In Russia's Hands | Nagorno-Karabakh After the Ceasefire Agreement

IN RUSSIA'S HANDS BRIEF / 8 Apr 2021 Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement SERIES by András Rácz Senior Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin Summary Nearly five months have passed since the 9 › The ceasefire of 9 November 2020 brought November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second an end to the second Nagorno-Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as war and appears to have stabilised the stra- a culmination of tensions that had been mounting tegic situation until the first mandate of the for years, and had already resulted in two smaller Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). to the region expires in November 2025. The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives › However, the ceasefire agreement does of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and not provide for a political settlement of the resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 conflict. Due to Armenia’s military defeat Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Karabakhi Armenians are left with no option but to rely on Russia as a security guarantor. This Brief(1) analyses to what extent the ceasefire › Hence, the most important factor shaping agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable the long-term outlook for the region will and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability be the policy pursued by Moscow. If Russian of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of peacekeepers leave after the expiration of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables their mandate, Azerbaijan will easily be that could affect the resilience of the post-war status able to retake the territories it lost in the quo in the medium and long run. The first and second 1990s. However, should Moscow decide to of these – the stability of the present post-war ter- maintain its forces in place, there is little ritorial configuration and the uncertain future legal Azerbaijan could do to prevent this. status of the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to be administered by the separatist de facto authori- › The ceasefire has provided Russia with the ties – constitute underlying, inherent weaknesses of opportunity of making its military presence the ceasefire agreement. The third and probably most in Azerbaijan de facto permanent, thus again important factor is the Russian peacekeeping contin- freezing the conflict resolution process and gent deployed to Azerbaijan in order to maintain the expanding its footprint in the region. © European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2021. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. ANDRÁS RÁCZ ceasefire, because it brings in Russia’s political will by Armenia, but also the Lachin/Berdzor corridor, as an independent variable that could fundamentally which is likely to remain the sole, permanently open shape the overall settlement process. land connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. The agreement also provides for the crea- The deployment of Russian troops into Azerbaijan de- tion of a land corridor between Western Azerbaijan and serves special attention, because there is a theoretical the Nakhichevan exclave through Armenian territory. possibility that it may lead to a new ‘freezing’ of the The Nakhichevan corridor will be under the control of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, in- the Border Guards Service of Russia’s Federal Security stead of politically settling the conflict itself. The core Service (FSB). problem is that should Moscow decide to keep its troops on Azeri soil even after their original five-year The ceasefire agreement did not contain even a ref- mandate expires, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan could erence to either the Organisation for Security and prevent such a scenario. Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or its Minsk Group, even though the latter has been The Brief is structured as follows: in he fact that responsible for the conflict set- the first section the weaknesses of tlement since the end of the first the ceasefire agreement are analysed, T the OSCE Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1994 and while in the following section the was completely Russia is one of its co-chairs. The role and potential future outcomes left out of the fact that the OSCE was completely of the Russian peacekeeping mission ceasefire agreement left out of the ceasefire agreement are examined. The concluding sec- constitutes a major setback both for tion offers a forward-looking per- constitutes a major the organisation itself, and also for spective on the post-war status quo(2). setback both for the the European Union, as one of the organisation itself, key EU member states, France, is one and also for the EU. of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, while other member states, namely Germany, Italy, Sweden and Finland WEAKNESSES are members of it. Turkey did not become a signatory party to the ceasefire agreement either, nor an addi- OF THE 9 NOVEMBER tional co-chair of the Minsk Group, although Baku re- peatedly called for Ankara to be involved in ceasefire 2020 CEASEFIRE DEAL negotiations during the war. In the evening of 9 November 2020 a ceasefire agreement(3) was signed in Moscow, facilitated by the Russian Stability of the present Federation, but with Turkey also being kept informed. The three signatories were Russian President Vladimir territorial settlement Putin, Nikol Pashinyan, the prime minister of Armenia, and Ilham Aliev, the president of Azerbaijan. The stability of the territorial settlement prescribed by the ceasefire agreement constitutes an important var- The agreement prescribed the immediate cessa- iable of the overall sustainability of achieved settle- tion of armed hostilities along the current line of ment. The agreement stipulated the cessation of hos- contact. This prevented the complete destruction of tilities based on the territorial status quo on 9 November the surviving Armenian forces, whose losses were 2020(4), starting from midnight on 10 November 2020. staggering. The ceasefire ordered the swift return This initially resulted in several highly volatile situa- of the three Armenian-occupied districts around tions all along the frontline, because the ceasefire came Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, which had not yet into effect immediately, thus cementing the tactical been seized by the Azerbaijani forces during the war. situation on the ground, irrespective of geographical, At the same time, some 70% of the territory of the for- social, infrastructural or other conditions. The often mer Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) arbitrary location of the line of contact (often cutting was to remain under Armenian control, as the rest roads and other infrastructure in two) may well lead to had already been taken over by the Azeri military by several problems in the future, particularly regarding 9 November. post-conflict reconstruction and the rebuilding of the economy. The return of the seven occupied districts All Armenian armed forces were obliged to leave around Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control is the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, and a Russian creating difficulties also on the now restored old bor- peacekeeping contingent was to be deployed in order between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as the borderline der to ensure the ceasefire and guarantee stabil- cuts across not just roads but also some villages. ity. Russian peacekeepers now secure not only the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that are still controlled 2 IN RUSSIA'S HANDS | NAGORNO-KarabakH AFTER THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT Armenia−Azerbaijan peace deal Areas of withdrawal and peacekeeping RUSSIA GEORGIA NAGORNOKARABAKH border according to the 1991 AZERBAIJAN ARMENIA declaration of independence’ Agda new Kalbaar NKarabakh Az by A Khankendi/Stepanakert TURKE Lachin Shusha/Shushi NAKHCHIVAN IRAN y Az war Data: BBC, 2020; GADM, 2021 A particularly sensitive issue has been the case of the military and civilian population. In some places flee- historical city of Shusha/Shushi, which was captured ing Armenian civilians set their houses on fire in order by Azerbaijani forces in the last days of the war. to prevent them from falling into Azerbaijani hands(5), Meanwhile, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, bitterly indicating the depth of hatred and how diffi- Khankendi/Stepanakert, which is located only a few cult it might be in the future to build ties between the kilometres away, downhill from Shusha, has remained two populations. under Armenian control. The situation of these two cities, now located on different sides of the line of con- Another problematic aspect of the ceasefire agreement tact, may become a point of tension in the future, be- was that although Armenian troops were obliged to cause their proximity constitutes a mutual vulnerabil- leave Karabakh, this had not happened to the full ex- ity to shelling and shooting, and in particular tent even by the end of January 2021. In fact, the agree- sniper-fire. Besides, one section of the Lachin corridor ment was rather vague on the exact parameters of this runs across Shusha. Hence, it is foreseen that a new, withdrawal. While Baku interprets this requirement as separate ring road will be built, which will avoid the all Armenian military forces needing to be withdrawn, Azerbaijani city, thus ensuring a direct land connec- according to Yerevan and the de facto leadership in tion between Nagorno-Karabakh

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