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The National Interest

Number 83 • Spring 2006

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Honorary Chairman Henry A. Kissinger Chairman, Advisory Council James Schlesinger Publisher Dimitri K. Simes Associate Publisher Paul J. Saunders Contributing Editors Ian Bremmer Ted Galen Carpenter • Alexis Debat • John Hulsman • David B. Rivkin, Jr. • Ray Takeyh • Aluf Benn • Alexey Pushkov Advisory Board Morton Abramowitz • Graham Allison • Brian Beedham • Conrad Black • Robert F. Ellsworth • Mar- tin Feldstein • Fred C. Iklé • Daniel Pipes • Helmut Sonnenfeldt • Ruth Wedgwood • J. Robinson West • Dov Zakheim Conflict Conundrums Tim Potier

urope’s unresolved tum to a potential Balkanization of the disputes—Kosovo’s bid for entire world. The question is whether E independence, the breakaway “consistency for consistency’s sake” is the regions of Georgia, the long-festering best approach. To escape the quandary Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the that the current stalemates in Kosovo, Greek-Turkish divide in Cyprus—pres- Cyprus and the Caucasus present, it may ent the United States and other global be time to utilize some creative thinking and regional powers with a policy di- that breaks us out of the “independence lemma: how to balance a people’s call for versus integrity” dilemma. autonomy with a desire to maintain the territorial integrity of existing states and Countdown for Kosovo preserve regional stability. None of these cases exists in a vacuum. A U.S. decision ver since the ethnic trou- to support autonomy in one area, such as bles that rocked the province Kosovo, could embolden demands for in- E in the spring of 2004, the dependence by other groups. In turn, the international community has been in- manner in which Europe’s frozen con- creasingly concerned that Kosovar Alba- flicts are resolved could have a broader nians—frustrated so far in their bid for impact, setting precedents that might be independence from Serbia—could turn cited for Taiwan, West Papua or southern on the un force that is precariously keep- Sudan, for example. ing the peace. Such a development would U.S. policymakers have a choice: destabilize the whole region. Those con- They can either apply guiding principles cerns prompted the United Nations to in brokering or mediating those disputes, commence (informally at first) status talks or consider each case independently in on Kosovo in November at Washington’s light of U.S. geopolitical interests. Inter- behest, after the voluntary surrender of national law falls, for the most part, on Kosovo’s then-Prime Minister Ramush the side of territorial integrity. Washing- Haradinaj to the War Crimes Tribunal in ton is similarly wary of lending momen- the Hague. Washington has been at pains to re- Tim Potier is assistant professor of international assure all interested actors that the out- law and human rights at Intercollege (Univer- come of the status talks has not been sity College) in Nicosia, Cyprus. He is author determined, but it appears the United of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and States has reconciled itself to the future South Ossetia: A Legal Appraisal (2000) and Cy- possibility of an independent Kosovo. prus: Entering Another Stalemate? (2005). That development could have far-reach-

88 The National Interest—Spring 2006 ing implications for Serbia, for America’s If such an approach is coupled with some and Europe’s relations with Russia, and form of (non-territorialized) Serbian self- for Europe’s other aspirants of autonomy. government, including protections for Most immediately, Serbia would elements of Serbian culture (such as lin- have to be placated. An independent guistic and educational traditions), then Kosovo could rile and give strength to such a compromise could well become Belgrade’s Serbian radicals. Serbians the preferred option. would be particularly angered by in- It is distinctly possible that Washing- dependence for Kosovo, given Serbia’s ton would view an independent Kosovo recent democratic progress. In addition, as a singular exception. The rest of the Serbia would have to be reassured with world, though, might not. With an eye on legally defined guarantees on the protec- Georgia’s restive areas, Russian President tion of the Serbian minority in Kosovo Vladimir Putin said in a press conference and its cultural heritage. on January 30 that a Kosovo precedent Although Belgrade publicly contin- would need to be applied to the other ues to reject independence for Kosovo, it “frozen conflicts” along Europe’s periph- has privately come to acknowledge that ery—such as the one between Georgia it may be unavoidable. If Montenegro and Abkhazia. moves this year towards its own indepen- dence through a referendum, Kosovo’s What Happens in the Caucasus continuing status as some form of un- managed Serbian province will look ever ecause of the importance more absurd. of the Caucasus as a transit The international community could B route for Caspian energy, and try to induce Serbia’s cooperation through because of Russia’s leading role in the the prospect of that country’s entry to region, the West has discovered it has the European Union. Serbia might then a strong interest in how local separatist subordinate its ethnic and cultural sen- conflicts are settled. Moscow’s firm pos- sitivities to its far more vital goals of at- turing has prevented Georgia from more taining eu membership at the earliest forcefully reining in its breakaway re- possible date, securing its position within gions, which have developed good politi- the Western alliance (perhaps with nato cal ties with Moscow. Georgia’s troubles membership), and attempting to establish with its rebel areas have in part prevented itself as the prime diplomatic actor in the it from more definitively entering the region. West’s orbit by complicating a potential An independent Kosovo, though, entry to nato and the European Union. would raise new demands for self-de- Washington’s priority vis-à-vis Geor- termination by the Serb minority there, gia should not be to preserve its territo- highlighting just how untidy the business rial integrity at all costs, but rather to of partition can be. If independence for ensure that Russia withdraws its mili- Kosovo is the option taken, an equally tary forces by 2008, the date Moscow has damned decision will have to be made as committed to under a Russian-Georgian to whether it is received whole or in parts. agreement of May 2005. America can If Kosovo itself is not partitioned, then its do little to alleviate the hostility of the independence will have to be guided by Abkhaz and Ossetian people towards a an eu-led mission with reserved powers, return to Tbilisi’s rule. Moreover, there while strenuous efforts would have to be may be nothing that Washington can made to persuade the Serbian population offer Moscow in return for its full coop- to participate in governmental structures. eration with the reunification of Georgia.

Conflict Conundrums 89 Consequently, Washington may seek to to “sacrifice” Armenia and accept the trade the independence of those areas for continued presence of Russian troops in the removal of Russian forces and Geor- Armenia in the interest of establishing gia’s eventual entry into nato. some sort of security cordon in Georgia The Georgian government would not and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh could welcome such a deal—but Tbilisi’s maxi- be gradually absorbed into Armenia. This malist position may not be in line with could be done with the return of six of larger U.S. interests. The United States the seven occupied districts surround- needs Russia’s continued support in the ing Nagorno-Karabakh proper (minus War on Terror in securing weapons-grade Lachin), the right of return for displaced material and promoting stability in Af- Azeris to Nagorno-Karabakh, and com- ghanistan; with North Korea and on pensation (for permanent resettlement) non-proliferation; and via nato’s move- for those that did not want to return. ment into the post-Soviet space. During At any rate, Washington would not these crucial times, Washington should lose Armenia completely under such a not seek to push Moscow over the edge scenario. Armenia’s sizeable U.S. and Eu- for the sake of a resolution of Abkhazia, ropean diaspora would guarantee that which is marginal to U.S. strategic inter- good diplomatic and trading relations ests. In the past few years, some normali- would continue. The Armenians, mean- ty has returned to Abkhazia, with Russian while, could be reassured by a “soft” Rus- tourists bringing much-needed rubles. sian security guarantee, which would also With the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi- satisfy Moscow by the fact it had retained Ceyhan (btc) pipeline, Washington’s pri- a military outpost in the south Caucasus. ority should be to maintain stability in the central core of Georgia. What About Cyprus? In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbai- he island of Cyprus was jan, pipeline politics will also prevail. physically divided in 1974, Washington will favor stability, and U.S. T following a Turkish military officials will tend to support the status invasion in response to a Greek Cypriot- quo since the dispute is relatively latent. inspired coup to remove then-President That stability could be ruptured, though, Makarios. The Turkish Cypriots have if the Aliyev regime of Azerbaijan were manifested their demand for some form to crumble and be replaced by a less qui- of separation from Greek Cypriot ma- escent administration in Baku—an un- jority rule over a far longer period than likely but not inconceivable prospect. the Kosovar Albanians have argued for a That scenario could ratchet up tensions separation from Serbia. Although Turk- on the ceasefire line and endanger the ish Cypriots govern and control a part of long-established truce. the island, that government is recognized During talks in Rambouillet, , only by Turkey, while the Greek Cypriot in February, the Armenian and Azerbai- administration in Nicosia is internation- jani leaders failed to agree to a resolu- ally considered the official government. tion of the dispute. Still, the Armenians The Turkish Cypriot leadership has of Nagorno-Karabakh will never agree recently gained credibility in Washing- to subordination to Baku. For Washing- ton and Brussels, though, because of its ton, Armenia is the least important of the cooperation with un efforts to broker a three south Caucasus states. Azerbaijan reunification agreement. Nicosia, mean- and Georgia remain much more impor- while, has come to be seen as the more tant. Washington may therefore choose recalcitrant party. The United Nations,

90 The National Interest—Spring 2006 via its Good Offices Mission, had en- until a reunification agreement is found gaged the two sides for nearly two and a or the Cypriot government drops its trade half years, with talks concluding in Bur- embargo on the Turkish side of the island. genstock, Switzerland, on April 1, 2004. eu countries, including France, are going A timeline had finally been imposed only to be pressuring Nicosia to come to the because Cyprus was to join the European negotiating table with greater seriousness. Union on May 1, 2004. When the Turk- Also, as the economic situation in Turkish ish and Greek sides held separate, simul- Cyprus continues to improve, the admin- taneous referendums on April 24, 2004, istration there will be much less willing to on a un plan to reunite the island, the satisfy Nicosia’s demands. Turkish Cypriots approved it by a margin The United States, meanwhile, has of 2 to 1, while Greek Cypriots rejected concluded that while it has finally found a it by 75 percent. Yet it was the Greek future set of partners (led by Mehmet Ali Cypriot-administered side that joined Talat, current president of the interna- the European Union, while the Turkish tionally unrecognized Turkish Republic Cypriots were excluded and are still sub- of Northern Cyprus) in the north of the ject to an international trade embargo. island, it is without a negotiating partner The government based in Nicosia— in the Greek-populated south. Conse- known as the Republic of Cyprus—has quently, the United States is unlikely to come to believe that, with the advantage press for the activation of any substantial of eu membership, time and circum- initiative towards reunification until ei- stances are on its side. Turkey, as an eu ther the tone from Nicosia is moderated candidate, is required to extend its eu or the government changes. Although customs-union agreement of 1995 to the talks may recommence this year, nothing ten new eu member states (the so-called will likely be achieved with the existing Ankara Protocol), including the Repub- faces on the Greek Cypriot side. Beyond lic of Cyprus. The eu Council will re- this, it appears likely that Cyprus’s presi- view the implementation of the protocol dent, Tassos Papadopoulos, who remains this year. The Greek Cypriot hope is popular with the Greek Cypriot people, that, very soon (if not quite by the end will be re-elected in presidential elections of this year), the European Union will in February 2008. force Turkey to implement the protocol, Those factors will cause the partition allowing Cypriot ships and aircraft to of the island to become more entrenched. enter Turkish ports, by maintaining that Still, the prospects for reunification are Turkey’s accession talks are at stake. bolstered by Turkey’s eu bid and the Nicosia may be overplaying its hand, pressure it puts on Ankara to demonstrate though. The Greek Cypriots have missed its commitment to the reunification of the opportunity they had after the 2004 the island. Also, the Turkish Cypriots still referendum to convince the international want to enter the eu as soon as possible. community of the merits of their decision Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots will to vote “no” and are increasingly squan- probably eventually realize that Papado- dering their chances of gaining key con- poulos is not the man to secure the great- cessions from the Turkish side, such as the est number of changes to the un’s Annan withdrawal of Turkish troops, freedom of Plan for reunification. settlement to the Turkish Cypriot-admin- On balance, the eventual reunifica- istered side, and an adjustment or removal tion of Cyprus still remains more likely, of the existing Treaty of Guarantee. rather than less. The Greek Cypriots still Ankara will continue to deal with Nic- have time to persuade the Turkish Cypri- osia only through un-mediated channels ots and the wider international commu-

Conflict Conundrums 91 nity that they are serious in their contin- of the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan. That ued demands for reunification. Turkey’s dynamic could jettison any remaining eu accession talks have only just com- pressure on the imperative of the reunifi- menced. However, the Greek Cypriots cation of Cyprus. have less time than they think to reverse a broadening impression that they are not hrough the 1975 Hel- willing to share political power with the sinki Act, freezing borders Turkish Cypriots. T was designed for a Cold War Moreover, the United States may not Europe divided between two superpow- be counted on to push Turkey on Cyprus ers; it remains a good principle, but we if such pressure becomes necessary. U.S. may need to prepare for exceptions to relations with Turkey will remain para- the rule. Managing the world is never mount. Turkey’s continued tolerance of easy. Washington will have to prioritize U.S. policy on Iraq remains central to its dealings with Europe’s territorial con- the Bush Administration’s legacy and, flicts. Putting some disputes on the back- ultimately, the fulfillment of many lon- burner can allow for workable compro- ger-term U.S. foreign policy objectives. mises to emerge over time, leading to a The current Turkish government remains better peace than might be achieved with popular and has steered a fairly solid time pressures. In addition, U.S. officials course, despite earlier misgivings from will have to carefully consider the broader some Turkey watchers in Washington. effects of any given resolution, not only The United States will be unwilling to on other ongoing conflict-negotiations, take any positions that might anger Tur- but also on the interests of other impor- key, which is already very sensitive about tant powers that America cooperates with a federalization of Iraq and entrenching over a broad range of issues. n

92 The National Interest—Spring 2006