Campbell O'hanlon 93-101

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Number 80 • Summer 2005

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CHAIRMAN James R. Schlesinger PUBLISHER Dmitri K. Simes CONTRIBUTING EDITORS Ian Bremmer Ted Galen Carpenter • Alexis Debat • John Hulsman • David B. Rivkin, Jr. • Paul J. Saunders • Ray Takeyh ADVISORY BOARD Morton Abramowitz • Graham Allison • Brian Beedham • Conrad Black • Robert F. Ellsworth • Martin Feld- stein • Fred C. Iklé • Daniel Pipes • Helmut Sonnenfeldt • Ruth Wedgwood • J. Robinson West • Dov Zakheim Untitled

iKurt M. Campbell & Michael O’Hanloni

OW COULD a decorated National security rightly emerged as war hero, experienced sena- the predominant issue of the 2004 elec- H tor and outstanding debater tion. Some 34 percent of the electorate lose a presidential race that turned largely cited either Iraq or the War on Terror as on national security issues to an incum- the policy issue of greatest concern, a bent who during his first term badly mis- significant jump from the twelve percent calculated both the urgency of the main that cited “world affairs” in 2000. Among war he pursued and the way to win the that 34 percent, sixty percent favored peace? And given some of the harsh reali- President Bush, with an overwhelming ties now facing the U.S. armed services, 86 percent of those most worried about particularly the protracted and dangerous terrorism favoring the incumbent. In the deployment to Iraq, how did Republicans electorate at large, about 58 percent said find their most loyal demographic, not they most trusted President Bush to among the Bible Belt voters of the South wage the War on Terror effectively, to and West or the wealthy businessmen Senator Kerry’s 40 percent. All this even along the coasts, but rather among U.S. though in nominating Senator Kerry, military members and a large percentage Democrats believed they were offering of the more than 25 million veterans? An- the country a viable alternative to a pres- swering these questions is critical to the ident who misdiagnosed the Iraqi threat, Democratic Party’s prospects as it looks went to war with a weak coalition and ahead to elections in 2006 and 2008. The failed to plan properly for the aftermath Democratic Party must reestablish its na- of invasion. tional security bona fides among key con- The recent election made clear, how- stituencies if it hopes to win back the ever, that there is profound anxiety over White House or Congress. how Democrats generally manage issues of war and peace. Party leaders’ instincts Kurt M. Campbell is senior vice president, director were wrong. Americans did not want the of the International Security Program and politics of antiwar protest. They wanted a Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security leader who convinced them he had a bet- at the Center for Strategic and International ter plan for the course of the nation at a Studies, and director of the Aspen Strategy crucial moment in its history. Group. Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow in In a small but telling example of how Foreign Policy Studies and the Sydney Stein, the party tends to think about national Jr., Chair at the Brookings Institution. He also security, when Democrats thought they lectures at Princeton University. had a chance of winning the recent presi-

The National Interest—iSummer 2005 93 dential elections, they got much more ex- Of Democrats and Soldiers cited about the topic of who should be Secretary of State than Secretary of De- NE STRIKING develop- fense. It was widely known that capable ment—dating back roughly individuals such as Richard Holbrooke O to the Reagan era—has been and Joseph Biden were interested in be- the growing identification of the Ameri- coming the nation’s top diplomat, and it can military culture with the Republican was obvious throughout the campaign Party and its increasing disenchantment how close both were to Senator Kerry— with Democrats. It is very true, of course, yet one struggles to recall a single name that the military vote (active-duty person- mentioned to run the Pentagon. As a mil- nel as well as reservists, civilian employees itary officer told one of us, “Don’t you and veterans) is not a monolithic group. find it surprising that at a time of war the These 30 million voters are not equally Democratic Party spends no time think- conservative politically nor equally in- ing about who the Secretary of Defense clined to factor military issues prominent- should be?” ly in their voting decisions. Yet a Military Especially in the post-9/11 context, Times survey released last September voters want to know that Democrats will showed President Bush the preferred can- have the backbone to attack America’s en- didate among active-duty military person- emies before they can strike the United nel by roughly 73 to 18, a staggering ratio States. And they want to be convinced found among reservists as well. More that Democrats know enough about the than 60 percent of today’s military leaders nation’s armed forces and the tough chal- self-identify as Republican, whereas less lenges of leadership to use military force than 10 percent call themselves Democ- effectively and decisively. In the last elec- rats. Overall, 59 percent of all military tion, Democrats as a party offered little personnel described themselves as Repub- more than international cooperation and licans in the September 2004 survey men- multilateralism as their prescription for tioned above, with 13 percent Democratic matters of national security. This was and 20 percent independent. The Repub- complemented by a “laundry list” ap- lican advantage is not nearly so stark proach to national security policy, pre- among veterans, but even within this cat- senting a broad agenda addressing energy egory, Republicans hold a two-to-one independence, civil conflicts, HIV/AIDS, edge (46 to 22) among veterans who are Mideast peace and other matters. These “civilian leaders” and a six point edge (37 are important, to be sure, but an effective to 31) among the veteran population at and well-communicated approach to the large. In the end, among the 18 percent of “hard” security problems of the day was the population with military experience, lacking. It is too early to tell if this prob- 57 percent voted for Mr. Bush to 41 per- lem has been rectified under the party’s cent for Mr. Kerry. (By contrast, Bill current leadership, but all Democrats, Clinton polled equally to George H. W. even those whose hearts are primarily in Bush among military veterans in 1992.) energy or trade or development policy, Certainly there are myriad factors need to recognize that they cannot cobble that explain the overwhelming Republi- together a winning platform from various can tilt in the military’s political prefer- bits and pieces—a military pay raise here, ences. A high percentage of recruits come a call for multilateralism there. Democ- from rural or “red state” America; reli- rats must have a comprehensive, credible gious observance in the military is higher approach to national security that res- than the national norm among civilians, at onates with the military vote. a time when the Democrats are seen in-

94 The National Interest—iSummer 2005 creasingly as the country’s more secular needed for the job, failed to procure the party; Republicans are associated with armor needed to protect troops in the support for large defense budgets. And field and wound up deploying troops at Democrats have also needlessly aggravat- far greater paces than almost any military ed their own problems. In 2004, following specialist thought advisable or Howard Dean’s example from the year sustainable.2 Despite these serious gaffes before, they more often than not chose in the current administration’s defense angry antiwar rhetoric over a debate on policy over the last few years, predictions future foreign policy vision or current na- that the Republican sway over the mili- tional security challenges. This was indul- tary vote would diminish in the 2004 elec- gence in emotion over analysis, in Bush tion were not fulfilled. bashing over solid political strategizing. This was compounded by the think- The Clinton Legacy ing among Democratic political strategists that national security was not a key F COURSE, the problems issue for Democratic voters. Former DNC did not begin with 2004. Chairman Terry McAuliffe epitomized O John Kerry and John Ed- this thinking when he indicated that na- wards had the misfortune of running as tional security was a subject where De- Democrats after their party had been per- mocrats had only to “check the box” be- ceived as the weaker of the two parties on fore moving on to issues they preferred to national security for more than a genera- discuss. This attitude was even less defen- tion. Democrats need to challenge this sible in 2004 than in 2000 (when top perception. strategists reportedly counseled Vice Setting the Clinton Administration’s President Al Gore to avoid national secu- record straight is the first place to start. rity issues because they ranked so low in The Clinton Administration made its voter surveys). share of mistakes on military matters, par- This attitude ignores the fact that vot- ticularly in its early years. But it had im- ers always care about national security, portant successes, too: It showed more particularly in presidential races. The military resolve in regard to North Korea president has a disproportionate impact in 1994 than the Bush Administration dis- on American foreign policy and national played during an even more serious nu- security decision-making, and voters clear crisis a decade later, credibly sig- know this. Many also have an easier time naled to China that there would be severe following debates over national security, repercussions if it attacked Taiwan and taking the measure of a candidate from eventually worked with NATO to prevail his or her resoluteness and logic in them, in both the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts. than discussions of tax or budget policy or health care reform. 2One need only reference the Third Infantry Divi- In 2004 in particular, it should have sion’s after-action report: “Higher headquar- been obvious that national security was ters did not provide the Third Infantry Divi- paramount in voters’ minds. The country sion (Mechanized) with a plan for Phase IV. As was still strongly affected by the Septem- a result, Third Infantry Division transitioned ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, even if not into Phase IV in the absence of guidance.” A as intensively as a couple years before. In Department of Defense report observed that addition, it became fully apparent that the “late formation of Department of Defense Bush Administration failed to prepare a [Phase IV] organizations limited time available serious stabilization plan for Iraq, ignored for the development of detailed plans and pre- military advice on the size of the force deployment coordination.”

XXXXXXXX 95 Moreover, even though its containment Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell had policy toward Iraq was springing leaks by gone along with the decision. the end of the 1990s in regard to sanc- And while the Clinton Administration tions enforcement and other matters, it may well deserve criticism for its limited does not look so bad compared with sub- response to the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombings sequent Bush Administration policy. of U.S. embassies in Africa, its main mis- The Clinton Administration’s major take was deferring too soon to the nation’s defense reviews helped balance the bud- top brass. The top military leadership get while ensuring that the military was demonstrated considerable reluctance to capable of promoting global stability and risk a special forces commando raid meeting urgent regional threats. For against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. those who doubted the quality of its In large part, this hinged on the objection major quadrennial defense reviews of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (QDRs), it is worth noting that Secretary General Hugh Shelton, a former special Rumsfeld in his own 2001 QDR did not operator himself. Admittedly, the chair- stray far from the path blazed by the man had strong arguments against risking Clinton Administration. The Clinton American forces in a raid that might come budgets bought large quantities of fast up empty, in a country where U.S. rein- sealift, precision weapons, mine warfare forcements were a great distance away. capabilities and chemical protective gear But given the stakes, increasingly appar- and provided early versions of the un- ent even at the time, it should have been manned aerial vehicles that were used ef- considered much more seriously. fectively in Afghanistan and Iraq. The The Clinton national security legacy Clinton Administration also maintained is complex, with lessons both about what military readiness standards—from train- to do right and what not to repeat. But ing rigor and intensity, to equipment re- Democrats can and should be proud of pair, to military pay and benefits—at his- what was accomplished during the Clin- torically high levels. ton years—and be prepared to build a na- The Clinton Administration had one tional security strategy on its achieve- great virtue and one frequent failing in its ments, rather than fall back on either the dealings with the military. The positive “politics of anger” or a reflexive endorse- was that it listened attentively to military ment of whatever steps a Republican ad- advice in fashioning plans for American ministration takes. operations in the Balkans, Haiti and else- where. The negative was that it some- Learning Lessons times deferred too quickly to military advice—or felt too intimidated to challenge T WOULD be wrong for De- the armed forces—and inadvertently may mocrats to think that competing have lost a bit of the military’s respect as a I with Republicans on national se- result. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin curity requires a strategy of being “more and President Clinton took responsibility Republican than the Republicans.” A De- for the debacle in Somalia and deserved mocrat need not reflexively support any some of it, yet the tactical decisions had weapon system under the sun to establish been taken by military commanders on credibility on national security issues. the ground, not dictated by the civilians With regard to Iraq, there was and con- in Washington. Much was made of the tinues to be a serious antiwar argument, fact that Secretary Aspin had denied the reflected in the views of former National military heavier ground equipment a few Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft weeks earlier, but Chairman of the Joint as well as a group of several dozen of the

96 The National Interest—iSummer 2005 nation’s best political science professors ters the two were not far apart. (That was (ranging from Barry Posen to Steven true partly because President Bush “bor- Walt to Richard Betts). Indeed, the anti- rowed” some of Kerry’s ideas, such as a war stance adopted by Howard Dean and faster transition to Iraqi sovereignty, General Wesley Clark was just as strategi- greater involvement of allies in the opera- cally defensible as Kerry’s and Edwards’s tion, better benefits for troops in the field reluctant support for the war or Senator and more focus on job creation in the re- Lieberman’s unflinching endorsement. It construction effort.) was not a sign of weakness for Democrats Finally, because the Kerry-Edwards to be ambivalent about the merits of over- ticket too often seemed only to offer criti- throwing Saddam Hussein by military in- cisms, President Bush was able to project vasion. What voters responded to was an image of resoluteness and firm beliefs. whether a candidate’s position was well Even when voters disagreed with some of conceived, resolute and above petty parti- President Bush’s policies, his unflinching san politics. views about the rightness of the Afghan- istan and Iraq wars and the importance of N THIS regard we would offer bringing democracy and freedom to the several friendly criticisms of the Greater Middle East made an impression I Kerry-Edwards effort. First, on voters and gave them a sense both of whatever the political imperative of com- his future foreign policy and of his competing with Howard Dean for the antiwar mitment to follow through on his initia- vote, both senators made a mistake in the tives. The election demonstrated that slo- fall of 2003 by opposing the proposed $87 gans don’t substitute for ideas. In both the billion supplemental funding package for 2002 and 2004 elections, Democrats were Iraq and Afghanistan. If they truly needed too content to criticize the Bush Adminis- to vote against that package, they also tration for isolating the United States in should have felt obliged to present a clear the world and acting unilaterally. These and serious alternative bill immediately— are largely fair criticisms. But they do not and pressed for its passage. Indeed, they address the question of whether the poli- could have included many of the propos- cies Bush followed were sufficiently im- als Kerry later advocated in a March 2004 portant to justify stepping on some allied address, such as guaranteeing adequate toes. Democrats had a tendency to argue armored protection for U.S. forces in Iraq about the means without engaging in a or mandating greater oversight of how debate over the desired ends. funds were disbursed. Instead, both Kerry This is not to say that the Kerry-Ed- and Edwards acquired a reputation as wards team did not do some big thinking politicians willing to withhold support for about policy. For example, it argued for U.S. troops on the battlefield in order to an acceleration of efforts to secure loose score partisan points. nuclear materials around the world, ar- Second, the ticket also made a mis- guably the greatest threat to American take by tacking left on the Iraq issue dur- national security. However, with this as ing the general campaign. The ticket’s with many other proposals, the candidates “wrong war—wrong time—wrong place” did not explain much of what, besides rhetoric was indeed reminiscent of added funds, would be needed to accom- Howard Dean, just as President Bush plish their objectives. And just when the said. Moreover, Senator Kerry’s statement Kerry campaign developed momentum that he would have done “almost every- on this and other foreign policy ideas in thing” differently than Mr. Bush on Iraq late May and early June of 2004 (and was too strong, given that on many mat- Kerry’s lead over Bush in the polls in-

XXXXXXXX 97 creased from two to seven percent), the by deployments, he failed to lay out a campaign apparently decided it had broader defense vision. “checked the box” on national security. But Democrats won’t be able to “talk Plans for another speech dealing with na- the talk” unless their candidates and lead- tional security were scrapped, as the cam- ing political strategists are prepared to lis- paign took the MacAuliffe line that it was ten. Too often meetings on Democratic time to get back to domestic matters. foreign policy and national security issues Whether intended or not, this sent a look like a directory of non-profit organi- very clear signal to the “national security” zations. There is of course nothing wrong voter bloc that the Democrats were inter- with NGOs, but they tend to be peopled ested in talking about defense issues only by advocates for individual objectives as an election tactic. Moreover, it did noth- rather than those who have an integrated ing to address a widespread perception view of foreign policy that clearly empha- that their party’s interest in military policy sizes American national security priori- revolves largely around social issues, such ties. Some steps have been taken. Democ- as gays in uniform or women in combat rats have recently recruited a number of billets—that Democrats are more interest- prominent military men and women, in- ed in the military as a vehicle for social en- cluding General Jack Keane, Admiral gineering than for protecting the country. William Crowe, General Claudia And so Democrats have several lessons Kennedy and General John Shalikashvili. they must absorb from the failed 2000 and Indeed, a retired four-star, Wes Clark, 2004 campaigns. First, Democrats need to was an unsuccessful candidate for presi- learn to “talk the talk” of military affairs. dent in the 2004 election. Too many candidates and top political op- Outside of election periods, however, eratives are uncomfortable using the lan- retired military people are still rarely in- guage of the military. In the last two cam- volved in the political dynamics or strate- paigns, both Senator Kerry and Vice Presi- gic thinking of the Democratic Party. dent Gore failed to lay out a broad vision Certainly, the would-be 2008 nominee for the armed forces in a major speech— must recruit some top advisers with mili- or, what would have been better yet, a se- tary experience and serious, forward- ries of speeches. In contrast, Governor looking views of national security and en- Bush, prior to his first run in 2000, gave sure they have access to him- or herself as several speeches specifically devoted to the well as to the political team. In addition, military and national security. Even if the however, the Democratic Party must un- specific policy recommendations he made dertake new efforts to bring retired and needed major adjustments, Bush got a lot active duty service personnel into their of credit for his attention to the details of discussion groups and learn more of the the so-called revolution in military affairs, critical issues that animate defense discus- defense transformation and military com- sions. (It would also help if more leaders pensation issues. Those speeches, plus the from business and finance were included choices of Dick Cheney and Colin Powell alongside academics and civilian officials for his core national security team, com- in Democratic conversations about na- bined with Gore’s relative silence on the tional security.) subject, gave Bush widespread credibility Democrats also need to gain the con- that few expected the young governor fidence to challenge the military when ap- from Texas to establish so soon. While propriate. Using military force is—and Senator Kerry did a good job on the sub- should be—an inherently contentious en- ject of specific military benefits for re- terprise; Democrats must get more com- servists, troops in Iraq and others affected fortable with the debates and more confi-

98 The National Interest—iSummer 2005 dent in their judgment. Furthermore, an- what might be called first-generation Al- nual defense budgeting should not be an Qaeda—needs to be totally destroyed attempt to protect existing Pentagon rice using all the tools of American power. But bowls, but rather a process in which they are equally concerned that we appear strategic judgment prevails and permits to have no long-term strategy to prevent some bowls to be broken. In short, con- the creation of the next generation of Al- structive friction is intrinsic to the Qaeda and its affiliated groups. After four process—and Democratic officials need to years in office, President Bush has finally have the confidence, which comes from begun to develop such a strategy, as re- close familiarity with military affairs, to flected in his focus on freedom and make national security decisions. Put dif- democracy for his second inaugural ad- ferently, while avoiding the extremes to dress. But the challenge requires more which he has sometimes taken his philos- than that vision, however constructive it ophy, Democrats need to emulate one of may be. Democrats need a more compre- their least favorite Bush Administration hensive and inspirational vision of their officials, Secretary of Defense Donald own to tackle this challenge. It should ac- Rumsfeld. He has been right to ask tough knowledge the validity of the president’s questions of the military. What is needed ideas but build on them.3 By mastering is a kindler, gentler, more respectful the “hard” security issues they have typi- Rumsfeldian, rather than the habitual De- cally avoided, Democrats will also be bet- mocratic deference to uniformed judg- ter able to engage such matters as the bat- ment on things military. tle of ideas in the War on Terror—a de- Democrats should not pretend that bate that the country, Republicans and civilian and military roles can be neatly Democrats alike, acutely needs. separated into two broad and distinct Where to go from here? One area the bins—high strategy, the primary province Democrats, as a party, might start with is of civilians, and military operations, the question of national service. In recent where the uniformed services possess the years, party spokesmen have done little nation’s principal expertise. There are more than raise public anxieties about the usually no clear lines distinguishing strat- prospect of a national draft. Military com- egy from operations. The political goals pensation packages are now generally of the nation’s conflicts fundamentally af- good, but there is room for Democrats to fect the tactics and operational plans be innovative by encouraging more young available to the military to prosecute Americans—especially from our nation’s them, meaning that military planners and elite universities—to serve, by exploring commanders must also think about and the possibility of shorter tours of duty for understand strategy. And the question of some specialties if that allows more to how wars are conducted affects decisions serve usefully, and by encouraging the on whether to fight them, so civilians study of languages and cultures that is in- must concern themselves with the techni- creasingly needed by intelligence person- cal subjects in which the armed forces nel and diplomats to win the War on Ter- specialize. ror. Democrats should sharply criticize

3 Democrats & Grand Strategy A broader agenda should extend to political, edu- cational and economic reform across the Is- EMOCRATS FULLY agree lamic world, new mechanisms for intensive po- with their Republican col- litical dialogue between Westerners and Mus- D leagues that the current lims and an evenhanded promotion of peace in threat to American peace and security— the Middle East.

XXXXXXXX 99 universities that deny ROTC access to tarian position; given Al-Qaeda’s proven their campuses over the gays-in-the-mili- ability to use the territories of failed tary issue. Whether or not the Depart- states for sanctuary and for revenue-gen- ment of Defense is right in this policy, erating illicit activity, it is a security im- many universities’ responses are dispro- perative as well. portionate, wrongheaded and harmful to Second, Democrats must keep paying the nation’s security—and top Democrats attention to threats and possible conflict should say so. scenarios that involve classic warfare, be it Democrats must prove that they can against other states or terrorist organiza- be good stewards of America’s military tions. Clinton’s 1997 QDR focused a good potential—improving the force for to- deal on the “asymmetric challenges” that morrow’s challenges and employing it countries like North Korea might pose to prudentially yet decisively when appropri- the United States and its allies in wartime. ate. There are three security challenges Defense policymakers need to ensure that the nation will soon face, which we be- we consider the needs of facing a similar lieve the Democratic Party must address potential challenge from Iran or China: if it wants to rebuild its national security fielding enough advanced capabilities to credentials and become more competitive find Iranian or Chinese mines and sub- for the military vote. marines in shallow waters near their The first is the role of the military in countries, improving our deployed forces’ post-conflict reconstruction. U.S. opera- defenses against cruise and ballistic mis- tions in Iraq and Afghanistan have high- siles, and keeping reconnaissance and lighted the intense difficulty of winning communications systems operational in the peace in countries where we’ve al- the face of hostile attempts to defeat our ready won the war. With the Bush Ad- high-tech advantages. Democrats must ministration conducting the country’s not become so transfixed by engagement largest nation-building effort since the strategies for difficult countries that we 1940s, the debate over whether the Unit- forget to prepare militarily for the possi- ed States should do such things is over, bility that such well-advised strategies and the common Republican position on may fail. the issue from the 1990s has decisively Third, Democrats can and must con- lost. It is now time to take advantage of tinue to contribute to homeland security. that fact and prepare the military and They must learn to take political credit other government institutions for the for ideas, such as the creation of the De- challenges ahead. The U.S. military is partment of Homeland Security, which getting better at such missions but con- were originally theirs. (Instead, in the tinues to have weaknesses and is not midterm elections of 2002, the Democ- aided enough by other parts of the gov- rats lost the Senate partly by putting up ernment. We are asking our uniformed obstacles to the rapid creation of a De- personnel to succeed at tasks for which partment of Homeland Security, even they have little training. This post-con- though such a department was Senator flict resolution role requires revisiting the Joseph Lieberman’s idea before Bush co- Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the 1980s, opted it.) The last several years have seen extending beyond the Department of De- progress, but with the country focused fense to the rest of government. Among largely on offensive military operations other things, a cadre of reconstruction abroad, and with the homeland security specialists should be created, with mecha- mission so new and so daunting, much re- nisms to rapidly expand their ranks in mains to be done. A comprehensive strat- times of crisis. This is not just a humani- egy is still lacking. For example, private-

100 The National Interest—iSummer 2005 sector infrastructure remains largely un- well. And if the governor of a small south- protected, largely due to the Bush Admin- ern state without foreign policy or mili- istration’s ideological opposition to plac- tary experience can win the presidency, ing any demands upon it. But there are the likely cast of candidates for 2008 solutions short of the heavy hand of gov- should have a shot as well. ernment regulation, such as requiring This prognosis should be encourag- owners to possess terrorism insurance and ing for Democrats, provided they roll up then letting the insurance markets en- their sleeves and develop big ideas and courage adoption of the best practices. good national security instincts—and avoid defaulting to criticisms of Republi- EMOCRATS HAVE their cans as the essence of their own foreign work cut out for them if they policy. A Democratic party that is weak, D are to rebuild their national or perceived as weak, on national security security credentials. However, they have a is a problem not just for Democrats but good deal of talent in Congress and else- for the country as a whole. The two party where (even if not in their top leadership system does not work properly when one at the moment) and time to think. They party fails to offer clear and cogent visions have proven they can win elections even for the big issues of the day—or loses the at the presidential level, despite their public’s trust that it can do so. Only when modern reputation of having difficulty two serious and confident participants with national security issues. Although consistently lock swords on critical for- national security will likely figure more eign policy debates will the nation engage heavily in voters’ minds in the next elec- in the analysis and in-depth discussion tions than they did in 1992, most Democ- necessary for the development of success- rats have more experience with the sub- ful policies. The health of our foreign and ject than Governor Clinton did in 1992 as national security policy are at stake. ■

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