Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume I: China, India, Israel

6. South Korea Jong Chul Choi* I. Introduction An examination of the arms procurement decision-making process of South Korea (the Republic of Korea) reveals certain idiosyncratic features stemming from the national and international security environments and from the institutional process within the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Since the 1950 Korean War the security environment of South Korea has been characterized by the long-standing threat posed by North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). US military policy towards South Korea—based on a military alliance relationship—and US arms transfer policy have been among the most salient factors influencing the arms procurement process. The domestic political system in operation since the 1970s—characterized by a strong presidency and an authoritarian tradition—has made the process less transparent and accountable to the public. A key feature is the concentration of arms procurement decision-making authority in the MND and the President. Throughout the process the MND dominates other government agencies and institutions and even the National Assembly. It has the task of concluding the process and it receives interim reports at nearly every stage. The President has the final say regarding procurement programmes with budgets exceeding 5 billion won ($5.25 mil- lion).1 1 At the 1997 average exchange rate of 951 won = $1. International Financial Statistics, Mar. 1998. * The author wishes to thank J. Y. Ra, formerly Professor of Political Science, Kyung Hee Uni- versity, and currently Vice-Director of the Agency for National Security Planning, for super- vising the study in the ROK. He also thanks the experts who contributed the papers which formed the basis of the chapter. See annexe C for the biographical details of the contributors. In addition to these contributors, the following experts participated in the workshop held in Seoul on 20 June 1995: Yong Soon Yim, Sung Kyun Kwan University; In Young Eun, Korea National Defense University; Kyung Soo Ro, Seoul National University; Sun Ho Lee, Korea Association of Military Studies; Won Hee Lee, Ansung National University; Kwan Hee Hong, Korea Institute for National Unification; Swung Hee Lee, Korea National Defense University; Kun Choon Lee, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy; Sam Sung Lee, Hanrim University; Suk Jung Lee, Ministry of National Defense (MND); Kyung Man Chun, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA); Ki Hyun Chung, MND; Yong Hun Chun, Kyemyung University; Sung Dae Oh, Air University; Hong Kyu Park, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; Ki Woong Son, Research Institute for National Unification; Nam Sung Han, KIDA; Chong Moon Kim, KIDA; Sang Ho Kim, Korean Research Institute for Military Affairs; and Chong Sik Moon, Navy Headquarters. 178 ARMS PROCUREMENT DECISION MAKING With the advent of a civilian, democratic government in the early 1990s, after 30 years of military–authoritarian rule, the arms procurement decision-making process changed dramatically through the reform of rules and regulations. In 1993 special inspection and auditing procedures were applied to the Yulgok Project—the force improvement plan launched in 1974.2 More broadly, how- ever, the changes can be attributed to the general process of political democra- tization which began in the late 1980s, as a result of which the Regulations on Weapon System Acquisition and Management (RWSAM) were formulated and rationalized in 1991. The gradual institutionalization of the arms procurement decision-making process has been complicated by a shift in civil–military relations and the more dynamic interplay of the determining factors since the end of the cold war. This chapter describes the arms procurement decision-making process of South Korea, focusing on its idiosyncratic features. The process in developing countries differs in many ways from that of Western industrialized demo- cracies, and in South Korea, a leader among ‘third-tier’ arms-producing countries in terms of defence industrial capabilities, it differs from that of many other developing countries.3 Special attention is paid in this chapter to determining the level of institutionalization, transparency and public accountability of the process. A number of questions about the decision-making process are addressed in section II. How is it organized? Who are the key actors? What external and internal factors influence the process? Section III explores problems in the cur- rent arms procurement decision-making process in the light of the need for public accountability and responsiveness to the objectives of national security, and presents some recommendations as to how these problems could be overcome. Section IV reviews short- and long-term developments and key findings. The overall focus is on the decision-making processes with regard to the choice between: (a) domestic research and development (R&D) and production; (b) production using foreign technologies; and (c) off-the-shelf purchases from abroad. Multidimensional perspectives are taken into account, including threat perceptions, security concepts, the level of defence industrial capability, the motivations of the political and military élite which lie behind the choice of suppliers, alliance relationships, national policies of self-reliance and the char- acteristics of procurement procedures as expressed by the organizational struc- tures involved. 2 For a detailed account of the Yulgok Project, see South Korean Ministry of National Defense, [The Yulgok project: yesterday, today and tomorrow] (MND: Seoul, 1994). 3 ‘Third-tier’ refers to those countries which cannot produce equipment across the full spectrum of military technology but which nevertheless have significant arms industries. For a detailed explanation see, e.g., Wulf, H. (ed.), SIPRI, Arms Industry Limited (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), pp. 362–63. SOUTH KOREA 179 II. The arms procurement decision-making process Defence planning The legal basis for arms procurement is the National Defense Planning and Management System (NDPMS), comprising five closely interrelated phases: planning, programming, budgeting, execution and evaluation (see figure 6.1).4 The actual process is clearly laid out in the RWSAM.5 Adopted and developed in line with the transformation of the security environment in the 1970s, the NDPMS is a comprehensive resource-management system in which MND efforts are integrated to ensure the efficient use of limited defence resources. National defence goals, policies and military strategy are based on a threat assessment carried out in the planning phase. A statement of requirements is then prepared by each armed service stating its strategic needs for the imple- mentation of defence policies and military strategy in accordance with the goals. Two NDPMS documents regulate arms procurement in South Korea: the Joint Strategy Plan (JSP) and the Mid-Term National Defense Plan (MNDP).6 Mission-specific military requirements stated in the JSP are submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) according to the concept-based requirements of each service rather than on the basis of the available budget. Mission requirements under the MNDP are fashioned into specific defence programmes. Appropria- tions are then made for five years within the limits of the available budget to meet those requirements. After an annual review of the five-year programme, through which funding is reviewed and adjusted on a rolling basis,7 some requirements are put off for later years or dropped altogether. The institutional process for threat assessment8 Analysis of the security environment is an important preliminary stage of the procurement process. The security environment of South Korea is characterized by its relations with North Korea and the USA. The most serious and direct threat is posed by North Korea. It has also been suggested that potential or indirect security concerns stem from the interaction between the four great powers in the Asia–Pacific region—China, Japan, Russia and the USA. 4 Initially drawn up by MND Directive no. 253 (7 June 1979), fully developed in 1983 and revised on 31 May 1995, the NDPMS was modelled on the US Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, with the addition of 2 steps: execution and evaluation. South Korean Ministry of National Defense, [Regula- tions on the National Defense Planning and Management System], MND Directive no. 500, 15 Apr. 1995. 5 The RWSAM was established in 1991 by MND Directive no. 431, 8 Aug. 1991, and revised by MND Directive no. 531, 13 Jan. 1996 and MND Directive no. 559, 19 May 1997. The revisions emphasized increased effectiveness, accountability and transparency. 6 The MNDP is a blueprint for MND national defence activities for the coming 5-year period. For a detailed explanation see Ministry of National Defence (note 2), pp. 71–75. 7 On the arms procurement budgeting process, see Myung Kil Kang, ‘Budget planning process in arms procurement’, SIPRI Arms Procurement Decision Making Project, Working Paper no. 46 (1995). 8 The explanation and analysis of threat assessment are based on a telephone interview of 25 Mar. 1996 with Dr Choon Il Jung, KIDA Senior Research Fellow and Lt-Col in the South Korean armed forces. 180 ARMS PROCUREMENT DECISION MAKING Phase Main content Threat assessment Planning • Counter-strategies • Defence goal setting • Statement of • Defence policies requirements Requesting plans and adjustment Programming Mid-Term National Defense Plan Budgeting Budget allocation

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