doing, Hamid

9 See: N. Sonboli, “Iran i sfera bezopasnosti Tsentralnoi Azii posle 11 sentiabria,” Amu Darya (Tehran), No. 12, Summer 2002, pp. 110, 118-121. 10 See: “Afghan Government Probes Taliban Visit To Iran,” available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-iran- taliban/25005609.html], 3 June, 2013. 11 See: “MID Irana oproverg soobshchenie o pribytii delegatsii afganskikh talibov v Tegeran,” Russian IRIB Service, available at [http://www.iran.ru/news/politics/87996/MID_Irana_oproverg_soobshchenie_o_pribytii_delegacii_afganskih_ talibov_v_Tegeran], 3 June, 2013.

102 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Karzai made it clear12 that the United States will continue to have an influence on the country’s po- litical system in order to avoid a situation similar to the one that developed in Iraq when the lack of consent with the local administration helped pro-Iranian forces come to power. Although the details of Hamid Karzai’s position are not clear, it is most likely aimed, among other things, at implementing America’s New Silk Road strategy in a format advantageous to Af- ghanistan. On the other hand, the U.S. continues to count on regulating Iran’s nuclear program by peaceful means; according to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “the situation is becoming increasingly dan- gerous with each passing month.”13 In this respect, there is always the possibility of holding a series of secret talks with Tehran. Such thoughts are supported by the fact that the U.S. opened a consulate in Herat in June 2012, located less than 50 miles from the Iranian border. According to several ex- perts, this will make it possible not only “to monitor Iranian activity in Herat and the surrounding area,” but also create opportunities for holding secret talks with Tehran “away the watchful eyes of the world.”14 As Iranian experts themselves believe, the need to ensure the safety of the troops remaining in Afghan territory also speaks in favor of establishing relations between their country and other re- gional neighbors.15 In their opinion, the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and the June presidential election in Tehran could open up new horizons for Washington with respect to practical cooperation with Iran. In this event, Iran will act as a potential strategic partner of the U.S. in implementing Afghanistan’s peaceful transformation. However, at present, this prospect is very doubtful, particularly if we keep in mind that Tehran and Washington have different interests in the Middle East; this factor will undoubtedly have a negative influence on the level of assumed Iranian-American partnership in Afghanistan. We would do well to recall a characteristic historical precedent at this juncture: as we know, constructive coop- eration in Afghanistan after 2001 ended in Iran being made part of the axis of evil. All the same, there are several positive factors that demonstrate the possibility of achieving a certain breakthrough in Iranian-American relations in the mid term. The main provisions of Iran’s foreign political doctrine proceed from pragmatic moderate con- siderations. For example, former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was in favor of reinforcing Iran’s status in the Islamic world by means of active participation in the activity of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and by developing contacts with essentially all the states, including with NATO members.16 Iranian experts believed that when the new monolithic and consolidated conservative cabinet headed by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power, the prospects for holding serious talks with the U.S. could increase.17 Even the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was in- clined toward cooperation with the U.S. He saw it as a way to resolve the country’s current problems, but providing that Washington agreed to equal conditions.

12 See: “Karzai Ensures a Continued U.S. Presence in Afghanistan,” available at [http://www.stratfor.com/ANALYSIS/ KARZAI-ENSURES-CONTINUED-US-PRESENCE-AFGHANISTAN], 9 May, 2013. 13 “U.S. Secretary of State: The Situation around Iran’s Nuclear Program is Becoming Increasingly Dangerous with Each Passing Month,” available in Russian at [http://www.itar-tass.com/c11/756608.html], 3 June, 2013. 14 A. Bozkurt, “U.S. Secret Talks with Iran over Afghanistan,” 31 December, 2012, available at [http://www. todayszaman.com/columnist-302684-us-secret-talks-with-iran-over-afghanistan.html], 24 June, 2013. 15 See: S.H. Mousavian, “Engage with Iran in Afghanistan,” available at [http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ engage-iran-afghanistan-8528], 30 May, 2013. 16 See: “Iran’s Strategic Role in the Islamic World,” Mehr News Agency (Tehran) , available at [www.mehrnews.com], 9 December, 2005. 17 See: A. Keshavarzian, “Clash of Neoconservatives? The Bush Administration and Iran’s New President,” Foreign Policy in Focus Policy Report, available at [http://www.fpif.org], 10 August, 2005.

103 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The June presidential election in Iran again showed signs of moderation gaining the upper hand in the state’s political development, which is shown by Hassan Rouhani’s advent to power, who combines adherence to both the country’s conservative and reform elite. We should also remind you that Tehran’s approach to the Greater Middle East project spon- sored by the U.S. before the Arab Revolution was distinguished by relative restraint. In particular, Iranian experts propose refraining from unconstructive criticism of the West’s initiatives and ad- dressing “without great political outlays” only “certain aspects” of the Middle East program. They also called for “a positive sum game” that presumes Iran’s participation in different programs in the Middle East.18 It is thought that these approaches have not dramatically changed since then and could very easily be used as a foundation in regulating the Syrian problem with Iran’s par- ticipation. What is more, Washington will most likely have to count on growing economic cooperation between the post-Soviet CA countries and Iran, including Afghanistan (see below). Continuing American pressure in this issue with all the negative consequences ensuing in security and the econ- omy will in fact accelerate the CA states’ search for alternative routes, including through China, as well as intensify partnership between the regional countries and Russia, which is not at all in the U.S.’s interests. We must also keep in mind the Indian factor. Iran, as the main supplier of energy resources and oil to India, is an important partner for it with respect to possible opposition with Pakistan, as well as in security issues relating to Afghanistan. What is more, India and Iran are in favor of advancing a North-South transport corridor capable of uniting Russia, CA and SA that is mutually advantageous for all the sides concerned. Before the Taliban was overturned in 2001, India and Iran supported the Northern Alliance together. It goes without saying that they are still not interested today in the Taliban or other radical groups returning to power. What is more, India and Iran are certainly not interested in intensification of the Sunni bloc that unites Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, since it could create threats to security (both ideological and political).19 So it is pretty certain that neither objective factors nor geopolitical interests will hinder regional partnership between the two countries. This is also shown by the 17th session of the Indian-Iranian joint commission held on 3-5 May, 2013, at which three memorandums were signed on mutual understanding, including cooperation among analytical institu- tions. In this context, it is worth noting the American approach to India’s role and importance in the region. In particular, U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman highly evaluates its key role in ensuring security in Afghanistan and reducing the level of its importation of Iranian oil. In her words, India has always been a leader in reviving the New Silk Road and an active participant in the heart of Asia process. The U.S. intends to further its relationship with the country through the strategic dialog.20 So it can be concluded that the U.S. is unlikely to do anything that will significantly hinder the Indian-Iranian partnership (this is at least how things stand at the moment). It seems to be easier for the Americans to find a common language with Tehran than put the NSR project in jeopardy. Nor can

18 See: K. Аfrasiabi, “Iran and the Greater Middle East Initiative,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs (Tehran), Vol. XVII, No. 2-3, Summer-Fall 2004, pp. 255-284. 19 See: A. Вhatnagar, “Indo-Iranian Cooperation in Afghanistan Faces Challenges,” The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 22 August, 2012, available at [http://atlanticsentinel.com/2013/05/indo-iranian-cooperation-in-afghanistan-faces- challenges], 7 May, 2013. 20 See: “Comments on India’s Relations with Iran, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Remarks Wendy Sherman Under Secretary for Political Affairs, New Delhi, India,” available at [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2013/202682.htm], 24 May, 2013.

104 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 the United States ignore the fact that Pakistan, despite the existing difficulties, is ready to develop economic projects with Iran’s participation. For example, issues were discussed at a meeting held recently of the trade ministers of Paki- stan, Iran, and Afghanistan concerning expansion of transit trade, encouraging investments in the private sector, and developing infrastructure, transport, and supply routes. According to a statement by the Afghan side, there is every chance that bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan will increase in the future from the current $2.5 to 5 billion.21 President Asif Ali Zardari assured that Pakistan is positively evaluating the Iranian-Pakistani gas pipeline project and is ready to imple- ment many other economic bilateral initiatives, particularly in the import of electricity, the export of grain, and the development of the transportation system (including implementation of the TAPI project).22 At the same time, Iran is willing to sign an agreement on a structured approach to defining the nature of the nuclear research being carried out, providing that the nuclear file will subsequently be closed. Such is the ambiguous reality of the processes going on around Afghanistan, which cannot help but have an influence on the economic situation in the country.

Economic Problems

The Iranian-American contradictions are having an impact on the economic situation in Afghani- stan. In this respect, let us take a look at the priority areas of Iran’s economic activity in Afghanistan, which are energy and transportation. Energy. Kabul gets most of its energy resources from neighboring Iran, which also provides 15% of the oil delivered to Afghanistan.23 Keeping in mind the mutual interest, in 2011 Iran and Afghanistan signed an agreement, under which Tehran pledged to supply its neighbor with one mil- lion tons of oil, gas, gasoline, and reactive fuel. In turn, Afghanistan is willing, despite the current problems, to continue purchasing oil from Iran.24 However, the implementation of any energy agreements between the two countries is jeopar- dized today by the international sanctions imposed on Iran. Officially, these sanctions are to prevent Iranian corporations from obtaining income from business that might be used to develop the country’s nuclear program. In practice, however, the sanction policy is causing the Afghan reconstruction and stabilization program declared by the U.S. to have a destabilizing effect on the domestic situation in the country. In particular, problems are arising in Afghanistan’s financial system (for example, the credit imbalance with subsequent disruption of financial operations with Iran).25 In conditions where the above-mentioned sanctions are being tightened, the uncompetitive Afghan markets are being satu- rated with low-quality Iranian goods. “The trade imbalance is further compounded by heavy Iranian

21 See: T. Khan, “Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan to Step Up Business Ties,” The Express Tribune, 10 January, 2013, available at [http://tribune.com.pk/story/491834/pakistan-iran-afghanistan-to-step-up-business-ties/], 10 January, 2013. 22 See: “Zardari for Early Convening of Pak-Iran-Afghanistan Summit,” available at [http://www.nation.com.pk/ pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/22-Mar-2013/zardari-for-early-convening-of-pak-iran-afghanistan- summit], 22 March, 2013. 23 See: “Sanktsii protiv Irana skazalis na ekonomike Afghanistana,” available at [www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1658472. html], 14 May, 2013. 24 See: “Afghanistan Continues Iran Oil Purchase Despite Pressure from the U.S.,” available at [http://www.wadsam. com/afghanistan-continues-iran-oil-purchase-despite-pressure-from-the-us-9879/], 3 February, 2013. 25 See: “Sanktsii protiv Irana skazalis na ekonomike Afghanistana.”

105 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS investment in western Afghanistan. Iran has also destabilized Afghan markets by purchasing large amounts of foreign currency.” Unable to transfer money out of Iran in a legitimate manner, the Ira- nian traders instead convert their Rial in Afghanistan.26 It appears that Washington is well aware of what is going on, but its ambiguous position regard- ing Iran, inert and bureaucratic financial institutions, as well as out-and-out corruption are preventing the appropriate decisions from being made on several important issues. As a result, the sanction provisions tend to ignore the inconvenient aspects of U.S. tactics in Afghanistan. For example, according to the October report from Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), “No Afghan entities have yet been sanctioned, even though Afghanistan currently imports between 33% and 50% of its fuel from Iran.”27 The U.S. State Department, which continues to insist on reducing the import of Iranian fuel into Afghanistan, nevertheless recognizes the difficulties in ensuring energy deliveries to the country and in choosing reliable exporters. According to experts, another problem is financing Afghanistan’s purchases of Iranian oil. It is very likely that by investing in the development of Afghan military-political structures, Washington is indirectly paying for Iranian fuel. Some of the Iranian oil purchased with American dollars is going to supply the military operations of the U.S. or its authorized representatives with fuel (meaning the Afghan National Army). Given the confrontation between the U.S. and Iran and the ongoing sanctions against the latter, implementing the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline projects looks highly problematic. Advancing their implementation will depend not so much on how the Iranian nuclear problem is resolved as on stabilizing the domestic situation in Pakistan. Despite the achievements in laying the Iranian-Pakistani pipeline, Nawaz Sharif’s government will have to withstand both U.S. pressure (which is hindering the development of any projects involv- ing Iran) and resistance from the powerful anti-American and anti-Iranian opposition in the country in order to successfully complete its construction. Moreover, efficient functioning of any regional pipeline, even after it has been launched, depends on relations with neighbors, that is, normalization of Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian relations in particular, which have seen better times. Conse- quently, in the next 1-2 years, no radical changes can be expected in this area, particularly after new anti-Iranian sanctions go into effect. In this respect, India has come forward with an initiative for building the TAPI-2 gas pipeline (going from the Russian gas fields in Western Siberia through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmeni- stan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to India). Implementation of this project is also doubtful (at least in the short term) due to the absence of the necessary mutual understanding among Afghanistan, Paki- stan, and India. Transport. The anti-Iranian sanctions have also affected Afghanistan’s transport sphere. Inter- national business has to overcome various restrictions associated with U.S. pressure on projects in- volving Iranian companies and banks. In particular, Washington is demanding that transit be halted along the route that passes through Bandar Abbas, which is causing tension in Afghan business circles. According to Deputy Director of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries Khan Jan Alokozai, Kabul imports foreign goods that are vitally important for the country’s development totaling more than $2 billion via this route.28

26 See: O. Samad, op. cit. 27 N. Schwellenbach, “Et Tu, Karzai? Afghanistan Violates U.S. Iran Sanctions,” available at [http://whowhatwhy. com/2013/01/30/e-tu-karzai-afghanistan-violates-us-iran-sanctions/], 30 January, 2013. 28 See: SAJAD, “U.S. Urge Afghanistan to End Trade Ties with Iran,” available at [http://www.khaama.com/us-urge- afghanistan-to-end-trade-ties-with-iran-184], 2 September, 2013.

106 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Feeling pressure from the U.S., the Afghan government has begun talking about the need to use the Iranian trade port of Chabahar. According to members of the Afghan government, all the neces- sary facilities for Afghan businessmen should be in place there with the help of Indian investors by 28 May. Moreover, the Afghan ministries of trade and finance have been set the task of using the transit route that starts at the port of Chabahar for transporting cargo.29 It should be noted that possible halting of the operation of the Iran-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan rail corridor with access to the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar is not in Uzbekistan’s inter- ests. Afghanistan, which is striving to gain access to the world markets, particularly given the instabil- ity presumed after 2014, is not interested in this either. One of the authors of the Afghanistan’s New Silk Road strategy, well-known Professor Freder- ick Starr, also points to the illogical actions of the American leadership. He believes that Washing- ton’s actions are essentially effectively sponsoring its adversary. The matter concerns support by the U.S. and NATO of Iranian ports in the Persian and Oman gulfs. The U.S. has been unable to lay any kind of transport corridor linking the northern Central Asian neighbors of Afghanistan with the indicated ports. According to Starr, Iran has been taking advantage of this by relying on Indian and Russian assistance to build a convenient port and free economic area in the Gulf of Oman (in Chabahar) from which cargoes are sent to Afghanistan. Chinese companies are not standing on the sidelines either; it took no time for them to rebuild the Gwadar port. In this respect, Starr cautioned Washington about making such mistakes in the transportation of Central Asian gas to Pakistan and India. The American professor also criticizes President Barack Obama and the U.S. National Security Council for not giving enough support to the TAPI project, without which this energy corridor cannot be built. However, it stands to reason that given the U.S. external debt of $16 trillion, this is not an easy task. However, as Professor Starr emphasized, all that is required of Washington is effective leadership.30 It goes without saying that the United States cannot ignore the interests of the CA countries associated with building the region’s transportation and trade system. In counterbalance to their pos- sible rapid reorientation in the Eurasian vector (in particular by participating in the NSR project on the basis of the Customs Union and implementing the North-South transport corridor), Washington, by all expectations, will assist the development of Afghan routes, which is impossible without Iran’s active participation in them.

Conclusion

Keeping in mind the objective factors, it can be said that Iran and Afghanistan are “doomed to economic partnership.” Neither Iran, nor Afghanistan, nor Pakistan are interested in prolonging re- gional instability, which is fraught with threats to the existence of the regimes in power in these countries. In this respect, it appears that the U.S. is taking a wait-and-see position in regional partnership issues and will not put up any strong resistance to projects involving Iran. In so doing, the stakes are being placed on possible normalization of relations with it in the future. It is obvious that, keeping in mind the inclination of most countries toward economic partnership with Iran, which is involved in the conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Washington is striving, if not to engage Tehran’s

29 [http://www.iran.ru], 28 May, 2013. 30 See: F. Starr, “Why Is the United States Subsidizing Iran?” available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/04/ why_is_the_united_states_subsidizing_iran?page=0,1&wp_login_redirect=0 FEBRUARY 4, 2013], 4 February, 2013.

107 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS support, at least to achieve neutralization of its influence on the resolution of regional problems. If the new round of talks with Iran is successful, the U.S. will still be able not only to save face, but also to reshape the entire Middle East region, as well as the CA and SA, within the NSR strategy with the active participation of Iran, Russia, and China. Incidentally, it appears that the worries of the international community about the establishment of a unipolar world headed by the U.S. and it launching military operations in different corners of the planet are overly exaggerated. As the above facts show, resistance of the international community to U.S. policy in the Afghan- Iranian vector is forcing it to change its strategy and is encouraging the establishment of a real mul- tifaceted regional approach (even if still imperfect). Otherwise, we can expect the destabilization of Afghanistan, CA, and the Middle East, which will not only be detrimental to the NSR plans, but also to the idea of U.S. global leadership. This is shown in particular by the results of the Bush rule, the negative consequences of which are still being felt today. So, it appears that the international community will continue looking for a consensus on the Iranian and Afghan questions. We can confidently presume that it will be based on the common re- gional challenges and threats to the sides interested in the Afghan peace process. In any case, success will depend on progress in the nuclear talks on Iran, which evidently should be reinforced by corre- sponding constructive actions by Tehran and the Euroatlantic community in Afghanistan and the Middle East countries. However, it is unlikely that this scenario will be implemented in the short term. As for the CA states bordering on Afghanistan, they are extremely interested in its sustainable and independent development; they are willing to unite all regional forces and resources to achieve this country’s restoration, stabilization and modernization. Afghanistan is very important for the CA republics both with respect to ensuring the safety of its southern borders in the face of the current threats and challenges (radical movements, drugs, il- legal migration, and so on) coming from the AfPak zone and with respect to the development of a new alternative network of transportation-transit routes through it. The continuing western economic pressure on CA and the U.S. anti-Iranian strategy, which excludes the participation of Tehran in energy transportation and other projects, are preserving socio- economic and political instability in the region. In these conditions, it is preferable and safer for the CA countries to establish partnership within the framework of the Eurasian Union being formed with participation of Russia, Iran, and China.

108 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

SOME ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE SCO

Kamilla SHERIAZDANOVA D.Sc. (Political Science), Associate Professor at the Chair of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Institute of Diplomacy, Academy of Public Management under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Astana, Kazakhstan)

Karlygash KONDYKEROVA Doctoral candidate at the Chair of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Institute of Diplomacy, Academy of Public Management under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Astana, Kazakhstan)

ABSTRACT

he SCO has become an influential in- SCO is playing an increasingly efficient part ternational structure today. Through- in building the global security system, which T out its existence, the Organization is largely due to the new threats and chal- has acted as an important mechanism for lenges the world community now faces. ensuring regional stability, as well as sus- Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in the SCO tainable political and economic cooperation ended with a celebratory sitting of the Council in the area in which it operates. Today the of Heads of Member States held on 15 June,

109 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

2011 in Astana. At this meeting, the Astana Russia, and China. This statement is based declaration of the SCO’s Tenth Anniversary on the experience of the SCO member was adopted, which states that during this states that are pooling their efforts to oppose time, the Organization has successfully ad- non-traditional threats to security in Central vanced from its institutionalization to the es- Asia—terrorism, flagrant fundamentalism, tablishment of efficiently functioning mecha- drug crimes, and separatism. nisms of interaction in different spheres. Of course, there are political reasons The SCO is a regional international or- for unifying the countries within the SCO ganization, the main tasks of which are borne by the desire to ensure security in the strengthening stability and security in the region, while economic factors predominate broad area that joins the states belonging to in the traditional integration models. In this it, fighting terrorism, separatism, extremism, case, free trade is the springboard for form- and drug trafficking, developing economic ing a political union. cooperation and energy partnership, and However, despite the prime importance enhancing scientific and cultural interaction. of the political component in the SCO’s ac- The SCO is an essentially new model tivity, it is the economic factors that make it of geopolitical integration that makes it pos- possible to oppose the negative trends in sible to unite the interests of Central Asia, the life of the Central Asian region.

KEYWORDS: SCO, Central Asian Region, security, the economy, legal regulation, fighting terrorism.

Introduction

The development of economic relations among the member states is one of the important areas of cooperation in the SCO, which largely predetermines the need for transferring from a specialized to a multivectoral model. There can be no doubt that, at the initial stage, the Organization’s activity was aimed at one goal—achieving security in the region; over time, economic cooperation among the SCO member states began to intensify and new common problems appeared. It became impossible to take efficient steps to combat threats and challenges to economic security without coordinating the economic pol- icy of the region’s countries. I would like to note that during the chairmanship of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the SCO, a certain amount of progress was achieved in the economic sphere; nevertheless, economic cooperation remains a weak link in the Organization’s activity. The numerous economic programs and plans re- quire careful revision, since they are not being fully implemented and are not having the necessary effect. There is still a significant gap between the SCO’s economic potential and its practical imple- mentation. Bilateral cooperation still prevails over multilateral, although it is large-scale joint projects that are capable in practice of integrating the SCO’s economic expanse. In our view, the SCO’s main strategic task in the next decade should be intensifying multilat- eral economic interaction. Multilateral cooperation must be given a serious boost and such struc- tures as the Business Council and SCO Interbank Union are called upon to play a special role in this matter. The principles for forming and operating a Special Account must be ultimately coordinated as soon as possible, reciprocal goods turnover significantly expanded, new markets created, a new boost 110 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 given to regional development, and transport corridors between Europe and Asia diversified on par- ity terms. Today, it can be affirmed that the SCO is an essentially new model of geopolitical integration representing the interests of CA, Russia, and China. Based on their own experience, the SCO member states are pooling their efforts to oppose the non-traditional threats to security in Central Asia—ter- rorism, flagrant fundamentalism, drug crimes, and separatism.

Key Problems in the SCO’s Activity

Of course, there are political reasons for unifying the countries within the SCO borne by the desire to ensure security in the region, while economic factors predominate in the traditional integra- tion models. In this case, free trade is the springboard for forming a political union. However, despite the prime importance of the political component in the SCO’s activity, it is the economic factors that make it possible to oppose the negative trends in the life of the Central Asian region. The terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, crime, and extreme forms of religious fanaticism rampant in Central Asia are largely due to the poverty of the region’s population. Jobs must be created and wide-scale social programs implemented to resolve this problem, which in turn implies accelerated economic develop- ment of the region within the framework of economic integration and close investment and technical cooperation with Russia and China. China is also interested in the region’s economic development. After the Tashkent summit, it issued its SCO partners loans totaling $900 million. Moreover, China signed agreements with Kyr- gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan in trade, industry, and oil and gas pipeline construction. In 2010, the PRC imported more than 40 million tonnes of Kazakh oil. As for Russia, it is ac- tively cooperating with Kazakhstan in the fuel and energy complex. Joint development of oil fields on the Caspian shelf is going on. There is no doubt that both Russia and China are interested in the region’s economic development. In this respect, it is worth noting China’s initiative, which, begin- ning in 2002, has been exerting significant effort to create a free trade area in the region. Even now China is one of the leading foreign trade partners of the Central Asian states, so it is not at all surprising that it is coming forward with initiatives to simplify customs procedures on both sides of the border. On the whole, the region’s relations with Russia and China are polarized; the flows of goods and services correspond to all factors of production. This is not a bad scenario for the transition pe- riod, but in order to create prerequisites for transferring to a contemporary model of international economic relations, the manufacturing industry of the Central Asian region must be restored and developed. Accelerated economic development within the framework of deep economic integration that corresponds to contemporary reality is a very important element in preserving political security in Central Asia. The countries of the region have all the prerequisites for that based on the surplus of production factors (mineral and energy resources) and the existence of a relatively cheap and suffi- ciently qualified workforce. Full-scale implementation of the region’s competitive advantages in light of globalization of the world economy is only possible through regional economic integration and close political cooperation within the EurAsEC and SCO. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the existence of a huge number of production factors ensures the countries’ development only at the first stage of economic development. Later, in

111 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS order to ensure efficient international investment cooperation, they will need to make advances in the manufacturing industry and the production of high-tech commodities and equipment. In addition to resources, the Central Asian countries possess immense transport potential. The CA region is situated at the crossroads of major Eurasian railroads. When the trans-Asian railroad went into operation, road and air communication was developed, export oil and gas pipelines ap- peared, the geopolitical and economic significance of CA significantly grew. Large cargo flows will pass through the region from east to west (from the Asia Pacific Region to Europe and back) and within the framework of the North-South corridor. In terms of its geopoliti- cal position, CA acts as a kind of bridge spanning Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, which should undoubtedly guarantee the security of the region’s countries. Pursuing an extensive transport policy requires restructuring of the region’s economy and development of infrastructure (transportation means and warehouses) in keeping with current world standards. Based on the above, it can be concluded that the available prerequisites for regional economic integration are opening up broad opportunities for resolving not only a whole set of economic, social, and environmental issues, but also for overcoming problems of political security in CA. They are caused by extreme poverty, which gives rise to terrorism and extremism. Resolving the problem of poverty in light of the accelerated economic processes within re- gional integration will make it possible to reduce drug trafficking, terrorist acts, and crime to the minimum. This integration could promote the acceleration of the CA states’ economic and political development, and so it is beneficial to each of them. However, the integration processes going on in the CA countries are still at the initial stage of their development (at the formation stage so to speak). Unfortunately, formation of the Common Economic Space in the Central Asian region is proceeding slowly and coming up against significant difficulties for the following reasons:  First, the economic reforms in the region’s countries are being carried out at different times and different rates, which means that visions of the future are out of sync.  Second, there is no common understanding of the integration development strategy, or of its goals, tasks, and priorities.  Third, problems of interstate relations are not being resolved in such spheres as joint water use, the environment, environmental protection, and the prevention of natural disasters.  Fourth, the CA states are pursuing different foreign policies and have different interna- tional orientations.  Fifth, trade relations among the region’s states have slackened; their interests are shifting to the developed countries of the world, primarily the U.S., the EU member states, Turkey, and China.  Sixth, the region is afflicted with a worsening geopolitical situation and intensification of such negative trends as a rise in extremism, terrorism, and drug trafficking. The problem of security has become a very important factor in unifying the region’s countries. In April 2000, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan signed an Agree- ment on Joint Action in the Fight against Terrorism, Political and Religious Extremism, Transna- tional Organized Crime, and Other Threats to Stability and Security in Tashkent. In addition, in De- cember 2002, a Joint Communiqué on resolving problems related to ensuring regional security was signed in Astana. The economic vector covers quite a wide range of issues pertaining to the development of rela- tions among the SCO member states. In this case, the matter concerns establishing cooperation in the 112 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 economy, trade, development and transportation of energy resources, transport, communications, fi- nancial relations, and the water industry.

Analysis of the Main Regulatory Legal Documents Regarding the Organization’s Economic Component

The main SCO documents (from the Declaration to the SCO Charter) laud the development of economic relations. In this regard, I would like to mention the Memorandum among the Governments of the SCO Member States on the Main Goals of Regional Economic Cooperation and Launching the Process to Create Favorable Conditions in Commerce and Investments signed on 14 September, 2001 in Al- maty. Art 1 of the Memorandum set forth the tasks facing the governments of the member states, which include identifying “economic compatibility,” “harmonizing national legislation,” and “creat- ing and developing regional economic cooperation mechanisms.” The Memorandum went on to designate the ways to perform these tasks, among which the following can be singled out: gradually removing trade and investment barriers, ensuring legal, economic, organizational, and other conditions for moving goods and passengers, including by transit, developing infrastructure at checkpoints, and harmonizing standards on goods and tech- nology. Moreover, the sides assumed obligations for “drawing up a long-term program of multilateral trade and economic cooperation reflecting its specific areas, priorities, spheres, and targets of activi- ty.” “The Sides will enter corresponding agreements to execute this Memorandum.”1 When assessing the Memorandum and the additional agreements that accompany it as achieving a consensus on a whole series of economic cooperation issues within the SCO, it should be noted that they (like those in the security sphere) were aimed at practical resolution of the situation, since their basic textual content is not politicized and is no way declarative in nature. These documents focus on resolving practical tasks at the interdepartmental levels. On the whole, along with the wide range of cooperation goals, tasks, and priorities in the SCO, all the main interaction parameters of the legislative regulatory framework are also becoming en- hanced. The main reason for the slowdown in economic cooperation is the absence of a mechanism for financing multilateral projects; the SCO budget is too modest and not intended for these goals. Conversations about creating a SCO Fund or Development Bank have been going on for a long time, but nothing has been done about it yet. China is essentially insisting on creating a bank in which votes would be distributed depending on the size of contribution. This is creating worries that China will make the largest contribution, which will allow it to control the bank and use its funds in its in- terests. Russia is suggesting establishing a Development Fund (Special Account) that will act as a mechanism for financing pre-project efforts, primarily in such spheres and energy, transport, and high

1 Memorandum among the Governments of the SCO Member States on the Main Goals of Regional Economic Cooperation and Launching the Process to Create Favorable Conditions in Commerce and Investments, Iurist Legal Data Base, Almaty, 14 September, 2001.

113 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS technology. In so doing, it is presumed that implementation of the projects themselves will be fi- nanced by the SCO Interbank Association.2 Several Russian ministries express this viewpoint. They believe that Russia’s interests will be best met not by establishing a bank with a predominating role played by China, but by the active use of a Eurasian Development Bank established within the EurAsEC, in which “the Russian share is much higher than the share of the other participants.”3 This viewpoint does not seem to be very perspicacious. A SCO bank with the participation of China would possess far greater financial opportunities than the Eurasian Bank of Development (in which Russia and Kazakhstan occupy the dominant position). In so doing, some of the SCO bank’s funds could be used to pay for projects implemented in Russia.4 In addition, Russia would have the opportunity to influence China’s financial participation in projects implemented within the SCO. In this respect, it should be noted that China is already unilat- erally issuing significant funds for privileged loans to Central Asian SCO members (at the moment they total more than $10 billion), but exclusively in its own interests and without any participation from Russia.5 To be fair, it should be noted that China’s economic domination in the region is not at all caused by the establishment of a bank, but by the situation currently existing in the SCO space. As for the SCO Interbank Association’s ability and desire to finance large multilateral projects, they appear doubtful. Moreover, the correlation of financial resources in it does not differ from the correlation of the SCO member states’ financial opportunities as a whole.6 It seems it would be expedient for Russia to agree to the establishment of a SCO development bank, providing that it and China invest an equal share of capital in it (in the same way as the SCO budget) and, correspondingly, have an equal number of votes. As observers so astutely noted, at the initial stage, the SCO’s main activity rode on two wheels— security and the economy. Now cultural-humanitarian and environmental cooperation has been add- ed, so the SCO is steadfastly moving forward on four wheels. The government leaders are cooperating regularly on the SCO platform, while there is also col- laboration at the level of branch ministers and heads of the special services. What is more, an exten- sive contractual-legal base of different types of activity has been prepared. In other words, the SCO has a strong institutional foundation.7

Conclusion

Summing up, it can be noted that the SCO’s main tasks today are strengthening stability and security in the broad area that joins its member states, fighting terrorism, separatism, extremism, and drug trafficking, and develop interaction and cooperation in the economy, energy, science, culture, and the environment.

2 See: A. Lukin, “Rasshirenie ShOS: vozmozhnosti i prepiatstviia,” Kazakhstan v globalnykh protsessakh, No. 1, 2011, p. 74. 3 P.A. Tsygankov, Teoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnosheny, Gardariki, Moscow, 2006, 590 pp. 4 See: V.G. Shemiatenkov, Evropeiskaia integratsiia, Mezhdnarodnye otnosheniia, Moscow, 2003, p. 66. 5 See: G.M. Kostiunina, Aziatsko-tikhookeanskaia ekonomicheskaia integratsiia, MGIMO, Moscow, 2002, p. 66. 6 See: K.F. Zatulin, A.V. Grozin, V.N. Khliupin, Natsionalnaia bezopasnost Kazakhstana. Problemy i perspektivy, Institute of CIS Countries, Moscow, 1998, p. 78. 7 See: A. Lukin, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: What Next?” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 3, 2007, available at [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9132]. 114 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

After rapidly passing through the institutionalization stage, the SCO became an efficient dialog platform8; nevertheless, although it has turned into a multifunctional structure with a wide range of ac- tivity, it still has a large amount of untapped potential. At the moment, it is important for the SCO not to lose its cooperation momentum, while the member states should have a clear vision of its prospects.9 What projects could become a fulcrum of multilateral economic trade cooperation? How can the efficiency of cooperation be raised when combating the new challenges and threats? What are the prospects for enlarging the SCO? What is the Organization’s contribution to resolving stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan? How will the SCO cooperate with other organizations in the Eurasian expanse? All of these questions are on the SCO’s development agenda. Due to the contradictions that have been designated between China and Russia in certain issues, in the next few years, trade and economic cooperation within the SCO will remain within the limits of the declarative agreements currently reached.10 As for China, it will try to develop trade and economic cooperation within the framework of the SCO and resolve the contradictions between the SCO and EurAsEC. Beijing does not like the fact that these two organizations are duplicating their priorities in trade and economic cooperation.11 China sees its integration into the EurAsEC as one of the ways to overcome the existing contra- dictions, which will lead to the Eurasian Economic Forum being absorbed by the SCO. Russia is not interested in strengthening the economic component of the SCO at the expense of weakening the EurAsEC and so it will not support the initiatives put forward by Beijing. For Moscow, it would be more beneficial to retain specific integration functions for the EurAsEC and more abstract ones for the SCO. So Moscow does not approve of Beijing’s calls for a free trade area in the SCO space.12 In turn, Russia will attempt to focus the SCO’s economic zone of responsibility on South Asia (Pakistan, India) and the countries adjacent to the CA region (Afghanistan, Iran) in the next few years. But Moscow’s policy will be opposed by Beijing, which during acceptance of some of observer countries as full-fledged members of the SCO has already expressed its concern that enlarging mem- bership while the Organization is still forming threatens erosion of its functional boundaries.13 On the whole, Russia’s position is entirely explainable; it will strive to retain the competency of the economic forum it controls in the post-Soviet expanse. In this respect, China’s interests do not appear to be entirely transparent. Despite the fact that no formal agreements on a free trade area have been entered within the SCO, the markets of the Organization’s member states are experiencing the significant expansion of Chinese export to a certain extent. In this respect, we will note that China’s desire to become integrated into the pro-Russian economic forum could be related to its desire to reduce Moscow’s influence on the Central Asian countries.14

8 See: Ar.A. Uluinian, Tsentrazia 2000/2005: Upushchenny shans? Otsenki i prognozy zarubezhnogo exspertno- analiticheskogo soobshchestva, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, 2006, p. 66. 9 See: A.G. Larin, “Rossia, Kitai i SShA: perspektivy sotrudnichestva v Tsentralnoi Azii,” in: Rossia i Kitai v Shankhaiskoi organizatsii sotrudnichestva, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, 2006, p. 29. 10 See: S.I. Lunev, Nezavisimye respubliki Tsentralnoi Azii i Rossii: ucheb. posobie, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, 2001, pp. 23-24. 11 See: M. Buries, Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics, RAND Report MR-1045-AF, San Francisco, 1999, p. 51. 12 See: A. Hyman, “Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia,” International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2, 1993, p. 289. 13 See: A.A. Kniazev, “Kirgizia i Rossia: bezopasnost, sotrudnichestvo i perspektivy razvitiia v tsentralnoaziatskom kontekste,” available at [http://vvww.eurasianhome.org/doc/knyazev.pdf]. 14 See: M.N. Suiunbaev, “Problemy identichnosti, predelov tselesoobraznosti integratsii i neodnovremennosti ee protsessa,” in: Proekty sotrudnichestva i integratsii dlia Tsentralnoi Azii: sravnitelny analiz, vozmozhnosti i perspektivy, ed. by A.A. Kniazev, Bishkek, 2007, p. 44.

115 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In contrast to Russia’s approaches to ensuring the competency of the EurAsEC, joining this economic community is not of principle importance to China; therefore, Beijing will accommodate Moscow in this issue, but in so doing achieve advantageous agreements for itself in the energy sphere.15 So in order to ensure social stability and raise the quality of life of the population of the SCO member states (much depends on the normal functioning of the government agencies, carrying out efficient reforms, strengthening economic trade ties, and streamlining regional transport and com- munication systems), the security issue must first be resolved. However, despite the prime importance of this aspect in the Organization’s activity, its long-term stability will to a great extent depend on how effectively the mechanisms of economic cooperation of its member states are utilized.

15 See: B.K. Kazbekov, “Integratsionnye vozmozhnosti razvitiia ekonomiki Kazakhstana,” Tranzitnaia ekonomika (Almaty), No. 5-6, 2005, p. 116.

THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE CIS REGION: BETWEEN CRISES?

Viktor BUDKIN D.Sc. (Econ.), professor, Chief Research Associate, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine)

ABSTRACT

his article examines the specific mani- from extensive to intensive economic activi- festations of crisis phenomena in the ty. He stresses the objective nature of the T region of the Commonwealth of Inde- lack of internal prerequisites for a transition pendent States (CIS) that are most pro- to large-scale modernization of the economy nounced in countries making progress in the and innovative economic development. His creation of a market economy. conclusion is that the CIS countries (or The author emphasizes the imitative “newly independent states” in foreign termi- nature of economic reforms in the post-So- nology) may face high-level threats to na- viet space. Based on an analysis of interna- tional security with the onset of the next tional assessments of the current economic stage of the recession in the absence of reli- situation in these states, he identifies the able prerequisites for economic stabilization main factors that prevent their transition in these countries.

116 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

KEYWORDS: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), level of economic development, crisis, modernization, civil society.

Introduction

The end of the active phase of the 2008-2009 crisis initially raised hopes of a rapid return to high growth rates in the world economy, the creation of new incentives for its qualitative renewal based on the most advanced technologies, and a correction of sectoral, territorial, financial and eco- nomic imbalances accumulated in the previous period. But reality fell short of these expectations. By the beginning of 2013, the slowly growing world economy only reached its pre-crisis level, while growth rates in China and other new economic growth centers had fallen sharply. Of the two regions with the largest contribution to the world economy, the European Union is going through a crisis of the eurozone, and the markets of North America are unsettled. As for the future, most experts are concerned about the possibility of a prolonged recession, which could lead to a new world crisis in much worse initial conditions than those on the eve of the previous crisis slump. Given the possible deterioration of global indicators, a particular cause for concern is the nega- tive impact of the recession on the situation in the CIS countries, most of which do not rank among advanced countries, have an insufficiently stable national economy, and are heavily dependent on global market conditions. It should be noted that the leaders of these countries have either failed to draw practical conclusions from the negative impact of the previous crisis or have confined them- selves to partial measures in ensuring national security during the recession, which makes it necessary to consider the specific responses of individual CIS countries to the events of 2008-2009.1

Peculiarities of the 2008-2009 Crisis in the CIS Countries

The latest global crisis has demonstrated an unexpected phenomenon in the specific develop- ment of the CIS countries: the hardest-hit countries were those which, according to previous esti- mates, had made the greatest progress along the path of economic reform. This applies to the region’s biggest drop in the gross domestic product (GDP) of Ukraine in 2009 (by 14.8%), its significant re- duction in Russia (by 7.8%), the slowdown in GDP growth in Kazakhstan from 18.8% in 2007 to 6.2% in 2009, and relatively slow economic growth in most other countries of the region. By contrast, high rates of economic growth even during the crisis were characteristic of Azerbaijan (in 2009, its GDP grew by 9.3%), Uzbekistan (by 8.1%) and Turkmenistan (by 6.1%), or countries with a high level of government intervention in economic processes and the lowest level of economic liberaliza- tion in the region.2

1 An initial and more complete analysis of the peculiarities of the crisis in the CIS region was given in my article “The CIS Countries: Some Peculiarities of Economic Development” in the journal Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2012. With inevitable duplication of a number of propositions and conclusions, the present article examines the new phenomena and processes in the economy of these countries that have appeared in the post-crisis period. 2 See: Osnovnye sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli gosudarstv-uchastnikov SNG za 1992 (1994)-2010 gody, Economic Cooperation Department of the CIS Executive Committee, Minsk, 2011, p. 3.

117 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

This phenomenon definitely needs to be explained. It is easiest to answer the question about the GDP decline in Armenia (by 14.1%, the second biggest drop in the region after Ukraine). This coun- try has no significant reserves of goods competitive in the world market (primarily energy resources) and can maintain some balance in its national economy only due to financial assistance from the IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank, Rus- sia, etc. The sharp drop in GDP during the crisis confirmed the lack of reserves for implementing the long-term economic stabilization program in Armenia as outlined in its development scenario for 2003-2015.3 The reasons behind the 6% drop in GDP in the Republic of Moldova (fourth biggest drop in the CIS) are virtually the same. The economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have only tenuous links with the world economy (especially with its financial sector), which is why they demonstrated positive, albeit low, rates of GDP growth in 2009 (a decline in GDP in Kyrgyzstan was recorded the following year). What is the reason for the continued high rates of economic growth in the three newly inde- pendent states mentioned above (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) and does not this obviate the need for market reforms in the post-Soviet space? A specific feature of all these three countries is that their exports are dominated by energy resources and raw materials which could be exported to the world market even during the crisis. But this statement of fact does not answer the question of why the same specialization of Russia and Kazakhstan did not allow them to maintain their previous high rates of economic development. Evidently, each of these countries had a set of specific factors that prevented or promoted the “import” of the global crisis into their national economies. Such an important preventive factor for Azerbaijan was that its exports were “locked” into long-term agreements with foreign partners—large transnational energy companies (TNCs)—un- der the so-called Contract of the Century (concluded in 1994) for the joint development of offshore oil fields in the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan, apart from existing long-term contracts, made active efforts from the beginning of this century to build new cross-border gas pipelines as an alternative to Russian routes: south to Iran (up to 14 billion cubic meters of gas per year) and especially east to rapidly developing China (in 2009, the first phase of a major pipeline running from Turkmeni- stan through Uzbekistan to China, which is to carry up to 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year, became operational). As for Uzbekistan, it has not only started the supply of energy resources to China, but has recently begun to open up its economy on a wider scale, attracting foreign invest- ments in the production of gold and polymetallic ores and in the chemical, automotive and other industries. A major role in fighting the crisis in these countries was also played by factors such as the pos- sibility to limit its impact based on the administrative-command mechanism of economic governance existing in these countries, as well as the absence of deep involvement in the world financial system, the epicenter of crisis phenomena in the world.4 Like the above three countries, Russia and Kazakhstan are oriented toward the export of en- ergy resources and raw materials in demand in the world market, and Kazakhstan, similarly to Azerbaijan, has long-term contracts with TNCs for the development of deposits in the west of the

3 See: Republic of Armenia: Third Review under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criterion—Staff Report; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion, IMF, Wash. D.C., 2003, p. 13. 4 As a parallel example of the use of administrative-command instruments to counter the crisis, one could also mention Belarus. Given its extremely high dependence on the situation in the Russian economy, one might have expected a plunge in the GDP of that country with the onset of the recession, but this not happen. Growth rates in the Belarusian economy did indeed fall to 0.2% in 2009 compared to 9-10% in previous years. But “manual” control of the Belarusian economy on the part of President Alexander Lukashenko’s administration made it possible to avoid a sharp drop in economic growth in the country.

118 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 country. But this similarity did not lead to equally positive results in fighting the world crisis, merely making it somewhat easier for the Kazakhstan economy to survive under its impact. This difference is due to the influence of many additional factors in the specific development of each of these two countries. In my opinion, the main reason for the economic difficulties in Kazakhstan lies in the financial sphere. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), Kazakhstan ranks very low (115th out of a total of 144 countries) on the development of the national financial market.5 In these conditions, private banks, which form the basis of the country’s banking system, in the precrisis period pursued a policy of massive borrowing in the international capital market, thus stimulating economic de- velopment and having an opportunity to pay off these loans from the export earnings of local companies. A decline in these earnings during the crisis disrupted this pattern, creating a critical situation for the banks. In late 2009, President Nursultan Nazarbaev was even obliged to speak of a real possibility of banks passing into the hands of foreign owners on a massive scale and the need for personal intervention in the economy to avert the threat looming over them. The example of Kazakhstan highlights the increased danger of excessive liberalization of the national financial system, which requires special control on the part of the state in view of the general instability of the global financial system.6 It would seem that the country least likely to experience a slump during the crisis was Russia, whose economic complex is the most powerful and diversified in the CIS region and has a strong position in a number of sectors of the world market. The world’s third-largest international reserves, a huge Stabilization Fund accumulating revenues from the export of highly priced energy resources, and a multi-year state budget surplus—such were the favorable indicators at the start of the unex- pected collapse of the Russian economy. The increased impact of the global recession is also due to a number of specific features of the Russian economy. First of all, let us note that the Russian economy is the largest economy in the CIS, and consid- ering that its quasi-market mechanism is identical to those of other post-Soviet countries, this made it more difficult for Russia to manage the anti-crisis processes compared to small states in the region. Suffice it to say that in contrast to them Russia has a three-level and not a two-level budget system: the Federal budget, the budgets of 89 different-status subjects of the Federation (ranging from repub- lics to autonomous areas) and local budgets. Such a complex pattern impeded the timely flow of anti- crisis financial assistance along the government vertical. Moreover, as it turned out, the actual re- sponse system for dealing with the financial roots of the crisis was not properly adjusted either: ac- cording to Padma Desai, an American researcher studying the Russian crisis, the policy of the Central Bank of Russia was initially focused on inflation control measures instead of assistance to the real sector.7 As in Kazakhstan, high foreign exchange earnings from exports created an illusion in the minds of Russian business people that it was safe for them to increase their foreign borrowing, so that from 2000 to 2008, when the external public debt was reduced from $158 billion to $37 billion, external bank borrowings increased from $7.8 billion to $192.8 billion, and non-financial sector borrowings,

5 See: The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, World Economic Forum, Geneva, 2013, p. 216. 6 The special role of the banking system in the impact of the crisis on the economy of Kazakhstan is examined in a report by researchers from the Karaganda Economic University of KazPotrebSoyuz Zh.A. Gusmanova and K.A. Yermakova Problemy vliania global’nogo krizisa na deiatelnost kommercheskikh bankov v Respublike Kazakhstan at a conference entitled “Integration Processes in the International Economy and Education,” Siberian Academy of Finance and Banking, Novosibirsk, 2009, pp. 80-85. 7 See: P.G. Desai, “Russia’s Financial Crisis: Economic Setbacks and Policy Responses,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, Issue 2, 2010, p. 2.

119 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS from $21.5 billion to $295.5 billion.8 Along with the slump in demand in the world market, the need to make significant payments on these loans became an additional factor working to depress business activity in the real sector, with fewer opportunities in this sector to obtain loans from Russian banks in view of their debt service payments to foreign lenders. Using Russia as an example, we can identify another important peculiarity of most CIS econo- mies: the existence of fictitiously healthy business entities which stay afloat only due to their special relationship with government authorities. Their instability during economic growth or even stagna- tion is in a latent state but becomes clearly evident when a crisis strikes. Academician Vladimer Pa- pava (Georgia) has described this unviable part of national business by the terms “necroeconomy” (that is, a virtually dead economy) and “zombie-economy” (the sector of virtually bankrupt firms living on soft loans based on their administrative support), emphasizing the special role of financial “doping” as the basis of the functioning of these two interconnected types of fictitious economy.9 As it turned out during the crisis, even major Russian corporations such as AvtoVAZ or KAMAZ have characteristic features of the type mentioned by Vladimer Papava. “Zombie-economy” elements will also be found in transport enterprises, in the aircraft industry (for example, significant airfare dis- counts for flights to and from the Russian Far East introduced in 2013 will increase passenger traffic and thus provide indirect support to actually “zombified” aircraft factories in view of the need to in- crease aircraft production) and in other branches of the economy. In conclusion, let us note Russia’s special role as the main partner of the CIS countries in trans- mitting the changes in global economic dynamics to the whole territory of the CIS region. This fact was stated quite clearly by the authors of a report on the first twenty years of independent develop- ment of these countries: “As the 2000s showed, Russia retransmitted global market fluctuations to the economy of most CIS countries in times of both recovery and recession.”10 A number of common development problems of the CIS counties that have affected the specif- ics of their participation in the crisis are considered below.

The Post-Crisis Development of the CIS Countries as Assessed by International Organizations

International organizations provide a sufficiently complete picture of the relative positions of different states in the global economic system, which also applies to their assessments of the com- parative rankings of all CIS countries. Of course, the leaders of individual states may disagree with these assessments, but they lack sufficiently reliable alternative tools for such comparisons. Let us also note that each individual indicator does not allow us to draw convincing conclusions about the situation in each country since this requires an integrated assessment of the whole range of rankings as provided by international organizations. Most newly independent states belong to the group of countries with relatively low levels of economic development. The highest level of GDP (PPP) per capita is in Russia: $10,310 in 2010 and

8 See: Mirovoi ekonomicheski krizis i Rossia: prichiny, posledstvia, puti preodolenia, Collective Report, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, 2009, p. 20. 9 See: V.G. Papava, “The Problem of Zombification of the Postcommunist Necroeconomy,” Problems of Economic Transition, Vol. 53, Issue 4, 2010, pp. 35-51. 10 Novye nezavisimye gosudarstva: sravnitelnye itogi sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitia, ed. by L.B. Vardomskiy, Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2012, pp. 55-56.

120 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

$17,709 in 2012, 53rd and 55th places among 187 countries ranked by the International Monetary Fund. In 2010, the second-best performer among the CIS countries was Kazakhstan ($8,883 per capita, rank 59), which in 2012 ($13,893, rank 69) lost its second place in the region to previously unranked Belarus ($15,634, rank 62). According to IMF data, only these three states exceeded the world average for GDP per capita, which in 2012 was $11,975. A point to note is that Azerbaijan moved down from 3rd to 4th place in the region and from 71st to 85th overall position in the rank- ings in the course of two years while its GDP per capita increased from $6,008 to $10,478. As for lower-ranking CIS countries, their positions in the region in 2010 and 2012 fully coincide, with some changes in the overall world rankings. If the appearance of Turkmenistan in the 2012 list (with $8,718 and rank 96 in the IMF estimate in the absence of the respective indicators for 2010) is not taken into account, Ukraine (with $3,000 in 2010 and $7,374 in 2012 and ranks 94 and 105, respec- tively) remained 5th in the region in this indicator, and Armenia, 6th (with $2,846 and $5,838 and a drop from rank 99 to rank 118 during these years). The remaining four countries, which lag signifi- cantly behind the above-mentioned states in terms of development level, have actually not changed their position in the CIS either. Uzbekistan, like Turkmenistan, was not included in the 2010 rankings,11 and in 2012 it ranked 134th with $3,555 per capita. The figure for Moldova increased from $1,631 to $3,415 with a significant drop in the world rankings from 107th to 136th position; Kyrgyzstan had $864 and $2,376 (120th and 147th); and Tajikistan with its extremely low GDP of $741 and $2,229 per capita was 125th and 151st in the IMF rankings.12 What catches the eye in the above figures is that all CIS countries have moved down in the world rankings, which can be explained by the more dynamic growth in recent years of developing countries with similar GDP levels. At the same time, GDP growth in the CIS countries exceeded the respective indicators of the EU and many other highly developed countries which are a major market for CIS goods. In view of this, the overall conclusion from this difference in dynamics will be ambivalent. While faster GDP growth rates in the CIS countries should be seen as positive, it should also be pointed out that relatively slow economic growth in their advanced trading partners will inevitably create additional difficulties for CIS exports to the latter. If we compare the figures for the CIS countries with those for the top five advanced economies, we will have to say that the whole region lags seriously behind in terms of economic development level. In 2010, the average figure for the top five countries (Luxembourg, , , Den- mark and Australia), according to our calculations, was $74,451.8 per capita. Relative to this average, GDP levels per capita in the CIS region ranged from 14% in Russia to 1% in Tajikistan. In 2012, the average for the top five countries (Luxembourg, Norway, United States, Switzerland and Canada), according to IMF data, fell to $54,585.4 (the reasons for such a drop in the rankings of this interna- tional organization are not explained), which somewhat improved the relative figures for countries in the CIS region: ranging from 32.4% in Russia to 4.1% in Tajikistan.13 The best data for GDP per capita in the CIS region in 2012 as demonstrated by Russia were close to those of Croatia or Malay- sia, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with their lowest GDP per capita figures in the CIS were in the group of least developed countries such as Yemen. Another interesting comparison is with post-Soviet countries that are not members of the CIS. In 2012, the levels of GDP per capita in Estonia ($21,713, rank 45 in the IMF list), Lithuania ($21,615, rank 46) and Latvia ($18,255, rank 51) exceeded those of Russia and all other countries in

11 Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan had not provided official information on their economic development indicators. 12 See: World Economic Outlook Database (April 2011 and April 2013), IMF, Wash. D.C., 2011 and 2013, available at [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_cap]. 13 Calculated from the same sources.

121 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the region, and only Georgia ($5,930, rank 117) was outranked by five CIS countries, being close to the level of Armenia.14 The reasons for the CIS countries’ lag can be explained by generalizing the analysis of their current economic situation performed both by international organizations and by researchers from these countries themselves. The efficiency of the functioning of the market economy outside the crisis period depends directly on the degree of economic liberalization. It is no accident that the most advanced countries in the world such as Australia, Switzerland, Canada, Denmark, the United States and a number of others are among the top ten states with the highest level of economic freedom. According to the Heritage Foundation, which ranks countries on economic freedom and its components using a scale of 0 to 100 (where 100 represents the maximum freedom), in 2012 Australia scored 90.0 on property rights and financial freedom, 88.0 on freedom from corruption, 80.0 on investment freedom, 86.2 on trade freedom, and 66.4 on fiscal freedom, and this, together with a number of other indicators, gives an overall economic freedom score of 82.6 (making its economy one of the freest in the world behind the economies of Singapore and Hong Kong. In the CIS region, this organization singles out Armenia (rank 38 among a total of 177 countries with an overall economic freedom score of 69.4), Kazakhstan (63.0, rank 68), Azerbaijan (59.7, rank 88) and the Kyrgyz Republic (59.6, rank 89). They are far ahead of Moldova (55.5, rank 115), Tajikistan (53.4, rank 131) and Russia (51.1, rank 139). Others were assigned less than half of the maximum score: Belarus (48.0, rank 154), Ukraine (46.3, rank 161), Uzbekistan (46.0, rank 162) and Turkmenistan (42.6, rank 169).15 The level of economic freedom was virtually unchanged compared to the pre-crisis period (in 2008, the average score for 11 CIS countries was 54.7, and in 2012, 54.4). In this period, the score of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia and Belarus rose by 1 to 3 points; Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan lost about as much, while the biggest losers were Uzbekistan (6 points) and Ukraine (5 points). In the same period, other post-Soviet countries increased their level of economic freedom so that in 2012 Estonia scored 75.3 (rank 13), Georgia 72.2 (rank 21), Lithuania 72.1 (rank 22), and only Latvia (66.5, rank 55) was at the level of the best performers in the CIS re- gion: Armenia and Kazakhstan.16 The above data point to the imitative nature and incompleteness of reform of the economic mechanism in the CIS countries: even after the adoption of numerous legal acts in the area of na- tional economic management, this mechanism resembles that of advanced countries only in form, whereas in content it does not meet the current needs of survival in the complex situation of stagnation processes in the world economy. With a low level of economic freedom, it is impossible to make full and, most importantly, extensive use of the country’s entire labor potential, especially of small and medium business, in the process of national production. It is no accident that all attempts to draw such business into the pro- duction sector in most CIS countries have not produced any results, and the field of its application is confined to consumer services, public catering, small-scale passenger traffic services, etc. Under the existing economic mechanism, small and medium business is rejected by the production sector, which continues to be dominated by large and medium-sized enterprises. But in relation to such economic entities the principle of reasonable competition operates only to a limited extent, whereas in real market conditions in other countries it is a key incentive to competitive struggle which entails the

14 See: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013, IMF, Wash., D.C., 2013, available at [http://www.en.wikipedia. org/wiki/list_of_countries_by_ GDP_(PPP)_per_cap]. 15 See: Country Rankings: World & Global Economy Rankings on Economic Freedom, 2012, The Heritage Foundation, New York, 2013, pp. 1-5, available at [http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking]. 16 Calculated from the same source.

122 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 need to improve product quality, implement innovations, and meet the changing demand of produc- tion and personal consumption. As for big business, researchers from Moscow State University and the Higher School of Economics (Moscow) have identified the characteristic features of modern Rus- sian corporations that fully apply to big business in other CIS countries as well. Among these features the Russian researchers list the following: highly concentrated ownership and control; rapid pace of integration (with integrated business groups dominating the Russian economy); and a tendency to “personify” Russian business.17 The high level of concentration naturally serves to strengthen the monopolies or oligopolies (domination by a small group of companies) in various spheres of business, making it possible for them to establish their own rules of the game in national markets and to frustrate even timid attempts by the state to introduce competition into the economy. Compared to the larger economic complexes of Russia or Ukraine, the imperative for monopolization in the smaller economies of the other CIS countries is more likely to manifest itself while its negative effects on these states become more pro- nounced. The reference to rapid business integration is also valid: more powerful companies push competitors out of the market through mergers and acquisitions, strengthening their monopoly posi- tion in an increasingly monopolized economy. And finally, a very important reference is made to the “personification” of big business, with the result that business dynasties (similar to the foreign “his- torical” companies of Rockefeller, Morgan, Rothschild, etc.) are being created in Russia and other CIS countries, which ensures the intrafamily transfer of the high level of monopolization with a view to the long term in the absence of the legal and economic instruments for limiting it that exist in ad- vanced capitalist countries. Despite the significant increase in the power of individual financial-industrial groups in all CIS countries, they are still highly dependent on government agencies, which also applies to control by the lower tiers of the entire power vertical over smaller-sized local business. This is particularly evi- dent in Muslim “strongman” countries of the region, where the power vertical is built on the principle of belonging to the family clan of the head of state. In the European part, this dependence is most clearly evident during a change of government leadership when, for example, the St. Petersburg or the Donetsk clan comes to power in a country, with a gradual weakening of business associated with the previous administration. As for President Lukashenko’s long-term leadership in Belarus, it brings the mechanism of administrative dependence of business closer to the practices of “Muslim” coun- tries in the CIS region. Of course, administrative agencies at different levels do not constantly intervene in all the con- crete activities of business entities but, in pursuit of their own interests (presented as the interests of the state or a particular region), sort of monitor their practical work. The CIS region has a typical model of patron-client relationships where business entities are under the patronage of administra- tions at different levels. At the same time, the degree of administrative influence on economic activ- ity varies, being highest in countries with the lowest indicators of economic freedom (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus).18 In this context, an indicative assessment of the situation in the economy was made by Belarusian Academician Gennady Lych: “In terms of economic freedom, joint stock com-

17 See: A. Yakovlev, Y. Simachev, Y. Danilov, “The Russian Corporation: Patterns of Behavior during the Crisis,” Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2010, p. 131. 18 As noted above, this group of countries with the least business freedom also includes Ukraine, but the situation with general administrative intervention in economic processes in this country differs significantly from that in the above three states. Given the unstable political position of the changing clans and the relative balance of power between them, patron-client relationships in Ukraine are not nationwide but are confined within the limits of several groups, which strengthen or weaken with a change of leadership in the country. Because of this, direct administrative intervention is applied only to “one’s own” business entities, with attempts to influence such entities from other political and economic clans in the country at least indirectly.

123 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS panies in Belarus differ very little from state enterprises. Like the latter, they are under the full control of the state, and any attempts to get out of this control, accompanied by ‘excessive’ independence in making cardinal management decisions, are, as a rule, severely punished.”19 The viability of each country in today’s difficult conditions is directly dependent on the level of its national competitiveness compared to other participants in the current global economic confronta- tion. Most CIS countries during the years of independence have not been able to join the ranks of countries with a high level of competitiveness, although in the post-crisis period many of them have somewhat improved their position in the global rankings. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), the top-ranking CIS country in terms of national competitiveness in 2012-2013 is Azerbaijan (46th out of a total of 144 countries listed in the WEF Global Competitiveness Index rankings), fol- lowed by Kazakhstan (51st), with both countries having improved their competitiveness from the previous year. The third place in the region belongs to Russia (67th with a slight drop from the previ- ous year). Ukraine (73rd), Armenia (82nd), Moldova (87th) and Tajikistan (100th) have improved their position, while the Kyrgyz Republic (127th) has lost some ground from the previous year. Characteristically, the WEF could not provide rankings for countries with the lowest level of eco- nomic freedom: Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.20 Even while most countries in the region have improved their position in the WEF rankings (by 5-10 places, with Kazakhstan making the most impressive progress, up 21 places in the 2012-2013 rankings compared to the previous WEF estimate), it should be noted that only Azerbaijan features among the top 50 countries in the rankings, and Kazakhstan with its 51st position is virtually within the same group. In the event, both these countries have “natural” competitiveness in view of favorable conditions for the production of energy resources, their main export item (indicatively, among the most competitive countries in the world, along with economically advanced countries, one will also find Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are countries with a monocultural national economy based on their rich energy resource endowments). That is why the progress in improving competitiveness made by other post-Soviet countries—Estonia (34th in the rankings), Lithuania (45th) and even Latvia (55th) along with Georgia’s fairly low 77th place21—is more impressive. In making an overall assessment of the current economic position of the CIS countries, one should emphasize that none of them have drawn the necessary conclusions from the previous crisis situation or taken decisive steps toward a radical change in the economic system. The leaders of the newly independent states have not ventured to launch a radical restructuring of the imitative-market economic mechanism, which would require a double infringement of the existing privileges both of businesses close to the authorities and of administrative agencies at different levels interested in maintaining current patterns of relationships with business.

Are the CIS Countries Ready for a Possible New Crisis?

Unfortunately, nothing in the modern world economy points to the possibility of a new eco- nomic recovery, while the most likely development scenarios boil down either to further prolonged stagnation or to the onset of a new crisis. Both of these can have an adverse effect on economic activ-

19 G. Lych, “Zamedlenie rynochnogo reformirovania ekonomiki Belarusi: vo blago ili vo vred?” Obshchestvo i ekonomika, No. 4, 2013, p. 20. 20 See: The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, p. 13. 21 See: Ibidem.

124 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 ity and even on the economic security of the CIS countries, most of which exist in a situation of ir- rational openness to the world market while some (primarily Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), on the contrary, are just as irrationally autarkic and fence themselves off from the still existing possibilities of its positive impact on large-scale modernization of their national economy. Even leaving aside the perfectly natural problem of the historically limited prospects for the current orientation toward maintaining one’s place in the world economy as suppliers of non-renew- able raw materials and energy resources, one must admit that such specialization of the CIS countries cannot put them in the forefront of global economic progress. The leading positions in the world, now and in the future, will be held by countries which secure these positions based on the advantages of high technology production, its constant innovative renewal, and effective and dynamic management using advanced methods of corporate governance. The imperative need for urgent changes not only in the structure of the national economy and exports, but also in the methods of economic management is due to the fact that the background to the CIS countries’ entry into a possible future crisis is much less favorable than on the eve of the 2008 crisis. At that time, a number of newly independent states had significant foreign exchange reserves due to high energy prices (accumulated in the stabilization funds of Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakh- stan) and a more or less stable position in some niches of the world economy (metallurgy for Ukraine, gas for Turkmenistan, and arms for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus). Nor should one forget the “retrans- mission” of Russia’s favorable market conditions to the entire CIS region, as noted in the above- mentioned report of the Russian Institute of Economics. In a situation of successful pre-crisis devel- opment in Western Europe and Russia, a major role in stabilizing the economy in a number of countries (especially Tajikistan, Moldova, and also Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) was played by remit- tances received from temporary migrant workers employed in foreign countries. Today all these factors are changing for the worse. It is no longer possible to have such huge stabilization funds, and competition in the world markets of metallurgical products, chemicals and intermediate goods is increasing. In July 2013, Saudi Arabia expressed its concern over a very likely sharp drop in energy prices with the transition of its main partner, the United States, to biofuel and shale gas, compounded by the slowdown in China’s energy imports. Such a price drop will not only lead to a decline in the revenues of OPEC countries and in oil production in these countries, but will also have a limiting effect on gas produc- tion in the world. It will also have a full impact on the energy export sectors of Russia, Turkmenistan and other CIS countries, as well as on their production of all export commodities. The worsening terms of trade for exports to non-CIS markets will not be fully offset by the development of intra-regional economic ties. The functioning of the Customs Union of Russia, Ka- zakhstan and Belarus, which may be joined by several other newly independent states, will indeed help to expand their mutual economic cooperation. It should be noted, however, that achieving a large share of mutual trade will take a long time since two members of this union are oriented toward the markets of other countries of the world: in the postcrisis 2010-2012 period, non-CIS countries ac- counted for 85% of Russia’s exports and 85-87% of its imports, for 85-87% of Kazakhstan’s exports and 49-52% of its imports, and for 46-51% of the exports of Belarus and 35-41% of its imports. Ex- ports mainly to partners outside the CIS are also characteristic of Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine, with a particularly large share reported by Azerbaijan (89-95% in the same period). In Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine, most imports in that period also came from countries outside the CIS region, which was the main supplier only for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.22

22 See: Udelnyi ves stran Sodruzhestva i drugikh stran mira v obshchem obiome eksporta otdel’nykh stran Sodruzhestva. Udelnyi ves stran SNG i drugikh stran mira v obshchem obiome importa otdel’nykh stran Sodruzhestva, Materials of the Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS, Minsk, 2013, available at [http://www.cisstat.com/rus/macro/mac2_an.htm].

125 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The CIS Free Trade Agreement signed on 18 October, 2011 will undoubtedly have a positive effect on the development of intra-regional trade relations, but its effectiveness is significantly re- duced by collective safeguards applied by member states of the Customs Union (take the already known cases of Russian bans on the import of some Ukrainian food products being extended to other Customs Union members). At the same time, attempts to include all CIS countries in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space cannot succeed both for economic reasons (concern among national business entities that they can maintain their position against more powerful Russian com- panies) and even for political reasons (a negative attitude to Russia among a significant part of the population of Ukraine or Moldova). As a conclusion, one can say that, in the event of a crisis, the foreign economic factor will play a negative role in the stabilization of national economies in the region. The only possibility for the CIS countries to reduce the impact of a possible crisis is to implement a rapid and large-scale modernization policy on the basis of innovation. In the post-crisis years, calls for modernization are increasingly common both in research papers and in government documents of most of these countries, and this without a sufficiently clear definition of the substance of this really important process. In my opinion, it is necessary to distinguish between its various levels such as technical and technological modernization (confined to the production process as such: replacement of obsolete ma- chinery, technologies and raw materials with more modern ones), economic modernization (addition- ally covering management and the country’s economic mechanism as a whole) and social moderniza- tion, designed to improve the entire system of social relations, including the construction of a civil so- ciety, full democratization of relations between members of society and the state, creation of an effective legal framework for the protection of all, including economic, rights of the individual, etc. There is a long-felt need for modernization in view of the “unprecedented deindustrialization that has occurred as a result of the transition to the market and the breakup of the U.S.S.R.”23 But at the present stage mod- ernization is turning into a critical factor in the survival of the CIS countries, given the fundamental changes and increasingly complex economic relations in the world. Technical and technological modernization can only be based on innovation, which requires significant financial and material resources. Such resources are not available in many newly indepen- dent states which have what is known in Russian as patekonomika, or an economy that is in a sort of “stalemate” where it lacks internal reserves for its normal functioning and exists only due to outside assistance. Today there are no such reserves in Moldova, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, for which the task of modernization is less important than the need to address a whole group of problems for the mere survival of the national economy. At the same time, Armenia, where the domestic situation is similar, is implementing some modernization measures of a technical and technological nature based on economic modernization: the use of modern management practices under conditions of a high level of economic freedom, the existence of highly qualified personnel, and support for innovation activities on the part of the Armenian diaspora. Countries such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turk- menistan have opportunities for selective “imported modernization” based on foreign equipment and technologies obtained for the technical and technological upgrading of export facilities at the expense of their own foreign exchange earnings or within joint ventures. The unpreparedness of these coun- tries to exploit the opportunities of “economic modernization” through a fundamental restructuring of the economic mechanism and the implementation of advanced management methods significantly limits their overall modernization opportunities. Selective modernization of large enterprises chosen directly by the country’s leadership is also underway in Belarus. The difficulties in carrying out mod- ernization with its high costs are evident in that a transition to its large-scale implementation as an-

23 See: Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoie razvitie postsovetskikh stran: itogi dvadtsatiletia, Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2012, p. 31.

126 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 nounced by the country’s authorities requires an estimated $20-25 billion a year, a sum Belarus does not have at its disposal.24 Successive Ukrainian leaders have also repeatedly proclaimed the need to undertake moderniza- tion. This was even the topic of President Viktor Yanukovich’s 2011 annual address to parliament, “Modernization of Ukraine: Our Strategic Choice.” But all modernization initiatives of the authorities have remained mere declarations for lack of material and financial backing. There are only some at- tempts to modernize individual enterprises in the metallurgical, chemical, automotive and food in- dustries without a comprehensive effort in each industry or the national economy as a whole. Kazakh- stan, on the contrary, is generally consistent in its modernization policy although its potential for modernization is more modest than that of Ukraine due to its much smaller national economic com- plex. The task of turning Kazakhstan into a developed industrial and agricultural country with a de- clining share of extractive industries and a predominant share of manufacturing was set in President Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan 2030 state program back in 1998. The country managed to retain its scien- tific and technical potential during the crisis, and after it began implementing medium-term innova- tion and investment programs. A concrete example is the program to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle in Kazakhstan: from uranium mining to exports of fuel for nuclear power plants. The largest and most developed country in the region, the Russian Federation, has the greatest potential for modernization. The Concept of Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federa- tion until 2020, former President Dmitry Medvedev’s Address to the Federal Assembly of 12 Novem- ber, 2009, and the tasks of enhancing the efficiency of the national economy formulated by current President Vladimir Putin provide guidelines for the implementation of national economic strategy, setting reference points such as modernization, priority innovation, and a transition to intensive develop- ment. In accordance with these guidelines, a number of state scientific and technical programs of an innovative nature have been launched in Russia; budget allocations for nanotechnology, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals have increased; and government contracts are being awarded to contractors who can ensure a technological level of production and product quality close to world class. Despite some positive changes in the field of modernization, these measures have not led to its diffusion throughout the Russian economy. Both Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin have repeat- edly noted that the achievement of modernization targets is behind schedule, with frequent departures from the prescribed qualitative parameters. Things have reached a point where a full-scale audit is being conducted at two of the most ambitious projects—RosNANO and Skolkovo—in view of incon- sistencies between the results of their activity and the funds allocated by the state. Russian experience is particularly valuable in that it shows the impossibility of “top-down” modernization, when grassroots economic entities are passive or do not accept even those moderniza- tion measures which are used in a “normal” market economy. A radical solution of this problem, which is an essential condition for cushioning the impact of a new crisis, lies not only in the eco- nomic sphere: of paramount importance is the political factor, a transition to higher levels of reform based on social modernization.

Conclusion

Foreign analysts of post-Soviet development problems such as Jeffrey Sachs, Padma Desai, Roland Götz, Martha Olcott and others pay much attention to the relationship between democratiza- tion and economic development in the CIS countries. Particularly interesting conclusions have been

24 See: V. Karbovich, Eto sladkoe slovo “modernizatsia”, available at [http://charter97org/ru/news/2013/2/9/6510].

127 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS made by the Hungarian researcher János Kornai, who is especially emphatic about the direct depen- dence of economic modernization on social liberalization in this region.25 In recent years, researchers from CIS countries, primarily Russia, are also increasingly insisting on this relationship. Georgy Satarov (INDEM Foundation) points to the growing pre-crisis threats to Russia and draws the conclusion that they can be averted only through a transition to economic mod- ernization, while the prerequisites for its successful implementation are “a sufficiently effective state (or, more precisely, government)” and “a developed civil society.” Yevgeny Yasin (Higher School of Economics) writes that “in Russia, at least since 2003, there has been a policy of modernization from above,” while effective modernization implies the need to “eliminate the personalistic regime incompat- ible with democracy and achieve a real separation of powers.”26 Such conclusions about social modern- ization apply to all CIS countries regardless of their current economic and political development level. Modernization is a complex economic and political process, and the leaders of even the most developed countries in the region find it difficult to embark on this process. But without its implemen- tation neither Russia nor the other CIS countries will be able to maintain their security in the face of a future crisis.

25 See: J. Kornai, “Innovation and Dynamism. Interaction between Systems and Technical Progress,” Economics of Transition, Vol. 18 (4), 2010, pp. 629-670. 26 G. Satarov, “Prolegomeny k poslednei modernizatsii Rossii,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 5, 2011, p. 6; Ye. Yasin, “Institutsionalnye ogranichenia modernizatsii, ili prizhiviotsa li demokratia v Rossii,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 11, 2011, pp. 10-11.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TAJIKISTAN’S TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA

Khojimakhmad UMAROV Professor, Department Head at the Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

ABSTRACT

uring its twenty years of indepen goods turnover with these countries. The dence, the dynamics of Tajikistan’s import and export commodity structures D trade and economic relations with also greatly differ. Both Russia and China Russia and China have undergone dramat- have their own areas of specialization in ic changes. Russia’s share is gradually de- the economy and are pursuing a policy clining, while China’s is growing; imports aimed at establishing unequal relations noticeably outstrip exports in Tajikistan’s with Tajikistan.

128 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

KEYWORDS: Tajikistan, Russia, China, trade and economic relations, foreign trade turnover.

Introduction. Dynamics of Tajikistan’s Trade and Economic Relations with Russia and China during Twenty Years of Independence

In order to make forecasts and elaborate promising vectors in the development of Tajikistan’s economic system, a comparative analysis of the efficiency of its trade and economic relations with different countries of the world must be carried out. The matter primarily concerns Tajikistan’s larg- est foreign economic partners—the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Both the Russian Federation and Tajikistan are not only members of the CIS, EurAsEC, and CSTO, but were also part of the same state for almost 150 years (first the and then the Soviet Union). During this time, they underwent mutual economic integration, established com- mon political and public institutions, experienced an upsurge in the number of Tajik migrant workers coming to Russia, and enjoyed perceptible cultural rapprochement. Both before and after the revolution, Russia rendered Tajikistan significant assistance in over- coming its long centuries of socioeconomic backwardness. In Soviet times, the centralized govern- ment sent large amounts of material and financial resources, advanced technology, scientific-technical staff, and engineering personnel to Tajikistan. This helped Tajikistan to overcome its extreme back- wardness and become a country with a middle level of economic and social development in a rela- tively short time. It is particularly worth noting that Tajikistan was rendered assistance in accordance with the theoretical conception elaborated by the C.P.S.U. intended to level out the economic and social de- velopment of the countries belonging to the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus were the main donors helping Tajikistan to overcome its technical-economic and social back- wardness. During Soviet times, such scientific-intensive spheres as machine-building, the electronic and electrotechnical industry, as well as the production of rare and trace metals were established. The manufacturing industry developed at an accelerated pace. Large power plants (the Nurek and Bai- pazin hydropower plants, the Dushanbe Central Heating and Power Plant, and others) were built and put into operation, and the first phase of a large-scale project to establish the South Tajik territorial production complex was implemented at a rapid rate. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought with it economic disintegration of the post-Soviet space and a breakdown in commercial and production ties between Russia and Tajikistan; de-indus- trialization and de-urbanization processes also began in the country. There was a dramatic change in the sociopolitical nature of trade and economic relations between Tajikistan and Russia that then acquired market features. There have been severe fluctuations in Tajik-Russian economic relations during the twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is shown by the data on goods turnover between the two countries presented in Table 1. Whereas the absolute indices in the table show the rapid growth rates of the foreign trade turn- over between Tajikistan and the Russian Federation, the relative ones reflect its drastic fluctuations.

129 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 24.9 19.1 2010 958.3 –8.4 –8.4 2010 2011 101.8 856.5 times 772.0 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 25.1 2009 898.1 17.8 –7.7 –7.7 2010 2009 102.9 795.2 times 685.3 25.0 2008 18.8 1,171.8 2009 –8.4 –8.4 2008 672.0 124.3 times 1,047.4 22.7 2007 911.0 10.0 2008 466.5 97.3 –8.4 2007 813.7 times 15.7 2006 7.1 489.1 2007 283.6 65.4 –6.5 2006 423.7 times 15.2 2005 5.1 339.3 2006 158.9 82.8 –3.1 2005 256.5 times 14.3 2004 4.4 301.3 98.2 2005 60.5 –4.0 2004 240.8 times 13.7 3.0 2003 236.3 63.1 2004 52.2 –3.4 2003 178.1 times 1.9 17.2 32.4 2003 2002 251.0 87.5 2002 163.5 –87.0% 9.7 0.7 2002 17.5 2001 234.1 2001 104.7 129.4 –23.6% 7.4 0.6 2001 , pp. 581, 582. , pp. 581, , Statistics collection, Dushanbe, 2011, pp. 575, 576. , pp. 577, 578. , pp. 577, 24.9 2000 363.9 Trade Turnover between Tajikistan and the PRC +2.5 +2.5 2000 258.8 105.1 times 1.0 15.3 2000 Foreign Trade Turnover between Tajikistan and Russia 14.8 1995 231.3 47.9 –2.1 6.0 0.4 1998 102.1 times 1995 Correlation of Export and Import in Trade between Tajikistan Russia 53.1 40.1 1991 0.5 0.1 1993 95.3 1995 136.0 –42.7% 31.5 21.6 1991 +45.8% $m

$m of Tajikistan’s foreign of Tajikistan’s foreign of Tajikistan’s foreign of Tajikistan’s foreign Export, Import, Trade balance (+) (–) S o u r c e: Tajikistan: 20 Years of State Independence $m % trade turnover S o u r c e: Tajikistan: 20 Years of State Independence $m % trade turnover S o u r c e: Tajikistan: 20 Years of State Independence

130 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

In 2004, Tajikistan’s share of trade with Russia in its total foreign trade turnover dropped to 14.3%. By 2010, this index reached 24.9%, but it still lags far behind the 1991 level when Russia’s share in the total volume of Tajikistan’s trade with foreign countries amounted to 40.1%. The trade dynamics between Tajikistan and China stand out against the background of the above-noted fluctuations. Trade relations between Tajikistan and the PRC did not begin until 1993. In Soviet times, Ta- jikistan imported a small amount of Chinese goods that were distinguished by high quality and en- joyed deserved respect among local consumers. Their inflow was regulated by Soviet central planned and foreign trade organizations. After 1993, trade between China and Tajikistan began to develop consistently and at very high rates, as shown by the data in Table 2. The above tables show two opposing trends. During the indicated time period, Russia’s share in Tajikistan’s foreign trade turnover dropped from 40.1 to 24.9%. At the same time, the PRC’s share increased from 0.1 to 17.8%. The volumes of trade turnover with Russia increased (in absolute terms) 18.0 times, and with China 1,370.6 times. In terms of its share and absolute trade turnover volumes, China still trails behind Russia. Nev- ertheless, there is every reason to conclude that China will soon rank as Tajikistan’s first trade partner. For the moment though (that is, in 2010), its four top foreign trade partners are Russia (with a share of foreign trade turnover of 24.9%), the PRC (17.8%), Turkey (11.3%), and Kazakhstan (8.1%). These trends can be seen in the documents of official sources, that is, the data of the Russian Statistics Agency. However, the PRC’s statistics on absolute trade volumes between the two countries indicate larger figures. According to Chinese data, in 2011, the trade turnover volumes between the PRC and Tajikistan topped $2.2 billion. If we proceed from them, it turns out that the PRC currently ranks first among Tajikistan’s foreign trade partners. In other words, China has managed to perceptibly exceed the current level of trade between Tajikistan and Russia, although the export and import commodity structures of these countries greatly differ.

Trade Turnover Structure between Tajikistan and Russia

In the context of the development of Tajik-Russian relations, the trade balance between Tajiki- stan and Russia arouses justified anxiety (see Table 3). The data in the table indicate that extremely undesirable trends are developing in Russian-Tajik trade relations. Primarily, an acute inequality in trade can be seen (by years). Fluctuations cannot only be seen throughout the entire period under review, but are also clearly traced in short time periods. It is worth noting that in 2010, compared with 2000, the export of goods to Russia dropped more than 2.5 times. At the same time, the opposite trend is seen with respect to the export of Tajik goods to China. Stable high growth rates can be seen in imports from Russia. In contrast to China, Russia’s imports consist of basic goods; the development of Tajikistan’s economy depends on them, as well as the security of its population. Goods worth mentioning are fuels and lubricants, wheat and the flour made from it, sugar, vegetable oil, and others. At the same time, it is worth noting the growing negative disproportion in the trade turnover structure between Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. Between 1991 and 2010, the volume of Tajikistan’s export to Russia grew 3.2 times, while import rose 39.6 times. These figures show that 131 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS import has increased 13.0 times faster than export. So the trade balance with Russia is extremely negative; in 2010 alone, imports exceeded exports 8.5 times. The emergence of this situation can be explained by the following reasons: 1. Tajikistan is importing those commodities from Russia that, as mentioned above, are vi- tally important for it. Due to Tajikistan’s geographic location, they cannot be imported (or imported in the necessary amounts) from other countries closer by. For example, Iran is mainly selling crude oil, since it does not have sufficient production capacities for produc- ing gasoline, diesel fuel, and lubricants. Moreover, there are certain technical issues and aspects of interstate relations that are preventing petroleum products from being sent from Iran to Tajikistan. Oil fields have been discovered in Tajikistan, but they are at a great depth (4,500- 6,000 m), and their exploitation does not look economically lucrative. The country is unable to import and refine crude oil; the same can also be said of grains. Tajikistan’s bioclimatic conditions do not allow strong and hard wheats to be produced in sufficient amounts; the republic mainly grows soft wheat varieties. Moreover, the planting of cotton, the cultivation of which is considered more efficient than growing wheat, predominates in the republic’s crop acreage. So both at present and in the future, Tajikistan will import wheat from Ka- zakhstan and Russia and, possibly, also from Pakistan and India. 2. Tajikistan imports those products from Russia it can also acquire from other countries: these include fruit, vegetables, canned goods, cotton fiber, raw tobacco, textiles, and so on. Recently, Russian trade companies prefer to buy many types of products earlier imported from Tajikistan in other countries. It should also be kept in mind that the goods Tajikistan offers cannot be compared in importance with those it purchases from Russia. For example, the Russian Federation imports cotton fiber from Tajikistan (in 2010, it imported around 23,000 tons). Based on the data of the early 1990s on volumes of cotton fiber export, it can be concluded that Tajikistan still has a large amount of untapped poten- tial. Moreover, Russian trade companies prefer to import cheap goods from China (cloth- ing, footwear, knitwear, and fabrics), which has caused the production capacities in Tajiki- stan’s light industry to take a sharp nose dive. Tajikistan’s textile, garment, knitwear, and shoe manufacturers, which are traditionally oriented toward the export of finished goods to Russia, have been unable to compete with China and simply ceased to exist. The export of onions, dried fruit, and peanuts to the Russian Federation is more or less satisfactory. However, the Chief Sanitary Physician of Russia has recently called for re- strictions to be introduced on the import of food products from Tajikistan. According to the Tajik side, this unjustified embargo has political undertones, and Russia is using it as a lever of pressure on the Tajikistan government. 3. Russia’s economic policy regarding the former Soviet republics unfortunately relies on the neo-classical concept of free trade. Although it is Tajikistan’s strategic partner, Russia, instead of promoting the establishment and development of commercial flower growing in this republic, prefers to buy Dutch roses. However, Tajikistan could in time provide large- scale deliveries of flowers not only to the Asian, but also to the European part of Russia. The same situation has also developed in the manufacture of perfume and cosmetic oils, cotton and silk fabrics, tobacco commodities, wines, canned vegetables and fruit, juices, and others. For example, a total of 62 tons of Tajik potatoes, 169 tons of fresh tomatoes, 604 tons of canned vegetables and fruit (including tomatoes), 353 tons of fruit and vegetable juices, 84 tons of raw tobacco, and 397 tons of plants used for perfume and pharmaceutical pur- 132 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

poses. Nevertheless, it would not take much effort to increase the delivery of certain types of products tens and hundreds of times (for example, Tajikistan could easily organize de- liveries of early potatoes to Russia in amounts of 50,000 to 100,000 tons). 4. The export of Tajik commodities to Russia is inhibited by Uzbekistan’s restrictive policy regarding their transit. For this reason, the winemaking and tobacco industry, citrus grow- ing, and certain sub-branches of Tajikistan’s chemical industry have undergone a profound slump. The most graphic example in this context is export to Russia of explosives (known as ammonal) manufactured at the Isfara Chemical Plant back in Soviet times. These explo- sives are commonly used in construction, the mining industry, when knocking down fa- cilities, and so on. But from the very first days of Tajikistan’s independence, Uzbekistan has been blocking rail transportation of ammonal through its territory. In so doing, the Uzbek authorities refer to the danger of an explosion during transportation, although ac- cording to the technical specifications, this is utterly impossible. Due to the activities of the Uzbek authorities the production of ammonal was reduced to the minimum, while use of the production capacities of the Isfara Chemical Plant dropped to 1.8-2.5%, resulting in losses of more than $2 billion for Tajikistan. Because of the chronic delays in deliveries of ammonal from Tajikistan to Russia, a new enterprise was built for its manufacture. A similar situation also developed in Tajik wine production (this branch specialized in the manufacture and export of fermentation must to the eastern districts of Russia) and citrus growing. However, due to the artificial barriers set up by the Uzbek authorities, Tajikistan was unable to export these commodities. Referring to possible drug trafficking, The Uzbek customs officials delayed the inspection of train carriages carrying fruit, vegetables, and citrus products from Tajikistan for up to 7-10 days. During this time, the grapes and lemons thoroughly spoiled. In the end, citrus growing, as an independent branch of Tajikistan’s agriculture, ceased to exist. As for winemaking, small amounts of its products are exported to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The transit of goods from China to Tajikistan through Uzbekistan also encounters almost insur- mountable barriers. Uzbekistan’s customs authorities are creating obstacles causing the shuttle traders from Tajikistan who import Chinese commodities into their country to go bankrupt. For example, in December 2009, trucks were detained on the Uzbek-Kazakh border carrying New Year’s merchan- dise for sale in Tajikistan during the preholiday season. As a result of the two-month delay (which lasted until February 2010), Tajik merchants went entirely bankrupt, since they were unable to sell the products they had bought and return their bank loans.

Structure of Goods Turnover between Tajikistan and China

Contradicting trends can be seen in the dynamics of goods turnover between China and Tajiki- stan, which is shown in the data of Table 4. The data in Table 4 show significant jumps in trade between the two countries. In 1993, imports topped exports 106 times. But as early as 1995, exports were 14.0 times higher than imports. Between 2000 and 2008, inclusive, there was an increase in imports over exports; however, dramatic changes were also seen in the development of this trend. For example, compared with 2007, the export volumes in 2008 rose by almost 10.0 times, and by almost 5.0 times between 2008 and 2009. On the whole, between 2007 and 2010, export volumes

133 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

from Tajikistan to China rose 53.7 times. The reason for this was that in the indicated time period, the PRC made signifi- +1.4 2010 447.0 238.2 times cant hikes in the volume of its purchases of primary alumi-

Table 4 num from Tajikistan.

In the indicated years, raw mineral goods predominated +1.6 2009 in the structure of Tajik exports to China; in 2010, lead and 405.4 266.6 times zinc concentrate were added to it, supplied by the Altyn-

Topkan mining and processing enterprise. Since 2009, the ratio of exports to imports in Tajik-Chinese trade has drasti- 81.6 –4.7 2008 384.9 times cally changed. This has put Tajikistan’s trade balance back

in the black, which can no doubt be considered a positive trend. 8.3 2007 275.3 –33.1 times Nevertheless, the following question arises: “How sta-

ble is the increase in Tajikistan’s share of exports in its goods turnover with China?” There is no easy answer. Moreover, as 10.0 2006 148.9 –14.9 times already noted above, in recent years, serious doubts have ap- peared about the reliability of the Tajik customs statistics.

In this respect, changes in the ratio of export to import 5.7 92.5 2005 –18.0 times of goods between the PRC and Tajikistan require in-depth analysis. It must be carried out using the statistics of both

countries, as well as data collected when studying smuggling 6.1 57.0 –9.3 2004 times across the Tajik-Chinese border. As for Tajik-Russian trade, underestimation or differ-

ences in statistics are almost never seen. Nevertheless, there 5.7 26.7 –4.7 2003 times are other problems in trade between Russia and Tajikistan. In order to reduce the border tax burden, importers of goods from

Russia attempt to lower their customs value. The Tajik cus- 2.1 7.6 –3.8 2002 times toms authorities are responding to these attempts by carrying

out price adjustment and determining the real value of the goods being imported, including their production, loading- 1.4 6.0 –4.3 2001 times unloading work, and transportation to the final destination.

Such actions are entirely justified, since lowering the value of

3.4 goods imported by Russia from Tajikistan is fraught with sig- 11.9 –3.2 2000 times nificant shortfalls in taxes to the republic’s state budget. In all likelihood, the same problem also exists in the

Ratio of Export to Import in Trade between Tajikistan and China +9

4.9 0.9 import of goods from China; our preliminary calculations 1998 times show that in 2012 alone, the state budget could be $393 mil-

lion short. 5.6 0.4 +14 1995 times

0.1

10.6 Areas of Tajikistan’s Trade and 1993 –106 times Economic Cooperation with

$m $m Russia and China

If we compare the vectors of Russia’s and China’s eco- Export, Import, Trade balance (+) (–) nomic cooperation with Tajikistan, a certain amount of spe- 134 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 cialization can be noticed. Recently, Russia has been oriented toward building hydropower plants and looking for oil and gas, while the PRC has been focused on building physical infrastructure facilities. But recently, China has also begun contending for participation in the development of the hydro- power industry and in geological exploration of Tajikistan’s hydrocarbon resources, although its strivings are not always yielding fruit. Unfortunately, both Russia and China are frequently guided by their narrowly egotistical and geopolitical interests when planning economic cooperation. On the whole, it can be noted that both countries are pursuing an unequal policy with respect to Tajikistan. The real intentions of Russia and China, as well as their institutional opportunities in economic and scientific-technical cooperation with Tajikistan, are expressed in different ways. Both countries have an absolute predominance of public investments in Tajikistan. The private sectors of China and Russia are still reluctant to invest funds in the Tajik economy, which is related to the unfavorable investment climate in the country. As for public investments, in this respect, Russia lags significantly behind China, the interna- tional reserves of which have long topped $3 trillion. At present, Tajikistan’s public debt to China is nearing $2 billion, which poses a significant risk with respect to the country’s economic security. If Tajikistan is not able to pay back its exter- nal loans on time, China might make territorial claims on it. By issuing Tajikistan loans, China is very well aware that it will have difficulty returning them. Nevertheless, the PRC encourages Ta- jikistan to take out new loans. At present, both countries are holding talks on several infrastruc- tural projects called upon to ensure a higher mutual transport availability; they will be implement- ed using Chinese loans. China has favorable opportunities for developing trade and economic relations with Tajikistan in the geographical respect too. At present, goods are being delivered from China through the Kulma border pass, which is open all year round. Moreover, a large part of the Chinese goods reaches Ta- jikistan through Kyrgyzstan, in the south of which there is a road from the PRC that operates con- tinuously. The current schedule of operation of these roads somewhat alleviate the tough transit conditions introduced by Uzbekistan for importing Chinese goods into Tajikistan.

Problems in Tajikistan’s Relations with the Great Nations-Strategic Partners

Despite the fact that both Russia and China are Tajikistan’s strategic partners, they occupy a passive position with respect to such a major project as completion of the construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant. As we know, this project was developed back in the 1970s-1980s by a group of engineers from the Zhuk All-Union Hydroproject Institution, which still functions to this day. In recent years, specialists from this institute, keeping in mind the latest achievements in Russian and world science, have made significant changes to the Rogun hydropower plant build- ing project. In this respect, it should be mentioned that this project has aroused Uzbekistan’s immense dis- content. However, the Russian political leadership is well informed that world-renowned experts (both Russian and foreign) think that any arguments against building the Rogun Hydropower Plant are insubstantial.

135 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

It comes as a great surprise that Russia, which has great influence on Uzbekistan, is not taking any steps to overcome (or at least weaken) the resistance of this republic to construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant. The Russian government is not striving to take on the role of arbiter or mediator in the issues relating to the transit of Tajik goods through Uzbekistan and the undeclared economic blockade it is imposing. Moreover, Tajikistan has been unable to enlist Russia’s alliance support in its difficult relations with Uzbekistan, even though it (in contrast to Uzbekistan) is a member of the EurAsEC and CSTO. China has assumed a similar stance with respect to Tajik-Uzbek disputes and the development of the hydropower industry in Tajikistan. An agreement has been signed between Tajikistan and China about the latter’s participation in building the Yavan Hydropower Plant in the Zeravshan Val- ley; in 2010, specialists from the PRC started planning and surveying work. However, just one statement by the Uzbek leader against construction of the Yavan Hydro- power Plant was enough for the Chinese to halt work. The Chinese government has called on both countries to settle their relations and stated that only after a compromise is reached between them with respect to construction of this hydropower plant will it allow Chinese companies to participate in building this facility. During the President of Tajikistan’s recent trip to the PRC in May 2013, documents on strategic partnership were signed between Tajikistan and the PRC. However, this new status is unlikely to help Tajikistan resolve its most difficult development-hindering problems with Uzbekistan. In this respect, it would be appropriate to examine another problem related to Tajik-Chinese economic relations. In this case, the matter concerns Tajik producers who are unable to compete with Chinese goods. The mass import of cheap Chinese commodities is helping most of the low- income Tajik population to make ends meet. But Chinese goods are known for their low quality and many are detrimental to human health. The most regretful thing, however, is that the massive influx of cheap Chinese goods has brought enterprises of Tajikistan’s light industry to a complete halt and led to a rise in unemployment in the country. This has forced Tajik citizens to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, both the Tajik and the Chinese government prefer to step silently around this situation. So it turns out that it has not been the Chinese investing in the real sector of the Tajik economy for twenty years, but Tajikistan investing in the development of the light industry, car manufacture, and the production of Chinese building materials. Despite the communist rhetoric, China has been employing a neo-liberal concept of free trade toward Tajikistan (just as it has toward several other countries), knowing in advance that due to the absence of equal conditions for competition, many branches of the neighboring country will be doomed to death. This is compelling a closer study of Tajik-Chinese trade and economic relations and the need for their revision, since they are threatening the emergence of new risks to the security of Tajikistan’s economic system.

Conclusion

An analysis of Tajikistan’s trade and economic relations with Russia and China shows that they are unequal and need significant improvement (from the viewpoint of meeting Tajikistan’s national interests). Russia is trying to preserve the position of a suzerain state with respect to Tajikistan, but, at the same time, is relying in the foreign economic sector on the policy of neo-liberalism and monetarism. When some problem arises, the Russian leaders refer to the fact that everything is regulated by the market. 136 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Incidentally, a pro-market policy is also pursued within the Union State of Russia and Belarus and within the EurAsEC. This policy does not envisage measures to accelerate the economic growth rates of certain countries and the social development of backward regions. Moreover, it does not aim to level out the economic and social development of certain countries belonging to the economic community. This is causing those problems that have led to the crisis in the EU to appear in the worst possible way in the EurAsEC. It can be confidently said that czarist Russia related much better to Central Asia than present- day Russia does to those countries that continue to seek guidance from it. Having noticeably rein- forced its presence in Central Asia in recent years, Russia is still unable to refuse Alexander Sol- zhenitsyn’s advice to get rid of its underbelly (i.e. Central Asia) as soon as possible. In our opinion, the entire set of relations between Russia and Central Asia does not meet the demands of the time and requires revision. We will note that the absolute majority of the agreements signed between Tajikistan and Russia are not working in full. China is taking very skillful advantage of this by trying to fill the vacuum Russia has left. While recognizing the economic advantages of cooperating with China, the dangers that ac- company it cannot be ignored. They include China’s augmentation and use of its competitive advan- tages when carrying out its expansive trade policy, indifference to production cooperation, territorial claims on its neighbors, etc. Most of the Tajik population is still hoping to restore and rapidly develop relations with Russia in all vectors. Russia still regards Tajikistan as a political bastion of widespread bilateral cooperation in production cooperation and development of human capital. Production cooperation should include the implementation of joint measures to build medium and large hydropower plants, restore the mining industry, develop the infrastructure of agriculture, and rehabilitate the manufacturing industry. Cooperation must be intensified in the human capital sphere in education and public health, while favorable conditions must also be created for migrant workers from Ta- jikistan. Remittances sent by Tajik migrant workers to their homeland are increasing with each passing year. A large share of this amount (from 30 to 45%) goes to purchase Chinese goods. The absence of an import substitution policy is causing the Tajikistan population to essentially spend this money on investments in China’s industry and not on the purchase of their own commodities. It stands to reason that this situation is unacceptable and requires major revision. Tajikistan should insist on reexamination of the entire system of foreign economic relations on a comprehensive, equal, and mutually advantageous basis. Tajikistan is too vulnerable in its relations with Russia and China, and the economic giants should understand this. Therefore, Tajikistan’s central task is to uphold its own national interests. In the meantime, however, Russia and China are pursuing their own egocentric strivings in Tajikistan, which is impeding the country’s socioeconomic development.

137 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRIES IN A STATE OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN ARMENIAN CASE-STUDY

Ashot MARKOSIAN D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor at the University of Architecture and Construction (Erevan, Armenia)

Boris AVAKIAN Ph.D. (Econ.), Deputy Director of the Territorial Administration of the Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) for the Leningrad Region (St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation)

Elianora MATEVOSIAN Ph.D. (Econ.), Employee at the Center of Political Scientific, Legal, and Economic Research and Forecasting Noncommercial Organization (Erevan, Armenia)

ABSTRACT

his article takes a look at the current This situation is making the country’s state and dynamics of Armenia’s economy dependent on particular players, T economy over the past few years; different factors, and so on, and is leading to the authors have studied several budget monopolization of its main branches and un- expenditure items, and also carried out a derdevelopment of sectors that in other con- comparative analysis of Armenia’s external ditions could become a catalyst for econom- trade indices with the countries of the re- ic progress. gion. An analysis of the economic growth Involvement in any conflict, particu- trends in the Republic of Armenia (RA) larly one that is unresolved, has an impact shows that this growth is still having little in- on the country’s economy and makes it un- fluence on the standard of living of the coun- attractive to investors, who do not like try’s population, since government budget vagueness and avoid risks; commerce expenditures are mainly oriented toward de- strives to minimize transactional outlays, fense. At the same time, the main source of while closed borders lead to enclave devel- personal monetary income comes from pri- opment. This is precisely how Armenia’s vate remittances. economy has been developing over the Investment flows and Armenia’s recip- past two decades. rocal trade with neighboring countries are 138 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 going against the overall economic integra- The authors of this article think that eco- tion trends. This is causing countries that nomic cooperation among all the countries of are already in a state of conflict to move in- the Southern Caucasus should become an creasingly away from each other. alternative to the continuing conflict.

KEYWORDS: Armenia, GDP, an armed conflict, the trends toward economic growth, defense spending.

In Lieu of an Introduction. The Economic Environment and Standard of Living

In the 2000s, the trend toward sustainable economic growth continued in the Republic of Ar- menia. However, it stands to reason that the world crisis had an impact on the republic’s economy. At its first stage, Armenia managed to prevent a severe market landslide: the republic’s low external debt before the crisis, rise in savings, and balanced and non-risk fiscal policy created a kind of safety net. According to another viewpoint, the main reasons Armenia was able to more or less cope with the first wave of the slump were its low integration into the global economic environment and the large volume of remittances sent home from workers abroad. Beginning in the 4th quarter of 2008, the drop in overall external demand and decrease in capi- tal flows took their toll. The volume of investments shrank considerably, while housing construction felt the main brunt of the abrupt change in the economic environment. The 2009 indices provided graphic evidence of the profound economic slump: the size of real GDP (in drams) decreased by 14.1%. This was followed by a slow economic revival: GDP growth rates reached 2.2% in 2010, 4.7% in 2011, and 7.2% in 2012. The precrisis economic growth indices reached during the past decade have permitted Armenia to debut in the group of middle-income countries. The precrisis economic growth allowed for stable employment, a rise in real wages, and an increase in consolidated government budget spending for social programs. All of these factors, as well as the higher volume of remittances, have made a con- siderable contribution to reducing poverty. Between 2004 and 2008, there was an increase in average economic growth rates in almost all sectors of the economy, which amounted to 11.6% and led to significant structural changes in GDP. The highest rates were achieved in construction; in 2008 they ensured 39.1% of GDP growth. In so doing, the share of construction in the GDP structure rose to 24.1%. However, in 2009, the real reduction in GDP, as mentioned above, amounted to 14.1%. It was a significant decrease in construction volumes that caused such a reduction. The construction slump continued in subsequent years, and the year 2012 saw negative shifts in this branch of the economy: there was a drop in construction rates compared to 2008 and 2009 (19.0% and 11.7%, respectively). In 2010, economic growth of 9.2% was registered in industry (compared with the 6.9% drop in 2009), which promoted an increase in GDP by 1.2 percentage points. A relatively favorable situation was seen in the agrarian sector in 2009, but in 2010 there was a 16.0% drop caused by unfavorable climatic conditions, which also had a negative effect on GDP growth (of 2.7 percentage points). The Armenian government took steps aimed at stimulating the supply of agricultural com- modities, attracting investments into industrial enterprises and branches, de-bureaucratizing tax pol- icy and alleviating the tax burden, offering benefits on deferred value added tax payments, and so on. 139 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

These measures encouraged significant changes in 2011 in the republic’s GDP structure. In particular, as the result of a 113.7% increase in agriculture and 113.5% in industry in 2010, the spe- cific percentage of these sectors of the economy in GDP rose (from 17.1% to 20.2% in agriculture and from 15.4% to 16.3% in industry). As in previous years, there was a 12.5% slump in construction. Along with the slump, an increase was seen in end consumption in the economy compared with the size of GDP. For example, in 2009-2011, the average final consumption level amounted to 95% (in 2012 to 101.4%), while in 2008, this index was equal to only 81.8% of GDP. During 2005-2008, the national currency strengthened compared to the U.S. dollar and other foreign currencies. The reason for this was, first, the increase in inflow of foreign currency in the form of private remittances, government grants, and foreign direct investments. In 2009-2012, due to the decrease in volumes of private remittances (in 2009) and foreign direct investments (in 2009-2012), Armenia’s currency became devaluated. In 2011, average annual inflation amounted to 7.7%, while in 2012 it was at a level of 2.6%. The main indices of Armenia’s socioeconomic development (in dollar equivalent) are presented in Table 1. It is difficult to give a positive assessment of the economy when the level of gross income per capita is extremely low (in 2012 it amounted to $3,290), import is almost three times as high as export (2012), a third of the population lives below the poverty line, and the level of unemployment is very high. Moreover, since the economy does not have the necessary resource base, its dependence on external remittances is rising. If we add monopolization and technological backwardness of industry to the above, as well as a high external state debt that reaches almost 40% of GDP, it can be con- cluded that this kind of economy is unlikely to comply with the goals and priorities the country must aim for in present-day conditions. The level of poverty is the most important indicator for measuring and assessing the popula- tion’s wellbeing. Poverty is manifested in different forms and affects such spheres of public life as consumption, food safety, health care, education, rights (including the right to vote), and the quality of life. In so doing, one of the most important ways to overcome poverty is to find a decent job. It should be noted that, in contrast to the previous two years, the poverty level stopped rising in 2011, amounting to 35.0%, which is a little lower than the index for 2010 (35.8%). In 2009-2010, the rise in poverty level in Armenia was mainly caused by the 14.1% economic slump of 2009. In 2010, compared with the previous year, Armenia’s economy grew by only 2.2%. In 2011, economic growth amounted to 4.7%, while in 2012, it was 7.2%. But initially the slump was so profound that further economic growth can be said to have had no effect on the standard of living. Moreover, there are doubts about whether the economic growth factors are being correctly calculated. In the end, the profound economic slump, which was accompanied by an increase in unequal levels of personal income, promoted a decrease in consumption volume. The results of an all-encom- passing study of the standard of living of Armenian households for 2011 shows that real average monthly consumption of the entire population compared with 2008 decreased by 6.1%. In so doing, the decrease in consumption volume affected all strata of the population. Experts calculated that in order to eliminate poverty in 2011, Armenia would have to spend 111.5 billion Armenian drams, or 3% of GDP, in addition to those funds that had already been allot- ted to finance social support programs.1 Moreover, social support must be properly targeted; other- wise financing meant for the poor strata of the population will be squandered on other needs and support of those who are not particularly in need of help.

1 See: Picture of Poverty and Social Situation of Armenia, Statistical Analytical Report, National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2012, p. 46. 140 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

% 11 87.8 15.4 –6.6 –1.0 2012 2012 265.7 203.1 216.0 239.3 159.1 196.5 193.5 points points points Table 1 compared compared with 2005, with 2005, percentage percentage percentage percentage 10 9.95 2.37 23.8 2.79 28.0 2.09 2012 401.8 302.1 3 290 10.09 101.4 9 9.79 96.6 2.83 27.9 2.68 26.4 2.13 2011 372.5 290.2 10.14 3 363 8 9.26 8.80 95.1 3.04 32.8 2.21 23.9 1.70 2010 373.7 274.7 2 844

7 8.65 8.10 93.7 3.00 34.7 1.84 21.3 1.52 2009 363.3 264.3 2 666 6 9.54 81.8 4.77 40.9 2.42 20.8 2.05 2008 305.9 285.7 11.66 3 606 5 9.21 7.53 81.8 3.48 37.8 2.09 22.7 1.85 2007 342.1 216.9 2 853 in 2005-2012 4 6.38 5.26 82.3 1.57 24.6 1.55 24.3 1.34 2006 416.0 149.7 1 982 Armenia’s Main Socioeconomic Indices 3 4.90 4.22 86.0 1.49 30.4 1.42 29.0 1.08 2005 457.7 113.7 1,523

$bn $bn 2 $ $bn Indices $ Average annual dram/dollar Average annual dram/dollar exchange rate Average monthly nominal workers’ wage, GDP (market value), GDP per capita, Final consumption expenditure, $bn % of GDP Gross savings, % of GDP Industrial production, % of GDP Agricultural production, $bn . 1 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. No

141 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

11 8.2 8.2 4.4 3.7 –1.0 –1.0 –7.7 –1.0 123.2 292.0 306.3 248.0 236.7 942.9 points points points points points points percentage percentage percentage percentage percentage percentage percentage 10 21.0 1.17 11.7 5.46 28.0 2.42 24.3 2.43 24.4 2.58 25.9 3.96 Table 1 (continued) 9 21.0 1.36 13.4 5.50 26.4 2.32 22.9 2.43 24.0 2.72 26.8 3.36 8 18.4 1.58 17.0 4.84 23.9 2.12 22.9 2.15 23.2 2.61 28.2 2.39 7 17.6 1.60 18.5 4.33 21.3 2.03 23.5 1.96 22.7 2.61 30.2 2.00 6 17.6 2.81 24.1 5.48 20.8 2.28 19.6 2.62 22.5 2.71 23.2 2.05 5 20.1 1.96 21.3 4.16 22.7 1.67 18.1 2.04 22.2 2.18 23.7 1.23 4 21.0 1.55 24.2 1.97 24.3 1.20 18.8 1.28 20.1 1.36 21.3 0.57 3 22.0 0.95 19.4 1.87 29.0 0.79 16.1 0.98 20.0 1.09 22.2 0.42

$bn $bn 2 $bn % of GDP Construction volume, % of GDP Goods turnover, % of GDP services, Volume of % of GDP Revenue of consolidated budget, $bn % of GDP Consolidated budget expenditure, $bn % of GDP Provision of crediting, $bn 1 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

142 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

,

11 — 0.2 15.3 205.2 146.6 236.8 102.0 141.7 340.0 points points 2,043.3 –3,331.2 percentage percentage , National Statistics , National Statistics –1.5 37.7 10 323.2 102.6 103.9 842.8 –812.5 –489.3 5,694.9 1,428.1 4,266.8 3,737.8 –1,056.4 Table 1 (continued) , National Statistics Board of , National Statistics Board of 9 96.2 –2.8 35.2 237.1 107.7 –781.2 –544.1 5,479.6 1,334.3 4,145.3 1,041.3 3,568.2 –1,108.2 Statistical Yearbook of Armenia, 2012 –5.0 35.6 8 4,790 108.2 107.9 170.15 –673.5 –503.0 1,041.1 3,748.9 1,247.8 3,299.0 –1,373.2 89.1 –7.7 34.3 7 134.8 103.4 7,10.2 –612.0 –477.2 4,031.3 3,321.1 1,260.4 2,966.7 –1,368.9 109 –0.7 13.5 6 199.7 148.9 –760.7 –560.9 5,483.3 1,057.2 4,426.1 1,220.4 1,577.1 –1,381.8 Socioeconomic State of Armenia in January-December 2012 5 –1.5 15.7 — — — 104.4 142.8 448.7 –589.3 4,420.1 1,152.3 3,267.8 1,448.9 Socioeconomic State of Armenia in January-February 2013 86.4 46.5 –1.3 18.9 4 — — — 985.1 102.9 –117.1 3,176.7 2,191.6 1,205.6 73.3 –1.7 22.4 3 — — — 973.9 100.6 –51.7 –25.3 , National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2010, pp. 15, 18; , National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2010, 2,775.6 1,801.7 1,099.2

$m ) 2 % $m

$m Statistical Yearbook of Armenia, 2010 : External trade turnover, External trade turnover, $m including: Export including food products Import including food products Consumer price index (compared to previous year, Current account of balance payments, assets account financial account External trade balance of food products, Deficit (–), surplus of government budget, % of GDP External public debt, % of GDP 1 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2012, pp. 15, 18; Armenia, Erevan, 2013, pp. 9, 78, 79, 127; Board of pp. 9-12. 2013, Armenia, Erevan, S o u r c e s

143 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Table 2 shows the expenditure items needed to eliminate poverty of the population. According to the calculations, 3.9 billion Armenian drams are needed in order to eliminate extreme poverty, or another 0.1% of GDP in addition to the funds already allotted to social support.

Table 2

Monetary Value of Poverty Elimination in Armenia in 2011

Extremely Poor Poor Population Population

Average consumption of the poor population 18,619 28,038 (drams, in the equivalent of one adult per month)

Poverty line 21,306 36,158 (drams, in the equivalent of one adult per month)

Additional consumption required by the poor population 2,687 8,120 (drams, in the equivalent of one adult per month)

Deficit—additional consumption required by the poor population 12.6 22.5 compared with the poverty line (%)

GDP (billion drams) 3,776.4 3,776.4

Necessary budget (billion drams) 3.9* 111.5*

Necessary budget in relation to GDP (%) 0.1 3.0

* This index is calculated as the product of the average annual size of the permanent population, level of poverty and amount of additional annual consumption required by the poor population.

S o u r c e s: The table was compiled on the basis of the results of a universal study of the standard of living of households in Armenia for 2011, National Statistics Board of Armenia; Picture of Poverty and Social Situation of Armenia, Statistical Analytical Report, National Statistics Board, Erevan, 2012, p. 47.

International experience shows that it is extremely difficult and almost impossible to ensure 100% targeted social support. The practice of other countries also shows that sometimes the number of poor is artificially inflated by those who want to acquire this status to receive large subsidies and social benefits. In this respect, it cannot be said for sure that Armenia will be able to avoid a similar situation. Keeping this factor in mind, the amount of financial funds that will actually be allotted to fighting poverty will most likely be much higher than the calculations we made. In order to ensure a high level of targeting social aid, the human resources activated in the programs to overcome pov- erty must also be doubled. Private noncommercial remittances from people working abroad, mainly from Russia and the U.S., are having a significant impact on the standard of living of the Armenian population (see Table 3). It follows from the data of Table 3 that during 2005-2012 the inflow of private noncommercial remittances rose by 224.1%, including from Russia by 266.9%, and from the U.S. by 80.5%. The outflow of remittances amounted to 154.0%, 197.0%, and 84.6%, respectively. The ratio of outflow of private noncommercial remittances to inflow amounted to 25.2% in 2005, 21.7% in 2006, 19.8% in 2007, 14.8% in 2008, 17.3% in 2009, 17.1% in 2010, 17.1% in 2011, and 17.3% in 2012. Meanwhile, the net inflow of private noncommercial remittances received from individuals abroad during 2005-2012 increased by 247.8%; including from Russia by 279.7% and from the U.S. 144 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 2012 66,554 66,554 25,936 40,617 Table 3 292,249 292,249 164,588 1,687,263 1,687,263 1,444,955 1,395,014 1,280,367 2011 74,380 74,380 27,331 47,049 264,602 264,602 141,352 1,546,959 1,546,959 1,295,163 1,282,357 1,153,811 2010 67,789 67,789 24,554 43,235 221,763 221,763 116,950 945,316

1,293,736 1,293,736 1,062,266 1,071,973

2009 59,288 59,288 99,524 23,332 35,956 904,011 904,011 194,884 929,235 804,487 1,124,119 1,124,119 ) $Thous 2008 60,958 60,958 32,110 28,848 242,240 242,240 122,759 1,635,307 1,635,307 1,371,066 1,393,067 1,248,307 2007 76,571 76,571 23,764 52,808 261,170 261,170 129,126 949,092 1,319,479 1,319,479 1,078,218 1,058,310 (data for 2005-2012, Private Noncommercial Remittances 2006 94,491 94,491 13,295 81,196 960,926 960,926 739,419 208,436 107,835 752,490 631,584 by Individuals through the Armenian Banking System from Individuals Received Abroad and Sent 2005 82,628 82,628 83,537 83,537 30,671 51,958 752,819 752,819 541,308 189,793 189,793 563,025 457,771 Years

Inflow including Russia U.S. Outflow including Russia U.S. Net inflow including Russia U.S.

145 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS by 78.2%. In 2005, Russia’s share in private noncommercial remittances amounted to 71.9%, while the U.S.’s was 11.0%. In 2006, these indices were equal to 76.9% and 9.8%, respectively, in 2007, 81.7% and 5.8%, in 2008, 83.8% and 3.7%, in 2009, 80.4% and 5.3%, in 2010, 82.1% and 5.2%, in 2011, 83.7% and 4.8%, and in 2012, 85.6% and 3.9%. The above data show that in recent years, the share of Russia and the U.S. in the total amount of noncommercial private remittances reached around 90%. We hereby note that Russia’s share in- creased and the U.S.’s, on the contrary, decreased. We will note that whereas in 2008, the ratio of indices of Armenia’s government budget expen- diture ($2,649.2 million) to private remittances ($752.8 million) amounted to 1:0.62, in 2009, it was equal to 1:0.44, in 2010 to 1:0.51, in 2011 to 1:0.63, and in 2012 to 1:0.71. So after 2009, the share of private noncommercial remittances received from individuals living abroad rose by 0.27 percent- age points, or by 38.0%. Calculations show that if we take Armenia’s actual government budget ex- penditures as five units, during 2008-2012, private noncommercial remittances from abroad amount- ed to around three units; in natural terms, this number comprises a significant sum capable of boosting the prosperity of the Armenian population. On the other hand, remittances are monetary resources that people earn abroad (since they can- not find a job in their homeland) and send to their family members. The high percentage of private noncommercial remittances from individuals is one of the char- acteristic features of Armenia’s development in 1990-the 2000s; most of them were sent to house- holds. There is essentially no data about how much these monetary resources promoted savings, created other benefits, or boosted investment activity. The same situation has been continuing in the 2010s; in our opinion, this is one of those problems that requires more in-depth examination in terms of the impact remittances are having on the republic’s economic development rate.

Budget Expenditures and Defense Spending

In 2008-2012, the amount of government budget resources spent on defense on average reached $384.12 million or 3.9% of GDP (or 15.3% of total budget expenditures). It is worth noting that in 2008-2012, expenditures (including reserve funds that do not relate to the main sections) on public order, security, judicial activity, economic development, housing construction, utilities, public health, recreation, culture, religion, and education dropped much more than spending on defense. Moreover, whereas in 2012 compared to 2008 government budget expenditures decreased to 89.4%, with respect to spending on defense they only dropped to 96.1%. It should be noted that defense expenditures are huge. For example, in 2012, almost as much was spent on defense ($380.5 million) as on public order, security, and judicial activity ($188.3 mil- lion), economic relations ($98.9 million), environmental protection ($9.5 million), housing construc- tion and utilities ($15.3 million), and recreation, culture, and religion ($48.2 million) all together. To be more precise, $20.3 million more was spent on defense. It follows from the above that the enormous expenditures on defense are allotted to the detri- ment of other items of the republic’s government budget. The data of Table 4 show that on average for 2008-2012, the amount of defense spending (15.3%) occupies second place after spending on social security of the population (27.3%). Proceeding from the fact that countries do not always present complete data about spending on arms and defense, we made use of information from the World Bank that is published in the annual World Development Indicators reports and reflected in the data base on the organization’s official 146 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Table 4

Armenia’s Government Budget Expenditures in Terms of Their Functional Classification

2012 compared Groups of Expenditures 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 with 2008, %

1 2,649.2 2,557.6 2,554.0 2,455.7 2,368.9 89.4

Expenditures 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

3 22.7 29.6 27.6 24.2 23.9 25.6*

including:

1 342.6 311.1 383.5 408.2 392.4 114.5

Overall public services 2 12.9 12.2 15.0 16.6 16.6 14.7*

3 2.9 3.6 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.7*

1 396 358.4 394.9 390.8 380.5 96.1

Defense 2 14.9 14.0 15.5 15.9 16.1 15.3

3 3.4 4.1 4.3 3.9 3.8 3.9

1 201.7 191.2 180.5 188.7 188.3 93.4 Public order, security, 2 7.6 7.5 7.1 7.7 7.9 7.6 and judicial activity 3 1.7 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9

1 292.3 368.4 300.9 93.8 98.9 33.8

Economic relations 2 11.0 14.4 11.8 3.8 4.2 9.0

3 2.5 4.3 3.2 0.9 1.0 2.4

1 9.8 10.8 13.2 11.9 9.5 96.6

Environmental protection 2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4

3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

1 45.9 58.1 114.6 85.3 15.3 33.4 Housing construction, 2 1.7 2.3 4.5 3.5 0.6 2.5 utilities 3 0.4 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.7

1 163.3 154.6 150.2 164.2 154.1 94.3

Public health 2 6.2 6.0 5.9 6.7 6.5 6.3

3 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6

1 52.4 44.9 43.1 47.3 48.2 92.1 Recreation, culture, 2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.9 and religion 3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5

147 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Table 4 (continued)

2012 compared Groups of Expenditures 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 with 2008, %

1 338.4 296.0 261.7 279.3 251.2 74.2

Education 2 12.8 11.6 10.2 11.4 10.6 11.3

3 2.9 3.4 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.9

1 694.7 670.7 653.5 687.5 726.2 104.5

Social security 2 26.2 26.2 25.6 28.0 30.7 27.3

3 6 7.8 7.1 6.8 7.3 7.0

1 112.1 93.4 57.9 98.8 104.4 93.1 Reserve funds that do not 2 4.2 3.7 2.3 4.0 4.4 3.7 belong to the main items 3 1 1.1 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.9

R e f e r e n c e: 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

exchange rate 305.97 363.28 373.66 372.50 401.76

GDP, million drams 3,568,228 3,141,651 3,460,203 3,776,443 3,981,506.5

D e s i g n a t i o n s: 1. $m; 2. % of total expenditures; 3. % of GDP

* On average in 2008-2012.

S o u r c e s: Socioeconomic State of the Republic of Armenia in January-December 2012, National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2013, pp. 105-106; Statistical Yearbook of Armenia 2012, National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2012, pp. 385-386; National Accounts for 2012, National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2012, p. 22. website. By way of comparison, we took the data on arms and defense spending in the South Cauca- sian countries involved in conflicts after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states, which used to belong to the Soviet Union and had more or less the same economy as the South Caucasian states but were not involved in conflicts after the Union’s collapse, and three European states (Austria, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic), which have not participated in any military action for at least the past 40 years. Based on our own calculations, we compiled Table 5, the data of which show that both Armenia and Azerbaijan spend much more on arms than any of the other countries studied. The data in Table 5 also make it possible to present the following generalizations:  Between 1992 and 2010 Azerbaijan spent 326.4% more on military requirements than Ar- menia;  In 1992-2010, the highest defense spending index among the listed countries (in percentage of GDP) was registered in Armenia, while the lowest was in Azerbaijan. In the South Cauca- sian republics, these indices were distributed as follows; in Georgia—4.5% (the highest in- dex), in Armenia—3.4%, and in Azerbaijan—3.0%. It is worth noting that during these years, Azerbaijan’s military spending was $1,645.5 million higher than Armenia’s ($2,523.4 mil- lion) and Georgian ($4,067.3 million) all together, which amounted to a total of $6,590.7;

148 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Table 5

Military Spending (Total for 1992-2010)

Military Spending, Military Military GDP, % of Central Country Spending, Spending, $m Government $m % of GDP Expenditures

Armenia 73,880.4 2,523.4 3.4 17.1*

Azerbaijan 276,865.4 8,236.1 3.0 1.2

Georgia 91,367.5 4,067.3 4.5 11.7

Estonia 192,784.1 3,329.7 1.7 4.4

Latvia 239,095.8 3,347.9 1.4 4.0

Lithuania 357,546.7 5,152.9 1.4 3.4

Austria 5,005,934.0 47,790.0 1.0 1.9

Switzerland 6,384,196.0 68,920.8 1.1 4.5

The Czech Republic 1,806,329.2 30,842.6 1.7 5.4

*Average statistics.

S o u r c e: The table is calculated on the basis of website data [data.worldbank.org/indicator/…], 2013-07-01.

 The ratio of military spending to GDP depends on the size of the latter. For example, be- tween 1992-2010, Azerbaijan’s GDP ($276.9 billion) was almost 1.7-fold higher than the total amount of Armenia’s GDP ($73.9 billion) and Georgia’s GDP ($91.4 billion); the matter concerns $165.3 billion;  In the expenditures of the South Caucasian republic governments for 1992-2010, the per- centage of military spending amounted to 1.2% in Azerbaijan, 11.7% in Georgia, and 17.1% in Armenia. In other words, all other things being equal (proceeding from the share of military spending in the structure of overall spending) during the entire period between 1992 and 2010, 14.25-fold (17.1:1.2) more was spent on military requirements in Armenia, and 9.75-fold (11.7:1.2) more in Georgia than in Azerbaijan;  If we presume that the South Caucasian republics, following Austria’s example (in this coun- try the amount of military spending relative to GDP amounts to 1%), will reduce their military expenditures, Azerbaijan will be able to save $5.538 billion [$276.9 billion x (3.0% – 1.0%)/100% = $5.538 billion], Georgia — $3.199 billion [$91.4 billion x (4.5% – 1.0%)/100% = $3.199 billion], and Armenia — $1.774 billion [$73.9 billion x (3.4% – 1.0%)/100% = $1.774 billion], which comprises a total of $10.511 billion. This enormous sum could have been used to develop the national economies, establish interregional good-neighborly relations, and support the formation of a common South Caucasian market. Spending such large amounts of money in the “proper” spheres would undoubtedly produce the best effect. Moreover, if we keep in mind that military spending in the direct sense is detrimental to the wealth created by the labor of the entire society, in the economic respect it can be easily compared with the losses that are incurred as a result of earthquakes, flooding, or other natural disasters, for example. 149 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Engage in Trade or Take Up Arms

We would do well to remember the words of one of the founders of the liberal economy Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1849), who said that when goods do not cross borders, armies will. The impenetrability of borders leads to a decrease in economic growth and territorial contradic- tions—to a rise in transaction outlays in commerce or, worse still, to its cessation. In conditions of contemporary globalization, openness of the economy becomes extremely important (there are no limitations for specialization, cooperation, development of all types of business activity, nor is there any monopoly). Despite the openness of the Armenian economy, the republic’s low level of goods turnover with neighbors is becoming the reason for the hike in price. The data on export and import volumes of the South Caucasian countries over the past three years and the reciprocal trade between them presented in Table 6 can serve as confirmation of the above. As can be seen from the calculations we present, the volumes of Armenia’s export and import are not very high. For example, the largest amounts of export and import the republic could achieve amounted to 5.7% of GDP (in 2012) and 6% (in 2011), respectively; no comment, as they say. Another extremely important source of economic growth is investments. In January-December 2012, the inflow of foreign investments into the Armenian economy (including from state manage- ment agencies and banks) amounted to $1,587.0 million, which is 8.6% lower than in 2011. In so doing, in 2012, the inflow of foreign direct investments amounted to $656.7 million; this amount is 27.5% lower than 2011. Other investments accounted for $928.9 million (which is 12.0% more than the index for 2011), while portfolio investments accounted for $1.4 million. Throughout 2012, the outflow of monetary resources (not counting accrued interest, dividends, and debt servicing) amounted to $19.7 million; I am talking about resources exported by legal resident entities in the form of investments (see Table 7). In January-December 2012, the amount of foreign investment flows into the real sector of the Ar- menian economy (not counting from state management agencies and banks) was equal to $751.8 million, which is 7.9% less than in 2011. The inflow of foreign direct investments into the real sector of the economy compared with 2011 decreased by 10.1% and amounted to $567.4 million. In January-December 2012, 37.6% of the total volume of foreign investments in the real sector and 49.82% of the volume of foreign direct investments went to telecommunications. In so doing, it should be noted that in 2011 the most attractive branch in terms of investments was the production of base metals, which received 23.69% of the total volume of foreign investments in the real sector and 21.47% of direct foreign investments.2 In 2012, 9.6% of direct investments went to performing real estate operations and 6.37% to plant cultivation, animal husbandry, and hunting (including rendering services to related branches). In 2011, 21.97% of the total amount of direct investments went to telecommunications and 15.45% to branches related to the production and distribution of electricity, gas, steam, and conditioned air. In our opinion, the presence or absence of a relation between foreign trade and investment activ- ity of particular countries (both those receiving investments, and those providing them) poses a cer- tain amount of interest. Research of data over the past few years shows that there is no direct depen- dence between Armenia’s foreign trade with a particular country and the amount of investments coming into the republic from that country (see Table 8). For example, in 2008-2011, Germany ranked 6th, 4th, 5th, 12th, 4th, and 3rd in terms of total investments, respectively. However, export volumes from Armenia to Germany occupied the top

2 See: Socioeconomic State of the Republic of Armenia in January-February 2013, National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2013, pp. 83-98.

150 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

6.0 8.2 % of 13.3 36.8 34.2 8.97 16.4 36.1 32.8 GDP GDP Table 6 Countries Neighboring Neighboring 478.0 680.7 $m 1,746.2 2,085.1 3,197.0 2,306.8 3,193.5 15,205.4 22,711.7

1.4 0.8 0.3 0.6 6.0 0.9

% of 12.0 0.79 11.1 GDP Import Southern Southern Caucasus 49.7 50.4 89.5 $m 568.2 184.5 247.0 711.0 1,158.3 2,011.1

$m

Total, 3,606.9 4,747.1 6,092.0 4,145.3 6,389.0 9,732.9 53,328.5 185,523.7 253,298.2

% of 9.1 7.1 8.8 32.5 34.5 12.2 15.3 12.7 26.8 GDP GDP 2010 2011 Countries Neighboring Neighboring 88.5 414.8 169.2 533.3 $m Interregional Export and 1,480.4 8,774.4 2,323.3 13,365.1 24,123.2

Import of the South Caucasian Countries

% of 5.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 4.6 2.0 GDP 13.8 5.92 14.2 Export Southern Southern Caucasus 48.2 61.9 $m 176.8 411.0 562.6 282.0 535.3 2,320.7 3,519.3

973.6 $m Total, 1,278.0 1,334.3 1,990.8 20,765.3 25,418.3 26,480.2 109,670.1 158,105.3 Countries Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Iran Turkey Total Армения Грузия Азербайджан

151 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

— % of 6.7 7.7 8.9 8.0 9.8 GDP GDP 11.3 35.0 33.2 — Countries Neighboring Neighboring 482.5 $m 3,982.1 2,511.4 3,205.2 18,505.6 28,668.7 18,995.4 25,194.5

Table 6 (continued) —

% of 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.2 0.6 GDP 10.3 Import Southern Southern Caucasus — 49.1 $m 255.0 576.7 741.8 129.9 520.2 1,879.2 1,441.0

— $m 4,266.8 7,184.8 9,641.7 Total, 5,9421.6 240,838.9 320,527.7 236,536.9 257,630.2

— % of 9.3 11.7 14.7 13.0 12.6 27.8 18.5 17.3 GDP GDP 2012 Countries — Neighboring Neighboring 180.3 466.2 $m 2,217.9 13,142.8 19,845.9 36,014.5 28,182.1 31,046.5

% of — 0.4 2.3 1.6 5.7 2.4 2.5 2.7 GDP 18.5 Export Southern Southern — Caucasus 81.6 $m 440.9 310.1 570.7 3,156.8 4,476.9 3,841.7 4,804.1

— $m Total, 1,428.1 1,674.4 23,827.2 neighboring countries: the Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, and Iran. neighboring countries: the Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, and 112,645.6 134,915.3 277,366.2 152,560.8 179 490.5 neighboring countries: the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey; Turkey; neighboring countries: the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and neighboring countries: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Iran, Cyprus, Armenia, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Georgia; neighboring countries: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Iran, Cyprus, Armenia, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Georgia; neighboring countries: Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Armenia, and Kuwait; neighboring countries: Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Armenia, and Kuwait; Table compiled and calculated on the basis of data from the following websites: [www.intracen.org], [www.armstat.am] and [www.trademap.org], of data from the following websites: [www.intracen.org], [www.armstat.am] and [www.trademap.org], Table compiled and calculated on the basis Iran’s Turkey’s Georgia’s Azerbaijan’s : Countries

Iran Turkey Total Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Iran Turkey Total N o t e S o u r c e: 2013-07-01.

152

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

%

Rates, Growth — — — — — 8.8 0.6 0.6 8.0 8.0 8.4 4.5 17.1 20.3

Table 7 to 2011 2011 to

Compared in 2012 2012 in

— — — — — Change

–2.1 Absolute Absolute –95.6 –62.2 –34.0 –15.9 –15.9 –19.6 –19.6 –17.5 — — — — 1.1 3.3 0.1 0.1 1.7 1.7 1.6 0.1 2012 2012 19.7 15.8 — — — — — 2.2 ) 78.0 37.3 16.0 16.0 21.3 21.3 19.1 2011 115.3 ($m — — — 8.3 1.5 9.7 7.9 2.0 2010 2010 94.6 84.8 12.5 12.5 72.3 62.6 — — — — 8.8 8.8 1.6 1.6 52.7 10.6 2009 2009 193.7 130.4 121.6 120.0 Investments from Armenia in Other Countries (assets) Investments from Armenia in Other Countries

%

— —

Growth Rates, Growth 2.3 91.4 72.5 94.5 раза 112.0 213.7 104.8 106.9 123.5 109.2 122.8 140.6

, National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2011, p. 70; p. 70; , National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2011, , National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2012, p. 85; p. 85; , National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2012, p. 83 , National Statistics Board of Armenia, Erevan, 2013,

to 2011 2011 to

Compared

in 2012 2012 in — —

0.2 8.4

Change Change 99.3 44.9 44.7 54.4 64.7 92.2 –4.5

160.8 Absolute Absolute –148.9 –249.6 — 1.4 4.4 84.4 80.0 99.5 77.1 656.7 928.9 844.5 844.5 348.7 319.2 2012 2012 1,587.0 — 4.2 39.5 35.3 91.1 81.6 906.3 829.6 790.1 106.4 683.7 284.0 227.0 2011 2011 1,735.9 5.9 26.6 20.7 49.4 Investments in Armenia (liabilities) 706.9 12.23 836.7 810.1 760.7 100.0 313.7 150.3 196.6 2010 2010 1,555.8 0 — Flows of Foreign Investments into Armenia in 2009-2012 by Type 11.0 49.9 31.2 18.7 906.2 337.4 186.2 2009 2009 2,555.4 1,638.2 1,588.3 1,588.3 1,065.0

Socioeconomic State of the Republic Armenia in January-February 2012 Socioeconomic State of the Republic Armenia in January-February 2013 Without calculating cash monetary resources, deposits, and other liabilities (assets). other liabilities (assets). Without calculating cash monetary resources, deposits, and

Total investments Direct investments Portfolio investments Other investments* Commercial loans Short-term Long-term Loans Short-term Long-term Monetary regulation bodies State management bodies Banks Other sectors * the Republic of Armenia in January-February 2011 S o u r c e s: Socioeconomic State of

153

Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 2011

1 5 5 — — — — — 25 15 17 13 11 2010

1 4 6 9 7

— — — — 24 16 11 15 Table 8 2009

1 8 6 4 — — — — — 23 12 14 10 2008

1 5 4 9 9

Years — — — — — 22 10 11 Investments 2007 Foreign Direct Foreign Direct

1 3 4

— — — — — 21 16 19 21 15

2006

1 2 3 6 — — — 20 18 17 21 19 16 2011

1 3 6 9 — — — 19 15 24 20 11 25 2010

1 4 6 3 — — — 18 15 10 16 13 18 2009

1 6 3 7 — — — 17 12 20 16 14 19 2008

Years

1 5 8 — — — — 16 14 17 12 15 16 2007

1 4 5 Total Investments — — — — 15 13 27 21 15 26 2006

1 6 5 9 — — — 14 15 22 25 18 21 2011

1 3 9 7 6 2 13 10 24 16 18 26 13 2010

1 4 9 8 7 6 2 12 29 14 17 30 15 2009 1 5 8 9 7 6 2 11 11 25 15 19 30

in 2006-2011 2008 Years

Import

1 5 6 7 2 10 12 31 14 17 26 10 35 2007

9 1 4 7 8 5 14 27 11 17 35 12 25 2006

8 1 4 8 5 6 7 16 28 18 29 11 23 2011

7 2 2 6 3 4 8 9 5 10 23 11 13 2010

6 1 3 6 2 4 7 8 5 9 10 20 11 2009

5 2 1 3 4 6 7 5 8 9

15 10 11 Years 2008

Export

4 1 2 7 6 3 4 5 9 12 13 10 31 2007 3 1 2 6 8 3 4 5 7

21 10 10 17

Rankings of Armenia’s Main Partner Countries in Terms Foreign Trade and Investments 2006 2 3 1 7 2 4 8 6 9 31 14 10 41 1 Countries Russian Russian Federation Germany U.S. Bulgaria The Netherlands Belgium Georgia Canada Italy Switzerland Iran China

154 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 2 9 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 25 2 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 24 14 7 2 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 23 3 — — — — — — — — — — — — 22 14 12 11 5 — — — — — — — — — — — 21 11 18 10 11 8 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 20 10 12 Table 8 (continued) 2 4 — — — — — — — — — — — — 19 22 14 2 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 18 11 12 2 8 — — — — — — — — — — — 17 11 15 10 2 3 8 — — — — — — — — — — — 16 13 21 8 3 7 — — — — — — — — — — — 15 19 22 8 2 — — — — — — — — — 14 14 17 24 14 27 5 — 13 21 23 12 20 22 19 34 15 31 28 30 63 33 35 3 — 12 16 28 12 23 22 13 32 20 37 24 27 50 31 21 3 — 11 16 29 13 22 23 10 31 18 50 28 33 51 32 27 3 9 — 10 24 11 25 19 15 33 18 36 29 22 40 32 20 9 2 6 — 10 28 29 18 16 33 25 33 24 40 36 32 22 8 2 3 — 15 30 13 22 21 20 36 19 24 27 54 33 37 7 7 15 29 18 17 50 14 25 27 24 48 20 22 33 31 38 6 13 23 12 16 15 46 25 28 18 26 36 22 14 31 35 41 5 12 13 14 17 18 27 16 22 24 25 31 20 23 28 29 30 4 8 11 19 14 15 16 41 22 28 25 32 27 21 24 34 39 3 9 22 14 15 20 27 45 29 24 18 32 31 30 37 33 50 2 12 20 11 18 17 16 37 28 40 19 34 22 27 33 46 49 1

Ukraine Austria Spain France UAE United Republic of Republic of Korea Thailand India Kazakhstan Moldova Belarus Turkmenistan Uzbekistan The Czech The Czech Republic Sweden

155 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 8 7 3 — — — — — — — — — — — — 25 12 18 3 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 24 10 12 9 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 23 10 8 6 7 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 22 8 — — — — — — — — — — — 21 14 10 17 13 12 9 7 — — — — — — — — — — — 20 13 15 11 14 Table 8 (continued) 5 7 8 — — — — — — — — — — — — 19 13 19 7 8 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 18 17 9 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 17 17 13 9 7 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 16 10 19 6 — — — — — — — — — — — 15 11 12 18 24 23 — — — — — — — — — — — 14 13 20 16 11 10 19 4 9 — — — — 13 64 25 29 32 14 87 60 39 41 54 56 5 — — — — 12 62 25 35 33 11 81 66 10 39 46 56 53 4 — — — — 11 67 20 37 34 12 78 65 14 24 38 57 48 4 8 — — — — 10 43 27 30 28 92 67 13 37 34 54 55 9 9 — — — — 67 30 20 23 13 77 50 15 34 41 53 51 8 9 — — — — 65 31 10 34 17 59 63 12 39 38 49 52 7 — — — 37 35 40 28 46 51 44 39 32 63 47 86 69 16 6 — — — — 34 32 29 24 47 55 37 39 40 51 57 54 21 5 — — — — — 32 34 36 38 40 42 43 44 61 67 62 64 4 — — — 30 36 18 20 55 45 35 43 50 40 53 49 77 29 3 — — — 26 39 19 12 42 23 36 52 47 44 41 16 13 34 2 5 — — — 24 31 15 62 45 27 56 55 34 60 21 35 13 1 Turkey Latvia Poland Israel Hungary Japan Luxemburg Lithuania Cyprus Estonia Rumania The Virgin The Virgin Islands Belize Slovakia Ireland Singapore

156 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

6 — — — — — — — — — — — — 25 19 10 14 4 8 — — — — — — — — — — — — 24 13 14

3 5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 23 13 2 7 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 22 6 7 2 9 — — — — — — — — — — — 21 20 4 5 — — — — — — — — — — — — 20 20 17 Table 8 (continued) — — — — — — — — — — 19 17 12 18 10 16 23 9 5 — — — — — — — — — — 18 22 20 19 23 5 4 — — — — — — — — — — — — 17 18 21 4 5 — — — — — — — — — — 16 13 20 11 18 , National Statistics Board of the Republic of Armenia, Republic of Armenia, , National Statistics Board of the 9 2 — — — — — — — — 15 25 10 16 17 14 20 7 4 3 — — — — — — — — — 14 23 28 12 26 — — — — — — — — — — 13 17 48 45 11 27 36 , National Statistics Board of the Republic of Armenia, Erevan, 2012, , National Statistics Board of the Republic Armenia, Erevan, 2012, — — — — — — — — — — 12 19 48 45 18 26 34 — — — — — — — — — — 11 21 43 39 17 26 36 — — — — — — — — — — 10 21 51 44 16 23 38 Statistical Yearbook of Armenia, 2010 9 — — — — — — — — — — 19 54 45 20 30 39 8 — — — — — — — — — — 14 48 40 26 26 32 7 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 6 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Statistical Yearbook of Armenia, 2012 5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 4 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 3 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — The table was compiled on the basis of data from 1 Greece Denmark Slovenia Brazil Indonesia Malaysia Argentina Australia The Cayman The Cayman Islands Lebanon Lichtenstein The Virgin The Virgin Islands (U.S.) Syria Panama The Bahamas UAR S o u r c e: Erevan, 2010, pp. 482-488 and pp. 471-474.

157 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS three positions on the list of other countries. We can look at another example: UAE did not invest in the Armenian economy in 2006-2011, but in terms of export from Armenia this country ranked 17th, 20th, 16th, 1st, 15th, and 17th, respectively. As for Armenia’s import indices, the UAE ranked 22nd, 29th, 25th, 22nd, 23rd, and 20th. In Table 8, we present the ranking of Armenia’s main partner countries in foreign trade and in terms of investment volumes for 2008 through 2011. The data on export, import, and investment volumes for the countries occupying the first three positions (the Russian Federation, Germany, and the U.S.) demonstrate, if not a direct, at least a very obvious interdependence. It can be concluded in this context that when a country opens up to foreign trade, it becomes more attractive and transparent for investors.

Conclusion

The interstate conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are hindering the development of the transition economies of the region’s countries. As a result of the government budget deficit and underdevelop- ment of market institutions (including social security mechanisms), they cannot fully carry out eco- nomic and social policy, nor are they in a state to permit themselves to spend large amounts on arms. Cooperation among the regional states can be activated, primarily by means of economic rec- onciliation of the sides. If we proceed from this position, we can also examine the question of creating free economic areas with special features in the region. For example, we can discuss a 10-year program of joint economic development of the region still in the grips of unsettled conflicts. In so doing, particular attention should be given to how much investment will be made over the entire planned period, as well as to maintaining parity (we will call this “parity of investments”) in those branches of the economy they go to. The aim of this proposal is to observe the interests of economic activity agents, which will help to prevent an exodus of capital. Launching economic cooperation and trade among the South Caucasian countries could help to open up new prospects for their interaction both in terms of ensuring peace in the region, and in terms of establishing mutually beneficial business relations.

158 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

REGIONAL POLITICS

UZBEKISTAN-TURKMENISTAN: A POLE OF MULTIVECTORAL POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Mikhail AGAJANIAN Independent Expert (Erevan, Armenia)

ABSTRACT

ontrary to the widespread opinion, eign policy preferences of the Central Asian Central Asia is not a homogenous re- republics. The author has taken two of C gion made up of independent coun- them—Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—to tries that can easily be lumped together. It is demonstrate the main trends of multivec- not a monolith, but a territory crisscrossed toral foreign policy pursued by the regional by numerous dividing lines, some of them actors, irrespective of how relations with the created by different, or even opposing, for- external players are developing.

KEYWORDS: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, multivectoral foreign policy, Central Asia, the Afghan Question, the problem of water resources, energy and transport projects, Russia, the United States, CSTO, SCO.

Introduction

Relations among the states responsible for the geopolitical makeup of Central Asia are not consistent at all. There are seats of ethnopolitical conflicts on the borders of at least some of them;

159 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the countries demonstrate different approaches to urgent transborder issues, hydroelectric projects, and distribution of the region’s water resources in particular. At the same time, the Central Asian republics have been preserving regional security at a certain level by drawing on internal and external resources. The far from simple relations between some of the regional actors have not developed into armed conflicts thanks to the great and increasing atten- tion of external forces and the fact that the region has become part of the collective security zone of the CSTO and SCO. The balance of power inside the region is highly important. Whether the regional processes can be stabilized largely depends on Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and their policies; they can be de- scribed as two “non-aligned countries.” Turkmenistan, which remains true to its neutrality status, and Uzbekistan, which suspended (once more) its CSTO membership, form a specific Central Asian pole. Their relations with the external forces interested in the region are a touchstone of regional stability. Their foreign policies are the most multivectoral and enjoy an equal distribution of priorities, while they have also set the tone for pursuing a complementary foreign policy course in the region. Cooperation between Tashkent and Ashghabad closely related to the most urgent regional is- sues provides a better understanding of the motivations and stimuli behind the multivectoral foreign policies of all the Central Asian countries.

Afghanistan as a Foreign Policy Stimulant

The two countries invigorated their bilateral cooperation in the security sphere and expected to acquire the largest possible dividends from their contacts with the extra-regional forces. Today, their stepped-up activity is explained by the approaching pullout of the coalition’s forces from Afghani- stan, which might increase tension in the border regions of both republics. In the last few months their leaders increased and deepened their foreign policy contacts in an attempt to prevent the looming threat. Here are several episodes that illustrate their relations with Russia. President Putin’s visit to Uzbekistan on 4 June, 2012 produced a Declaration on Deeper Strate- gic Partnership between the two countries. A month later, the Russian president was invited to visit Ashghabad any time he liked. The schedule of President Putin’s visits to the Central Asian countries follows the traditional pat- tern of priority attention toward the CSTO and EurAsEC members. He started with Kazakhstan, then visited Tajikistan, and completed this round by receiving the President of Kazakhstan in Moscow. On 5 December, 2012, Vladimir Putin paid a working visit to Turkmenistan timed to coincide with the CIS Summit in Ashghabad. Late in June 2013, Turkmenistan repeated its invitation. On 14-15 April, 2013, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, probably concerned about the upcoming withdrawal, paid an official visit to Moscow. He not only informed Russia (and other foreign policy partners, for that matter) about his ap- prehensions, but also “sounded the alarm.” He spoke of the creeping expansion of Islamic radicalism toward Central Asia, described the situation in Afghanistan as unpredictable, and did not exclude a civil war in this country. During his visit, the president, who earlier suspended Uzbekistan’s CSTO membership, spoke of “wider and closer cooperation with Russia within the U.N., SCO, CIS, and other important inter- national organizations.” This means that Uzbekistan has revived its fears of possible destabilization in Central Asia associated with radical Islamic groups crossing the border from Afghanistan into the Central Asian republics. 160 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

On 4 April, 2013, during the visit of Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov to Ashghabad, the sides signed a Program of Cooperation between the Foreign Ministries of the Two Countries for 2013, which presupposed, among other things and for the first time, a regular exchange of foreign ministerial opinions on the situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Tashkent and Ashghabad are rightly concerned about instability in Afghanistan. Despite the optimism of some local political scientists, who expect that Uzbekistan and its armed forces are strong enough to oppose the looming threats from the south, the largest of the Central Asian republics is obviously worried. It should be said that the fears in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan of creeping Islamic fundamen- talism are well founded. In April-May 2013, for example, Taliban and fighters of the Islamic Move- ment of Uzbekistan (IMU) clashed with local law-enforcers in the close to the Turkmen border, an area of strategic importance because of the water resource known as the “Turke- stan Water Bank” used by Faryab and the border areas of both countries. The fact that IMU fighters were involved suggests that their activity along the Turkmen borders will create a new context for the republic and the region as a whole. Some experts think that groups hostile to Ashghabad might spring into being under the IMU aegis and start pouring across the border as soon as the pullout is complete. This will reduce Turkmenistan’s neutrality and turn it from a strong diplomatic argument into a weak link in its real politics. It is more or less commonly believed that Turkmenistan is the least likely target of post-2014 fundamentalism: under the late President Niyazov, the republic created an informal channel of con- fidential cooperation with the Taliban leaders. The republic’s neutral status was and remains its trump card, which allows its leaders to argue that they are equally removed from all the sides fighting in Afghanistan. Ashghabad cannot but be concerned about the very possible post-2014 fragmentation of Af- ghanistan. With this possibility in view, Ashghabad is wasting no time: it is looking for new partners in the West and drawing closer to Tashkent, which is also concerned about the risks stemming from Afghanistan. As long as there are NATO troops in Afghanistan, Ashghabad and Tashkent can feel safe from the threat of jihad. The planned pullout, however, forces all players to pay much closer attention to possible regrouping of the IMU and Islamic Jihad Union (so far operating on the border with Pakistan and in Afghanistan) in the Central Asian republics. Tashkent has been using the relative decrease in the radical Islamic threat to its advantage: it boosted its budget and bought armaments and military hardware thanks to the counterterrorist opera- tion and Tashkent’s recent and much more pronounced orientation toward the U.S. and NATO. Jeffrey Mankoff from Washington has offered the following interesting facts: “Collectively, the four Central Asian states that provide ground transit (i.e., excluding Turkmenistan) receive approxi- mately $500 million per year in transit fees.” The planned reverse transit will, likewise, pump a lot of money into Uzbekistan: “Uzbekistan will charge a 50 percent markup over the normal commercial rail tariffs for this reverse transit.”1 Recently, the relations between Washington and Tashkent have acquired a new dimension: Amer- ica supplies the security forces of Uzbekistan, its law-enforcers, and the army with non-lethal weapons and equipment. In March-April 2013, several American officials stated that it would be advisable to extend assistance to Uzbekistan to help it oppose the threats from Afghanistan. The White House has already agreed to supply Uzbekistan with night-vision goggles, global positioning systems (GPS) gear, and bullet-proof vests. It is discussing the supply of small surveillance drones with the Presidential Administration, the Department of State, the Defense Department, and Congress.

1 J. Mankoff, “The United States and Central Asia after 2014,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2013.

161 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In the face of increased IMU activity on the southern borders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and fearing that other radical groups will find their way into their territories, Tashkent and Ashghabad have pooled forces and established much closer relations with the United States, the main external force operating in Afghanistan. Experts and analysts have coined a new term—Afghanization—to describe possible large-scale destabilization as one of the many effects cropping up in some of the Central Asian republics. Uz- bekistan is described as one of the most probable victims, a statement that can be taken with a grain of salt. Indeed, in the past, the best armed republic repeatedly demonstrated its immunity to centrifu- gal trends and its ability to neutralize extremist outcrops. Meanwhile, neither the Uzbek leaders nor the local experts affiliated with them have any illu- sions about the success scored inside the country. Some of them write that “organizations of the IMU type are sheltered by the Taliban; they will present the main threat.”2 Uzbekistan, together with Turkmenistan, is looking for the means and methods to contain the threats. Multisided cooperation of regional and external forces looks like one of the right answers. It seems that Tashkent is trying to revive its old idea of a Contact Group on Afghanistan first formu- lated 5 years ago. In 2008, it suggested a 6 + 3 format consisting of the six countries bordering on Afghanistan (Pakistan, Iran, China, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and three external actors (Russia, the U.S., and NATO) coordinated by the special representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Afghanistan. In August 2008, however, relations between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. and NATO, on the other, were burdened by the military escalation around South Ossetia. It would be logical to expect that today the regional and external forces are much more willing to cooperate in the 6 + 3 format. This means that Tashkent can start brainstorming and probe for re- sponses from Moscow and other capitals.

Water Ducts of Regional Tension and Regional Solidarity

Water distribution is the highest transborder stumbling block in Central Asia, compelling Tash- kent and Ashghabad to join forces to address the problem. This makes President Karimov’s visit to Turkmenistan on 1-2 October, 2012 doubly important. The commentators, who are proceeding from the results of a discussion on the fairer distribution of water resources, have agreed that the relations between the two countries have reached the highest point and that Turkmenistan is Uzbekistan’s closest Central Asian ally. The two presidents were united in their opinion that the Russian capital should be excluded from the large-scale hydropower projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. President Karimov was scathingly critical of Dushanbe, which planned to complete the Rogun Hydropower Plant located in a seismi- cally unsafe area. Several days later, Ashghabad informed that the RF and Tajikistan had not reached an agreement on Russian investments in the Rogun Hydropower Plant on the River Vakhsh. The conflict potential among the three republics is fed by hydropower projects. Uzbekistan is dead set against the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan and the Kambarata Hydropower Plant in Kyrgyzstan. The disagreements are old ones and will not be resolved any time soon.

2 R. Sayfulin, political scientist, former advisor to the President of Uzbekistan, Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii, Collection of international conference papers, IMEMO RAS, Moscow, 2013, p. 69.

162 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Experts have pointed to the lack of progress in this field and also predict another round of ten- sion between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Some ex- perts deem it necessary to warn that by 2014-2015, the Uzbek Army will acquire new armaments and accumulate more strength, in particular thanks to the equipment the United States will transfer to it after the pullout. In fact, according to Kazakh political scientists (Marat Shibutov being one of them),3 Uzbekistan is strong enough to fight on two fronts. Strange as it may seem, Uzbekistan, with the largest population, far from steady transportation connections with the rest of the world, and a climate ill-suited for agriculture, has been resisting the hydropower projects in the neighboring republics for several years now. The problem of water distribution came to the fore after 2012 when Tashkent left the CSTO again. Uzbekistan is especially opposed to the Rogun Hydropower Plant; the American experts in- vited to assess its negative effects concluded that Uzbekistan would lose $600 million every year; they predicted the plant’s negative effect on agriculture, which would cause a 2 percent decrease in the country’s GDP. Moreover, the level of the Amu Darya will drop by 18 percent in the summer and increase by 54 percent in the winter, causing droughts and floods, while large chunks of Karakalpa- kia and the Khwarezm and Bukhara regions might become deserts.4 Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan object to the new hydropower plants on the transborder rivers because of a possible drop in water supply in the lower reaches. Experts forecast that tension between Uzbekistan, on the one side, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyz- stan, on the other, will mount late in 2014 and early 2015; armed clashes are not excluded. The United States is quite capable of extending its high-level support to Uzbekistan after 2014; however, compromises should rely on the country’s internal resources and the stabilization resources of Russia and Kazakhstan. The Russian president’s visits to Tashkent, Bishkek, and Dushanbe between early June and early October 2012 helped to defuse the tension within the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan trian- gle, but did not resolve the hydropower confrontation. It is hard to say how the problems of water and energy supply can be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. Moscow wants Bishkek and Dushanbe within its foreign policy orbit and relations with Tashkent at a constructive level. Supported by the United States, Tashkent will build up its military potential by 2014-2015, but the use of force will end in a catastrophe similar to that of the 1990s when the region came danger- ously close to a total war.

Unifying Gas

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan cooperate in energy supplies to external markets, gas exports to China in particular. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline commissioned late in 2009 gave Ashghabad and Tashkent a reliable gas export route. In fact, Turkmenistan, which left Russia far behind, has become China’s main partner in extracting and exporting natural gas. The volumes of gas exports and prospects for even larger amounts of energy resources being extracted in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan and exported to China are very impressive.

3 See: “Migrantskie voyny,” Svobodnaia pressa, available at [http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/70344/], 3 July, 2013. 4 See: “Po zakonam Fallout. Sredney Azii predrekaiut voynu za vodnye resursy,” available at [http://lenta.ru/ articles/2012/09/25/maybe/], 25 September, 2012.

163 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In 2012, China bought 21.3 billion cu m of gas from Turkmenistan; there is an agreement to bring the annual volumes of exported gas up to 65 billion cu m by 2016. Uzbekistan, likewise, intends to expand its gas trade with China within the Central Asia-China project. It is expected that the third phase of the gas pipeline will bring the volumes of Uzbek gas moved to China from 25 to 30 billion cu m. Today, Gazprom of Russia buys 33 billion cu m of gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 10 billion cu m of which are bought from Turkmenistan. Russia never fails to remind the Turkmen leaders, directly or indirectly, that it is willing to buy even more gas. In April 2013, Alex- ander Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Board of Executive Directors of Gazprom, accompanied Foreign Minister Lavrov during his visit to Ashghabad. Russia hoped to talk about wider cooperation in the gas sphere. These expectations fell through, although the talks were not entirely useless. Moscow is not overjoyed at the gas-related cooperation between Tashkent and Ashghabad; it is even less pleased about the possibility of their joining projects that will bring Caspian and Central Asian gas to the European market and which, therefore, will undermine the interests of Gazprom. So far, the Trans-Caspian project remains on paper, although Russia’s firm opposition seems to be counterproductive. On the whole, the project for laying pipelines across the Caspian is not easy to implement for several reasons: there are disagreements between Baku and Ashghabad over certain gas fields on the Caspian shelf, while Iran is opposed to the decision to pass the pipeline along the sea bottom without a concerted agreement among the five Caspian states. It should be said that Moscow has demonstrated a lot of good sense by removing its pressure on Turkmenistan, which in the past greatly irritated the Turkmen leaders. In December 2011, President of Turkmenistan Berdymukhammedov’s visit to Russia took place in a highly emotional atmosphere created by the Russian media, which spoke of the Trans-Caspian gas project as a death sentence to Russia’s monopoly on fuel transit from Central Asia to Europe. Experts, on the other hand, describe the Trans-Caspian project as “failed hopes;” this was fur- ther confirmed by the decision of the consortium working on the Shah Deniz gas field development in the Azeri sector of the Caspian to concentrate on a Trans-Adriatic Pipeline project. Gas from Turkmenistan, a direct rival of Russian gas, has not yet reached the European market. This, however, cannot be totally excluded. So far, Tashkent and Ashghabad are more interested in wider cooperation with China; they regard access to the solvent European market as a distant strategic prospect.

Access to the Sea

The two republics have their transit potential in common. The region’s transit function created by the U.S.’s involvement in Afghanistan is no less important for the regional actors seeking access to external markets. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan play key roles in several transportation projects with long overland stretches. The Western capitals want to extend the railway that will connect Tur- key, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (the project of Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku) to Turkmenbashi (Turk- menistan) and Navoi (Uzbekistan), as well as the northern regions of Afghanistan. On 1-2 October, 2012, at a meeting in Ashghabad, the leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan spoke of the railway project between the eastern provinces of Turkey and the Azeri coast of the Caspian in positive terms. The transport corridor between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf (Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan- Iran-Oman-Qatar), in which Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are involved and the agreement on which was signed on 25 April, 2011, is one of the priorities in both capitals. The United States, however, is not overjoyed about the future access of these republics to ex- ternal markets through Iranian territory (Turkmenistan will allow Uzbekistan to reach the Gulf ports 164 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 through Sarakhs, on the Iranian border). The White House is prepared to fund alternative routes, the New Silk Road in particular, devised and developed by American analytical centers and supported by the U.S. Department of State. This project, a transport-logistical project in official parlance or, in the words of American diplomats, an international network with transit junctions and economic hubs, should be discussed in a wider geopolitical context. Washington is prepared to extend the planned transport routes and cor- responding logistics infrastructure with elements of its geopolitical presence (in the form of function- ing and planned pipelines), as well as the transborder power lines. “Other initiatives seek to match energy from Central Asia with Pakistan and India—two markets with significant electricity needs. The TAPI pipeline project would bring on-shore natural gas from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to markets in Pakistan and India. Other efforts would facilitate the transmission of electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.”5 Some Washington analysts write that “while direct trade between the Central Asian states and Iran tends to be small, three of these states remain dependent on transshipment through Iran for export access to ocean ports.”6

Conclusion

The United States is exploiting the desire of the Uzbek and Turkmen leaders to develop their multivectoral foreign policy. It is also involved in the region’s other urgent problems created by the Afghan threats and challenges, the problem of water distribution, trade in energy resources bypassing Russia, as well as access to external markets of commodities and services. Washington is prepared to support the projects being implemented outside Iran and Russia. So far, this policy has not brought many dividends, even though some of the projects, not yet completed, look promising. The TAPI gas pipeline demonstrated certain progress last year; in May 2012, Ashghabad signed gas sale-purchase agreements with Pakistan and India. On 9 July, 2013, the Chairman of Turkmeni- stan’s State Company Turkmengaz and the Chairman of Afghanistan’s Gas Corporation signed a gas sale-purchase agreement (GSPA). At the same time, Washington’s official statements about the stra- tegic priority of TAPI so far remain pure declarations. Another suspension of Uzbekistan’s CSTO membership, which has become a tradition, Tashkent’s special position on several economic and political problems obvious in the post-Soviet space, and integration processes are bringing the repub- lic closer to the United States. Experts confirm that Uzbekistan has an important role to play in America’s plans in Central Asia and the neighboring regions and countries. Today, this is most graphically illustrated by the fact that Uzbekistan is treated as part of the White House’s Afghan policy: on 22 September, 2011, the U.S. Congress lifted the bans on military aid to Uzbekistan introduced seven years earlier. American diplomats stationed in Uzbekistan never fail to point to a new mechanism put in place by the White House: annual political consultation. The third round took place in August 2012 when the Uzbek leaders left Russia’s orbit again to try on the garb of the United States’ main regional partner. Later, Tashkent readjusted its foreign policy strategy by joining the CIS Free Trade Area; con- sultations with the Americans on the regional agenda remained as important as ever.

5 R.D. Hormats, The United States’ “New Silk Road” Strategy: What is it? Where is it Headed? Address to the SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and CSIS Forum, 29 September, 2011. 6 R.M. Shelala II, N. Kasting, A.H. Cordesman, U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Central Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 June, 2013.

165 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

On 25 July, 2013, Uzbek diplomats discussed bilateral relations with General Lloyd James Austin III, Commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM). The press service of the Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan issued a statement that “the sides are paying particular attention to international and regional issues and the developments in Afghanistan in particular.” The general was received by President Karimov the same day. Having reached a new level of relations with the United States, Tashkent is not ignoring re- gional developments: it intends to profit from economic integration in the post-Soviet expanse and does not intend to move away from China’s strategic interests in the East European markets. The latter is reciprocated by China’s interest in the republic’s fairly capacious market and its long land border with Kazakhstan. The United States not only wants to draw Uzbekistan into Washington’s strategic project re- lated (and unrelated) to Afghanistan; it also wants to draw Turkmenistan into its Central Asian policy. In fact, Washington is working toward a loyal southwestern flank in Central Asia to outweigh all other extra-regional players. In Central Asia, the preferences and new configurations of relations among the Central Asian and with external forces change frequently. Today, the Uzbek-Turkmen alliance taking shape is not anti-Russian. Both capitals are looking for the best possible mechanisms for maintaining relations with all the big external and regional actors. So far, they prefer the format of bilateral relations and strategic agreements: since the summer of 2012, Tashkent has been shaping its foreign policy accordingly. On 4 June, 2012, during President Putin’s visit to Tashkent, the sides signed a declaration on deepening strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and Russia; a year later a similar document was signed between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. It should be said that Tashkent made the visit of mid-April 2013, rather than the agreements of 4 June, 2012, the starting point of its new strategic partnership with Moscow. President Karimov’s visit to Russia on 14-15 April, 2013, which surprised many, spoke of Tashkent’s deep concerns over the possible developments in Afghanistan. The two presidents agreed to strengthen cooperation between the special services of both coun- tries (information about this was deliberately downplayed); however, Uzbek experts described it as President Karimov’s great achievement. Indeed, outside the CSTO and in close contact with the political centers of the West, Uzbekistan still needs close cooperation with the Russian special services. According to local experts, Uzbekistan has neutralized the negative effects of suspended membership by means of new agreements with Russia. Under its agreement with the Russian Federation, the threatened side can count on talks to neu- tralize the threat up to and including stationing Russian military in Uzbekistan. Recently, relations between Russia and Turkmenistan moved away from the gas issue as the only priority to a gradually widening political and economic agenda. Neutral Turkmenistan is interested in cooperation within the SCO, even though it does not be- long either to it or to the CSTO. This limits the range of its involvement in multisided regional coop- eration. Deeper bilateral cooperation will make Russia even more pragmatic in dealing with Turkmeni- stan. Moscow should stop concentrating on gas: the two countries are gradually moving closer. Ash- ghabad is interested in the SCO and takes into account the CSTO: it needs to protect itself from the Afghan threats looming on the post-2014 horizon.

166 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 IRANIAN PRESIDENTS AND TAJIK-IRANIAN RELATIONS

Rashid ABDULLO Ph.D. (Hist.), Independent Expert (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

ABSTRACT

he author examines the relations be- in an effort to become better acquainted with tween the two countries in the context each other. Under President Khatami bilat- T of the political processes going on in eral relations acquired an even stronger eco- Iran. Throughout the twenty years of Tajiki- nomic bias. Iranian investments helped to stan’s independence, these relations have implement several large-scale strategic in- passed through different stages, each of frastructural projects initiated by the govern- them marked by Tehran’s political course ment of Tajikistan. It was during the presi- and the personalities of each of the Iranian dency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that rela- presidents. At the early stages, flexible and tions between the two countries reached a cautious Rafsanjani preferred to limit con- new and higher level: Iran became a strate- tacts to cultural cooperation; Tehran, how- gic partner and the largest investor. Tehran ever, did not shun involvement in the domes- invested in strategically important projects in tic conflict in Tajikistan as a broker; its posi- energy, transport, and communication. Re- tive contribution cannot be overestimated. cently elected President Hassan Rouhani, This was when the two countries set up a known as subtle politician and diplomat, will base for closer trade and economic contacts; probably change the development vector of they encouraged business trips and tourism relations between the two countries.

KEYWORDS: Iran, Tajikistan, presidents, cooperation, economic contacts.

Introduction

On 14 June, 2013, the Islamic Republic of Iran elected a new president, an event that invariably invites a lot of attention in Tajikistan for at least two reasons:  first, in the last decade, Iran has become one of Tajikistan’s strategic partners with a great role to play in the Tajik economy;  second, the president as the head of the executive branch of power with considerable con- stitutional rights and as the second figure, de jure and de facto, in the hierarchy of power in Iran is responsible for its smooth functioning on a day-to-day basis. This means that economic cooperation between the two countries and its smooth development depends, among other things, on the president and his team. For over nearly a quarter of a century, three presidents—Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989- 1997), Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013)—carried the far

167 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS from easy burden of the country’s development. Each of them was elected to two consecutive presi- dential terms, and the presidency of each can be described as an epoch in the country’s development and its relations with Tajikistan.

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani: The Beginning

Both of his terms coincided with the far from easy postwar period. The war with Iraq had just ended and the nation had to switch to a peaceful life and pour its efforts into the country’s economic revival. The state of emergency in which the country has been living for the eight wartime years had to be abolished to allow the country to implement overdue economic reforms. During the war, the country and its economy had been functioning according to the demands of wartime: all resources were controlled by the state; the same applied to administration and economic management, which negatively affected business activity and entrepreneurship. During the war, the people reconciled themselves to hardships, low living standards, and limited opportunities to satisfy social, economic, political, and other needs. Soon after the war, it became abundantly clear that the wartime approaches should be abandoned. President Rafsanjani and his team coped, on the whole, with this task. After all, the president himself was a big businessman well aware of what should be done for the business community in his country and for its economy; this made it much easier to switch to peaceful development. Within a relatively short time, Iran’s economy was returned to peacetime tracks; it was no lon- ger burdened by the demands of wartime or the state’s interference. Enjoying lighter state control, Iran’s economy began growing rapidly. During his eight years in power, the president and his team laid the foundations of a modern diversified economy strong enough to meet the demands and require- ments of the state and each of its citizens. It was during Rafsanjani’s presidency that the country ac- quired conditions conducive to the development of education, science, and national culture through a newly established network of educational and research centers that met the highest world standards. This was the hardest period in the relations between Iran and Tajikistan. On 9 September, 1991, Tajikistan declared its independence; the Tajiks expected that Iran would immediately recognize its new status, establish diplomatic relations with them, and open its embassy in Dushanbe. Reality proved very different indeed. Early in the 1990s, Tehran badly needed conflict-free rela- tions with the Soviet Union. During the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, the West had sup- pressed its dislike of Islamic Iran: it was very much needed as an ally to support the Afghan mojahe- deen. The Soviet pullout restored the tension, forcing Tehran to tread carefully in its relations with Moscow. It tried to avoid all potentially dangerous steps to maintain the fragile balance, despite the West’s extreme intolerance. It comes as no surprise that Iran supplemented its de facto contacts with Tajikistan with diplomatic relations to become the first state with an embassy in Dushanbe opened on 9 January, 1993 after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Tajik authorities housed the Iranian em- bassy in a building next to the buildings of the parliament and the government. In the first months of 1992, contacts rapidly developed; this is partly explained by the fact that the political forces that determined the political priorities of the Tajiks—the Rastokhez (Revival) movement and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan—treated national resurrection and orientation to- ward Iran as two absolute musts. This made it much easier to establish extensive political and hu- manitarian contacts between the two countries. The Iranian embassy and Iranian Ambassador Ali Ashraf Mujtahid i Shabistari, a professional diplomat whose career goes back to the time of the shah, did a lot to promote even closer relations.

168 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

In 1993, however, relations deteriorated: many of the prominent leaders of the Tajik opposition emigrated to Iran to while away the civil war. This explains why the former openness was replaced with a caution that the new people who came to power in late 1992 never bothered to conceal. The top crust, the political elite, and a large part of the public remained prejudiced toward Iran, a country that embraced political Islam. The political and ideological clichés inherited from Soviet times were still very much alive; this explains the attitude of the Tajiks toward all Muslim states. On the whole, those who write about Tajikistan’s relations with the world and the factors that interfere in or further the republic’s relations with other countries concentrate on political, economic, geopolitical, and other factors and lose sight of the civilizational factor. Meanwhile, the impact of criteria and assessments created by the force field of the Soviet civilization shaped the republic’s relations with the rest of the world. So far, Tajikistan’s Soviet past has been strongly affecting its post-Soviet relations with coun- tries outside the common Soviet civilizational space. Relations, however, have been gradually chang- ing: while in 1993 Tajikistan treated these countries as if the Soviet Union were very much alive, later Dushanbe learned to take the changed circumstances into account. Its relations with Tehran are highly illustrative in this respect. The de- process unfolding across the post-Soviet space taught Tajik society to readjust its ideas about Iran after the catastrophically worsened relations at the turn of 1993. De-Sovietization of Tajikistan and the other Central Asian republics was a natural and unavoid- able process, since the Soviet system was alien to the local societies. It was brought in from outside and, therefore, needed outside support for its continued existence in the form of political and ideo- logical impact and economic support of Russia, the core Union republic. The changed social and political order in Russia and disintegration of the Soviet Union made this support impossible by definition. De-Sovietization of the former Soviet republics was going on in parallel to the emergence of the newly independent national states on the ruins of the superpower. They gained strength within the model of national revival. Tajikistan, however, failed to develop its new statehood in the first year of its independence (September 1991-November 1992) because of internal (a power struggle between the regional and political elites) and external (external support extended to the sides in the political and later military confrontation inside the country) factors. The new leaders who came to power at the 16th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan of the last Soviet convocation created a favorable political context in which the Tajik state could develop its post-Soviet identity. The session was convened in late November and early in December 1992 in , the administrative center up in the country’s north (still called the Len- inabad Region at that time), which had avoided the civil war. As distinct from the Tajik leaders of the previous period, the new people talked about the post-Soviet Tajik state and Tajik statehood (lost for different historical reasons many centuries ago) as an heir to the traditions of the state of the Sama- nids. It was within it, and within smaller states, that a new common Iranian civilizational space emerged as an organic part of the larger Islamic civilizational space. The new leaders were fairly open: for them national values, closely associated with Islamic values, were just as important as ideas of secularism and democracy. This created an ideological and conceptual foundation on which the new leaders built their rela- tions with Iran and the other Muslim countries, a prospect rejected by some of Tajik society. The gradual evolution of the ruling regime in Iran improved relations between Dushanbe and Tehran. I have already written that the Iranian leaders had to concentrate on postwar resurrection and, therefore, shift the accent from political and ideological to economic aspects of the development of the Iranian revolution, on the one hand, and establish conflict-free relations with the external world and neighbors in particular, on the other.

169 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The peace talks between the sides in the Tajik conflict were the Iranians’ first serious political step toward reviving relations with Tajikistan. The Iranian leaders, the Supreme Leader of Iran Aya- tollah Seyyd Ali Hosseini Khamenei, as well as President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his govern- ment spared no effort to make the talks a success. The talks allowed the top officials of Tajikistan directly involved at the preparatory stages and at the talks to meet the Iranian representatives and discuss all sorts of problems with them. The Tajiks were pleased to discover that the Iranian politicians and Iranian people as a whole understood that Tajikistan’s problems were of a temporary nature and that they were very positive about the republic and ready to remove the obstacles created by the political crisis and confrontation of 1992. They also became convinced that, on the whole, Iran wanted to see Tajikistan a united and indepen- dent state. The Iranian politicians promoted the dialog between the sides in the Tajik military and political conflict. The first positive result was achieved with the help of Iran. In September 1994, the sides signed an agreement in Tehran on a temporary ceasefire and “a Joint Commission consisting of representa- tives of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Tajik Opposition” to ensure “the ef- fective implementation of this Agreement.” The members of the United Tajik Opposition who had spent several years in emigration came back for the first time to start working in the commission. Iran was one of the main guarantors of the comprehensive Tajik peace agreements signed on 27 June, 1997. The meetings between President of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmon and the Iranian leaders pro- moted further cooperation. The first official visit of the Tajik president to Iran, which took place on 16-18 July, 1995, ended the period of estrangement between the two countries. In May 1997, Presi- dent Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani paid an official visit to Tajikistan. His talks with President Rakhmon, in view of the signing of a peace agreement, moved the relations between the two countries, no longer burdened by the Tajik conflict, to a higher level. Economic contacts between the two countries, which were developing against the background of the rapidly unfolding political stabilization in Tajikistan, advanced their relations further. In fact, the people who found themselves amid the ruins of the former state and economy, yet willing to survive and even climb out of the economic abyss, established the first economic contacts with Iran in the form of “shuttle” or “suitcase” trade. Despite its own problems, Iran simplified the visa regime and encouraged “shuttle” trade to keep bilateral economic relations with Tajikistan alive. The relatively large number of these traders gained the opportunity to familiarize themselves with Iran and its economic situation, as well as with the way people were doing business there. They saw with their own eyes that the Iranians, pestered by numerous problems on a day-to-day basis, found rational solutions to at least some of them. Confronted with Iranian reality, people not only shed their prejudices, but also the illusion that Soviet Tajikistan had been more developed than Iran. They gradually realized that Islamic rule in Iran did not interfere with the country’s economic, cultural, or scientific progress, despite the economic and other sanctions imposed on it by certain countries after the Iranian revolution. Broad contacts at the grass-roots level and better knowledge of how the ordinary people lived gradually diffused the Tajiks’ guarded and reserved attitude toward Iran. Gradually, movement in the opposite direction began to gain momentum: Iranian businessmen and specialists in various fields came to Tajikistan to implement small-scale Iranian projects. Very much like the Tajiks in Iran, the Iranians in Tajikistan were given the opportunity to obtain first-hand knowledge about life in the republic and the problems the ordinary people had to grapple with. The Tajiks and Iranians became more and more aware that they belonged to the common space of the Iranian and Islamic civilization; they acquired real knowledge about each other and abandoned the old and recent stereotypes. 170 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

At that time, Tajikistan was looking forward to economic cooperation with Iran, while Iran preferred cultural contacts and humanitarian aid for two important reasons.  First, at that time, Iran was working hard to overcome the repercussions of the eight-year war with Iraq in the pinching conditions of Western sanctions and relatively low oil prices. In other words, the country had no money to invest in economic projects in other countries.  Second, at that time, no sober-minded investor would have poured money into expensive economic projects in the Republic of Tajikistan torn apart by civil war. The country had not yet developed a new statehood and could not, therefore, guarantee secu- rity either of the country or of investments. The Brits were the only exception: they chose this far from easy period to set up a complete gold-mining cycle—from geological prospecting to producing 999 gold ingots. They set up a Tajik-British JV Zarafshan Gold Company and used the industrial facilities of Zarya Vostoka to open a refining line. Today the company belongs to the Chinese.

Mohammad Khatami: Stronger and Broader Economic Cooperation

Toward the end of Rafsanjani’s second term, it had become absolutely clear that the country was moving toward a new stage in its development. At the previous stage, ushered in by the deposi- tion of shah and establishment of the republic, the Iranian state was busy building its new Islamic statehood and defending it in a bloody war. It learned to function with no military-political support from other countries; it learned to suppress alien influences determined to destroy the very core of the 1,400-year-long Iranian identity. At the new stage, the country had to learn how to respond to new challenges. In the latter half of the 1990s, a new generation of Iranian citizens joined adult life; these young people grew up in the new political context created by the victory of the Iranian revolution and the war with Iraq. This generation took shape amid the postwar economic upsurge, when the middle class was becoming the leading, best educated, and politically active segment of Iranian society. The experience of the generation that entered adult life in the 1990s was very different from the experience of their fathers and elder brothers, that is, of the generations that carried out the revolution and defended it in the years of the Holy Defense (Defā’-e Moqaddas). The new generation wants higher living standards adequate to the country’s development level; they want the older generation and the country’s leaders to pay attention to their ideas of how the country and the Islamic revolution should develop; they want reforms to harmonize the political real- ity with the country’s economic, scientific, and cultural level. Those who defended these ideas in the public and political context became known as reformers. The reformers and those who shared their ideas were convinced that Mohammad Khatami was the best possible president to support their views and interests at the top level. He was elected president in 1997 and reelected in 2001. The new Iranian president had not only to cope with the task of the liberalizing political life and bringing the country closer to the standards of the democratic countries. He was convinced that the supreme interests of the Islamic revolution demanded that the country should finally end isolation and become integrated into the world community as an equal partner. He called on the international com- munity and the West in particular to move away from the idea of the clash of civilizations to the idea of a dialog between cultures and civilizations. The Iranian president expected that his initiatives and

171 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS practical steps in this direction would convince one and all that his country, oriented toward a dialog with the entire civilizational space, threatened no one. Under Khatami, economic relations between the two countries acquired a new dimension. The Iranians, reassured by the Tajik government, which assumed the role of a direct entity of economic cooperation with Iran, and by the mounting business activity in Tajikistan, demonstrated much more willingness to invest in the programs suggested by Tajikistan. The Tajik government launched sev- eral strategic infrastructural projects; Iranian construction firms took part in the first of such projects by building several railway stations along the railway between Kurgan-Tyube and Kulob. Later, the Iranians took part in the Anzob tunnel (now known as tunnel Istiqlol) project which, unfortunately, took too much time to be completed. On the other hand, it revealed the pluses and minuses of cooperation on large-scale projects. It turned out that the Tajik side was not up to the mark when working on the legal, financial, technical, logistic, administrative, and other aspects at the initial stage, during construction and commissioning. The Sangtuda-2 power plant became the most important bilateral project. It was a by-product of the talks between President Rakhmon and President Khatami held in September 2004 in Dushanbe. At the very end of the talks, the Iranian president amazed everyone by saying that his country was prepared to invest a quarter of a billion dollars in the unfinished Sangtuda-2 power plant on River Vakhsh. Before that, Dushanbe had asked Russia several times to finish the power plant started in Soviet times. Russia agreed to extend about $100 million, an obviously inadequate sum. From Du- shanbe it looked like an apology for a refusal. Moreover, by keeping the power plant issue suspended, Russia could promote its political and other interests in the republic. The sudden offer of a quarter of a billion looked like a challenge to Moscow, which had to shift its position from “neither yes nor no” to a much more constructive approach. In October 2004, during his official visit to Dushanbe, President Putin offered Tajikistan nearly $2 billion to complete the Sangtuda-2 and Rogun power plants, modernize the old aluminum plant, and build a new similar production facility. The leaders of Tajikistan accepted Russia’s money but, for two reasons, were not prepared to reject Iran’s money. First, Iran offered real money and was very serious about it; this step was sug- gested by Iran’s national interests: the country had to overcome international isolation. Second, the past experience of dealing with Russia had shown that it was ready to act in earnest in Tajikistan only if there were strong rivals. Tajikistan looked and continues looking at Iran as a financially reliable partner able to compete with Russia and to force it to fulfill what it promised. These foreign policy moves by Tajikistan led to the idea of building two Sangtuda power plants. It was discussed at a tripartite meeting of the ministers of energy of Tajikistan (Jurabek Nurmuham- madov) and Iran (Habibollah Bitaraf) and Head of RAO UES Anatoly Chubais. The sides signed three protocols, according to which Russia pledged to invest in the construction of the Sangtuda-1 power plant costing a total of $400-500 million; Iran was expected to invest in the Sangtuda-2 power plant costing $220 million. The fact that Iran shouldered two far from simple and protracted projects (the tunnel and the power plant) spoke of two things. First, that as one of the largest oil exporters, Iran profited from the higher oil prices in the 2000s. Second, Tehran no longer doubted that Dushanbe could maintain stabil- ity and security in Tajikistan. On 31 May, 2005, President Rakhmon and Deputy Minister of Energy of Iran Reza Ardakanian discussed the prospects of cooperation in the energy sphere. On 8-11 June, at a meeting of energy ministers of Tajikistan and Iran in Tehran, the Iranian side confirmed its readiness to extend a loan of $180 million for 10 years at a 5% annual interest rate for the Sangtuda-2 power plant. On 15 June, President Rakhmon met Governor of the Central Bank of Iran Ebrahim Sheibani, who assured him that the Central Bank was prepared to invest in the Sangtuda-2 power plant project. 172 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: Cooperation Continues

The larger part of the world community not only heard, but also supported the call of Khatami to a dialog of civilizations. The U.N. General Assembly proclaimed the year 2001 the “United Nations Year of Dialog among Civilizations.” The West, however, interpreted the call to enter a dialog as evi- dence that Iran had been broken by the Western sanctions. Encouraged, the West increased its pressure using the newly created “nuclear file” as a pretext and also as a lever of pressure. Tehran’s 2003 vol- untary decision to suspend some of the aspects of its nuclear program was interpreted in the Western capitals as their victory. Deluded by this illusion, the Western countries increased their pressure. This brought dual results. On the one hand, it undermined the position of those in the country who counted on equal relations with the Western countries. On the other, Western pressure, coupled with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, fanned anti-Western sentiments; the public became de- termined to resist the pressure. The country needed politicians resolute enough to talk to the Iranian ill-wishers in their own language. The presidential election of 2005 brought victory to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a charismatic and religious man with several years on the frontline of the war with Iraq behind him. The new president and his team wasted no time in addressing tasks of vital importance: nuclear, missile, and space high technologies, development of the military-industrial complex, oil and gas processing industrial facilities, and development of the regions. On the international scene, the new people were determined to staunchly oppose external threats. From the very first days of his presi- dency, Ahmadinejad demonstrated that he was ready to operate in conditions of severe political confrontation and respond in kind to all hostile or unfriendly actions. There is a fairly widespread opinion that the results of his presidency were positive. Some ex- perts are convinced that his unyielding position and his obvious readiness to face armed confrontation combined with the evident progress of the military-industrial complex and re-armament of the Ira- nian armed forces made it impossible for the country’s opponents to treat Iran as another Serbia, Afghanistan, or Iraq. The eight years of his presidency can be described as the heyday of cooperation between Iran and Tajikistan. On 24-30 July, 2005, Speaker of the Lower Chamber of the Tajik parliament Say- dullo Khayrulloev met the newly elected president of Iran and newly appointed foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki for the first time. They confirmed their readiness to develop cooperation with Tajikistan, in the energy sphere in particular. On 7-8 December, 2005, Mecca hosted a summit of the OIC, which gave the presidents of the two countries the chance to meet on the margins. The Iranian president confirmed that he was ready to help Tajikistan implement its economic projects up to and including the Sangtuda-2 power plant project. On 16 January, 2006, President of Tajikistan came to Iran on an official visit, during which the presidents discussed the major areas of cooperation. They concentrated on the Sangtuda-2 power plant project, the Anzob tunnel, and restructuring of the Tajik debt to Iran. The Tajik president was received by the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Seyyd Ali Hosseini Khamenei, who assured him that Iran was firm in its intention to cooperate with Tajikistan. In 2006, the presidents met two more times: on 15 June, at the SCO summit in Shanghai, where they discussed bilateral economic cooperation, energy, and other projects, as well as the planned summit of the Persian-speaking countries in Dushanbe. The second meeting took place on 25 July in Dushanbe at the summit. The talks held on the margins produced agreements on cooperation in en- ergy, transportation, land tenure, science and education, and joint production of tractors. The next day, both presidents attended the official opening of the Anzob tunnel. 173 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Later, the meetings became regular; the presidents established good personal relations, impos- sible with Ahmadinejad’s predecessors, who belonged to the very refined sectors of the Iranian elite; Ahmadinejad did not belong to it and, therefore, proved to be a much easier partner for Emomali Rakhmon. Their last two meetings took place in Turkmenistan, which they visited on 20 March, 2013 to celebrate Navruz and on 5 June of the same year to attend the ceremony for launching the railway that will connect Iran and Tajikistan via Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. It will give Tajikistan, a landlocked country, an outlet to the world by-passing Uzbekistan. On the whole, during the eight years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, annual trade turnover never went below the $200 million level. In 2010 and 2011, Iran was the largest investor in the Tajik economy; in 2012, China pushed it into the second place. On 26 June, 2013, at a meeting in Tehran, the foreign ministers of Tajikistan and Iran said with satisfaction that there were 200 Iranian companies working in Tajikistan.

Stumbling Blocks

Even now, when times are favorable, relations between the two countries are experiencing their share of problems. Not everyone in Sunni Tajikistan is overjoyed with the close and stronger relations with Shi‘a Iran. Its great and widening presence has been running up against opposition at the middle and lower level of the Iranian bureaucracy, which is making it hard for Iranian businessmen to defend their rights in economic disagreements and conflicts with local entrepreneurs. Education is another sphere where cooperation is far from welcome. Every year Iran opens quotas for citizens of Tajikistan at Iranian higher educational establishments; however, every year a fairly large share of them remains unfilled, and not because young Tajiks do not want to study in Iran. A head of the office of the cultural attaché at the Iranian embassy in Tajikistan complained to me that the quotas at Iranian medical universities, as well as budget places at universities teaching engineer- ing and exact sciences are being wasted despite the free accommodation and stipends that are part of the quotas. In response to the wishes of the Tajik side, Iran is working with the official structures, which probably deliberately suppress information about the quotas. The negligible number of those who can unearth this information profits from the opportunities. It looks strange that the fears about wider and deeper cooperation between the two countries have moved to the fore in a situation where Iran remains the only state wishing to support Tajikistan’s hydropower industry, a branch of national importance. Tehran is building the Sangtuda-2 power plant and has already voiced its willingness to switch, upon its completion, to a power plant on River Zer- avshan. Russia and China, two other strategic partners of Tajikistan, are pursuing a wait-and-see policy, despite the numerous promises and signed agreements on hydroelectric projects, so as to avoid conflicts with Uzbekistan, which is dead set against any hydropower projects in Tajikistan.

A New Leader: Prospects

President Ahmadinejad preserved the status quo in his country by setting up a powerful defense complex and mastering high technologies. This could not be done without encouraging fundamental sciences and training scientific and technical personnel. During his presidency, Iran moved far ahead in nuclear and space research, acquired up to the mark missile systems, etc. It was then that Iran be- came a strong regional power with a lot of impact on the region, the opinions and interests of which are taken into account. 174 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 3 2013

Today, Iran must work harder than before to end the isolation imposed on it by outside forces in order to join the international (no longer unipolar) community, while keeping its national interests in mind. Its military and political might based on economic, scientific, and technical potential is caus- ing concern in many places of the world, the Gulf monarchies in particular. Their domination in the Islamic world cannot be ignored; the West with its huge economic and military potential is on their side too. Tehran should address a task of primary, if not vital, importance: to convince the world to abandon its guarded attitude for the sake of cooperation in politics, the economy, scientific, technical, and other spheres. There is no consent inside the country: some people wholeheartedly supported Ahmadinejad and his methods, while the 2009 events showed that there was opposition and that a fairly large sec- tion of the country’s population did not agree with the president. The majority shared the aims and ideas of the Islamic revolution, which means that there was considerable integration potential to be used inside the country and, partly, outside it. This was not an easy task: Ahmadinejad and his team clashed with the legislative and judicial branches. Late in October 2012, fierce political battles forced the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Seyyd Ali Hosseini Khamenei to point out to the conflicting sides that their conflicts might split the nation on the eve of the presidential election. Tension subsided, but disagreements over the country’s future development remained. The Supreme Leader of Iran, in fact, launched the presidential race: all TV channels were only too eager to use what he said about the coming elections as an opportunity to discuss the personality of the new president. Very soon the nation learned that both inside and outside the country the new president must be firm and flexible at one and the same time: he must demonstrate firmness when moving toward the selected goal and flexibility when selecting means and tools. The Iranian media pointed out that Iran’s foreign policy would become one of the top priorities of all candidates and that when pursuing na- tional aims the country should not necessarily alienate the world. The results achieved by President Ahmadinejad and his team had to be preserved and devel- oped, therefore the country needed a new team able to cope and to keep a lower profile. Ahmadinejad was inclined toward demonstrative public actions and statements either about external forces or clos- er to home, about opponents in the presidential race, the speaker of the parliament, or top judiciary. It seemed that he respected no one but the Supreme Leader of Iran, who on rare occasions was the target of his mildly critical remarks. To a great extent, when elected president, he preserved much of his previous experience of his years as a revolutionary-minded student, frontline commander, governor of a small province, and mayor of Tehran. He felt at ease when talking to people rather than being confined to his office. In the last eighteen months, he quarreled with many influential figures up to and including the heads of the legislative and judicial branches; he was not adverse to pointing out that, unlike them, he had been elected by general direct vote. The fact that as distinct from many other high officials he did not descend from the religious milieu accounted for his approaches, which were very much dif- ferent from theirs. The need to consolidate the positive results of Ahmadinejad’s presidency demanded a very differ- ent person for president. Hassan Rouhani, the new president of Iran, looks much better adjusted to the task than all of his contenders. As distinct from Ahmadinejad, he is not a public figure, he cannot be described as an open person; he has accumulated a lot of experience as a member of all sorts of councils and enough patience to conduct long and very complicated negotiations and avoid rash actions. He has vast experience in parliamentary work as a vice speaker and chairman of a parliamen- tary committee, which means that his relations with the parliament will be less tumultuous than those of his predecessor. 175 Volume 14 Issue 3 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The new president knows a lot about military matters; he was actively involved in building the new army and commanded the country’s air force and air-defense system. He served as deputy su- preme commander of the armed forces and is, therefore, well known in the army and its elite. He is an integral part of the top crust of the Shia clerical community, which means that conflicts and confronta- tion with it are next to impossible. For several decades he served as a proxy of the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Seyyd Ali Hosseini Khamenei, which rules out even a hint of a conflict with him. The president elect is inaugurated in two stages. First, his election is affirmed in the presence of the Supreme Leader of Iran, heads of all branches of power, and the military in the residence of Imam Khomeini in the north Tehran suburb of Jamran. He settled there after the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1979. At the second stage, the president elect is adjured in the parliament. As soon as the results of the popular vote became known— nearly 18.7 million (50.7%) out of 36.7 million (the turnout of 72.7%) voted for Hassan Rouhani—the dates for the two stages were fixed for 3 August and 5 August, 2013. The month and a half that separated the election and inauguration were very important for Iran and Tajikistan. It was then that the newly elected president polished his program for the next four years and selected his team. He had to concentrate on new foreign policy approaches and somewhat readjust relations with the West and the Gulf monarchies. Dushanbe worked hard to keep bilateral relations in energy, transport, and communication at the top of the new president’s agenda. This explains the visit of Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi to Tehran. On 26 June, he was received by outgoing President Ahmadinejad, to whom he handed a letter of greetings from Emomali Rakhmon, probably addressed to the president elect. There was no information that the foreign minister of Tajikistan was received by Hassan Rouhani; this means that the new president probably avoided this meeting. Eight years earlier, Speaker of the Chamber of Representatives of the Tajik Parliament Saydullo Khayrulloev was received by president elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The list of diplomatic representatives received by any new president speaks volumes about his foreign policy priorities. Ahmadinejad was geared toward stiff confrontation with the West; when talking to the Tajik foreign minister he clearly indicated that his vision of the world was not limited by the West and its allies. Hassan Rouhani, a skilled politician and diplomat, avoided a meeting with the Tajik foreign minister to show that he did not intend to reveal his foreign policy preferences or bind himself with political, financial, and economic obligations. This means that the Tajik side should be prepared for less openness when dealing with someone who has graduated from religious educational establishments in Qom, Tehran University, holds a Master’s degree in Islamic Law and a Doctor’s degree in constitutional law from Glasgow Caledonian University. At different times, he served as a member of the Assembly of Experts, Expediency Coun- cil, Supreme National Security Council, and Center for Strategic Research; he was a negotiator on the nuclear file, has numerous scientific works to his name, and is a polyglot with a good command of Arabic, English, French, German, and Russian. In short, the Tajik leaders should be prepared to deal with a less open and less spontaneous person than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was outspoken and straightforward as befits a military man.

176