Mid-Year Update: 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2021

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Red Lines: Up- heaval and Con- tainment n the Horn of Afri-ca Red Lines: Up- heaval and Con- tainment in the Horn of Afri- ca MID-YEAR jhkjUPDATE: 10 CONFLICTS TO WORRY ABOUT IN 2021

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

August 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS (in no particular order) ETHIOPIA 2 INDIA AND PAKISTAN 5 MYANMAR 8 HAITI 11 BELARUS 14 COLOMBIA 17 ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN 20 YEMEN 23 MOZAMBIQUE 27 THE SAHEL 30

EDITED BY: Timothy Lay, Roudabeh Kishi, and Sam Jones GRAPHICS BY: Adam Miller, Josh Satre, and Elliott Bynum

LAYOUT BY: Sogand Afkari

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY: Braden Fuller and Clionadh Raleigh (Ethiopia) Ashik KC (India and Pakistan) Elliott Bynum (Myanmar) Sandra Pellegrini and Maria Fernanda Arocha (Haiti) Franklin Holcomb (Belarus) Bhavani Castro (Colombia) Franklin Holcomb (Armenia and Azerbaijan) Emile Roy (Yemen) Sam Ratner (Mozambique) Héni Nsaibia (The Sahel)

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 1 ANALYSIS Reuters, 15 April 2021; April 15 Reuters, the context the in (VOA (VOA Amharic, 1 June 2021; Office ofthe Prime ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 2 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED efforts bythe central government to govern the region – Minister Ethiopia, 3 June 2021). As federal soldiers struggled to maintain territorial control, Ethiopia’s top officials havefaced heavy diplomatic pressure — including sanctions — the over involvement of Er- itrean troops, civilian targeting, and sexual violence 2021; May 24 Times, York (New humanitar- a facing and Frustrated 2021). July 3 EBC, to decided government the disaster, military and ian 2021. June of days last the in withdraw strug- likewise have authorities regional and Federal Ben- in Oromia; insurgencies smaller gled contain to shangul/Gumuz; and the Southern Nations, Nation- alities and Peoples Region (SNNPR). against Attacks across have increased communities minority civilian the country. Serious violence has also broken out in So- and Afar the between territory contested of areas mali regional as states, well as in areas surrounding Ataye city of the Oromo special zone of Amhara re- thou- and killed been have people of Hundreds gion. by overshadowed largely conflicts in displaced sands war. Tigray publicized highly the As the finalized electoral results emerge, will Ethiopia enter a new political phase as elected officials debate constitutional issues built into the country’s ques- Territorial governance. of system ethno-federal tions, secession, and identity politics will be central to these debates — along with the management of security and international relations regarding Tigray. in war the The power that central authorities have to address these issues, however, lies with ty remains whatever in the capaci- Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). The extent of damage inflicted on the Ethi- EPO contests contests (see Raleigh

Clionadh ethno-nationalism and Fuller

rising

Braden Ethiopian Ethiopian federal troops have been battling multi- throughout ple the country insurgencies in 2021, the most serious being in the northern Tigray region. An initial victory for the federal government came after pushing the TPLF from their strongholds in the major cities in gion’s late 2020. re- Nevertheless, further for into a have quagmire spiraled operations military federal troops as TPLF forces regrouped in insur- crippling a launched and remote villages mountainous gency. On the ground, Ethiopian army troops have faced a guerrilla force that assassinated interim au- complicating convoys, military attacked and thorities Weekly: Weekly: 19-25 June 2021 for more detailed analysis). Yet difficulties remain: voting didnot take place in many locations of the country due to ongoing clash- election the boycotted parties opposition popular es; top after leaderswere and arrested; the government lost control of the Tigray regional following a capital, heavy offensive bythe Even TPLF. with Mekele, a sweeping electoral win, solving Ethiopia’s complex min- prime the for will be a challenge puzzle political ruling PP. the and ister Despite Despite these threats, violence was minimal June 21 on on election the long-anticipated Ethiopia’s of day 2021, with few incidents security reported. Although logistical issues and scattered violence took during place voting, election day ful and was widespread violence did not generally occur peace- The summer of 2021 has been the most destabilizing 2021 The of summer has been destabilizing the most While tenure. Ahmed’s Abiy Minister Prime in yet time the general election resulted in the Prosperity Par- ty’s (PP) overwhelming victory, violence from multiple active in insurgencies has Ethiopia overwhelmed Tigray the by posed threat the with resources, federal re- in apparent most (TPLF) Front Liberation People’s months. summer cent

of Ethiopia: Administrative Ethiopia: opian and Eritrean armies in Tigray is difficult to es- in a year ( OFC Statement, 23 June 2021; OLF, 1 July timate, as troops were evacuated quickly in the face 2021; Addis Standard, 26 June 2021). They will also of the TPLF advance into Mekele in the last days of be opposed to any proposed changes to the federal June. By the government’s admission, however, con- constitution that reinforce ethnic-based territorial ditions in Tigray had become “unbearable” for Ethi- authority. opian soldiers prior to withdrawal (New York Times, 30 June 2021). As many as 7,000 troops of the Ethi- Violence levels in Ethiopia are likely to remain high opian military were reported by international jour- during the remainder of 2021. The federal govern- nalists to have been taken captive (New York Times, 2 ment will continue to face multiple ongoing conflicts, July 2021), though government sources have insisted as well as another round of voting in regions that did that the number of ENDF members held by the TPLF not participate in the last round of elections due to is exaggerated (Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, electoral disputes and ongoing violence. The coun- 3 July 2021). If it is the case that federal forces have try’s Somali region and select zones of Benshangul/ been incapacitated or the ranks cannot be filled, mil- Gumuz region are scheduled to vote in September of itary power will devolve to ethnically exclusive forces this year. Voting will not take place in the Tigray re- loyal to the regional governments, like the Amhara gion due to continued instability and a loss of control special forces controlling Western Tigray zone. There by the federal government (France 24, 21 June 2021). is some evidence that this has already occurred, giv- Conducting and winning a national election was an en the prominent role Afar and Amhara militias have enormous task completed by Prime Minister Abiy in played in holding off TPLF advances in July 2021. June. However, with opposition figures jailed and large swaths of the country in turmoil, the victory As noted in the original installment of this report se- may be considered somewhat hollow. What remains ries at the beginning of the year, authority shifts in- to be seen is if the electoral win will provide Abiy the volving regional officials in Ethiopia have been a key strength to overcome the forces rising against him driver of conflict and remain difficult issues to resolve. from across the country. The administration of Western Tigray zone has long been contested and was inhabited by both ethnic FURTHER READING: Tigray and Amhara prior to the start of the conflict in November 2020. Both TPLF and the Amhara regional • It Cannot be Known: Ethiopia’s Election and Abiy’s forces have been implicated in massacres of civilians Political Prospects during the conflict, including at Mai Cadera where an • 2021 Conflict Dimensions in Ethiopia investigation found that at least 600 ethnic Amhara were killed (Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, 24 November 2020). Forces from the Amhara region have also been accused of forcibly removing ethnic Tigray- ans from the zone — an act that American authorities claim amounts to ethnic cleansing (AP, 7 April 2021). The TPLF has insisted on the withdrawal of all Amha- ra forces from Tigray regional state boundaries and a return to the status quo — a condition that the Am- hara regional state is unlikely to accept (Getachew K Reda, 29 July 2021; Addis Standard, 14 July 2021).

In the state’s largest region of Oromia, elected regional authorities are unquestionably loyal to the PP, but the federal government may face legitimacy issues especially around proposed changes to the constitution which may limit the demographic power of the Oromo group. Oromo parties other than the Oromo Prosperity Party (O-PP) — including Oromo Feder- al Congress (OFC) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) — denounced the election, calling instead for a national dialogue, the establishment of a transitional government, and for new elections to be held with-

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 3 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 4 led led ANALYSIS 1 Reuters, Reuters, 18 Feb- Pakistan in cross-border cross-border ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 5 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED 1. A border alignment between China and India that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled demarcated. or delineated been yet not has but territory south south banks of Pangong Tso Lake. In May and June Control Actual of Line the along clashes year, last to to the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers (The Hindu, 13 June 2020; ruary ). 2021 Following the 2020 clashes, from troops both sides positioned themselves on the north and Ten- 2021 ). February 21 (BBC, lake the of banks south disengage- phased as region the in high remain sions ment and the withdrawal of troops at other conten- tious areas in eastern Ladakh have yet to take place (The 22 2021). Print, April In addition, both India and China the of have person- military number bolstered nel and infrastructure along the disputed border in ). 2021 July 2 Journal, Street Wall (The months recent and Modi Narendra Minister Prime India, in Elsewhere his government held an meeting all-party with political leaders from J&K in June. This is a since Au- first and revoked was status special J&K’s when 2019, gust the region was bifurcated into two union territories. includ- leaders, J&K 14 by attended was meeting The ing four former chief ministers. During the meeting, the government outlined its intentions to soon complete redrawing the boundaries of assembly and seats to hold assembly statehood the that elections indicated minister home quickly the While thereafter. leaders political Kashmiri J&K demand of for — a key was timeline no course,” “due in restored be would — agreed to (The Wire, 25 June 2021 ). The restoration people in would that ensure J&K would statehood of have the right to elect their own state government. Currently, J&K is a federal territory governed by the central government of India through an appointed governor. lieutenant militancy militancy Kashmir; rising Kashmir; akistan: Decreased Pakistan: in and ). While this fragile peace peace fragile this While ). piece analysis ACLED KC

Ashik In J&K’s In neighboring J&K’s region of Ladakh, a disengage- ment agreement in February led to both Chinese withdrawal and of Indian forces from the north and Although Although the ceasefire has held, mains tense. On 27 the June, suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba situation re- kind, its of first the attack, drone a launched militants on a military facility in Jammu and (The Hindu, Kashmir 2 July (J&K) 2021). Two bombs were dropped Jammu in drones by station Force Air Indian an inside district, injuring two officers. Indian security forces accuse Pakistani security services of providing support to militants to conduct the attack accusations (The the denies Hindu, Pakistan though 2021), 11July (The International News, 30 June 2021). In the past, Indian on mili- both groups militant by attacks major in J&K tary and have civilian targets led to a in break and an negotiations of (for violence escalation more, this see continues to hold along the India-Pakistan countries. both of border, parts other in persists disorder A A spike in fighting cross-border made 2020 the most violent year for conflict between India and Pakistan since the beginning of ACLED coverage in 2016. Yet, contrary to expectations at the beginning of cross-border 2021, violence virtually ceased afterthe two on agreement ceasefire 2003 the reaffirmed countries 2021 2021) . 25 25 (Al The February February Jazeera, reaffirmation ofthe ceasefire agreementfollowed a year. new the in early tensions cross-border in decline This downward trend emerged from back-channel negotiations between India and Pakistan that were in army chief Janu- by Pakistan’s initiated reportedly Diplomat, The 2021, April 5 Times, (Financial 2021 ary have largely 19 2021). March Both India and Pakistan from two in apart incidents to adhered the ceasefire, June. and May

India violence violence Demonstrations against the Citizenship Amendment across Eurasia, and Chinese interests in the province Act (CAA) 2019 have largely subsided since mid-Feb- (Gandhara, 8 June 2021). The separatists oppose ruary, with the exception of protests in the northeast Chinese infrastructure development and investment state of Assam, in March. The All Assam Students’ and consider such projects to be an exploitation of Union launched statewide demonstrations against local labor and natural resources (Deutsche Welle, 14 the CAA just before the first phase of Assam’s state July 2021). assembly elections; since their completion in early April, anti-CAA demonstrations have not been re- In other developments, the Pakistan Democratic ported in Assam. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Movement, an alliance of opposition parties that which is the main proponent of the CAA, secured a aimed to oust Prime Minister Imran Khan, lost the majority in the elections while also inducting sev- momentum it had gained during anti-government eral prominent anti-CAA leaders into the party (The demonstrations at the end of last year. In April, two Quint, 26 March 2021; Scroll, 2 May 2021). However, major opposition parties quit the alliance after dis- other anti-CAA movement leaders have vowed to agreements over the nomination for the leader of continue protesting and, once implementation be- the opposition in the senate (Dawn, 13 April 2021). gins, demonstrations and violence are likely to renew The anti-government national march, planned to be and escalate (The Economic Times, 2 July 2021). The launched in March, was also postponed. Currently, ef- Indian Ministry of Home Affairs missed another dead- forts are being made to revive the alliance (Dawn, 25 line on 9 July to finalize the rules for the CAA, and the May 2021). While anti-government demonstrations deadline has now been extended by another three decreased, overall demonstration levels in Pakistan months (The Economic Times, 3 June 2021). have remained steady. Demonstrations opposing India’s policy in J&K have continued, and large na- Meanwhile, nationwide farmer demonstrations de- tionwide demonstrations have been held by Islamist manding the repeal of three agricultural acts passed parties. by the central government in September 2020 have continued during the first half of 2021. Due to the FURTHER READING: new legislation, farmers fear losing market protections, including a minimum guaranteed price for their produce (BBC News, 27 November 2020). Despite 11 • Cow Protection Legislation and Vigilante Vio- rounds of talks between farmers and the government, lence in India no agreement has yet been reached. The government • Naxal-Maoist Insurgency Trends in India During has hinted that talks with the farmers could resume, the Coronavirus Pandemic but has ruled out a complete repeal of the laws — a • Rising Organized Political Violence in Baloch- key demand of the farmer unions (Outlook, 18 June istan: A Resurgence of Baloch Separatism? 2021; Foreign Policy, 13 January 2021). The demon- • COVID-19 and Political Unrest In Northeast India strations are set to continue with the farmer unions’ planned daily sit-in protest outside the parliament in the capital, Delhi, throughout the monsoon season.

In Pakistan, militant violence increased in both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, indicating the continued resurgence of both the Tehreek-i-Tali- ban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch separatist movement. Already this year, the TTP has claimed large- scale attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as well as in the heart of the provincial capital of Balochistan. During the first half of 2021, violence involving the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has nearly equaled levels recorded during the entirety of last year. Similarly, after a long period of decline, violence involving Ba- loch separatist groups has continued to rise in 2021. Baloch separatist groups have increasingly targeted the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which aims to build infrastructure and expand trade links

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 6 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 7 ANALYSIS 2021 in ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 8 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED lawmakers lawmakers overthrown by the military, announced the formation of a Defense ‘People’s Force’ (PDF) in anticipation of raising a new federal army Irrawad- ( dy, 5 May 2021). Many newly formed local defense forces have adopted the PDF name loyalty and to the NUG, indicated while other local defense forces much While NUG. the of independent remained have defense local and forces state between fighting the of groups has taken place in rural areas of Chin and state Sagaing region, as well as Kayah state, clashes well, including as areas in urban have been recorded Mandalay. of city second the in There are varied responses armed groups from to the existing coup, with ethnic movement the and anti-coup not. others The United some supporting League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) — an ethnic Rakhine armed group that had battled the military for the past two years — has not clashed with the military since shortly after the November NUG the from 2020 outreach resisted have They elections. they since military the with relations closer and have were removed from its list of tions in “terrorist” March (Irrawaddy, 17 organiza- June ). 2021 While Ra- khine state remains free of clashes as the unilateral noted at ceasefires the beginning of the year appear to have held for now, no stable political solution to reached. been has conflict the Meanwhile, both the Kachin nization/Kachin Independence Independence Army Orga- (KIO/KIA) and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) have largely supported anti-coup actions, while still resisting calls to join the federal army envisioned by the NUG. Fighting between the military and KIO/KIA has restarted in Kachin state, reignited reignited conflicts conflicts for for more, see ACLED’s recent report: Bynum

Elliott The The crackdown on and demonstrations the ongoing targeting of civilians by state forces have prompted many opposed to the coup to take up arms against the military ( ). Spring Myanmar’s On Revolution 5 the May, Nation- al Unity Government (NUG), composed of elected Demonstrations Demonstrations against the coup have been widespread and are ongoing. Throughout the month of February, demonstrators marched military the As country. the across daily villages and towns, in cities, and police began to crack down on demonstrations, and killing protesters, force usingpeaceful excessive demonstrators adapted by staging flash mob-style rallies. While these demonstrations each recorded have still are dozens February, since overall declined week. On On 1 February 2021, the military in Myanmar seized Democracy for League National elected the as power (NLD) government was set to begin its second term, having won the 2020 November election. general Al- leging the NLD had engaged in electoral fraud, the military set about arresting NLD officials er andactivists. The public oth- response to the coup was to military to return a of rejection a in streets the to take rule. The military responded to the demonstrations with excessive force, killing coun- the throughout violence hundreds military As protesters. of peaceful try increased, armed local defense forces emerged to protect communities. The coup has also set offa armed renewed of fighting wave with ethnic in areas groups. ACLED records an increase in all political violence and protest event types tracked in Myanmar to- the surpassing 2021, of months six first the during 2020. of all for counts event tal Myanmar: Dormant Myanmar: which had seen infrequent clashes since mid-2018. Battles between the military and KNU/KNLA in Kayin state have also sharply increased alongside military airstrikes in the region. As ACLED noted at the beginning of the year, clashes between the KNU/KNLA had already begun to increase prior to the coup amid a breakdown in monitoring mechanisms put in place under previous ceasefire agreements.

In Shan state, clashes between ethnic armed groups themselves have caused displacement. The Resto- ration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) and the Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N), both ethnic Shan armed groups, have clashed. Fighting has also been reported between the RCSS/SSA-S and the Pa- laung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liber- ation Army (PSLF/TNLA), an ethnic Palaung armed group. Clashes between these ethnic armed groups had declined in 2020 but, as ACLED observed earlier in the year, appear to have reignited over ongoing territorial disputes. The conflict between rival ethnic Shan armed groups has prevented a united Shan response to the military coup.

Amid a third wave of the coronavirus pandemic, political violence and protests are likely to continue. The military’s deliberate targeting of health workers has undermined efforts to control the spread of the virus, and deaths from COVID-19 have begun to increase significantly amid oxygen shortages (AP, 6 July 2021). The impact of the coup on many sectors of Myanmar society can be seen in the military’s response to the worsening pandemic. Resistance to the junta — both armed and unarmed — will persist, as much of the population remains firmly opposed to a return to military dictatorship.

FURTHER READING:

• Lukashenko’s Last Legs? The 2020 Belarusian Presidential Election • Lukashenko Versus Belarus: The State Against the People

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 15 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 16 ANALYSIS that groups — partic- — groups that social can can cultivate coca and marijuana coun- other to drugs transport crops, to routes use can they or where tries. Social are and leaders communities vulnerable tothese ac- obstacles as armed groups seen by often tivities. In 2020, restrictions associated with the rus pandemic coronavi- also increased the vulnerability of rural communities. Quarantine measures meant that many were local leftactivists alone com- inside their munities and homes, often withoutbodyguards, putting them protectionat risk of or intimidation by armed groups. Although the Colombian government in 2021, it did restrictions not ad- quarantine relaxed vance any measures to increase the protections for de Norte the In groups. vulnerable and leaders social social 25 least at example, for department, Santander leaders or members of vulnerable groups have been than higher already number a — 2021 in far thus killed 2020. of is There in- the entirety during reported that the in especially Santander, de Norte in conflict tense Catatumbo region, between several armed groups, and paramilitaries, former dissidents, FARC including multi- fired gunmen 2021, June 25 On gangs. criminal Iván President transporting helicopter a at bullets ple visit a after municipality, Cúcuta in landed it as Duque video, released recently a In region. Catatumbo the to Medio Magdalena the FARC, the of faction dissident a (El Espect- the attack for Bloc, claimed responsibility 2021). 25 July ador, found ACLED 2021, of start the At ularly Indigenous communities and farmers — faced high risks of displacement from conflict. During the Office Ombudsman’s Colombian the 2021, of half first 30,000 than peo- more of displacement the recorded ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 17 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED targeting targeting violence violence International International Crisis vulnerable groups vulnerable and Castro

Bhavani

Colombia: Rising Colombia: leaders Group, Group, 6 October 2020). The power vacuum leftby the dismantling of the FARC has led sion to of groups, other such as the National Liberation the expan- Army (ELN) and the Gulf Clan, a drug trafficking organization composed of former paramilitary Armed cells. groups often clash in rural areas near farmers’ villages or near Indigenous and Afro-Colombian at active are leaders social Meanwhile, communities. in in promoting projects development local-level the their communities, and are oftentargeted by armed groups due to their role in curbing criminal and vio- sever- into splintered also has FARC The activity. lent al dissident groups, which compete for territory and control of illegal markets, raiding areas where they The The government’s inability to fully implement peace the agreement signed cit- in 2016 often is (FARC) Colombia of Armed Forces with the Revolutionary ed as a key factor contributing to the rise in killings (Al Jazeera, 24 November 2020; 2020 ended with the highest number of targeted at- by ACLED in recorded ever civilians Co- against tacks lombia. These attacks resulted in over 600 reported fatalities, the majority of whom were social leaders or farmers as groups, such vulnerable of members or Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. From January to June 2021, ACLED records over 420 civil- more than 250 attacks, of from targeted ian fatalities whom were either activists or rural residents. This is a more than 85% increase pe- in time same the total to compared civilian attacks fatalities targeted from and a last year, riod 27% increase in killings of social This communities. vulnerable of members or leaders is the highest number of from reported fatalities tar- on these attacks geted groups in recorded Colombia begin- the since year the of months six first the during 2018. in coverage ACLED ning of ple from 181 different communities (Defensoría del in response to the demonstrations was criticized by Pueblo, 4 June 2021), exceeding the total reported human rights organizations. In some cases, demon- during the entirety of 2020 (Defensoría del Pueblo, strations were met with lethal force, resulting in es- 7 January 2021), indicating that vulnerable timates of over 80 fatalities connected to the unrest, communi-ties continue to be severely affected by including approximately 40 demonstrators.2 At least intense con-flict between different armed groups. two police officers were reported killed during the demonstrations, while multiple civilians not involved in protesting have also been targeted and killed (Hu- Apart from targeted attacks increasing in the first man Rights Watch, 9 June 2021). A recent report by half of 2021, the rate of fatalities reported overall is the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also on the rise. In 2020, over 820 fatalities were re- (IACHR) accuses state forces of using disproportion- ported over the course of the year. Halfway through 2021, there have already been reports of ate and excessive force against protesters (CNN, 8 nearly 675 fatalities across the country. Conflict July 2021). Overall, ACLED records more than twice continues as armed groups and gangs fight for as many excessive force events against peaceful pro- territorial control of disputed areas and state testers during the first half of 2021 than during the en- forces try to combat their activities. tirety of the previous three years.

The increasing number of fatalities is also linked to the targeting of protesters during clashes with The protest movement led to a dramatic increase police amid massive anti-government in the total number of demonstration events across demonstrations. Although the Duque government Colombia. There were nearly 10 times more demon- has only recognized 24 deaths directly connected stration events recorded in May 2021 than in any to the demonstrations, ACLED data indicate that other month over the past three years. However, by more than 80 fatalities have been reported, based mid-June, the number of demonstration events had largely on documentation from local NGOs, such as dramatically decreased, especially after the govern- Indepaz (Indepaz, 28 June 2021). Demonstrations ment cleared major roadblocks that had been set up started on 28 April when the National Strike by demonstrators. On 15 June, the CNP announced Committee (CNP, Comité Nacional del Paro, in it would be formally suspending protest activity un- Spanish), a coalition of different labor unions, til 20 July, though some groups such as students and called for a nationwide strike in response to Indigenous organizations indicated that they did not proposed tax reform. The fiscal reform proposed agree with the decision and continued to demon- by Duque would increase taxation on basic strate. On 20 July, coinciding with Colombian Inde- commodities and would lower the exemption limit pendence Day, the CNP resumed massive demon- for income taxes (BBC Mun-do, 29 April 2021). The strations across the country (El Espectador, 21 July government eventually withdrew the proposal due 2021). Colombian citizens will likely continue to de- to the backlash. Nevertheless, demonstrations mand a comprehensive solution to the social and continued with an expanded focus encompassing discontent with policies on health, education, and economic crisis afflicting the country, and social un- other social issues. Greater protections for social rest is expected to persist until old grievances deriv- leaders are also a frequent topic of demonstrations ing from the failure to fully implement the guidelines given mounting dissatisfaction with the from the 2016 peace accord are met. government’s inability to address the effects of decades-long conflict. Thousands of labor FURTHER READING: unionists, students, teachers, farmers, and civil society organizations took to the streets for several • Understanding the Killing of Social Leaders in Co- weeks during the late spring, amid a growing lombia During COVID-19 economic crisis exacerbated by the coronavirus • CDT Spotlight: Attacks on Civilians in Colombia pandemic (Reuters, 29 April 2021; New York Times, 18 May 2021). 2. The total number of demonstrator fatalities may be higher, as it is often unclear if the remainder of those reported killed While more than 80% of all demonstrations were — which contribute to the over 80 fatalities currently coded by peaceful, demonstrators engaged in violence, van- ACLED as having been killed during this period, based largely on dalism, and clashes with security forces in several documentation from local NGOs — were protest participants or instances. The violent intervention of the Mobile bystanders. For more on ACLED fatality methodology, see this Anti-Disturbances Squadron police force (ESMAD) FAQ.

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 18 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 19 ANALYSIS de facto Republic holds, over over borders, mapping information for minefields, POWs, and the recognition of the of Artsakh. While negotiations over some of issues have these not made much visible progress, there have been prominent successes. Particularly among these are negotiations between Armenia and exchange Azer- in POWs Armenian of return the over baijan mine- of location the about information Armenian for in fields captured Since by the territory Azerbaijan. 9 88 have POWs been to returned ceasefire, November returned were Armenia, two the last which of groups in maps for exchange of in minefields the Agdam, Fi- 13 2021). June (Azatutyun, regions Zangilan and zuli, Discussions over these topics are likely to continue for some time as the reportedly two are There leverage. political for sides minefields use prisoners and over 100 Armenians still held suggest- by Azerbaijan, 13 (Azatutyun, continue may exchanges such that ing 2021). June Meanwhile, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashin- yan’s Civil Contract party won a decisive victory in elections parliamentary on 20 June 2021. Pashinyan recent the from recovering on focused campaign a ran an- popular party’s his continuing and defeat military ti-corruption and modernization initiatives President Former 2021). June 21 (Prime Armenia, of Minister Armenia party, Robert Alliance, Kocharyan’s was the main competition for Civil Contract. Despite the re- a Civil Contract under forces Armenian of defeat cent government, Armenia Alliance was unable to gener- likely Pashinyan, defeat to support public enough ate a result of the corruption allegations Kocharyan has over faced the years 6 (Carnegie Center, Moscow Oc- tober ). 2018 party Pashinyan’s won close to 54% of ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 20 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED As 3 de fac- de remain de facto Artsakh Republic. and Azerbaijan: Ceasefire largely Ceasefire Azerbaijan: and Holcomb tensions tensions at the start of the year, sporadic cross-border cross-border sporadic year, the of start the at

Republic Republic of Artsakh remained low during the first

Franklin Armenia Armenia but Despite Despite this notable decrease, tensions remain over disputes include These war. the from issues lingering half half of 2021. Cross-border violence between Arme- nian and Azeribaijani forces decreased dramatically in 2021 relative to the year prior. Between January and June 2021, 33 clashes took place, compared to in decrease The 2020. in period same the during 2,600 Russian of presence the by ensured been has fighting Art- and Armenia of areas key in troops peacekeeping 9 of ceasefire the following deployed were who sakh, 2021). 10 November 2020 (Reuters, November to Conflict between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the the and Armenia, Azerbaijan, between Conflict warned levels. low relatively at only if continued, has violence Meanwhile, Armenia and Azerbaijan continue negotiations about the border dispute, the return of prisoners of war (POWs), and other issues related to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Contrary to be- has situation previous political Armenian the assessments, come relatively stable following a decisive electoral came victory This June. in government the for victory despite the government’s recent military defeat by Azerbaijan and an economy still struggling to man- pandemic. coronavirus the of fallout the age 3. The disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is international- is Nagorno-Karabakh of territory disputed 3. The de facto the to refers ACLED Azerbaijan. of part as recognized ly the which by name the — Artsakh as institutions its and state and methodology on more For itself. to refers territory de facto methodology this see states, de facto around decisions coding primer In In the first half of 2021, important political developments in occurred Armenia, and continued ceasefire violations took place along the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the the vote, with Kocharyan’s party trailing at 21% (DW, FURTHER READING: 21 June 2020). All other parties received vote percent- ages too small to enter parliament, though the ‘I Have • Civilians Under Fire in Nagorno-Karabakh: Honor’ alliance was admitted in order for a third par- September-November 2020 ty to be present, as legally required (Factor, 21 June • ACLED Methodology and Coding Decisions 2021). around Political Conflict and Demonstrations in Central Asia & the Caucasus Sporadic clashes between Armenian and Azeribaijani troops are likely to continue throughout the second half of 2021, as they have so far this year. Negotiations on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh and the outcome of the war are also unlikely to make major progress. The status of the remaining territories controlled by the de facto Artsakh Republic continues to be disputed, which may drive some small surges in fighting, as has happened sporadically along the frontline since the ceasefire. Meanwhile, tension over the opening of regional roads and railways, which was initiated by the 9 November agreement, will continue, especially given Azerbaijan’s insistence on having a ‘corridor’ through the Syunik region of Armenia despite the Ar- menian government’s refusal to broach any such dis- cussion (Azatutyun, 21 April 2021).

In the long term, the military situation may come to resemble the front before the 2020 war, with sporadic surges in fighting for tactically or strategically significant ground. However, unlike the period prior to the 2020 war, major offensive operations are extremely unfeasible for both sides. The deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops to Armenia has ensured that offensive action by Azerbaijan will be effectively im- possible without massively increasing tensions with Russia and provoking a Russian military response. Meanwhile, the Armenian army is currently incapable of offensive action as it was severely damaged by the war, and was already militarily weak relative to Azer- baijan’s forces (Al Jazeera, 1 October 2020). Since the ceasefire, Azerbaijan and Turkey have expanded their military cooperation, acting as a further deterrent to Armenia. With this situation unlikely to change, there is little chance that either side will resume major offensive operations similar to those seen in 2020.

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 21 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 22 - ANALYSIS pre amid fallout at the beginning of the year, however, the end the however, year, the beginning the of at the the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an assault on the city could displace 385,000 people 2021). (IOM, 15 February The inauguration of President Joe Biden at the start of this year has led to a sharp turn in American policy towards the Yemen conflict. In his visit first to the Department, President State Biden called for an end to the announced war, the end of American support for the Saudi-led military intervention, and appointed a special envoy for Yemen, Timothy Lenderking (Associated Press, 5 February 2021). As ACLED dicted of already negligible US support has so far had little war. the of trajectory current the on effect the announcements, these after weeks two than Less US Department State officiallyrevoked the designations of the Houthis as a “Foreign Terrorist Organi- zation” and a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist in Group,” “recognition of the dire humanitarian sit- 12 Febru- State, of (US Department in Yemen” uation ini- — designations these of revocation The 2021). ary President former of administration the by made tially and Donald then Trump suspended by the Biden administration in January 2021 — arguably prevented devastating humanitarian consequences (ACAPS, 14 2021). January This renewed US engagement, however, has been initially perceived by the Houthis as a sign of weak- ness. The Houthi offensiveon Marib was launched less than a week after the appointment of US Spe- cial Envoy Lenderking, leading some to actually may war the argue end to efforts purported that Biden’s ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 23 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED that thethat humanitarian humanitarian

assessed

Marib

This new territory would on 4 risk of risk

offensive offensive

emen: High

Emile Roy Y the At the time of writing, Houthi forces have not yet taken taken yet not have forces Houthi writing, of time the At control of Due Marib. to a air sustained campaign by on the ground and the resistance Saudi-led coalition by pro-Hadi tribes and military forces, the Houthis have achieved no significant gains since April 2021. Houthi forces seem determined to overtake the city turning point a represent would this as nevertheless, in one possibly the of conflict, no Marib return. From would Houthi city, forces be able to move eastwards and take control of the Safer oil and which gas would facilities, represent a major blow to the coffers of the Hadi government. limited limited successes of pro-Hadi forces on the battle- in field Houthi 2020 forces for would it make unlikely to agree to a or ceasefire an inclusive peace process in Yemen. In February 2021, Houthi forces launched a large-scale offensive on Maribcity, the laststrong- hold of the Hadi government They in reached areas within 15 kilometers west of the northern Yemen. city, before halting their offensive in May, amid unprecedented international efforts to find a political solution to the conflict. The Houthis resumed their June. late in again offensive also also open new possible routes southern towards Ye- men through the Shabwah governorate. Finally, the would have devastating forces Houthi to Marib of fall humanitarian consequences. Over the course of the around from grown has population city’s the conflict, influx the to due two million almost 30,000 to people gov- other from (IDPs) persons displaced internally of ernorates (Crisis Group, 17 April 2020). According to 4. According to ACAPS, the loss of crude oil exports from Marib Marib from exports oil crude of loss the ACAPS, to 4. According 19.5 USD least at to amount would government Hadi the by 2021). 26 July (ACAPS, month per million At the beginning of the year, ACLED ACLED year, the of beginning the At intensify it (ISPI, 26 April 2021). Still, since May 2021, ernment at the national level does not seem to have political violence decreased significantly in Marib: removed STC secessionist ambitions. STC-affiliated ACLED records a monthly average of 132 political vi- forces are notably still very much under STC control, olence events across May-June in the governorate instead of the defense and interior ministries, as per compared to 225 across February-April. This was the the military provisions of the Riyadh Agreement. In result of unprecedented engagement of internation- June 2021, these forces stormed several Hadi-aligned al actors in support of the peace process, which saw newspapers in Aden with the reported goal of estab- renewed Houthi participation in negotiations, as well lishing ‘Aden News Agency for the State of South Ara- as a notable change in Oman’s role from being a fa- bia’ (Al Masdar, 2 June 2021; Committee to Protect cilitator of the process to being its mediator (Middle Journalists, 9 June 2021). That same month, the STC East Eye, 10 June 2021). also made unilateral military appointments and designated its own foreign representatives to a number In late June, only a few days after Martin Griffiths gave of countries. his last briefing to the UN Security Council as the UN special envoy for Yemen (OSESGY, 15 June 2021), Following the increase in tensions between the two Houthi forces renewed their offensive on Marib — yet parties, Saudi Arabia was quick to convene talks be- another failure of the diplomatic track. As a way to tween the STC and the Hadi government on 2 July to alleviate pressure on Marib city, pro-Hadi forces then reaffirm both parties’ adherence to the Riyadh Agree- launched an offensive against Houthi forces in Al Bay- ment. On the same day, however, clashes erupted da governorate. This worked temporarily, leading in between pro-Hadi and STC forces in Abyan governor- early July to the most violent week ever recorded in ate over control of Lawdar district security depart- Al Bayda since the start of ACLED’s Yemen coverage in ment. Tensions between the two camps then esca- 2015. Houthi forces were quick to reverse a number lated further, as pro-Hadi forces repressed protests of pro-Hadi territorial gains, however, and fighting organized throughout southern governorates on 7 in Marib has since flared up again. As a new UN spe- July to commemorate the 1994 “Southern Invasion cial envoy has yet to be officially appointed at time of Day” (South24, 6 July 2021). As ACLED assessed at writing,5 renewing the political process between the the start of 2021, the success or failure of the Riyadh Houthis and the Hadi government will not be easy Agreement remains critical for the future of the war — (The Washington Institute, 1 July 2021). though success appears less likely today.

In southern Yemen, the new UN special envoy will need Finally, while successful negotiations between Saudi to focus on the Riyadh Agreement that was signed in Arabia and the Houthis over border insecurity could November 2019 under the auspices of Saudi Arabia to lead to a significant decrease in the Saudi war effort, solve the conflict between the Southern Transitional negotiations have made little progress during the Council (STC) and the Hadi government. In December first half of 2021. In March, the Houthi leadership re- 2020, the STC agreed to join a power-sharing govern- jected a Saudi offer for a nationwide ceasefire. A new ment with President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in ex- development in 2021, however, is ‘secret’ talks being change for allowing the government to move back held between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Iraq since April. into Aden, the interim capital. At the beginning of the During these talks, the Saudi government reportedly year, ACLED identified this as a potential opportunity asked Iran to stop Houthi attacks on the kingdom in for the southern secessionists and the Hadi govern- exchange for helping sell Iranian oil in international ment to unify against Houthi forces. markets (Middle East Eye, 13 May 2021). ACLED data show that Houthi attacks indeed decreased for four So far this has not materialized. After a hopeful end consecutive weeks across May and June 2021, only to to 2020, the relationship between the two parties pick up again afterwards. What these direct talks be- has only deteriorated. Joining a power-sharing gov- tween Iran and Saudi Arabia can achieve with regard 5. Swedish diplomat and current EU ambassador to Yemen Hans to the broader Yemeni conflict remains to be seen. Grundberg is expected to take over from Martin Griffiths over the summer. Martin Griffiths was appointed as the new UN Un- der-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator in May 2021. ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 24 FURTHER READING:

• Little-Known Military Brigades and Armed Groups in Yemen: A Series • The Myth of Stability: Fighting and Repression in Houthi-Controlled Territories • The Wartime Transformation of AQAP in Ye- men • Yemen’s Fractured South: ACLED’s Three-Part Series • Inside Ibb: A Hotbed of Infighting in Houthi-Controlled Yemen • Yemen Snapshots: 2015-2019 • Yemen’s Urban Battlegrounds: Violence and Politics in Sana’a, Aden, Ta’izz and Hodeidah • ACLED Methodology and Coding Decisions around the Yemen Civil War

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 25 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 26 ANALYSIS US Depart- US 11 May 2021; May 11 Cabo the for ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 27 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED ). The European Union is is Union European The 2021). March 10 State, of ment to expected announce its own training mission soon (Cabo Ligado, 6 July 2021). Yet neither have offered to engage in direct provision security in Cabo Delga- it Instead, is do. the pres- SADC that has consistently force, intervention regional a accept to Maputo sured finally prevailing at a June summit (Cabo Ligado, 29 June 2021). The of details the SADC deployment are much operating be will it appears it but clear, yet not trainers. European or US than lines front the to closer Government Government forces, conversely, have progress toward restricting the combat insurgency’s made little capabilities or freedom of movement. The greatest have made in is reoccu- troops government progress town located strategically a holding Diaca, pying and in Mocimboa da Praia district that will be town crucial Praia da to Mocimboa retake to effort eventual any 2021). The 26 May Ligado, (Cabo insurgency the from insurgent occupation of Mocimboa da Praia town in August 2020 remains the most substantial insurgent victory of the conflict, and the Mozambican govern- (Cabo control re-establish to able not been ment has 2020). 16 September Ligado, Indications that Mozambique would relent in its opposition to international intervention in the conflict has also proven to accurate an extent. The report at the start of the year assessed that the US and Euro- pean countries would likely be the main sources of pressure for intervention. The US has stepped up its counterterrorism programming with Mozambique by designating the insurgency a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” and a “Specially Designated Terrorist Group” and launching another round of Joint Com- bined Exchange Training missions 2021; March 16 in Ligado, (Cabo the country - re in sight in Ratner

at the of start the noted year that the Mozambi-

Sam

Mozambique: No end Mozambique: Delgado insurgency Delgado In In many respects, concerns about ACLED’s the Cabo The out. borne been have 2021 in conflict Delgado So far in 2021, the conflict in Mozambique’s northern in Mozambique’s in 2021, So the conflict far Cabo has Delgado province been less geographically The lethal. less no but 2020, in was it than widespread province the in operated has that insurgency Islamist since October 2017 has maintained its strength and added another district capital to its record of major has conflict the time, same the At raided. settlements become more internationalized, with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwan- da both authorizing military conflict deployments zone to to support the Mozambican government forces. The humanitarian crisis that the conflict has precipitated continues to expand. An from April the report International Organization to due displaced people of number the for (IOM) records Migration and Delgado Cabo 720,000 across over at conflict the Nampula up 660,000 provinces, from over the at end 2021). 2020 (IOM, April of port the winning for strategy clear a lacks government can conflict militarily, and would struggle to reduce the In military capacity. March 2021, insurgency’s the in- cap- eponymous the at victory major a won surgency gas natural liquified hosts which district, Palma of ital will hopes government Mozambican the that projects be the key to the country’s economic future (Cabo Ligado, 30 March largely melted away 2021). in the face of the insurgent Government as- resistance regrouped, forces government time the and, sault by insurgents The withdraw. to able were insurgents the have continued to threaten the 2021). 29 June Ligado, (Cabo since ever surrounding area In addition to the SADC deployment, Mozambique in the conflict. In the meantime, local grievances also negotiated a deployment of 1,000 Rwandan mil- against the government grow as the humanitarian itary and police to Cabo Delgado to, in the words of situation in the province worsens, potentially driving the Rwandan government, “conduct combat and se- conflict well into the future. curity operations, as well as stabilisation and security sector reform” (Government of Rwanda, 9 July 2021). FURTHER READING: Some trends in the country have deviated from con- siderations noted in the report at the start of the year. • Weekly and monthly reports from ACLED’s Following the insurgency’s incursions into Tanzania Cabo Ligado conflict observatory in October 2020, the report indicated that insurgent • CDT Spotlight: Escalation in Mozambique attacks may continue across Mozambique’s northern border, yet that has so far not taken place. Outside of an isolated incident on 17 February at Mahurunga in Kitaya Ward, there have been no indications of insurgents from Cabo Delgado launching attacks in Tanza- nia, and no claims of any such attacks. Instead, Tan- zania’s primary role in the conflict in 2021 has been the “soft refoulement” of Mozambican refugees flee- ing insurgent attacks in Palma district (Cabo Ligado, 16 June 2021). Rather than being housed in Tanzania, Mozambicans seeking refuge in Tanzania are instead shipped west and deported back to Mozambique at a border post in Mueda district. The report also noted expectations that the Mozam- bican government would increase its reliance on private military contractors (PMCs) in 2021. Instead, Mozambican police allowed their contract with South African PMC Dyck Advisory Group to lapse in April (Cabo Ligado, 6 April 2021). The government has not employed any private fighters since, aside from a small group of Ukrainian pilots flying Mi17 and Mi24 helicopters that Mozambique purchased from the South African arms company Paramount (Cabo Ligado, 30 March 2021). Instead, Mozambique has worked to expand its own military capabilities, con- tracting Paramount and its partner Burnham Global to purchase military equipment and to train Mozam- bican soldiers on the new platforms (Cabo Ligado, 30 March 2021). That project has come along slowly, but Gazelle helicopters piloted by newly trained Mozam- bicans began to see combat in late May (Cabo Ligado, 1 June 2021). There is still no clear path to a resolution of the Cabo Delgado conflict in the near future. The insurgency’s ability to carry out major operations appears undent- ed, and it remains to be seen if added domestic capabilities and foreign intervention can give the Mo- zambican government a decisive military advantage

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 28 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 29 ANALYSIS (for more, see this recent recent this see more, (for at — such as Dan Na Ambassagou in Mali, the Volunteers Volunteers the Mali, in Ambassagou Na Dan as such — for Defense of Homeland (VDP) in Burkina and Faso, fledgling militias in — Niger as well as the communi- groups these supporting ties ). report ACLED While 2020 was the deadliest year on record in the Sahel, the first six months of trajectory of 2021 perpetual and show escalating cycles a of vio- similar lence. In Burkina Faso, conflict reached record levels in May and June, with the two deadliest attacks ever reported in the country. The attacks civilians and targeted the Burkinabe police, and respectively, occurred in Solhan and The Bilibalogo. escalation in Burkina Faso follows the collapse of a fragile ceasefire between state forces and JNIM, which had been in place throughout most of 2020. In eastern Burki- na fighters haveJNIM-affiliated Faso, also pressured and towns small several in communities isolated and villages, including in Mansila, Tankoualou, Tanwal- bougou, Kpenchangou, and Madjoari, imposing em- (Me- impede movement and commerce that bargoes 2021). 5 July nastream, in situation Burki- security deteriorating The steadily na has Faso led to unrest. widespread In June, thousands of people demonstrated in the towns of Dori, Titao, and Kaya (Le Monde, 28 spread demonstrations, led June by the 2021). political opposi- Wide- tion, have followed in early July, with demands for improved security for the population and adequate support for the Defense and Security Forces While have the armed Burkinabe forces and the VDP. (FDS) stepped up their effortsthrough numerous military operations throughout the country, they have sufficiently not weakened the capacities of the jihadist groups. The largely reactive and transient nature of their operations make them predictable, hence only ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 30 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED fragile politics fragile crisis and unabated unabated an earlier this year. year. this earlier of Sahel: Insurgency Sahel: Insurgency center Nsaibia

ACLED highlighted ACLED

Héni The Sahel crisis entered 2021 following a record year 2021 year entered following The a Sahel crisis record of conflict and violence in 2020, during which more than 6,200 fatalities were reported in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In 2020, more civilians were in Mali and than killed Niger in and any only previous year, Burkina Faso saw a decrease in civilian deaths. Thus far in 2021, jihadist groups also continue while to Faso, Burkina consolidate in control and influence their expanding activities their to such other countries, as the Ivory Coast (Le Monde, 7 July 2021) (ACLED and & Clingendael, 10 June 2021), and Benin becoming a threat to Ghana (3news, 15 June 2021). Addition- ally, there has been significant political in instability the Sahel: two Mali experienced military coups within the nine months between August 2020 and Id- 2021); Monde, President Chadian 31 2021 May (Le May riss Deby Itno was killed amid a rebel incursion into Chad from neighboring Libya in April 2021 (La Croix, alleged an and elections 2021); disputed and 20 April (Cour- 2021 March in Niger in held were attempt coup 1 2021). International, April These rier developments underscore the continuation and intensification of the fragile politics and unabated crisis in the Sahel that In 2020, relations between the Nusrat al-Islam Jama’at wal-Muslimin (JNIM) Al and Is- Qaeda-affiliated lamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) deteriorated into a full-blown turf war. However, in 2021, the jihadi-on-jihadi fighting did, as expected, gradually exter- sustained ISGS faced JNIM and both as decline Barkhane Operation French-led the from pressure nal border (ISPI, 3 in 2021), March the tri-state especially region (ie. Liptako-Gourma). Instead, JNIM and ISGS beyond areas geographic to efforts their have shifted in parts other forces of external the reach immediate regularly they where Niger, and Mali, Faso, Burkina of militias ethnic-based and attack self-defense groups

The the causing very temporary disruptions. ger, and Menaka, in Mali. The joint force scored a series of tactical victories against ISGS in June, killing In Mali, similar to in Burkina Faso, conflict reached and capturing several ISGS commanders, and there- near-record high levels between April and June by degrading some of the group’s senior leadership 2021. The political upheaval following a second mili- (Le Point, 2 July 2021). Since the French-Nigerien op- tary-led coup in May 2021, nine months after a previ- erations, under the name ‘Solstice,’ took place large- ous coup in August 2020, did little to alleviate Mali’s ly on Malian soil, it seems that France has found in precarious position as a regional conflict epicenter. the Nigeriens a partner suited to take on a larger role. Rather, it strained relations with Mali’s main military Indeed, it seems that France intends to make Niger partner, France, which is leading the counter-militan- a central pillar, both at the operational and logis- cy alliance against jihadist groups in the Sahel. As a tical level, as part of the transformation of its Sahel result of the second coup, France suspended its joint mission (Jeune Afrique, 9 July 2021). Niamey is set military operations with Malian forces (RFI, 3 June to host the new command and control center of the 2021). While these operations resumed only a month Task Force Takuba. later (Al Jazeera, 3 July 2021), the suspension highlighted France’s increasingly problematic position in The death of Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno, a supporting controversial and undemocratic regimes key strategic partner of France, further weakened (Le Figaro, 4 June 2021). the alliance to combat militancy in the Sahel. France also announced, on 10 June, the end of Operation Both Mali and Burkina Faso have engaged in nego- Barkhane, which has been in place since August 2014, tiations with jihadist groups with varying degrees of along with a gradual withdrawal of troops stationed state involvement, and with limited success. In Mali, in the Sahel, and the closure of bases in northern Mali for example, the Ministry of National Reconciliation (Le Point, 9 July 2021). This is part of a transforma- assigned a delegation from the High Islamic Council tion of French efforts in the Sahel aimed at building of Mali (HICM) to facilitate the talks in Farabougou. a broader coalition with greater burden-sharing with Meanwhile, in Burkina Faso, the National Intelligence other European countries as part of Task Force Taku- Agency (ANR) negotiated with JNIM. Many agree- ba. Meanwhile, they are seeking more support from, ments, however, were negotiated directly between and cooperation with, the US, as the two countries local communities and JNIM militants. In a June 2021 signed a new agreement that will allow French and report, ACLED evaluated the fragility and difficulty of American special operators to work more closely to- sustaining these local agreements. One such ceasefire gether on counterterrorism operations in Africa (De- agreement in Farabougou — which took effect in April fense One, 9 July 2021). The transformation of the 2021 after a six-month embargo by Katiba Macina mil- French military mission involves targeting jihadist itants, who are part of JNIM (Mali 24 Info, 18 April 2021) leaders, concentrating efforts on the tri-state border — was revoked by the group in early July. Hostilities region, and the southward encroachment of the mil- between Katiba Macina militants and Bambara hunt- itant threat. ers are now rapidly resuming (aBamako, 5 July 2021). The embargo tactic is an integral part of the jihadist Another dimension is the ‘Sahelization’ of the larger strategy, and just as in eastern Burkina Faso, the mil- effort, in which Sahelian states take greater respon- itants in Mali also use this tactic in other places, such sibility for their own security. In June, a series of si- as Dinangourou, Mondoro, Petaka, and Bandiagara. multaneous joint operations were conducted over vast territories in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger with Just halfway into 2021, in Niger, ISGS have been re- a rather unprecedented level of coordination, involv- sponsible for the highest number of civilian deaths by ing troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, France, Mali, a single armed actor in the country in any year since Niger, and the Ivory Coast (Menastream, 20 June the beginning of ACLED coverage in 1997. Their in- 2021). These operations could be seen as a test-run creased targeting of civilians has largely been prompt- of an emerging ‘Sahelization’ dynamic. However, it is ed by the formation of self-defense groups by villag- questionable whether local state forces will be able ers in northern Tillaberi and Tahoua — in response to to maintain a sufficient level of coordination and ISGS attacks and the government’s failure to protect to sustain these types of operations over the longer them. The group has also carried out a series of dead- term, given logistical challenges and a lack of critical ly attacks against Nigerien forces. In reaction, Nige- intelligence capabilities and aircraft. rien forces and French forces of Operation Barkhane conducted joint operations between Tillaberi, in Ni-

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 31 FURTHER READING:

• Sahel 2021: Communal Wars, Broken Cease- fires, and Shifting Frontlines • The Conflict Between Al-Qaeda and the Islam- ic State in the Sahel, A Year On • Mali: Any End to the Storm? • In Light of the Kafolo Attack: the Jihadi Mil- itant Threat in the Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast Borderlands • State Atrocities in the Sahel: The Impetus for Counterinsurgency Results Is Fueling Govern- ment Attacks on Civilians

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 32 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 33